Keading v. Keading - Case Brief

Keading v. Keading

Case Number: A151468

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-02-18

Case Brief – Keading v. Keading

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: A151468 (consolidated with A153075, A152034)
Disposition: The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding Kenton Keading liable for elder financial abuse, upheld the statutory award of double damages under Probate Code § 859, declined to disturb the prejudgment attachment order as moot, and affirmed the dismissal of Kenton’s libel action under the anti‑SLAPP statute (CCP § 425.16).

Holding

The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Kenton Keading committed elder financial abuse through undue influence, that Probate Code § 859 authorizes double damages for such abuse without a separate bad‑faith finding, that Hilja Keading possessed standing as an “interested person” under Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.3 and Probate Code § 48, and that the appellate challenges to the attachment order and the anti‑SLAPP dismissal were without merit.

Narrative

Lead
In a three‑way consolidation that pits sibling against sibling, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a $1.55 million elder‑abuse judgment, clarified the reach of Probate Code § 859’s double‑damages provision, and reinforced the anti‑SLAPP shield for speech concerning alleged elder abuse. The decision underscores the appellate court’s willingness to enforce the Elder Abuse Act’s punitive aims while limiting procedural challenges that lack concrete relief.

Procedural History
The dispute originated in Contra Costa County Superior Court where Hilma Keading sued her brother, Kenton Keading, alleging elder financial abuse of their parents, Lucille and Lewis Keading. The trial court entered a judgment ordering Kenton to pay $1,548,830 in damages, vacated a grant deed he had recorded, and appointed a professional fiduciary, Elizabeth Soloway, as successor trustee. Kenton appealed the judgment (Case No. A153075), the trial court’s ex parte attachment of Kenton’s interest in a separate Crockett property (Case No. A151468), and the dismissal of his libel suit against Hilma under the anti‑SLAPP statute (Case No. A152034). The Court of Appeal consolidated the three appeals for efficiency.

Factual Background
Lucille and Lewis Keading created a family trust to hold their residence at 60, 50, and 21 Laurel Lane, El Sobrante, for the benefit of their children, Kenton and Hilma. Over the years, the parents amended the trust, ultimately leaving the bulk of the assets to Kenton and a modest investment account to Hilma. In late 2015, after Lucille’s death and while Lewis was gravely ill, Kenton secured a new durable power of attorney (POA) from Lewis at a UPS store, then, on December 30, 2015, recorded a grant deed transferring the Laurel Lane residence out of the trust to himself and his father as joint tenants. He also transferred nearly 100,000 shares of Freedom Motors stock and later sold Lewis’s car. Hilma discovered these actions, petitioned the court to remove Kenton as trustee, and sued for elder abuse, fraud, conversion, and related claims.

Issues Presented

Standing: Whether Hilma, a former co‑trustee who had been suspended, retained standing to sue for elder abuse after a professional fiduciary was appointed.
Substantial Evidence: Whether the trial court’s finding of elder financial abuse—based on undue influence—was supported by the record.
Statutory Construction of Probate Code § 859: Whether double damages require a separate finding of bad faith when the conduct is characterized as elder financial abuse.
Mootness of the Attachment Appeal: Whether the appellate court could entertain Kenton’s challenge to the ex parte attachment of his Crockett‑property interest.
Anti‑SLAPP Dismissal: Whether the trial court erred in striking Kenton’s libel complaint and denying discovery.

Court’s Analysis

Standing
The appellate court applied Welfare & Institutions Code § 15657.3(d) and Probate Code § 48. The statute expressly permits “interested persons” to maintain elder‑abuse actions when the personal representative declines to do so. Hilma, as a trust beneficiary, qualifies as an interested person. The court rejected Kenton’s argument that the appointment of Soloway extinguished Hilma’s standing, emphasizing that the statute’s language is designed to encourage private enforcement and that a beneficiary’s right to sue survives the substitution of a fiduciary.
Substantial Evidence of Elder Financial Abuse
Relying on Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15610.30 and 15610.70, the court identified the four statutory factors—victim vulnerability, influencer’s authority, tactics, and inequity. Lewis’s severe illness, dependence on dialysis, and emotional distress satisfied the vulnerability prong. Kenton’s status as son, caregiver, and attorney‑in‑fact satisfied the authority factor. The rushed UPS‑store POA, secrecy surrounding the grant deed, and timing (the week Hilma was away) satisfied the tactics factor. Finally, the removal of the primary trust asset and the resulting economic loss to Hilma satisfied the inequity factor. The court held that the record, including testimony that Lewis was barely able to read or sign documents, provided ample circumstantial evidence to meet the statutory burden. Kenton’s concession that the grant deed was later invalid did not erase the fact that the deed had been executed and relied upon for 18 months, constituting an actionable taking.
Probate Code § 859 and Double Damages
The court performed a plain‑meaning construction of § 859, which lists three alternative bases for double damages: (i) bad‑faith taking, (ii) taking by undue influence in bad faith, and (iii) taking “through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse.” The third clause, the court held, does not require a separate bad‑faith finding. The appellate panel cited Hill v. Superior Court (2016) and Kerley v. Weber (2018) for the same interpretation, and expressly distinguished Levin v. Winston‑Levin (2019), finding that Levin misread the statutory grammar. Accordingly, the trial court’s award of double damages—$1,523,330 based on the stipulated $761,665 value of the Laurel Lane residence—was proper.
Mootness of the Attachment Appeal
The attachment order was issued ex parte to protect prospective recovery. By the time the appeal was decided, the trial court had entered the final elder‑abuse judgment, which superseded the attachment. The appellate court applied the mootness doctrine, noting that even a reversal would produce no effective relief because the attachment had already been satisfied by the judgment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot.
Anti‑SLAPP Dismissal
The court affirmed the trial court’s application of CCP § 425.16. Hilma’s email, though vitriolic, was deemed protected activity because it concerned a matter of public interest—allegations of elder abuse. Kenton failed to demonstrate a probability of success on his libel claim, and the trial court properly denied discovery. The appellate panel emphasized that the anti‑SLAPP statute is intended to “protect the robust exchange of ideas on matters of public concern,” and that the plaintiff’s burden to show merit was not met.

Conclusion and Impact
The decision solidifies two important precedents for California probate practitioners:

Broad Standing for Beneficiaries: The court’s expansive reading of “interested person” under § 15657.3(d) confirms that beneficiaries may pursue elder‑abuse claims even after a fiduciary is appointed, ensuring that private enforcement remains viable when the estate’s representative is unwilling to act.
Double‑Damages Without Bad Faith: By affirming that § 859’s third alternative triggers automatic double damages for elder‑financial abuse, the court removes the need for plaintiffs to prove the subjective bad‑faith element, thereby increasing the punitive reach of the Elder Abuse Act.

The ruling also reaffirms the high bar for overturning anti‑SLAPP dismissals, signaling that defendants who allege abuse may rely on the statute to shield themselves from retaliatory suits, provided the speech is tied to a public‑interest issue.

Unresolved Questions
While the court clarified statutory construction, it left open how courts should treat “partial” or “mixed” takings where both elder‑abuse and ordinary fiduciary breaches coexist. Additionally, the decision did not address whether a court may award punitive damages beyond the statutory double‑damage multiplier in egregious elder‑abuse cases, a question that may surface as litigants seek to maximize deterrence.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15600‑15657.3 – Elder Abuse Act, standing, and attachment authority.
Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 15610.30, 15610.70 – Definitions of elder financial abuse and undue influence.
Probate Code §§ 48, 859 – “Interested person” definition; double‑damages provision.
California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.16, 482.010, 485.220 – Anti‑SLAPP procedure; attachment statutes.
Key Cases
- Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220 – Purpose of the Elder Abuse Act.
- Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 – Undue influence factors.
- In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587 – Circumstantial evidence in undue influence.
- Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 – Double damages without bad faith for elder abuse.
- Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1187 – Statutory construction of § 859.
- Levin v. Winston‑Levin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1025 – Dissenting view on bad‑faith requirement.
- B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1 – Interpretation of “or” in statutory clauses.
- In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 – Disjunctive reading of statutory language.
- Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World National Assurance (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881 – Purpose of attachment.

These authorities collectively shape the appellate court’s reasoning and will guide future probate litigation involving elder‑abuse claims, fiduciary misconduct, and the interplay between civil remedies and free‑speech protections.