Balistreri v. Balistreri - Case Brief

Balistreri v. Balistreri - Case Brief

Balistreri v. Balistreri

Case Number: A162222

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-02-24

Case Brief – Balistreri v. Balistreri

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-02
Case Number: A162222
Disposition: The orders dated January 8 and February 9, 2021 of the San Francisco Probate Court are affirmed; respondent Sal J. Balistreri is awarded costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that when a revocable trust expressly prescribes a method of amendment, that method is exclusive under Probate Code § 15402; an amendment executed in a manner that deviates from the prescribed method—here, the failure to obtain a notary acknowledgment— is void and cannot be validated by resorting to the statutory revocation procedure of § 15401.

Narrative

Lead – In a tightly contested probate dispute, the California Court of Appeal reaffirmed the primacy of a trust’s own amendment provisions over the default statutory revocation scheme, holding that a “first amendment to trust” signed by the decedent but lacking the required notarization was ineffective. The decision sharpens the line between a settlor’s power to revoke a trust and the separate, statutorily‑governed power to amend it.

Procedural History – Mary A. Nivala Balistreri, as trustee of the Balistreri Family Trust, filed a petition in San Francisco Probate Court seeking a construction of the trust and confirmation that a February 2020 amendment—purportedly executed by her late husband, Sal C. Balistreri—was valid. The trial court, applying Probate Code § 15402, declared the amendment “null and void” because it was not notarized as required by the trust’s Section 5.2.4, and denied the petition. Sal J. Balistreri appealed, and Mary appealed the denial. The appellate panel reviewed the matter de novo.

Facts – Mary and Sal created a revocable family trust in 2006, subsequently restated, renamed, and amended it in 2008, 2017, and again on September 6, 2017 when they revoked a prior trust and simultaneously established the Balistreri Family Trust. The trust placed community property on 23rd Street, San Francisco into the trust and provided, in Section 7.2.1, that upon Sal’s death the property would be divided equally among their daughter Julia and Sal’s half‑siblings, Sal and Christina.

The trust’s amendment clause (Section 5.2.4) required that “any amendment, revocation, or termination … shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by a notary public, … and delivered to the trustee.” All prior amendments and the 2017 revocation were notarized.

In February 2020, Sal signed a document titled “First Amendment to Trust” that struck the equal‑distribution clause and directed that the property “shall remain in the trust.” The amendment was signed by both trustors and accepted by the co‑trustees but was not notarized. Sal died the following day. Mary sought confirmation that the amendment was effective; Sal’s heirs contested its validity, asserting lack of notarization and alleging undue influence.

Issues – (1) Does a trust’s internal amendment requirement preclude reliance on the statutory revocation procedure of Probate Code § 15401(a)(2) when the amendment does not satisfy the trust’s notarization mandate? (2) Is the phrase “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” in § 15402 satisfied by a trust that merely prescribes a method of amendment without expressly labeling it exclusive?

Court’s Analysis – The appellate court applied the de novo standard for statutory construction and trust interpretation, emphasizing that “the paramount rule in construing a trust instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.” The court turned to Probate Code §§ 15401 and 15402, which distinguish revocation from modification.

  • § 15401 offers two routes to revoke a trust: (a) compliance with any method set forth in the trust, or (b) a statutory writing signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee. The statute makes the trust‑specified method exclusive only when the trust explicitly states exclusivity.

  • § 15402 provides that, “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, a revocable trust may be modified by the procedure for revocation.” The court read the qualifying phrase as a gatekeeper: if the trust sets forth any specific amendment procedure, that procedure must be used. The language “provides otherwise” does not require an explicit exclusivity clause; the mere existence of a prescribed method satisfies the statutory trigger.

The court relied heavily on King v. Lynch (204 Cal.App.4th 1186), where the court held that a trust’s specified amendment method is binding even when the statutory revocation method is available. The panel rejected Mary’s argument that the identical procedural language for revocation and amendment rendered the amendment provision “superfluous.” The court noted that the trust distinguished between unilateral revocation of separate property and joint amendment of community property, thereby creating a distinct amendment requirement.

The panel distinguished the recent Haggerty v. Thornton (68 Cal.App.5th 1003) decision, which permitted a settlor to amend a trust using the statutory revocation method where the trust’s amendment language was permissive rather than mandatory. The Balistreri court found Haggerty persuasive only for highlighting a conflict in authority, not for overturning the clear statutory construction that a specified amendment method is controlling.

Finally, the court emphasized that the trust’s notary requirement is not a “mere formality” that parties may waive at will. The requirement was part of the trust’s express intent to bind the settlors to a particular amendment process, and the failure to obtain notarization rendered the amendment ineffective. The court also rejected Mary’s claim of undue influence as unraised at the trial level.

Disposition – The appellate court affirmed the probate court’s orders, confirming that the February 2020 amendment is void for lack of notarization. Sal J. Balistreri was awarded costs.

Impact and Unresolved Issues – Balistreri reinforces the principle that a trust’s internal amendment provisions are exclusive under § 15402, even when the statutory revocation scheme offers an alternative route. Practitioners must ensure that any amendment complies with the trust’s own procedural mandates—most commonly notarization—otherwise the amendment will be invalid regardless of the parties’ intent.

The decision leaves open the precise boundary between “provides otherwise” and “exclusive” language. While the majority reads any specified method as sufficient to trigger § 15402’s exclusivity, Judge Tucher’s concurrence suggests a narrower view, reserving a distinction for trusts that use permissive language without an implicit exclusivity. Future cases may need to resolve whether a trust that merely allows a method of amendment (e.g., “may be amended by…”) still “provides otherwise” in the statutory sense. Moreover, the tension with Haggerty indicates that California appellate courts have not yet settled whether identical amendment and revocation procedures in a trust render the amendment provision surplusage. Until the Supreme Court addresses the conflict, litigants should draft amendment clauses with explicit exclusivity language or, at a minimum, ensure compliance with any procedural requirement—such as notarization—to avoid costly invalidation.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code § 15401 – Methods of revoking a revocable trust; statutory revocation procedure.
  • Probate Code § 15402 – Modification of a revocable trust; “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” clause.
  • Probate Code § 154021 – (Citation in lower court; pertains to notarization requirement in this case.)
  • Doctrine of Trust Modification vs. Revocation – Distinction between statutory revocation and amendment powers.
  • Key Cases
    • King v. Lynch, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (trust‑specified amendment method is exclusive).
    • Pena v. Dey, 39 Cal.App.5th 546 (de novo review of statutory construction).
    • Heaps v. Heaps, 124 Cal.App.4th 286 (trust amendment must follow literal terms).
    • Cundall v. Mitchell‑Clyde, 51 Cal.App.5th 571 (exclusive revocation method).
    • Crook v. Contreras, 95 Cal.App.4th 1194 (invalid amendment when trust expressly deprives power).
    • Haggerty v. Thornton, 68 Cal.App.5th 1003 (conflict in authority; permissive amendment language).
    • Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 121 Cal.App.4th 956 (historical rule that revocation implies modification).
    • Fairbanks v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 56 (plain meaning governs ambiguous statutes).

These authorities collectively shape the current framework for interpreting amendment provisions in California revocable trusts.

Last updated September 05, 2025.