Malear v. State of California - Case Brief
Case Number: A163146
Court: California Supreme Court
Date Filed: September 01, 2025
Holding
The court held that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the plaintiff had achieved substantial compliance with the Government Claims Act by filing an amended complaint—after the claim’s denial and before the defendants were served—that expressly alleged the denial, thereby curing the prematurity defect; additionally, the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action for failure to summon medical care under Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6, and the asserted statutory immunities were not apparent on the face of the pleadings.
Narrative
A pandemic‑era transfer sparks a novel public‑entity liability claim
When the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) moved roughly 194 inmates from the Chino Institute for Men to San Quentin State Prison in late May 2020, the transfer precipitated a massive COVID‑19 outbreak that infected more than 1,400 prisoners, including plaintiff‑inmate Steven Malear. Malear’s putative class‑action alleges that CDCR officials, aware of the inmates’ age and comorbidities, failed to summon immediate medical care—screening, testing, and isolation—despite a clear risk of viral transmission. The case tests two intersecting procedural doctrines: (1) the “substantial compliance” exception to the Government Claims Act’s claim‑presentation prerequisite, and (2) the narrow liability carve‑out in Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6 for public entities that knowingly neglect to summon medical care for prisoners.
Procedural odyssey from claim presentation to appeal
Malear presented his government claim on July 15, 2020. Two days later he filed the original complaint, omitting any reference to claim‑presentation compliance. The Government Claims Program rejected his claim on July 29, 2020. Within the statutory six‑month window, Malear filed a first amended complaint (October 23, 2020) that expressly alleged the claim’s denial, and served it on November 3, 2020—well before the defendants filed any responsive pleading. The amended pleading superseded the premature original filing under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 472(a) and Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 430.40, 435.
The trial court, relying on Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, holding that the suit was untimely because the original complaint preceded the claim’s denial. Malear appealed, arguing that the amended complaint cured the defect and that his allegations satisfied the pleading requirements for a § 845.6 claim.
The Court of Appeal’s de novo review of the demurrer
The appellate court first addressed the claim‑presentation issue. It reaffirmed the “substantial compliance” doctrine articulated in Cory v. City of Huntington Beach (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 131 and endorsed by the California Supreme Court in City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730. The court noted that the statutory purpose of §§ 905.2, 912.4, 945.4–. 6 is to give public entities sufficient notice to investigate and settle claims, not to penalize plaintiffs who file a premature complaint that is never served. Because Malear’s first amended complaint—filed as a matter of right before any answer or demurrer—explicitly alleged the claim’s denial, the “prematurity defect” vanished, satisfying the substantive objectives of the Act.
The court rejected the Lowry line of authority as overly rigid, emphasizing that Lowry misread DiCampli‑Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, which concerned strict compliance with the delivery provisions of § 915(a), not the broader claim‑presentation requirement. The appellate panel held that DiCampli‑Mintz does not foreclose the substantial‑compliance analysis where the plaintiff’s amendment occurs before the defendant is served and within the six‑month deadline.
Turning to the merits of the § 845.6 claim, the court applied the standard that a demurrer “does not lie” when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. It found that Malear plausibly alleged that CDCR employees “knew or had reason to know” of the imminent COVID‑19 risk and “unreasonably failed to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” The court rejected the defendants’ contention that the complaint required a “serious and obvious medical condition” at the time of transfer, noting that the statute itself imposes no such limitation and that COVID‑19’s severity was evident by May 2020. Moreover, the plaintiff identified the specific preventive measures—testing and isolation—that, if summoned, could have averted the outbreak, satisfying the pleading requirement for a duty to summon care.
Finally, the appellate court examined the asserted statutory immunities—California Emergency Services Act §§ 8550, 8655, 8658, and § 855.4. It concluded that the pleadings did not tie the alleged negligence to the discretionary functions protected by those provisions; thus, immunity could not be decided at the pleading stage. Accordingly, the demurrer on immunity grounds also failed.
Impact and unresolved questions
Malear clarifies that California courts will continue to apply the substantial‑compliance doctrine to Government Claims Act violations, even where a plaintiff’s initial filing is premature, provided an amended pleading cures the defect before service. This approach preserves the Act’s remedial purpose while preventing technical dismissals that thwart substantive justice.
The decision also signals a willingness to entertain novel public‑entity liability theories under § 845.6, especially where the alleged omission concerns preventive medical measures rather than direct medical malpractice. Practitioners should note the court’s liberal construction of “failure to summon medical care” to include testing and quarantine protocols in a pandemic context.
Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open several questions. First, the court did not resolve whether the Emergency Services Act immunity could attach to a decision to transfer inmates—a factual determination that will likely surface in later stages of the litigation. Second, the appellate panel’s reliance on “substantial compliance” may invite future disputes over the precise line between permissible amendment and impermissible circumvention of the claim‑presentation deadline, particularly in cases where the amendment is filed after service but before a responsive pleading. Finally, the breadth of § 845.6’s liability scope—whether it covers failures to implement public‑health policies in correctional facilities—remains to be tested on the merits.
For California probate and civil litigators, Malear underscores the importance of timely, fact‑rich amendments when navigating the Government Claims Act, and it offers a roadmap for pleading “failure to summon medical care” claims against correctional agencies in the era of infectious disease emergencies.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Government Claims Act (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 805‑945.6) – claim‑presentation requirements, § 945.4 (premature suit prohibition), § 945.6 (six‑month filing deadline).
- Section 845.6, Cal. Gov’t Code – limited liability for public entities that fail to summon medical care for prisoners when they know or should know of an immediate need.
- California Emergency Services Act §§ 8550‑8658 – discretionary‑function immunity provisions.
- Substantial Compliance Doctrine – as articulated in Cory v. City of Huntington Beach (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 131; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730; reaffirmed in Bodde (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234.
- Amendment Rule – Code Civ. Proc. § 472(a) (right to amend once before service of answer/demurrer).
- Statutory Immunities – §§ 8655, 8658, 855.4 (discretionary‑function and public‑health immunity).