Brief
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Case Number: A165210
Court: California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One
Date Filed: August 31, 2025

Holding

The court held that while the trial court’s issuance of elder‑abuse restraining orders was supported by substantial evidence and therefore affirmed, the court lacked statutory authority under Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03 to declare the deed transferring Gracia Bovis’s residence to Marina Casey void ab initio, and that portion of the judgment was reversed.

Narrative

Elder‑abuse protective orders meet a new frontier in California probate litigation. In Newman v. Casey, the First Appellate District confronted the intersection of the Welfare and Institutions Code’s summary restraining‑order scheme and the traditional probate remedy of rescission. The case arose from a fraught family transaction in which an 86‑year‑old homeowner, Gracia Bovis, signed a grant deed that transferred her San Mateo residence to her daughter, Marina Casey, shortly before the 2021 Proposition 19 deadline. Bovis later alleged that Casey had misled her, that the deed was executed under undue influence, and that the transfer constituted financial elder abuse. The trial court responded with a suite of elder‑abuse restraining orders (EAROs) and, in a separate order, declared the deed void ab initio. Casey appealed, arguing both that the restraining orders were unsupported and that the court had overstepped its statutory grant in voiding the deed.

Procedural History

Bovis filed a petition for EAROs on Judicial Council form EA‑100.2 in February 2022, invoking Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.031. The petition sought a personal‑conduct order prohibiting Casey from any form of physical, financial, or emotional abuse; a no‑contact order; a stay‑away order of 100 yards; and an “additional order” compelling Casey to execute a rescission deed returning the property to Bovis. Casey filed a response (EA‑120) attaching a declaration from her counsel that the transfer was motivated solely by Proposition 19’s reassessment exclusion and that Bovis had signed the deed after being fully informed.

The trial court held a remote hearing, extended a temporary restraining order, and after hearing both parties, issued a final protective order on a two‑year term. The order included the personal‑conduct, no‑contact, and stay‑away components enumerated in § 15657.03(b)(5)(A)–(C). It also added a provision directing Casey to sign a rescission deed and, ultimately, entered a separate order declaring the grant deed void ab initio and ordering Casey to return the title within 30 days. Bovis sought a writ of mandamus to enforce the rescission; Casey filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to void the deed under the elder‑abuse statute.

The appellate panel reviewed the case de novo on the statutory‑authority issue and under the substantial‑evidence standard on the restraining‑order issue.

Factual Landscape

Bovis testified that she was “confused” and “tricked” into signing the deed. She recounted that Casey told her the paperwork would protect her from rising property taxes, that she signed without reading the documents, and that Casey later threatened to place her in a nursing home if she refused. Bovis also described receiving unsolicited calls from realtors and fearing that Casey intended to sell the house.

Casey testified that the transfer was a legitimate estate‑planning maneuver designed to avoid a Proposition 19 reassessment. She pointed to a grant deed dated February 8 2021, a will dated February 6 2020 naming Casey as executor, and a 1997 survivor‑trust amendment that disinherited Bovis’s son, Nicholas J. Bovis, on the basis of alleged criminal conduct. Casey’s counsel attached the same documents to the response and argued that Bovis’s son had been exerting undue influence, prompting Casey to act protectively.

The trial court found Bovis’s testimony credible, noting her advanced age, lack of legal counsel at the signing, and the hurried nature of the transaction. The court concluded that the four statutory factors for undue influence—vulnerability, apparent authority, coercive tactics, and inequitable result—were satisfied. Accordingly, the court found clear and convincing evidence of financial elder abuse and issued the EAROs.

  1. Whether the trial court’s restraining orders were supported by substantial evidence under Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03.
  2. Whether § 15657.03 authorizes a court to issue an order declaring a deed void ab initio and to compel rescission of a property transfer.

Court’s Analysis

1. Substantial‑evidence support for the EAROs
The appellate court reiterated that the standard for reviewing a trial court’s factual findings in an elder‑abuse protective‑order proceeding is “substantial evidence” (see Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131). The court emphasized that the statutory definition of “financial abuse” in § 15610.30 includes taking, secreting, or appropriating an elder’s property by undue influence. The four‑factor test—vulnerability, authority, tactics, and inequitable result—was fully satisfied, the opinion noted, by Bovis’s advanced age, her reliance on her daughter, the hurried execution of the deed, and the fact that the transfer left Bovis without any consideration and exposed her to a loss of her home.

The appellate panel found the trial court’s reliance on Bovis’s testimony, corroborated by the absence of independent counsel at the signing and the timing of the deed relative to Proposition 19, to be sufficient. The court rejected Casey’s argument that the preponderance‑of‑evidence standard, not clear‑and‑convincing, applied; it clarified that § 15657.03 requires only “good cause” and a preponderance of evidence for protective orders, but the trial court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence was nonetheless permissible. Accordingly, the restraining orders were affirmed.

2. Statutory scope of § 15657.03 and the void‑deed order
The crux of the appeal lay in the statutory construction of § 15657.03(b)(5). The statute enumerates three categories of protective orders:

  • (A) personal‑conduct orders prohibiting abuse, intimidation, etc.;
  • (B) exclusion orders barring a respondent from the petitioner’s residence unless the respondent holds legal or equitable title;
  • (C) ancillary orders enjoining specified behavior necessary to effectuate (A) or (B).

The appellate court read the language “any of the following restraining orders” as a closed list. The court noted that an order “declaring a deed void ab initio” is not among the enumerated remedies. Moreover, subsection (b)(5)(B) expressly bars an exclusion order when the respondent holds title in his or her sole name—a situation that applied to Casey after the grant deed recorded. The trial court’s order, therefore, attempted to combine a title‑voiding judgment with a protective‑order scheme that the legislature never intended.

The court applied a plain‑meaning approach, citing Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, and rejected the trial court’s reliance on “equitable” authority. The appellate panel emphasized that the elder‑abuse statute was designed as a summary, provisional remedy to stop ongoing abuse, not to adjudicate the validity of a conveyance. The appropriate avenue for rescission, the court held, is a traditional civil action under the Elder Abuse Act’s § 15657.5 (financial‑abuse claims) or a probate proceeding, not a protective‑order proceeding.

Consequently, the order declaring the deed void was beyond the court’s statutory authority and was reversed. The appellate court vacated the rescission directive, leaving the deed intact pending resolution in the probate court, where the Bovis estate is already subject to a petition for letters of administration (Probate No. 23PR000362).

Impact and Unresolved Questions

The decision clarifies the boundary between the summary protective‑order scheme of § 15657.03 and the substantive remedial mechanisms of the Elder Abuse Act. Practitioners must now distinguish between immediate, protective relief (stay‑away, no‑contact, personal‑conduct orders) and longer‑term remedies such as rescission, attachment, or damages, which require separate civil or probate actions.

The ruling also underscores the importance of procedural precision when drafting protective‑order requests. Casey’s counsel could have sought a “financial‑abuse” claim under § 15657.5, which would have permitted a broader suite of remedies, including a judgment of rescission, without overstepping the protective‑order statute.

Two issues remain open for future litigation:

  1. Mootness of the restraining orders. The appellate opinion noted that Bovis had died, and the restraining orders survive the elder’s death under § 15657.03(c). However, the practical effect of a personal‑conduct order against a deceased petitioner is limited, raising questions about the continued enforceability of such orders and the scope of the statutory survival provision.

  2. Interaction with probate proceedings. The appellate court left the deed’s validity to be decided in the pending probate case. How the probate court will apply the undue‑influence analysis, especially in light of the appellate decision’s emphasis on the statutory limits of protective orders, will shape the future of elder‑abuse claims involving intergenerational property transfers.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

  • Draft EARO petitions with precision. When the relief sought extends beyond the enumerated protective orders, consider filing a separate civil action under § 15657.5 or a probate petition.
  • Preserve the evidentiary record. The appellate court relied heavily on Bovis’s testimony and the absence of independent counsel; detailed affidavits and contemporaneous documentation of the transaction are critical.
  • Monitor statutory deadlines. The case hinged on Proposition 19’s reassessment deadline; timing can be a double‑edged sword—both a justification for a transfer and a potential source of undue‑influence claims.
  • Anticipate mootness arguments. Even if an elder dies, the protective‑order framework may survive; counsel should be prepared to argue either for or against continued jurisdiction.

Newman v. Casey thus serves as a pivotal guidepost, delineating the protective‑order regime’s reach and reminding California probate attorneys that the Elder Abuse Act’s summary remedies are not a substitute for the full suite of civil and probate tools available to combat financial exploitation of seniors.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15657.03, 15657.5, 15657.01 – Elder‑abuse protective‑order scheme, financial‑abuse civil actions, and prejudgment attachment.
  • Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15610.07, 15610.30, 15610.70 – Definitions of elder abuse, financial abuse, and undue influence.
  • California Code of Civil Procedure § 483.010 – Interaction with attachment orders.
  • Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1160 – Forms and procedures for EAROs.
  • Key Cases
    • White v. Wear, 76 Cal.App.5th 24 (2022) – Preponderance standard for protective orders.
    • Bookout v. Nielsen, 155 Cal.App.4th 1131 (2007) – Substantial‑evidence review.
    • Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC, 82 Cal.App.5th 481 (2022) – De novo statutory construction.
    • Mahan v. Charles (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 – Definition of financial abuse and undue influence.
    • Gdowski v. Gdowski, 175 Cal.App.4th 128 (2009) – Protective orders may issue on past abuse without proof of future risk.
    • Royals v. Lu, 81 Cal.App.5th 328 (2022) – Legislative intent behind the Elder Abuse Act.
    • In re Naomi, 132 Cal.App.4th 808 (2005) – Limits on appellate fact‑finding.
    • In re Sheila, 19 Cal.App.4th 187 (1993) – Credibility determinations reserved for trial courts.

These authorities collectively shape the appellate court’s reasoning and provide the doctrinal framework for future elder‑abuse protective‑order litigation in California.

Last updated September 05, 2025.