Colvis v. Binswanger - Case Brief

Colvis v. Binswanger - Case Brief

Case Number: A166997
Court: California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five
Date Filed: September 01, 2025

← Back to Case Summary


Holding

The court held that Probate Code §§ 48 and 1043 authorize “interested persons”—including entities with a property right or claim that may be affected by a trust proceeding—to file written responses or objections at or before a hearing, and therefore the probate court must make a discretionary determination on whether Garaventa Enterprises, Inc. satisfies the statutory definition of an interested person.


The California Court of Appeal resolved a novel standing dispute that pits a corporate shareholder against the traditional view that only trustees and beneficiaries may intervene in trust litigation. In 2022 Linda Garaventa Colvis and her brother Joseph filed a petition in Contra Costa County Superior Court seeking to compel Louisa Binswanger, the trust’s trustee, to order Garaventa Enterprises, Inc. (“the Company”) to borrow funds to pay the trust’s estate‑tax liability. The Company, a 70 % shareholder of the trust, filed a status report objecting to the petition, prompting the plaintiffs to move for a declaration that the Company lacked standing. The trial court agreed, holding that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary it could not participate in the proceeding.

On appeal, Garaventa Enterprises argued that the Probate Code’s broader “interested person” regime—specifically §§ 48, 1043, and the notice provisions of §§ 17203(b) and 17204(b)—permits entities with a protectable interest in the trust estate to respond to petitions, even if they cannot initiate them. The plaintiffs countered that §§ 17200(a) and related sections limit participation to trustees and beneficiaries, warning that an expansive reading would create a procedural loophole.

The appellate panel applied a de novo standard of review to the statutory construction, noting that § 1043(a) expressly allows “an interested person” to appear and make a written response or objection at or before a hearing. The definition of “interested person” in § 48(a)(1) includes any person “having a property right in or claim against a trust estate … which may be affected by the proceeding.” The court emphasized that the probate code’s “interested person” concept is purpose‑driven and fluid; courts may designate parties whose rights could be impacted, even when those parties are not trustees or beneficiaries. The panel rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on § 17200(a), observing that the provision governs who may file a petition, not who may respond to one. Moreover, the notice requirements of §§ 17203(b) and 17204(b) demonstrate legislative intent to give non‑beneficiary parties an opportunity to protect their interests, reinforcing the view that response rights are distinct from filing rights.

Having concluded that §§ 48 and 1043 apply to trust‑petition hearings, the court reversed the trial court’s standing determination and remanded for a discretionary analysis of whether the Company’s 70 % ownership stake and the shareholder agreement’s borrowing powers constitute a sufficient interest to qualify as an “interested person.” The appellate court also awarded the Company its costs on appeal.

Impact and unresolved questions. This decision clarifies that the Probate Code’s “interested person” language extends to corporate shareholders with a substantial ownership interest, broadening the pool of parties who may intervene in trust disputes. Practitioners should now anticipate that probate courts will conduct a fact‑specific inquiry—rather than a categorical exclusion—when assessing corporate standing. The ruling leaves open how narrowly a court must define the “interest” required; future cases will likely flesh out the threshold for entities whose rights are only indirectly affected by a trust’s actions. Additionally, the opinion does not address whether an interested person’s right to object includes the ability to present oral argument, a point that may surface in subsequent litigation.


Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code § 48 (definition of “interested person”)
  • Probate Code § 1043(a) (right of interested persons to appear and object)
  • Probate Code §§ 17200(a), 17203(b), 17204(b) (petition filing, notice, and special notice provisions)
  • Probate Code § 1040 (general hearing procedures)
  • Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663 (purpose of notice to interested persons)
  • In re Nicole S. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 91 (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
  • Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 (flexibility of “interested person” determination)
  • Arman v. Bank of America (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697 (fluid concept of standing under Probate Code)
  • Patton v. Sherwood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 339 (beneficiary standing to object)
  • Smith v. Szeyller (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 450 (beneficiary standing and fee awards)

← Back to Case Summary

Last updated September 05, 2025.