Searles v. Archangel - Case Brief

Searles v. Archangel - Case Brief

Searles v. Archangel

Case Number: B296011

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-01-22

Case Brief – Searles v. Archangel

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B296011
Disposition: The order dismissing the petition is affirmed. Searles is to bear her own costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that, under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6(m), a civil‑harassment restraining order petition must be personally served on the respondent, and the trial court was therefore correct in refusing to waive that requirement in favor of service by social‑media posting; consequently the dismissal of the petition for failure to effect personal service was affirmed.

Narrative

Lead – When a self‑represented victim of alleged street harassment could not locate the homeless defendant she named, the Los Angeles Superior Court refused to allow her to serve the restraining‑order petition by posting it on Facebook. The Court of Appeal upheld that refusal, reaffirming the statutory mandate that personal service—not social‑media posting—remains the exclusive method for giving notice in a civil‑harassment restraining‑order case.

Procedural backdrop – Queen Searles filed a petition for a civil‑harassment restraining order (CH‑100) on July 23, 2018, alleging that Michael Archangel had threatened her with a “wicked looking stick” in a Burbank parking lot. Because she listed Archangel’s address as “None,” the court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) the same day and set a hearing for August 14, 2018. Searles repeatedly sought continuances, explaining that Archangel was homeless and deliberately avoided locations where she might serve him. The trial court granted three continuances (to September 6, September 27, and October 18) but consistently ordered her to continue attempting personal service as required by Cal. Civ. Proc. § 527.6(m) and Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1160(c).

On September 27, 2018 Searles moved to waive traditional service and to serve Archangel by posting the petition, notice of hearing, and TRO on her own social‑media accounts (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Scribd). She bolstered the request with a declaration describing her diligent attempts to locate Archangel and cited out‑of‑state decisions—most notably Baidoo v. Blood‑Dzrako (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) and K.A. v. J.L. (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016)—that had permitted service by Facebook where personal service was impracticable. The trial court denied the motion, directing Searles to keep trying personal service and suggesting assistance from the sheriff’s department.

Searles renewed the motion at a November 29 hearing; the court again denied it, emphasizing that California law does not authorize service by social media in a civil‑harassment proceeding. After a final continuance to January 31, 2019, the court dismissed the petition without prejudice, dissolved the TRO, and advised Searles that she could refile if harassment continued.

Issues on appeal –

  1. Whether California law permits a trial court, under § 527.6(m) or any other provision, to waive the personal‑service requirement and authorize service by social media.
  2. Whether § 413.30, which allows a court to order “any manner…reasonably calculated to give actual notice” when no statutory method exists, can be invoked to permit alternative service in a civil‑harassment restraining‑order case.

Court’s analysis –

Statutory framework. The appellate court began by reiterating the text of § 527.6(m): the respondent “shall be personally served…at least five days before the hearing,” and the court may shorten that time only for good cause, but the method of service must be that provided for personal service of a summons in civil actions (Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1160(c)). The statute therefore incorporates the same service scheme found in the Code of Civil Procedure §§ 415.10‑415.30, which enumerate personal delivery, substituted service, and service by mail with acknowledgment of receipt.

Inapplicability of § 413.30. Searles argued that because personal service was impossible, § 413.30 (which permits a court to direct service “in a manner…reasonably calculated to give actual notice” when no other provision exists) should apply. The court rejected this, noting that § 413.30 is limited to summons in civil actions and expressly applies only when “no provision is made in this chapter or other law for the service of summons.” Since § 527.6(m) does provide a specific method—personal service—the prerequisite for invoking § 413.30 is absent. The appellate panel cited California precedent (People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999; Cornette v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63) that courts may not rewrite statutes to create authority that the legislature did not grant.

Comparison to out‑of‑state and federal authority. The opinion surveyed a growing body of law permitting electronic or social‑media service—New York’s CPLR § 308(5), New Jersey’s rule 4:4‑3(b), Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.033(b), and Alaska’s rule 4(e). Federal district courts have also applied § 413.30 to authorize service by email (Beqa Lagoon Support Services v. Hasselman, S.D. Cal. 2020; Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Johnston, N.D. Cal. 2017). However, the California Court of Appeal emphasized that state‑specific statutes govern restraining‑order proceedings, and the mere existence of persuasive authority elsewhere does not alter the mandatory language of § 527.6(m).

Due‑process considerations. Searles contended that denying alternative service violated her due‑process rights. The court responded that the trial court had already afforded her multiple continuances, a fee waiver for sheriff service, and a six‑month extension of the TRO, thereby satisfying the constitutional requirement of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The dismissal “without prejudice” further ensured that Searles could re‑initiate the proceeding should she later locate Archangel, mitigating any substantive due‑process injury.

Conclusion – The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that California law strictly requires personal service of civil‑harassment restraining‑order petitions and that § 413.30 cannot be stretched to create a new service method. The decision underscores the legislature’s intent to keep the service regime for protective orders narrowly defined, despite evolving technology and persuasive out‑of‑state examples.

Impact and unresolved questions – This opinion solidifies the current procedural barrier to using social‑media service in civil‑harassment cases, signaling to trial courts that they lack discretion to deviate from § 527.6(m). The ruling may prompt legislative action; the court itself suggested that the California Legislature or Judicial Council consider pilot programs for electronic service, especially as electronic notice provisions already exist elsewhere in the Code (e.g., § 1010.6, rule 2.251). Until such reforms occur, attorneys must focus on exhaustive personal‑service efforts—potentially involving private investigators or repeated sheriff attempts—to satisfy the statutory prerequisite. The decision also leaves open whether a future amendment to § 527.6 could expressly incorporate alternative electronic methods, a question that will likely surface as courts in other states continue to adopt social‑media service.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Cal. Civ. Proc. § 527.6(m) – Personal service requirement for civil‑harassment restraining orders.
  • Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10‑415.30 – Traditional methods of service of summons.
  • Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1160(c) – Service of restraining‑order petitions must follow personal‑service rules.
  • Cal. Civ. Proc. § 413.30 – Court‑directed service “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” when no statutory method exists (summons only).
  • Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1215, 1212 – Service of probate notices; reference to § 413.30 for alternative methods (illustrative, not controlling).
  • Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1010.6 – Electronic service of notice (consent‑based).
  • Cal. Rules of Court rule 2.251 – Electronic service of court‑filed documents (with consent).

Key Cases Cited

  • Baidoo v. Blood‑Dzrako, 48 Misc.3d 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) – Service by Facebook permitted where personal service impracticable.
  • K.A. v. J.L., 450 N.J. Super. 247 (2016) – Service by Facebook under NJ Rule 4:4‑3(b).
  • WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22084 (E.D. Va. 2014) – Federal approval of service via email/social media.
  • Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.033(b) (2019) – Legislative directive for electronic service, adopted by Texas Supreme Court (2020).
  • Beqa Lagoon Support Services v. Hasselman, No. 20‑CV‑968 JLS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26 2020) – Federal court authorizing email service under § 413.30.
  • Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Johnston, No. 16‑CV‑03404‑BLF (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19 2017) – Email service under § 413.30.
  • Federal Insurance Co. v. Caldera Medical Inc., No. 2:15‑CV‑00393‑SVW‑PJW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8 2015) – Rejection of alternative service where statutory methods exist.
  • People v. Leal, 33 Cal.4th 999 (2004) – Courts may not rewrite statutes.
  • Cornette v. Dept. of Transportation, 26 Cal.4th 63 (2001) – Same principle.
  • Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal.App.3d 236 (1971) – Inherent authority to vary service for indigent litigants.
  • Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) – Due‑process right to access courts without prohibitive costs.
  • People v. Hull, 1 Cal.4th 266 (1991) – Limits on review of peremptory challenge decisions.

Last updated September 05, 2025.