Conservatorship of Brokken - Case Brief

Conservatorship of Brokken - Case Brief

Conservatorship of Brokken

Case Number: B303898

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-03-15

Case Brief – Conservatorship of Brokken

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B303898
Disposition: The order approving respondents’ petition for attorney fees is reversed; appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that attorney fees under Probate Code § 2640.1 are unavailable where no conservator is appointed, because the statute’s plain language requires a petition for a specific conservator and the existence of a conservatee’s estate from which fees may be paid.

The California Court of Appeal reversed a trial‑court award of attorney fees in a conservatorship dispute, reaffirming that Probate Code § 2640.1 applies only when a conservator is actually appointed and the conservatee’s estate exists to bear the cost. The decision, issued on September 3, 2025, resolves a split in lower‑court practice that had allowed fee awards even after parties settled a petition without a conservatorship being created.

Procedural backdrop. Beth and Barry Brokken, adult children of Doris Mae Brokken, filed a petition in Santa Barbara County Superior Court seeking to place their mother under a conservatorship, alleging ongoing mental‑health problems and erratic behavior. After two years of litigation the parties reached a settlement: Doris voluntarily agreed to receive professional mental‑health services and the petition was dismissed. As part of the settlement, the Brokkens asked the probate court to award them $12,584 in attorney fees under Probate Code § 2640.1. The trial court, after noting the “clear” statutory language but invoking the appellate decision Conservatorship of Cornelius as a basis for flexibility, granted the fee request. The Brokkens appealed.

Issues presented. Whether § 2640.1 authorizes an award of attorney fees when no conservator is appointed and, consequently, no conservatee’s estate exists to fund such fees.

Court’s analysis. The appellate panel applied de novo review to the statutory construction, emphasizing that “if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said.” Subdivision (a) of § 2640.1 permits a petitioner who sought a particular conservator to recover fees only if “another conservator was appointed while the petition was pending” and the court finds the petition was filed in the best interests of the conservatee. Subdivision (c)(2) further requires that any fee award be “charged to the estate of the conservatee.” The court found that none of these conditions were satisfied: no conservator was ever appointed, Doris never became a conservatee, and there is no estate from which to draw fees. Consequently, the statutory basis for a fee award collapses.

The Brokkens leaned heavily on Conservatorship of Cornelius, 200 Cal.App.4th 1198 (2011), arguing that the case opened the door to fee awards even in the absence of a permanent conservatorship. The appellate court distinguished Cornelius on two grounds. First, Cornelius concerned §§ 2641 and 2642, statutes that expressly allow compensation to a temporary or permanent conservator and his attorney; the present case involves § 2640.1, a different provision with its own prerequisites. Second, Cornelius dealt with a scenario where a temporary conservator was actually appointed, and the fee issue turned on whether the appointment benefitted the conservatee. Here, there was no appointment at all, rendering the Cornelius rationale inapplicable. The court quoted the principle that “cases are not authority for propositions not considered,” reinforcing the need to stay within the statutory text.

The panel also reiterated that equitable considerations cannot override clear legislative language. While the trial court’s “reservation” suggested a willingness to stretch the statute, the appellate court warned against rewriting statutes to fit policy preferences, citing Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 125.

Conclusion and impact. By reversing the fee award, the Court of Appeal sent a clear message: Probate Code § 2640.1 is a narrowly tailored fee‑recovery mechanism that activates only upon the appointment of a conservator and the existence of a conservatee’s estate. Practitioners should not assume that settlement of a conservatorship petition creates a fee‑eligible circumstance absent an actual appointment. The decision also narrows the reach of Cornelius, limiting its persuasive value to cases involving §§ 2641 or 2642. Unresolved questions remain about whether other statutes—such as § 2641(a) or § 2642(a)—might be invoked in similar settlement contexts where a temporary conservator is appointed but later dismissed. Future litigation will likely test the boundary between statutory text and equitable relief in probate fee disputes.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code § 2640.1, subdivisions (a) and (c)(2)
  • Probate Code §§ 2641, 2642 (referenced in Cornelius)
  • Plain‑meaning statutory interpretation doctrine
  • De novo review of statutory construction (see In re Joshua A. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 208)

Key Cases Cited

  • Conservatorship of Cornelius, 200 Cal.App.4th 1198 (2011)
  • In re Joshua A., 239 Cal.App.4th 208 (2015)
  • Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.App.5th 125 (2018)
  • American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 13 Cal.4th 1017 (1996)
  • B.B. v. County of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.5th 1 (2020)

Last updated September 05, 2025.