Chui v. Chui - Case Brief

Chui v. Chui - Case Brief

Chui v. Chui

Case Number: B308574

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-12-22

Case Brief – Chui v. Chui

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B308574
Disposition: The court dismissed as moot the appeals from the order granting guardian ad litem Jackson Chen’s disqualification motions. It vacated the orders striking the removal petitions and directed the trial court to enter new orders terminating Chen’s appointment as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and Michael Chui, awarding the appellants their costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that, because the parties are now adults and have been permitted to retain independent counsel, the appeals challenging the disqualification orders are moot, but the trial court erred in striking the minors’ petitions to remove their guardian ad litem; consequently, the removal‑petition orders were vacated and Chen’s appointment was terminated.

Narrative

When the Chui grandchildren were ten and eight years old, the probate court appointed Jackson Chen as their guardian ad litem (GAL) in a contentious trust dispute involving their mother, Christine Chui, and the trust’s trustees. The appointment was made under Probate Code § 1003, which authorizes a GAL to represent a minor’s interests in probate litigation.

As the minors approached adulthood, they hired separate counsel and filed petitions in June 2020 to remove Chen, alleging conflicts of interest and breaches of fiduciary duty. Chen responded with demurrers, anti‑SLAPP motions, and, more crucially, motions to disqualify the minors’ attorneys on the ground that the children were unemancipated minors and that the attorneys were “retained by Christine,” a party with a direct conflict. Relying on Code of Civil Procedure § 372 (which requires a minor to appear through a GAL) and Family Code § 6602 (which voids attorney‑fee contracts for minors absent court approval), the trial court granted the disqualification motions on October 20, 2020 and, in the same order, struck the removal petitions without addressing their merits.

The minors appealed the disqualification order and the striking of their removal petitions. While the appeal was pending, both turned 18 (Jacqueline in March 2021, Michael in May 2022). The trial court subsequently allowed each to retain independent counsel, noting that a GAL’s authority “does not automatically terminate upon majority” but that the court could discharge the GAL at any time. On March 30, 2022 the court entered an order expressly permitting the minors to retain counsel and stating that Chen would remain their GAL “pending further order of the court.”

At the appellate level, the court first confronted mootness. Citing the classic principle that a court will not render judgment on a controversy that no longer presents a live dispute (Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859), it observed that the disqualification order no longer deprived Jacqueline or Michael of any effective relief; they already possessed counsel of their choosing and had been able to appear in subsequent hearings. Accordingly, the appeals as to the disqualification motions were dismissed as moot.

The court then turned to the orders striking the removal petitions. California law provides a clear procedural avenue for a ward to seek removal of a guardian of the person or estate (Probate Code §§ 1600‑1601). Although the Probate Code is silent on removal of a GAL, the court relied on the broader Guardianship‑Conservatorship statutes and on precedent permitting interested parties to petition for a GAL’s removal (Estate of Emery (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 22; Estate of Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172). It further noted that a minor capable of making informed decisions should be allowed counsel to assist in such a petition, citing Mendoza v. Small Claims Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 668.

Because the trial court had struck the petitions solely on the basis that the minors’ counsel was disqualified—an issue now resolved—the appellate court concluded that the lower court erred in denying the minors the procedural right to seek removal of their GAL. The court therefore vacated the striking orders and directed the trial court to enter new orders terminating Chen’s appointment, emphasizing that the statutory basis for a GAL’s authority (Probate Code § 1003) exists only while the underlying disability—minority—remains. The court rejected the trial court’s reliance on Probate Code § 2627(b), which governs the term of a guardian of the estate, noting that it does not extend to a GAL appointed solely because the ward is a minor.

The decision closes a two‑year saga in which the Chui grandchildren, now adults, were forced to litigate not only the substantive trust issues but also the procedural propriety of their representation. By clarifying that a GAL’s authority terminates at majority absent a separate statutory ground, the court aligns California probate practice with the majority rule in other jurisdictions (e.g., Mason v. Royal Indemnity Co., N.D. Ga. 1940; Malik ex rel. O’Brien v. Malik, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). The ruling also underscores that a minor’s right to counsel is not limited to the narrow context of a guardian’s fee contract; it extends to any petition that directly challenges the guardian’s continued service.

Impact and Unresolved Issues
The precedent will guide trial courts in future probate matters involving minors who reach adulthood while litigation is pending. Courts must now assess, on a case‑by‑case basis, whether any independent statutory justification exists to retain a GAL beyond majority. The decision leaves open the question of whether a GAL appointed for reasons other than minority—such as alleged incapacity—may continue after the ward turns 18, a scenario that may arise in conservatorship or dependency cases. Additionally, while the appellate court dismissed the disqualification appeal as moot, it did not address whether the trial court’s earlier denial of counsel violated the minors’ due‑process rights, a point that may surface in subsequent appeals concerning fee‑approval petitions.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code §§ 1003, 1600‑1601, 2627(b) – appointment and removal of guardians/guardians ad litem.
  • Family Code § 6602 – voidability of attorney‑fee contracts for minors without court approval.
  • Code of Civil Procedure §§ 372, 128.7 – representation of minors and sanctions for frivolous pleadings.
  • California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110 – partial certification for publication.

Key Cases Cited

  • Estate of Emery (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 22 – right of interested parties to petition for removal of a GAL.
  • Estate of Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172 – same.
  • Guardianship of Gilman (1944) 23 Cal.2d 862 – GAL authority limited to the question of the guardianship itself.
  • Mendoza v. Small Claims Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 668 – right to counsel in removal petitions.
  • Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859 – mootness doctrine.
  • Chui v. Chui (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 873 – earlier appellate decision upholding the trial court’s March 3, 2020 order.

The decision in Chui v. Chui thus clarifies the termination of a guardian ad litem’s authority upon a ward’s attainment of majority and affirms a minor’s procedural right to seek removal of a GAL with counsel assistance.

Last updated September 05, 2025.