In re E.L. - Case Brief

In re E.L. - Case Brief

In re E.L.

Case Number: B316261M

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-09-16

Case Brief – In re E.L.

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B316261
Disposition: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders terminating the parental rights of both mother (D.L.) and father (E.O.) and denied the petition for rehearing.

Holding

The court held that, under Probate Code §1516.5 and applying the clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence standard, the trial court’s termination of the parents’ rights was supported by substantial evidence; the court also exercised California Code of Civil Procedure §909 to admit the mother’s ICWA‑020 form and tribal responses, concluding that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply, and it affirmed the trial court’s refusal to allow the mother to reopen evidence after an unexplained abrupt departure from the hearing.

The Ventura County juvenile dependency case of In re E.L. turned on whether the termination of parental rights for a mother who had largely abandoned her four children and a father who spent more than five years incarcerated could withstand appellate scrutiny, and whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) required additional procedural safeguards. The appeal arose from a trial‑court order terminating both parents’ rights pursuant to Probate Code §1516.5.2, after a guardian, Aida R., had cared for the children since 2016 and sought adoption.

Procedurally, the appellate court invoked CCP §909, which permits a reviewing court to consider evidence not presented at trial when “the interests of justice” demand a single‑appeal resolution. The court noted the liberal construction of §909 (citing In re Zeth and Guardianship of Ann S.) and emphasized that a remand would only delay permanency for the children. Accordingly, the court admitted three pieces of post‑trial evidence: the mother’s completed ICWA‑020 form asserting possible Tohono O’odham affiliation, and two letters from the tribe confirming that neither the children nor the parents were members or eligible for membership. The admission was made “as appendices A‑1 through A‑3” to the opinion.

On the merits, the court applied the clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence standard required by Probate Code §1516.5. The statutory elements—lack of legal custody by the natural parents and a physical‑custody period of at least two years—were undisputed. The remaining inquiry was the best‑interest analysis. The record, including a Human Services Agency report and testimony from the children, showed that Aida R. had provided a stable, nurturing home, while the mother’s contact was limited to two letters since 2019 and the father had been incarcerated from 2015 to 2020, with only bi‑weekly jail visits and written correspondence. The children, now aged 10‑14, testified they considered Aida R. their mother and desired adoption. The court concluded that these facts satisfied the “all factors” best‑interest test, citing Guardianship of Ann S. and rejecting the father’s argument that his incarceration constituted an “exigent circumstance” that should outweigh the children’s need for permanency.

The mother’s attempt to reopen the evidentiary window on October 12, after abruptly leaving the hearing on October 6 to “catch an earlier bus,” was denied. The trial court found no “good cause” for her absence, a finding the appellate court affirmed as a proper exercise of discretion. The court stressed that a party cannot abandon a hearing and later demand a reopening without a compelling justification.

Regarding ICWA, the court examined Welfare & Institutions Code §224.2, which mirrors federal ICWA requirements. Because the mother’s ICWA‑020 form and the tribe’s responses demonstrated that the children were not members or eligible for membership of a federally recognized tribe, the court held that ICWA did not apply. The court rejected the mother’s claim that her counsel’s failure to obtain a waiver of a “substantial right” rendered the trial court’s ICWA analysis erroneous, noting that the substantive right at issue was the children’s best‑interest, not tribal jurisdiction.

In sum, the appellate court affirmed the termination orders, upheld the denial of the mother’s late testimony, and validated the use of §909 to resolve the ICWA question without remand. The decision underscores California courts’ willingness to employ §909 to expedite permanency and reaffirms that, absent clear tribal affiliation, ICWA does not impede adoption proceedings.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code §1516.5 (termination of parental rights)
  • California Code of Civil Procedure §909 (admission of additional evidence on appeal)
  • Welfare & Institutions Code §224.2 (state implementation of ICWA)
  • Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901‑1912 (substantive ICWA provisions)
  • Clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence standard (as applied in Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal.4th 1110)
  • Best‑interest of the child analysis (Probate Code §1516.5 factors)
  • In re Zeth, 31 Cal.4th 396 (limits on §909)
  • Guardianship of Ann S., 45 Cal.4th 1110 (exigent circumstances)
  • In re Dezi C., 79 Cal.App.5th 769 (post‑judgment evidence in dependency appeals)

Last updated September 05, 2025.