Bailey v. Bailey - Case Brief

Case Number: B320664
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six
Date Filed: September 01, 2025

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Holding

The court held that Probate Code § 8226(c) applies only to a proponent who receives formal notice of the petition for letters of administration or probate under § 8110; the “notice to potential beneficiary” served by George Bailey did not satisfy that statutory requirement, so the 60‑day and 120‑day deadlines did not run, and Mills’ petition was timely.

Narrative

Lead – In a tightly contested probate dispute, the California Court of Appeal clarified the narrow scope of Probate Code § 8226(c), holding that a “notice of a petition” must be the statutory notice required by § 8110, not a courtesy mailing. The decision affirms the trial court’s order admitting a 2001 will to probate and underscores the importance of strict compliance with notice requirements when invoking the deadline exception.

Procedural History – James Harvey Bailey died intestate on October 16, 2020. His brother, George Bailey, petitioned for letters of administration on November 6, 2020 and was appointed special administrator on February 17, 2021. While processing the estate, George discovered a 2001 will that named Mitchell Bailey (the decedent’s only child) as a beneficiary of certain stock and named Olan Mills II, a former employer, as a cash gift recipient. George filed the will with the court on December 22, 2020 and served copies on Mitchell, their sister Theia, and himself. After the court issued an intestacy order on January 13, 2021, George mailed a “Notice to Potential Beneficiary” (including the will and the intestacy order) to all parties on March 4, 2021.

Mills filed a petition to probate the will on May 27, 2021, ten days after George’s final inventory. Mitchell objected, asserting that Mills’ filing was untimely under § 8226(c), which imposes a 60‑day “knowledge” period and a 120‑day “intestacy order” period on any proponent who has received notice of the petition for letters of administration. The trial court rejected the objection, reasoning that Mills had not received the statutory pre‑hearing notice required by § 8110 and therefore § 8226(c) did not apply. The appellate court was asked to review that determination.

Issues – Whether the “notice” referenced in Probate Code § 8226(c) includes the informal “Notice to Potential Beneficiary” sent after the probate court’s intestacy order, or whether it is limited to the formal notice required by § 8110 that must be served at least 15 days before the hearing on the petition for letters of administration.

Court’s Reasoning – The appellate panel emphasized that “notice” in the probate context carries a specific procedural meaning, tied to due‑process rights. Section 8110 mandates service of notice on all heirs, devisees, and any person named in a will before the hearing on a petition for letters of administration. The “Notice to Potential Beneficiary” served by George was merely a copy of the petition and related documents; it did not give Mills an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the petition, nor did it satisfy the statutory timing or content requirements of § 8110. Consequently, Mills did not “receive notice” as contemplated by § 8226(c).

The court further noted that the legislature drafted § 8226(c) as an exception to the general rule that a will may be probated at any time (§ 8000(a)). Exceptions are to be strictly construed. Extending the definition of “notice” to include post‑hearing, informal mailings would effectively nullify the deadline provision, contrary to legislative intent to promote prompt administration and to protect proponent rights.

Applying this construction, the 60‑day “knowledge” clock and the 120‑day “intestacy order” clock never began for Mills, rendering his May 27 filing timely. The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment admitting the will to probate and awarded costs to Mills.

Impact and Unresolved Questions – This decision reinforces the procedural rigor required for parties seeking to invoke § 8226(c). Probate practitioners must ensure that any proponent who wishes to rely on the deadline exception receives formal § 8110 notice; informal notices will not suffice. The ruling also leaves open the question of whether notice by publication under §§ 8120‑8125 could ever satisfy the “notice” requirement of § 8226(c), as the court expressly declined to address that issue. Future litigants may test that boundary, especially in cases involving unknown heirs or remote beneficiaries.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code § 8000(a) – General rule permitting petition to admit a will at any time after death.
Probate Code § 8226(b) & (c) – Exceptions and deadline provisions for will proponents who receive notice of a petition for letters of administration.
Probate Code § 8110 – Mandatory pre‑hearing notice requirements for petitions for administration.
Probate Code §§ 8120‑8125 – Notice by publication (discussed but not decided).

Major Cases Cited

Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135 – De novo review of probate code constructions.
Estate of Kelly (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1367 – Definition of “notice” and due‑process implications.
Estate of Earley (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 369 – Legislative purpose of § 8226 to facilitate prompt estate administration.
Estate of Wilcox (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 780 – Interpretation of § 8226 as an exception to the general probate rule.