Gomez v. Smith - Case Brief

Gomez v. Smith - Case Brief

Gomez v. Smith

Case Number: C089338M

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2020-10-19

Case Brief – Gomez v. Smith

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑04
Case Number: C089338
Disposition: The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff‑respondent Louise A. Gomez on the intentional interference with expected inheritance claim and denied appellant‑defendant Tammy J. Smith’s petition for rehearing. No change in judgment.

Holding

The court held that the trial court’s findings—(1) that Louise Gomez had a legitimate expectancy of an inheritance from a newly‑drafted living trust, (2) that Tammy Smith knowingly interfered with that expectancy, (3) that the interference was independently tortious as undue influence and a breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) that Frank Gomez possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute the trust—were supported by substantial evidence and therefore were affirmed.

Narrative

Lead
In a tightly contested probate dispute that pitted a widowed step‑spouse against an adult child wielding a durable power of attorney, the California Court of Appeal upheld a trial‑court finding of intentional interference with expected inheritance, underscoring the high evidentiary bar for overturning a jury‑type determination of undue influence and fiduciary breach in the context of end‑of‑life estate planning.

Procedural History
Louise A. Gomez sued her late husband’s adult children—Tammy J. Smith and Richard Gomez—for intentional interference with expected inheritance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse after they allegedly blocked the execution of a new living trust that would have granted Louise a life estate. The trial court, after a bench trial, entered a statement of decision granting Louise’s interference claim and rejecting the remaining causes of action. Tammy appealed the judgment on the interference claim; she did not appeal the trial court’s rulings on the other causes of action or on her cross‑complaint seeking trust property. The appellate panel reviewed the appeal de novo on legal issues and for substantial evidence on factual findings.

Facts
Frank Gomez, a widower of Beverly Gomez (deceased 2012), married Louise A. Gomez in November 2014. In 2015 Frank suffered a stroke and later an abdominal aortic aneurysm repair. Anticipating his declining health, Frank consulted attorney Clarence McProud and later retained estate‑planning attorney Erik Aanestad to draft a new “Frank Gomez and Louise Gomez Living Trust” that would give Louise a life estate in the family home, with the remainder passing to Frank’s children upon her death. Frank’s children—Tammy Smith, Richard Gomez, and two sisters—objected to the proposed amendment.

On August 15, 2016 Aanestad met with Frank (who was lucid) at the nursing home; Louise was present for part of the discussion. Aanestad returned on August 20 to obtain Frank’s signature. Tammy and Richard confronted the attorney and his paralegal at the front door, shouting that the house was “their mother’s” and that Frank could not change the trust. The sheriff was called; the attorney was forced to leave without obtaining a signature. Frank died early on August 21.

Louise testified that Frank had repeatedly expressed a desire to “take care of” her, that he wanted a life estate for her, and that she understood the new trust would be titled the “Frank Gomez and Louise Gomez Living Trust.” Tammy testified that she sought to prevent any signing, believing the trust would disadvantage the children. The trial court found (1) Louise had a reasonable expectancy of inheritance, (2) Tammy knew of that expectancy, (3) Tammy’s conduct constituted undue influence and a breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) Frank possessed the mental capacity to execute the trust on August 19‑20.

Issues on Appeal

  1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Louise had an expectancy of inheritance under the proposed trust.
  2. Whether the evidence established that Tammy knew of Louise’s expectancy.
  3. Whether Tammy’s conduct satisfied the “independently tortious” requirement for intentional interference—specifically, whether undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty were supported by substantial evidence.
  4. Whether the trial court correctly applied the legal standard for mental capacity and whether the evidence supported a finding of capacity.
  5. Whether the trial court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, or whether the appellate court should have remanded for a new trial.

Court’s Reasoning

1. Expectancy of Inheritance
The appellate court applied the six‑element test for intentional interference with expected inheritance, first articulated in Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039. The court emphasized that an “expectancy” does not require a named bequest; it is satisfied by a reasonable belief that one will receive some interest. The trial court relied heavily on Aanestad’s testimony that Frank intended to create a trust for Louise’s benefit, and on Louise’s own statements that she understood the trust would be titled in her name. Tammy’s attempt to discredit Louise’s expectancy hinged on two excerpts of Louise’s testimony in which she described Frank’s habit of adjusting children’s percentages and said the new trust would “only benefit” Richard. The appellate court read those excerpts in context, noting that the preceding questioning focused on the children’s percentages, not on Louise’s share, and that Louise later affirmed the trust’s purpose was to provide for her. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the expectancy finding.

2. Knowledge
Tammy argued she never learned of Louise’s expectancy. The appellate panel found the record replete with circumstantial evidence that Tammy was aware of the attorney’s purpose: (a) Frank had told Tammy in 2015 that he intended a life estate for Louise; (b) Tammy’s own statements to Aanestad—“It wasn’t Frank’s decision…that was their mother’s house”—demonstrated awareness that the trust would affect the house; (c) Tammy explicitly asked Louise to promise she would not let the attorney sign; (d) the financial advisor, Kenneth Meyers, testified that Frank complained about Tammy’s interference; and (e) Tammy’s prior online research into Louise’s Santa Cruz property indicated a motive to protect the children’s interests. The court held that, under Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, the knowledge element was a question of law reviewed de novo, and the evidence met the substantial‑evidence standard.

3. Independently Tortious Conduct
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B requires that the interference be “by fraud, duress, or other tortious means.” The trial court identified two tortious means: (i) undue influence, and (ii) breach of fiduciary duty.

Undue Influence – The court applied the statutory definition in Probate Code § 1575, which requires (1) a confidence relationship, (2) exploitation of a weakness, and (3) a grossly unfair advantage. Tammy, as an attorney‑in‑fact under a durable power of attorney, held a confidence relationship. Evidence showed she knew Frank was bedridden, in distress, and that she physically barred the attorney from entering. The court rejected Tammy’s contention that isolated acts (researching a property, a prior conversation) were insufficient, emphasizing the totality‑of‑circumstances test. Substantial evidence supported the undue‑influence finding.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Probate Code §§ 4232(a) and 4266 impose a duty of loyalty on an attorney‑in‑fact. Tammy’s power of attorney granted broad authority but did not permit self‑dealing. The court found that Tammy’s actions—preventing Frank from executing a trust that would have benefited Louise—were contrary to Frank’s expressed wishes and therefore a breach. The appellate panel rejected Tammy’s argument that the power of attorney “ratified” her conduct, noting that ratification cannot cure a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, per Beeler v. West American Finance Co. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 702.

4. Mental Capacity
The court applied the standard from Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, requiring proof that the decedent possessed the ability to understand the nature and consequences of the act. Expert testimony from hospice social worker Michelle Tagg and psychiatrist Helen Crawford affirmed Frank’s competence on August 19‑20, despite morphine administration. The trial court found the opposing expert, Patricia Bay, unpersuasive. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence met the “substantial evidence” threshold and that the trial court correctly applied the legal standard.

5. Standard of Review
The appellate panel reiterated that factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The trial court’s findings on expectancy, knowledge, undue influence, fiduciary breach, and capacity all survived the substantial‑evidence test. The court also addressed procedural default: Tammy failed to object to the trial court’s statement of decision on the record, thereby forfeiting the right to raise those specific defects on appeal, per Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372.

Conclusion
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, emphasizing that a step‑spouse’s reasonable expectancy of inheritance, when coupled with an adult child’s knowledge and tortious interference—manifested as undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty—constitutes actionable conduct under California law. The decision reinforces the high evidentiary bar for overturning findings of undue influence in the fraught context of end‑of‑life estate planning, especially where a durable power of attorney is invoked.

Impact and Unresolved Issues
Gomez v. Smith clarifies that a broad power of attorney does not immunize an attorney‑in‑fact from liability when the agent’s actions run counter to the principal’s expressed wishes. The ruling also signals that courts will give great weight to contemporaneous statements of intent and to expert testimony on capacity, even when the decedent is under heavy medication.

Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open the precise scope of “independently tortious” conduct when the alleged interference is motivated by familial rivalry rather than overt fraud. Future litigants may test the limits of the undue‑influence analysis, particularly where the principal’s capacity is borderline and the attorney‑in‑fact claims reliance on a prior, non‑specific power of attorney. Moreover, the decision does not address the remedy of a constructive trust, which Tammy argued was “fatally ambiguous.” Lower courts may now be more cautious in crafting constructive‑trust orders without clear statutory guidance.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B – intentional interference with expected inheritance.
  • Probate Code §§ 4232(a), 4266 – fiduciary duties of an attorney‑in‑fact; duty of loyalty.
  • Probate Code § 1575 – definition of undue influence.
  • Civil Code § 1575 – (cross‑referenced in the opinion).
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 634 – requirements for objections to a statement of decision.
  • California Rules of Court, rule 232 – procedural standards for appellate review of statements of decision.

Key Cases Cited

  • Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039 – elements of intentional interference with expected inheritance.
  • Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791 – de novo review of legal issues, substantial‑evidence review of facts.
  • In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83 – substantial‑evidence standard for statements of decision.
  • Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372 – forfeiture of objections to trial‑court statements.
  • Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346 – standard for mental capacity in probate matters.
  • Beeler v. West American Finance Co. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 702 – fiduciary duty of loyalty.
  • Allen v. Hall (1999) 328 Ore. 276 – independently tortious conduct requirement.

Last updated September 05, 2025.