Robinson v. Gutierrez - Case Brief
Case Number: C097301
Court: California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District
Date Filed: September 01, 2025
Holding
The court held that “remuneration” under Probate Code § 21362 includes non‑cash compensation such as free room and board, so a person who receives such benefits in exchange for care services is a “care custodian” and the donor’s transfer to that person is subject to the statutory presumption of fraud or undue influence in § 21380.
The appellate decision in Robinson v. Gutierrez reshapes how California probate courts will treat non‑monetary compensation in the context of the dependent‑adult donative‑transfer presumption. The case arose when the surviving children of Gwyneth A. Robinson challenged a 2018 estate plan that left the entire estate to Elvira Gutierrez, who had been living with Robinson since 2015 and received free room and board in exchange for household chores, transportation, and companionship. The plaintiffs argued that Gutierrez should be deemed a “care custodian” under Probate Code §§ 21362 and 21380, triggering a statutory presumption that the transfer was the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court rejected that theory, holding that the free room and board did not constitute “remuneration” and that Gutierrez and Robinson had a pre‑existing personal relationship that fell within the statutory exception. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed.
Procedural backdrop. The plaintiffs filed a petition in the San Joaquin County Superior Court in 2020 seeking a declaration that the trust and will were invalid, alleging elder‑financial abuse and undue influence. After a three‑day trial, the trial court entered judgment for Gutierrez, finding no undue influence and concluding that Gutierrez was not a “care custodian” because the only benefit she received was non‑taxable room and board and because a personal relationship pre‑dated the caregiving arrangement. The appellate panel reviewed the judgment de novo on the statutory construction of “remuneration” and the evidentiary record, ultimately finding the trial court’s factual determinations unsupported by the record and its legal analysis flawed.
Statutory framework. Probate Code § 21362 defines a “care custodian” as a person who provides health or social services to a dependent adult, except when the person provided services “without remuneration” and had a personal relationship meeting specific timing requirements. The same section clarifies that “remuneration” does not include the donative transfer at issue or reimbursement of expenses, but it is silent on whether non‑cash benefits such as lodging constitute remuneration. Section 21380 creates a presumption that any donative transfer from a dependent adult to a care custodian, executed during the caregiving period or within 90 days before or after, is the product of fraud or undue influence unless the caretaker can rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
Key issue. Does “remuneration” under § 21362 encompass free room and board, thereby rendering Gutierrez a care custodian and subjecting the transfer to the statutory presumption? The appellate court answered affirmatively.
Reasoning. The court began with a textual analysis, noting that “remuneration” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary as “payment; compensation… especially for a service performed.” Both definitions encompass “something of equivalent value,” not limited to cash. The court rejected the trial court’s reliance on federal tax treatment, emphasizing that “taxable income” is a narrow subset of compensation and cannot control the statutory meaning.
Turning to legislative intent, the court examined the history of the donative‑transfer provisions, tracing them from the 1993 reforms (now codified at §§ 21350‑21351) through the 1997 amendment that broadened the definition of “care custodian” to include non‑professional caregivers, and finally to Senate Bill 105 (2009‑2010) which created the current §§ 21362 and 21380. The legislative record repeatedly expressed a desire to protect vulnerable dependent adults from exploitation by anyone who receives any form of compensation for care services, while carving out an exception only for “personal friends” who provide services without remuneration. The court observed that the statute’s exception expressly lists the categories of compensation that are excluded (the donative transfer itself and expense reimbursements) but makes no mention of room and board. By omission, the legislature did not intend to treat such non‑cash benefits as outside the scope of remuneration.
The court further reinforced its construction by citing a line of California case law interpreting “remuneration” and “compensation” in employment, workers’ compensation, and labor contexts. In Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, the court held that “compensation” includes any form of value given for services, not merely cash. Barragan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 637 recognized that non‑monetary benefits such as meals, lodging, and training constitute remuneration for purposes of workers’ compensation statutes. Motheral v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 148 expressly treated the market value of room and board as part of an employee’s remuneration. These precedents demonstrate that California courts consistently interpret remuneration broadly to include in‑kind benefits.
Applying that construction, the appellate panel concluded that Gutierrez’s receipt of free room and board was a form of compensation exchanged for her caregiving services. Consequently, she fell squarely within the definition of “care custodian” and the transfer of the estate to her triggered the presumption of fraud or undue influence under § 21380. The trial court’s finding that the presumption did not apply was therefore erroneous.
Undue influence analysis. The court noted that once the presumption attaches, the burden shifts to the caretaker to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the transfer was not the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court had never applied that heightened burden; it simply concluded, on a preponderance standard, that no undue influence existed. The appellate court vacated that conclusion and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the statutory burden‑shifting framework.
Disposition and implications. The appellate judgment reverses the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ petition and remands for a new hearing on the presumption and its rebuttal. Costs on appeal are awarded to the plaintiffs. The decision clarifies that non‑cash compensation, including room and board, is “remuneration” for purposes of §§ 21362 and 21380. Probate practitioners must now scrutinize any in‑kind benefits provided to a dependent adult’s caregiver when evaluating the validity of donative transfers. The ruling also signals that the statutory exception for “personal friends” will be applied narrowly; a personal relationship alone will not shield a caregiver from the presumption if any form of remuneration—cash or otherwise—is exchanged.
Unresolved questions. While the court settled the definition of remuneration, it left open how courts will assess the “personal relationship” exception when the relationship predates caregiving but the parties also exchange non‑cash benefits. Future litigation may need to delineate the line between a genuine friendship and a compensated arrangement, especially where the value of room and board is difficult to quantify. Additionally, the decision raises the prospect of increased litigation over the valuation of in‑kind benefits, potentially prompting legislative clarification or amendment.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code § 21362(a) – Definition of “care custodian” and the remuneration exception.
- Probate Code § 21380(a)(3) – Presumption of fraud or undue influence for transfers to care custodians.
- Probate Code § 21380(b) – Burden of proof on the caretaker to rebut the presumption.
- Probate Code §§ 21350‑21351 – Former statutes on donative‑transfer presumptions (historical context).
- Labor Code §§ 200(a), 3352(a)(9), 4454 – Definitions of wages and remuneration, including non‑cash benefits.
- California case law: Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794; Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630; Barragan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 637; Motheral v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 148; Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973.
These authorities collectively shape the modern interpretation of “remuneration” and the scope of the statutory presumption protecting dependent adults from undue influence.