A.F. v. Jeffrey F. - Case Brief

Case Number: D079919
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
Date Filed: September 01, 2025

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Holding

The court held that a trial court may proceed on representation issues in a DVRO action even while an appeal of a prior attorney‑disqualification order is pending, that a “minor’s counsel” may be appointed only in custody or visitation proceedings (not in a DVRO action), and that a minor who lacks the capacity to understand a fee agreement may have that agreement voided without the court automatically disqualifying the attorney who signed it.

Narrative

When eleven‑year‑old A.F. filed a domestic‑violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., she did so under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). At the time, her mother, Andrea F., served as guardian ad litem (GAL) and had retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify both the mother as GAL and Castro as counsel; the trial court entered that order on July 16, 2021. A.F. appealed the disqualification on July 21, 2021.

While the appeal was pending, A.F. turned twelve and the family court, in the parallel dissolution proceeding (DN 171362), appointed a “minor’s counsel,” Stephanie Mendez, to advise the court on the child’s best interests. Seeking independent representation in the DVRO matter, A.F. hired attorney Aaron Smith. The trial court rejected Smith’s fee agreement on several grounds: (1) a potential conflict because A.F.’s maternal grandfather acted as a third‑party guarantor, (2) A.F.’s demonstrated lack of competence to understand the contract, and (3) Smith’s failure to satisfy the qualifications for “minor’s counsel” under California Rules of Court, rule 5.242. Consequently, the court removed Smith, appointed Mendez as “minor’s counsel” in the DVRO proceeding, and barred Smith from substituting for Mendez.

A.F. appealed, asserting (i) an automatic stay should have halted any representation‑related rulings pending the appeal of Castro’s disqualification, (ii) the trial court lacked authority to appoint “minor’s counsel” in a DVRO action, (iii) the fee‑agreement rejection did not justify disqualifying Smith, and (iv) her due‑process rights were violated because the court interviewed her without prior notice.

Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction. The appellate court clarified that an appeal of an attorney‑disqualification order triggers an automatic stay only of the enforcement of that specific order (URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture, 15 Cal.App.5th 872). However, the stay does not extend to collateral matters that do not affect the appealed order. Because A.F. had already substituted Smith for Castro, the pending appeal no longer implicated the question of counsel of record. The court therefore possessed jurisdiction to address Smith’s fee agreement and the appointment of counsel, and it affirmed the trial court’s authority to proceed.

Statutory Authority for “Minor’s Counsel.” The court examined Family Code §§ 3150, 3151, 3152, which authorize appointment of private counsel to represent a child’s best interests only in custody or visitation proceedings. The DVPA, §§ 6211, 6301, creates a civil action in which the minor is a party, not a subject of a custody dispute. Accordingly, the trial court’s designation of Mendez as “minor’s counsel” in the DVRO proceeding was beyond statutory authority. The appellate court reversed that appointment, emphasizing that A.F. is entitled to her own attorney in a DVRO action, distinct from a court‑appointed “minor’s counsel” whose duty is to advise the court on the child’s best interests.

Validity of the Fee Agreement and Disqualification of Smith. Under Civ. Code § 1550 and Family Code § 6602, a minor cannot bind a contract for attorney fees without court approval. The trial court correctly voided the agreement because A.F. demonstrated an inability to comprehend essential contractual terms—retainer, fee structure, and the role of the third‑party guarantor. The court’s finding that A.F. lacked capacity did not, however, justify a categorical ban on Smith’s representation. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by extending the voiding of the fee agreement into a blanket prohibition on Smith, especially since the rule‑based qualifications for “minor’s counsel” (Rules 5.240, 5.242) do not govern a privately retained attorney in a DVRO case. The prohibition was reversed, allowing Smith to represent A.F. provided the court later determines she is competent to retain counsel.

Due‑Process Considerations. The appellate court acknowledged that the trial court’s interview of A.F. without prior notice was procedurally imperfect but found no prejudice. The interview was designed to assess A.F.’s capacity to contract—a factual inquiry permissible under Probate Code §§ 811, 812. Because the court’s determination was supported by substantial evidence and the interview did not deprive A.F. of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the due‑process claim was rejected.

Conclusion and Impact. This decision refines the interface between family‑law procedural safeguards and the DVPA’s civil remedy framework. It underscores that “minor’s counsel” is a tool limited to custody/visitation contexts and cannot be transplanted into DVRO actions, even when the outcome may affect future custody arrangements. Moreover, the ruling clarifies that an appeal of an attorney‑disqualification does not automatically stay all ancillary proceedings, and that a trial court may evaluate a minor’s capacity to retain counsel without overstepping into disqualification absent a clear conflict or misconduct. Practitioners should note the heightened evidentiary burden required to prove a minor’s competence to enter a fee agreement and the necessity of distinguishing between “minor’s counsel” and privately retained counsel in DV matters.

Unresolved issues remain regarding the precise standard for determining a minor’s competence to retain counsel in DVRO actions and whether a GAL must be appointed when a minor is deemed incompetent to select counsel but wishes to proceed pro se. Future appellate guidance may further delineate the balance between protecting a minor’s procedural rights and preserving the efficiency of DVPA proceedings.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Family Code §§ 3150, 3151, 3152 – appointment of “minor’s counsel” in custody/visitation proceedings.
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), §§ 6211, 6301, 6301.5 – civil restraining order procedure.
Civil Code § 1550 – capacity to contract.
Family Code § 6602 – voidability of attorney‑fee contracts for minors.
Probate Code §§ 811, 812 – capacity to make decisions, including contractual capacity.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.240, 5.241, 5.242 – qualifications for “minor’s counsel.”
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.8.6 – third‑party payment restrictions.

Key Cases Cited

URS Corp. v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture, 15 Cal.App.5th 872 (2017) – automatic stay of attorney‑disqualification orders.
A.F. v. Jeffrey F., 79 Cal.App.5th 737 (2022) – prior appellate analysis of “minor’s counsel” vs. DVRO counsel.
In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 16 Cal.App.4th 556 (1993) – standard of review for attorney disqualification (abuse of discretion).
City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.5th 457 (2018) – “substantial continuing effect” standard for disqualification.
Akkiko v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 525 (1985) – minor’s right to select counsel in dependency context.
Leonard v. Alexander, 50 Cal.App.2d 385 (1942) – enforceability of attorney‑fee contracts for incompetent parties.
Chiu v. Chiu, 86 Cal.App.5th 929 (2022) – interpretation of § 6602.

These authorities collectively shape the appellate court’s analysis of jurisdiction, statutory limits on “minor’s counsel,” and the procedural safeguards owed to a minor seeking a DVRO.