Case Number: D081916
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
Date Filed: August 31, 2025
Case Brief – Trotter v. Van Dyck
Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TIMOTHY J. TROTTER, as Trustee, D081916 etc., Petitioner and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 37‑2022‑ v. 00031695‑PR‑TR‑CTL) WENDY TROTTER VAN DYCK, Objector and Respondent. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia C. Kelety, Judge. Affirmed. Yale & Baumgarten and David W. Baumgarten for Appellant. The Inheritance Recovery Attorneys and Edward Terzian for Respondent. Timothy J. Trotter (Timothy), successor trustee of the Trotter Family Revocable Trust (Trust), petitioned the probate court seeking guidance about whether certain e‑mails from his mother, Mary Trotter (Mary), constituted a valid amendment to the Trust’s beneficiaries. The court found that Mary’s writings were insufficient to constitute an amendment to the Trust, and it ordered that the Trust be distributed to its original beneficiaries, including Wendy Trotter Van Dyck (Van Dyck). Timothy contends on appeal that each of the various grounds upon which the probate court based its order was erroneous. We conclude that at least two of the grounds the court relied on were proper: (1) there was no signed document amending the Trust and the electronic‑signature provision of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) does not apply because a unilateral trust amendment does not constitute a “transaction” within the meaning of the statute (Civ. Code § 1633.2, subd. (o)); and (2) Mary’s writings did not adequately express an intent to amend the Trust by the writings themselves. Accordingly, we affirm the order without deciding Timothy’s contentions as to the other grounds. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Jerry and Mary Trotter, who were married, established the Trust as a revocable trust in 2011, and named themselves collectively as both Trustee and Trustors. The Trust names Timothy, their son, as the successor trustee in the event neither Jerry nor Mary can act as a trustee. The Trust also provides that upon the death of whichever spouse survives the other, certain stock is to be distributed to Timothy, and the rest of the trust estate should be distributed in equal shares to each of several children, including Jerry’s daughter from another marriage, Van Dyck. When Jerry died in 2012, Mary became the sole trustee. According to declarations in the record, Mary intended to exclude Van Dyck as a beneficiary because Van Dyck had already inherited from Jerry’s previous wife, and Mary believed Van Dyck had been fairly provided for in 2015. In relevant part, the Trust authorized Mary to amend the Trust by an instrument in writing signed by Mary and delivered to the Trustee at the time, herself. In late June 2020, Mary, Timothy, and Matthew Pribyl, Mary’s estate‑planning attorney, exchanged e‑mails about amending the Trust. On June 25, Mary e‑mailed Timothy that “my mind is quite clear now … I will write it out and then we need to see that the lawyer gets a copy asap and start redoing the will and trust. 1. The house will go to you 2. My cash assets will be divided among my five children; nothing to Wendy …” Subsequent e‑mails show Timothy asking Pribyl to schedule a conference, Pribyl sending a questionnaire, and Mary completing and returning the questionnaire with a handwritten note beside Van Dyck’s name reading “NO CONTACT WOULD PREFER TO DROP FROM WILL IF POSSIBLE.” Mary underwent surgery on July 1, suffered complications, and died a few weeks later. Timothy, as successor trustee, petitioned the probate court for instructions on whether Mary’s e‑mails and questionnaire removed Van Dyck as a beneficiary. The trial court held the writings were “instruments in writing” under § 7.02(b) of the Trust but rejected them as valid amendments because they lacked Mary’s signature and, under the UETA, did not satisfy the statutory signature requirement. The court also found the writings insufficiently explicit to effectuate a beneficiary removal. Timothy appealed. DISCUSSION The appellate court addressed two of Timothy’s arguments that it deemed dispositive. First, whether a unilateral trust amendment qualifies as a “transaction” under the UETA. The UETA defines a transaction as “an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs” (Cal. Code § 1633.2, subd. (o)). The court noted that the Uniform Law Commission’s comments expressly exclude unilateral acts—such as the execution of a will, trust, or power of attorney—from the definition of “transaction.” Because Mary, as both settlor and trustee, acted alone, the amendment was a unilateral exercise of her statutory power, not a commercial exchange between parties. Consequently, the UETA’s electronic‑signature provisions do not apply, and the trial court correctly required a traditional handwritten signature on a written amendment. Second, whether Mary’s e‑mails and questionnaire manifested a clear intent to amend the Trust. California trusts law demands that a settlor’s intent to amend be “clearly expressed” in the instrument itself; extrinsic evidence may be considered only when the language is ambiguous. The appellate court applied the standard articulated in Estate of Wong (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1198 and Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546, emphasizing that the writing must be intended to serve as the operative amendment, not merely as a draft or a communication of intent. Mary’s June 25 e‑mail explicitly stated she would “write it out” and that the lawyer needed a copy “asap,” indicating the e‑mail was a preliminary instruction, not the amendment itself. Similarly, the questionnaire was titled “Client Estate Plan Data Sheet” and was designed to gather information for the attorney to prepare a formal amendment; Mary left the “Dispositive Plan” section blank and placed a marginal note expressing a preference, not a definitive directive. The court therefore concluded that the writings were precatory, lacking the requisite definiteness to alter the trust’s beneficiary scheme. Because either ground alone sufficed to uphold the trial court’s order, the appellate court affirmed without addressing Timothy’s remaining arguments concerning the applicability of Probate Code § 15401 procedures or alleged procedural defects. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to recover her costs on appeal. Holding
The court held that Mary Trotter’s e‑mails and completed questionnaire did not satisfy the Trust’s statutory amendment requirements because they lacked a proper signature and did not unequivocally express an intent to amend; moreover, a unilateral trust amendment is not a “transaction” within the meaning of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, rendering the UETA’s electronic‑signature provisions inapplicable. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order directing distribution of the Trust to the original beneficiaries, including Wendy Trotter Van Dyck.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- California Civil Code § 1633.2, subd. (o) – definition of “transaction” under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).
- California Civil Code § 1633.3, subd. (b)(1) – UETA exclusion for wills, codicils, and testamentary trusts.
- California Civil Code § 1633.5, subd. (b) – requirement that a transaction involve parties who have agreed to conduct it electronically.
- California Civil Code § 1633.7, subd. (c) & (d) – electronic record and electronic signature satisfy “writing” and “signature” requirements.
- Probate Code § 15401(a)(2) – formal requirements for revocation or amendment of a trust by a signed writing.
- Probate Code § 15402 – definition of “trustor” and “trustee” powers.
- Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) – California adoption (Cal. Code §§ 1633‑1633.9).
Key Cases Cited
- B. H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168 – de novo review of statutory construction.
- J. B. B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974 – electronic signatures satisfy statutory signing requirements.
- Ni v. Slocum (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1636 – legislative approval of electronic signatures in commercial transactions.
- Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729 – trust modification via Probate Code § 15401 when the instrument does not preclude revocation procedures.
- Estate of Wong (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1198 – requirement that a settlor’s intent be evident in the instrument itself.
- Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 – need for clear testamentary intent in interlineations or ancillary documents.
- Estate of Beebee (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 851 – “instrument itself must show intent to make a disposition.”
- Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161 – interpretation of written instruments is a question of law.
- Scharlin v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 162 – intent must be ascertained from the whole instrument, not isolated excerpts.