White v. Davis - Case Brief

White v. Davis - Case Brief

Case Number: E077320
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
Date Filed: 2025‑09‑01

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Holding

The court held that Laura White, as cotrustee of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust, has standing to seek elder‑abuse restraining orders (EAROs) on behalf of her father, that the underlying conservatorship and White’s cotrustee status are valid, and that the trial court correctly denied the defendants’ anti‑SLAPP motions. However, the appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by failing to employ case‑management tools—specifically, by not granting temporary EARO relief pending resolution of the anti‑SLAPP motions or by hearing the EARO applications together with those motions. Accordingly, the matter was remanded for the trial court to proceed to trial on the remaining EARO applications (all defendants except Russell Lowell Davis, whose anti‑SLAPP motion was deemed moot).

Narrative

Lead

In a sprawling probate‑litigation saga that pits a nonagenarian’s surviving daughters against his second wife and her adult children, the Fourth Appellate District affirmed a trial court’s refusal to strike six elder‑abuse restraining‑order (EARO) applications and, crucially, ordered the lower court to correct procedural missteps that delayed protection for the conservatee. The decision clarifies standing requirements for cotrustees, reinforces the limited reach of California’s anti‑SLAPP statute in intra‑family fiduciary disputes, and signals a more active appellate role in supervising case‑management tools in complex probate battles.

Procedural History

The dispute began when Laura White, cotrustee of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust, filed six separate applications for EAROs in Riverside County Superior Court (October 30 2020) to restrain Russell Lowell Davis, Ian Herzog, Evan Marshall, Gloria Tedesco, Stephen Carpenter, and Debra Wear from contacting or influencing Thomas S. Tedesco, the conservatee. The trial court consolidated the six matters under master file No. PRIN2000353 and, on March 22 2021, denied each defendant’s special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (the anti‑SLAPP statute).

Defendants appealed, arguing (1) White lacked standing as a trustee or fiduciary; (2) the trial court erred in assuming the conservatorship and White’s cotrustee status were valid; (3) the anti‑SLAPP motions should have been granted because the EARO applications arose from protected petitioning activity; and (4) the trial court should have dismissed the EAROs on the ground that Orange County courts held exclusive jurisdiction over the underlying estate‑plan dispute.

The appellate panel affirmed the denial of the anti‑SLAPP motions but, finding an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s case‑management approach, remanded for further proceedings.

Factual Background

Thomas S. Tedesco, a wealthy nonagenarian, amassed a $40 million estate held in part by TW Tedesco Properties, L.P. In 2005 his estate plan—implemented through the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust and the LLC W. Mae—provided for his three daughters (Laura White, Sandra Kay, Julie Bas) and their descendants. After the death of his first wife, Thomas married Gloria Basara in 2007; Gloria’s daughters, Debra Wear and Wendy Basara, entered the family sphere.

Between 2013 and 2015 Thomas suffered multiple surgeries and a documented cognitive decline (Mini‑Mental State Examination score 23/30). A neurologist’s report concluded he “needs total supervision.” In May 2014 White petitioned for a conservatorship of Thomas’s person and estate. The probate court appointed Kenneth Jenkins as guardian ad litem and later, after a contested hearing, appointed David Wilson as permanent conservator (August 2015).

During the conservatorship, Gloria, Wear, and a cadre of non‑appointed counsel—including Davis, Herzog, Marshall, and Carpenter—repeatedly sought to influence Thomas to amend the trust in favor of Gloria and her daughters. Notably, a purported 2020 amendment (signed January 20 2020) would disinherit the biological children and name Gloria as the primary beneficiary. The daughters, through White, alleged that the amendment was the product of undue influence, isolation, and scripted statements forced upon Thomas.

White responded by filing six EARO applications (April 27 2020) seeking prohibitions on any contact with Thomas, any facilitation of estate‑plan changes, and a 100‑yard exclusion zone around his residence. The trial court denied temporary EAROs pending a merits hearing and subsequently entertained the defendants’ anti‑SLAPP motions before addressing the substantive restraining‑order applications.

Issues Presented

  1. Standing: Does a cotrustee of a living trust have statutory standing under Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03 to seek an EARO on behalf of the conservatee?

  2. Validity of Conservatorship and Cotrustee Status: Must the appellate court re‑evaluate the probate court’s prior rulings affirming the conservatorship and White’s cotrustee appointment?

  3. Applicability of the Anti‑SLAPP Statute: Do the defendants’ anti‑SLAPP motions succeed because the EARO applications arise from protected petitioning or speech activity?

  4. Procedural Management: Did the trial court err by refusing to grant temporary EARO relief or to hear the EARO applications concurrently with the anti‑SLAPP motions, thereby causing undue delay?

Court’s Reasoning

1. Standing
The court turned to Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03(a), which expressly permits a “conservator or a trustee” to seek protective orders on behalf of an abused elder. White had been a cotrustee since June 5 2013, a status repeatedly affirmed by the probate court and by this appellate district in Tedesco III (G059883). The court rejected the defendants’ argument that only a sole trustee could act, emphasizing that the statute’s language is inclusive of “a trustee” without limitation to singularity. Consequently, White possessed the requisite standing.

2. Conservatorship and Cotrustee Validity
The appellate panel applied the law of the case and collateral‑estoppel doctrines, noting that the probate court’s determinations had been upheld on multiple occasions, including a California Supreme Court denial of review (October 12 2022). The court cited Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.1115(b) to justify reliance on unpublished opinions that formed the factual foundation of the lower court’s rulings. The defendants bore the burden of demonstrating error, which they failed to meet.

3. Anti‑SLAPP Analysis
The court performed the two‑step anti‑SLAPP test. First, it examined whether the defendants’ conduct—filing motions and alleged “undue‑influence” schemes—constituted protected activity. The court concluded that the defendants’ alleged actions were not “petitioning” or “speech” in the statutory sense but rather alleged fiduciary breaches and elder‑abuse conduct. Citing Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864 and City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, the court stressed that the “arising from” prong requires the injury‑producing act itself to be protected. Here, the injury‑producing acts were the alleged undue‑influence and isolation, not the filing of any pleadings.

On the second prong, the court found that White demonstrated a “probability of prevailing” on the merits of her elder‑abuse claims, satisfying the burden shift. Accordingly, the anti‑SLAPP motions were properly denied.

4. Abuse of Discretion in Case Management
While affirming the substantive rulings, the appellate panel rebuked the trial court for its “failure to utilize its case‑management tools.” The court noted that California appellate precedent (e.g., People v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1195) permits a trial court to grant temporary injunctive relief pending resolution of ancillary motions when the underlying harm is imminent. The trial court could have either (a) revisited its earlier denial of temporary EAROs and issued a limited restraining order pending the anti‑SLAPP appeal, or (b) consolidated the hearing on the EARO applications with the anti‑SLAPP motions to avoid a piecemeal process. By refusing both, the trial court unnecessarily prolonged the conservatee’s exposure to alleged abuse. The appellate court therefore remanded for the trial court to proceed to trial on the remaining EARO applications, with directions to employ appropriate case‑management mechanisms.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

White v. Davis delivers three practical takeaways for probate practitioners:

  1. Cotrustee Standing Is Robust. The decision confirms that any trustee—whether sole or co‑trustee—may invoke Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.03 to protect an elder, reinforcing the protective scope of the statute in multi‑trustee contexts.

  2. Anti‑SLAPP Limits in Fiduciary Disputes. The ruling narrows the anti‑SLAPP shield in intra‑family fiduciary battles, emphasizing that allegations of undue influence, isolation, or financial abuse are not “protected activity” merely because they are intertwined with litigation. Attorneys must therefore assess carefully whether their client’s conduct falls within the four protected categories before invoking § 425.16.

  3. Judicial Management of Parallel Proceedings. By mandating the trial court to use temporary injunctive relief or joint hearings, the appellate court signals a willingness to intervene when procedural inertia threatens the welfare of a conservatee. Future litigants should anticipate that courts may require early, limited protective orders even while anti‑SLAPP or other dispositive motions are pending.

Unresolved issues remain. The appellate court did not address whether the alleged 2020 trust amendment, executed amid the conservatorship, is void ab initio or merely voidable—a question that will likely surface again on the remand. Additionally, the court left open the possibility that, should the defendants succeed on a future appeal challenging the conservatorship’s validity, the standing analysis could be revisited.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15657.03, 15610.07, 15610.30, 15610.70 – elder‑abuse protective‑order authority and definitions of financial abuse and undue influence.
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 – anti‑SLAPP special motion to strike.
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6 – removal of a judge for cause.
  • California Rules of Court rule 8.1115(b) – citation of unpublished opinions under law‑of‑the‑case, res judicata, collateral estoppel.
  • Cal. Probate Code §§ 1800‑1805 (implicit) – conservatorship appointment and duties.

Key Cases Cited

  • City of Montebello v. Vasquez, 1 Cal.5th 409 (2016) – definition of “SLAPP.”
  • Gaynor v. Bulen, 19 Cal.App.5th 864 (2018) – anti‑SLAPP procedural framework.
  • Gaynor v. [Beneficiary], 19 Cal.App.5th 869 (2018) – distinction between protected petitioning activity and underlying fiduciary breach.
  • Moore v. Shaw, 116 Cal.App.4th 182 (2004) – estate‑planning actions not protected under anti‑SLAPP.
  • Cabral v. Martins, 177 Cal.App.4th 471 (2009) – contrasting approach to protected activity in trust‑related litigation.
  • People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.4th 1195 (1995) – trial‑court authority to grant temporary injunctive relief pending appeal.
  • Tedesco I, E070316 (non‑pub. 2019) – affirmation of conservatorship and cotrustee status.
  • Tedesco II, E069438 (non‑pub. 2019) – affirmation of probate‑court actions.
  • Tedesco III, G059883 (non‑pub. 2022) – appellate affirmation of cotrustee appointment; SCOTUS denial of review.

White v. Davis thus stands as a pivotal decision at the intersection of elder‑abuse protection, probate fiduciary duties, and the strategic use of anti‑SLAPP defenses in California.

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Last updated September 05, 2025.