Conservatorship of Tedesco - Case Brief

Case Number: E077664
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
Date Filed: 2025‑09‑01

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Holding

The court held that the probate court did not err in denying Gloria Tedesco’s petition to vacate the estate conservatorship and all related orders; the conservatorship was validly created, the stipulation appointing David M. Wilson was proper, and the trial court’s discretionary rulings—including the denial of a hearing on the conservatorship’s validity and the restriction on non‑appointed counsel—were reviewed under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard and therefore affirmed.

Narrative

A battle over a $40 million estate
When Thomas S. Tedesco, a nonagenarian with a sprawling portfolio of real‑estate, partnership interests, and a living trust, became cognitively impaired in 2013, the probate court was thrust into a protracted dispute that would span more than a decade. The core of the controversy centered on whether a conservatorship of Thomas’s estate should be imposed, who should serve as conservator, and whether the process that created the conservatorship complied with statutory due‑process requirements.

Procedural odyssey
The saga began in 2015 when Thomas, assisted by counsel, signed a stipulation appointing independent professional fiduciary David M. Wilson as conservator of his estate. The appointment was entered on August 13, 2015 after a contested trial on his daughter Laura White’s petition for a conservatorship of both person and estate. The stipulation was recorded, and no party—including Thomas’s second wife, Gloria Tedesco—objected at the hearing.

Over the next six years, Thomas’s daughters (the “cotrustees”) and Wilson engaged in a series of litigations aimed at preserving the conservatorship and protecting the estate from alleged undue influence by Gloria and her daughters, Debbie Wear and Wendy Basara. The daughters secured multiple court‑appointed independent counsel, while Gloria repeatedly sought to replace them with attorneys of her choosing. The conflict spilled into ancillary actions: restraining orders, anti‑SLAPP motions, and a separate Orange County proceeding challenging the living‑trust amendments.

On March 23, 2021, Gloria and a co‑petitioner, Stephen G. Carpenter, filed a verified petition to vacate all orders in the conservatorship—including the original appointment of Wilson—asserting that Thomas had never been afforded the statutory advisements required by Probate Code §§ 1822, 1827, 1828, that the stipulation was invalid, that Judge James A. Cox was disqualified, and that Thomas’s right to a jury trial had been waived without consent. The trial court struck the petition as time‑barred, held that the parties lacked standing, and declared the issues previously litigated to be law of the case. Gloria appealed; the appellate court dismissed the appeal for failure to perfect the cost deposit, but later allowed a limited review of the underlying denial of the petition.

Issues before the Court of Appeal

Whether the probate court abused its discretion in refusing a hearing on the validity of the conservatorship.
Whether the stipulation appointing Wilson was void for lack of a valid written agreement, judge disqualification, or failure to advise Thomas of his rights.
Whether the trial court erred in barring non‑appointed counsel from representing Thomas or intervening parties.
Whether the petition was barred by res judicata or the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine.

Standard of review
The court reiterated that a trial court’s decision on a motion to strike a pleading (Code Civ. Proc. § 436) and a denial of a petition to vacate an order are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The appellate court may reverse only where the lower court “exceeds the bounds of reason” and no reasonable basis for its action exists. (See Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370.)

Reasoned analysis

1. Prior adjudication bars relitigation
The appellate panel emphasized that the February 2018 challenge to the conservatorship’s validity had already been resolved in Tedesco I (E070316). In that opinion, the court denied a writ of mandate seeking a hearing on the conservatorship, finding that the probate court’s refusal was supported by the record and that the issue was therefore final. Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the court held that Gloria’s present petition was barred because it raised the same factual and legal questions already decided. The court cited Lazzarone v. Bank of America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581 (probate matters are subject to claim preclusion).

2. The stipulation was valid and the appointment proper
Gloria argued that the oral stipulation lacked the formalities required by Probate Code §§ 1822‑1828. The appellate court rejected this, noting that the parties—including Thomas—executed a written stipulation filed with the court, and that the probate judge entered an order based on that stipulation. The court pointed to the record showing Thomas’s signature on the petition appointing Wilson and the contemporaneous counsel’s acknowledgment that Thomas “consented to be subject to a conservatorship with an independent professional fiduciary.” Under Probate Code § 1822, a conservatorship may be created by court order upon a valid petition; a stipulation is merely a procedural shortcut, not a substantive defect.

3. No jurisdictional defect from judge disqualification
Gloria contended that Judge Cox’s recusal under Code Civ. Proc. § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) rendered the subsequent order void. The appellate court clarified that a judge’s disqualification does not invalidate a prior order if the case is reassigned and the successor judge lawfully entered the same order. The court referenced Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918 (disqualification does not void prior valid orders).

4. Due‑process advisements were satisfied
The petition alleged violations of Probate Code §§ 1822, 1827, 1828 because Thomas allegedly did not receive the required advisements or waive his right to a jury trial. The appellate court observed that the probate investigator had informed Thomas of his rights, including the right to a jury trial, at the June 10, 2014 hearing. Moreover, the statutory waiver language in § 1828 permits a conservatee to waive the jury trial right in writing; the record contains Thomas’s signed stipulation, which satisfies that requirement. The court further noted that, as an incapacitated person, Thomas lacked the legal capacity to retain counsel of his own choosing (Civ. Code §§ 40, 2356(a)(3); Prob. Code § 1872(a)), reinforcing the necessity of court‑appointed independent counsel—a function the probate court performed on multiple occasions (appointments of Ofseyer, Burt, and McKenzie).

5. Restriction on non‑appointed counsel upheld
Gloria’s challenge to the trial court’s order barring non‑appointed counsel from representing Thomas or intervening in related litigation was reviewed under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard. The appellate panel found the order rationally related to protecting the conservatee’s interests and preventing “undue influence” by parties with a conflict of interest, consistent with the court’s earlier finding that Gloria and her daughters were “the driving force” behind numerous attempts to circumvent the conservatorship. The court cited McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083 (courts may limit counsel’s participation when it threatens the integrity of the probate proceeding).

6. Law‑of‑the‑case and procedural defaults
Finally, the court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine, noting that the appellate panel in Tedesco I had already adopted a specific construction of the probate code provisions and the role of independent counsel. The petition’s failure to raise new authority or factual distinctions rendered it procedurally foreclosed. The court also rejected Gloria’s argument that the petition was untimely, reiterating that the statutory limitations for a petition to vacate a conservatorship are governed by Probate Code § 1828 and that the petition was filed well after the statutory deadline.

Conclusion
The Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court’s denial of Gloria Tedesco’s petition to vacate the conservatorship and all related orders. The decision underscores the appellate deference owed to probate courts in discretionary matters, the binding effect of prior appellate rulings on the same issues, and the heightened scrutiny applied to claims of procedural due‑process violations in the conservatorship context. While the judgment leaves the conservatorship intact, it leaves open the possibility of future challenges should new, unaddressed evidence of incapacity or undue influence emerge.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code §§ 1822, 1827, 1828 – requirements for creating a conservatorship, advisement of rights, and waiver of jury trial.
Probate Code § 1872(a) – incapacity of a conservatee to contract.
Civil Code §§ 40, 2356(a)(3) – agency termination upon principal’s incapacity.
Evidence Code §§ 452(d), 459 – judicial notice of court documents.
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 436 (motion to strike), 664.6 (stipulation waiver), 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) (judge disqualification), 170.6 (challenge to disqualification), 425.16 (special motion to strike).
Law of the case doctrine – Tedesco I (E070316) precedent.
Res judicata / claim preclusion – Lazzarone v. Bank of America (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 581.
Abuse‑of‑discretion standard – Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 370; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 19.
Independent counsel requirement – McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083.
Anti‑SLAPP – Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (as applied in the EARO proceedings).

Key cases cited in the opinion: Tedesco I (E070316), Tedesco II (E069438), Tedesco III (G059883), White v. Wear (76 Cal.App.5th 24), White v. Davis (87 Cal.App.5th 270), Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, Conservatorship of Chilton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 40, Sullivan v. Dunne (1926) 198 Cal 183.