Case Number: F088679
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District
Date Filed: 2025‑09‑01
Holding
The court held that R.J.’s challenges to the trial court’s authorization of periodic payments to the public conservator were forfeited because he failed to raise those objections in the trial court, and therefore the appellate court affirmed the judgment without disturbing the fee‑payment provision.
Narrative
Lead – A procedural misstep ends a fee‑dispute before the appellate bench
When R.J., a 37‑year‑old conservatee with a long history of mental‑health commitments, appealed the Kern County Superior Court’s order allowing the public conservator to collect periodic compensation from his modest estate, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District dismissed his challenge on a single ground: he never objected at trial. The decision underscores California’s strict forfeiture rule in probate proceedings and signals that fee‑schedule authorizations, when properly pleaded, are unlikely to survive appellate scrutiny absent a contemporaneous objection.
Procedural backdrop
The dispute began on April 15, 2024, when the Kern County Public Conservator filed a petition seeking both temporary and permanent conservatorship of R.J.’s person and estate. The petition invoked Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) § 5008(h)(1)(A) to establish that R.J. was “gravely disabled” and therefore ineligible to consent to treatment. Crucially, the petition also requested authority to make “periodic payments” to the public conservator under Probate Code § 2643, citing the county’s fee schedule as a benchmark for “just and reasonable” compensation.
The trial court appointed the public conservator as temporary conservator on the same day and set a hearing for a jury trial on the gravely‑disabled issue. After a five‑day evidentiary presentation—including testimony from two psychiatrists and a deputy public conservator—the jury found R.J. gravely disabled. The judge then entered a post‑trial order that (1) appointed the public conservator as permanent conservator of both person and estate, (2) set the conservatorship term to terminate on September 3, 2025, and (3) authorized periodic payments to the conservator in accordance with the county’s graduated fee schedule. The fee schedule stipulated, for estates with cash balances between $201 and $1,999, an annual fee of $444, payable in twelve $37 installments. Because R.J.’s conservatorship lasted roughly five months, the disputed amount was about $185.
R.J. did not object to the fee provision at trial, nor did his counsel raise any issue during the post‑trial hearing. After the conservatorship was terminated by stipulation on February 18, 2025, R.J. filed an appeal solely challenging the periodic‑payment clause, arguing that the trial court’s reliance on a standard fee schedule violated Probate Code §§ 2942 and 2643(c), which he contended required case‑specific findings before authorizing compensation.
Issues presented
- Whether R.J.’s failure to object to the periodic‑payment provision at trial forfeits his right to raise the issue on appeal.
- Whether the trial court’s authorization of periodic payments, based on a county‑adopted fee schedule, complied with Probate Code §§ 2942 and 2643(c).
- Whether R.J.’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel—alleging his attorney’s failure to object—provides a basis for reversal.
Court’s analysis
Forfeiture of unraised issues
The appellate panel applied the well‑settled principle that “failure to object in the trial court waives the right to claim error on appeal” (People v. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580 (1993); Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180 (1979)). The court noted that the request for periodic payments was expressly set out in the original petition and was expressly granted in the minute order (“fees were granted as prayed”). Because R.J. raised no objection, the appellate court deemed the issue forfeited. The panel emphasized that allowing a party to introduce a new claim after the record is closed would be unfair to the opposing party and contrary to procedural efficiency.
Statutory compliance
The court examined Probate Code § 2643(c), which permits a court to authorize periodic payments “subject to review and approval at the next succeeding account.” The appellate panel found that the trial court’s order satisfied the statutory text: it authorized payments based on a fee schedule, required that payments be made only after monthly expenses, and conditioned the payments on later court review at the accounting. Moreover, the fee schedule itself was designed to reflect the factors enumerated in Probate Code § 2942(b) (actual costs, estate size, special value of services, and avoidance of economic hardship). The court distinguished the single‑case precedent cited by R.J., Conservatorship of A. B. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 384, noting that it dealt with an accounting error, not with the propriety of a prospective fee‑schedule authorization.
Ineffective assistance claim
R.J. invoked Welfare and Institutions Code § 5365, which guarantees a conservatee the right to effective counsel. The appellate court applied the two‑prong Strickland test (deficient performance and prejudice). It concluded that even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, R.J. suffered no prejudice because he retained the opportunity to contest any fees during the final accounting set for May 14, 2025. The court cited People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal. 5th 697 and People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 240, emphasizing the high bar for overturning a conviction—or, here, a conservatorship order—on ineffective‑assistance grounds.
Disposition
Because the fee‑payment issue was forfeited and the statutory authorizations were proper, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s post‑trial order. Each party was assessed its own costs.
Impact and unresolved questions
The decision reinforces the procedural doctrine that probate litigants must voice objections contemporaneously; appellate courts will not entertain “after‑the‑fact” challenges to fee authorizations. Practitioners should therefore ensure that any dispute over compensation—whether a lump‑sum or periodic schedule—is raised at the earliest opportunity, preferably during the post‑trial hearing where the court’s findings become part of the record.
The ruling also validates the use of standardized fee schedules for public conservators, provided the schedule aligns with Probate Code § 2942(b) factors and the court includes the requisite “subject to review” language. While the opinion does not overturn the fee‑schedule model, it leaves open the question of how courts should handle estates with negligible balances where even modest periodic fees could constitute a hardship. Future litigants may test the limits of “just and reasonable” compensation when the estate’s cash flow is minimal, potentially prompting legislative clarification or more granular judicial review at the accounting stage.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code § 2643(a)–(c) – Authority for periodic payments to a conservator/guardian.
- Probate Code § 2942(b) – Standard for “just and reasonable” compensation of public guardians.
- Welfare and Institutions Code § 5008(h)(1)(A) – Definition of “gravely disabled.”
- Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 5350‑5358 – Conservatorship establishment and powers.
- Welfare and Institutions Code § 5365 – Right to effective assistance of counsel in LPS proceedings.
- People v. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580 (1993) – Forfeiture of unraised issues.
- Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180 (1979) – Waiver of issues not raised at trial.
- People v. Woodruff, 5 Cal. 5th 697 (2018) – Strickland test for ineffective assistance.
- People v. Sapp, 31 Cal. 4th 240 (2003) – Prejudice requirement in ineffective‑assistance claims.
- Conservatorship of A. B., 66 Cal.App.5th 384 (2021) – Accounting error precedent (distinguished).
- Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist., 39 Cal.App.4th 691 (1995) – Requirement for cognizable arguments on appeal.
- Singh v. Lipworth, 227 Cal.App.4th 813 (2014) – Forfeiture of unsupported points.
- Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 100 Cal.App.4th 1066 (2002) – Necessity of substantive argument for appellate review.