People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation - Case Brief

People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation - Case Brief

People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation

Case Number: JAD21-08

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-10-28

Case Brief – People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation

Court: California Court of Appeal
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: Unknown
Disposition: Affir­med

Holding

The court held that Emergency Rule 9, which tolls statutes of limitations for civil causes of action, does not apply to the procedural timelines set forth in Penal Code §§ 1305, 1305.4, and 1306 governing bail‑bond forfeiture; consequently, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against the surety was timely and the denial of the motion to set aside the forfeiture was affirmed.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that clarifies the reach of the Judicial Council’s COVID‑19 emergency tolling provisions, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a summary‑judgment forfeiture of a bail bond, holding that Emergency Rule 9 does not extend the statutory deadlines embedded in the Penal Code’s bail‑bond forfeiture scheme. The ruling underscores that “pure legislative” forfeiture proceedings remain governed by their own timelines, irrespective of pandemic‑related tolling rules.

Procedural History – The People, as plaintiff, sought enforcement of a bail‑bond forfeiture after defendant Maria Campos failed to appear in court on March 28, 2019. The clerk mailed a notice of forfeiture on April 2, 2019, triggering the 180‑day appearance period prescribed by Penal Code § 1305. The trial court, after granting a court‑ordered extension to April 17, 2020 and noting a COVID‑19 shutdown (March 17–May 22, 2020), held that the shutdown did not toll the surety’s deadline to move to vacate the forfeiture. The surety, Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., never filed a motion, and the trial court entered summary judgment on June 11, 2020, well within the 90‑day limitation of Penal Code § 1306. The surety appealed, arguing that Emergency Rule 9 should have tolled the filing deadline.

Facts – The bail bond was forfeited after Campos’ non‑appearance. The clerk’s notice was mailed within the statutory 30‑day window, extending the appearance period by five days per § 1305(b). The court later extended the appearance period to April 17, 2020. The pandemic forced the trial court to close from March 17 to May 22, 2020, but the court treated the closure as “holiday time” for computing deadlines under Code Civ. Proc. § 12, not as tolling time under § 12a. No motion to extend the appearance period or to vacate the forfeiture was filed before the entry of summary judgment.

Issues –

  1. Does Emergency Rule 9 toll the procedural deadlines in Penal Code §§ 1305, 1305.4, and 1306 that govern bail‑bond forfeiture?
  2. If not, was the trial court’s summary judgment entered within the statutory period, rendering the surety’s motion untimely?

Court’s Reasoning –

Statutory Construction of Emergency Rule 9 – The court began by applying the “plain‑meaning” rule articulated in All of US or None – Riverside Chapter v. Hemrick (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 751: when a rule’s language is clear, it governs. Emergency Rule 9 expressly tolls “statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action” (both over and under 180 days). The court emphasized that “civil causes of action” are distinct from the procedural timelines embedded in the Penal Code’s bail‑bond forfeiture scheme, which are not statutes of limitation or repose but mandatory statutory deadlines governing a legislative forfeiture process.

Distinction Between Civil Actions and Legislative Forfeiture – The appellate division highlighted the historical evolution of bail‑bond forfeiture, citing People v. Burton (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d Supp. 878 and People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898. Since 1927, forfeiture is a “pure legislative type of forfeiture” that does not require a separate civil action; the court’s declaration of forfeiture itself initiates the proceeding, and the surety’s motions are merely responses within that proceeding. Accordingly, the timelines in §§ 1305, 1305.4, and 1306 are procedural, not limitation periods for a civil cause of action.

Advisory Committee Comment and Circulating Order – Both the Advisory Committee Comment and the Judicial Council’s Circulating Order Memorandum stress that Rule 9 tolls the period to commence a civil cause of action—i.e., the filing of an initial pleading. They do not address extensions of deadlines within an existing proceeding. The court found no language indicating that Rule 9 was intended to affect the statutory deadlines for bail‑bond forfeiture motions, which are “responses” rather than new causes of action.

Absence of a Specific Emergency Rule for Bail‑Bond Forfeiture – The Judicial Council issued separate emergency rules (e.g., Emergency Rule 4 for bail schedules) but did not create a rule extending the 180‑day appearance period or the 90‑day summary‑judgment deadline. The court reasoned that legislative silence, especially after targeted emergency rulemaking, signals an intent to leave the existing statutes unchanged.

Timeliness of Summary Judgment – Applying Penal Code § 1306(a), the court confirmed that the 90‑day window for entering a consent judgment began when the 180‑day appearance period (including the five‑day mailing extension) expired. The trial court’s June 11, 2020 entry fell well within that period, rendering the summary judgment proper.

Conclusion – The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s denial of the surety’s motion to set aside the forfeiture, holding that Emergency Rule 9 does not toll the statutory deadlines governing bail‑bond forfeiture. The decision reinforces the principle that emergency tolling rules apply only to civil causes of action, not to procedural timelines embedded in criminal or legislative statutes.

Impact and Unresolved Issues – This opinion provides a clear boundary for the application of emergency tolling rules, signaling to practitioners that bail‑bond forfeiture deadlines remain enforceable even amid court closures. It also raises a question for future litigation: whether other specialized criminal procedures—such as arraignment or pre‑trial motions—might be similarly insulated from emergency tolling, or whether a future emergency rule could be crafted to address those gaps. Attorneys representing sureties must now vigilantly monitor reopening dates and file any extension or exoneration motions within the strict statutory windows, regardless of pandemic‑related disruptions.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Penal Code §§ 1305, 1305.4, 1306 – Bail‑bond forfeiture procedures and summary‑judgment timeline.
  • Code of Civil Procedure §§ 12, 12a – Computation of time and effect of court closures.
  • California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(b) – General statute of limitations for civil actions (tolling target of Emergency Rule 9).
  • Emergency Rule 9 (Judicial Council, effective April 6, 2020; amended May 29, 2021) – Tolling of statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action.
  • CCP § 77(d) – Judicial notice of Judicial Council publications.

Key Cases Cited

  • All of US or None – Riverside Chapter v. Hemrick, 64 Cal.App.5th 751 (2021) – Rules of construction for statutes and rules.
  • People v. Grant, 52 Cal.App.2d 794 (1942) – Distinction between civil actions and legislative forfeiture.
  • People v. Surety Insurance Co., 82 Cal.App.3d 229 (1978) – Bail‑bond forfeiture as an “order to show cause.”
  • People v. Burton, 146 Cal.App.2d Supp. 878 (1956) – Historical shift to legislative forfeiture.
  • People v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 5 Cal.3d 898 (1971) – Disapproval of Burton’s reasoning.
  • People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp., 1 Cal.App.5th 1144 (2016) – Nature of bail‑bond contracts.
  • People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., 49 Cal.4th 301 (2010) – Limits of statutory construction.
  • Rowan v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Cal.App.5th 289 (2020) – Pandemic‑related filing hardships.
  • Bean v. Los Angeles County, 252 Cal.App.2d 754 (1967) – Surety’s responsibilities.
  • Nunn v. State of California, 35 Cal.3d 616 (1984) – Construction of statutes to reflect legislative intent.
  • Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal.3d 190 (1976) – Presumption against implied exceptions.
  • In re Greg F., 55 Cal.4th 393 (2012) – Legislative awareness of existing law.

Last updated September 05, 2025.