Conservatorship of T.B. - Case Brief

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Case Number: A167919
Court: California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two
Date Filed: 2025‑08‑31

Holding

The court held that the statutory time limit for commencing a Lanterman‑Petris‑Short conservatorship trial is directory, and dismissal of the proceeding for missing that deadline is a discretionary, not mandatory, remedy; therefore, the trial court’s refusal to dismiss did not warrant reversal because the conservatee suffered no demonstrable prejudice.

Narrative

A delayed trial, a statutory amendment, and a clash over “directory” versus “mandatory.” When T. B., a 46‑year‑old woman with a long history of homelessness, schizoaffective disorder, and methamphetamine use, was found gravely disabled and placed under a conservatorship, the trial court set a series of trial dates that stretched over seven months. After the Legislature amended Welfare & Institutions Code § 5350(d)(2) to make “failure to commence the trial within the statutory period … grounds for dismissal,” T. B. argued that the trial court was now required to throw out the proceeding. The Court of Appeal resolved the dispute by interpreting the amendment as a clarification, not a departure, from longstanding case law that treats the 10‑day limit as directory. The appellate decision therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no prejudice despite an abuse of discretion.

Procedural History

The matter began on August 4, 2022, when the Public Guardian of Contra Costa County filed a petition for a conservatorship of the person of T. B. after she was deemed incompetent to stand trial on two misdemeanor battery charges. Deputy Conservator Melinda Shrock’s investigative report diagnosed T. B. with schizoaffective disorder, chronic methamphetamine use, and a history of homelessness, concluding that she was gravely disabled because she could not provide food, clothing, or shelter. The petition sought appointment of a conservator, a temporary conservator pending resolution, and a slate of disabilities—including loss of driving privileges and the right to refuse treatment.

The trial court promptly appointed a temporary conservator and counsel for T. B. On November 4, 2022, T. B.’s appointed counsel demanded a jury trial, invoking her statutory right under § 5350(d). The court set the trial for November 14, consistent with the then‑operative “trial shall commence within 10 days of the demand” rule. A series of continuances followed, each predicated on “good cause” such as counsel’s need for records, departmental unavailability, and scheduled vacations. The trial was postponed to December 5, then to January 9, 2023, then to February 27, and finally to March 27 and May 1. Throughout, T. B.’s counsel did not object to the continuances.

On January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill 2275 took effect, amending § 5350(d)(2) to add: “Failure to commence the trial within that period of time is grounds for dismissal of the conservatorship proceedings.” The amendment was intended to tighten procedural timelines for LPS cases, but the statutory language left open whether the new “grounds for dismissal” provision created a mandatory bar or merely a discretionary option.

On April 24, 2023, after 171 days from the original demand, the trial finally commenced. T. B. waived her presence, and the Public Guardian presented testimony from Deputy Conservator Shrock, T. B.’s father, and psychiatrist Dr. Khan, establishing that T. B. suffered chronic paranoid schizophrenia exacerbated by methamphetamine use and was unable to meet basic needs. The trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that T. B. was gravely disabled and, by clear and convincing evidence, imposed the requested disabilities. A one‑year conservatorship was entered on April 25, 2023.

T. B. appealed, asserting that the trial court violated § 5350(d)(2) by failing to commence trial within the statutory window and by refusing to dismiss the proceeding as required by the amendment. She also claimed a due‑process violation because the delay deprived her of a speedy trial.

Issues Presented

  1. Statutory construction: Does the amendment to § 5350(d)(2) transform the 10‑day trial‑commencement deadline from a directory limitation—previously interpreted as non‑jurisdictional—to a mandatory deadline whose breach mandates dismissal of the conservatorship petition?

  2. Discretionary authority: Assuming the deadline remains directory, did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the proceeding despite the prolonged delay?

  3. Due‑process claim: Did the delay infringe T. B.’s Fourteenth‑Amendment right to a speedy trial, thereby requiring reversal of the conservatorship order?

The Court’s Reasoning

1. Legislative Intent and the Directory‑Mandatory Distinction

The appellate court began by reaffirming the well‑settled principle that time limits are presumed directory unless the Legislature unmistakably signals a mandatory effect. The court cited California Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State Personnel Board and Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital for the governing framework: a procedural requirement is mandatory only when non‑compliance invalidates the subsequent governmental action.

The court examined the plain language of the amended § 5350(d)(2). While the statute uses the mandatory‑sounding verb shall, it qualifies the dismissal provision with the phrase “grounds for dismissal,” which, the court noted, ordinarily denotes a basis rather than an automatic consequence. The court contrasted this construction with statutes that employ unequivocal language—e.g., “shall be dismissed” or “the court shall dismiss”—to impose a mandatory result. Because the amendment merely identifies dismissal as a possible remedy, the court concluded that the Legislature intended to preserve judicial discretion.

The court further considered legislative history. Assembly Bill 2275’s purpose was to tighten early‑stage LPS timelines (e.g., 72‑hour holds and 14‑day intensive‑treatment reviews), not to overhaul procedural safeguards for conservatorship trials. The legislative reports offered no explicit statement that the trial‑commencement deadline should become jurisdiction‑stripping. In the absence of clear intent, the court applied the presumption that the amendment was a clarifying measure, not a repealing one.

2. Precedent on § 5350(d)(2)

The appellate panel relied heavily on James M. (30 Cal.App.4th 293) and its progeny (M. M., 39 Cal.App.5th 496; Jose B., 50 Cal.App.5th 963). Those cases uniformly held that the 10‑day limit is directory, emphasizing that the statute provides no penalty for non‑compliance and that treating it as mandatory would impermissibly divest the trial court of its core jurisdictional authority. The court reiterated that the “good cause” exception—allowing a 15‑day extension—demonstrates legislative awareness that strict adherence is not feasible in all circumstances.

The court also noted Briggs v. Brown (3 Cal.5th 808), which applied the constitutional avoidance canon to reject a mandatory interpretation of a procedural deadline that would have interfered with the judiciary’s separation‑of‑powers prerogatives. By analogizing the LPS deadline to the capital‑case review deadline in Briggs, the court reinforced that a directory reading best preserves the balance between individual liberty interests and the public interest in timely adjudication of conservatorship petitions.

3. Abuse‑of‑Discretion Analysis

Having concluded that the deadline is directory, the court turned to the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The appellate panel acknowledged that the trial court’s continuances—totaling more than five months—were “excessive” and that the court failed to rigorously apply the “good cause” standard. Nonetheless, the court applied the standard set forth in James M.: a conservatee’s remedy for prejudicial delay is a motion to dismiss, not an automatic dismissal. T. B. had indeed filed motions to dismiss, but the trial court, after finding good cause, denied them.

The appellate court found that the trial court’s denial, while arguably an error of judgment, did not rise to the level of reversible abuse because T. B. suffered no demonstrable prejudice. The conservatorship was based on clear and convincing evidence of grave disability, and the delay did not affect the substantive findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, noting that reversal would not serve any remedial purpose.

4. Due‑Process Claim

The court rejected T. B.’s due‑process argument. The Fourteenth‑Amendment guarantees a speedy trial, but the Supreme Court has held that “speedy” is a flexible concept, evaluated in light of the nature of the proceeding, the length of delay, and the reason for the delay. In LPS conservatorship cases, the public interest in ensuring appropriate treatment and protection of a gravely disabled individual outweighs a strict timetable. The court found that the delay was attributable to legitimate administrative and evidentiary hurdles, not to prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, and that T. B. was afforded counsel and the opportunity to object at each continuance. No prejudice resulted; thus, the due‑process claim failed.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

The decision solidifies the appellate line that § 5350(d)(2)’s 10‑day trial‑commencement rule remains directory even after the 2023 amendment. Practitioners should continue to treat the deadline as a procedural guideline, invoking “good cause” when continuances are necessary, and should be prepared to defend against dismissal motions on a case‑by‑case basis. The ruling also underscores the courts’ willingness to tolerate substantial delays where the public interest in protecting a gravely disabled person is at stake, provided the conservatee’s rights are not demonstrably prejudiced.

Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open a few doctrinal fissures. First, the court’s reliance on the phrase “grounds for dismissal” as indicative of discretion may be revisited if future legislative amendments employ more forceful language. Second, the decision does not address whether a pattern of excessive continuances—absent prejudice—could, in the future, trigger a heightened scrutiny of the trial court’s docket management. Finally, the interplay between the amended § 5350(d)(2) and the newer definition of “gravely disabled” under Senate Bill 43 (2024) may generate novel challenges as courts balance expanded disability criteria against procedural timeliness.

For California probate and mental‑health attorneys, the case serves as a reminder to monitor statutory amendments closely, to document “good cause” meticulously, and to be prepared to argue both the directory nature of procedural deadlines and the absence of prejudice when delays are unavoidable.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare & Institutions Code § 5000 et seq. (Lanterman‑Petris‑Short Act)
  • WIC § 5350(d)(2) – trial‑commencement deadline and amendment adding “grounds for dismissal” (Assembly Bill 2275, Stats. 2022, ch. 960)
  • WIC § 5350(e) – definition of “gravely disabled” (as amended by SB 43, Stats. 2023, ch. 637)
  • Due‑Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const.
  • Statutory construction principles – mandatory vs. directory distinction (see Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, 2 Cal.5th 330; California Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State Personnel Board, 10 Cal.4th 1133)
  • Constitutional avoidance canon – People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354

Major Cases Cited

  • James M. (30 Cal.App.4th 293) – directory nature of § 5350(d) time limit.
  • M. M. (39 Cal.App.5th 496) – affirmation of James M. reasoning.
  • Jose B. (50 Cal.App.5th 963) – directory construction; separation‑of‑powers concerns.
  • Briggs v. Brown (3 Cal.5th 808) – constitutional avoidance applied to procedural deadlines.
  • People v. Allen (42 Cal.4th 91) – test for mandatory vs. directory provisions.
  • California Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State Personnel Board (10 Cal.4th 1133) – mandatory‑directory analysis.
  • Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2 Cal.5th 330) – statutory interpretation framework.
  • Allied Premier Ins. v. United Fin. Casualty Co. (15 Cal.5th 20) – inference of legislative intent from language change.
  • People v. Overstreet (42 Cal.3d 891) – consideration of legislative awareness of precedent.