Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Case Number: B293952
Court: Cal. Ct. App.
Date Filed: 2020-06-29
Case Brief – Cundall v. Mitchell‑Clyde
Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: B293952
Disposition: The trial court’s order revoking the February Trust was affirmed; appellant Cundall’s petition was denied and respondent Clyde was awarded costs on appeal.
Holding
The court held that a revocable trust may be revoked under Probate Code § 15401 (a)(2) unless the trust instrument explicitly states that its own revocation procedure is exclusive; the February Trust did not contain such an explicit exclusivity clause, so the settlor’s statutory revocation was valid despite the trust’s internal requirement that the settlor’s attorney sign the revocation.
Narrative
When John W. Martin executed a living trust in February 2009 that named his longtime friend Robert Cundall as sole beneficiary, the trust also required that any revocation be signed by Martin’s attorney, Frances Diaz. Months later, after a falling‑out with Cundall, Martin sought to discard that arrangement and replace it with a new trust naming different beneficiaries. He did so by signing a revocation document and delivering it to himself as trustee, relying on the statutory “alternative” revocation method set out in Probate Code § 15401 (a)(2). Cundall sued, arguing that the trust’s internal requirement made the attorney’s signature an indispensable condition, and that the statutory method could not override that requirement. The trial court concluded that the February Trust did not expressly make its own revocation method exclusive and therefore affirmed the validity of Martin’s statutory revocation. Cundall appealed.
Procedural posture. The appeal arose from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County’s final decision (July 31 2018) in which the court held that the February Trust was properly revoked and that the subsequent May 2009 trust was therefore operative. Cundall appealed solely on the ground that the trial court erred in interpreting Probate Code § 15401 and the trust’s revocation language. The Court of Appeal reviewed the issues de novo as matters of law.
Key facts. Martin, a homeowner, entered into a neighborly arrangement with Cundall, who agreed to remodel Martin’s house in exchange for temporary housing. The February Trust, drafted by Diaz, named Martin as trustee, Cundall as successor trustee and sole beneficiary, and stipulated that any revocation required the signatures of both Martin and Diaz. Within five months, Martin grew dissatisfied, rehired a former bookkeeper, and retained a new estate‑planning attorney, Paul Kanin. In May 2009 Martin executed a revocation of the February Trust and simultaneously created a new “May Trust” naming Clyde and Ronald Preissman as beneficiaries. The revocation bore only Martin’s signature; Diaz was not consulted. Martin died in January 2010.
Issues presented.
- Does Probate Code § 15401 (a)(2) provide a default revocation method that can be used even when a trust instrument designates a third party (here, an attorney) to approve revocation?
- If the statutory method is available, does the February Trust’s language make that method exclusive, thereby barring reliance on the statute?
Court’s analysis. The appellate court began by affirming the principle that § 15401 (a) offers two permissible revocation routes: (i) any method expressly set out in the trust instrument, and (ii) a written revocation signed by the settlor (or any other person holding the power of revocation) and delivered to the trustee. The statute’s sole limitation is that the alternative method is unavailable only when the trust explicitly declares its own method to be exclusive.
The court rejected Cundall’s distinction between “method” and “authority.” It noted that the statutory language defines “method” broadly, encompassing the procedural steps and the persons authorized to carry them out. The phrase “by any other person holding the power of revocation” in § 15401 (a)(2) expressly grants the settlor the ability to revoke even when a trust designates a protector or attorney to approve revocation, unless the trust unmistakably states that such third‑party approval is the exclusive avenue.
Turning to the exclusivity question, the court emphasized that “explicit” means a clear, unambiguous statement in plain language. The February Trust’s revocation clause required the settlor’s and attorney’s signatures but stopped short of declaring that requirement exclusive. The court cited Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738, which held that absent an explicit exclusivity clause, the statutory method remains available. The appellate panel also relied on the legislative history of § 15401, noting that Assembly Bill 1683 (2012) was intended to “provide a default method of revocation…unless the trust instrument explicitly makes the method…exclusive.” The Commission’s commentary confirmed that the statute was a compromise, preserving the settlor’s ability to use the statutory route unless the trust unmistakably blocks it.
The court further dismissed Cundall’s reliance on pre‑1986 case law (e.g., Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo), explaining that § 15401 superseded the earlier rule that a detailed trust‑specified method implied exclusivity. Post‑1986 jurisprudence, including Huscher v. Wells Fargo (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, treats exclusivity as a matter of explicit language, not inference.
Having resolved both sub‑issues, the appellate court concluded that Martin’s May 2009 revocation satisfied the statutory requirements: it was a writing signed by the settlor, delivered to the trustee (Martin himself). Consequently, the February Trust was effectively revoked, and the May Trust became the operative instrument. The trial court’s factual findings regarding Martin’s capacity and lack of undue influence were left undisturbed, as they were not at issue on appeal.
Disposition. The appellate court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, confirming that the February Trust was properly revoked under § 15401 (a)(2). Respondent Clyde was awarded costs on appeal.
Implications for practitioners. This decision reinforces the primacy of the statutory default revocation method in California trusts. Estate‑planning attorneys must be meticulous when drafting revocation clauses: to make a trust‑specified method exclusive, the language must state so unequivocally. Merely requiring a third‑party signature does not, by itself, preclude the settlor from using the statutory route. The ruling also clarifies that the presence of a “trust protector” does not automatically bar the settlor’s statutory power to revoke, unless the trust expressly declares the protector’s approval as the sole avenue.
For litigators, the opinion underscores the importance of isolating the precise statutory language and legislative intent when challenging revocations. The court’s reliance on Masry and the Commission’s commentary suggests that future disputes will hinge on whether the trust instrument contains an explicit exclusivity statement, not on the sophistication of the revocation procedure itself.
Unresolved questions. While the court settled the exclusivity issue, it left open how courts will treat trusts that contain ambiguous language suggesting exclusivity without a clear statement. Additionally, the decision did not address whether a trust protector’s refusal to sign a revocation could, under certain circumstances, constitute undue influence sufficient to invalidate a statutory revocation. Those factual nuances may surface in future appellate review.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code § 15401 – Alternative methods of revoking a revocable trust; exclusive‑method exception.
- Probate Code § 15400 – General revocability of trusts unless expressly made irrevocable.
- Doctrine of “explicit exclusivity” – Trust provisions must plainly state that a revocation method is exclusive to preclude statutory alternatives.
- Trust protector concept – Role of a designated third party in trust administration and revocation.
Key Cases Cited
- Masry v. Masry, 166 Cal.App.4th 738 (2008) – Interprets § 15401’s exclusivity requirement.
- Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 121 Cal.App.4th 956 (2004) – Discusses prior rule and the shift introduced by § 15401.
- Estate of Powell, 83 Cal.App.4th 1434 (2000) – Context for the legislative amendment of § 15401.
- Gardenhire v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.App.4th 882 (2005) – Dicta on default revocation method.
- People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co., 24 Cal.4th 415 (2000) – Standard of review for statutory interpretation.