Tukes v. Richard - Case Brief

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Tukes v. Richard

Case Number: B307242

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-07-12

Case Brief – Tukes v. Richard

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: B307242
Disposition: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s anti‑SLAPP rulings and fee awards, reversed the probate court’s dismissal of Tukes’s finder‑fee claim on the ground that issue preclusion was misapplied, and affirmed the probate court’s order directing counsel to pay expenses for repeated page‑limit violations.

Holding

The court held that Richard’s malicious‑prosecution suit failed for lack of standing, so the anti‑SLAPP motions and associated fee awards were proper; however, the probate court erred in applying issue preclusion to bar Tukes’s finder‑fee claim because a dismissal with prejudice does not satisfy the “actual litigation” requirement for collateral estoppel, and the Bennett Trustee may be sued independently of the Pitts Trustee.

Narrative

Lead – In a three‑pronged decision that intertwines California’s anti‑SLAPP framework with probate‑law preclusion doctrines, the Court of Appeal upheld a trial court’s striking of a malicious‑prosecution complaint and the attendant attorney‑fee awards, while simultaneously overturning a probate‑court dismissal of a creditor’s petition for a $350,000 finder’s fee on the basis that the lower court misapplied issue preclusion. The ruling clarifies the limits of standing in anti‑SLAPP actions, the proper calculation of fee awards, and, most importantly for probate practitioners, the distinction between claim and issue preclusion when a case is dismissed with prejudice.

Procedural History

The litigation arose from the sale of a contaminated parcel in Santa Fe Springs owned jointly by the Adeline R. Bennett Trust (the “Bennett Trust”) and the Pitts Grandchildren’s Trust (the “Pitts Trust”). In 2006 the two trustees entered a settlement agreement to sell the property, but no sale materialized for more than a decade. While a college student, Denise Tukes, with the knowledge of the Bennett trustee, identified a buyer—CenterPoint Properties—and facilitated the $13 million transaction. The trustees paid no broker’s commission.

Tukes subsequently sued the Pitts trustee (later removed to federal court and settled) for a finder’s fee. Although Pierre Richard, a beneficiary of the Bennett Trust, filed a two‑page answer to Tukes’s complaint, he never sought leave to intervene and was never designated a party. After the settlement, Richard filed a malicious‑prosecution suit against Tukes and her counsel, James A. Frieden. Both defendants moved to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (anti‑SLAPP). The trial court granted the motions, finding Richard lacked standing, and awarded attorney fees to both defendants.

Separately, Tukes filed a creditor’s petition in the probate court (the “475 Action”) seeking a $350,000 finder’s fee from the Bennett trustee, asserting breach of an implied contract and quantum meruit. Richard, as a beneficiary, moved for judgment on the pleadings. The probate court dismissed the petition, holding that Tukes’s earlier dismissal of similar claims against the Pitts trustee with prejudice effected issue preclusion, and also found the quantum‑meruit count insufficient as pled. Tukes appealed; Richard and his counsel, Robert A. Brown, cross‑appealed the probate court’s order requiring Brown to pay $4,000 in expenses for repeated page‑limit violations.

All three appeals were consolidated before the Second Appellate District, Division Eight.

Issues Presented

  1. Anti‑SLAPP Appeal (270 Action): Did Richard have standing to bring a malicious‑prosecution claim, and were the trial court’s fee awards under § 425.16(c)(1) proper?

  2. Probate Appeal (475 Action): Was the probate court correct in applying issue preclusion—based on Tukes’s prior dismissal with prejudice—to bar her finder’s‑fee claims against the Bennett trustee?

  3. Cross‑Appeal: Was the probate court’s order directing counsel to pay expenses for page‑limit violations within its discretion?

Court’s Analysis

1. Standing and Anti‑SLAPP Rulings
The appellate court applied the de novo standard for anti‑SLAPP motions (Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, 2020) and reviewed the fee awards for abuse of discretion (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 2008).

Standing. The court reiterated that “party” status requires either being named as plaintiff or defendant or obtaining court‑approved intervention under CCP § 387. Richard’s two‑page answer, filed without a petition for leave to intervene, did not satisfy § 387’s procedural prerequisites. The trial court correctly concluded that Richard was a “non‑party” on the docket and therefore lacked standing to sue for malicious prosecution. The appellate court rejected Richard’s reliance on cases such as Fireman’s Fund and Tyrrell where defendants were treated as parties after a voluntary appearance, emphasizing that those cases involved a clear, court‑sanctioned recognition of party status—absent here.

Fee Awards. The court affirmed the trial court’s award of fees to both Tukes’s and Frieden’s counsel. Under § 425.16(c)(1), a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees “regardless of the reason” for prevailing. The court rejected Richard’s argument that fees should be limited to work directly on the anti‑SLAPP motion, noting that all preparatory work—including monitoring the parallel probate action—was reasonably related to the anti‑SLAPP defense. The court also upheld the trial court’s discretion in accepting the Laffey Matrix, adjusted for local rates, as a basis for reasonable hourly fees (see Syers Properties III v. Rankin, 2014).

2. Issue Preclusion in the Probate Action
The core of the 475 Appeal turned on whether a dismissal with prejudice satisfies the “actual litigation” element of issue preclusion. The appellate court adopted the “dominant rule” articulated by Justice Moreno in Boeken v. Philip Morris (2010): a voluntary dismissal with prejudice does not constitute “actual litigation” of the issues for collateral estoppel purposes.

The court distinguished the probate court’s reliance on Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court (1989), which addressed claim preclusion, not issue preclusion. The appellate panel emphasized that DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) requires (1) a final adjudication, (2) of an identical issue, (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided, and (4) asserted against a party or privity. Because the Tukes Action was dismissed before any substantive adjudication of the finder’s‑fee issues, element (3) was unsatisfied. The court further cited Rice v. Crow (2000) and Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) to reinforce that pre‑trial dismissals, even with prejudice, do not create the “actual litigation” needed for issue preclusion.

Consequently, the probate court’s reliance on issue preclusion was erroneous, and the dismissal of Tukes’s claims was reversed.

Joint Liability of Trustees. Richard argued that the Pitts trustee’s dismissal rendered the Bennett trustee an indispensable party, barring suit. The appellate court rejected this, applying Civil Code § 1659, which presumes joint and several liability when multiple parties receive a benefit from a promise—express or implied. The court found that the implied contract and quantum‑meruit theories alleged against both trustees satisfy the statutory presumption, allowing the Bennett trustee to be sued independently.

3. Cross‑Appeal on Counsel Expenses
The court affirmed the probate court’s order requiring Robert A. Brown to pay $4,000 in expenses for repeated violations of the court’s page‑limit rules. The appellate panel held that the probate court acted within its inherent authority to enforce procedural rules and impose sanctions to preserve judicial efficiency.

Conclusion and Impact

The decision delivers three practical takeaways for California probate and civil litigators:

  • Standing in Anti‑SLAPP Contexts – A party must be formally recognized as such under § 387 before a malicious‑prosecution claim can survive an anti‑SLAPP motion. Unapproved “answers” do not confer standing.

  • Fee‑Award Discretion – Courts retain broad discretion to award fees for work “related” to the anti‑SLAPP motion, including ancillary monitoring of parallel litigation, and may rely on the Laffey Matrix with appropriate local adjustments.

  • Issue vs. Claim Preclusion – The appellate court reaffirmed that a dismissal with prejudice is insufficient to satisfy the “actual litigation” requirement for issue preclusion. Practitioners must therefore be cautious when relying on prior dismissals to bar future claims; a full adjudication of the issues is required.

The ruling also clarifies that joint‑and‑several liability under Civil Code § 1659 can attach to multiple trustees, allowing a creditor to pursue any one of them even if the other was previously dismissed.

Unresolved questions remain regarding the precise boundary between “related” work for fee awards and unrelated effort, and whether future Supreme Court clarification might narrow the distinction between claim and issue preclusion in the context of dismissals with prejudice. Nonetheless, the opinion provides a robust framework for navigating anti‑SLAPP defenses and preclusion doctrines in California probate litigation.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 – Anti‑SLAPP motion to strike; fee award provisions.
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 387 – Intervention requirements.
  • Probate Code § 1300(d) – Judgment on the pleadings (demurrer‑like standard).
  • Probate Code § 48 – Definition of “interested party.”
  • Civil Code § 1659 – Presumption of joint and several liability for multiple promisees.

Major Cases Cited

  • Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC, 2020 50 Cal.App.5th 1037 (de novo anti‑SLAPP review).
  • Baral v. Schnitt, 2016 1 Cal.5th 376 (burden on anti‑SLAPP defendant).
  • Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 2008 165 Cal.App.4th 1315 (fee‑award abuse‑of‑discretion review).
  • DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 2015 61 Cal.4th 813 (issue‑preclusion elements).
  • Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2010 48 Cal.4th 788 (dismissal with prejudice not “actual litigation”).
  • Kim v. Reins International California, Inc., 2020 9 Cal.5th 73 (claim preclusion from dismissal).
  • Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court, 1989 216 Cal.App.3d 813 (claim‑preclusion, not issue‑preclusion).
  • Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin, 2014 226 Cal.App.4th 691 (Laffey Matrix acceptance).
  • Rice v. Crow, 2000 81 Cal.App.4th 725 (settlement without trial does not satisfy issue preclusion).
  • Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 2003 110 Cal.App.4th 1161 (issue preclusion requires actual litigation).
  • Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc., 2006 138 Cal.App.4th 1215 (judgment‑on‑the‑pleadings standard).
  • Baughman v. State of California, 1995 38 Cal.App.4th 182 (review of demurrer/judgment‑on‑pleadings).
  • Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, 2020 51 Cal.App.5th 299 (waiver of unraised issues discretionary).