People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.

Case Number: B309234

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-05-16

Case Brief – People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B309234
Disposition: Order affirmed; respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that Emergency Rule 9, which tolled statutes of limitations for civil causes of action during the COVID‑19 emergency, does not toll the statutory “appearance period” for vacating a bail‑bond forfeiture under Penal Code §§ 1305‑1306; consequently, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment after the appearance period expired was proper.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that clarifies the reach of the Judicial Council’s pandemic‑era tolling provisions, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a summary‑judgment forfeiture of a $100,000 bail bond, rejecting the surety’s argument that Emergency Rule 9 extended the deadline for moving to set aside the forfeiture. The ruling underscores that bail‑bond forfeiture timelines, governed by the Penal Code, remain outside the ambit of the rule’s civil‑action tolling scheme.

Procedural background – Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (“Surety”) posted a $100,000 bail bond for defendant Vanessa Anderson in March 2019. After Anderson failed to appear on May 17, 2019, the Los Angeles County Superior Court declared the bond forfeited and mailed notice to Surety on May 23, 2019. Under Penal Code § 1305, Surety had 185 days to secure Anderson’s appearance; the court later extended that period by the maximum 180 days permitted by § 1305.4, moving the new deadline to June 10, 2020. When the appearance period lapsed without a successful appearance, the court entered summary judgment against Surety on July 31, 2020, pursuant to Penal Code § 1306.

Surety filed a motion on August 17, 2020 to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), contending that the statewide shelter‑in‑place order and the resulting inability to locate Anderson constituted a judicial emergency (CCP §§ 12, 12a) and an “excusable mistake.” The trial court denied the motion on October 16, 2020. Surety appealed, arguing that Emergency Rule 9—adopted by the Judicial Council to toll statutes of limitations for civil causes of action from April 6, 2020 through October 1, 2020—also tolled the appearance period, rendering the summary judgment premature.

Issues – The appellate court addressed two intertwined questions: (1) whether Emergency Rule 9 applies to the appearance period prescribed by Penal Code §§ 1305‑1306, and (2) whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment before the expiration of a tolled period violated any statutory or procedural rights.

Statutory framework – Penal Code §§ 1305(a) and (c) set the 185‑day appearance period and enumerate limited excuses for vacating a forfeiture. Section 1305.4 permits a single extension of up to 180 days. Section 1306(a) mandates that, absent a successful motion to vacate, the court must enter a summary judgment against the surety. Emergency Rule 9, effective April 6, 2020, tolls “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action” that exceed 180 days, until October 1, 2020. The rule’s Advisory Committee comment emphasizes that the tolling applies to “the filing of a pleading in court asserting a civil cause of action,” including special civil proceedings.

Court’s analysis – The appellate court began by affirming its independent authority to interpret Judicial Council rules, citing People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33 and In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013. Applying traditional rules of statutory construction, the court examined the plain language of Emergency Rule 9, the Advisory Committee comment, and the circulating order that accompanied the rule.

The court concluded that the appearance period is not a statute of limitations. Unlike a limitations period that governs when a plaintiff may initiate a civil action, the appearance period is a procedural window embedded in the bail‑bond contract, allowing the surety to cure its breach by producing the defendant or to demonstrate an excusable failure. The court highlighted that a motion to vacate a forfeiture is a defensive filing within an existing civil proceeding, not the initiation of a new cause of action. Accordingly, the motion does not “commence a pleading” as contemplated by Emergency Rule 9.

Relying on precedent, the court noted that bail‑forfeiture proceedings are “collateral” civil matters distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution, but they are governed by specific penal statutes rather than the general civil pleading regime. The court rejected Surety’s reliance on People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, emphasizing that the cited case dealt with appealability, not with the nature of the forfeiture proceeding. The court also dismissed the argument that the appearance period is a “statute of limitations” by referencing People v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 773, where the court’s analogy to a limitations period was not a binding definition.

Having determined that Emergency Rule 9 does not toll the appearance period, the appellate court found no error in the trial court’s entry of summary judgment after the statutory deadline passed. The court therefore affirmed the judgment and awarded costs to the respondent.

Impact and unresolved questions – This decision draws a clear line between the Judicial Council’s pandemic tolling rule and the specialized timelines of bail‑bond forfeiture. Practitioners should note that the appearance period remains fixed by Penal Code §§ 1305‑1306, irrespective of broader civil‑action tolling measures. The ruling also reinforces the principle that “civil causes of action” for tolling purposes exclude defensive motions within ongoing special proceedings.

Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open the question of whether other statutory deadlines embedded in special civil proceedings—such as certain administrative or probate time limits—might be considered “civil causes of action” for purposes of Emergency Rule 9. Future litigation may test the boundary where a procedural deadline functions both as a limitation period and as a contractual cure period.

Conclusion – By holding that Emergency Rule 9 does not extend the appearance period for bail‑bond forfeiture, the Court of Appeal preserved the integrity of the Penal Code’s forfeiture scheme and provided a definitive answer for sureties navigating post‑COVID‑19 procedural landscapes. The decision serves as a reminder that pandemic‑related tolling rules, however expansive, do not automatically sweep in specialized statutory timelines unless the language expressly captures them.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Penal Code §§ 1305, 1305.4, 1306 – Bail‑bond forfeiture procedures and appearance period.
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 473(b), 12, 12a – Relief from judgment; judicial emergency.
Emergency Rule 9 (Judicial Council of California) – Tolling of statutes of limitations for civil causes of action (effective 4/6/2020 – 10/1/2020).
Advisory Committee Comment & Circulating Order (CO‑20‑09) – Interpretive guidance for Emergency Rule 9.

Key Cases Cited