Meiri v. Shamtoubi

Case Number: B310619

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-07-25

Case Brief – Meiri v. Shamtoubi

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B310619
Disposition: The order is affirmed. Tale Shamtoubi, as trustee of the Shamtoubi Trust, is awarded her costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that a beneficiary’s untimely filing of a petition that seeks to invalidate a trust amendment constitutes a “direct contest” within the meaning of Probate Code §§ 21310‑21311, and that the untimeliness itself satisfies the statutory requirement of lacking probable cause; consequently, the trust’s no‑contest clause was properly enforced, and the beneficiary was disinherited as if she had predeceased the trustors without issue.

Narrative

Lead – In a sharply divided intrafamily dispute, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial‑court order that stripped a daughter‑beneficiary of her interest in a family trust after she pursued a belated challenge to the trust’s 2014 amendment. The decision underscores the Court’s willingness to enforce “no‑contest” (in terrorem) clauses strictly, even when the contest is filed after the statutory 120‑day window, so long as the pleading alleges a direct attack on the trust instrument.

Procedural backdrop – Tale Shamtoubi, the surviving spouse and trustee of the Shamtoubi Trust, sought a protective instruction after her daughter, Minoo Meiri, filed a petition on July 10 2019—approximately 230 days after the trustee’s statutory notice under Probate Code § 16061.7—seeking to void the 2014 amendment and restatement on grounds of lack of capacity, undue influence, and fraud. The trial court, applying Probate Code §§ 21310‑21311, concluded that Meiri’s suit was a “direct contest” filed without probable cause and therefore triggered the trust’s no‑contest clause, which stripped Meiri of any future interest as if she had predeceased the trustors. Meiri appealed.

Key facts – The original 1994 trust named the four Shamtoubi children as remainder beneficiaries of a sub‑trust that would become payable upon the death of the surviving spouse. In 2014 the trust was amended and restated, redistributing benefits to reflect prior loans and gifts among the children. The amendment contains a no‑contest clause that declares any beneficiary who “directly or indirectly contests” the trust or any amendment “shall be deemed to have predeceased the trustors without surviving issue.” The clause defines a “direct contest” as a pleading that alleges invalidity of the document on any of ten enumerated grounds, including lack of capacity, fraud, undue influence, duress, or mistake.

Legal issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions: (1) Whether an untimely petition that seeks to void a trust amendment qualifies as a “direct contest” under §§ 21310‑21311; and (2) Whether the untimeliness alone satisfies the statutory “lack of probable cause” prong, thereby permitting enforcement of the no‑contest clause without a substantive evidentiary hearing.

Court’s analysis –

1. Statutory framework – The Court reiterated that California law treats no‑contest clauses as enforceable “disinheritance devices” so long as the condition is not prohibited by public policy (Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal.4th 412). The 2010 amendments to Probate Code §§ 21310‑21313, prompted by the Law Revision Commission’s 2008 report, narrowed the enforceable scope to three circumstances, one of which is a “direct contest … brought without probable cause.”

2. Direct contest despite tardiness – The Court rejected Meiri’s reliance on pre‑2010 cases (Estate of Lewy; Estate of Crisler) that distinguished “contests” from procedural challenges. Those cases did not address the post‑2010 statutory scheme and, more importantly, focused on the substance of the pleading rather than its timeliness. Here, Meiri’s petition plainly sought a declaration that the 2014 amendment was void—a classic “clear and unequivocal attack” on the protected instrument, squarely within the statutory definition of a direct contest.

3. Untimeliness as lack of probable cause – Section 21311(b) defines probable cause as a reasonable likelihood that relief will be granted after an opportunity for further investigation. The Court emphasized that the Legislature expressly tied the probable‑cause inquiry to the “purposes of this section,” which include both substantive merit and procedural bars. The 120‑day limitation in § 16061.8 is a statutory bar designed to “settle property rights within a reasonable time” (Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Superior Court). By filing after that period, Meiri could not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success; the procedural defect alone satisfies the lack‑of‑probable‑cause requirement. The Court dismissed Meiri’s analogy to the malicious‑prosecution standard, noting that the Probate Code’s probable‑cause test is a distinct, more stringent metric intended to deter not merely frivolous but any untimely contest that threatens the donor’s intent.

4. No evidentiary hearing required – Because the statutory scheme provides a categorical penalty for a direct contest without probable cause, the Court held that an evidentiary hearing on the merits is unnecessary. The trial court’s determination that Meiri’s filing was untimely and therefore lacked probable cause was therefore correct as a matter of law.

Disposition – The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, confirming that Meiri is disinherited under the trust’s no‑contest clause and awarding costs to Trustee Tale Shamtoubi.

Impact and unresolved questions – Meiri v. Shamtoubi reinforces the California courts’ strict construction of no‑contest clauses post‑2010, signaling to practitioners that procedural compliance (the 120‑day notice period) is not a mere technicality but a substantive element of the probable‑cause analysis. The decision also clarifies that a beneficiary cannot evade the clause by framing a late filing as a “non‑direct” grievance; the language of the pleading governs.

Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open the question of how courts will treat “indirect contests” that fall outside the enumerated grounds but nevertheless challenge the trust’s administration. Moreover, the Court did not address whether equitable tolling might apply where a beneficiary can demonstrate that the statutory notice was defective—a scenario that could arise in larger, multi‑generational trusts. Practitioners should therefore ensure timely filing of any contest and be prepared to argue the existence of probable cause on the merits if the contest is filed within the statutory window.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

• Probate Code §§ 16061.7‑16061.8 – Mandatory notice and 120‑day contest period.
• Probate Code §§ 21310‑21313 – Definitions of “direct contest,” “probable cause,” and enforcement of no‑contest clauses.
• Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal.4th 412 (2013) – Validity of no‑contest clauses.
• Burch v. George, 7 Cal.4th 246 (1994) – Construction of donor intent in no‑contest clauses.
• Key v. Tyler, 34 Cal.App.5th 505 (2019) – Application of § 21311’s probable‑cause standard.
• Estate of Black, 160 Cal.App.3d 582 (1984) – “Clear and unequivocal attack” triggers penalty.
• Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.App.2d 551 (1937) – Purpose of probate statutes of limitations.
• Law Revision Commission Report, Revision of No Contest Clause Statute (Jan. 2008) – Legislative intent behind 2010 amendments.

These authorities collectively shape the current California approach to enforcing no‑contest provisions in trusts and wills.