Welch v. Welch - Case Brief

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Welch v. Welch

Case Number: B311507

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-05-31

Case Brief – Welch v. Welch

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B311507
Disposition: Reversed and remanded.

Holding

The court held that the five‑page mediation settlement agreement (MSA) executed by Freeman H. Welch and his late wife Patricia Ann Welch constituted a “complete property settlement” within Probate Code § 145, thereby operating as a statutory waiver of Freeman’s surviving‑spouse rights under Probate Code § 141. Accordingly, the probate court’s finding that the MSA was not a complete settlement was erroneous, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination.

Narrative

Lead

In a decision that clarifies the reach of California’s surviving‑spouse waiver provisions, the Court of Appeal reversed a Los Angeles probate judge’s refusal to recognize a 2017 mediation settlement as a full property settlement, holding that the agreement waived the surviving spouse’s inheritance and personal‑representative rights despite the parties never obtaining a formal dissolution judgment before the wife’s death.

Procedural History

The dispute began in the family‑law division of the Los Angeles Superior Court. After 36 years of marriage, Freeman and Patricia Welch separated in September 2015 and filed for dissolution. In October 2017 the parties, each represented by counsel, executed a handwritten five‑page mediation settlement agreement (the “MSA”) that divided community and quasi‑community assets, addressed spousal support, and provided a mechanism for resolving any residual disputes through the mediator.

Patricia objected to Freeman’s draft judgment and, in January 2018, refused to sign it, insisting that any disagreements be resolved by the mediator as the MSA required. Freeman filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 to enforce the MSA and enter a judgment; the motion was continued, and the parties never obtained a final dissolution decree because Patricia died on June 16 2018. The trial court later vacated the July 2018 judgment it had inadvertently entered, citing lack of jurisdiction after the spouse’s death.

Brendon Welch, one of the couple’s adult sons, then filed a petition in probate court for letters of administration of Patricia’s estate and a Section 850 petition seeking a declaration of heirship, a constructive trust, and quiet‑title relief. Freeman opposed, asserting that the MSA was not a “complete property settlement” and therefore did not waive his statutory rights as a surviving spouse under Probate Code §§ 141, 145. On January 14 2021 the probate judge denied Brendon’s petitions, upheld Freeman’s status as a surviving spouse, and held that the MSA was not a complete settlement. Brendon appealed; the appellate panel issued a prior unpublished opinion (Welch v. Welch, B295880, June 3 2020) affirming the family‑court’s dismissal of the dissolution judgment. The present appeal addressed the probate court’s contrary conclusion.

Facts

The MSA listed specific assets—real property, retirement accounts, a timeshare, automobiles, and a detailed inventory of garage contents—assigning each to either petitioner (Patricia) or respondent (Freeman) on a 50/50 basis where appropriate, and providing for an equalization payment to be calculated after a “Propertizer” valuation. The agreement also contained a catch‑all clause granting each party all personal property in the marital home not otherwise enumerated, and a waiver of any further credits or reimbursements. Both parties signed the MSA and their attorneys signed as well.

Prior to mediation, each spouse filed a Family Code § 2104 preliminary declaration of disclosure, satisfying the statutory requirement that each party disclose all assets and liabilities with sufficient particularity. No final disclosures were exchanged, but Freeman later waived receipt of Patricia’s final declaration. After the MSA’s execution, Freeman prepared two draft judgments; Patricia objected to the first, prompting Freeman to prepare a second “mirror‑image” draft that he claimed reflected the MSA. The parties never resolved the draft‑judgment disputes because the mediator was never called upon; the family court ultimately could not enter a judgment after Patricia’s death.

  1. Whether the MSA qualifies as a “complete property settlement” under Probate Code § 145, thereby effecting a statutory waiver of Freeman’s surviving‑spouse rights.
  2. If the MSA is a valid waiver, whether it is enforceable under the procedural safeguards of Probate Code §§ 142‑144 (fair and reasonable disclosure, independent counsel).
  3. Whether the failure to obtain a formal dissolution judgment or a final declaration of disclosure under the Family Code defeats the waiver.

Court’s Analysis

1. Definition of “Complete Property Settlement”

The appellate court emphasized that § 145 provides two mechanisms for a surviving‑spouse waiver: an express “all rights” clause or a “complete property settlement” entered into after or in anticipation of separation. The statute does not require the parties to label the agreement as “complete.” The court rejected Freeman’s insistence that the absence of such language rendered the MSA incomplete, noting that statutory language makes the label unnecessary.

Relying on contract‑interpretation principles—de novo review of the agreement’s language, the parties’ intent, and surrounding circumstances—the court found that the MSA’s detailed allocation of every identified community and quasi‑community asset, the inclusion of a catch‑all provision for unlisted personal property, and the parties’ expressed desire that the court adopt the MSA as its order collectively demonstrate an intent to settle all property issues. The court distinguished the present case from Miller v. Miller (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 785, observing that Miller pre‑dated the Probate Code’s waiver provisions and that the modern statutory scheme focuses on the totality of the parties’ intent rather than a formal “complete” label.

2. Enforceability Under §§ 142‑144

Having concluded the MSA is a statutory waiver, the court turned to the enforceability requirements. Section 142 mandates a written, signed waiver; the MSA satisfies both. Section 143(a) bars enforcement only if the surviving spouse can show (1) a lack of fair and reasonable disclosure of the decedent’s property or (2) the absence of independent counsel at signing.

Freeman offered no evidence of any undisclosed assets; the record shows both spouses exchanged preliminary disclosures under Family Code § 2104, which the court deemed “fair and reasonable” for the purposes of § 143. Moreover, Freeman’s own filings acknowledge receipt of Patricia’s disclosures, and he even waived her final declaration. Regarding counsel, both parties were represented by attorneys at the time of execution, satisfying the second prong. Consequently, Freeman failed to meet his burden, and the waiver is enforceable.

The court also addressed Freeman’s alternative reliance on § 144, which permits enforcement when a court finds the waiver “fair and reasonable” or when the surviving spouse had adequate knowledge of the decedent’s assets. The appellate panel found no factual basis to invoke § 144, as § 143 already validated the waiver.

3. Effect of Unfinished Family‑Court Proceedings

Freeman argued that because the family court never entered a dissolution judgment, the MSA could not operate. The appellate court rejected this, citing Civil Code § 1598, which voids contracts only when their sole purpose is impossible or unlawful. The MSA had multiple independent purposes—property division, spousal support, dispute‑resolution procedures—none of which were rendered impossible by the lack of a judgment. The property settlement portion, therefore, remains effective independent of any judgment.

Similarly, Freeman contended that the absence of a final declaration of disclosure under Family Code § 2105 invalidated the waiver. The court held that the probate‑code waiver scheme is distinct from the family‑code disclosure regime; § 145’s disclosure requirements are less stringent and operate independently. Imposing Family Code § 2105 requirements on a probate‑code waiver would defeat the legislative intent of Chapter 1, which expressly allows waivers to be effective even when the parties have not filed a dissolution petition.

Holding and Disposition

The appellate court held that the MSA is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of Probate Code § 145 and therefore constitutes a valid statutory waiver of Freeman’s surviving‑spouse rights under § 141. The probate court’s finding to the contrary was erroneous. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further probate proceedings consistent with the waiver.

Impact and Unresolved Issues

This decision sharpens the interpretation of “complete property settlement” in the context of surviving‑spouse waivers, confirming that a written, signed agreement that allocates all community and quasi‑community assets—regardless of whether it expressly labels itself “complete”—satisfies § 145. Practitioners should note that:

  • Disclosure sufficiency: Preliminary disclosures under Family Code § 2104 are deemed “fair and reasonable” for probate‑code waivers; a final disclosure is not required.
  • Independent counsel: The presence of counsel at execution is sufficient; the waiver survives even if one spouse later claims inadequate advice.
  • Judgment independence: Property‑settlement provisions survive the failure to obtain a formal dissolution judgment, provided the agreement contains distinct, enforceable obligations.

The ruling leaves open the question of how courts will treat waivers where the parties’ disclosures are contested or where the agreement omits a material asset that later surfaces. Additionally, the decision does not address the interplay between § 145 waivers and the “spousal election” provisions of Probate Code § 141.5, which may become litigated in future estate‑planning contexts.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code §§ 140‑147 – Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights (Chapter 1, Division 2, Part 3).
  • Probate Code § 141 – Rights of a surviving spouse (subdivision (a)).
  • Probate Code § 145 – Definition of “complete property settlement” and statutory waiver.
  • Probate Code §§ 142‑144 – Formal requirements and enforceability of waivers.
  • Family Code §§ 2102, 2104, 2105 – Disclosure requirements in dissolution actions (referred to but held distinct).
  • Civil Code § 1598 – Void contracts for impossibility or illegality.
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6 – Enforcement of settlement agreements in family law.
  • Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1636, 1638, 1647 – Contract interpretation principles.
  • Key Cases:
    • People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1423 – statutory interpretation de novo.
    • Safarian v. Govgassian (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1053 – marital settlement agreements governed by contract law.
    • Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234 – contract interpretation and extrinsic evidence.
    • Miller v. Miller (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 785 – property settlement completeness (historical context).
    • Estate of Gibson (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1486 – statutory waiver under § 145.
    • Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344 – enforceability of contracts despite subsequent disputes.