Case Number: B318131
Court: California Supreme Court
Date Filed: September 01, 2025
Holding
The court held that when a revocable‑trust instrument specifies a particular procedure for amendment and does not expressly make that procedure exclusive, the trust’s own amendment provisions control; consequently, the 2007 document signed by the settlor but not delivered by certified mail did not satisfy the trust’s amendment requirements and was invalid.
The Los Angeles County Court of Appeal affirmed a trial‑court ruling that a purported 2007 amendment to a revocable trust was ineffective because it failed to follow the amendment method set out in the trust instrument. The decision resolves a split among California appellate courts over whether Probate Code §§ 15401 and 15402 or the trust’s own terms govern amendments when the instrument outlines a method but stops short of declaring it exclusive. The ruling follows the line of authority advanced in Balistreri v. Balistreri and the majority opinion in King v. Lynch, reinforcing the principle that a settlor may bind himself to a specific amendment procedure by expressly providing that method in the trust.
Procedural backdrop
Robert Diaz and other beneficiaries (the appellants) appealed a June 30, 2021 final statement of decision entered by Judge Brenda J. Penny of the Los Angeles Superior Court. The trial court had held that the 2007 document—found after the settlor’s death in a closet and never mailed to the trustee—did not meet the trust’s amendment requirement that the settlor “deliver[ed] … by certified mail to the Trustee.” The appellate panel reviewed the issue de novo because it involved statutory construction and trust‑instrument interpretation, not credibility determinations.
Factual matrix
Mateo Diaz, the settlor‑trustor and sole trustee during his lifetime, executed a revocable trust that became irrevocable upon his death on May 6, 2018. Article X of the trust provides a single, detailed amendment procedure: an amendment must be a written instrument signed by the settlor and delivered by certified mail to the trustee. Article IX governs revocation and contains only a general statement that the trust may be revoked “in whole or in part by the Trustor during Trustor’s lifetime,” without prescribing a delivery method.
After Mateo’s death, an envelope containing a dated 2007 amendment was discovered in his bedroom closet. The amendment sought to reallocate two parcels of real‑estate—one in Montclair, the other in Temple City—among the seven siblings and other beneficiaries. The document bore Mateo’s signature but had never been mailed to the trustee, nor was there any evidence that Mateo intended the amendment to be effective.
Legal issue
Which rule governs the validity of a settlor’s amendment when the trust instrument specifies a method but does not expressly declare that method exclusive: (1) Probate Code §§ 15401/15402, which provide default statutory procedures, or (2) the trust’s own amendment clause?
Statutory framework
- Probate Code § 15401(a) permits revocation either by a method expressly provided in the trust (if the trust makes that method exclusive) or by a writing signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee during the settlor’s lifetime.
- Probate Code § 15402 states that, “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise,” a revocable trust may be modified by the same procedure used for revocation.
The statutes thus create a default rule (use the statutory method) that is displaced only when the trust explicitly makes its own method exclusive for revocation (15401) or, by implication, for modification (15402).
Divided authority
California appellate courts are split. King v. Lynch and Balistreri v. Balistreri hold that a trust’s specified amendment method controls, even absent an exclusivity clause. Conversely, Haggerty v. Thornton and the dissent in King argue that the statutory amendment procedure remains available unless the trust expressly bars it. The California Supreme Court has granted review of both Balistreri and Haggerty, indicating the issue’s significance.
Court’s analysis
The appellate court adopted the reasoning of Balistreri and the King majority. It emphasized the plain language of § 15402: the settlor may modify the trust “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.” The phrase “provides otherwise” is read as a direct, explicit statement that the trust’s own method is exclusive, mirroring the language required in § 15401(a)(1). Because Article X of the trust does not contain an exclusivity clause, the court concluded that the trust’s amendment provision itself displaces the statutory default.
The court rejected the Haggerty line of reasoning, which treated “provides otherwise” as a broader limitation—i.e., that the trust must distinguish between revocation and amendment to invoke the statutory method. The appellate panel found that the trust already distinguishes the two processes (Article IX for revocation, Article X for amendment) and therefore provides otherwise with respect to amendment, rendering the statutory route unavailable.
The court also addressed the appellants’ argument that the distinction between certified‑mail delivery and ordinary delivery is inconsequential. Citing Conservatorship of Irvine and other precedent, the court noted that the settlor’s choice of a more stringent delivery method reflects a clear intent to safeguard the trust against undue influence. Accordingly, the failure to comply with that method defeats any inference of intent to amend.
Result
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the 2007 document was not a valid amendment. Marisela Zuniga, the respondent‑co‑trustee, was awarded costs on appeal.
Implications
The decision reinforces the view that a settlor may “lock in” a particular amendment procedure by expressly prescribing it, even without an exclusivity clause. Practitioners should counsel clients that any amendment must strictly follow the method set out in the trust instrument; otherwise, the amendment will be deemed ineffective regardless of statutory fallback provisions. The ruling also signals that California’s Supreme Court, while reviewing Balistreri and Haggerty, may ultimately adopt a uniform rule favoring the trust’s own terms, thereby providing greater predictability for trust drafting and litigation.
Unresolved questions remain about how courts will treat trusts that use permissive language (“may amend”) without an exclusivity statement but also lack a detailed delivery requirement. The pending Supreme Court review will likely clarify whether the “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” language in § 15402 requires an express exclusivity clause or can be satisfied by any non‑exclusive procedural provision.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code § 15401 – Revocation methods; exclusivity requirement.
- Probate Code § 15402 – Modification of revocable trusts; “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.”
- Doctrine of Trust‑Instrument Primacy – Intent determined from the instrument itself (see Burch v. George, 7 Cal. 4th 246).
- Standard of Review – De novo for statutory construction and trust interpretation (see Pena v. Day, 39 Cal.App.5th 546).
Major Cases Cited
- Balistreri v. Balistreri, 75 Cal.App.5th 511 (2022) – Trust amendment provisions control.
- King v. Lynch, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (2012) – Trust‑specified amendment method governs; dissent favoring statutory flexibility.
- Haggerty v. Thornton, 68 Cal.App.5th 1003 (2021) – Statutory amendment method available absent exclusive trust provision (dissent).
- Conservatorship of Irvine, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 (1995) – Trust amendment procedures reflect settlor’s intent to prevent undue influence.
- Cundall v. Mitchell‑Clyde, 51 Cal.App.5th 571 (2020) – Requirement of explicit exclusivity clause for statutory revocation method to prevail.
- Brown v. Labow, 157 Cal.App.4th 795 (2007) – Primary rule in trust construction: ascertain settlor’s intent from the instrument.
- Burch v. George, 7 Cal. 4th 246 (1992) – Intent first looked to within the trust document.