Case Number: B320383
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three
Date Filed: 2025‑08‑31
Case Brief – Estate of Flores
Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Case: B320383 – Estate of ROBERT ALLEN FLORES, Deceased. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18STPB08481)
Parties: BRENDA DEPEW, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner, v. DONALD C. CARMODY, Objector and Appellant; AMERICAN RESEARCH BUREAU, INC., Claimant and Respondent.
Date: 2025‑08‑31
Disposition: Appeal affirmed; trial court’s final‑distribution order giving effect to Donald Carmody’s 2018 assignment of his share to his brother John L. Carmody was proper.
Holding
The court held that the October 2019 order determining the heirs of Robert Allen Flores was conclusive only as to the identities and statutory shares of the heirs and did not preclude the probate court from later enforcing a valid assignment of one heir’s interest to another; consequently, the trial court correctly honored Donald Carmody’s 2018 assignment to John L. Carmody and distributed the estate accordingly.
Narrative
When an heir‑hunter firm told Donald Carmody that he was the maternal uncle of a long‑forgotten nephew, his first instinct was distrust. Believing the outreach to be a scam, Donald signed a simple “Assignment of Interest in Estate” in December 2018, transferring whatever share he might later acquire in the nephew’s intestate estate to his brother, John Carmody. The assignment was executed without fanfare, the parties assuming the estate held little value.
The reality proved otherwise. Robert Allen Flores died intestate on September 2, 2012, leaving no surviving spouse, children, parents or siblings. In September 2018, American Research Bureau, Inc. (ARB), an heir‑finder, identified John and Donald as the decedent’s maternal uncles—his only heirs under California intestacy law. ARB offered to assist the brothers in securing their inheritance and, when Donald balked, suggested he could assign his prospective share to John.
John promptly filed a petition under Probate Code § 11700 seeking a determination of entitlement to distribution. The petition listed only the two brothers as heirs, each entitled to a 50 percent share. No reference was made to the December 2018 assignment, nor to John’s later agreement assigning a quarter of his interest to ARB. The court, after giving proper notice, entered an Order Determining Entitlement to Estate Distribution in October 2019, confirming John and Donald as the sole heirs‑at‑law, each with an equal share.
John died in August 2020, leaving a will that bequeathed his entire estate to his step‑daughters, Kara Masteller and Dawn Bailey, who were appointed executors of his estate. In early 2021, the administrator of Flores’s estate, Brenda Depew, filed a First and Final Account and a petition for final distribution. Depew’s proposed distribution mirrored the 2019 order: 50 percent to John and 50 percent to Donald.
At that point, Donald’s attorney reminded the court that Donald had already assigned his interest to John. The administrator, unaware of John’s death, sought clarification. Donald objected to the proposed distribution, arguing that the 2019 order was final and binding on all questions of entitlement, including the effect of his prior assignment. He further contended that John had waived the assignment by failing to file a statement of interest in the § 11700 proceeding and that, because John never raised the assignment, the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce it.
The trial court rejected every facet of Donald’s argument. It held that the § 11700 proceeding was limited to determining heirship and the statutory shares of the heirs; it did not—and could not—address derivative contractual rights such as assignments. Accordingly, the October 2019 order did not decide whether John, as an assignee, owned Donald’s half‑share. The court also found that failure to file a statement of interest under Probate Code § 11702(b)(2) does not forfeit an interested party’s rights, merely bars further participation in that particular proceeding. Because John’s assignment was a valid contract, and because Donald had freely transferred his interest, the court ordered that the estate’s residue be paid to John’s executors, who would then honor the internal arrangement between the brothers.
Donald appealed, asserting that the trial court erred on three grounds: (1) the 2019 order was collateral estoppel‑binding on the assignment; (2) John’s failure to file a statement of interest amounted to a waiver; and (3) the assignment was void for lack of consideration or duress. The appellate panel, reviewing de novo, found no error.
1. Scope of a § 11700 Determination
The court began by parsing the statutory scheme. Probate Code § 11700 authorizes any person claiming a right to distribution to petition for a determination of who is entitled to what share. § 11702 requires interested persons to file a written statement of interest; failure to do so “does not affect the person’s interest” but merely limits participation. § 11705 makes the resulting order “binding and conclusive as to the rights of all interested persons” with respect to the matters actually adjudicated.
The appellate court emphasized that the 2019 order only adjudicated heirship—the identities of John and Donald and their statutory 50‑percent shares. It did not adjudicate any contractual rights arising from the later assignment. The court cited Chever v. Ching Hong Poy (1889) 82 Cal. 68 and Parr v. Reyman (1932) 215 Cal. 616, which hold that a probate distribution decree is conclusive as to heirs, devisees, and legatees, but does not affect the validity of an heir’s separate contract to assign his interest.
2. Failure to File a Statement of Interest Is Not Waiver
Donald’s reliance on the absence of a statement of interest under § 11702(b)(2) was rebuffed. The appellate panel pointed to the explicit statutory language that a failure to file “does not otherwise affect” the person’s interest. The court rejected the notion that non‑filing operates as a waiver, noting that the purpose of the filing requirement is to give notice and allow participation, not to extinguish derivative rights. The panel distinguished Ward (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 207, which pre‑dated the modern § 11702 language and therefore did not control.
3. The Assignment Was Not Void for Lack of Consideration or Duress
Donald argued that the assignment lacked consideration because he believed the estate held no value. The court applied the well‑settled principle that a contract need not be supported by consideration if the assignor voluntarily relinquishes a right, even if that right is of negligible monetary worth. Moreover, the record showed Donald signed the assignment after consulting with ARB and expressly directing that any payment be made to John. The court found no evidence of duress; the assignment was a legitimate conveyance of a future interest.
4. Jurisdiction to Enforce Assignments
The appellate panel addressed whether Probate Code § 11604, which authorizes the court to consider “any person other than a beneficiary…under an agreement, request, or instructions of a beneficiary,” applied. The court concluded that § 11604 provides the probate court with authority to enforce valid assignments in a final‑distribution proceeding, even though the assignment was not raised in the earlier § 11700 hearing. The court rejected Donald’s contention that the earlier proceeding barred later consideration of the assignment, noting that the statute does not impose such a limitation.
5. Policy Considerations
Beyond statutory construction, the court underscored a pragmatic policy: allowing parties to enforce valid assignments prevents unnecessary litigation and honors the parties’ expectations. To treat an assignment as void merely because it was not litigated in a prior heirship proceeding would incentivize parties to withhold assignments until after final distribution, creating chaos and undermining the efficiency of probate administration.
Closing Analysis
The Estate of Flores decision clarifies a long‑standing tension in California probate law between the in‑rem nature of heirship determinations and the contractual rights of assignees. By affirming that a § 11700 order is conclusive only as to the identities and statutory shares of heirs, the court preserves the integrity of the heirship proceeding while simultaneously recognizing the probate court’s jurisdiction to enforce valid assignments under § 11604.
Practically, probate practitioners must now be vigilant to file statements of interest when they intend to assert derivative rights, but they can be reassured that failure to do so does not extinguish those rights. Moreover, parties should document assignments promptly and consider filing a supplemental petition or motion to recognize the assignment before the final‑distribution order, though the Flores court makes clear that such a step is not strictly required.
Unresolved issues remain. The decision leaves open the question of whether an assignee may raise a claim of fraud or duress in a later proceeding if the original assignment was not contested in the heirship petition. Additionally, the appellate panel did not address the potential impact of the doctrine of laches on delayed enforcement of assignments, a point briefly raised by ARB but not fully explored.
Overall, Estate of Flores reinforces the principle that probate courts can and should adjudicate contractual claims separate from heirship determinations, ensuring that the distribution of an estate reflects both statutory succession rules and the parties’ contractual expectations. Attorneys handling intestate estates should incorporate this dual‑track approach into their case strategies, particularly when heir‑finder firms or other third parties are involved.