Marriage of Diamond - Case Brief

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Case Number: B321833
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven
Date Filed: August 31, 2025

Holding

The court held that Susan Diamond failed to meet her burden of proof on both the mental‑incapacity and duress grounds under Family Code section 2122, and therefore the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside the 2015 dissolution judgment was affirmed.

Narrative

Susan Diamond’s appeal raises a familiar but thorny question for family‑law judges: when, if ever, may a judgment in a dissolution proceeding be vacated on the basis of mental incapacity or duress? The appellate panel, reviewing a two‑year‑long evidentiary record, concluded that the trial court’s denial was supported by the weight of the evidence and that the statutory standards for relief under Family Code § 2122 were not satisfied.

Procedural backdrop. Susan and Troy Diamond married in 1992 and separated in 2008. After a brief, abandoned 2008 filing, Susan filed a new petition on December 19, 2013. The case proceeded largely without her participation. Her counsel withdrew in July 2014 after repeated failures to respond to discovery and to appear at a hearing on the withdrawal. From that point forward Susan was self‑represented, missed every scheduled conference, and did not appear at the May 5, 2015 trial. The court entered a default judgment on June 17, 2015, awarding Troy sole custody of the younger daughter, $724 monthly child support, reimbursement of roughly $40,000 in child‑support expenses, and approximately $275,000 in property and attorney‑fee awards. The judgment was entered on November 25, 2015.

The motion to set aside. In November 2016 Susan filed a request to vacate the judgment on the basis of “mistake” (Family Code § 2122(e)). The trial court dismissed the request as barred by the disentitlement doctrine, a decision later upheld on appeal. In November 2017 Susan filed a second request, this time invoking duress and mental incapacity under § 2122(c) and (d). She alleged that severe back pain, seizures, migraines, depression, and an abusive marriage rendered her unable to comprehend the proceedings and that Troy’s conduct—particularly his refusal to allow her contact with the children—constituted duress.

Statutory framework. Section 2122 limits post‑judgment relief to six months for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” (CCP 473(b)) and to two years for duress or mental incapacity. The moving party bears the burden of proving that the alleged condition “materially affected” the original outcome and that relief would “materially benefit” the movant. The appellate court reiterated that, absent a statutory definition, courts look to analogous provisions—Probate Code § 810 and CCP § 372(a)(4)—to discern the meaning of “mental incapacity.” Those statutes require a deficit in at least one of a list of mental functions (orientation, memory, reasoning, etc.) that “significantly impairs” the person’s ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of a specific act.

Evidence on mental capacity. Susan presented three expert reports. Dr. Barry Unger (internal medicine) testified that by 2016 Susan’s back pain, seizures, and cerebral atrophy would have precluded sustained courtroom attention. Dr. Halote (psychologist) concluded that Susan’s depression and anxiety amounted to “severe deficits in activities of daily living” and that she was “incapacitated” in 2015. Dr. John Ayvazian (neuropsychology) found only mild attention and memory deficits, attributing them to anxiety and depression rather than to a disabling cognitive disorder. The trial court found Dr. Halote’s opinion unpersuasive because it defined incapacity solely in terms of daily‑living impairment and relied heavily on Susan’s self‑report without corroborating contemporaneous observations. Moreover, the court noted that Susan, a former deputy attorney general, executed numerous financial transactions during the disputed period—selling her home, paying tuition, cashing checks, and even attending her daughter’s high‑school graduation—activities that, under Probate Code § 811, demonstrate at least a functional level of reasoning and planning.

The appellate panel affirmed that the record did not establish a “significant impairment” of Susan’s ability to understand the dissolution proceeding. While depression and anxiety were undisputed, the evidence did not rise to the level of mental incapacity required by § 2122(d). The court emphasized that mental incapacity is fact‑specific and must be tied to the particular act—in this case, participation in a family‑law action—not merely to general daily‑living difficulties.

Evidence on duress. Duress, like incapacity, is undefined in the Family Code. California courts have borrowed from contract law, defining duress as “the destruction of a party’s free agency by wrongful threat or pressure” that leaves the party with no reasonable alternative. Susan alleged that Troy’s alleged domestic‑violence history and his refusal to allow her contact with the children created such pressure. The trial court, however, found no credible evidence of threats or coercive control. The single alleged 1997 incident of physical violence was uncorroborated, and the testimony of the daughters indicated that Susan was able to interact with family members, attend school events, and even drive to Troy’s house in 2014. The appellate court agreed that the record did not demonstrate that Troy’s conduct “destroyed” Susan’s free will or forced her non‑participation.

Standard of review. The appeal was reviewed for abuse of discretion, applying the “substantial evidence” standard to the trial court’s factual findings and a de novo review of the statutory construction. Because Susan bore the burden of proof, the appellate panel focused on whether the evidence was “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and of such weight as to compel a finding in her favor. The court concluded the evidence was insufficient on both grounds and therefore affirmed the denial of relief.

Implications. Diamond underscores that the mere presence of mental‑health diagnoses does not automatically satisfy the “mental incapacity” prong of § 2122. Practitioners must be prepared to show a direct causal link between the impairment and the litigant’s inability to understand or act in the specific family‑law proceeding. The decision also reaffirms the high evidentiary bar for duress in dissolution cases; allegations of domestic abuse must be corroborated and must be shown to have directly compelled the party’s non‑participation. Finally, the case illustrates the continuing relevance of the disentitlement doctrine and the six‑month “excusable neglect” window—issues that often trap self‑represented litigants who miss early deadlines.

Unresolved questions. The opinion leaves open how courts should treat “task‑specific” incapacity when a party can manage daily finances yet cannot attend a courtroom due to severe physical pain. Moreover, the reliance on expert testimony that is retrospective—evaluating a past mental state years after the fact—remains a contested methodological issue. Future litigants may seek clearer guidance on the admissibility and weight of such hindsight evaluations, especially when the underlying medical record is sparse.

In sum, the appellate court’s affirmation signals that California family‑law judges will continue to apply a rigorous, evidence‑based standard when evaluating post‑judgment relief on mental‑incapacity or duress grounds, and that petitioners must meet a demanding burden to overturn a final dissolution judgment.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Family Code § 2122 (grounds and time limits for setting aside a judgment; subdivisions (c) duress, (d) mental incapacity)
  • Family Code § 2125 (prohibition on setting aside a judgment solely on inequitable grounds)
  • Family Code § 2121(b) (burden of proof on moving party)
  • Probate Code § 810 (presumption of capacity; definition of mental incapacity)
  • Probate Code § 811 (enumeration of mental functions relevant to capacity)
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 372(a)(4) (capacity to assist counsel and understand proceedings)
  • Civil Code § 39(b) (presumption of unsound mind for substantial inability to manage finances)
  • Penal Code § 1367(a) (definition of mental incompetence in criminal proceedings)
  • CCP § 473(b) (excusable neglect within six months)
  • CCP § 473(b) (motion for relief from judgment within six months)
  • Key cases: In re Marriage of Thorne & Raccina (2012); In re Marriage of Heggie (2002); In re Marriage of Greenway (2013); In re Marriage of Walker (2012); In re Marriage of Balcof (2006); In re Marriage of Hofer (2012); Doyle v. Exchange Bank (2015); Juen v. Alain Pinel Realtors (2019); Stone v. Alameda Health System (2024).