Cohen v. Super. Ct. - Case Brief

Case Number: B330202M
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four
Date Filed: 2025‑08‑31

Holding

The court held that Government Code § 36900, subdivision (a) grants only city authorities—not private citizens—the power to redress violations of municipal ordinances by civil action; consequently, the statute does not confer a private right of action, and the precedent set in Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. is overruled.

Narrative

Lead

In a decision that reshapes the enforcement landscape for California’s municipal ordinances, the Court of Appeal for the Second District held that ordinary residents cannot sue under Government Code § 36900(a) to enforce city codes. By overruling the two‑decade‑old Riley decision, the court closed a narrow but increasingly cited avenue for private civil enforcement of local regulations, reaffirming that such enforcement remains the exclusive domain of city authorities.

Procedural History

The dispute began when Thomas and Lisa Schwartz filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County alleging that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, violated two provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC): (1) height limits for hedges under § 12.22(C)(20) and (2) landscaping standards for residential parkways under § 62.129. The Schwartzes sought damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief, anchoring their civil‑action claims on Government Code § 36900(a) and the appellate panel’s earlier interpretation in Riley that the statute creates a private right of action.

The trial court sustained the Cohens’ demurrer to the nuisance and declaratory‑relief claims but, relying on Riley, overruled the demurrers to the LAMC‑based claims, allowing the Schwartzes to proceed. The Cohens appealed, petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order and to reinstate their demurrers. After a series of briefs, amicus participation by the City of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities, and a hearing on the writ, the appellate court issued a peremptory writ, overturning the trial court’s ruling on the LAMC causes of action and, crucially, declaring that § 36900(a) does not confer a private right of action.

Facts

The properties sit directly across the street from one another in a residential neighborhood of Los Angeles. The Schwartzes allege that the Cohens’ hedges exceed the 3‑foot height limit set by LAMC § 12.22(C)(20) and that the Cohens replaced parkway plantings without the required permits, violating the city’s Residential Parkway Landscaping Guidelines codified in LAMC § 62.129. The Schwartzes contend that these violations diminish their enjoyment of their property, depress its market value, and cause “severe annoyance, discomfort, and distress.” Their complaint lists four causes of action: (1) nuisance, (2) violation of LAMC § 12.22, (3) violation of LAMC § 62.129, and (4) declaratory relief. The second and third causes rely on § 36900(a) as the statutory basis for a private civil remedy.

Issues

1. Statutory Construction: Does Government Code § 36900(a) create a private right of action for any member of the public to enforce municipal ordinances, or is the right limited to city authorities?
2. Stare Decisis: Should the Court adhere to Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which held that § 36900(a) does create such a private right, or may it overrule that precedent?
3. Jurisdictional Adequacy: Does the appellate court have authority to issue a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order overruling a demurrer before final judgment?

Court’s Reasoning

1. Interpreting § 36900(a)

The Court applied the two‑part framework from Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (50 Cal.4th 592) for determining whether a statute confers a private cause of action: (a) clear, unmistakable statutory language indicating legislative intent; and, if ambiguous, (b) legislative history. The statute reads:

“Violation of a city ordinance is a misdemeanor unless by ordinance it is made an infraction. The violation of a city ordinance may be prosecuted by city authorities in the name of the people of the State of California, or redressed by civil action.”

The Court found the language ambiguous. The first clause explicitly limits criminal prosecution to “city authorities.” The second clause, written in the passive voice and lacking an explicit actor, does not repeat “city authorities.” The Court rejected the Schwartzes’ reliance on the “last antecedent” and “expressio unius” doctrines, noting that the statute does not employ qualifying words that would limit the phrase “redressed by civil action” to a specific class of actors. Instead, the Court turned to the principle of consistent statutory construction: when a statute identifies an actor in one clause and then uses a passive construction in a subsequent clause, the actor is ordinarily presumed to be the same. Applying Coso Energy Developers v. County of Inyo (122 Cal.App.4th 1512), the Court concluded that the omission of “city authorities” in the second clause was a stylistic avoidance of redundancy, not an expansion of the class of actors.

2. Legislative History

The Court examined the predecessor statutes—Sections 769 and 867 of the Municipal Incorporation Act of 1883—and the legislative history of SB 750, which codified § 36900. Both predecessor statutes expressly limited civil redress to “the option of said authorities.” SB 750’s legislative history, consisting of reports from the California Code Commission, the Office of the Legislative Counsel, and the Attorney General, repeatedly emphasized that the bill “makes no substantive changes in existing law” and merely consolidates and restates the prior provisions. The reports never mention any intent to create a private right of action. The Court held that the removal of the phrase “at the option of said authorities” was a purely textual simplification, not a substantive amendment. Accordingly, the legislative history supports an interpretation that the right to bring civil actions remains confined to city authorities.

3. Overruling Riley

The Court acknowledged the strong presumption of stare decisis but invoked the doctrine’s flexibility, citing Moradi‑Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (46 Cal.3d 287) and People v. Hardin (15 Cal.5th 834). It noted that Riley offered no reasoned analysis of the statutory language, merely concluding that “redressed by civil action” granted a private right. Moreover, Riley has been sparsely cited (≈20 decisions) and rarely relied upon; only two published appellate opinions have adopted its view. The Court found no substantial reliance interests that would be disrupted by overruling Riley. Given the clear legislative history and the ambiguous statutory language, the Court concluded that Riley was erroneously decided and that overruling it serves the interests of legal clarity and predictability.

4. Jurisdiction

Addressing the Schwartzes’ jurisdictional challenge, the Court held that a writ of mandate is proper where (i) the trial court’s order is not appealable as a final judgment and (ii) the order creates an irreparable injury that cannot be remedied on appeal. The Court found both conditions satisfied: the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer was not a final judgment, and the Cohens faced the prospect of an adverse judgment on the merits of the LAMC claims. Accordingly, the Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to issue the writ.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision narrows the scope of private enforcement of municipal ordinances, confirming that only city authorities may bring civil actions under § 36900(a). By overruling Riley, the Court eliminates a narrow pathway that had allowed private parties to sue for civil penalties and injunctive relief based solely on a statutory provision that was never intended to create such a right. The ruling restores the traditional enforcement model: municipalities retain exclusive authority to prosecute or civilly enforce their ordinances, while private parties may still rely on general tort theories (e.g., nuisance, private nuisance, or public nuisance) when they can demonstrate a special injury or a class‑based interest protected by the ordinance.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

The decision will reverberate across California’s local‑government litigation. Municipalities can now anticipate that private lawsuits predicated solely on § 36900(a) will be dismissed, potentially reducing the volume of civil enforcement actions and concentrating enforcement resources within city law‑enforcement and prosecutorial offices. However, the Court left untouched the broader doctrinal question of when a municipal ordinance can serve as an element of a private cause of action—a point the Schwartzes raised in their alternative argument. Future litigants will likely test the boundaries of that doctrine, especially in nuisance and land‑use contexts where the ordinance’s purpose aligns with a plaintiff’s special injury.

The ruling also raises a policy question: if city authorities lack the resources or political will to enforce certain ordinances, private citizens now lack a direct statutory remedy. The Court expressly deferred to the Legislature for any policy‑driven amendment to § 36900(a). Lawmakers may consider a targeted amendment to restore a limited private right of action—perhaps confined to specific classes of ordinances (e.g., health, safety, or environmental regulations)—to balance municipal discretion with citizen enforcement.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines