Dora V. v. Super. Ct. - Case Brief

7 Mins read

Case Number: B332985
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven
Date Filed: 2025‑08‑31

Holding

The court held that a legal guardian appointed by the juvenile court—unlike a probate‑code guardian—has no statutory entitlement to reunification services, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to extend such services to Dora; consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied.

Narrative

Lead. In a decision that clarifies the divergent statutory regimes governing probate‑code guardians and juvenile‑court guardians, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial‑court order denying a dependency guardian’s request for additional reunification services. The ruling underscores that a guardian appointed by the juvenile court is not a “parent or guardian” for purposes of Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 361.5, 366.21, 366.22, and therefore cannot invoke the presumptions and procedural safeguards that protect biological parents and probate‑code guardians.

Procedural backdrop. The dispute began when the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code § 387 supplemental petition in August 2021 seeking removal of three children—Rene (born 2012) and his siblings—from the custody of their great‑aunt, Dora V. The juvenile court sustained the petition, ordered the children’s removal, and placed them with a maternal aunt (V.E.) and her partner (M.Z.). Because the children were removed from Dora’s home, the court appointed Dora as their legal guardian under the dependency‑guardianship scheme of §§ 360 and 366.26 and terminated dependency jurisdiction.

Over the next two years the juvenile court conducted the statutorily required six‑month, twelve‑month, and eighteen‑month review hearings under §§ 366.21(e) and (f) and § 366.22. At each hearing the Department reported that the children—particularly Rene—were thriving with V.E. and M.Z., that Rene repeatedly refused visitation with Dora, and that the child expressed a clear desire not to return to Dora’s home. The court ordered family‑reunification services for Dora, including parenting classes, sexual‑abuse awareness counseling, and monitored visits, but it declined to extend those services beyond the eighteenth‑month hearing. Dora responded by filing a petition for writ of mandate, alleging (1) a due‑process violation because the court allowed Rene to “unilaterally” refuse visits, and (2) that the court erred in concluding reasonable reunification services had been provided.

Statutory framework. The appellate court began its analysis by distinguishing two parallel statutory schemes. Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 361.5, 366.21, 366.22, and related provisions speak of “parents or guardians” and create a presumption that a child should be returned to a parent—or, where a guardian was appointed before dependency proceedings—unless a preponderance of evidence shows a substantial risk of detriment. By contrast, §§ 360, 366.26, 366.3, 366.4, and the accompanying California Rules of Court rule 5.740(d) govern dependency guardianships—those created by the juvenile court after a child becomes a dependent. The legislature expressly limited the application of the reunification presumptions to probate‑code guardians, not to guardians appointed under the juvenile‑court scheme. The court cited In re Carrie (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746 and the Senate Bill 2232 legislative history to confirm that “parents or guardians” in §§ 361.5‑366.22 refers to guardians existing prior to dependency jurisdiction.

Due‑process claim. Dora’s reliance on In re Hunter (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497— which holds that a visitation order must be enforceable—was rejected. The appellate court noted that the due‑process analysis in Hunter applies to parental visitation rights, not to the limited visitation authority a juvenile‑court guardian possesses. Because the statutory scheme does not grant Dora a vested right to visitation, the court concluded there was no constitutional violation when the juvenile court allowed Rene to decline visits.

Reunification‑services claim. The core of Dora’s petition was the contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to order additional reunification services. The court reiterated that reunification services are discretionary for dependency guardians; the statute does not require a finding that “reasonable services” have been offered before a guardianship can be terminated. In re Carlos (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1408, a controlling precedent, held that a dependency guardian is not entitled to the statutory presumption of reunification services that applies to probate‑code guardians. The appellate court adopted Carlos’s reasoning, emphasizing that the juvenile court may order services if it finds they are in the child’s best interests, but it is under no obligation to do so.

The record showed that Rene had refused all contact with Dora for more than a year, that he expressed fear of returning to her home, and that the Department’s own reports indicated he was safe and thriving with V.E. and M.Z. The juvenile court’s finding that returning Rene to Dora would be “detrimental” was supported by competent mental‑health testimony and by the child’s own statements. The appellate court applied the abuse‑of‑discretion standard—reviewing for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or manifest irrationality—and found the trial court’s decision well‑grounded in the best‑interest‑of‑the‑child analysis articulated in Jennifer S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113 and L.C. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021. Accordingly, no abuse of discretion occurred.

Disposition and forward‑looking guidance. The petition was denied, and the appellate court directed the juvenile court to follow the statutory procedures for terminating a dependency guardianship under § 366.3 and rule 5.740(d). The decision makes clear that a guardian appointed by the juvenile court cannot compel the court to provide reunification services, nor can she invoke a due‑process right to enforce visitation absent a statutory grant. Instead, any challenge to the termination of a dependency guardianship must be brought under the § 388 petition framework, which requires a showing of changed circumstances and a best‑interest determination.

Impact and unresolved issues. This opinion solidifies the bifurcation between probate‑code guardianship and dependency guardianship, reinforcing the legislature’s intent that the latter be treated as a distinct, more flexible mechanism. Practitioners should now anticipate that petitions for writ of mandate seeking to compel reunification services for a juvenile‑court guardian will be dismissed unless the guardian can demonstrate that the court’s discretion was exercised arbitrarily. The ruling leaves open the question of whether a dependency guardian may seek a separate petition for services under § 366.3(b)(2) before a termination hearing—an avenue that may invite further litigation as parties test the limits of the discretionary service‑ordering power.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 361.5, 366.21, 366.22 – reunification presumptions for parents and pre‑existing guardians.
  • WIC §§ 360, 366.26 – creation of dependency guardianships.
  • WIC §§ 366.3, 366.4 – procedures for termination/modification of dependency guardianships.
  • WIC §§ 387, 388 – removal of a child from a guardian and petition to terminate/modify a guardianship.
  • Probate Code § 1601 – referenced to show non‑applicability to dependency guardians.
  • California Rules of Court 5.740(d) – procedural requirements for § 388 petitions.

Key Cases

  • In re Hunter (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 – visitation orders must be enforceable.
  • In re Carlos (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1408 – dependency guardians lack statutory reunification rights.
  • In re Carrie (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746 – distinction between probate‑code and dependency guardians.
  • In re Z. C. (2022) 178 Cal.App.4th 1277 – discretionary nature of reunification services for dependency guardians.
  • In re Jessica (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 474 – termination of a dependency guardianship does not require a reunification‑services finding.
  • In re N. B. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1139 – § 388 petition standards.
  • B. B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563 – best‑interest analysis in guardianship termination.
  • L. C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021 – presumption of return absent substantial risk.
  • Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113 – definition of “best interest of the child.”
  • In re Malick (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109 – statutory limits on reunification after removal.
  • In re Jacob (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819 – risk‑of‑detriment standard at 18‑month review.

These authorities collectively shape the appellate court’s conclusion that Dora, as a juvenile‑court‑appointed guardian, was not entitled to the statutory reunification protections afforded to parents or probate‑code guardians, and that the trial court’s discretionary denial of additional services was proper.