Enmark v. KC Community Care - Case Brief

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Case Number: B333022
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two
Date Filed: 2025‑08‑31

Holding

The court held that the trial court properly denied the defendants’ petition to compel arbitration because the LPS conservatorship did not grant Scott Enmark the authority—actual or ostensible—to execute arbitration agreements on behalf of his daughter Lisa or to bind her heirs, and because the wrongful‑death claim brought by the parents falls outside the scope of the arbitration provisions.

Narrative

When Lisa Enmark, a 37‑year‑old woman under a Lanterman‑Petris‑Short (LPS) conservatorship, was admitted to a skilled‑nursing facility and subsequently died following an alleged sexual assault, her parents sued the facility’s owners and operators. Central to the litigation was whether two optional arbitration agreements, signed by Lisa’s father Scott Enmark in his capacity as “Resident Representative,” could compel the parties to resolve the successor‑claim and wrongful‑death actions in arbitration. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed the trial court’s refusal to enforce those agreements, drawing a clear line between conservatorship authority and contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial.

Procedural backdrop

The case began in Los Angeles County Superior Court, where Scott and his wife Marilyn Warhol filed a complaint alleging dependent‑abuse, negligence, premises‑liability, and related claims on behalf of their daughter, as well as a wrongful‑death action in their individual capacities. The defendants, KC Community Care, LLC and affiliated entities, moved to compel arbitration, attaching the two arbitration agreements and the LPS conservatorship order as evidence of Scott’s authority. The trial court, after a brief hearing, denied the petition, finding no proof that Scott possessed the requisite authority to bind Lisa—or her heirs—to arbitration. The defendants appealed.

Core factual matrix

In 2018, a Los Angeles County judge found Lisa gravely disabled and appointed her father, Scott, as conservator of her person for a one‑year term. The conservatorship order empowered Scott to place Lisa in the “least restrictive setting” for treatment, to require her to accept psychotropic medication, and to contract for her placement in a medical or psychiatric facility. The order also expressly prohibited Lisa from entering into any contract involving money or property.

When Lisa was admitted to the Facility in 2019, Scott signed two separate arbitration agreements. The first covered medical‑malpractice disputes; the second covered all other claims arising from the Facility’s services. Both agreements contained a clause stating they would bind “heirs, representatives, executors, administrators, successors and assigns” of the parties. Lisa herself never signed either document, and the agreements were expressly optional and rescindable in writing. Scott never rescinded them.

The appellate court addressed two intertwined questions:

  1. Whether the LPS conservatorship conferred on Scott the authority—actual or ostensible—to execute arbitration agreements on Lisa’s behalf, thereby rendering the successor‑claim actions arbitrable.
  2. Whether the wrongful‑death claim filed by Scott and Marilyn could be compelled to arbitration under California law, particularly Ruiz v. Podolsky and Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare.

Reasoned analysis

Agency authority under the conservatorship

The court began by applying California contract and agency law. An arbitration clause is enforceable only if the party seeking to compel arbitration can demonstrate a valid agreement between the parties. The burden rests on the movant (the defendants) to prove the existence of such an agreement; the opposing party must then show a defense—most commonly, lack of authority.

The court dissected the conservatorship order, emphasizing that a conservator’s power derives from a court‑imposed statutory scheme, not from the traditional principal‑agent relationship. Actual agency requires the principal’s consent and the ability to control the agent’s actions. The court held that the LPS framework does not create actual agency because the conservatee (Lisa) does not consent to the conservator’s actions, nor does the conservator act under the conservatee’s direction.

Turning to ostensible (apparent) authority, the court examined whether the order’s language—granting Scott the power to “contract for Lisa’s placement” and to “require her to accept treatment”—could be read to include the execution of side‑agreement arbitration clauses. The court relied heavily on the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939. Harrod held that a relative’s power of attorney did not extend to signing optional arbitration agreements because such agreements are not “health‑care decisions” within the scope of the authority granted. The appellate court analogized the LPS conservatorship to a power of attorney, concluding that the conservator’s authority is limited to decisions directly affecting the conservatee’s health and placement, not to contractual waivers of procedural rights.

The court rejected the defendants’ reliance on Gordon v. Atria Management Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1020, which had upheld arbitration agreements signed under a durable power of attorney that expressly included “contract for placement” language. The Enmark court noted that Gordon involved a power‑of‑attorney document that explicitly authorized the agent to “enter into contracts for the resident’s care,” whereas the LPS order contains no comparable language authorizing arbitration. Moreover, the Harrod decision clarified that even broad contractual language does not automatically encompass arbitration provisions, which are “separate and optional” and do not further the health‑care objective.

Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Scott lacked both actual and ostensible authority to bind Lisa to arbitration, rendering the successor‑claim actions non‑arbitrable.

Wrongful‑death claim

The defendants argued that, under Ruiz v. Podolsky (50 Cal.4th 838) and Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare (101 Cal.App.5th 1125), heirs may be bound by an arbitration clause if the agreement’s language manifests an intent to bind them. The Enmark court distinguished those precedents because, in both Ruiz and Holland, the deceased resident had personally signed the arbitration agreement, thereby creating a clear contractual nexus with the heirs. Here, neither Lisa nor her mother Marilyn signed the agreements, and Scott’s authority to bind Lisa was already found lacking. The court therefore concluded that the wrongful‑death claim, which is a personal cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60, cannot be compelled to arbitration absent a direct agreement between the decedent (or her personal representative) and the facility.

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) considerations

Defendants also contended that a narrow construction of Scott’s authority violated the FAA, which favors enforcement of arbitration agreements. The appellate court reiterated that the FAA applies only after a contract’s enforceability is established under state law. Because California law—through agency analysis and the Harrod precedent—failed to recognize a valid arbitration agreement, the FAA could not rescue the defendants’ position.

Conclusion and implications

The Court of Appeal’s decision underscores that conservatorship authority, even when broad, does not automatically extend to contractual waivers of procedural rights such as arbitration. Practitioners should note the clear distinction drawn between health‑care decisions (within the conservator’s purview) and ancillary contractual choices that do not further the conservatee’s treatment. The ruling also reaffirms that wrongful‑death actions remain outside the reach of arbitration clauses absent the decedent’s own signature or a clear, express intent to bind heirs.

For California probate and elder‑law attorneys, the Enmark opinion provides a roadmap for evaluating arbitration provisions in the context of LPS conservatorships and similar protective arrangements. It signals that facilities must obtain explicit, signed arbitration agreements from the resident—or from a duly authorized agent with clear contractual authority—if they wish to compel arbitration of future claims. Absent such clear authority, courts will likely follow the Enmark precedent and refuse to enforce arbitration clauses, preserving plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 5000‑5008, 5150‑5358 (Lanterman‑Petris‑Short Act)
  • Civil Code §§ 2295‑2319 (Agency law: actual, ostensible, and implied authority)
  • Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1295, 377.60 (Arbitration agreements; wrongful‑death actions)
  • Probate Code § 4617 (Definition of health‑care decision)
  • Health & Safety Code §§ 1599.81 (Optional arbitration agreements in health‑care facilities)

Major Cases Cited

  • Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005
  • Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners (2024) 15 Cal.5th 939
  • Gordon v. Atria Management Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1020
  • Ruiz v. Podolsky (2000) 50 Cal.4th 838
  • Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1125
  • Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804
  • Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076
  • DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346
  • Logan v. Country Oaks Partners (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 365
  • Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 311
  • Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 469