Newell v. Super. Ct. - Case Brief

7 Mins read

Case Number: B339383
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven
Date Filed: August 31, 2025

Holding

The court held that Lucy Mancini Newell’s petition, as supplemented, does contain a real‑property claim within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure § 405.4 because a successful challenge to the trust amendments would alter the identity of the trustee holding legal title to the Van Nuys property; consequently, the probate court erred in expunging the lis pendens and must deny Rollins’s motion.

Narrative

Lead:
In a decisive ruling for California probate practitioners, the Court of Appeal affirmed that a petition to overturn a trust amendment that determines who holds legal title to real property constitutes a “real‑property claim” under CCP § 405.4, thereby barring the expungement of a lis pendens. The decision in Newell v. Superior Court clarifies the scope of lis pendens protections in trust‑related litigation and curtails lower courts’ tendency to treat trust‑change petitions as non‑real‑property actions.

Facts and Procedural History:
Arthur and Julia Mancini created the Mancini Family Trust in 2002, naming their three children—including Lucy Mancini Newell—as beneficiaries. After Julia’s death in 2009, Arthur amended the trust to name Newell as successor trustee and sole beneficiary. In July 2020, Arthur, then 89, hired Neneth D. Rollins, a 56‑year‑old caregiver, who soon became a central figure in subsequent trust amendments.

In January 2021 Arthur executed a second restatement that appointed attorney Edgardo Lopez as successor trustee (with a 9 % compensation clause) and allocated 51 % of the trust assets to Rollins, 40 % to Newell, and the remainder to other parties. An April 2021 amendment increased Lopez’s compensation, named Rollins as sole successor trustee (serving without compensation if Lopez could not serve), and directed that 100 % of the remaining assets go to Rollins, effectively stripping Newell of any interest.

When Arthur died in November 2022, Lopez had already died (October 2022), so Rollins became successor trustee. Newell learned of the 2021 documents only after receiving a notice under Probate Code § 16061.7 in December 2022. She promptly filed a petition in the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Probate Division) challenging the validity of both the January and April amendments, alleging fraud, undue influence, and elder abuse under Probate Code § 21380 and Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.30. Newell sought removal of Rollins as trustee, appointment of herself as trustee, a $2 million bond, accounting, damages, and attorney fees.

During discovery, Newell discovered that Rollins, as trustee, had used trust assets to purchase a single‑family home in Van Nuys. Newell recorded a notice of lis pendens on the property and amended her petition to request that the court impose a constructive trust on the home. Rollins moved to expunge the lis pendens under CCP § 405.31, arguing that Newell’s petition did not assert a real‑property claim because it merely sought to invalidate trust documents and did not directly claim an interest in the Van Nuys house.

The probate court agreed with Rollins, holding that Newell’s petition “does not contain a real‑property claim” because, even if successful, the title to the property would remain in the name of the trustee—who would simply be a different person. The court granted the expungement, awarded Rollins $5,500 in attorney fees, and denied Newell’s request for a constructive trust. Newell appealed, filing a petition for a writ of mandate; the appellate court issued an alternative writ, and the probate court again denied relief. Newell then sought a peremptory writ of mandate, which is the exclusive avenue for reviewing an order that grants or denies a motion to expunge a lis pendens.

Issues:

  1. Whether Newell’s petition, as supplemented, asserts a “real‑property claim” within the meaning of CCP § 405.4.
  2. Whether the probate court erred in expunging the lis pendens under CCP §§ 405.30‑405.31.

Holding and Reasoning:
The appellate court held that Newell’s petition does contain a real‑property claim. The court emphasized that a trust is not a legal entity; legal title to trust‑held real property resides with the trustee, while equitable title belongs to the beneficiaries. Accordingly, any successful challenge to the trust amendment that removes Rollins as trustee and reinstates Newell (or another trustee) would directly affect the name on the deed and thus “affect title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property” as required by § 405.4.

The court rejected the probate court’s reliance on BGJ Associates v. Superior Court (1999), noting that subsequent authority—Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) and Shoker v. Superior Court (2022)—has narrowed the “over‑broad” approach and recognized that a petition to change a trustee can, when successful, alter the legal title holder. The appellate court further observed that the statutory scheme already contains safeguards against lis‑pendens abuse, including the burden on the moving party to show lack of probable validity (CCP § 405.32) and the possibility of fee awards (CCP § 405.38). Therefore, the fear of “massive” lis‑pendens filings is mitigated by these procedural protections.

Because Newell satisfied the pleading requirement and bore the burden of showing probable validity of her claim, the probate court’s order to expunge the lis pendens was improper. The appellate court vacated that order, directed the probate court to deny Rollins’s motion, and awarded attorney fees and costs to Rollins while allowing Newell to recover her own costs.

Impact and Unresolved Questions:
The decision sharpens the definition of a real‑property claim in the context of trust litigation, confirming that any action that could change the trustee—and thereby the legal title holder—falls within the ambit of § 405.4. Practitioners should now anticipate that petitions to remove or replace trustees will likely survive a motion to expunge a lis pendens, provided the pleadings articulate the effect on title.

The ruling also underscores the importance of precise pleading. While Newell’s petition successfully survived the expungement challenge, the court did not address the separate issue of whether a constructive trust claim itself constitutes a real‑property claim; it left that question open for future litigation. Additionally, the decision invites scrutiny of how lower courts will apply the “probable validity” standard under § 405.32 in trust‑related cases, especially where the factual record is complex and may require evidentiary hearings.

Overall, Newell provides a clear precedent that the appellate courts will enforce the protective purpose of the lis pendens statutes in trust disputes, ensuring that potential purchasers and lenders receive notice of pending challenges that could affect title.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 405.30, 405.31, 405.4, 405.32, 405.33, 405.38 (lis pendens filing, expungement, real‑property claim definition, probable validity, alternative relief, fee awards).
  • California Probate Code §§ 16061.7 (notice of trust administration), 21380 (presumption of fraud/undue influence for donative transfers to care custodians), 15642 (grounds for removal of trustee), 859 (damages, attorney fees, costs).
  • Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.30 (elder abuse).

Major Cases Cited

  • Kirkeby v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 642 (2004) – definition of real‑property claim for lis pendens.
  • Shoker v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.5th 271 (2022) – modern interpretation of § 405.4 and abuse concerns.
  • Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court, 244 Cal.App.4th 259 (2016) – writ of mandate as exclusive review of lis pendens expungement.
  • De Martini v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.5th 1269 (2024) – standards for probable validity and expungement.
  • Boshernitsan v. Bach, 61 Cal.App.5th 10883 (2021) – trustee holds legal title, beneficiary holds equitable title.
  • Portico Management Group v. Harrison, 202 Cal.App.4th 464 (2011); Greenspan v. LADT LLC, 191 Cal.App.4th 486 (2010); Galdjie v. Darwish, 113 Cal.App.4th 1331 (2003) – trust property ownership principles.
  • Robinson v. Gutierrez, 98 Cal.App.5th 278 (2023); Jenkins v. Teegarden, 230 Cal.App.4th 1128 (2014); Butler v. Le Bouef, 248 Cal.App.4th 198 (2016) – presumptions and burdens of proof for undue influence.
  • BGJ Associates v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.4th 952 (1999) – historical “over‑broad” approach (subsequently limited).
  • Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 64 Cal.App.5th 346 (2021) – probable validity standard.
  • Estates of Collins & Flowers, 205 Cal.App.4th 1238 (2012); Behniwal v. Mix, 147 Cal.App.4th 621 (2007) – purpose and function of lis pendens.