Marriage of Wendt and Pullen

Case Number: C084083

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-04-28

Case Brief – Marriage of Wendt and Pullen

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: C084083
Disposition: The order denying appellant’s § 2030 motion is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings; appellant is awarded costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that, under Family Code § 2030, a trustee of a spendthrift trust may be ordered to pay attorney’s fees incurred in a marital dissolution proceeding, and that the family court erred by conditioning such an award on a finding of trustee bad‑faith—a requirement inconsistent with the statute and with modern trust law that permits third‑party recovery for liabilities arising from trust administration.

Narrative

In a decision that sharpens the interface between family law and trust‑administration doctrine, the California Court of Appeal reversed a Nevada County family court order that barred William Nicholas Pullen from recovering attorney’s fees under Family Code § 2030 against the trustee of his former wife’s spendthrift trust. The ruling affirms that a trustee, even of a spendthrift trust, can be compelled to satisfy fee awards when the fees arise from the trustee’s participation in the dissolution litigation, regardless of any alleged “bad‑faith” conduct.

Procedural backdrop – The dispute began when Elizabeth Anne Wendt filed for dissolution of her marriage to Pullen in 2013. Because Wendt’s primary assets were held in the irrevocable Elizabeth Anne Wendt Trust—created in Indiana in 1989, administered by Windham Bremer, and containing a classic spendthrift provision—Pullen moved to join the trust and its trustee as a third party to the family‑court case. The trial court granted the joinder but denied Pullen’s § 2030 request for $76,141 in attorney’s fees, holding that an award could be made only if the trustee acted in bad faith. Pullen appealed; the trustee, invoking both California and Indiana trust law, argued that the spendthrift clause insulated the trust from such liability.

Key issues – The appellate panel addressed two intertwined questions: (1) whether § 2030 permits a fee award against a non‑spouse third party absent a showing of bad faith, and (2) whether a spendthrift trust’s protective provisions bar recovery of fees that stem from the trust’s administration.

Statutory framework – § 2030(a)(1) directs courts to ensure that each party in a dissolution proceeding can obtain legal representation, authorizing an order that “if necessary…pay…whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding.” Subsection (d) expressly allows the court to require a non‑spouse party to pay such fees, limiting the award to amounts “reasonably necessary” and not conditioning it on the third party’s culpability. The court noted that California precedent—In re Marriage of Bendetti and In re Marriage of Siller—confirms that a spouse need not prove likelihood of success or a prima‑facie link to the third party to obtain fees.

Trust law analysis – The trial court leaned on Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Brown (2004), which tied a trustee’s duty to support obligations to a finding of bad faith. The appellate court distinguished Brown, emphasizing that the case concerned child‑support enforcement under Probate Code § 15305, not a fee award under § 2030. Moreover, the modern “representative‑capacity” approach to trust liability—reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and codified in Probate Code §§ 18004 and 15305—allows third parties to sue the trust itself for liabilities arising from its administration, even when a spendthrift clause is present. The court cited Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) and Chatard v. Oveross (2009) to underscore that spendthrift provisions shield beneficiaries, not the trust or trustee from claims tied to the trust’s operation.

Choice‑of‑law considerations – Although the trust instrument designates Illinois law for interpretation and Indiana law for other matters, the appellate panel found that the issue at hand—liability of the trustee for administration‑related fees—was governed by the law of the trust’s principal place of administration, i.e., Indiana. Both Indiana and California adopt the modern approach that permits recovery against the trust in the trustee’s representative capacity, rendering the choice‑of‑law debate moot.

Reasoned conclusion – By conditioning the § 2030 award on a bad‑faith finding, the family court imposed a statutory limitation that does not exist. The appellate panel held that the fee request was “not contingent on claims against the trust by the beneficiary” but on the trustee’s participation in the litigation, a classic administrative liability. Consequently, the denial constituted an abuse of discretion.

Impact and unresolved questions – The decision reinforces the principle that spendthrift trusts do not immunize trustees from fee awards arising out of their involvement in family‑law proceedings. Practitioners should now anticipate that § 2030 can be invoked against trustees even when the underlying trust contains robust spendthrift language, provided the fees are tied to the trustee’s administrative role. The ruling leaves open the precise contours of “reasonable necessity” for fee calculations in complex multi‑state trusts, a factual inquiry that will surface on remand. Additionally, while the court harmonized California and Indiana law, future cases may test the limits of this alignment when trusts are administered in jurisdictions with divergent public‑policy exceptions.

Overall, the opinion clarifies that California’s public‑policy goal of equitable access to counsel in dissolution actions supersedes trust‑protective doctrines, ensuring that wealthier parties—whether individuals or fiduciaries—cannot evade fee responsibilities through spendthrift provisions.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Family Code § 2030 (attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings)
Probate Code §§ 15305, 15303, 18004 (trust creditor rights, trustee liability, representative‑capacity claims)
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, ch. 21 (modern approach to trustee liability)
Spendthrift trust doctrine (protecting beneficiary’s interest from creditors)

Key Cases Cited

In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863
In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36
Droeger v. Friedman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26
In re Marriage of Perry (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 295
Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Brown (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 144
Chatard v. Oveross (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1098
Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844
Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058
Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909
Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. v. First Bank of Whiting (Ind. 1993) 624 N.E.2d 520
Clay v. Hamilton (Ind. 1945) 116 Ind.App.214
Brosamer v. Mark (Ind. App. 1989) 540 N.E.2d 652