Gomez v. Smith - Case Brief

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Gomez v. Smith

Case Number: C089338

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2020-09-22

Case Brief – Gomez v. Smith

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: C089338
Disposition: Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed.

Holding

The court held that Louise Gómez proved all six elements of the tort of intentional interference with an expected inheritance, that Tammy Smith’s conduct amounted to undue influence and a breach of fiduciary duty despite her power‑of‑attorney authority, and that Frank Gómez possessed the statutory capacity to execute a trust amendment; consequently the trial court’s judgment in favor of Louise was affirmed.

Narrative

A late‑life romance, a dying patriarch, and a contested trust— the appellate decision in Gómez v. Smith sharpens California’s emerging jurisprudence on intentional interference with expected inheritance, the limits of power‑of‑attorney authority, and the evidentiary burden for mental‑capacity challenges in estate‑planning contexts.

Procedural History

Frank Gómez, a widower of the 1998 revocable trust he created with his first wife Beverly, remarried Louise A. Gómez in 2014. In August 2016, while under hospice care, Frank sought to replace the 1998 trust with a new “Frank and Louise Gómez Living Trust” that would grant Louise a life estate and pass the remainder to his children after her death. Attorney Erik Aanestad arrived on August 20 to obtain Frank’s signature, but Frank’s adult children—Tammy Smith and Richard Gómez—physically barred the attorney from entering the home. Frank died the following morning.

Louise sued Tammy and Richard for intentional interference with expected inheritance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. The trial court found in Louise’s favor on the interference claim and against Tammy and Richard on the remaining causes, and also rejected Tammy’s cross‑complaint for trust property. Tammy appealed the interference judgment; Richard did not appeal. The appellate brief raised six grounds, including alleged lack of expectancy, absence of tortious conduct, improper capacity analysis, and the purported ambiguity of a constructive‑trust remedy.

Factual Matrix

The factual record is dense. Frank’s 1998 trust named his four children—Tammy, Richard, and two daughters—as primary beneficiaries. In 2015 Frank executed a third amendment that increased Richard’s share, a move Louise testified was motivated by a temporary dispute. By 2016 Frank, now frail from a stroke, abdominal‑aortic aneurysm repair, and hospice care, told attorney Clarence McProud that he wanted to ensure Louise’s welfare. On August 15, Aanestad met with Frank (Louise was present) and discussed the new trust’s terms. Frank’s expressed intent, corroborated by Aanestad’s testimony, was to create a life estate for Louise and to pass the remainder to his children.

On August 19 Frank’s condition deteriorated; he was “groggy, drowsy, but not disoriented,” according to hospice social worker Michelle Tagg, and was able to request a suction machine. The next morning, Tammy arrived, warned Louise not to let the attorney sign anything, and later confronted Aanestad at the front door, shouting that “it wasn’t Frank’s decision to make and that was their mother’s house.” The sheriff was called; Aanestad and his paralegal withdrew. Frank died at 1 a.m. on August 21 without signing the new trust.

  1. Whether Louise had a reasonable expectancy of inheritance under the proposed 2016 trust.
  2. Whether Tammy possessed knowledge of that expectancy and acted with intent to interfere.
  3. Whether Tammy’s conduct was independently tortious (undue influence or breach of fiduciary duty).
  4. Whether Frank possessed the requisite mental capacity on August 19‑20 to execute the trust amendment.
  5. Whether Tammy’s power‑of‑attorney authority insulated her from liability for the alleged interference.

Standard of Review

The Court applied the “substantial evidence” standard to the trial court’s factual findings and de novo review to its legal conclusions, consistent with Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) and the California Rules of Court. The appellate panel emphasized that appellate courts may not re‑weigh credibility or re‑assess the weight of evidence; they must accept the trial court’s determinations if supported by substantial evidence.

Reasoning and Holding

1. Expectancy of Inheritance
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Louise had a legitimate expectancy. The court rejected Tammy’s argument that Louise’s testimony—specifically her comment that Frank wanted “to fix the percentages so that Ric[hard] would get more”—negated an expectancy. Reading the exchange in context, the court concluded that Louise’s remarks pertained to the allocation among Frank’s children, not to her own interest. Moreover, Aanestad’s contemporaneous testimony that Frank intended the new trust to “provide plaintiff [Louise] a life estate” and that Louise was present during the August 15 meeting supplied substantial evidence of an expectancy, satisfying the first element articulated in Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) (Cal.App.4th).

2. Knowledge and Intent
Tammy’s knowledge was inferred from multiple sources: (a) Tammy’s own outburst to the attorney (“It wasn’t Frank’s decision to make”), (b) her demand that Louise promise not to let the attorney sign, (c) Frank’s prior statements to his financial advisor Kenneth Meyers that Tammy was “prying into his business,” and (d) Tammy’s research into Louise’s Santa Cruz property, indicating an awareness of Louise’s potential gain. The appellate panel held that these facts, taken together, satisfy the intent element—Tammy acted with the purpose of preventing Louise’s inheritance.

3. Independently Tortious Conduct
The Court applied Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B, which requires the interference to be carried out by “fraud, duress, or other tortious means.” Tammy’s conduct met this threshold on two fronts:

Undue Influence. The Court adopted the statutory definition in Civil Code § 1575 and Probate Code § 4266, emphasizing that Tammy exploited Frank’s physical weakness and emotional distress to block the attorney. The totality of circumstances—Frank’s bedridden state, Tammy’s physical obstruction, and her expressed desire to protect the “mother’s house”—constituted “grossly oppressive and unfair advantage” over a vulnerable principal.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Under Probate Code §§ 4232(a) and 4266, an attorney‑in‑fact owes the principal undivided loyalty. The Court rejected Tammy’s reliance on the 1995 durable power of attorney, noting that the instrument grants “general powers” but does not excuse violations of fiduciary duties. The trial court correctly found that Tammy acted in self‑interest (as primary beneficiary under the 1998 trust) contrary to Frank’s expressed wish to create a life estate for Louise, thereby breaching her fiduciary duty.

4. Mental Capacity
The appellate panel affirmed the trial court’s application of Probate Code §§ 810‑812, which set a rebuttable presumption of capacity and enumerate the mental functions required for a valid act. Expert testimony from hospice social worker Michelle Tagg and psychiatrist Helen Crawford confirmed that Frank was “engaged,” “aware of his surroundings,” and capable of appreciating the consequences of his intended trust amendment. The Court rejected Tammy’s expert, finding her testimony unpersuasive and noting that the burden of proving lack of capacity rested on the plaintiff, who had met her burden. The Court also clarified that the trial court correctly applied the statutory standard, not the outdated Probate Code § 6100.5, aligning with Lintz v. Lintz (2014).

5. Power‑of‑Attorney Scope
The Court emphasized that a power of attorney does not create a blanket exemption from liability. Probate Code § 39 and case law (Beeler v. West American Finance Co. (1962)) impose fiduciary duties on an attorney‑in‑fact, including the duty of loyalty. Tammy’s assertion that the power of attorney “ratified” her conduct was rejected as a misreading of the instrument; ratification requires the principal’s informed, voluntary assent, which Frank could not give while being physically barred from the attorney.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

Gómez v. Smith solidifies several doctrinal points for California probate practitioners:

  • Expectation Evidence: Courts will look beyond isolated statements and consider the broader context of trust‑amendment discussions, especially when the plaintiff was present at meetings with counsel.
  • Undue Influence Standard: The decision reaffirms the “totality‑of‑facts” approach, allowing courts to infer undue influence from a pattern of pressure, even when individual acts (e.g., researching a sibling’s property) appear peripheral.
  • Fiduciary Duties of Attorneys‑in‑Fact: The ruling underscores that a durable power of attorney does not immunize an agent who acts contrary to the principal’s expressed wishes; the fiduciary duty of loyalty remains paramount.
  • Capacity Analysis: The appellate affirmation of the Probate Code §§ 810‑812 framework clarifies that mental‑capacity challenges must be anchored in the statutory four‑prong test, and expert testimony must directly address those functions.

Unresolved issues linger. The Court did not address the constructive‑trust remedy Tammy argued was “fatally ambiguous,” leaving open the question of how appellate courts will treat constructive‑trust claims when the underlying trust amendment never materialized. Additionally, the decision leaves room for future clarification on the evidentiary threshold for “knowledge” when an alleged interferer claims ignorance of a plaintiff’s expectancy, especially in families with complex, multi‑generational trust histories.

For practitioners, the case serves as a cautionary tale: when acting as an attorney‑in‑fact for an incapacitated principal, meticulous documentation of the principal’s wishes and contemporaneous capacity assessments are essential to avoid liability for interference or breach of fiduciary duty.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (intentional interference with expected inheritance)
  • California Civil Code § 1575 (undue influence)
  • California Probate Code §§ 39, 4232(a), 4266 (fiduciary duties of attorney‑in‑fact)
  • California Probate Code §§ 810‑812 (mental‑capacity standards)
  • California Probate Code § 812 (capacity for trusts)
  • California Probate Code § 4266 (definition of undue influence)
  • California Probate Code § 4232 (duty of loyalty)

Key Cases

  • Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039 – elements of intentional interference
  • Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346 – capacity analysis for trusts
  • In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83 – substantial‑evidence standard for statements of decision
  • Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791 – de novo review of legal issues
  • Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372 – forfeiture of objections to statements of decision
  • Beeler v. West American Finance Co. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 702 – fiduciary duty of loyalty
  • Allen v. Hall (1999) 328 Ore. 276 – independently tortious conduct requirement.