Wehsener v. Jernigan
Case Number: D079623
Court: Cal. Ct. App.
Date Filed: 2022-12-28
Case Brief – Wehsener v. Jernigan
Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: D079623
Disposition: The August 16, 2021 probate‑court order finding that Judith “Judy” Bloodgood is an intestate heir of Loch David Crane is affirmed; costs are awarded to Judy on appeal.
Holding
The court held that California’s intestate‑succession statutes, including Probate Code §§ 6450‑6455 and the Uniform Parentage Act incorporated by Family Code §§ 7611‑7612, govern the determination of a parent‑child relationship for heirship purposes even when the relationship was effected outside the state, and that clear and convincing evidence that Charles Bloodgood openly held Judy out as his natural child establishes a presumption of natural parentage that cannot be rebutted on public‑policy grounds alone. Accordingly, Judy is a “natural” child of Charles and, through Charles, an intestate heir of Decedent Loch David Crane.
Narrative
Lead – In a decision that reaffirms California’s willingness to look beyond state borders to protect de facto family relationships, the Fourth Appellate District held that a child who was taken in and publicly acknowledged by a non‑biological parent in Indiana is a “natural” child for purposes of California intestate succession, thereby securing a share of a San Diego estate for a woman who had never set foot in the state.
Procedural backdrop – After Loch David Crane died intestate in April 2018 while domiciled in San Diego County, Shannon Wehsener—Crane’s first cousin on his paternal side—filed a petition for letters of administration and later a petition for final distribution, asserting that she was the sole heir. Judy Bloodgood, through the personal representative of her Indiana estate, filed an objection claiming heirship through her presumed natural‑parent relationship with Charles Bloodgood, Crane’s maternal uncle (the brother of Crane’s mother, Clare Bloodgood Crane). The probate court, after a bifurcated hearing, concluded that (1) California law governs the parent‑child inquiry, (2) Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), and (3) Shannon offered no evidence to rebut that presumption. The court entered an order on August 16, 2021 declaring Judy an intestate heir. Wehsener appealed.
Key facts – The undisputed record shows that in 1951, two‑year‑old Judy, whose biological parents had abandoned her, was left with Charles and his wife Frances in Kentucky. The couple raised her as their own child, and when they moved to Indiana in 1962, they continued to “hold her out” as their daughter. School records, a 1968 marriage certificate, Charles’s 1993 obituary, his 1988 will, and Judy’s 2022 Indiana death certificate all list Charles (and Frances) as her parents. No formal adoption ever occurred, and Charles never disavowed the relationship.
Issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions:
- Choice of law – Should California or Indiana law determine whether a parent‑child relationship exists for intestate‑succession purposes?
- Existence of a natural parent‑child relationship – Assuming California law applies, does the factual record satisfy the statutory presumption of natural parentage, and can that presumption be rebutted on policy grounds alone?
Court’s analysis
Choice of law – The court applied a well‑established line of authority—Estate of Bassi (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 529; Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532; Wolf v. Gall (1916) 32 Cal.App. 286; Lund (1945) 26 Cal.2d 472—to hold that California courts have the “power and right” to determine heirship of a decedent who died domiciled in the state, regardless of where the alleged parent‑child relationship was formed. The extraterritorial effect of California’s succession statutes outweighs any contrary foreign or out‑of‑state law.
Presumption of natural parentage – Probate Code §§ 6450‑6455 define “parent‑child relationship” for intestate succession, and § 6453(b)(2) incorporates the UPA’s presumption that a person who receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his own is a natural parent, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Family Code §§ 7611‑7612 mirror that standard. The record furnishes “clear and convincing evidence”—school enrollment, marriage and death certificates, the uncle’s will, and the obituary—demonstrating that Charles openly held Judy out as his daughter for more than five decades.
The appellant argued that public policy should defeat the presumption because Indiana does not recognize such de facto parentage absent adoption. The court rejected that, emphasizing that § 7612(a) limits rebuttal to clear and convincing evidence, not policy considerations, and that § 7612(b) permits policy to prevail only when conflicting presumptions exist—none did here. Moreover, the court cited In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, underscoring California’s “strong social policy in favor of preserving an ongoing parent‑child relationship.” To discard the presumption would undermine that policy and the statutory purpose of §§ 6450‑6455.
Disposition – The appellate court affirmed the probate court’s order, confirming Judy’s status as a natural child of Charles and, through Charles, as an intestate heir of Loch David Crane. Costs were awarded to Judy.
Closing analysis – Wehsener v. Jernigan reinforces two pivotal principles for California probate practitioners. First, the state’s succession statutes apply extraterritorially; a decedent’s domicile alone triggers California law, even when the alleged parent‑child nexus was forged elsewhere. Second, the UPA‑based presumption of natural parentage is robust and can be overcome only by clear, convincing proof of disavowal—not by abstract policy arguments. The decision therefore broadens the reach of California’s “de facto adoption” doctrine, allowing heirs who were never formally adopted but were publicly acknowledged to inherit.
Unresolved questions linger, however. The opinion did not address whether a similar presumption could be raised for a step‑parent who “holds out” a child without formal adoption, nor did it explore the impact of a later‑life challenge to the presumption by a biological parent asserting rights under the UPA’s genetic‑parent provisions. Future litigants may test the limits of the “clear and convincing” standard in more contested contexts, especially where competing presumptions arise.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code §§ 6450‑6455 – Definitions of “parent‑child relationship” and “natural parent” for intestate succession.
- Family Code §§ 7611‑7612 – Uniform Parentage Act provisions on presumptions of parentage and rebuttal standards.
- Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) – Governs presumptions of natural parenthood when a child is received and held out.
- Doctrine of Extraterritorial Application of Succession Law – As articulated in Estate of Bassi, Blythe v. Ayres, Wolf v. Gall, Lund.
- Public‑policy exception – Limited to cases of conflicting presumptions under Fam. Code § 7612(b).