Amundson v. Catello

Case Number: D082158A

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2025-06-03

Case Brief – Amundson v. Catello

Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: D082158
Disposition: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s interlocutory judgment ordering partition by sale and directed dismissal of the partition action for lack of standing; each party bears its own costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that the siblings, as contingent heirs whose ownership interest in the decedent’s property remained unresolved pending probate, lacked the statutory standing required under Cal. Civ. Code § 872.210(a)(2) to bring a partition action; consequently, the trial court’s judgment ordering partition by sale was reversed.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that sharpens the boundary between probate administration and real‑property litigation, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that heirs who have not yet secured a vested interest in a decedent’s real estate cannot sue for partition. The ruling reverses a San Diego Superior Court order that had identified the parties as owners of a jointly‑owned parcel and ordered its sale, underscoring that “standing is a threshold issue” that cannot be satisfied by a speculative inheritance.

Procedural backdrop – The dispute originated with the 2005 joint‑tenancy deed that made Ruth Catello and Leslie J. Knoles (the decedent) co‑owners of a residential parcel in San Diego County. In September 2020 the decedent recorded a quit‑claim deed severing the joint tenancy, converting the ownership to a tenancy‑in‑common. Weeks later she died intestate. The decedent’s four siblings promptly opened probate (Prob. Code §§ 58, 7000) to administer the estate, while Catello simultaneously filed a quiet‑title action seeking to cancel the 2020 quit‑claim deed and assert sole ownership.

In May 2022 the siblings filed a cross‑claim for partition by sale, arguing that the quit‑claim deed was valid and that, as intestate heirs, they already owned half of the property. The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment in January 2023 identifying the “record owners” as Catello and the decedent’s estate, labeling the siblings as “estate successors in interest/beneficiaries,” and ordering a sale of the property with proceeds to be divided among the parties. Catello appealed, contending that the siblings lacked standing because the probate court had not yet determined who owned the decedent’s one‑half interest.

Key issues – The appeal turned on a single, dispositive question: Did the siblings satisfy the ownership requirement of Cal. Civ. Code § 872.210(a)(2), which limits the right to bring a partition action to “an owner of an estate of inheritance” in the property at issue?

Court’s analysis – The appellate court applied the ordinary standing doctrine—requiring a concrete, actual interest rather than a conjectural one (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 6 Cal.App.5th at 810). The court noted that while probate law (Prob. Code § 7000) dictates that a decedent’s real‑property interest passes to heirs at death, that interest is “subject to administration of the estate” and does not become enforceable until a final distribution order is entered (Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265). Accordingly, the siblings’ claim to half of the parcel remained contingent on the outcome of the pending probate proceeding.

The court rejected the siblings’ reliance on the probate code as conferring immediate ownership, emphasizing that § 872.210’s purpose is to “split title amongst current owners” and that a partition action cannot be used to pre‑empt the probate court’s determination of title. The court also dismissed two ancillary arguments:

Judicial estoppel – The siblings argued that Catello’s naming of them as defendants in the quiet‑title suit constituted a concession of their standing. The court held that estoppel applies only when a party has successfully asserted a position in a prior proceeding; Catello never asserted that the siblings possessed an enforceable interest, merely that they might have an adverse claim.
Delegation by the personal representative – A stipulation in the probate record indicated that the estate’s administrator would “defer” to the siblings on the partition issue. The court found no statutory authority permitting a personal representative to delegate a partition claim to heirs; Probate Code § 9823 expressly authorizes the personal representative—not the heirs—to bring a partition on behalf of the estate.

Having found no viable basis for standing, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in treating the siblings as owners for purposes of the partition action. The judgment ordering partition by sale was therefore reversed, and the case was dismissed.

Impact and unresolved questions – Amundson clarifies that an heir’s “potential” interest, however likely, does not satisfy the ownership prerequisite for a partition suit. Practitioners must now ensure that any partition claim involving probate assets is either filed by the personal representative or postponed until a final distribution order confirms the heir’s title. The decision also raises a lingering question about the scope of “deferred” authority: could a personal representative, by explicit statutory amendment or court order, empower an heir to litigate a partition before final distribution? Until the legislature addresses that gap, the safe course remains to keep partition actions within the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Cal. Civ. Code § 872.210(a)(2) – Standing requirements for partition actions.
Cal. Probate Code §§ 58, 7000, 7001, 9650 et seq., 9823 – Administration of estates, passage of title, and authority of personal representatives.
Cal. Civ. Code § 761.020(c) – Naming of parties in quiet‑title actions.
Cal. Civ. Code § 367 – Real‑party‑in‑interest rule.
Judicial estoppel – Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171; Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107.

Key Cases Cited

Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802 – Standing principles.
Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506 – Standing as a question of law.
American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008 – Requirement of clear title for partition.
Bank of Ukiah v. Rice (1904) 143 Cal. 265 – Heirs’ rights subject to probate administration.
Reed v. Hayward (1943) 23 Cal.2d 336 – Heirs may convey contingent interests subject to administration.
Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481 – Legislative awareness of common‑law precedents.