Packard v. Packard

Case Number: D082480

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2025-02-24

Case Brief – Packard v. Packard

Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: D082480
Disposition: The appellate court reversed the probate court’s judgment on the pleadings, denied the trustee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and remanded for further proceedings; appellant Scott Packard was awarded costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that a petition seeking reformation of a trust to correct a settlor’s alleged drafting mistake is not a “trust contest” subject to the 120‑day limitations period of Probate Code § 16061.8, and therefore the probate court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that sharpens the line between permissible trust reformation and prohibited contests, the Fourth Appellate District reversed a San Diego probate court’s dismissal of a beneficiary’s petition to correct a handwritten amendment to the Newton Roy Packard Trust. The ruling underscores that California courts will not treat a claim to enforce the settlor’s true intent as a “contest” subject to the strict 120‑day bar in Probate Code § 16061.8.

Procedural backdrop – Newton Roy Packard executed the Newton Roy Packard Trust in 2010, providing equal shares to his two sons, Gregory and Scott. In 2012 Newton added a first amendment directing that Scott receive a cash sum equal to the value of the family residence, while Gregory would receive the residence itself. In 2014 Newton hand‑wrote “one‑half” into the amendment, apparently to ensure equal overall distributions. After Newton’s death in 2020, Gregory, as successor trustee, served the required notice under § 16061.7. In May 2022 Scott filed a petition asking the court to reform the amendment so that the “one‑half” interlineation would be interpreted as a mistake and the trust’s actual intent—equal division—would be honored. Gregory moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Scott’s petition was in fact a trust contest and therefore barred by the 120‑day limitation in § 16061.8. The probate court agreed and dismissed Scott’s petition.

Issues – The appeal turned on two questions: (1) whether a petition for construction and reformation of a trust is a “contest” within the meaning of § 16061.8; and (2) whether the probate court erred in treating the handwritten “one‑half” as unambiguous, thereby precluding extrinsic evidence of settlor intent.

Court’s analysis – Applying the de novo standard for a judgment‑on‑the‑pleadings review, the appellate court first clarified that “contest” is a substance‑over‑form inquiry, focusing on the petition’s practical effect rather than its label. The court cited Estate of Stoker and Giammarrusco v. Simon for the principle that a claim seeking to ascertain or reform a donor’s intent does not constitute a contest, even when the language at issue appears clear on its face.

The court then turned to the modern doctrine governing trust reformation. Relying on Estate of Duke (61 Cal. 4th 871) and Ike v. Doolittle (61 Cal. App. 4th 51), it affirmed that California law permits extrinsic evidence to correct a settlor’s mistake in expressing intent, provided the petitioner can meet the clear‑and‑convincing standard. The appellate court rejected the probate court’s “no‑ambiguity” rule, noting that the Supreme Court has expressly abandoned the historic bar on extrinsic evidence for unambiguous documents. Because Scott’s petition alleges a drafting error—Newton’s belief that the phrase “one‑half” would achieve equal distributions—the petition is a classic reformation action, not a contest.

Consequently, the 120‑day limitation in § 16061.8 does not apply. The appellate court reversed the judgment on the pleadings, remanded for the probate court to consider the reformation claim on its merits, and awarded Scott his costs.

Impact – This decision reinforces the protective scope of California’s reformation doctrine and limits the reach of no‑contest clauses. Trustees and beneficiaries must now distinguish carefully between challenges that seek to invalidate a trust provision (a contest) and those that seek to clarify or correct a provision to reflect the settlor’s true intent. The ruling also signals that courts will continue to admit extrinsic evidence even when the instrument’s language appears unambiguous, provided the petitioner meets the clear‑and‑convincing burden.

Unresolved questions – While the court clarified the distinction between contests and reformations, it left open how lower courts will apply the “practical effect” test in borderline cases where a reformation claim also threatens to alter a beneficiary’s share. Future litigation will likely flesh out the line between permissible reform and prohibited contest, especially where no‑contest clauses are aggressively drafted.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code § 16061.7 – Trustee’s notice of irrevocability.
Probate Code § 16061.8 – 120‑day limitation on trust contests.
Probate Code § 15409(a) – Court’s equitable power to modify trust provisions.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 8.5 – Reformation to reflect donor’s intent.

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