Estate of Williams - Case Brief

4 Mins read

Case Number: D083713
Court: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
Date Filed: August 31, 2025


Holding

The court held that Carla Montgomery failed to meet her burden of proving that Benjamin C. Williams omitted her from his trust solely because he was unaware of her birth, and therefore her petition under Probate Code section 21622 was denied.


Narrative

A California appellate panel this month affirmed a San Bernardino Superior Court decision that barred an alleged pre‑termitted child from recovering a share of her father’s trust estate. The case turns on the narrow construction of Probate Code section 21622, which limits a child’s recovery to situations where the decedent’s sole reason for omission was ignorance of the child’s existence.

Carla Montgomery, the appellant, asserted that she was the daughter of Benjamin C. Williams, a long‑time educator who executed a declaration of trust in 1999 naming only two of his children—Benita Ligia Williams and Benjamin S. Williams—as beneficiaries. Montgomery, born in the 1960s to Benjamin’s brief relationship with Annie Elliott, discovered her parentage after a DNA match linked her daughter, Niyah Montgomery, to Benita. In December 2019 she filed a petition under section 21622, seeking a share of the trust as an omitted child who was alive when the trust was executed.

The trial court, after a one‑day hearing, found that Benjamin was indeed unaware of Montgomery’s birth at the time he executed the trust. However, it concluded that Montgomery could not satisfy the statutory “sole reason” requirement because Benjamin had knowingly omitted four other pre‑termitted children and deliberately provided for only the two named beneficiaries. Relying on Rallo v. O’Brien (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 997, the court held that the burden rests on the claimant to show that the decedent would have provided for the child but for the lack of knowledge. The court granted Benita’s motion for nonsuit and entered judgment against Montgomery.

On appeal, Montgomery argued that Rallo was inapplicable because Benjamin’s trust lacked a general disinheritance clause, a factual distinction she said should preclude the “sole reason” analysis. The appellate court rejected that contention, emphasizing that Rallo does not create an additional element tied to a disinheritance clause; rather, it interprets the statutory language of section 21622. The court reiterated that the legislature, in replacing the former section 90 with §§ 21620‑21622, intended a clear demarcation: children born after execution are presumed omitted inadvertently, while those born before execution are presumed intentionally omitted unless the decedent’s unawareness is shown to be the only reason for the omission.

Citing the legislative history and prior authority—including Estate of Della Sala (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 463, Estate of Mowry (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 338, Harustak v. Wilkins (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208, and Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246—the court affirmed that the burden of proof lies squarely on the claimant. Montgomery’s evidence, the court found, did not overcome the presumption that Benjamin intended to provide solely for his two named children. The appellate panel therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition and awarded costs to Benita.

Impact and unresolved issues. This decision reinforces the stringent “sole reason” standard of § 21622, limiting recovery for pre‑termitted children to cases where the decedent’s ignorance is the exclusive cause of omission. Practitioners should note that the presence or absence of a general disinheritance clause does not alter the statutory test; rather, it may serve as evidence of intent but does not create a separate pleading requirement. The ruling leaves open the question of how courts will treat cases where a decedent omitted multiple known children for mixed reasons—some intentional, some due to ignorance—potentially prompting future litigation on the evidentiary thresholds for establishing “sole reason.”


Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Probate Code §§ 21620, 21621, 21622 – statutory framework for omitted children (pre‑ and post‑execution).
  • Former Probate Code § 90 – repealed provision presuming rights for all omitted children.
  • Burden of proof – claimant must prove decedent’s sole reason for omission was lack of knowledge (as interpreted in § 21622).
  • Presumption of intentional omission – applies to children born before execution of testamentary instruments.

Major Cases Cited

  • Rallo v. O’Brien, 52 Cal.App.5th 997 (2020) – interpretation of § 21622’s “sole reason” requirement.
  • Estate of Della Sala, 73 Cal.App.4th 463 (1999) – principle of construing testamentary intent.
  • Estate of Mowry, 107 Cal.App.4th 338 (2003) – burden on claimant to prove intent.
  • Harustak v. Wilkins, 84 Cal.App.4th 208 (2000) – de novo review of statutory construction.
  • Burch v. George, 7 Cal.4th 246 (1994) – standards for interpreting probate statutes.