Conservatorship of Navarrete

Case Number: E070210

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2020-12-21

Case Brief – Conservatorship of Navarrete

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: E070210
Disposition: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order compelling Anna Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father and awarded her costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that a probate conservator’s authority does not extend to forcing an adult conservatee to receive visits or participate in therapy with a parent against the conservatee’s expressed wishes; such an order exceeds the statutory powers granted under the Probate Code and therefore must be vacated.

Narrative

A dispute over the care of a disabled adult quickly escalated into a high‑stakes conservatorship battle that tested the limits of California’s probate statutes and the constitutional privacy rights of an incapacitated person. The case began when Anna Navarrete, a 33‑year‑old woman with cerebral palsy, a speech disorder, and an anxiety adjustment disorder, was the subject of a petition filed by her mother, Maria Navarrete, seeking appointment as her probate conservator.

Anna’s father, Rodolfo Navarrete, Sr., and her older brother, Rodolfo “Rudy” Navarrete, Jr., objected. Rudy filed a competing petition to become conservator, while the father sought a restraining order against the mother and, later, visitation rights with his daughter. Underlying the family feud were grave allegations: Anna told her mother, younger brother Adrian, and her therapist that her father had sexually assaulted and raped her in May 2016. The father denied the accusations, and no criminal charges were filed at the time of trial.

Procedural History. The Riverside County Superior Court conducted a multi‑day trial in 2017. Testimony included the mother, father, both brothers, Anna’s therapist, and an interview with Anna herself. The trial judge, after a detailed but ultimately inconclusive competency inquiry under Evidence Code § 701, concluded that Anna was not a competent witness and therefore barred her from testifying on the merits of the abuse allegations. The court appointed the mother as conservator, denied Rudy’s petition, and later—despite Anna’s expressed fear—ordered that Anna attend joint counseling sessions with her father, reasoning that supervised visitation might “reconcile” the parties if the abuse allegations proved unfounded.

Anna appealed the visitation order. The father did not cross‑appeal, and no respondent brief was filed. The appellate record therefore rested on Anna’s brief, which raised three intertwined arguments:

Statutory Authority. The Probate Code reserves to an adult conservatee the right to receive visitors; a conservator may not compel visitation absent an explicit court order granting that power.
Constitutional Privacy. Forced contact infringes the California and United States constitutions’ protections of personal autonomy and privacy.
Abuse of Discretion. Even assuming the court could order visitation, the trial judge lacked a reasonable factual basis to find that forced joint therapy served Anna’s best interests, especially given her credible fear of the father.

Statutory Analysis. The appellate court focused on Probate Code §§ 1801, 2351(a), and 2351(b). Section 1801 authorizes appointment of a conservator when a person cannot provide for basic personal needs. Section 2351(a) grants the conservator “care, custody, and control” of the conservatee but expressly reserves personal rights, including the right to receive visitors, telephone calls, and personal mail. The statute further allows the court to grant a conservator the power to enforce those visitor rights, or to limit the conservator’s powers by expressly reserving them to the conservatee (§ 2351(b)).

The appellate panel found no indication that the trial court had issued an order granting the conservator authority to force visitation, nor that it had limited the conservator’s powers in a way that would permit such compulsion. The court emphasized that the language of § 2351(a) is clear: the conservator’s control “shall not extend to personal rights retained by the conservatee.” Accordingly, the trial court’s visitation order exceeded the statutory grant of authority.

Comparative Jurisprudence. The court distinguished the probate context from family‑law guardianship, noting that guardianship statutes (unlike conservatorship statutes) do permit courts to order visitation for the welfare of a minor ward. Citing In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, the court reiterated that visitation is a form of custody and that the Family Code’s visitation provisions do not apply to adults who have reached the age of majority, even when disabled. The panel also referenced Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford (1891) 141 U.S. 250, underscoring the fundamental right of an individual to control his or her own person absent clear legal authority.

Constitutional Considerations. While the appellate court acknowledged the privacy and autonomy claims, it deemed a statutory analysis sufficient to resolve the appeal. Nonetheless, the court noted that compelling an adult conservatee to engage in therapy with a parent against her expressed fear would likely implicate both the California Constitution’s privacy clause and the U.S. Constitution’s substantive due‑process rights, reinforcing the statutory conclusion.

Abuse of Discretion Standard. Applying the abuse‑of‑discretion framework from Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, the panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not merely erroneous but outside the bounds of statutory authority. The judge’s speculation that “perhaps” forced visitation might lead to reconciliation did not constitute a reasonable basis when the conservatee herself categorically refused and when the factual record contained credible allegations of sexual abuse.

Disposition. The appellate court reversed the visitation order, vacating the requirement that Anna attend joint counseling with her father, and awarded her costs on appeal. The decision restores Anna’s statutory right to refuse visitors and underscores the limited scope of a conservator’s powers over an adult conservatee’s personal autonomy.

Implications. This opinion clarifies that Probate Code § 2351(a) protects an adult conservatee’s right to decline visitation, even when a conservator believes contact may be beneficial. Practitioners must now ensure that any request to compel visitation is supported by an explicit court order that expressly grants the conservator that power, or else risk reversal on appeal. The ruling also signals heightened judicial scrutiny of visitation orders that intersect with alleged sexual abuse, especially where the conservatee’s expressed wishes are clear and the evidentiary record is ambiguous.

Unresolved questions remain regarding the evidentiary standard for allowing an adult conservatee to testify about alleged abuse. Although the appellate court sidestepped that issue, future litigants may confront the same competency dilemma under Evidence Code § 701. Moreover, the decision leaves open how courts should handle situations where a conservatee’s disability genuinely impairs decision‑making capacity regarding personal relationships, a gray area that may prompt legislative clarification.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code §§ 1801, 2351(a), 2351(b) – appointment, powers, and limits of conservators of the person.
Evidence Code § 701 – competency of witnesses; discretion to defer competency determination until after direct examination.
California Constitution, Article I, § 1 – privacy and personal autonomy rights.
U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment – substantive due‑process protection of personal liberty.

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