Gann v. Acosta

Case Number: F080831

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-03-15

Case Brief – Gann v. Acosta

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: F080831
Disposition: The judgment of the Superior Court denying Gann’s petition for a writ of mandamus is affirmed; respondent is awarded costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) interpretation of “step‑parent” in its regulations was not clearly unreasonable, and therefore the agency’s denial of the inmate’s request for an overnight family visit was proper. Accordingly, the superior court’s denial of the traditional mandamus petition was affirmed.

Narrative

Lead – An inmate convicted of first‑degree murder sought a court order compelling a CDCR correctional counselor to approve an overnight family visit with his spouse. The Court of Appeal upheld the denial, emphasizing de novo review of the agency’s regulatory construction and reaffirming the principle that visitation privileges are discretionary, not a constitutional right.

Procedural backdrop – Nathaniel Marcus Gann, serving a 25‑to‑life sentence at Valley State Prison, filed a Family Visiting Application on July 7 2016 under California Code of Regulations (CCR) title 15, § 3000 and § 3177, which define “family visits” as a privilege for eligible inmates and their immediate family members. The application was rejected on the ground that Gann, a convicted murderer, was ineligible because the victim—Timothy MacNeil—was deemed his “step‑parent” under the regulation’s definition of “immediate family member.”

Gann pursued three levels of administrative review (first‑level response, warden review, and CDCR Office of Appeals), each affirming the denial. He then filed a petition for a traditional writ of mandamus (Code Civ. Proc. § 1085) in the Superior Court of Madera County, arguing that the CDCR’s interpretation of “step‑parent” was erroneous and that, under Penal Code § 6404, his life‑sentence status could not be a basis for denial. The trial court denied the petition, entered judgment for the respondent, and awarded costs. Gann appealed.

Key factual nuances – Gann’s mother married MacNeil in 2004 and died in 2006, a year before Gann murdered MacNeil. Gann never lived with his mother’s husband, nor was he in his mother’s custody during the marriage. His sister, a co‑defendant, remained in the victim’s home at the time of the murder, establishing a “link” between Gann and the victim in the CDCR’s view.

Issues presented

Whether the CDCR’s regulatory construction of “step‑parent” as the husband of an inmate’s deceased mother falls within the scope of a permissible agency interpretation.
Whether the denial of the visitation request was a ministerial act subject to mandamus, or a discretionary decision requiring de novo judicial review of the agency’s rule‑making.
Whether Penal Code § 6404, enacted by Senate Bill 843, bars the CDCR from denying family visits solely because the inmate is serving a life sentence.

Court’s analysis

Standard of review. The appellate court applied de novo review because the dispute centered on the meaning of a regulatory term, not on factual determinations. Precedent (e.g., Menefield v. Foreman (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 211) mandates de novo scrutiny for statutory or regulatory construction.

Agency authority and deference. The court reiterated that the CDCR’s quasi‑legislative rules—promulgated under Penal Code § 5058—carry the weight of statutes. Under Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683, courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless the construction is “clearly unreasonable.”

Interpretation of “step‑parent.” CCR § 3000 defines “Immediate Family Members” and includes “step‑parents or foster parents” without the qualifier “legal.” The court read this omission as intentional, indicating the legislature did not intend to limit the term to a legally recognized step‑parent under the Family Code. The CDCR’s reading—treating the husband of the inmate’s mother, even if the mother is deceased, as a step‑parent—was therefore not “clearly unreasonable.”

The court rejected Gann’s reliance on the Family Code definition of “stepparent” (Fam. Code § 3101(d)(2)), noting that the definition applies solely within that statute and that the CDCR had not incorporated it into its regulations. Moreover, the court found that the CDCR’s broader, dictionary‑style definition of “step‑father” (e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary) aligns with the agency’s interpretation.

Mandamus versus administrative mandamus. While the respondent argued that the proper remedy was administrative mandamus under § 1094.5, the court held that the procedural posture was immaterial; the same de novo standard applies to either form of mandamus when the issue is statutory construction. Consequently, the traditional writ petition was proper, but the agency’s decision stood.

Penal Code § 6404. The 2016 statute bars denial of family visits “solely” because an inmate is serving a life sentence without parole. The court concluded that the CDCR’s denial was not based solely on Gann’s sentence; it was predicated on the victim’s status as an immediate family member under the regulation. Thus, § 6404 did not preempt the agency’s action.

Disposition and costs. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, ordering the respondent to recover its costs. A brief note addressed Gann’s motion for appointment of counsel, noting that family visitation is a privilege, not a protected right, and therefore the motion was denied.

Impact and unresolved questions – Gann v. Acosta reinforces the high de novo deference afforded to correctional agencies in interpreting their own regulations, especially where the language is ambiguous and the agency possesses specialized expertise. The decision clarifies that “step‑parent” under CCR § 3000 is not confined to a legally recognized step‑parent under the Family Code, expanding the scope of “immediate family” for visitation restrictions.

Nevertheless, the case leaves open the question of how courts will treat similar regulatory terms when the statutory definition is more precise and the agency’s language is silent. Future litigants may argue for a stricter “plain‑meaning” approach when a regulation mirrors a statutory term, potentially prompting the California Supreme Court to refine the “clearly unreasonable” threshold. Additionally, the interplay between § 6404 and agency‑crafted visitation criteria may surface again as more life‑sentence inmates seek family contact.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

California Code of Regulations, title 15, §§ 3000, 3177 – definitions of “Immediate Family Members” and family‑visiting privileges.
Penal Code §§ 187, 6404, 5054, 5055, 5058 – murder statutes, visitation‑restriction prohibition, CDCR duties, and agency rule‑making authority.
Family Code § 3101(d)(2) – statutory definition of “stepparent” (limited to that statute).
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5 – traditional and administrative mandamus.

Key Cases Cited

Cabrera v. State of California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683 – de novo review of agency interpretations; “clearly unreasonable” standard.
Menefield v. Foreman (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 211 – de novo review for statutory construction.
Hutchinson v. City of Sacramento (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 791 – distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties for mandamus.
Southern California Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1531 – choice between traditional and administrative mandamus.
In re Marriage of Williams (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 507 – effect of death on marital dissolution.
In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322; In re Jason V. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1168 – definitions of “parent” and “step‑parent” in statutory contexts.
Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63 – inference from omission of language in statutes.