Maleti v. Wickers - Case Brief

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Maleti v. Wickers

Case Number: H048393M

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-09-09

Case Brief – Maleti v. Wickers

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: H048393
Disposition: The petition for rehearing filed by both parties is denied; the opinion is modified only to correct terminology. The appellate court affirms the trial court’s denial of the special motion to strike the malicious‑prosecution claim and reverses the trial court’s denial of attorney‑fees and costs under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1).

Holding

The court held that a plaintiff satisfies the “favorable termination” element of a malicious‑prosecution claim when, in a prior multi‑claim action, the defendant prevails on all claims and at least one claim is terminated on the merits in the defendant’s favor, even though other claims may have been dismissed on procedural grounds. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti‑SLAPP motion as to the malicious‑prosecution claim and reversed the trial court’s refusal to award the prevailing defendants reasonable attorney fees and costs under the anti‑SLAPP statute.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that sharpens the line between procedural dismissals and substantive “favorable termination” for malicious‑prosecution purposes, the California Sixth District Court of Appeal upheld a malicious‑prosecution claim arising from a probate easement dispute while granting the prevailing defendants their statutory anti‑SLAPP attorney‑fees award. The ruling clarifies that a plaintiff need not prove that every claim in the underlying suit was decided on the merits; it is enough that the defendant prevailed on all claims and that at least one claim was resolved on the merits in the defendant’s favor.

Procedural Odyssey

The litigation began after the estate of Andrew Farkas filed a probate petition in Santa Cruz County seeking to record a prescriptive easement over a private “Tradewinds Route” road. The petition, filed by the estate’s administrator, Collette McLaughlin, named a series of neighboring owners, eventually adding Sal Maleti and his corporation, the Sal Maleti Corp., as respondents. The probate court disposed of nine of the ten asserted easement‑related claims in favor of the Maleti respondents—five via demurrer with leave to amend, one via demurrer without leave, and three by summary judgment.

Following the probate judgment, Carol Maleti, executor of the Maleti estate, sued McLaughlin and the law firm that represented her (Law Office of Rodney W. Wickers, Rodney Wickers, and Christina Wickers) for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The complaint alleged that the probate claims were “utterly meritless,” that the attorneys knew the claims were time‑barred, and that they pursued the suit in bad faith to extract a settlement.

Defendants moved under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, to strike both causes of action. The trial court recognized that the claims arose from protected petitioning activity, thereby satisfying the first prong of the anti‑SLAPP test. It then applied the second prong, the “probability of prevailing” inquiry. Finding that Carol had shown a prima‑facie case for malicious prosecution, the court denied the motion to strike that claim but granted the motion as to the abuse‑of‑process claim and refused the defendants’ request for attorney‑fees and costs.

Both parties appealed. Carol cross‑appealed the order striking her abuse‑of‑process claim; the attorneys appealed the denial of fees and the denial of the anti‑SLAPP motion as to malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeal denied both petitions for rehearing, but in a separate order modified the opinion to replace the term “resolved” with “terminated,” “disposed of,” or “terminated” where appropriate, and inserted citations to § 425.16(b)(3) and other authorities.

Core Issues

  1. Whether the “favorable termination” element of malicious prosecution is satisfied when the underlying action contains multiple claims, some dismissed on procedural grounds and at least one dismissed on the merits.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing defendants under § 425.16(c)(1).

The Court’s Reasoning

A. Protected Activity and the Anti‑SLAPP Framework
The court reiterated that any civil action arising from a petition to a judicial body is “protected activity” under § 425.16(e)(1)–(2). The defendants had met their burden of showing that the underlying probate suit was filed in furtherance of a petitioning right. Consequently, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate a “probability of prevailing” on each asserted cause of action.

B. The “Favorable Termination” Element
California law requires that a malicious‑prosecution plaintiff show that the prior action was “terminated in the plaintiff’s favor on the merits” (Bertero v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666). The Supreme Court has long distinguished substantive, merit‑based terminations from procedural dismissals that do not reflect on the defendant’s innocence (Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747; Casa Herrera v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336).

The appellate court parsed the prior probate proceeding as follows:

  • Six of the nine claims against the Maleti respondents were dismissed on the merits—either by demurrer with leave to amend (substantive defects) or by summary judgment (substantive lack of liability).
  • The remaining three claims (negligence, slander of title, and a claim to pierce the corporate veil) were dismissed on procedural grounds—statute‑of‑limitations defenses or lack of standing.

The court held that the “favorable termination” requirement is satisfied when all claims are resolved against the plaintiff and at least one claim is terminated on the merits in the defendant’s favor. The reasoning draws on the Supreme Court’s “Bertero rule,” which permits a malicious‑prosecution claim where any theory in the prior suit lacked probable cause, even if other theories were viable. The appellate court clarified that the “favorable termination” analysis is distinct from the “probable cause” element; the former focuses on the outcome of the prior suit, not on the tenability of each claim.

Thus, the court rejected the defendants’ contention that a “favorable termination” requires that every claim be decided on the merits. Instead, it emphasized that the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the defendant emerged from the prior suit with a substantive victory—i.e., that the court’s judgment reflected on the merits of at least one claim. The procedural dismissals of the remaining claims do not defeat the favorable‑termination analysis because they do not indicate any vindication of the plaintiff’s position.

C. Probable Cause and Malice
Having satisfied the favorable‑termination prong, the appellate court turned to the remaining elements of malicious prosecution. The record, including the parties’ briefs and the trial court’s findings, established that the six merits‑based dismissals were grounded in the lack of any legal basis for the easement claims. The court found that the defendants proceeded despite an objective lack of probable cause and with the requisite malice—evidenced by the prolonged pursuit of a claim that the plaintiff’s estate had no enforceable easement rights.

D. Attorney‑Fees Award
Section 425.16(c)(1) provides that a prevailing defendant in an anti‑SLAPP motion is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. The trial court had denied such an award, reasoning that the defendants derived “no practical benefit” from striking the abuse‑of‑process claim. The appellate court found this factual determination unsupported. Under the anti‑SLAPP statute, the fee award is a matter of right once the defendant prevails on any claim; the trial court must consider the prevailing party’s “actual expenses” and the “benefit” of the successful motion, not a speculative assessment of “practical benefit.” Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the denial and remanded for a proper fee determination.

Closing Analysis

Maleti v. Wickers resolves a lingering tension in California malicious‑prosecution jurisprudence: whether a plaintiff must prove that every claim in the prior suit was dismissed on the merits. By holding that a single merits‑based dismissal suffices—provided the defendant prevailed on all claims—the court aligns the “favorable termination” element with the policy behind the tort, namely, to protect defendants who are vindicated on the substantive merits of the case. This approach prevents plaintiffs from escaping liability merely because a defendant’s victory rests on a mixture of procedural and substantive outcomes.

The decision also reinforces the anti‑SLAPP fee regime. Courts must award fees to prevailing defendants even when the practical benefit of a partial strike is modest; the statutory language creates a clear entitlement that cannot be negated by a trial court’s subjective view of “benefit.”

Unresolved Questions – The opinion leaves open how lower courts should treat cases where the prior action yields a mixed verdict—some claims dismissed on the merits in favor of the defendant, others dismissed on procedural grounds, and yet others won by the plaintiff. The Maleti court emphasized that any plaintiff victory defeats the favorable‑termination requirement, but it did not address scenarios where the plaintiff’s victory is limited to a narrow, perhaps nominal, relief. Future litigation will likely refine the line between “partial victory” and “substantive defeat” for malicious‑prosecution purposes.

Overall, Maleti provides California practitioners with a clearer roadmap for evaluating malicious‑prosecution claims in the anti‑SLAPP context, especially in multi‑claim disputes common in probate, real‑estate, and professional‑negligence litigation.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 – Special motion to strike (anti‑SLAPP) statute; §§ 425.16(b)(1)–(2) (two‑step test), (c)(1) (attorney‑fees award), (e)(1)–(2) (protected activity).
  • Probate Code § 850 – Petition to establish estate’s claim of ownership and to direct transfer of property.
  • Statute of Limitations – General limitation periods referenced in the underlying probate claims (e.g., § 338).

Key Cases Cited

  • Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (2003) – Anti‑SLAPP standard.
  • Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (1994) – Malicious prosecution may proceed when only some claims lack probable cause.
  • Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal.3d 43 (1974) – Elements of malicious prosecution.
  • Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747 (1979) – Definition of “favorable termination.”
  • Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal.4th 336 (2004) – Distinction between substantive and procedural dismissals.
  • Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 184 Cal.App.4th 313 (2010) – Malicious prosecution may focus on a subset of claims.
  • Friedberg v. Cox, 197 Cal.App.3d 381 (1987) – Favorable termination requires defeat of all plaintiff claims.
  • StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc., 136 Cal.App.4th 1392 (2006) – No favorable termination where plaintiff obtains any relief.
  • Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez, 63 Cal.App.5th 117 (2021) – Requirement that the entire action be favorably terminated.
  • Mendoza v. Wichmann, 194 Cal.App.4th 1430 (2011) – Review standards for anti‑SLAPP motions.
  • Rasmussen v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 804 (2011) – Effect of anti‑SLAPP rulings on subsequent evidentiary admissibility.

These authorities collectively shape the appellate court’s analysis of malicious prosecution within the anti‑SLAPP framework and guide California litigators in crafting and defending such claims.