Conservatorship of K.P. - Case Brief

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Conservatorship of K.P.

Case Number: S258212

Court: Cal.

Date Filed: 2021-06-28

Case Brief – Conservatorship of K.P.

Court: California Court of Appeal
Date: 2025‑09‑04
Case Number: S258212
Disposition: The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a one‑year conservatorship and denied the petition to modify the jury instruction, holding that a conservatee’s willingness or ability to accept voluntary treatment is a relevant consideration but not a separate statutory element required to prove “grave disability.”

Holding

The court held that, under the Lanterman‑Petris‑Short Act, the trier of fact may consider a person’s capacity or willingness to accept treatment when determining whether the person is gravely disabled, but the statute does not require a distinct finding that the person is “unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment” as an independent element for imposing a conservatorship.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that resolves a long‑standing split among California appellate courts, the Second Appellate District clarified that the Lanterman‑Petris‑Short (LPS) Act’s definition of “grave disability” does not impose a separate statutory requirement that a conservatee be unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment. The ruling affirms the trial court’s grant of a conservatorship over 23‑year‑old K.P., a man with chronic schizophrenia, and rejects the petitioner’s demand that the jury instruction be altered to make treatment resistance a prerequisite element.

Procedural History – The Los Angeles County Superior Court first appointed a public‑guardian conservatorship for K.P. in May 2008 and renewed it annually for nine years. In April 2018 the Public Guardian filed a petition for renewal, asserting that K.P. remained gravely disabled. K.P. exercised his statutory right to a jury trial and, after a trial, the jury found him gravely disabled; the court reappointed the conservatorship. K.P. appealed, challenging the trial court’s refusal to modify CACI No. 4000 so that the jury would have to find, as a separate element, that he was “unwilling or unable voluntarily to accept meaningful treatment.” The Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflicting authority.

Facts – At trial, a psychologist from K.P.’s residential facility testified that K.P. suffers from schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions, and grossly disorganized behavior. He had repeatedly refused medication, once nearly overdosing on a double dose, and required round‑the‑clock supervision. The psychologist concluded K.P. lacked insight into his illness and could not meet basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter without supervised medication. K.P.’s mother, who had previously served as his conservator, testified she could help with medication and therapy but could not provide housing. K.P. himself admitted he had not lived outside a treatment facility since 2013, denied any mental illness, and said he would not take psychiatric drugs if released.

Issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions:

  1. Statutory Construction: Does the LPS Act require a separate factual finding that a conservatee is “unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment” before a conservatorship may be imposed?
  2. Due Process: If the statute does not require such a finding, does due‑process jurisprudence compel the State to prove that element as a constitutional safeguard?

Statutory Framework – The LPS Act creates a tiered system for involuntary mental‑health interventions. Section 5350 defines a conservatorship and limits the trial‑court inquiry to whether the person is (a) suffering from a mental disorder and (b) gravely disabled as a result—meaning the person cannot provide for basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter. Section 5352 governs professional recommendations that initiate conservatorship proceedings. For inpatient cases, the professional must find the person is “unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily” before recommending conservatorship; for outpatient cases, the statute lists only two prerequisites—gravely disabled and no need for further inpatient evaluation—without any reference to treatment willingness. Section 5361, which governs reappointment petitions, likewise requires only proof that the person “remains gravely disabled,” omitting any treatment‑willingness language.

Court’s Reasoning – Justice Corrigan, writing for a unanimous court, applied a holistic statutory‑interpretation approach:

  1. Textual Analysis – The word “gravely disabled” appears only in § 5008 and § 5350, each defining the condition solely in terms of inability to meet basic needs. No mention is made of treatment willingness. The only statutory provision that couples “unwilling or unable to accept treatment” with a conservatorship is § 5352, and that provision is limited to the recommendation stage for inpatients. The court emphasized that the Legislature deliberately separated the recommendation function (where treatment resistance is a screening tool) from the trial function (where the only elements are mental disorder and grave disability).

  2. Legislative History & Policy – The LPS Act was enacted to balance two competing goals: (a) protect the liberty interests of persons with mental illness, and (b) ensure that individuals who cannot safely survive in the community receive appropriate supervision. The 1989 amendment to § 5350 codified the principle that third‑party assistance (family, friends) must be considered, but it did not extend that principle to treatment willingness. The court noted that imposing a separate treatment‑willingness element would create an “insuperable burden” on the State, contrary to the Act’s purpose of providing prompt, calibrated interventions.

  3. Precedent – The court distinguished earlier decisions that required a treatment‑willingness finding (e.g., Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313; Walker (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1082). Those cases pre‑date the 1989 amendment and were decided before the appellate split solidified. More recent authority—Symington (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1464, D.P. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 794, and the Court’s own 2020 decision in Conservatorship of K.P. (39 Cal.App.5th 254)—rejects the notion that § 5352’s treatment‑willingness language creates a separate element at trial. The court expressly disapproved Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542 and Walker for extending the statutory scheme beyond its text.

  4. Evidentiary Role of Treatment Willingness – While not an element, the court affirmed that evidence of a conservatee’s willingness or ability to accept treatment is “relevant” and may be considered by the trier of fact in evaluating grave disability. The jury instructions (CACI No. 4002) correctly allowed jurors to consider such evidence, but the instruction did not make it a prerequisite to a finding of grave disability.

  5. Due‑Process Analysis – The court held that the Constitution does not require the State to prove a separate “unwillingness to accept treatment” element. The due‑process safeguard is already satisfied by the statutory requirement that the State prove grave disability beyond a reasonable doubt, and by the fact‑finder’s ability to consider any credible evidence—including treatment willingness—when determining whether the person truly cannot survive safely in freedom. Adding a new constitutional requirement would amount to judicial law‑making, which the court declined to do.

Disposition – The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s reappointment of the conservatorship and denied K.P.’s petition to modify the jury instruction. The decision resolves the appellate split and clarifies that, for both initial appointments and reappointments, the only statutory elements to be proved are mental disorder and grave disability; treatment willingness is merely a factor to be weighed, not a separate element.

Impact and Unresolved Issues – This opinion provides a definitive answer to a question that has lingered for three decades. Practitioners can now rely on the view that CACI No. 4000 need not be altered to require a separate treatment‑willingness finding, and that CACI No. 4002’s language—permitting consideration of such evidence—is sufficient. The ruling also underscores the importance of the professional recommendation stage: for inpatient cases, a mental‑health professional must still find the person unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment before recommending a conservatorship. However, the decision leaves open how lower courts should handle future challenges that argue the scope of “grave disability” should be broadened to include other functional criteria (e.g., capacity to manage finances) beyond basic survival needs. Moreover, while the court rejected the constitutional argument, it did not address whether a future amendment to the LPS Act could expressly make treatment willingness a statutory element, a possibility that could reshape conservatorship practice.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare & Institutions Code (W&I Code) §§ 5000‑5008 – LPS Act’s purpose and definitions.
  • W&I Code § 5350 – Definition of conservatorship and the two statutory elements (mental disorder + grave disability).
  • W&I Code § 5350.5 – Application to existing Probate Code conservatorships.
  • W&I Code § 5352 – Professional recommendation requirements (inpatient vs. outpatient).
  • W&I Code §§ 5354, 5357, 5358 – Investigation, disabilities, and placement standards.
  • W&I Code §§ 5361, 5364 – Reappointment and rehearing procedures.
  • W&I Code §§ 5150, 5250, 5270.15 – 72‑hour, 14‑day, and 30‑day involuntary detention provisions.
  • Evidence Code § 210 – Definition of relevant evidence.
  • Code of Civil Procedure § 1858 – Limits on judicial expansion of statutory language.

Key Cases Cited

  • John L. (48 Cal.4th 142) – Standard of review for statutory construction.
  • Conservatorship of Ben C. (40 Cal.4th 529) – Constitutional backdrop of liberty interests.
  • Early (35 Cal.4th 244) – Third‑party assistance as a factor in grave disability.
  • Davis (124 Cal.App.3d 313) – Earlier view that treatment willingness was an element (overruled).
  • Walker (196 Cal.App.3d 1082) – Similar to Davis, also overruled.
  • Symington (209 Cal.App.3d 1464) – Distinguishes § 5352’s limited purpose.
  • Conservatorship of D.P. (41 Cal.App.5th 794) – Recent affirmation of the present holding.
  • O’Connor v. Donaldson (422 U.S. 563) – Federal due‑process principle that a nondangerous individual who can survive with help is not subject to confinement.
  • In re Miller (31 Cal.2d 191) – Prohibition on judicial creation of new statutory elements.

These authorities collectively shape the modern interpretation of “grave disability” and delineate the permissible role of treatment‑willingness evidence in California conservatorship proceedings.