Cases Cited in Probate Opinions
Last updated: September 05, 2025
Hover over case names to see the context in which they cited these authorities.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:reasonable hypothesis. ‘One cannot be said to act under an insane delusion if his condition of mind results from a belief or inference, however irrational or unfounded, drawn from facts which are shown to exist.’ ” (Estate of Putnam (1934) 1 Cal.2d 162 , 172.) “If there is any evidence, however slight or inconclusive, which might have a tendency to create a belief, such belief is not a delusion.” (Estate of Alegria (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 645, 655.) “Capricious and arbitrary likes, dislikes and mistrusts are not evidence of unsoundness of mind.” (Ibid.) “Care: 11 In this context, a delusion “has been defined to be the conception of a disordered mind which imagines facts to exist of which there is no evidence and the belief in which is adhered to against all...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:This long-standing rule, as the Chamberlain court referred to it, was purportedly reaffirmed in Kunkin, which provided: “ ‘The substantial evidence rule has received extended discussion and express reaffirmation in several of our recent cases. In People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379 , 395 . . . , we observed that “this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. . . . If the circumstances reasonably justify: Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395 . . . , we observed that “this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact t...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:present in court agreed that the terms “affecting the Minors’ interests and 42 rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem.” The phrase “ ‘[s]ubject to’ is generally construed to impose a condition precedent.” (Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50 , 54.) The court found that this condition of Chen’s approval was met when Chen entered into the first GAL agreement and stated that he “agrees to the terms of the Settlement Agreement” reached in court on May 14, 2018. Chen reiterated his approval of the settlement terms in his: Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50, 54.) The court found that this condition of Chen’s approval was met when Chen entered into the first GAL agreement and stated that he “agrees to the terms of the Settlement A...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Any use to which they put the corporation or their power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation’s business.” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93 , 108 (Jones); accord, Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1171; see § 17704.09 [describing the fiduciary duties of members and managers of a limited liability company]; Feresi v. The Livery, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 419, 425 [same]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 411, 424-425: F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 108 (Jones); accord, Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:judicial notice of the Task Force Report and the Senate committee reports cited in this footnote sua sponte because they are part of the legislative history of the Act. (See Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 1 Cal.4th 155 , 160-162 [task force report on property taxes was a part of the relevant legislative history]; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 871, 878, fn. 7 [same]; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) 11 increased in recent years because of real and perceived: County of Los Angeles (1991) -162 ; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:judicial notice of the Task Force Report and the Senate committee reports cited in this footnote sua sponte because they are part of the legislative history of the Act. (See Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 1 Cal.4th 155 , 160-162 [task force report on property taxes was a part of the relevant legislative history]; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 871, 878, fn. 7 [same]; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) 11 increased in recent years because of real and perceived: County of Los Angeles (1991) -162 ; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:denying her motion to waive traditional service was invalid because he was biased against her. Any challenge to Commissioner Martella’s failure to grant her motion to disqualify him for cause, however, is not reviewable on appeal. (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266 , 268.) As to the later order, Searles contended Judge Dorothy Shuba, who presided at the November 29, 2018 hearing and denied her renewed motion, did not give her a fair hearing. The court (Judge Amy Pellman) did not rule on the motion before dismissing the case. 7 plaintiff’s good: Hull (1991) .) As to the later order, Searles contended Judge Dorothy Shuba, who presided at the November 29, 2018 hearing and denied her renewed motion, did not give her a fair hearing.
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:Child was two years old, that he was Child’s biological father. M.M. alleged that he was entitled to status as a presumed father under the principles of due process and equal protection set forth in Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.) for unwed fathers who are prevented by the mother or by a third party from establishing presumed father status. M.M. does not dispute the parental status of T.M., who is married to Child’s mother (Mother), is listed on Child’s birth certificate as the father, and signed a Voluntary: M. alleged that he was entitled to status as a presumed father under the principles of due process and equal protection set forth in Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) (Kelsey S.
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe’].)” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1 , 8 (Isaiah W.).) “Second, ICWA notice ensures that an Indian tribe is aware of its right to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child.” (Ibid.) 5 We are somewhat concerned at the amount of times mother’s appearance was waived at: C. § 1903(4) [defining Indian child as ‘any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:protected by section 425.16. (See Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1087.) As a result, the trial court imposed on Richard the burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 384.) Next, the trial court concluded that Richard failed to satisfy that burden. It explained: “[Richard] did not submit evidence suggesting he was a party to the [Tukes Action] such that he can establish the threshold requirement that the action in connection with which malicious prosecution is sought was: Schnitt (2016) .) Next, the trial court concluded that Richard failed to satisfy that burden.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:Anti-SLAPP Procedure Analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. In the first step, “the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 396 (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from protected activity, which is defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the: Schnitt (2016) (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from protected activity, which is defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:162.) “ ‘ “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” ’ ” (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994 , 1010.) We “adopt[ ] a liberal construction of the pleading and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims.” (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1143.) We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm the judgment if correct on any: Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) .) We “adopt a liberal construction of the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims.” (Candelore v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1051 [partners “who fail to keep proper records of the dates and amounts of receipts and expenses … have the burden of establishing that data”]; see also Pierce v. Lyman (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1093 , 1101–1102 [“A fiduciary or confidential relationship can arise when confidence is reposed by persons in the integrity of others, and if the latter voluntarily accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, he or she may not act so as to take advantage of the other’s interest without that person’s: Lyman (1991)
- Garcia v. Garcia : A party may not introduce a new argument on appeal that was never raised and preserved in the trial court; issues not presented to the lower court are deemed waived and are not reviewable on appeal.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims to accomplish the purposes of the trust as determined from the trust instrument.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Gump (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 582 , 596 [citing Prob. Code, § 16040, subd. (a)].) “The trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” (Prob. Code, § 16002, subd. (a).) With respect to Dae, the cotrustees breached these duties. As a result, he was improperly cheated out of millions: 3 “Among the duties of the trustee is the duty to administer the trust and to manage trust property ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a pruden...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:because nonresidency was conceded. (See Estate of Heath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 396, 401 (Heath) [stating in passing that decedent’s German sisters were “ineligible for appointment as administrators because they [did] not reside in the United States”]; Estate of Damskog (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 78 , 81 (Damskog) [decedent’s Norwegian sisters were not entitled to appointment as administrator themselves and therefore could not nominate an administrator].) Accordingly, the court turned to much older cases that construed a prior version of the statute requiring California residency....: App.4th 396, 401 (Heath) not reside in the United States”]; Estate of Damskog (1991)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the judgment voidable.”]; see also American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 660-661; People v. North River Ins. Co. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 300, 311-313; Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111 , 117 (Torjesen).) “Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1035; see People v. Superior Court (Mitchell) (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 451, 458.) “[L]ack: Mansdorf (2016) (Torjesen).) “Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:summary judgment on June 11, 2020. Summary judgment was entered against the surety for the amount of the bond plus costs in accordance with Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (a). As explained in People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1144 , “[a] bail bond is a contract between the court and a surety whereby the surety promises that a defendant released from custody will appear in court when ordered. If the defendant fails to appear, the surety becomes a debtor for the bond amount. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1148.) The: Corp. (2016) , “ bail bond is a contract between the court and a surety whereby the surety promises that a defendant released from custody will appear in court when ordered.
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:evidence to support case-linked jurisdiction. They say his verified 12 petition and allegations made on information and belief were insufficient to defeat a motion to quash. These arguments are contrary to precedent. The mother cites ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198 , but this case refutes Mother’s argument. (Id. at p. 217 [“Generally, a properly verified complaint—or in this case a properly verified petition—may be treated as a declaration or affidavit.”]....: Retzlaff (2016) , but this case refutes Mother’s argument. (Id. at p. 217 .) The son verified his petition...
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:on Maria’s objection. There was no evidentiary hearing and consequently no evidence was accepted into the record. I STANDARD OF REVIEW Sections 17202 and 17206 both provide the court with discretion to make orders regarding trusts. (Gregge v. Hugill (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 561 , 567.) The court must exercise its discretion within the “ ‘ “limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568.) A court abuses its discretion if “ ‘it exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow: Hugill (2016) .) The court must exercise its discretion within the “ ‘ “limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A lien creditor may enforce a judgment lien against estate property by filing an equitable action without first filing a probate claim, but the creditor is barred from obtaining any deficiency judgmen...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (John L., at p. 143.) We consider individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each part may be harmonized and given effect. (See Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222 , 230; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.) A. Overview of the LPS Act The LPS Act has many purposes, including “end[ing] the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of persons with mental health disorders” (§ 5001, subd. (a)), “provid[ing] prompt evaluation and treatment” (id., subd. (b)), and: Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:proceeding involving judicial discipline, our Supreme Court held it would independently evaluate the record evidence in reviewing a recommendation by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications to remove a sitting judge from the bench. (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270 , 276....: Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their preference on the matter. (Id. at p. 643; see also In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476 , 479.) In the context of family law orders, the trial courts have no authority to order adult disabled children to visit with a parent. (In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 594.) As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Jensen, “[v]isitation is a form of custody,”: App.4th 628, 641.) A conservatee may overcome a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their preference on the matter. (Id.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:trial court as having no effect on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence. (See Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 25 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 17 Cal.4th 396, 401; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 , 1126.)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189, In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339, In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581, and Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d: Carbajal (1995) .)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:attaining substantial justice among the parties,’ ” and “ ‘[o]ur primary task is to determine whether the facts alleged provide the basis for a cause of action . . . under any theory.’ ” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226 , 1232.) B. Legal Principles Section 16061.7, subdivision (a)(1) requires a trustee to serve notice on a trust’s beneficiaries when the trust has become irrevocable due to the settlor’s death. (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288, 293.) Section 16061.8 provides that any person served with such a notification “shall: Rothwell (1995) .) B.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 , 793.) “An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments in the appellate briefs.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 109; Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 334 [“Rather than brief those arguments, [appellants] purport: Stanley (1995) .) “An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments in the appellate briefs.” (Paterno v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:conduct in the statute. Not so. The “bad faith” reference plainly modifies only the first category of conduct, because otherwise the “bad faith” modifier in the second category would be rendered surplusage. (See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1 , 12–13.) He also contends the words “in bad faith” in the phrase “by the use of undue influence in bad faith” apply to the phrase “or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse” because both refer to the same property taken. Kenton’s reading disregards the word: County of Los Angeles (2020) –13.) He also contends the words “in bad faith” in the phrase “by the use of undue influence in bad faith” apply to the phrase “or through the commission of elder...
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Conservatorship of Brokken
Context from opinion:temporary conservatorship. Here, we have a different statute and no conservatorship. “‘[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.’” (American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1039; B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1 , 11.) 4 In Cornelius, a daughter petitioned for a temporary and permanent conservatorship of her father. (Cornelius, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) Following an investigation, the probate court established a six-month temporary conservatorship. (Id. at pp. 1200-1201....: County of Los Angeles (2020) .) 4 In Cornelius, a daughter petitioned for a temporary and permanent conservatorship of her father. (Cornelius, supra, 200 Cal.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:statutory provision remains unclear after we consider its terms, structure, and related statutory provisions, we may take account of extrinsic sources— such as legislative history—to assist us in discerning the relevant legislative purpose. [Citations.]” (Gund v. County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th 503 , 511.) Section 15642 authorizes the removal of a trustee upon the petition of a settlor, cotrustee, or beneficiary, where the trustee has committed a breach of a trust, among other specified grounds. (§ 15642, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) “If the court finds that the petition for removal of the: County of Trinity (2020)
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Pronunciations (2d ed. 1948) p. 1360.) The dictionary thus ascribed to “weight” as applied to evidence a meaning of degree of probative value -- a meaning sanctioned by our Supreme Court as recently as last year. (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786 , 805 [“[w]eight” in relation to evidence “describes the degree to which the jury [or fact finder] finds the evidence probative”].) 26 mean preponderance of the evidence by implicitly incorporating only the cases identified in Chamberlain and Ettinger. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011 [interpreting Probate Code: Turner (2020) eight” in relation to evidence “describes the degree to which the jury finds the evidence probative”].) 26 mean preponderance of the evidence by implicitly incorporating only the cases i...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:losses to [his] farming business attributable 85 to a future diminished supply of water, remained for determination," citing Allen, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at p. 467. We need not address points raised on reply. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446 , 1453 (Stroh) ["[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument"].) Even if we were to consider these arguments, we would not find them to be persuasive. The issue: Stroh (1992) (Stroh) oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argume...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:losses to [his] farming business attributable 85 to a future diminished supply of water, remained for determination," citing Allen, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at p. 467. We need not address points raised on reply. (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446 , 1453 (Stroh) ["[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument"].) Even if we were to consider these arguments, we would not find them to be persuasive. The issue: Stroh (1992) (Stroh) oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argume...
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:(Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M. Ross Law Group, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 196, 208; Trustees of the Ken Lusby v. Piedmont Lumber (N.D. Cal. 2015) 132 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1180; see, e.g., Fisch, Spiegler, Ginsburg & Ladner v. Appel (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1810 , 1812 (Appel).) But these imprecise references are hardly compelling, particularly when the issue being discussed did not involve an ownership distinction between a trust and a trustee. (See Carolina Casualty, at p. 208 [“undisputed” that revocable trust “owned” property, but settlor was effectively owner for purpose of insurance policy: Appel (1992)
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:interests involved in recusal motions.” (Id. at 582.) The court’s exercise of discretion must be affirmed on appeal if there is any fairly debatable justification for it under the law. (See McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083 , 1124 (McDermott).) 2. Analysis The trial court acted within its discretion in applying the advocate-witness rule to disqualify Lee from representing appellant at trial, in evidentiary hearings at which Lee is likely to testify, and in taking or defending depositions. The court reasonably concluded that Lee is almost certain: Superior Court (2017) (McDermott).) 2.
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and a reviewing court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial evidence to support it . . . .’”’” (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083 , 1102.) In that situation, “we must ‘accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision . . . .’” (Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130, fn. 6; see Baker v.: Superior Court (2017) .) In that situation, “we must ‘accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and...
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:inferences therefrom would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850, 856.)” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150 , 1158.) 6 II Rules of Court Violations Rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of Court requires a party moving for summary judgment to identify in its separate statement of undisputed material facts each affirmative defense to be raised in the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1).) If the: Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850, 856.)” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) .) 6 II Rules of Court Violations Rule 3.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:characterized an “interested person” under the Probate Code as someone who could be financially affected by the probate proceedings. (See Estate of Prindle (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 119, 126–127 [insurance company was an interested person]; see also Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198 , 1206 [“simply being [an elder’s] child is not sufficient to confer standing” where child had no “legally cognizable interest in her mother’s revocable living trust”]; Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771, 782 [interested person has “ ‘ “a property right in or claim against a trust estate .: Wilkins (2017) child is not sufficient to confer standing” where child had no “legally cognizable interest in her mother’s revocable living trust”]; Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:of the decedent.” (§ 15657.3, subd. (d)(1).) A personal representative includes a person who is a trustee of 2 All unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 11 an estate. (Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198 , 1204–1205; see § 15610.30, subd. (d).) Here, Kenton recognizes that when Hilja initiated the action, she was a co-trustee of the family trust, a status that readily conferred her standing to commence the action against him for elder abuse. (§ 15657.3, subd. (d)(1).) Kenton argues, however, that Hilja lost: Wilkins (2017) –1205; see § 15610.30, subd. (d).) Here, Kenton recognizes that when Hilja initiated the action, she was a co-trustee of the family trust...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:behalf of a beneficiary of that estate. Rather, an elder can bring an elder abuse claim on his or her own behalf, as can 7 4 someone acting as the elder’s representative (not the estate’s). (See Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198 , 1208-1209 [conservator or guardian ad litem may bring elder abuse claim on elder’s behalf, as can someone acting with elder’s consent through “a power of appointment”].) The trial court was mistaken to suggest that Ring could bring a claim that she suffered financial elder abuse in her capacity as: Wilkins (2017)
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:appellant’s failure to provide proper headings forfeits an issue that may be discussed in the brief but is not clearly stated in a heading. (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538, 547; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172 , 179.) 19. POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J., concurring. The resolution of plaintiff’s claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.)1 (CLRA) is unnecessarily complicated by the extra-statutory expansion of omission-based liability under the CLRA by cases like Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19: Reynoso (2017) .) 19. POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:attempt of one of the beneficiaries to obtain a greater share of the trust property, the expense may properly be chargeable to that beneficiary’s share.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Rudnick v. Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1334.) In Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172 (Pizzaro), the appellate court confirmed that “[t]he trial court’s equitable power over trusts gives the court authority to charge attorney fees and costs against a beneficiary’s share of the trust estate if the beneficiary . . . ‘instigate[d] an unfounded proceeding against the trust in bad faith.’ [Citation....: Reynoso (2017)
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 [“Courts will ordinarily treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or her opening brief as a waiver of that challenge”]; Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266 , 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or abandoned”].) Gary devotes five pages to the standing issue in his reply brief, but it is settled that “[p]oints raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good: County of Santa Cruz (2017) , fn. 7 .) Gary devotes five pages to the standing issue in his reply brief...
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:assume for purposes of this opinion that Braum could establish that jeopardy attached when he entered his no contest plea to the criminal complaint, even though he was not sentenced in that case. (But see Liang v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1047 , 1055 [jeopardy did not attach when a defendant entered a plea of no contest as part of a conditional offer that required his codefendants to also plead circumstances of this case relieved him of the burden or otherwise warranted shifting it to the City. 24 guilty and court then: Defendant contends in his opening brief that he “pled nolo contendere and was convicted on all charges.” But, as we discuss above, the record on appeal does not indicate whether defendant was sentence...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:that a legislative enactment is invalid on its face confronts daunting obstacles to success. The first hurdle to overcome is the bedrock principle that courts are exceedingly reluctant to declare legislation unconstitutional.” (Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Board of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129 , 137.) A statute “cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484....: Board of Supervisors (2002) .) A statute “cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:seasons of repose,” “cannot be lost until another is gained,” and “can be changed only by the union of act and intent.” (Gov. Code, § 244.) 15 at p. 402; see also In re Marriage of Amezquita & Archuleta (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1415 , 1421.)11 To be sure, residency and domicile are not always synonymous. Although cases sometimes use the words interchangeably, “ ‘residence’ connotes any factual place of abode of some permanency, more than a mere temporary sojourn,” whereas domicile is more comprehensive, including “both the act of residence and an intention: Code, § 244.) 15 at p. 402; see also In re Marriage of Amezquita & Archuleta (2002)
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:Yet the contents of the boxes were neither introduced into evidence nor made part of the record on appeal. “Where exhibits are missing we will not presume they would undermine the judgment.” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278 , 291; see ibid. [“[Appellant’s] brief leaves the reader mystified as to what was introduced at trial and why critical evidence was not”].) The $300,000 surcharge came down to a credibility determination, and the trial court did not believe Stacey. She was found to have falsified records in the past: County of Yuba (2002) ; see ibid. brief leaves the reader mystified as to what was introduced at trial and why critical evidence was not”].) The $300,000 surcharge came down to a credibility determina...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:(E.g., T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239-1240 (T.J.).) Another position maintains that the clear and convincing standard of proof has no bearing on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence. (E.g., In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581 , 604.) From this perspective, a court reviewing a finding requiring clear and convincing proof surveys the record for substantial evidence, without also considering whether this evidence reasonably could have yielded a finding made with the specific degree of certainty required by the clear and convincing standard....: J.).) Another position maintains that the clear and convincing standard of proof has no bearing on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence. (E.g., In re Marriage of Murray (2002)
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:“who has lived with a child, treating it as his [or her] son or daughter, has developed a relationship with the child that should not be lightly dissolved” ’ ” ’ ”].) Shannon relies on In re Karen C. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 932 (Karen C.) in support of various policy considerations she contends should apply in 20 rebutting the parentage presumption between Charles and Judy. Karen C. does not help our analysis in this case. Karen C. involved a petition by a 12-year-old girl who sought an order from the juvenile court determining: 19 But even if the natural parent and child presumption between Charles and Judy could be rebutted purely on public policy groundsa premise we rejectwe disagree with Shannon’s assertion that public...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:plaintiff). (Estate of Black, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 587.) The commission’s report on the 2010 amendments augments these contrasts, expressly repudiating the equivalency of the two legal standards set forth in the decisions, such as Estate of Gonzalez (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1296 , 1304, that Meiri advances. After discussing how the prior standard had been “equated with the standard that governs malicious prosecution cases, requiring only that the contest be ‘legally tenable,’ ” the commission concluded “that such a standard is too forgiving. A no contest clause should deter more than just: App.3d at p. 587.) The commission’s report on the 2010 amendments augments these contrasts, expressly repudiating the equivalency of the two legal standards set forth in the decisions, such as Estate...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:than new evidence. But the principle explained in Jay—which is based upon the unfairness to the opponent of not being able to address the new matter raised in a reply (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308 , 316)—applies here, particularly where the circumstances giving rise to the argument (i.e., an asserted pleading defect) were known to Attorneys when their anti-SLAPP motion was filed. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 9:106.1 [“[i]t is a serious mistake to: A. (2002) )—applies here, particularly where the circumstances giving rise to the argument (i.e., an asserted pleading defect) were known to Attorneys when their anti-SLAPP motion was filed.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:severe forms of state action’”]; see generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996) 519 U.S. 102, 128.) Patricia’s right to actively participate in this dependency proceeding may not be disregarded for the sake of 9 expediency. (See In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403 , representing her. (We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s May 7, 2021 order terminating Patricia’s parental rights pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459.) That order, as well as all other orders made by the juvenile court while a guardian ad litem was in place,: S. 102, 128.) Patricia’s right to actively participate in this dependency proceeding may not be disregarded for the sake of 9 expediency. (See In re Josiah S. (2002)
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:declaration supporting the amount of monetary sanctions sought, as required under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276. Accordingly, to the extent Hilja’s request constitutes a motion for sanctions, we deny it. (Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Pacific Bell (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1397 , 1402 [denying procedurally improper request for sanctions].) We also decline to impose sanctions on our own motion. 34 5....: Pacific Bell (2002) .) We also decline to impose sanctions on our own motion. 34 5.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:adequately alleged a sufficient injury to confer standing upon him. (Cal. Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings Before Trial (CJER 2022) Parties, § 10.26 [“The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in the complaint to establish standing to sue.”]; Codoni v. Codoni (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 18 , 21.) VI. Standing In California A. Code of Civil Procedure Section 367 Limon contends “California standing doctrine ‘simply requires that the action be maintained in the name of “[t]he person who has the right to sue under [the] substantive law,” ’ ” quoting Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court: Codoni (2002) .) VI.
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Adoption of M.R.
Context from opinion:§§ 224.2 through 224.6 apply to an Indian child custody proceeding]), and courts have made clear it is error for a court applying the Welfare and Institutions Code to fail to determine whether ICWA applies. (In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692 , 704-705.) We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence. (In re Noreen G., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.) 4 II Analysis A. Failure to Make ICWA Findings Father argues the trial court erroneously: Code, §§ 224..6 apply to an Indian child custody proceeding]), and courts have made clear it is error for a court applying the Welfare and Institutions Code to fail to determine whether ICWA applies.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:six years past” before his sister’s death. (Id. at p. 128.) By contrast, several cases rejected California residency where the proposed administrator merely intended to relocate to California but did not yet live here. (In re Estate of Donovan (1894) 104 Cal. 623 , 625‒626 (Donovan) [decedent’s brother did not establish residence by coming from Massachusetts to California for three days and stating his intent to remain]; Weed, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 639 [decedent’s niece lost her California residency when she and her husband “moved east, taking with them all of their: 13 property in Massachusetts, came to California intending to make it his permanent home, and “resided here continuously for some six years past” before his sister’s death. (Id. at p. 128.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:the optional arbitration agreement. Based on the foregoing, we decline to follow Garrison’s broad interpretation of “health care decisions.”5 Rather, we begin our analysis by reviewing the plain language of the Advance Directive. (See Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1202 , 1214 [“The scope of a power of attorney depends on the language of the instrument, which is strictly construed. [Citation.]”].) Logan stated in the Advance Directive: “If my primary physician finds that I cannot make my own health care decisions, I grant my agent full power and authority to: Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) ”].) Logan stated in the Advance Directive: “If my primary physician finds that I cannot make my own h...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373–1374 (Leeman).) A settlement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if some parties stipulate orally in court while others agree in writing. (See Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421 , 1432 [Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows “a ‘mix and match’ approach to the manner of agreement as long as all parties agree to the same material terms”]; accord, Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1259.) In ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement under Code: Hoffman (2003) ; accord, Critzer v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:157 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1182 [“The trial court’s ruling that certain findings and determinations were not supported by the record does not, in itself, constitute evidence of arbitrary and capricious conduct by the hearing officer.”]; see also Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156 , 168 [it was an abuse of discretion to find a legal argument frivolous when it was at least “arguable”]; Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809, 823 [“ ‘ “Attorney’s fees may not be awarded [citation] simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous,: Stein (2002) ; Reis v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:of the entire action . . . since the remaining causes of action were based on the same requested relief: an easement.” We need not consider this argument as it is unsupported by any legal authority. (Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379 , 384.) 10 The sixth cause of action (easement by estoppel) is discussed separately, post. . 28 “ ‘[W]hen a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his [or her] complaint and elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be presumed that: Dabney (2002)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:interests” under section 2000]; Panakosta, Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Management, LLC (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 612, 635 [“[w]ithout a pending judicial dissolution action, the trial court was without jurisdiction to allow the buyout petition to proceed”]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379 , 383 [“no court has inherent authority to decide a matter for which there is no legally recognized cause of action”]; Housing Group v. United Nat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1107-1108 [pending litigation is required 22 before parties may stipulate to the appointment of a judicial referee or: Dabney (2002) ; Housing Group v.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:pay the amount of civil penalties sought. The City counters that it was Braum’s burden in the trial court to raise and demonstrate his inability to pay the penalties, citing, among other cases, People v. First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 721 , 729.) To the extent it was Braum’s burden to show an inability to pay the penalties, he failed to carry that burden because his opposition did not raise the issue, much less submit evidence concerning his financial status. But, even it was the City’s burden to make a prima: First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) .) To the extent it was Braum’s burden to show an inability to pay the penalties, he failed to carry that burden because his opposition did not raise the issue...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:recur between parties, appeal was not moot].) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion, we assume the defendant could have proven all of the factual allegations in its answer. (Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1115.) “The issue is whether the [pleading] raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) Interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision is “purely a question of law” that may properly be resolved on a plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ibid.) In: Board of Administration (2003) .) “The issue is whether the raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) Interpretation of a statute...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:recur between parties, appeal was not moot].) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion, we assume the defendant could have proven all of the factual allegations in its answer. (Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1115.) “The issue is whether the [pleading] raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) Interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision is “purely a question of law” that may properly be resolved on a plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ibid.) In: Board of Administration (2003) .) “The issue is whether the raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Ibid.) Interpretation of a statute...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:as appropriate to accommodate seasonal or fluctuating income of either parent.” 40 likely income for the immediate future, as distinct from extraordinarily high or low income in the past.” (Riddle, supra, at p. 1082.) In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808 , likewise involved an order of pendente lite spousal support from a husband whose income fluctuated due to monthly sales commissions. (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.Appp.4th at pp. 1077–1078.) The trial court utilized a sample size of just two months in calculating support payments. (Id. at p. 1078.) Rosen held this: 40 likely income for the immediate future, as distinct from extraordinarily high or low income in the past.” (Riddle, supra, at p. 1082.) In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) ...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:(Sanders).) “Fiduciary” and “confidential” have been used interchangeably to describe a relationship in which one party has a duty to act in the highest good faith for the benefit of the other party. (Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257 , 270.) When a person places confidence in another person, the person who voluntarily accepted the confidence cannot take any advantage from acts undertaken for the other party without the knowledge or consent of that party. (Ibid.) “Technically, a fiduciary relationship is a recognized legal relationship such as guardian and: Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003)
- Conservatorship of Martha : Courts have the inherent authority to reconsider and modify their own interim orders.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:412, 415.) “ ‘If the complaint fails to plead, or if the defendant negates, any essential element of a particular cause of action, this court should affirm the sustaining of a demurrer.’ ” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Arkopharma, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 824 , 827.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we also must “decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse: PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) .) “ ‘If the complaint fails to plead, or if the defendant negates, any essential element of a particular cause of action, this court should affirm the sustaining of a...
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(4).) RICHARDSON, J. WE CONCUR: LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. 7 Because sanctions were warranted on that ground, we do not address whether Hankin’s petition also had an improper purpose. (See Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 967 , 976 [“A violation of any of [the conditions in section 128.7, subdivision (b)] may give rise to sanctions.”].) 16: Alon (2003)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502; accord, Zapanta v. Universal Care, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1167 , 1175.) Thus, as Scruton indicated, the court could reject a guardian ad litem’s repudiation of an agreement if the court determines the repudiation is “adverse to the best interests of the minors.” (Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Although Scruton was concerned with guardian ad litem’s repudiation of: Universal Care, Inc. (2003) .) Thus, as Scruton indicated, the court could reject a guardian ad litem’s repudiation of an agreement if the court determines the repudiation is “adverse to the best inte...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. adopted by the court in connection with a dependency proceeding (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii)) in T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 1229. The court in T.J. observed that “[i]f: App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) ; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:had died without having executed any testamentary instruments.” 7 (Italics added.) A child claiming relief under this section bears “the burden of proof regarding the parent’s intent in omitting the child from the will [or trust].” (Estate of Mowry (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 338 , 343 (Mowry).) An omitted child born after the decedent’s execution of his testamentary instruments is treated differently. Under section 21620, such a child “shall receive a share in the decedent’s estate equal in value to that which the child would have received if the decedent had died without having: 8 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Neither the trial court nor this court will rewrite the complaint. (Gould v.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:She notes that, in proposing 8 Meiri does not allege equitable tolling or otherwise invoke the body of cases excusing the 120-day requirement in instances where a beneficiary is prejudiced by a defective notice. (See, e.g., Germino v. Hillyer (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 951 , 956 [surveying cases].) In fact, Meiri expressly abandoned her initial challenges to the notice’s adequacy below, and has not sought to excuse her late filing. 13 amendments to the statute, the commission emphasized that the “granting of relief . . . requires not only the proof of factual contentions: Hillyer (2003) .) In fact, Meiri expressly abandoned her initial challenges to the notice’s adequacy below, and has not sought to excuse her late filing. 13 amendments to the statute...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:within the meaning of a no contest clause depends upon the circumstances and the language used. A court must consider the purposes that the trustor sought to obtain by the provisions of his or her trust. (Estate of Strader (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 996 , 1002–1003.) Consequently, a contest has been construed to mean an attempt to thwart a testator’s intent. (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 262–263.) The intent of trustors—Erin and Jean—can be gleaned from the unambiguous terms of the Family Trust. They intended for Jean’s issue to receive her share: A court must consider the purposes that the trustor sought to obtain by the provisions of his or her trust. (Estate of Strader (2003) –1003.) Consequently, a contest has been construed to mean an atte...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:222, 239.) Writ review may be appropriate where “conflicting trial court interpretations of the law require a resolution of the conflict.” (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 160 , 176.) These criteria are fulfilled here. Currently, there appears to be no appellate authority addressing whether section 1043 or Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40 governs the timing for filing a demurrer in a probate proceeding. (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2024) .) These criteria are fulfilled here.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:policy.’ ” (Ibid.; former § 21305, subd. (b).) That statute applied only to instruments that became irrevocable on or after January 1, 2001, and therefore does not directly apply here. (Ibid.; former § 21305, subd. (d); Hermanson v. Hermanson (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 441 , 445.) However, the legislative change was based on a public policy to permit claims of fiduciary misconduct that challenge a trustee’s failure to carry out the terms of a trust. (See Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 436–438.) In making that change, the Legislature concluded that this public policy: Hermanson (2003) .) However, the legislative change was based on a public policy to permit claims of fiduciary misconduct that challenge a trustee’s failure to carry out the terms of a trust.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903 , 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages: I. (2003) ; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962 , 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. adopted by the court in connection with a dependency proceeding (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(ii)) in T.J., supra, 21: App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) ; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:of summons. It did not hold a default prove-up hearing; therefore, it never ruled on whether Humphrey’s claim was meritorious. “In other words, there is simply no ruling for us to review.” (Farmer Bros. Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 976 , 993.) In part VII, post, we will hold that the trial court properly vacated the default, properly did not hold a default prove-up, and properly did not rule on whether Humphrey’s claim was meritorious. It should have denied the motion to quash, and it should have given Bewley time: Franchise Tax Bd. (2003) .) In part VII, post, we will hold that the trial court properly vacated the default, properly did not hold a default prove-up, and properly did not rule on whether Humphrey’s...
- Conservatorship of Martha : An interested party must expressly allege specific objections to an accounting in writing; failure to do so constitutes a waiver of those objections.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:permanent, annual features in the 2013 EDP. As for the cases cited by the District, those cases involve 97 provisions not impacted by later enactments or are otherwise distinguishable. (See Buena Park Motel Assn. v. City of Buena Park (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 302 , 308 [plaintiffs could not challenge older hotel stay ordinance, or portions of related provision not altered by later ordinance]; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v. Napa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 387, 390 [petitioners contended that traffic measures in specific plan invalidated circulation element of general: City of Buena Park (2003) ; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:permanent, annual features in the 2013 EDP. As for the cases cited by the District, those cases involve 97 provisions not impacted by later enactments or are otherwise distinguishable. (See Buena Park Motel Assn. v. City of Buena Park (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 302 , 308 [plaintiffs could not challenge older hotel stay ordinance, or portions of related provision not altered by later ordinance]; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v. Napa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342, 387, 390 [petitioners contended that traffic measures in specific plan invalidated circulation element of general: City of Buena Park (2003) ; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v.
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:“It is the essence of a spendthrift trust that it is not subject to voluntary alienation by the cestui, nor subject to involuntary alienation through attachment or other process at the suit of his creditors. [Citations.]” (Kelly v. Kelly (1938) 11 Cal.2d 356 , 362; see Brosamer v. Mark (Ind. App. 1989) 540 N.E.2d 652, 654-655 [“a spendthrift trust is one in which the beneficiary is unable to transfer, assign, or alienate his right to future payments of income or principal, and which provides the beneficiary’s creditors are unable to subject the beneficiary’s: Kelly (1938) 11 Cal.2d 356, 362; see Brosamer v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366 , 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), §§ 1233–1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity 29 Jurisprudence: Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:different rights holders, or are otherwise inapposite. (See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Cal. 116, 133-136, 141 [overlying owners had correlative rights in common supply of groundwater, and were entitled to reasonable use]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501 , 518-519 [superior court erred by enjoining water use among riparians based on extent of ownership, rather than current needs and uses]; El Dorado Irr. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App....: Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 518-519 ; El Dorado Irr.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:different rights holders, or are otherwise inapposite. (See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Cal. 116, 133-136, 141 [overlying owners had correlative rights in common supply of groundwater, and were entitled to reasonable use]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501 , 518-519 [superior court erred by enjoining water use among riparians based on extent of ownership, rather than current needs and uses]; El Dorado Irr. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App....: Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 518-519 ; El Dorado Irr.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:the termination of parental rights under juvenile dependency law. We review the court’s order, however, not its reasoning, and may affirm the order if it is correct on any theory of applicable law. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 , 18−19.) 12 supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 83.) For the following reasons, we decline to follow it. For the quoted statement, the O.C. court relied solely on subdivision (b)(1) of section 155, set forth above, which makes no reference to “substantial” evidence. The court’s statement is otherwise made without: Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18−19.) 12 supra, 44 Cal.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:fundamental vested right, the trial court’s inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.” (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 , 32.) I The Independent Judgment Standard Of Review Applies We first address petitioner’s confusing argument that Conservatorship of O.B. mandates the trial court shall apply the substantial evidence standard of review rather than the independent judgment standard of review in evaluating the merits of his 5 petition....: San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32.) I The Independent Judgment Standard Of Review Applies We first address petitioner’s confusing argument that Conservatorship of O.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:times, ‘ “ ‘the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.’ ” ’ ” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 , 284; see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620 [“An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court’s opinion but only ‘for the points actually involved and actually decided’ ”].) To state the obvious, we have no occasion here to consider circumstances materially different: Katz (1995) ; see also Santisas v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:buyout offer.10 II. Governing Legal Principles and Standard of Review “California follows what is commonly referred to as the American rule, which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney fees.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274 , 278; Code Civ. Proc., § 1021 [“[e]xcept as attorney’s fees are specifically provided by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys . . . is left to the agreement, 9 Section 16701, subdivision (b), provides: “The buyout price of a dissociated partner’s interest is the amount that: Katz (1995) ; Code Civ.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the statute is satisfied’ ”]; see also Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 821, disapproved in part on other grounds in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376 , 393, fn. 5 [statute of frauds applies equally to actions “based on contract or implied contract”].) Thus, Tukes can recover her claimed finder’s fee under her oral contract, implied contract, or quantum meruit theories only if she can ultimately prove that an exception to the statute of frauds exists.: A., Inc. (1995)
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:986, 1034 [“an uncooperative attitude is not, in and of itself, substantial evidence of incompetence”]; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 [“‘the test, in a section 1368 proceeding, is competency to cooperate, not cooperation’”]; People v. Medine (1995) 11 Cal.4th 5 Penal Code section 1367 provides a defendant is incompetent for purposes of a criminal trial “if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in: Medine (1995)
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:“by the weight of the evidence.” In In re Menna, a case decided approximately four years later, the court reversed a determination that an applicant had the requisite good moral character to be certified for admission. (In re Menna (1995) 11 Cal.4th 975 , 979.) The court explained “[b]oth the hearing department and the review panel of the State Bar Court evaluated the evidence of rehabilitation under a heightened ‘clear and convincing’ standard” and the question was “whether the evidence support[ed] the State Bar Court’s determination he met that standard.” (Id. at pp.: 24 how a reviewing court exercises its independent judgment when “given the power to weigh the evidence.” (Drummey, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 86.) As the Ettinger court noted...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:parental reunification is not viable”].) We agree. We have observed that the termination of parental rights “is a uniquely serious step — one widely recognized as ranking ‘among the most severe forms of state action.’ ” (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234 , 245.) Accordingly, courts have held that a trial court may not terminate parental rights unless the state has first made efforts to assist a parent suffering from poverty. (See, e.g., In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355, 374 [“where family bonds are strained by the incidents of poverty,: R. (2021) .) Accordingly, courts have held that a trial court may not terminate parental rights unless the state has first made efforts to assist a parent suffering from poverty. (See, e.g.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:litem [for a parent] in a dependency proceeding may jeopardize the parent’s interest as much, if not more, than any of the actions taken in the cited custody cases finding a due process violation”]; see also In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234 , 245 [order terminating parental rights is “widely recognized as ranking ‘among the most severe forms of state action’”]; see generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996) 519 U.S. 102, 128.) Patricia’s right to actively participate in this dependency proceeding may not be disregarded for the sake of 9 expediency. (See In: R. (2021) ; see generally M.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:an appeal from a final judgment — a remedy that is presumed to be adequate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration v. Superior Court (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922, 929; Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381 , 393.) While “ ‘appellate courts are loath to exercise their discretion to review rulings at the pleading stage, they will do so where the circumstances are compelling and the issue is of widespread interest.’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222, 239.) Writ review may be: App.5th 922, 929; Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) .) While “ ‘appellate courts are loath to exercise their discretion to review rulings at the pleading stage...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:the court addressed at the hearing and removed from its final order. 19 credibility determinations “whether the trial court’s ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479; accord People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 , 528, fn. 7.) Nor was the trial court’s credibility finding “a clear abuse of discretion” where the court logically credited the declaration filed by Janine at a time when her residency was not at issue. Even otherwise, although the court discounted Janine’s 2021 declaration, it did not ignore her: Vivar (2021) , fn. 7.) Nor was the trial court’s credibility finding “a clear abuse of discretion” where the court logically credited the declaration filed by Janine at a time when her residency was n...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:LPS conservatorship at issue here expired by operation of law but argues this court should not dismiss his appeal as moot. When a challenged conservatorship has ended, the appeal of that conservatorship is “technically moot.” (See Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695 , 705, fn. 3 (K.P.).) Nevertheless, a reviewing court has the discretion to decide an otherwise moot case if “ ‘it raises important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.’ ” (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142, fn. 2; see also Conservatorship of George: P. (2021) , fn. 3 (K.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A party cannot introduce a factual argument for the first time on appeal; issues and factual contentions must be raised in the trial court before an appellate court will consider them.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:[“The right of survivorship is the distinguishing feature of a joint tenancy.”].) The deceased joint tenant’s interest in the property held in joint tenancy vests automatically in the surviving joint tenant by operation of law. (Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313 , 1317; Zanelli v. McGrath, supra, at p. 630.) “Nothing ‘passes’ from the deceased joint tenant to the survivor; rather, the survivor takes from the instrument by which the joint tenancy was created.” (Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp., supra, at p. 1317.) The fact that Ruth and Jack held title to: Cortlandt Corp. (1992) ; Zanelli v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:answer the question because waiver and abandonment rules also apply. First, one challenging a judgment after demurrer or on a motion for judgment on the pleadings bears the burden to demonstrate reversible error. (Berman v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 465 , 471 (Berman).) Since showing merely that the trial court sustained a motion for judgment on the pleadings for the wrong reason is insufficient to show reversible error (Stevenson Real Estate, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220), an appellant must address in its opening brief each ground argued to the: A. (2017) (Berman).) Since showing merely that the trial court sustained a motion for judgment on the pleadings for the wrong reason is insufficient to show reversible error (Stevenson Real Estate, su...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:to provide this court with supporting facts, argument, or related law relevant to the issue of whether adequate notice of the demurrer was given by Circle K, we deem the issue forfeited. (Central Valley Gas Storage, LLC v. Southam (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 686 , 696 [failure to provide supporting legal analysis or legal authority forfeits issue on appeal].) III. Standard Of Review The parties agree the standard of review on appeal is de novo. We concur. “In reviewing a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, we decide de: Southam (2017) .) III.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the evidence is in conflict, but one in which the court below did not so far mistake the relative weight of the opposing proofs as to justify us in going behind the special findings”]; Howland v. Oakland C.S.R. Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513 , 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216, 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little: Co. (1895) -522 ; People v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:issues and thus prevents application of collateral estoppel”; distinguishing CSAA].) But we agree with our Second District colleagues in Rice v. Crow, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pages 736– 737 and Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1161 , 1174, that the bare pre-trial dismissal of a lawsuit with prejudice does not result in the “actual litigation” of any issues for issue preclusion purposes. To hold otherwise would render issue preclusion’s “actual litigation” requirement meaningless....: Appeals Bd. (2003) , that the bare pre-trial dismissal of a lawsuit with prejudice does not result in the “actual litigation” of any issues for issue preclusion purposes.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:sense, jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to try the case before it. This is a court’s jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, the competency or inherent authority to hear a case and render a valid judgment. (Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1344-1345.) “Fundamental jurisdiction is, at its core, authority over both the subject matter and the parties.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 780.) Any ruling issued by a court that lacks fundamental jurisdiction is void. (Ibid.) Fundamental 8 jurisdiction is statewide and not specific to any one county.: Whitty (2003) -1345.) “Fundamental jurisdiction is, at its core, authority over both the subject matter and the parties.” (People v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:to the property. He did not argue, however, that the probate court’s jurisdiction was exclusive. This particular issue does not go to “fundamental” jurisdiction; therefore, it can be forfeited if not raised in the trial court. (Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1345; In re Michael R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 126, 146.) He also did not raise his statutory contentions below. Certainly he did not cite the relevant statutes. He has further forfeited the statutory issues on appeal by failing to discuss the nature of Humphrey’s claim to the property. Indeed,: Whitty (2003) ; In re Michael R. (2006) 137 Cal.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:advocate-witness rule. 18 disqualify Lee in the early stages of the litigation. Nor was the court required to make additional findings of fact, as the material facts before the court were effectively undisputed. (See Hetos Investments, Ltd. v. Kurtin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 36 , 49-51 [rejecting appellant’s contention that trial court violated Smith’s requirement to “‘make specific findings of fact when weighing the conflicting interests,’” where there were no material factual disputes].) In sum, in light of the near certainty that Lee will be a key witness at trial, Yim’s interests and the: Kurtin (2003)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255 , 1264-1265 (Carrancho).) " 'In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance, it would have taken the action taken by the administrative agency. The 6 The parties and amicus IVC have filed a number of requests: California Air Resources Board (2003) -1265 (Carrancho).) " 'In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255 , 1264-1265 (Carrancho).) " 'In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance, it would have taken the action taken by the administrative agency. The 6 The parties and amicus IVC have filed a number of requests: California Air Resources Board (2003) -1265 (Carrancho).) " 'In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:performance of any act provided or required by law to be 2 Although this extension is not reflected in the appellate record, the parties stipulate in their briefs that it occurred. We accept the stipulation. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273 , 274, fn. 2.) The April 14, 2020 extended deadline is consistent with the permissible procedure of Surety filing its extension motion toward the end of the initial appearance period (September 19, 2019), the court hearing the motion within 30 days of that date (October 19, 2019), and the court: Allen (2003)
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:specific grounds on which it sustained the trustee’s first demurrer with leave to amend in time for Adam to cure the defect. We need not consider objections not made in the trial court. (Cabrini Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Haghverdian (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 683 , 693 [“ ‘An appellate court will not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been, but was not, raised in the court below.’ ”].) Nevertheless, Adam has not demonstrated prejudicial error. Adam contends the trial court would not tell him how to amend his complaint: We need not consider objections not made in the trial court. (Cabrini Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Haghverdian (2003)
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:direct professional relationship with the former client in which the attorney personally provided legal advice and services on a legal issue that is closely related to the legal issue in the present representation. (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698 , 710-711.) If the former representation involved such a direct relationship with the client, the former client need not prove that the attorney possesses actual confidential information. (Id. at p. 709....: Co. (2003)
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:corporation and its directors could become embroiled in expensive retaliatory or harassing litigation by a disgruntled individual who no longer has a “dog in the hunt.” (See Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 912 , 921 [a purpose of the standing requirement is “to protect a defendant from harassment”].) On the other hand, allowing perpetual standing to an individual who no longer stands in a definite and special relationship with the nonprofit public benefit corporation, such as a director or officer who is constrained: San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2003) .) On the other hand, allowing perpetual standing to an individual who no longer stands in a definite...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:following Patricia’s unsuccessful Marsden motions. The court need not have granted permissible withdrawal if the delay caused by replacement of counsel would have prejudiced Patricia in proceedings in which time is of the essence. (See Lempert v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1161 , 1173 [“[t]he determination whether to grant or deny an attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, having in mind whether such withdrawal might work an injustice in the handling of the case”]; Mandell v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d: Superior Court (2003) he determination whether to grant or deny an attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record lies within the sound discretion of the trial court...
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:summary judgment on the other grounds asserted. We may affirm a summary judgment on any correct legal theory that the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial 39 court. (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16 , 22.) Ginsberg contends that each of the other theories he asserted below was a correct one that warrants affirmance of the summary judgment. We disagree. 1. Tinker’s estate had standing to challenge the enforceability of the PMA, and causation remains a question of fact. Ginsberg contends that the causation: Lujan (2003) .) Ginsberg contends that each of the other theories he asserted below was a correct one that warrants affirmance of the summary judgment.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Cal. at p. 654 & Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., supra, 23 Cal.App. at p. 546.) Notably, Miller and Lawyer, in turn, relied on Murphy. (People v. Miller, supra, 171 Cal. at p. 654, quoting Murphy v. Waterhouse (1896) 113 Cal. 467 , 473; Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., supra, 23 Cal.App. at p. 546, citing Murphy, at p. 473.) Our Supreme Court, in Miller, considered whether the trial court’s insanity instruction as to the meaning of preponderance of the evidence was erroneous. (People v. Miller, supra, 171 Cal. at pp.: Waterhouse (1896) ; Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., supra, 23 Cal.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:the law of trusts confirms that the building’s title is held by appellants as trustees, because trusts do not themselves as entities hold title to property. “Unlike a corporation, a trust is not a legal entity.” (Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331 , 1343.) Rather, a trust is “ ‘a fiduciary relationship with respect to property.’ ” (Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1132, fn. 3, quoting Rest.2d Trusts, § 2, p. 6.) When property is held in trust, “ ‘there is always a divided ownership of property,’ ” generally: Darwish (2003) .) Rather, a trust is “ ‘a fiduciary relationship with respect to property.’ ” (Moeller v.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:trust property only if the trustee is personally at fault,’ and that ‘[a] trustee is personally liable for torts committed in the course of administration of the trust only if the trustee is personally at fault.’” (Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331 , 1343). A “trustee thus cannot be held personally liable under [Probate Code] section 18001 for any obligation arising from his ownership or control of trust property, nor can he be held personally liable under [Probate Code] section 18002 for any torts committed in the course of his administration of: Darwish (2003)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:to question jurisdiction over him’”]; Becerra, at p. 493 [“a person can become a party to an action, even if not named in the complaint, by appearing and participating without any objection by the other parties”]; Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258 , 266 [“‘because the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a “variety of legal arrangements” by which a 23 litigant may give “express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court”’”].)7 7 We also question whether Michael and Joseph have standing to assert this argument: Anderson (2003) [“‘because the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a “variety of legal arrangements” by which a 23 litigant may give “express...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509 , 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th: App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) ; In re J.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functionally comparable’ to those of judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their function.” (Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 429, 435-436 [ 113 S.Ct. 2167 , 2171; 124 L.Ed.2d 391, 399-400], fn. omitted [function performed by court reporters not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity].) 12 In the unique situation before us, the court’s listing orders did more than merely appoint Brock to sell the property. They vested an element of discretionary authority in Brock to assist: S. 429, 435-436 [; 124 L.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:565, 576; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 541; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal. 220, 223; Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657; Morgan v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182; see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89 , 93.)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “[W]here one is justified in relying, and does in fact rely, upon false representations, his right of action is not destroyed merely because opportunities for examination or means of knowledge were open to him where no legal duty devolved upon him to employ such: Godey, .)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “here one is justified in relying, and does in fact rely, upon false representations, his right of action is not destroyed merely because opportunities for examin...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:in going behind the special findings”]; Howland v. Oakland C.S.R. Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 513, 521-522 [objection as to the sufficiency of a witness’s knowledge “goes more to the weight of the evidence than its admissibility”]; People v. Sanders (1896) 114 Cal. 216 , 235 [“the weight of the evidence . . . was exclusively for the jury” such that “how much or how little importance should be attached to it was for the jury alone to say”].) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court, prior to the enactment of: Sanders (1896) .) Even more pertinent is the fact that our Supreme Court...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:status involve belated challenges to a court’s jurisdiction where the putative defendant had appeared and been treated by the plaintiff and/or the court as an actual defendant for all purposes. In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135 , the plaintiff served a complaint on two entities that it had intended to add by Doe amendment but failed to do so properly (at the time of service, an amended operative complaint had dropped the original complaint’s Doe allegations, effecting a dismissal as to all Does). (Id. at p.: Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) , the plaintiff served a complaint on two entities that it had intended to add by Doe amendment but failed to do so properly (at the time of service...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:action. But third parties may appear and be bound by a judgment without being named in a complaint. (See People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 493; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135 , 1145-1147; In re Marriage of Williams (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 753, 759-760.) As stated, Michael and Joseph do not argue the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the five UCNP entities, and in any event the UCNP entities’ participation in the appraisal and buyout proceeding without objection (to this day): Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) -1147; In re Marriage of Williams (1985) 163 Cal.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) It makes up for defective service, or 18 even a complete lack of service. (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135 , 1145.) “The determination of special appearance versus general appearance is based on the ‘character of the relief sought,’ not by statements of intention of the party. [Citation.]” (In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583, 593.) “‘“What is determinative is whether [the] defendant takes a part in the particular action: Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) .) “The determination of special appearance versus general appearance is based on the ‘character of the relief sought,’ not by statements of intention of the party.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1171; see § 17704.09 [describing the fiduciary duties of members and managers of a limited liability company]; Feresi v. The Livery, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 419, 425 [same]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 411 , 424-425 [describing the fiduciary obligations in a partnership].) A minority shareholder may bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against majority shareholders as an individual claim or as a derivative claim, depending on the circumstances. (See Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52, 63; Jara v.: McNeil Partners (2003) -425 .) A minority shareholder may bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against majority shareholders as an individual claim or as a derivative claim...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:focus on the probable cause element (as well as the element of malice addressed, post) is on the six Easement Claims for which Carol made a prima facie showing of termination on the merits. (Cf. Padres L.P. v. Henderson (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 495 , 522 (Padres L.P.) [because malicious prosecution plaintiff opposing anti-SLAPP motion failed to show that two underlying lawsuits lacked probable cause, appellate court would address malice element only as to third lawsuit for which there was no probable cause].) The complaint contains the allegation that when the Fourth and Fifth: P. v. Henderson (2003) (Padres L.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:p. 1445.) However, in evaluating support, the trial court cannot engage in speculation, and an order for spousal support must be based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the order. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572 , 575 [request for modification of child and spousal support denied where income and expense declaration not current].) In In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Riddle), upon which Kim relies, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating income for child and spousal: App.4th 1438, 1442 (Blazer).) There is no statute defining income for the purpose of determining spousal support, and this determination is left to the trial court’s discretion. (Id. at p. 1445.
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:also In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476, 479.) In the context of family law orders, the trial courts have no authority to order adult disabled children to visit with a parent. (In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587 , 594.) As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Jensen, “[v]isitation is a form of custody,” and the Family Code section allowing the trial court to impose visitation orders does not reach a child who has attained the age of majority. (Ibid.) Navarrete is such a person, notwithstanding her: App.4th 628, 641.) A conservatee may overcome a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their preference on the matter. (Id.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:involving conservatorship, including one on which Beneficiaries rely for their unauthorized practice argument, have made a similar distinction between probate litigation and litigation outside the probate context between a trust or estate and a third party. (Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 618 , 619 [“a conservator, executor, or personal representative of a decedent’s estate who is unlicensed to practice 23 cannot be said when, as here, a trustee is seeking instructions regarding how to interpret the trust document or execute his or her duties thereunder....: Hansen (2003) [“a conservator, executor, or personal representative of a decedent’s estate who is unlicensed to practice 23 cannot be said when, as here...
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:Oct. 1, 1993, was limited to the common law definition such that property passing to a joint tenant by right of survivorship was not part of a decedent’s estate under the Medicaid program) and Bucholtz v. Belshe (9th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 923 , 925-926 (same, as to property passing to a beneficiary by way of a revocable inter vivos trust). However, these federal cases “turned on an assessment of congressional intent in the absence of an express definition of estate. Congress has now provided a definition and California has incorporated it into: Belshe (9th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d 923, 925-926 (same, as to property passing to a beneficiary by way of a revocable inter vivos trust).
- Garcia v. Garcia : An appellate court may not consider evidence that was not properly offered and admitted at trial; the appellate record is limited to evidence that was moved into the record.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:through extrinsic fraud. We agree. The only appealable orders in probate proceedings are those listed in the Probate Code. (§§1300–1304; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10); Kalenian v. Insen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575–576 (Kalenian); Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118 , 1125–1126.) An order settling an account of a fiduciary is an appealable order. (§1300, subd. (b).) An order denying a motion to vacate an order on equitable grounds is generally not appealable. (Kalenian, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 577; Estate of Baker (1915) 170 Cal. 578, 581–582 (Baker).) Otherwise,: App.4th 569, 575–576 (Kalenian); Estate of Stoddart (2004) –1126.) An order settling an account of a fiduciary is an appealable order. (§1300, subd. (b).
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:evidently agreed, as its ruling turned on these very questions. As Ginsberg asserts, “fairness is at the heart of a waiver claim.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of 8Here, Ginsberg mentions only the waiver requirement. 33 America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168 , 178.) The record here does not evince any unfairness to Ginsberg and therefore does not support a finding of waiver. Moreover, even if it did, “a Court of Appeal is at liberty to reject a waiver claim and consider the issue on the merits.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita: Matsushita Electric Corp. of 8Here, Ginsberg mentions only the waiver requirement. 33 America (2004) .) The record here does not evince any unfairness to Ginsberg and therefore does not support a find...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:amount.’ (§ 483.010, subd. (a).) Although damages need not be liquidated, they must be measurable by reference to the contract sued upon, and their basis must be reasonable and certain.”); see CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 537 , 540. 23 Mindful that the Attachment Law was enacted in an effort to rectify due process problems in a predecessor statute (Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1115; see Randone v. Appellate Department, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 543–563), we read: Super DVD, Inc. (2004) . 23 Mindful that the Attachment Law was enacted in an effort to rectify due process problems in a predecessor statute (Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v.
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:One of our court found some years ago, a parent’s hospitalization for severe mental illness can serve as a basis for finding any procedural error in appointing a GAL harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903 , 914.) But hospitalization alone is insufficient. In In re Daniel S., the panel had been presented with extensive evidence that the parent in question was unstable and unable to effectively participate in the proceedings. (Id. at p. 914.) Medical staff at the psychiatric facility would not even allow her: As Division One of our court found some years ago, a parent’s hospitalization for severe mental illness can serve as a basis for finding any procedural error in appointing a GAL harmless beyond a reas...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:does not justify denying her the rights afforded under the law”].) 3. The Appointment of a Guardian ad Litem for Patricia Was Not Harmless Relying on In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th 901 and In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903 , the Department alternatively argues that any error in appointing a guardian 10 ad litem was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In both 10 In In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th 901 the Supreme Court held appointment of a guardian ad litem in violation of due process was subject: The Appointment of a Guardian ad Litem for Patricia Was Not Harmless Relying on In re James F., supra, and In re Daniel S. (2004) , the Department alternatively argues that any error in appointing a g...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” (Davey v. Southern Pac. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325 , 329.) More significantly, because we review for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the court’s factual findings, plaintiffs’ burden on appeal in this matter is not to establish that substantial evidence supports an opposite finding. Rather, plaintiffs must show that substantial evidence in the record establishes only: Co. (1897) .) More significantly, because we review for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the court’s factual findings, plaintiffs’ burden on appeal in this matter is not to establis...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:” (Leader v. Cords (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1588, 1596.) “Generally, a trial court’s . . . award of fees and costs[] is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332; Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1017 [“the propriety or amount of an attorney fees award is reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard”].) However, the standard may change depending on the particular issue under review. “ ‘We independently review any legal issue regarding the appropriate criteria for a fee award. But once those criteria: Superior Court (2004) .) However, the standard may change depending on the particular issue under review. “ ‘We independently review any legal ...
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:property is presumed to be owner of the full beneficial title, which presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing proof. 24. she held title to the property within five years before filing the action. (Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084 .) “The Pearce Parties did not carry their burden of proving seisin or possession in the five-year period before they filed the original petition in April 2011. The uncontested evidence showed that the Charles J. Briggs Individual Living Trust has had actual legal title to both the Rosedale and Gibson: Welch (2004) .) “The Pearce Parties did not carry their burden of proving seisin or possession in the five-year period before they filed the original petition in April 2011.
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:reach to or apply to the inter vivos trust” because it is against Joseph’s probate estate that “does not reach to or apply to the decedent’s inter vivos trust.” She cites Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. v. Dobler (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1324 . However, Arluk did not address a Medi-Cal reimbursement claim and, therefore, does not stand for the proposition she advances. Rather, the Arluk court concluded that the trustee of a revocable living trust has no duty, following the death of the settlor, to preserve trust assets for the benefit of: Dobler (2004) .
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:order was a proper prophylactic measure. There is no reason to suspect replacement counsel will attempt to solicit confidential information from Lee, in violation of that counsel’s ethical obligations and Lee’s duties of confidentiality. (See Addam v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 368 , 372 [courts should presume attorneys 24 behave ethically and honor duties of confidentiality].) Thus, replacement counsel will not be in a position to exploit such information. (See McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2004) .) Thus, replacement counsel will not be in a position to exploit such information. (See McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:to be preserved or protected.’ [Citation.] This interest must be concrete and actual, and must not be conjectural or hypothetical.” (Iglesia, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.) 26. In Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 6 (Coral Construction), the plaintiff was a construction company that frequently bid on projects within the state and within the City and County of San Francisco (City) as a contractor or subcontractor. (Id., at pp. 10–12) After one of its bids for a City project was rejected on grounds it did: City and County of San Francisco (2004)
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:of punitive damages. (See State Farm Mut. Automobile 9 Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416–418 [155 L.Ed.2d 585, 123 S.Ct. 1513] (State Farm); BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 [134 L.Ed.2d 809, 116 S.Ct. 1589 ] (BMW).) We recently explained the basis of these constraints: ‘The imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process entitles a tortfeasor to “ ‘fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty: Ed.2d 809, ] (BMW).) We recently explained the basis of these constraints: ‘The imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” awards is constitutionally prohibited...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:issues which the plaintiff should be able to establish without discovery—the court should consider resolving those issues before permitting what may otherwise turn out to be unnecessary, expensive and burdensome discovery proceedings.” (The Garment Workers Center v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1162, fn. omitted.) Here, Kenton explained in his petition that he wanted to depose Hilja to demonstrate she “published the defamatory statement either knowing of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.” He added that such discovery was needed to establish malice....: Superior Court (2004) , fn. omitted.) Here, Kenton explained in his petition that he wanted to depose Hilja to demonstrate she “published the defamatory statement either knowing of its falsity...
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:the 6 trust are required to care for a disabled beneficiary [citation].” (Carmack v. Reynolds, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 849.) The family court relied on a spendthrift trust case, Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Brown (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 144 (Ventura), to find section 2030 fees could be awarded only upon a finding of bad faith by the trustee. Ventura involved an application of the provision allowing spendthrift trusts to be accessed for child support payments, Probate Code section 15305, subdivision (c).3 (Ventura, at p. 149.) The issue in Ventura: Brown (2004) (Ventura), to find section 2030 fees could be awarded only upon a finding of bad faith by the trustee.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:birth parent. Both cases also involved principles of comity that are inapplicable here, based on the rule that adoption status “ ‘is determined by the laws of the state in which the adoption was effected.’ ” (Ehrenclou v. MacDonald (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 364 , 375; Hart, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pp. 394−395, 397 [Oklahoma court in 1954 decreed then 16-year-old petitioner was legally adopted by his step-father, a determination that was upheld in 1982 by the Oklahoma Supreme Court and subsequently recognized in California under full faith and credit principles in determining that: Both cases also involved principles of comity that are inapplicable here, based on the rule that adoption status “ ‘is determined by the laws of the state in which the adoption was effected.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) Malice may be found “where the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has no relation to the merits of the claim.” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204 , 218 (HMS Capital).) And “[s]ince parties rarely admit an improper motive, malice is usually proven by circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In evaluating the element of malice, its distinction from, and relationship to, the element of lack of probable cause, are important. The absence: Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 383.) “Malice ‘may range anywhere from open hostility to indifference. ’ ” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) Malice may be found “where the proceedings are initiated...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:the court determines “whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Ibid.) The plaintiff’s showing must be based upon admissible evidence. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204 , 212.) Thus, the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) In this step, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to: Lawyers Title Co. (2004) .) Thus, the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults.” (§ 15600, subd. (j), italics added.) “This statement of legislative intent suggests the Legislature intended a broad definition of standing in the context of elder abuse cases.” (Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220 , 227 (Lowrie)....: 15 abandonment and . . . this state has a responsibility to protect these persons”; “mental and verbal limitations often leave them vulnerable to abuse and incapable of asking for help and protection”...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:the Elder Abuse Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.) is “ ‘essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect.’ ” (Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220 , 226 (Lowrie).) Although the Elder Abuse Act was originally enacted to encourage the reporting of abuse of elders and dependent adults, the Legislature modified the statutory scheme to “provide incentives for private, civil enforcement through lawsuits against elder abuse and neglect.” (Ibid.) 10 a. Standing As a threshold matter,: Code, § 15600 et seq.) is “ ‘essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684 , 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. adopted by the court in connection with a dependency proceeding (see Welf. & Inst.: App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) ; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” 34 their public rights. [Citation.]” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 , 716.) Whether such minimum standards of fairness exist is examined at the time of enforcement of the agreement, not execution of the agreement, and is analyzed based on the specific discovery needs of the plaintiff’s case. “In striking the appropriate balance between the desired simplicity of limited discovery and: NCR Corp. (2004)
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:section 155 for the purpose of obtaining the findings authorized by that section. The court’s order denying the requested findings completely disposes of the matter before it and leaves no further issues to be resolved. (See Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750 , 755 [holding that a probate court’s order denying a request to set aside community property transfers was appealable as a final judgment because it had “all the earmarks of a final judgment,” leaving nothing further for judicial consideration].) Thus, the court’s order denying the SIJ petition is the equivalent: The court’s order denying the requested findings completely disposes of the matter before it and leaves no further issues to be resolved. (See Estate of Miramontes-Najera (2004) [holding that a probat...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522 , 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. adopted by the court in: App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) ; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:party seeking modification. (Cryer, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) “The ultimate determination of whether the individual facts of the case warrant modification of support is within the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546 , 556.) “[A]n abuse [of discretion] occurs when a court modifies a support order without substantial evidence of a material change of circumstances.” (In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 983 (McCann)....: App.4th at p. 1054.) “The ultimate determination of whether the individual facts of the case warrant modification of support is within the discretion of the trial court.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:attorney acquired confidential information’ that is relevant and material to the present representation, then the two representations are substantially related. (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 711; see Farris v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 671 , 680 [material confidential information is that which is ‘directly at issue in’ or has ‘some critical importance to, the second representation’]....: Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2004) .) When a substantial relationship between the two representations is establi...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:[citation], or a bad faith legal dispute [citation]. The determination of whether an action is arbitrary or capricious is essentially one of fact, within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ”]; see also Corbett v. Hayward Dodge, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 915 , 920-921 [courts have interpreted the Consumers Legal Remedies Act provision authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant when plaintiff’s action is “ ‘not in good faith’ ” (Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (d)) to require a finding of subjective bad faith on the part of the: Hayward Dodge, Inc. (2004) -921 [courts have interpreted the Consumers Legal Remedies Act provision authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant when plaintiff’s action is “ ‘not in...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:his disbarment” (Narlian v. State Bar of California (1943) 21 Cal.2d 876, 880-881, italics added) by clear and convincing evidence (Hildebrand v. State Bar of California (1941) 18 Cal.2d 816, 828). (See also Furman v. State Bar of California (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212 , 214, 229 [the court “can and always does pass upon the weight of the evidence” in attorney discipline cases to determine if guilt is established by “ ‘convincing proof to a reasonable certainty’ ”].) That the weight of the evidence phrase was used by our Supreme Court in attorney: State Bar of California (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:. .' " Clough was one of multiple cases addressing the rights of bondholders in irrigation districts. (Id. at pp. 387-388; El Camino Irr. Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378, 380- 381; Provident v. Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365 , 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389), but the Court confirmed elsewhere that a trust must have beneficiaries. (Zumwalt, at p. 375 ["It would be manifestly absurd to say that although property: Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365, 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389)...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:. .' " Clough was one of multiple cases addressing the rights of bondholders in irrigation districts. (Id. at pp. 387-388; El Camino Irr. Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378, 380- 381; Provident v. Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365 , 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389), but the Court confirmed elsewhere that a trust must have beneficiaries. (Zumwalt, at p. 375 ["It would be manifestly absurd to say that although property: Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365, 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389)...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:futile to attempt to discover the 'beneficiaries . . . .' " Clough was one of multiple cases addressing the rights of bondholders in irrigation districts. (Id. at pp. 387-388; El Camino Irr. Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378 , 380- 381; Provident v. Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365, 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389), but the Court confirmed elsewhere that a trust must have beneficiaries. (Zumwalt, at p. 375 ["It: El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378, 380- 381; Provident v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:futile to attempt to discover the 'beneficiaries . . . .' " Clough was one of multiple cases addressing the rights of bondholders in irrigation districts. (Id. at pp. 387-388; El Camino Irr. Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378 , 380- 381; Provident v. Zumwalt (1938) 12 Cal.2d 365, 368.) The Court disagreed that bondholders could be exclusive beneficiaries and thus rejected partition of district land as a remedy (Clough, at pp. 388-389), but the Court confirmed elsewhere that a trust must have beneficiaries. (Zumwalt, at p. 375 ["It: El Camino Land Corp. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 378, 380- 381; Provident v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:"broad and comprehensive"].) 21 Finally, California courts have long held that irrigation districts operate in a public capacity. (See Jenison, supra, 149 Cal. at p. 503 [irrigation district "when formed is a public corporation"]; Clough v. Compton-Delevan Irr. Dist. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 385 , 388 (Clough) [addressing Wright-Bridgford Act § 29, regarding property being held in trust: "The property is by this language impressed with the public use"]; Allen v. Hussey (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 457, 467 (Allen) [irrigation district is "an active trust for public uses and purposes"].) c....: Dist. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 385, 388 (Clough) ; Allen v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:"broad and comprehensive"].) 21 Finally, California courts have long held that irrigation districts operate in a public capacity. (See Jenison, supra, 149 Cal. at p. 503 [irrigation district "when formed is a public corporation"]; Clough v. Compton-Delevan Irr. Dist. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 385 , 388 (Clough) [addressing Wright-Bridgford Act § 29, regarding property being held in trust: "The property is by this language impressed with the public use"]; Allen v. Hussey (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 457, 467 (Allen) [irrigation district is "an active trust for public uses and purposes"].) c....: Dist. (1938) 12 Cal.2d 385, 388 (Clough) ; Allen v.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145 , 151.) Applying these principles to section 15401, it is clear that, unless a trust document contains an explicit statement that the trust’s revocation method is exclusive, the statutory revocation method is available, regardless of whether the trust document requires that a particular person approve revocation....: 10 the language governs.” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) However, if there is ambiguity, we may “resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:as his excuse for failing to object within the original proceeding. The elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631 , 638.) The terms extrinsic fraud and extrinsic mistake have been interpreted broadly, encompassing “almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342....: The elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and resulting damages. (Lazar v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:had the power “to waive when they drafted and executed” the amendment. “The argument is forfeited because [Mary] failed to raise it below.” (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 854; Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854 , 865, fn. 4 [argument not raised below is “not cognizable”].) In the lower court, Mary argued the notary requirement served no purpose, but she did not assert — as she does here —that she and the decedent were “free to waive” the requirement. 14 DISPOSITION The orders dated January: City of Culver City (1996) , fn. 4 .) In the lower court, Mary argued the notary requirement served no purpose...
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:an evidentiary hearing. It follows that the Pacific parties were not entitled to a determination of factual issues, such as Kirchner’s intent, and cannot raise such issues for the first time on appeal. (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854 , 865, fn. 4 [court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal].) Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1310, is of no help to the Pacific parties. There the Court of Appeal held that estate beneficiaries who petitioned to set aside a settlement agreement were: City of Culver City (1996) , fn. 4 .) Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:to section 1820. For that reason, Hankin’s “argument . . . the statutes could or ‘should have been written differently [is] more appropriately addressed to the Legislature’ ” in the first instance. (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1 , 26.) At bottom, Hankin’s unsupported personal opinion that the law should give him standing is irrelevant to our determination of whether it actually does. (See Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 442–444 (Peake) [party’s novel 3 That is not a concern in this case, where multiple concerned individuals: Appeals Bd. (2021) .) At bottom, Hankin’s unsupported personal opinion that the law should give him standing is irrelevant to our determination of whether it actually does. (See Peake v.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:our discretion to address the merits of the claim notwithstanding K.R.’s failure to object below. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190, 194, disapproved on other grounds in Public Guardian of Contra Costa County v. Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085 , 1107.) As for the issue of waiver, several appellate courts postdating Joseph W. have reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made. (See Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009,: Eric B. (2022) .) As for the issue of waiver, several appellate courts postdating Joseph W. have reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil com...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391, 407–408; Synergy Project Management, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 21, 30–31; SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043 , 1053; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 706–707). Thus, while it is true that standing in California is not explicitly governed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, it is also true that there are, in many instances,: City of San Jose (2017) ; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:landlords of medical-marijuana dispensaries. But the cases cited by the City are sufficiently analogous to show that the penalties imposed in this case are not dissimilar to those imposed under other regulatory statutes. (See, e.g., People v. Overstock.Com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064 , 1087–1088 [trial court imposed a daily penalty of $2,000 for a total of $6,828,000 in civil penalties under Business and Professions Code sections 17206, subdivision (b) for unfair competition and 17536, subdivision (b) for false advertising] and cases cited therein at pp. 1089–1090.) 31 d....: Com, Inc. (2017) –1088 [trial court imposed a daily penalty of $2,000 for a total of $6,828,000 in civil penalties under Business and Professions Code sections 17206, subdivision (b) for unfair compet...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:appellant cannot “urge errors which affect only his coparties who do not appeal, and such errors can be reviewed only at the instance of the parties affected thereby”]; see also Brenner v. Universal Health Services of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 589 , 605 [“As a general rule, a third party does not have standing to bring a claim asserting a violation of someone else’s rights.”].) After all, as we will discuss, Michael and Joseph argue Leonard lacked standing to assert his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty for the: Universal Health Services of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2017) .) After all, as we will discuss...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:permanently in the United States.’ (ROA 160, ¶ 10.) This statement indicates that Janine has no intention of living in the United States during the administration of the estate. These circumstances are similar to [In re Estate of Weed (1898) 120 Cal. 634 (Weed)], in that Janine lost her resident and domicile status when she moved to Mexico in 2014, and she has not regained resident or domicile status 9 in the United States because she still has not moved back.” DISCUSSION Janine argues the trial court abused its discretion in removing her: These circumstances are similar to , in that Janine lost her resident and domicile status when she moved to Mexico in 2014...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:3600, is intended to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties as closely as possible to the status quo, pending trial and the division of the assets and obligations of the parties. (In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317 , 1328.) In contrast, permanent spousal support is intended to provide financial assistance as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property. (In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926, 1932.) Permanent spousal support is governed by the statutory: App.5th 939, 942.) Temporary spousal support, awarded under section 3600, is intended to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties as closely as possible to the status quo...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:v. Superior Court (Mitchell) (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 451, 458.) “[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690 , 701; see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 (Abelleira) [“A court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case where the type of proceeding or the amount in controversy is beyond the jurisdiction defined for that particular court by statute or constitutional provision.”];: App.4th 451, 458.) “ack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Guardianship of Ariana K.
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:is the failure to file a proof of service establishing that the notice and a copy of the petition were sent by certified mail, error will not be presumed and compliance will be deemed sufficient.” (In re Elizabeth W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 900 , 907.) Here, the reports indicated the tribes responded to the notice in the negative, but the actual responses and communications themselves were not included. The entire judgment must therefore be reversed and remanded so the errors noted in this opinion may be corrected. We understand that our disposition of: 12 Z.O. was not eligible for ICWA status. On the basis of this report, the juvenile court ruled, on May 6, 2021, that ICWA did not apply to the matter.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:the appellants knowingly went to trial but failed to object to the absence of a jury. (See Joseph W., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 968, citing City of Los Angeles v. Zeller (1917) 176 Cal. 194, Ferrea v. Chabot (1898) 121 Cal. 223 , Boston Tunel Co. v. McKenzie (1885) 67 Cal. 485, Glogau v. Hagan (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 313, and Pink v. Slater (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 816.) Those cases do not provide an apt analogy given the specific statutory framework governing conservatorships. 10 As to the question of forfeiture, we cannot conclude: Chabot (1898) , Boston Tunel Co. v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:of action for the same wrong”]; Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1018, fn. 3 [“A single cause of action by a shareholder can give rise to derivative claims, individual claims, or both.”]; Denevi v. LGCC, 31 LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211 , 1222 [same].) But where a cause of action seeks to recover for harms to the corporation, the shareholders have no direct cause of action “[b]ecause a corporation exists as a separate legal entity” (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1108 (Grosset)) and “is the ultimate beneficiary of such: LGCC, 31 LLC (2004) .) But where a cause of action seeks to recover for harms to the corporation, the shareholders have no direct cause of action “ecause a corporation exists as a separate legal entit...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against majority shareholders as an individual claim or as a derivative claim, depending on the circumstances. (See Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52, 63; Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1252-1253, 1257-1258 (Jara); see also Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [“a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action for the same wrong”]; Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th: Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) -1253, 1257-1258 (Jara); see also Sutter v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:have standing to sue in California. Limon cites several additional cases in support of his claim that concrete injury is not required for standing in California—Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 (Angelucci), Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353 (Goehring), and McConnell v. Cowan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 805 (McConnell). In Angelucci, the all-male plaintiffs sued defendant supper club under the Unruh Civil Rights Act contending they were discriminated on the basis of sex due to the defendant charging them higher admission prices than its female patrons....: Chapman University (2004) (Goehring), and McConnell v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:in Ashlock I, a trier of fact may reject even the uncontradicted testimony of a witness so long as the rejection is not arbitrary. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353 , 368.) Stacey contends “[t]he trial court’s finding that [she] did not support the correctness of her accounting is belied by the fact that … nine boxes of supporting documentation were sitting in the courtroom.” She refers to these boxes no less than 10 times in her opening brief and: Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004)
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:with Prob. Code, § 15401, subd. (a)(2)), and case law allowed this statutory revocation procedure also to effect a modification, on the theory “that the right to revoke included an implied right to modify.” (Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956 , 962, fn. 5.) This was the principle that section 15402 sought to codify. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Prob. Code (2021 ed.) foll. § 15402 [“This section codifies the general rule that a power of revocation implies the power of modification”].) The Huscher court, after analyzing cases: Wells Fargo Bank (2004) , fn. 5.) This was the principle that section 15402 sought to codify. (Cal.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:which required that a trust instrument’s method of revocation must be used if it was either explicitly or implicitly exclusive. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Prob. Code (2021 ed.) foll. § 15401; Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956 , 970 (Huscher).) “[W]e presume the change made was to require a statement of explicit exclusivity and thereby avoid the problems of interpretation inherent in determining issues of implicit exclusivity.” (Huscher, at p. 971, fn. 13.) Section 15402 governs modification. It states, “Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, if a: Wells Fargo Bank (2004) (Huscher).) “e presume the change made was to require a statement of explicit exclusivity and thereby avoid the problems of interpretation inherent in determining issues of imp...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:settlor] to protect himself from the consequences of his whim, caprice, momentary indecision, or of undue influence by other persons.” (Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 399, 404 (Hibernia); see also Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956 , 970 (Huscher) [“if the trustor has gone to the trouble to spell out a revocation method in some detail, the 14 procedure must have some importance to the trustor, especially where the procedure is geared toward protecting the trustor from his own incompetence or the undue influence of others,”: Wells Fargo Bank (2004)
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:a narrow, hyper technical sense. It construed a predecessor statute of section 6120 and explained that, “[i]n its primal significance,” to cancel a will required a “lattice work” or “‘criss-cross’” drawn on top of preexisting text. (Estate of Olmsted (1898) 122 Cal. 224 , 230; id. at p. 229 [citing former Civil 7 Code § 1292].) While this 127-year-old case is still good law, even if we found “canceled” to be ambiguous, extrinsic aids confirm the Legislature intended it to be used in a narrow sense. Construing section 6120 invites analysis of the: It construed a predecessor statute of section 6120 and explained that, “n its primal significance,” to cancel a will required a “lattice work” or “‘criss-cross’” drawn on top of preexisting text.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:ratio of 3.5:1. 26 Any claim that appellants have demonstrated unchecked passion and prejudice apart from the ratio itself is forfeited. Appellants’ vague reference to “above and below” is not sufficient to preserve the claim. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1246.) Although it is not our task “ ‘to search the record on [our] own’ ” when “ ‘a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record’ ” (Id. at p. 1246), we note briefly that our reading of the record has not disclosed: Uba (2004) .) Although it is not our task “ ‘to search the record on own’ ” when “ ‘a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record’ ” (Id. at p. 1246)...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:will be automatically 22 disqualified. (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284, fn. 3.)[1] Moreover, an attorney may not switch sides during pending litigation representing first one side and then the other. (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17 , 23.) That is true because the duty to preserve client confidences (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)) survives the termination of the attorney’s representation. (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) “That enduring duty to preserve client confidences precludes an attorney from later agreeing to represent an: Superior Court (2004) .) That is true because the duty to preserve client confidences (Bus. & Prof.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:29 Cal.App.3d 526, 531-532 [“Once the testamentary scheme or general intention [of a trust or will] is discovered, the meaning of particular words and phrases is to be subordinated to this scheme, plan or dominant purpose”]; Estate of Goyette (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 67 , 73 [same].) Carl Tucker Cheadle, an expert on the attorney standard of care in drafting estate planning instruments, testified that Hanako’s trust is a separate property trust and, as such, should only hold separate property assets. He opined that if Hanako’s intent was to transfer community property assets into: App.3d 526, 531-532 is discovered, the meaning of particular words and phrases is to be subordinated to this scheme, plan or dominant purpose”]...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution places constraints on state court awards of punitive damages. (See State Farm Mut. Automobile 9 Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416–418 [155 L.Ed.2d 585, 123 S.Ct. 1513 ] (State Farm); BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 [134 L.Ed.2d 809, 116 S.Ct. 1589] (BMW).) We recently explained the basis of these constraints: ‘The imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process entitles a tortfeasor to “ ‘fair notice: Ed.2d 585, ] (State Farm); BMW of North America v.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:place “ ‘becomes his place of residence or domicile, notwithstanding he may have a floating intention to return to his old residence at some future time.’ ” 9 A contrary result was reached in In re Estate of Newman (1899) 124 Cal. 688 based on the procedural posture and standard of review. The decedent in Newman had moved to California and lived there for 40 years while his wife remained in New Hampshire. On his death, his surviving spouse sought to be named administrator of his estate, claiming she came to California because: 9 A contrary result was reached in In re Estate of Newman (1899) based on the procedural posture and standard of review.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:‘shall be made by written instrument signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee’ ”]; King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1194 [“to be effective,” the trust could be amended only according to specified method]; Heaps v. Heaps (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 286 , 290–291, 294 [“under the literal terms of the trust,” trustors “had to write a memo to themselves (or its substantive equivalent) to amend the trust”]; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1209 [where trust “expressly deprived [the decedent] of the power to revoke, modify or amend,” documents purporting: Heaps (2004) –291, 294 ; Crook v.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:trust document provides Trusts B and C became “irrevocable” at that point, meaning Mary “was not at liberty to change that planned distribution after [Rodney, Sr.’s] death.” (Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 35, 40; see Heaps v. Heaps (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 286 , 291–292 [attempts to transfer assets from irrevocable trust to different trusts constituted conversion]; see also § 15403, subd. (a) [requiring consent of beneficiaries to amend terms of irrevocable trust].) That Trusts B and C became irrevocable and were not subject to amendment following Rodney, Sr....: Heaps (2004)
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:an extension of time may be harmonized with the timeline in section 1043. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) 8 filing the demurrer. McDonald’s failure to supply any legal authority forfeits the argument on review. (Osornio v. Weingarten (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 304 , 316, fn. 7 [“ ‘Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived’ ”].) In sum, and pursuant to section 1043, we hold a demurrer to a petition brought under the: Weingarten (2004) , fn. 7 .) In sum, and pursuant to section 1043...
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:may not ‘compel the owner of any residential real property to offer, or continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or lease . . . .’ (Gov. Code, § 7060, subd. (a).)” (Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504 , 509.) The tenants suggest that a trustee is not a “natural person” because a trustee takes only “representative actions . . . on behalf of a trust.”8 But case law has recognized the distinctive status of a trustee who is, as both appellants are here, also settlor and beneficiary: Board of Supervisors (2004) .) The tenants suggest that a trustee is not a “natural person” because a trustee takes only “representative actions . . . on behalf of a trust.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:existing at the time of the order. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575 [request for modification of child and spousal support denied where income and expense declaration not current].) In In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Riddle), upon which Kim relies, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating income for child and spousal support orders based on the husband’s latest two months of earnings as a commissioned financial advisor at an investment firm. (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) The: App.4th 572, 575 .) In In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) (Riddle), upon which Kim relies...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:(Lackner, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 751.) Similarly, dismissal after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend is not on the merits where it was based upon the jurisdictional defect of lack of standing. (Hudis v. Crawford (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1586 , 1590-1592.) And “a dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings. [Citations.]” (Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1335-1336; see also Minasian, supra, 80 . 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 827, fn. 4 [“dismissal [through settlement] reflects ambiguously on the: Crawford (2005) -1592.) And “a dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings. ” (Villa v.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment creditor who has not previously attached a judgment lien to a debtor’s property before the debtor’s death cannot later create such a lien; the creditor must instead file a timely claim in t...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:“must be clear and convincing, making out the mistake to the entire satisfaction of the Court, and not loose, equivocal or contradictory, leaving the mistake open to doubt.” (Id., at p. 675.) We later stated in Sheehan v. Sullivan (1899) 126 Cal. 189 (Sheehan) that “[t]he authorities are uniform to the point that to justify a court in determining from oral testimony that a deed which purports to convey land absolutely in fee simple was intended to be something different, as a mortgage or trust, such testimony must be clear, convincing, and conclusive: Sullivan (1899)
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:conduct by the hearing officer.”]; see also Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 168 [it was an abuse of discretion to find a legal argument frivolous when it was at least “arguable”]; Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809 , 823 [“ ‘ “Attorney’s fees may not be awarded [citation] simply because the administrative entity or official’s action was erroneous, even if it was ‘clearly erroneous.’ ” ’ ”].) After listening to all the evidence and arguments from both sides, the trial court rejected Jones’s claims on the merits,: Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 107; see Bader, at p. 793 [“A direct (as opposed to a derivative) action is maintainable ‘only if the damages [are] not incidental to an injury to the corporation.’”]; see also Schuster v. Gardner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 305 , 313; Denevi, at p. 1222; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 124 (Nelson).) The principles governing derivative actions in the context of corporations apply to limited liability companies and limited partnerships. (See Sprengel v. Zbylut (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1040-1041 [limited liability company]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil: Gardner (2005) ; Denevi, at p. 1222; Nelson v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:1390, 1396; Schrage I, supra, B288478.) Nevertheless, Michael and Joseph can challenge it in this appeal if it is a void order, because a party may collaterally attack a void judgment or order at any time. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823 , 830, fn. 9; accord, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 526-527; see Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d) [“[t]he court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order”].) A: Kondo (2005) , fn. 9; accord, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:or collateral attack at any time. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Gassner v. Stasa (2018) 30 22 Cal.App.5th 346, 356.) Hence, “[a] motion to vacate a judgment void on its face is not subject to a claim of laches.” (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823 , 831, fn. omitted.) “‘“A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.” [Citation.] In a case in which the defendant does not answer the complaint, the judgment roll includes the proof of service. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”: Kondo (2005) , fn. omitted.) “‘“A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:to give effect to the settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 826.) Where, as here, interpretation of the instrument does not depend on disputed extrinsic evidence, we consider the issue de novo. (Gardenhire v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 882 , 888.) The language of Bertsch’s trust agreement does not distinguish between revocation and modification. It reserves the following right to the settlor: “The right by an acknowledged instrument in writing to revoke or amend this Agreement or any trust hereunder....: Superior Court (2005) .) The language of Bertsch’s trust agreement does not distinguish between revocation and modification.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:as the court in that case relied on authorities that had interpreted Civil Code former section 2280. (See Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 966; Masry, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) Finally, Cundall cites Gardenhire v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 882 , where the court offered the observation that, if a trust provides a method of revocation, section 15401, subdivision (a)(2) is inapplicable. (Id. at p. 894.) The observation was dictum—the actual issue in that case was whether a trustor effectively revoked her trust under the method specified in the trust: Superior Court (2005)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:“power is dependent upon the continued disability of the person being protected” and once the disability has ended, the representative “loses authority to maintain the suit on behalf of the former infant or incompetent”]; cf. In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051 , 1067 [appointment of court- appointed special advocate for dependent child necessarily ends when child is adopted].) Because Jacqueline and Michael are adults and there is no other ground for continuing Chen’s appointment as their guardian ad litem, the appointment must terminate.13 13 On November 7, 2022, Michael filed a: In re Carl R. (2005) .) Because Jacqueline and Michael are adults...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction.’” (Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1093 , 1101; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661 [“‘“[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.”’”].) b....: 14 the California Constitution confers broad authority on the superior courts. (Donaldson v. National Marine, Inc. (2005) ; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [except as otherwise provided...
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:held in trust, “ ‘there is always a divided ownership of property,’ ” generally with the trustee holding legal title and the beneficiary holding equitable title. (Gonsalves v. Hodgson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 91, 98; Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458 , 1475; Galdjie, at p. 1343; Herrick v. State of California (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 156, 161; see Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319.) Furthermore, when settlors transfer property to a revocable living trust, there is even more reason to conclude that the property’s title is: Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) ; Galdjie, at p. 1343; Herrick v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:strike allegations of punitive damages, however, the standard of review is de novo, because the “motion to strike, like a demurrer, challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations, which are assumed to be true.” (Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36 , 53.) “ ‘In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.’ [Citation.]” (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012): App.4th 603, 612.) When the motion seeks to strike allegations of punitive damages, however, the standard of review is de novo, because the “motion to strike, like a demurrer, challenges the legal suf...
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:influence is pressure brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the testator’s free agency.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 96; David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672 , 684–685 6 [balancing factors]; accord, § 86 [statute supplements common law].) Robert fails to show his evidence of undue influence was not “‘“‘uncontradicted and unimpeached.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125....: Hermann (2005) –685 6 ; accord, § 86 .) Robert fails to show his evidence of undue influence was not “‘“‘uncontradicted and unimpeached.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education, supra, 57 Cal.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:and the probate court did not assert any form of continuing jurisdiction or supervision over it. The probate court’s in rem jurisdiction over a decedent’s assets does not exist in the absence of a probate estate. (David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672 , 682 [prior probate of will did not deprive a different county superior court of jurisdiction to hear challenge to the validity of an inter vivos trust related to the will].) Similarly, the probate court’s continuing and exclusive jurisdiction “presupposes an estate subject to administration.” (Ibid.) There is no estate: The probate court’s in rem jurisdiction over a decedent’s assets does not exist in the absence of a probate estate. (David v. Hermann (2005)
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the procedure devised for reviewing adjudicatory decisions of administrative agencies as discussed in Drummey, Laisne, Walker, Dare, and Sipper. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 811-814 [citing and discussing in part IIA: Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75 ; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831; Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879; Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same: State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75; Laisne v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:including reasonable attorney’s fees [citations], compensation for injury to his [or her] reputation or impairment of his [or her] social and business standing in the community [citations], and for mental or emotional distress [citation].” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43 , 50-51, fn. omitted (Bertero).) Although “malicious prosecution is not a tort ‘favored by the law’ . . . [t]his convenient phrase should not be employed to defeat a legitimate cause of action.” (Id. at p. 53.) There are four essential elements to a malicious prosecution claim. First, there had: In recognition of the wrong done the victim of such a tort, settled law permits him to recover the cost of defending the prior action including reasonable attorney’s fees ...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:“However, if the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise appearing from the information supplied, that defense fails.” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43 , 53–54.) In Ashlock I, the trial court found it “highly doubtful that [Stacey] disclosed to counsel that she had [forged and fabricated the partnership agreements]. Even if she had, the advice of any attorney to proceed with the trusts could not be considered given in ‘good faith.’” Stacey argues,: App.4th 1534, 1544.) “However, if the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise appearing from the information s...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:the Act is unconstitutional. [¶] On the contrary, California authority supports the conclusion that a suit by a citizen in the undifferentiated public interest is ‘justiciable,’ or appropriate for decision in a California court.” (Ibid., citing White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 , 762 (White) [rejecting a challenge to taxpayer standing as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 526a].) As is relevant here, National Paint merely stands for the proposition that the Legislature may grant standing to sue in the public’s interest (public interest standing) even in the absence of a: Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 762 (White) .) As is relevant here...
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Conservatorship of Brokken
Context from opinion:(a) applies to both temporary and permanent conservatorships. Cornelius involved a temporary conservatorship. Here, we have a different statute and no conservatorship. “‘[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.’” (American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017 , 1039; B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11.) 4 In Cornelius, a daughter petitioned for a temporary and permanent conservatorship of her father. (Cornelius, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200....: Appeals Bd. (1996) ; B.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:petitioner’s assertion that our Supreme Court impliedly overruled Chamberlain and intended to 7 require a trial court to account for the standard of proof in the underlying proceeding when exercising its independent judgment under section 1094.5. (Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381 , 388 [“ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered’ ”]....: We thus disagree with petitioner’s assertion that our Supreme Court impliedly overruled Chamberlain and intended to 7 require a trial court to account for the standard of proof in the underlying proce...
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:program was designed to provide health care services to qualified indigent persons. The California Department of Health Care Services (the department) administers the Medi- Cal program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14203; Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center v. Belshé (1996) 13 Cal.4th 748 , 751.) For a person older than 55 years of age, financial eligibility for Medi-Cal benefits is calculated without including the value of his or her principal residence....: Belshé (1996) .) For a person older than 55 years of age, financial eligibility for Medi-Cal benefits is calculated without including the value of his or her principal residence.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:consent was illegal; all implicitly agreed the act of harvesting the sperm without the husband’s consent was lawful.” “Cases are not authority, of course, for issues not raised and resolved.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893 , 943.) As plaintiff concedes, Vernoff does not address whether the sperm harvesting was lawful, and therefore provides no authority on that point. Vernoff does not “implicitly” suggest that California law allows posthumous conception without the decedent’s consent....: Superior Court (1996) .) As plaintiff concedes, Vernoff does not address whether the sperm harvesting was lawful, and therefore provides no authority on that point.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:heir” (italics added) and of “heirs who may be living at the date of [O’Brian’s] death” unambiguously reflects O’Brian’s intent “to disinherit any heir not provided for, even those he was not aware of.” (See, e.g., Estate of Katleman (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 51 , 60 (Katleman) [“If a testator expresses an intent to disinherit his or her ‘heirs,’ ‘legal heirs,’ ‘relatives’ and the like, such language is generally found sufficient to disinherit a child who was alive at the time the will was executed or a surviving spouse who was then married to: 19 As the court noted, in Article Two of the Trust, O’Brian stated he was “intentionally not providing for” any person “who claims to be descendant or heir...
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:with an overview of the applicable legal standards. A. Applicable Legal Standards “The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (§ 7600 et seq.) ‘provides the framework by which California courts make [parentage] determinations. (§ 7610, subd. (b).)’ ” (In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302 , 1309 (L.L.).)6 6 Recent amendments to the Family Code have revised certain provisions 6 A person qualifies as a natural parent either by giving birth or by meeting one of the applicable statutory methods for being adjudged a natural parent. (§ 7610, subd. (a).) Section 7611 sets forth several: L. (2017) (L.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:while a court may, in construing a term of art, consider the history of a term’s legal interpretation as a guide to the Legislature’s intended meaning rather than its dictionary definition (Irvin v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 162 , 174), the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts failed to recognize that our Supreme Court did not uniformly employ the weight of the evidence phrase as a synonym for preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, prior to the enactment of section 1094.5, our Supreme Court and appellate courts sometimes used the phrase: Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) ), the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts failed to recognize that our Supreme Court did not uniformly employ the weight of the evidence phrase as a...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:appeal if it is a void order, because a party may collaterally attack a void judgment or order at any time. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830, fn. 9; accord, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513 , 526-527; see Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d) [“[t]he court . . . may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order”].) A judgment or order that is not void but “merely” voidable, however, is generally not subject: Pyle (2017) -527; see Code Civ.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:v. Solomon (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 289, 297-299); service of wrongful attachments (see White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 336, 348-351); obtaining a temporary restraining order to perpetuate a false representation concerning a party (see Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563 , 1579-1580); knowingly filing debt collection actions in improper venues for the purpose of impairing the debtors’ ability to defend themselves (see Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal....: Kizilbash (2005) -1580); knowingly filing debt collection actions in improper venues for the purpose of impairing the debtors’ ability to defend themselves (see Barquis v.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:Holt did not involve a revocable trust. (See Holt, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 752–761.) Neither did leading California cases applying Holt. (E.g., Patton v. Sherwood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 339, 341–342; L.B. Research & Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 171 , 176; Hardman v. Feinstein (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 157, 161–162; San Diego etc. Boy Scouts of America v. City of Escondido (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 189, 192–193.) World Services made just this point to the probate court: no case involving charitable trusts that were revocable has conferred special standing. The proposal: UCLA Foundation (2005) ; Hardman v.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A trust amendment is voidable if the maker lacked testamentary capacity or was subjected to undue influence; either ground alone is sufficient to invalidate the amendment.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:judges or performing subordinate judicial duties ordered by the court, administrative hearing officers, arbitrators, organizations sponsoring an arbitrator, referees, prosecutors, and officials of the State Bar and the Committee of Bar Examiners. (Id. at p. 853; Regan v. Price (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1491 , 1495 [referee].) This class also includes public officials who are connected with the judicial process through investigating crimes and instituting criminal proceedings....: Price (2005) .) This class also includes public officials who are connected with the judicial process through investigating crimes and instituting criminal proceedings.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:Yim’s whereabouts during each alleged act of abuse; (2) Yim’s interactions with and feelings toward appellant over the years he allegedly functioned “as a parent and as a caregiver”; (3) Yim’s relations with other Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 417 , 442 & fn. 12 [similar, regarding clergy-penitent communications privilege].) 23 prospective witnesses; and (4) Yim’s finances. (See McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2005) & fn. 12 .) 23 prospective witnesses; and (4) Yim’s finances. (See McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:fiduciary obligations in a partnership].) A minority shareholder may bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against majority shareholders as an individual claim or as a derivative claim, depending on the circumstances. (See Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52 , 63; Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1252-1253, 1257-1258 (Jara); see also Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [“a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action: Yessne (2005) ; Jara v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:of his or her stock (e.g., by reducing corporate assets and net worth)”’”; instead, the “‘“corporation itself must bring such an action, or a derivative suit may be brought on the corporation’s behalf”’”]; Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621 , 651 [plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for corporate mismanagement and diverting corporate assets was derivative]; PacLink Communications Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App....: National Football League (2005) ; PacLink Communications Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:information charges him with an offense for which he was formerly placed in jeopardy;” for instance, “when a defendant is being retried on a conspiracy charge for which defendant maintains he has been convicted or acquitted.” (People v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1537 , 1549, fn. omitted.) Defendant does not contend that the 23 “The [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, [citations], and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings . . . . [¶] Whether a particular punishment is criminal or: Smith (2005)
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:reviewed de novo].) B. Harrod Lacked Authority to Bind Logan to Arbitration with Country Oaks Country Oaks contends the Advance Directive granted Harrod actual authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Logan’s behalf. Relying on Garrison v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 253 (Garrison), Country Oaks argues that because the Advance Directive expressly authorized Harrod to make health care decisions, including “choos[ing] . . . health care facilities,” Harrod also was authorized to sign an optional arbitration agreement when admitting Logan to the nursing facility....: Superior Court (2005) (Garrison), Country Oaks argues that because the Advance Directive expressly authorized Harrod to make health care decisions, including “choos . . . health care facilities...
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:care decision” and Charles, who co-held the personal care POA, was not authorized to make such decisions. (Id. at pp. 945-951.) 2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. 6 Similarly, in Garrison v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 253 , 266, the court also found that an agreement to arbitrate was a health care decision. The court concluded that a health care POA was sufficient to establish the validity of an arbitration clause, concluding the arbitration clause was “part of the health care decisionmaking process.” Thus, Silverado argues, the: Superior Court (2005) , the court also found that an agreement to arbitrate was a health care decision.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:14 terms governing Trust B (and, by extension, Trust C) after Rodney, Sr.’s death is necessary in order to secure the benefit of the federal marital deduction. (See Donkin I, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 416–417; McIndoe v. Olivos (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 483 , 489 [surviving spouse could not amend trust terms regarding exempt trust because this would give her “power over the assets in the exempt trust, a result the trustors clearly did not intend, as evidenced by their use of a marital deduction and exempt trust”].) Thus, the trial court correctly: Olivos (2005)
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:obtained treatment elsewhere. Second, we conclude that, reading the SAC and judicially noticed materials as a whole, it is not reasonable to infer that Torres would have behaved differently by seeking treatment elsewhere. (See Neilson v. City of California (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1296 , 1305 [in determining whether pleading states a cause of action, court assumes the truth of all facts that reasonably may be inferred from the facts properly pleaded or judicially noticed].) The SAC alleges that Torres was charged $3,206.34 for “ED LEVEL 5 89.” This amount and description correspond to: City of California (2005)
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:was filed in a state court and the other two were filed in federal courts (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), we deny the request for judicial notice by separate order. (See Bennett v. Regents of University of California (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 347 , 358, fn. 7; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564−1565, 1568.) 9 rights of the parties.” (Id. at p. 697.) An order by the superior court may constitute an appealable judgment if it disposes of all causes of action pending in the case. (See ibid.) “As a general: Regents of University of California (2005) , fn. 7; Sosinsky v.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:NGI statutes, the SVPA does not contain language requiring a jury trial advisement or a personal waiver of that right, evincing a legislative intent not to provide these procedural protections. As the Third District explained in People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447 , 454 (Rowell), in concluding the SVPA does not require a trial court to take a personal waiver from a defendant of his or her right to a jury trial, “[T]he fact that the interests involved in involuntary commitment proceedings are fundamental enough to require a jury trial does not: Rowell (2005) (Rowell), in concluding the SVPA does not require a trial court to take a personal waiver from a defendant of his or her right to a jury trial...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a proposed construction.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1082.) For the reasons we set out below, we conclude section 41821.5, subdivision (g)(2) cannot plausibly be construed as Waste Connections would have us construe it. The context of subdivision (g)(2) does not support Waste 17 Connections’ interpretation....: Superior Court (2013) .) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a proposed construction.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1082.) For the reasons we set out below, we conclude section 41821.5, subdivision (g)(2) cannot plausibly be construed as Waste Connections would have us construe it. The context of subdivision (g)(2) does not support Waste 17 Connections’ interpretation....: Superior Court (2013) .) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:established. (E.g., Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [“Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant”]; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118 , 125 [“an appellant’s failure to discuss an issue in its opening brief forfeits the issue on appeal”].) “‘“To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.”’” (Reichardt v.: Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) .) “‘“To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:In addition, the vast majority of Michael and Joseph’s argument appears in a footnote. (See Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947 [“Footnotes are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal.”]; Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151 , 160 [raising an issue in a two-page footnote “is a violation of court rules that require arguments to be contained in discrete sections with headings summarizing the point”]; see also Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419-420 [an “appellant cannot bury a substantive legal argument: Centerstone Development Co. (2005) ; see also Holden v.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:Casey decision is not cited in Donovan, and it has not been questioned or limited by the California Supreme Court, or by any published California case on any relevant point.11 Indeed, the court in Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565 (Stewart), followed both Donovan and Casey in resolving a unilateral mistake claim. There, the plaintiff in a personal injury suit signed a settlement at the end of a mediation but then subsequently refused to accept the settlement check. (Stewart, at pp. 1568–1569.) The trial court entered summary judgment in favor: 19 only to claims for property damage does not entitle him to rescind the release under the circumstances of this case.” (Casey, at pp. 104–105.)10 The Casey decision is not cited in Donovan...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:271) for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.) “In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 , 47.) “‘To the extent that a trial court’s exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld “as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented.”’” (In re Marriage of Blazer, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.) 2. Mark’s: App.5th 267, 276.) “In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) .
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:sustained with leave to amend results in the plaintiff “ ‘practically confess[ing] that he [or she] has alleged in [the] pleading every fact [the plaintiff] is prepared to prove in support of [the plaintiff’s] action.’ ” (Goldtree v. Spreckels (1902) 135 Cal. 666 , 672.) When McLaughlin (through her Attorneys) failed to amend her petition as to the first through fifth causes of action, she admitted that she had “ ‘stated as strong a case as [she could’ ” against the Maleti Respondents. (Reynolds, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) And her failure: Spreckels (1902)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120, 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392 , 1409 [review is de novo, "except where the trial court made foundational factual findings, which are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence"].)7 B....: State Water Resources Control Board (2006) .)7 B.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120, 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392 , 1409 [review is de novo, "except where the trial court made foundational factual findings, which are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence"].)7 B....: State Water Resources Control Board (2006) .)7 B.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528 , 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods, Inc. v. 15 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court: App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) ; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:claim existed, notwithstanding the fact that the similar, but distinct, defamation claim remained].) Thus, “the results of the motion were [not] so insignificant that [Attorneys] did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Ibid.) Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952 (Moran), cited by the trial court and relied on by Carol, does not dissuade us from concluding that Attorneys were “prevailing defendant[s]” under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1)....: Endres (2006) (Moran), cited by the trial court and relied on by Carol, does not dissuade us from concluding that Attorneys were “prevailing defendant” under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:prosecution 7 Courts in other cases have similarly held that there is no favorable termination where the prior-suit defendant received a favorable resolution on some, but not all, causes of action. In StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1392 , 1395 continued . 19 plaintiff show that all claims in the underlying action were unsuccessful and that each of them was resolved on the merits. Here, unlike Friedberg and similar cases citing that case (see, e.g., Lane v. Bell (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 61; StaffPro, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 1392), no: Elite Show Services, Inc. (2006) continued . 19 plaintiff show that all claims in the underlying action were unsuccessful and that each of them was resolved on the merits.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:beneficiaries’ interests. The same is true when a trustee disagrees with the need for an accounting or surcharge based on the trustee’s and beneficiaries’ varying understandings of the trust document. The decision of Division Six in Finkbeiner v. Gavid (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1417 (Finkbeiner) is instructive here. Finkbeiner concluded that, in probate litigation between a trustee and beneficiaries, the trustee was not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by representing herself when filing a petition to modify and terminate the trust. (Id. at p. 1421....: Gavid (2006)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:both confirm that they place no limitation on a district's power to control water distribution. Thus, these statutory provisions permit, but do not require, compliance with their irrigation application procedures. Abatti disagrees, citing State Water Resources Control Board Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674 (SWRCB) to support his contention that the term "may" must "be construed as mandatory where the 'public interest or private right requires that a thing should be done.' " But SWRCB was talking about the State Board itself, and found the power at issue to be of public interest. (Id.: Abatti disagrees, citing State Water Resources Control Board Cases (2006)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:both confirm that they place no limitation on a district's power to control water distribution. Thus, these statutory provisions permit, but do not require, compliance with their irrigation application procedures. Abatti disagrees, citing State Water Resources Control Board Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674 (SWRCB) to support his contention that the term "may" must "be construed as mandatory where the 'public interest or private right requires that a thing should be done.' " But SWRCB was talking about the State Board itself, and found the power at issue to be of public interest. (Id.: Abatti disagrees, citing State Water Resources Control Board Cases (2006)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:District's water rights and that "each individual landowner has a statutory 60 It does not appear that Abatti raised collateral estoppel in the superior court; although this could be a basis for forfeiture (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82 , 89), we elect to address it. He raises additional, related arguments on appeal, as well. Specifically, Abatti contends that Bryant bars relitigation under stare decisis, which we reject for reasons similar to our reasons for rejecting his collateral estoppel argument. He makes a validation argument, based on a superior: Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) ), we elect to address it.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:District's water rights and that "each individual landowner has a statutory 60 It does not appear that Abatti raised collateral estoppel in the superior court; although this could be a basis for forfeiture (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82 , 89), we elect to address it. He raises additional, related arguments on appeal, as well. Specifically, Abatti contends that Bryant bars relitigation under stare decisis, which we reject for reasons similar to our reasons for rejecting his collateral estoppel argument. He makes a validation argument, based on a superior: Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) ), we elect to address it.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:by which appellants transferred the property to themselves as trustees of the trust. Appellants did not oppose the request, and although the trial court did not explicitly rule upon it, we presume it was granted. (See Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910 , 918–919.) 3 non-natural persons thereby.” The court did not rule on the other ground for demurrer the tenants raised. II. DISCUSSION Both below and on appeal, the tenants framed the primary issue as whether the term “landlord” under rule 12.14 includes a revocable trust established by natural persons who: Martinez-Senftner (2006)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:from attacking arbitration award on that basis]; see also Kristine H. v. Lisa R., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 166; Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP v. California Coastal Com., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 842; In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 980 , 989; Conservatorship of O’Connor, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.)11 (Armstrong, at pp. 950-951; see Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 752, 767 [“Errors of substantive law are within the jurisdiction of a court and are not typically acts beyond the court’s fundamental: App.4th at p. 842; In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) ; Conservatorship of O’Connor, supra, 48 Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:they would have learned that both Wilson (Parcel 19) and the Kings (Parcel 21) had given permission to Farkas to use the Tradewinds Route passing over their respective properties, thereby negating McLaughlin’s prescriptive easement claim. (See Aaron v. Dunham (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1244 , 1252 [landowner’s express permission defeats assertion of a prescriptive easement].) There is evidence in the record that the owners of Parcels 19 and 21 in fact gave permission to Farkas to use the Tradewinds Route. This evidence includes (1) the declaration of Kendall King in support of his motion: Dunham (2006) .) There is evidence in the record that the owners of Parcels in fact gave permission to Farkas to use the Tradewinds Route.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:the probate court’s jurisdiction was exclusive. This particular issue does not go to “fundamental” jurisdiction; therefore, it can be forfeited if not raised in the trial court. (Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1345; In re Michael R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 126 , 146.) He also did not raise his statutory contentions below. Certainly he did not cite the relevant statutes. He has further forfeited the statutory issues on appeal by failing to discuss the nature of Humphrey’s claim to the property. Indeed, neither side has asked that the complaint or the: App.4th 1333, 1345; In re Michael R. (2006) .) He also did not raise his statutory contentions below.
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:to the trial court’s factual findings when substantial evidence supports them. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons), abrogated on other grounds by Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (2017) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 137 S.Ct. 1773 , 1781] (Bristol-Myers).) When evidence does not conflict, we independently review both the record and the trial court’s application of law to facts. (Vons, at p. 449.) Among other findings, the trial court specifically found most of the Trust properties currently are in Idaho, the son is no longer a: S. ___, ___ [
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:judgments settling the accounts of guardians, administrators, or executors who withheld information that 30 would have enabled the beneficiaries to attack the accounts. (Lataillade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565, 576; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 541; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal. 220 , 223; Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657; Morgan v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182; see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93.)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “[W]here one is justified in relying, and does in fact rely, upon false representations, his right: Barton, ; Simonton v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:equitable relief has been granted from final judgments settling the accounts of guardians, administrators, or executors who withheld information that 30 would have enabled the beneficiaries to attack the accounts. (Lataillade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565, 576; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536 , 541; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal. 220, 223; Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657; Morgan v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182; see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93.)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “[W]here one is justified in relying, and does in: Santos, ; Aldrich v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:without leave to amend, we assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and facts of which judicial notice can be taken.” (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135 , 1181.) “[W]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.”: Helliker (2006) .) “e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:material facts properly pleaded, but does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1219–1220 (Stevenson Real Estate).) 19 “Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer, the standard of review is the same.” (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 187.) Thus, “[w]e independently review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment: CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) –1220 (Stevenson Real Estate).) 19 “Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer, the standard of review is the sa...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:and conserve" water for "beneficial use of the inhabitants"]; Bryant, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 371 [no farm in the District has "permanent right to any specific proportion of the water"]; cf. Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261 , 1279 (Allegretti) [overlying user's "claim to an unlimited right to use as much water as it needs to irrigate flies in the face" of reasonable use standard].) Abatti's position appears to be that historical use by the farmers' ancestors established their vested rights to continue to receive the amounts: County of Imperial (2006)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:and conserve" water for "beneficial use of the inhabitants"]; Bryant, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 371 [no farm in the District has "permanent right to any specific proportion of the water"]; cf. Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261 , 1279 (Allegretti) [overlying user's "claim to an unlimited right to use as much water as it needs to irrigate flies in the face" of reasonable use standard].) Abatti's position appears to be that historical use by the farmers' ancestors established their vested rights to continue to receive the amounts: County of Imperial (2006)
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:no conflict or question of credibility in the relevant extrinsic evidence. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 604; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1325 , 1331-1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however, those findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 87 (Ike).) The clear and convincing standard, however, “applies only at: George (1994) , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) -1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:temporary conservator of the estate,” they “belong to the conservatorship estate.” We reject Parker’s characterization as she cites no authority to support the characterization of such documents as estate assets subject to a section 850 petition. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 408 [“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations....: C. (2006)
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:the Legislature intended a different meaning.” ’ ” (Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1352.) “We usually ‘presume differences in language … convey differences in meaning.’ ” (Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. U.S. (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 138 S.Ct. 2067 , 2071, 201 L.Ed.2d 490]; Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 872, 879 [same].) The term “damages” is not defined in the FCRA. “Statutory terms or words will be construed according to their ordinary, common meaning unless these are defined by the statute: S. ___, ___ [, 201 L.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:that farmers lack beneficial ownership interests. (See, e.g., Glenn Colusa Irrigation District v. Paulson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 57, 69, 71-72 ["no private estate can be created in property devoted to a public use"]; Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) 139 Cal. 22 , 24, 29 [beneficiaries had no rights to private ownership of water]; Madera Irrigation District v. All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681, 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different from remedies: Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) , 29 ; Madera Irrigation District v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:that farmers lack beneficial ownership interests. (See, e.g., Glenn Colusa Irrigation District v. Paulson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 57, 69, 71-72 ["no private estate can be created in property devoted to a public use"]; Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) 139 Cal. 22 , 24, 29 [beneficiaries had no rights to private ownership of water]; Madera Irrigation District v. All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681, 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different from remedies: Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) , 29 ; Madera Irrigation District v.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:be “personally liable” to pay attorneys’ fees, Lynne contends we must apply the “rule of statutory construction that ‘the enumeration of things to which a statute applies is 17 presumed to exclude things not mentioned.’ [(]O’Grady v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1423 , 1443.[)]” Because the Legislature included express provisions allowing for personal liability for attorneys’ fees and costs in sections 2622....: Superior Court (2006) .” Because the Legislature included express provisions allowing for personal liability for attorneys’ fees and costs in sections 2622.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:fees and costs, subject to the trial court’s determination of the appropriate amount awardable based upon the defendant’s partial success. (See, e.g., City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782-783; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328 , 339-340 (Mann); ComputerXpress, supra, at pp. 1019-1020.) The entitlement to fees and costs where the defendant prevails in part, however, is not absolute. As explained by the court in Mann, supra, at page 340, “a party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing: Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) -340 (Mann); ComputerXpress, supra, at pp. 1019-1020.) The entitlement to fees and costs where the defendant prevails in part, however, is not absolute.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:title to or possession of which is held by another, . . .’ upon a petition brought by the executor, administrator, or any claimant.” (Estate of Williams (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 141, 143, fn. 1; see also Estate of Myers (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 434 , 441 (Myers).) As explained in Estate of Linnick (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 752, “Section 851.5 . . . provide[d] the authority and the procedure for the hearing of a petition by a decedent’s estate concerning any claim involving property allegedly wrongfully possessed by another.” (Id. at p. 760.) The court: App.3d 141, 143, fn. 1; see also Estate of Myers (2006) (Myers).) As explained in Estate of Linnick (1985) 171 Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) In performing our de novo review, we “ ‘conduct[] an independent review of the entire record. [Citations.]’ ” (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659 , 672.) “[O]ur review is conducted in the same manner as the trial court in considering an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s decision, not its rationale. (See City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1307.) B. Malicious Prosecution: Protected Activity It is clear that the: Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) .) “ur review is conducted in the same manner as the trial court in considering an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s decision, not its rationale.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:of his deceased mother.” (Italics added.) William contends, and we agree, Gary has waived any challenge to the probate court’s ruling on standing by failing to raise the issue in his opening brief. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659 , 685 [“Courts will ordinarily treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or her opening brief as a waiver of that challenge”]; Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived: Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) ; Aptos Council v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:court upheld a PMA even though the wife was unwed and pregnant before the execution of the PMA, noting the wife, like Kim, had her own counsel. (Id. at pp. 354–355.) Further, as in In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712 , Kim had her own counsel and was given a full explanation of the transaction and signed the acknowledgment to the Weaver letter. (Id. at pp. 735–736.) Although she claimed to have no choice, “[Kim] signed the [PMA] because she wanted to be married to Mark and she knew clearly: Here, the trial court compared the case to In re Marriage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342 (Dawley), a factually similar case where the court upheld a PMA even though the wife was unwed and pregnant bef...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:claims are speculative, Abatti argues that if he had filed suit after water delivery had been curtailed, the District would have argued that his claim accrued in October 2013, when the 2013 EDP was adopted, citing Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502 , 515. We decline to entertain such conjecture. Davies is not a taking case, but rather, confirms that harm is necessary for a 53 Abatti also cites a case outside the water context, Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 454. Similar to Salton Bay, it involved a: Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 515.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:claims are speculative, Abatti argues that if he had filed suit after water delivery had been curtailed, the District would have argued that his claim accrued in October 2013, when the 2013 EDP was adopted, citing Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502 , 515. We decline to entertain such conjecture. Davies is not a taking case, but rather, confirms that harm is necessary for a 53 Abatti also cites a case outside the water context, Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 454. Similar to Salton Bay, it involved a: Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 515.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:the form of the action may be, if the proof of a promise or contract within the statute is essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the statute is satisfied’ ”]; see also Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815 , 821, disapproved in part on other grounds in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 393, fn. 5 [statute of frauds applies equally to actions “based on contract or implied contract”].) Thus, Tukes can recover her claimed finder’s fee under her oral contract, implied: Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 821, disapproved in part on other grounds in Della Penna v.
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:must be administered according to the testator’s intent. (Prob. Code, 1 § 21102, subd. (a).) Administration consistent with that intent is the “paramount rule . . . to which all other rules must yield.” (Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126 , 134.) That means honoring Don Kirchner’s final wishes above all else. Here, however, the probate court exalted principles of forfeiture over Kirchner’s express wishes, concluding that the Pacific parties forfeited their rights to the gifts Kirchner wanted them to have because they did not satisfy a requirement Kirchner did: Wells Fargo Bank (1996) .) That means honoring Don Kirchner’s final wishes above all else. Here, however, the probate court exalted principles of forfeiture over Kirchner’s express wishes...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:recited below are alleged in Limon’s complaint, or are judicially noticeable. We also set forth some of Limon’s related contentions for context. However, we do not assume the truth of those contentions. (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294 , 300–301.) Circle K operates gas stations and convenience stores in California. Limon was employed by Circle K from June 29, 2018, through July 31, 2018. To gain employment with Circle K, Limon was required to complete a consent form purporting to authorize Circle K “to obtain a consumer report: (1996) –301.) Circle K operates gas stations and convenience stores in California.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19Cal.4th 851, 861.) And, of course, courts “should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4 , 22, citing Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple....: Dal Cielo (1996) , citing Delaney v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19Cal.4th 851, 861.) And, of course, courts “should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4 , 22, citing Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple....: Dal Cielo (1996) , citing Delaney v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.’ [Citation.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434 , 444, fn. 3.) We also deny the request because the document is not relevant. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.) As discussed in part VI, ante, notice by publication in a quiet title action must include either: (1) a: Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) , fn. 3.) We also deny the request because the document is not relevant. (See People ex rel.
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:in support of the trial court’s order. (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 923.) When the evidence conflicts, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings when substantial evidence supports them. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434 , 449 (Vons), abrogated on other grounds by Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (2017) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781] (Bristol-Myers).) When evidence does not conflict, we independently review both the record and the trial court’s application of law to facts. (Vons, at p. 449.) Among other findings,: Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) (Vons), abrogated on other grounds by Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (2017) ___ U.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:parties informed the court that the matter had settled. Despite a settlement, we have the discretion to decide the merits of an appeal that raises an issue of continuing public interest that is likely to recur. (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580 , 584, fn. 2; Bushell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 915, 919, fn. 1.) We exercise that discretion here. 2Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. 2 authority to do so. Cundall argues that, by requiring Diaz’s signature on the revocation document, the February: Eubanks (1996) , fn. 2; Bushell v.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:expire on January 17, 2025. Neither party has addressed the issue of mootness in their briefs, and we exercise our discretion to consider the merits, as there may be a recurrence of controversy between the parties. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 282.) A. Authority to Seek Court Relief Citing the Due Process in Competence Determinations Act (Stats. 1995, ch. 842, §§ 2, 3, as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 581, §§ 19, 20), Herren 12 contends Susannah had no authority or standing to seek a restraining order under the Elder: P. (2023) .) A.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:allegations were uncertain or vague, but because they alleged no factual basis for the assertion O’Brian’s unawareness of appellants’ existence was the sole reason he did not provide for Adam or Kimberly. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612 , 615-620 [reversing order sustaining demurrer on ground allegations as to nature and duration of oral agreement were uncertain, acknowledging oral contract “may be pleaded generally as to its effect,” but affirming sustaining of demurrer on other tort causes of action for failure to allege a factual basis for the: Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993)
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:2018, transcript. (Ct. App., Fifth Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 1(b); cf. Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Associates (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1558, fn. 17 [denying a request to augment the record with irrelevant material]; Carleton v. Tortosa (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 745 , 759, fn. 5 [same].) For the above reasons, the motion to augment is denied. 9. B. Respondent’s Motion to Strike Gabriel moved to strike (1) the transcripts in the Reply Appendix and (2) portions of the reply brief addressing claims not previously asserted in the opening brief. Gabriel was: Tortosa (1993) , fn. 5 .) For the above reasons, the motion to augment is denied. 9. B.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086 , 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re: American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) ; Pfeifer v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:We are not required to develop appellants’ argument for them. The absence of clear legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as forfeited. (Orange County Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343 , 383.) (c) Improper “Odious Comparison” Standard Kim argues the trial court’s use of the “odious comparison” standard is based upon an unpublished decision and therefore its child support order departs from established standards for such awards.26 The fact the trial court borrowed terminology from an unpublished case does not: Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) .) (c) Improper “Odious Comparison” Standard Kim argues the trial court’s use of the “odious comparison” standard is based upon an unpublished decision...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:of his statutory arguments — and in particular, because he has not shown that Humphrey was not claiming the property adversely to the estate — he has forfeited them for purposes of appeal. (Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514 , 521.) VI THE VALIDITY OF THE SERVICE BY PUBLICATION Humphrey contends that the named defendants were properly served. Bewley responds that the publication did not adequately describe the property. We agree. In a quiet title action, “Whenever the court orders service by publication, the order is subject to the: City of San Diego (2017) .) VI THE VALIDITY OF THE SERVICE BY PUBLICATION Humphrey contends that the named defendants were properly served.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:Attachment Law. The Elder Abuse Act, a remedial scheme designed to protect a vulnerable class of citizens, is generally construed broadly in favor of plaintiffs seeking relief on behalf of elders (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 , 860–861 (Mahan)), while the Attachment Law, which authorizes “a harsh remedy [that] . . . causes the defendant to lose control of his property before the plaintiff’s claim is adjudicated” (Martin v. Aboyan (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 826, 831), is generally construed strictly according to the letter of its statutory: Agency, Inc. (2017) –861 (Mahan)), while the Attachment Law, which authorizes “a harsh remedy . . . causes the defendant to lose control of his property before the plaintiff’s claim is adjudicated” (M...
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:of Sigourney (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 593, 603; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 845 [a contractual right is “a chose in action, a form of property”]; Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 , 861, 853–854, 864 [deprivation of a property right under section 15610.30 implicated where respondents allegedly restructured insurance policies held by plaintiffs’ trust with increased premiums that required payment by plaintiffs]; Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App....: Agency, Inc. (2017) , 853–854, 864 [deprivation of a property right under section 15610.30 implicated where respondents allegedly restructured insurance policies held by plaintiffs’ trust with increas...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:to consider: (1) the victim’s vulnerability; (2) the influencer’s apparent authority; (3) the tactics used by the influencer; and (4) the inequity of the result. (§ 15610.70, subd. (a)(1)–(4); see also Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 , 867.) Because perpetrators of undue influence rarely leave any direct evidence of their actions, plaintiffs typically 13 rely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence to prove their case. (In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 601 [because direct evidence of undue influence is: Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) .) Because perpetrators of undue influence rarely leave any direct evidence of their actions, plaintiffs typically 13 rely on circumstantial evidence...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:et seq.) was enacted to protect elders, defined as “any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or older” (id., § 15610.27), and dependent adults from abuse and neglect. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841 , 858 (Mahan).) The Act protects against both “[p]hysical abuse” and “[f]inancial abuse.” (§ 15610.07, subds. (a)(1) & (3).) Financial abuse, which is what Ring alleges, occurs when an elder is wrongfully “deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of: Agency, Inc. (2017)
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:misappropriated by the Robbs with the assistance of respondents). (See Wood, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 164-165 [finding defendant committed elder abuse both by receiving fees paid through loan proceeds and by assisting another in misappropriating loan proceeds]; Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 864 [finding “deprivation” of “property” where respondents, through “manipulation and use of [a trust] as an instrument . . . managed to separate the [elders] from their money”]....: App.4th at pp. 164-165 ; Mahan, supra,
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:maintain their father’s lifestyle as far as possible. 2. Spousal Support There are two distinct types of spousal support under California law, based on the timing and the purpose of the award. (In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 939 , 942.) Temporary spousal support, awarded under section 3600, is intended to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties as closely as possible to the status quo, pending trial and the division of the assets and obligations of the parties. (In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th: Spousal Support There are two distinct types of spousal support under California law, based on the timing and the purpose of the award. (In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar (2017) .
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:unusual procedural circumstances presented here, we believe it would be improper to conclude that she did not satisfy her burden in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion due to imprecise wording in her complaint. (See Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 515 , 530 [expressing inclination “to allow the plaintiff in a SLAPP motion a certain degree of leeway in establishing a probability of prevailing on its claims due to ‘the early stage at which the motion is brought and heard . . . and the limited opportunity to conduct discovery’ ”].): Fitzgibbons (2006)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:holders of different water rights.44 44 Abatti cites several other cases. We addressed Tehachapi and Simon Newman, ante. The remaining cases do not involve equitable distribution, address different rights holders, or are otherwise inapposite. (See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Cal. 116 , 133-136, 141 [overlying owners had correlative rights in common supply of groundwater, and were entitled to reasonable use]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal....: Walkinshaw (1903) -136, 141 ; Rancho Santa Margarita v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:holders of different water rights.44 44 Abatti cites several other cases. We addressed Tehachapi and Simon Newman, ante. The remaining cases do not involve equitable distribution, address different rights holders, or are otherwise inapposite. (See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw (1903) 141 Cal. 116 , 133-136, 141 [overlying owners had correlative rights in common supply of groundwater, and were entitled to reasonable use]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal....: Walkinshaw (1903) -136, 141 ; Rancho Santa Margarita v.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:the court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it, and can only determine those questions or matters arising in the estate which it is authorized to do.” (Estate of Schloss (1961) 56 Cal.2d 248, 253; accord Estate of Ryder (1903) 141 Cal. 366 , 368.) However, the court has broad equitable powers to protect the trust estate. “ ‘ “Courts having jurisdiction over trust administration have the power to allocate the burden of certain trust expenses to the income or principal account . . . . Sometimes this authority is stated in statutory: As a general matter, probate proceedings are statutory in nature, such that the trial court “has no other powers than those given by statute and such incidental powers as pertain to it...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5. (See, e.g., Jones v. Board of Police Commissioners (1903) 141 Cal. 96 , 98.) Second, while a court may, in construing a term of art, consider the history of a term’s legal interpretation as a guide to the Legislature’s intended meaning rather than its dictionary definition (Irvin v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 162, 174), the Chamberlain and: Board of Police Commissioners (1903) .) Second, while a court may, in construing a term of art, consider the history of a term’s legal interpretation as a guide to the Legislature’s intended meaning r...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:statute applies only to those fees incurred in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion (including a related motion for fees and costs), not those incurred in other aspects of the action. (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15 , 21.) In his opening brief, Richard offers a purported quote from counsel’s declaration in support of the fee request as follows: “Mr. Brooks [of Nemecek & Cole] stated that he ‘billed 72.7 hours on the matter prior to any work performed on the instant motion, and Mr. McCarthy billed: Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) .) In his opening brief, Richard offers a purported quote from counsel’s declaration in support of the fee request as follows: “Mr.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:Capitola (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 918, 932 [“Good faith, or its absence, involves a factual inquiry into the [person’s] subjective state of mind”].) “Appellate courts ‘do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.’” (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509 , 1531.) Section 859 does not define “bad faith.” In other contexts, “[b]ad faith involves a subjective determination of [a] party’s state of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper purpose.” (Powell v. Tagami, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 234....: App.4th 918, 932 subjective state of mind”].) “Appellate courts ‘do not reweigh evidence...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:action. “Informational injury that causes no adverse effects”—e.g., where required information is provided but is provided in the wrong format as in the present case—has been held insufficient to satisfy Article III standing. (TransUnion, supra, 2021 WL 2599472, *15 [ 141 S.Ct. 2190 , 2214.) California case law has held similarly. (Boorstein, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 472– 473 [noting a lack of California case law recognizing “informational injury” and holding “informational injury” is not cognizable under Civil Code, section 1798.83 et seq.];15 Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App....: App.4th at p. 883.) We also reject Limon’s claims he suffered “informational injury” sufficient to confer upon him standing to maintain his action.
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:which implicates the fundamental interest “of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford (1891) 141 U.S. 250 , 251.) An adult conservatee’s disability does not put them in the legal position of a minor. For example, a conservatee retains the right to marry or enter a registered domestic partnership. (Prob. Code, § 1900 [“The appointment of a conservator of the person or estate or both does not: Botsford (1891) .) An adult conservatee’s disability does not put them in the legal position of a minor.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:of California and later of the U.S. With no recent case authority on point, older cases construing that word in evaluating California residency appropriately guide our construction. For example, California residency was established in In re Estate of Gordon (1904) 142 Cal. 125 by a decedent’s brother who sold his 13 property in Massachusetts, came to California intending to make it his permanent home, and “resided here continuously for some six years past” before his sister’s death. (Id. at p. 128....: For example, California residency was established in In re Estate of Gordon (1904)
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:for this consideration is that, if the penalties for comparable misconduct are much less than a punitive damages award, the tortfeasor lacked fair notice that the wrongful conduct could entail a sizable punitive damages award.’ ” (Grassilli v. Barr (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1260 , 1290.) Appellants contend 1) there are no applicable civil penalties in comparable cases; and 2) we should consider repealed and inapplicable penalties....: B. There Are No Comparable Civil Penalty Provisions. We skip next to the third guidepost, which directs us to “consider ‘the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 518-519 [superior court erred by enjoining water use among riparians based on extent of ownership, rather than current needs and uses]; El Dorado Irr. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 937 , 942-943, 965-967 [affirming writ of mandate requiring removal of permit condition that did not apply to later appropriators; reasonable use and public trust doctrines were primary, but no interest there justified subverting priority]....: State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) -943, 965-967 [affirming writ of mandate requiring removal of permit condition that did not apply to later appropriators...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 518-519 [superior court erred by enjoining water use among riparians based on extent of ownership, rather than current needs and uses]; El Dorado Irr. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 937 , 942-943, 965-967 [affirming writ of mandate requiring removal of permit condition that did not apply to later appropriators; reasonable use and public trust doctrines were primary, but no interest there justified subverting priority]....: State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) -943, 965-967 [affirming writ of mandate requiring removal of permit condition that did not apply to later appropriators...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089 [discussing tort’s “disfavored” nature].) Malicious prosecution has historically involved personal injury to another. (Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926) 199 Cal. 15, 18; accord Thompson v. Clark (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [ 142 S.Ct. 1332 , 1338].) For this reason, a separate two- year statute of limitations applies. (Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 14 193 Cal.App.4th 874, 879 [discussing Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1].) Enforcement of a no contest clause is far afield from tort: such a clause is a rule set forth in a particular: S. ___ .) For this reason, a separate two- year statute of limitations applies. (Vafi v.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:concede exists— she would acquire title to the half of the property Decedent left behind with an acquisition date that similarly relates back to the date of her death. (Prob. Code, § 7000; see Bank of Ukiah v. Rice (1904) 143 Cal. 265 , 271 (Bank of Ukiah) [“While it may be conceded that upon the death of C. C. Rice his title to the land descended to his heirs at law, their right thereto was subject to the administration of his estate, and subordinate to his testamentary disposition thereof.”].) In the language: Rice (1904) (Bank of Ukiah) [“While it may be conceded that upon the death of C.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A lay witness may testify about a person’s mental condition, competency, or health when the witness has personal knowledge of the facts, and such testimony is admissible without the need for expert qu...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” (In re Miranda (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 757, 762; see Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174 , 1178–1179.) The critical factor in considering mootness is “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60), and we decide the question of mootness on a case-by-case basis (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544,: Chadmar Group (2006) –1179.) The critical factor in considering mootness is “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error” (In re N.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:no threat to District's discretion. c. Morgan validation action The validation statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 860, et seq.) "provide a procedure by which a public agency may determine the validity of certain acts." (Kaatz v. City of Seaside (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 13 , 29.) A judgment in a validation proceeding is "binding and conclusive, as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 870.) If the agency does not timely file a validation proceeding, interested persons must bring: City of Seaside (2006) .) A judgment in a validation proceeding is "binding and conclusive, as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:no threat to District's discretion. c. Morgan validation action The validation statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 860, et seq.) "provide a procedure by which a public agency may determine the validity of certain acts." (Kaatz v. City of Seaside (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 13 , 29.) A judgment in a validation proceeding is "binding and conclusive, as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 870.) If the agency does not timely file a validation proceeding, interested persons must bring: City of Seaside (2006) .) A judgment in a validation proceeding is "binding and conclusive, as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:to challenge that order in their appeal from the alternative decree, but they dismissed the appeal, making that order final. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 913; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 100; Patchett v. Bergamot Station, Ltd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1390 , 1396; Schrage I, supra, B288478.) Nevertheless, Michael and Joseph can challenge it in this appeal if it is a void order, because a party may collaterally attack a void judgment or order at any time. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830, fn. 9; accord, Deutsche Bank National: Bergamot Station, Ltd. (2006) ; Schrage I, supra, B288478.) Nevertheless, Michael and Joseph can challenge it in this appeal if it is a void order, because a party may collaterally attack a void judgm...
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Adoption of M.R.
Context from opinion:ICWA applies. (In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704-705.) We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence. (In re Noreen G., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384; In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426 , 1430.) 4 II Analysis A. Failure to Make ICWA Findings Father argues the trial court erroneously failed to make ICWA findings, including whether the minor is an Indian child. Grandmother does not argue the absence of error, and we agree with father. The court made no findings as to: App.4th at p. 1384; In re Rebecca R. (2006) .) 4 II Analysis A.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:brief by permission.”’” (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) Thus, “[w]hen new arguments are raised in the reply brief, to which respondent has no opportunity to respond, we are not required to consider them.” (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151 , 171.) Stacey’s reply brief raises several new issues. The most notable example is a claim regarding section 859. In her opening brief, she argued there was insufficient evidence of the type of misconduct the statute requires. In her reply, she claims the trial court misinterpreted the language of section: Robinson (2006) .) Stacey’s reply brief raises several new issues.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:impressed with the public use"]; Allen v. Hussey (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 457, 467 (Allen) [irrigation district is "an active trust for public uses and purposes"].) c. Irrigating landowners In Merchants' National Bank of San Diego v. Escondido Irrigation District (1904) 144 Cal....: Escondido Irrigation District (1904)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:impressed with the public use"]; Allen v. Hussey (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 457, 467 (Allen) [irrigation district is "an active trust for public uses and purposes"].) c. Irrigating landowners In Merchants' National Bank of San Diego v. Escondido Irrigation District (1904) 144 Cal....: Escondido Irrigation District (1904)
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:proof by a preponderance of the evidence” -- the portion of Evidence Code section 115 relied upon 20 by the Chamberlain court. Moreover, section 2061 was frequently described as enumerated matters affecting the weight of evidence (People v. Moran (1904) 144 Cal. 48 , 63) or weight of the evidence rules (see, e.g., People v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592, 597, overruled on another ground in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482; People v. King (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 122, 128). Thus, the weight of the evidence phrase was used in common law: Moran (1904) ) or weight of the evidence rules (see, e.g., People v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537.) Section 271 is not tied to need, but is a penalty for bad conduct. With section 271, a lesser showing of culpable conduct is needed than under other sanctions statutes. (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387 , 399; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1318 [section 271 “does not require that the sanctioned conduct be frivolous or taken solely for the purpose of delay”].) The purpose behind section 271 is to promote settlement and encourage litigant cooperation; therefore, no showing of separate injury: Burkle (2006) ; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:an accounting, and the court’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [“Determining the need for an accounting is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion”]; Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517 , 520.) “‘Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion . . . .’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566: App.4th 1407, 1413 ; Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) .) “‘Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason...
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:challenging the trial court’s ruling in this regard. Instead, Trustees seem to want to ignore the issue by arguing that, “whether Mary did or did not have the right to as the interpretation of a trust. (Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517 , 522.) The remainder of the trial court’s decision addressing appellants’ petition for instructions likewise “[d]etermine[s] questions of construction of a trust instrument” and is also appealable. (See §§ 17200, subd. (b)(1), 1304, subd. (a).) 13 amend the entire Trust is irrelevant. The fact remains that Mary did amend the: Cummins (2006) .) The remainder of the trial court’s decision addressing appellants’ petition for instructions likewise “etermine questions of construction of a trust instrument” and is also appealabl...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:have adopted Ferber’s reasoning. (See Fazzi v. Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1289 (Fazzi) [following Ferber in concluding that a no contest clause could not apply to a nonfrivolous action to remove a trustee for cause]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554 , 561 [citing Ferber for the proposition that “ ‘[b]eneficiaries must be free to raise public policy issues so the court may address them’ ”], quoting 21 Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 252; Hearst, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213 [citing Ferber at p. 253 for the proposition that: Wells (2006) eneficiaries must be free to raise public policy issues so the court may address them’ ”], quoting 21 Ferber, supra, 66 Cal.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:which expressly granted powers that the trustees exercised in setting up the Split Dollar Trust Arrangement. A challenge to investment decisions that a trust expressly empowers a trustee to make can amount to a contest. In Hearst v. Ganzi (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1195 (Hearst), income beneficiaries of a trust sought a ruling that their proposed petition would not violate the trust’s no contest clause. 6 The petition alleged that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties by decisions that reduced the dividends the income beneficiaries received....: Ganzi (2006) (Hearst), income beneficiaries of a trust sought a ruling that their proposed petition would not violate the trust’s no contest clause.
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Tubbs v. Berkowitz
Context from opinion:assets once he exercised the power of appointment in his favor. He could not possibly have breached any fiduciary duties by doing something that was expressly authorized and required under the terms of the Marital Trust. (Hearst v. Ganzi (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1195 , 1207-1208 [trustees did not breach their fiduciary duties where their actions were explicitly authorized by the trust].) Finally, we note that Berkowitz’s exercise of his power of appointment would have been unobjectionable if he had resigned as trustee before exercising the power. In that scenario, the successor trustee (Tubbs): Ganzi (2006) -1208 .) Finally, we note that Berkowitz’s exercise of his power of appointment would have been unobjectionable if he had resi...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:on the merits.” (Lackner, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p 750.) While Attorneys may challenge this conclusion as the malicious prosecution case proceeds on remand, Carol’s showing was sufficient to defeat the special motion to strike. (See Ross v. Kish (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 188 , 198 [if there is a conflict “as to the circumstances of the termination, the determination of the reasons underlying the dismissal is a question of fact”].) 3. Absence of Probable Cause a. Applicable Law “[T]he probable cause element calls on the trial court to make an objective determination of: Kish (2006) .) 3.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents.” (§ 6450, subd. (a) 7; see Britel, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) Section 6453 “contains the rules for determining who is a ‘natural parent.’ ” (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021 , 1026.) Under “section 6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform Parentage Act and not rebutted.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 921; Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514 [the intestacy statutes “incorporate the UPA: App.4th at p. 135.) Section 6453 “contains the rules for determining who is a ‘natural parent.’ ” (Estate of Burden (2007) .) Under “section 6453, subdivision (a)...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:The trial court rejected Kenton’s argument, and so do we. “ ‘Standing’ is a party’s right to make a legal claim and is a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the merits of an action.” (Said v. Jegan (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1375 , 1382.) Generally, standing is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73.) “Standing, for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, must be analyzed in a manner that induces: Jegan (2007) .) Generally, standing is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:Law “ ‘ “Attachment is an ancillary or provisional remedy to aid in the collection of a money demand by seizure of property in advance of trial and judgment.” ’ ” (Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474 , 1476, italics omitted.) Under the statutory scheme governing attachments in California (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 481.010–493.060), denominated by the Legislature as “The Attachment Law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 482.010), plaintiffs must meet a set of detailed procedural and substantive requirements. In 1972, our Supreme Court invalidated a predecessor statute: Titan Electric Corp. (2007) , italics omitted.) Under the statutory scheme governing attachments in California (Code Civ.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:money demand by seizure of property in advance of trial and judgment.” ’ [Citation.] California’s Attachment Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 482.010 et seq.) is purely statutory and is strictly construed.” (Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474 , 1476, fn. omitted.) The purpose of a writ of attachment is to ensure recovery of payment in the event judgment is entered. “An attachment remedy would be useless if it required the court to first decide the merits and issue a judgment.” (Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied: Titan Electric Corp. (2007) , fn. omitted.) The purpose of a writ of attachment is to ensure recovery of payment in the event judgment is entered.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.” [Citation.] In a case in which the defendant does not answer the complaint, the judgment roll includes the proof of service. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488 , 496; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a).) A default judgment is void on its face if the underlying proof of service fails to show compliance with all statutory requirements. (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441-1442.) Here, the trial court determined — based,: Fagor America, Inc. (2007) ; see also Code Civ.
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:and hearing in “every significant deprivation” of an interest in property]). It forces potential beneficiaries to participate in costly mediation (legal entities cannot appear except through counsel), something “antithetical to the entire concept” thereof. (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 536 , 543.) It permits a trustee to favor some beneficiaries over others—in 1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Probate Code. breach of the duty of impartiality (§ 16003)—simply because the latter did not participate in mediation....: Superior Court (2007) .) It permits a trustee to favor some beneficiaries over others—in 1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Probate Code. breach of the duty of impartiality (§ 16003)...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:— as under the Code of Civil Procedure — it would render superfluous the timeline in section 8251 — filing within 30 days of when a summons is served. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a); Young v. McCoy (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1078 , 1084 [avoiding statutory interpretations that would “ ‘render any part of a statute superfluous’ ”].) Second, McDonald insists — citing no legal authority — that allowing an interested party to file a demurrer at any time at or before the hearing is absurd. (County of Santa Barbara v. Connell: McCoy (2007) .) Second, McDonald insists — citing no legal authority ...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:Galentine (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 89 (Serway)), and the guardian ad litem is appointed, if at all, “ ‘ “merely to aid and to enable the court to perform that duty of protection.” ’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36 , 49–50 (Williams); see 27 Section 1003’s discretionary appointment power contrast with the requirement under section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “[w]hen a minor . . . is a party, that person shall appear either by a guardian or conservator of the estate or by a guardian: App.2d 86, 89 (Serway)), and the guardian ad litem is appointed, if at all, “ ‘ “merely to aid and to enable the court to perform that duty of protection.” ’ ” (Williams v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:priority than other, non- 29 As discussed post, the no injury rule generally bars a change to the place or use of water if it injures a legal user. (North Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 555 , 559 (North Kern).) We will also discuss the superior court's finding under the "appurtenancy rule," which is not addressed in the case law and appears to refer to the trial court’s acceptance of Abatti's argument that the appurtenant nature of the farmers' rights to water service precludes the District: Kern Delta Water Dist. (2007) (North Kern).) We will also discuss the superior court's finding under the "appurtenancy rule," which is not addressed in the case law...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:priority than other, non- 29 As discussed post, the no injury rule generally bars a change to the place or use of water if it injures a legal user. (North Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 555 , 559 (North Kern).) We will also discuss the superior court's finding under the "appurtenancy rule," which is not addressed in the case law and appears to refer to the trial court’s acceptance of Abatti's argument that the appurtenant nature of the farmers' rights to water service precludes the District: Kern Delta Water Dist. (2007) (North Kern).) We will also discuss the superior court's finding under the "appurtenancy rule," which is not addressed in the case law...
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:Logan stated in the Advance Directive: “If my primary physician finds that I cannot make my own health care decisions, I grant my agent full power and authority to make 5 We note Hogan v. Country Villa Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 259 , 262 followed Garrison, opining Garrison was “well reasoned.” In Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1129, however, the court in dicta disagreed with the Garrison court’s conclusion that the “the term ‘health care decision’ made by an agent encompasses the execution of arbitration agreements on behalf: Country Villa Health Services (2007) followed Garrison, opining Garrison was “well reasoned.” In Young v.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:agreed to arbitrate.”’ [Citation.]” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581 , 586.) The issue on appeal—i.e., did the Advance Directive confer authority on Harrod to enter into an arbitration agreement on Logan’s behalf—presents a legal question. We therefore apply the de novo standard of review. (See Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center, 4 The arbitration agreement states: “The parties to this: Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) .) The issue on appeal—i.e., did the Advance Directive confer authority on Harrod to enter into an arbitration agreement on Logan’s behalf—presents a legal question.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, if the other party would have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed.’ ”]; but see SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 663 , 675-676 [authorizing fee award only in cases “arising under” the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL); “[i]t is not sufficient that the case ‘relates to’ the MRL”].) 14 on the “good faith” language, contending the trial court acted well within its discretion in finding that Jones did not act in bad: Canyon View Estates, Inc. (2007)
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 21, 30–31; SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1053; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696 , 706–707). Thus, while it is true that standing in California is not explicitly governed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, it is also true that there are, in many instances, commonalities between California’s standing doctrine and federal standing doctrine. The issue in Save the Plastic Bag was whether: State Dept. of Health Services (2007) –707).
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:repudiations of the agreements. They rely on the general principle that “a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before majority or within a reasonable time afterwards.” (Fam. Code, § 6710; see, e.g., Berg v. Traylor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 809 , 820 (Berg) [“ ‘[a] contract (or conveyance) of a minor may be avoided by any act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate its binding force and effect’ ”].) This rule exists to protect minors “against [their] own improvidence and the designs of others. The policy of the: Traylor (2007) (Berg) contract (or conveyance) of a minor may be avoided by any act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate its binding force...
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:What are we to make of this? At oral argument, World Services cited Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, but that case does not authorize evidence at the demurrer stage. (See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 , 112–118.) In this peculiar situation, we treat the evidentiary material Autonomous Region attached to its supplemental briefing as offers of proof to convince the probate court to grant leave to amend. Nothing in Autonomous Region’s offer of extrinsic evidence supports its claim to be a settlor. We outline its: Fremont General Corp. (2007) –118.) In this peculiar situation, we treat the evidentiary material Autonomous Region attached to its supplemental briefing as offers of proof to convince the probate cou...
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:“Hankin does not meet any of [the] criteria” to maintain a petition pursuant to section 1820, and therefore “the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 , 112 [“lack of standing . . . and the failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action . . . are general grounds for demurrer” and are both “considered a failure to state facts sufficient to constituted a cause of action”]; see also Code Civ. Proc.,: The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Judgment on the Pleadings The trial court determined “Hankin does not meet any of criteria” to maintain a petition pursuant to section 1820...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:judicial notice of them. When a court takes judicial notice of a document on demurrer, it does not “accept[ ] a particular interpretation of its meaning,” when the meaning is in dispute. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 , 113 (Fremont); StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9.) Contrary to Adam’s contention, the trial court did not take judicial notice of the meaning or a particular interpretation of the Trust terms. The court considered the terms as stated in the Trust and independently: Fremont General Corp. (2007) (Fremont); StorMedia, Inc. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:(Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115.) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 , 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer[ ] . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 566.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is: Fremont General Corp. (2007) .) Further, " 'f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:(Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115.) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97 , 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer[ ] . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 566.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is: Fremont General Corp. (2007) .) Further, " 'f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:works, franchises, concessions and rights." (§ 20529; see ibid. [except as applied to assessments].) "The ultimate purpose of a district organized under the Irrigation Act is the improvement, by irrigation, of the lands within the district." (Jenison v. Redfield (1906) 149 Cal. 500 , 503 (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1927) 200 Cal. 318, 329 (Crawford) 20 ["prime object and purpose" is to "provide water for the use of its inhabitants and land owners for irrigation and domestic purposes"]; City of Modesto: Redfield (1906) (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:works, franchises, concessions and rights." (§ 20529; see ibid. [except as applied to assessments].) "The ultimate purpose of a district organized under the Irrigation Act is the improvement, by irrigation, of the lands within the district." (Jenison v. Redfield (1906) 149 Cal. 500 , 503 (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1927) 200 Cal. 318, 329 (Crawford) 20 ["prime object and purpose" is to "provide water for the use of its inhabitants and land owners for irrigation and domestic purposes"]; City of Modesto: Redfield (1906) (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:sufficient evidence in a manner mindful of the elevated degree of certainty required by this standard. This guidance often has been coupled with language recognizing the limits of such review. More than a century ago, in Wadleigh v. Phelps (1906) 149 Cal. 627 , we upheld a finding that a deed, absolute on its face, was in fact a mortgage. (Id., at p. 639.) In doing so, we expounded, “It is, of course, the universal rule that the presumption of law, independent of proof, is that such a deed is what it purports: More than a century ago, in Wadleigh v. Phelps (1906) , we upheld a finding that a deed, absolute on its face, was in fact a mortgage. (Id., at p. 639.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:will sustain the trial court’s factual findings if there is [the requisite] substantial evidence to support those findings [under the clear and convincing standard of proof], even if there exists evidence to the contrary. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Amanda B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 342 , 347.) Because mother was in nearly daily contact with appellant for the past 10 years, mother was in a far better position than Dr. Khoie and Donati to evaluate appellant’s capacity to function independently....: Khoie and Donati, opined that a limited conservatorship is inappropriate. But “n appellate court . . . will sustain the trial court’s factual findings if there is substantial evidence to support those...
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : A party waives an issue when it neither raises the point nor supports it with reasoned argument and citations to authority. Consequently, unsupported assertions are deemed forfeited.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:ninth causes of action. . 25 remained against them. Carol makes the conclusory argument, unsupported by authority, that this was a favorable termination on the merits. We may “treat the issue as abandoned.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836 , 852 (Benach).) In any event, the court’s ruling concerning the alter ego claim does not appear to have been a substantive determination. The court did not consider the merits of whether Maleti Corp. was, in fact, the alter ego of Maleti. Instead, the probate court reasoned that the alter: County of Los Angeles (2007) (Benach).) In any event, the court’s ruling concerning the alter ego claim does not appear to have been a substantive determination.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 79–82.) The modification must be necessary to accomplish the purpose of the trustors as expressed in the trust instrument. (Id. at p. 80; Stewart v. Towse (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 425, 428.) In Adams v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 352 (Adams), investors placed real property into a trust to be sold by a date certain at a fixed price. (Id. at pp. 354, 360.) Any lease of the property had to be subject to its sale. “It was the intent of the trustors that the unit holders or beneficiaries under: Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 352
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:myriad provisions of the Probate Code, including those related to notice requirements (§ 17203), hearings and objections (§ 1040 et seq.), and the approval of settlements (§ 9837), as well as their constitutional counterparts (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 , 208 [due process requires a notice and hearing in “every significant deprivation” of an interest in property]). It forces potential beneficiaries to participate in costly mediation (legal entities cannot appear except through counsel), something “antithetical to the entire concept” thereof. (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v....: State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 208 ).
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:certain exceptions . . . , terminates the lower court’s jurisdiction.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs, supra, ¶ 3:2, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 916, italics omitted; see Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660 , 666; Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 123.) As a result, a trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate, modify or otherwise change an order that is the subject of a pending appeal. (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [“Until remittitur issues, the lower court: Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666; Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 123.) As a result, a trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate, modify or otherwise change an order that is the subject of a pend...
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money 19 value.” ’ ” (Estate of Sigourney (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 593, 603; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838 , 845 [a contractual right is “a chose in action, a form of property”]; Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 861, 853–854, 864 [deprivation of a property right under section 15610.30 implicated where respondents allegedly restructured insurance policies held by plaintiffs’ trust with increased: App.4th 593, 603; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 845 ; Mahan v.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:appointment, but it was more than a “mere unilateral expectation” as claimed by respondents. First, “[t]he law has long recognized that a contingent future interest is property [citation] no matter how improbable the contingency” (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838 , 846, fn. 8), and “a contingent remainder is an estate and not a mere expectancy” (Estate of Zuber (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 584, 591). Second, takers in default (i.e., persons specified by a donor of a power of appointment to take property in default of the appointment) hold property interests: First, “he law has long recognized that a contingent future interest is property no matter how improbable the contingency” (In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 846, fn. 8)...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:among the entity defendants and the UCNP entities.10 10 Michael and Joseph recognize their collateral attack on the consent decree is limited to jurisdictional arguments. (See Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339; Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942 , 950-951.) In a nod to that limitation, Michael and Joseph argue the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by failing to include in the buyout value “the economic impact of Leonard’s derivative allegations and prayer in his verified complaint.” This is not a jurisdictional argument; it is an argument the: Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950-951.) In a nod to that limitation, Michael and Joseph argue the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by failing to include in the buyout value “the economic impa...
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 6 consequences the Legislature did not intend.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 538.) C. Hankin Has No Standing to Petition Under Section 1820 Hankin argues he has standing to petition for conservatorship of Anne as an “ ‘interested person’ ” or a “ ‘friend.’ ” The record shows Hankin’s association with Anne is limited to being her “neighbor” who “lives one: R. (2023) .) C.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:filing. These precedents notably predate the 2010 revisions to the Probate Code, which were prompted by a 2008 report of the California Law Revision Commission that studied the no contest law and recommended certain revisions. (See Urick v. Urick (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1182 , 1192–1193 (Urick).) Before settling on its proposal of “simplifying the statute by defining the types of contests narrowly” (id. at p....: 11 testator’s expressed wishes” (thereby constituting a contest), simply because she sought to contest the will in Oregon. (Id. at pp. 200–201.) In this respect, Meiri’s petition stands apart.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:he argues that the trial court improperly assumed the validity of Barbara’s disclaimer. The trial court’s determination on standing presents a question of law which we review de novo. (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67 , 73; Tarin v. Lind (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395, 403–404.) We hold that the undisputed facts confer standing on Simon under section 11700. Having reached that conclusion, we need not discuss his other arguments. I. Governing Law Probate proceedings are statutory; the language of the applicable statute defines the court’s: California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) ; Tarin v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:merits of an action.” (Said v. Jegan (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1382.) Generally, standing is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67 , 73.) “Standing, for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, must be analyzed in a manner that induces interested persons to report elder abuse and to file lawsuits against elder abuse and neglect.” (Lowrie, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) When the Legislature enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3,2: California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) .) “Standing, for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, must be analyzed in a manner that induces interested persons to report elder abuse and to file lawsuits against el...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:point, “counsel may be disqualified where counsel has obtained the secrets of an adverse party . . . because the situation implicates the attorney’s ethical duty to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.” (Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 210 , 219.) The attorney’s duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial process includes a more specific duty, in judicial proceedings, to honor obligations of confidentiality arising from nonlawyer confidential or fiduciary relationships. (See O’Gara Coach Co., LLC v. Ra (2019) 30 Cal.App....: Seagate Technology, LLC (2007) .) The attorney’s duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial process includes a more specific duty, in judicial proceedings...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (Wilson), superseded by statute as stated in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527 , 547-548.) The plaintiff must show that its claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) Thus, “[o]nly a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute— i.e., that arises from protected speech: Hafif (2007) -548.) The plaintiff must show that its claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:abuse of discretion. First, it was Harber’s attorney, not Harber, who was at fault. The fact that “the fault lies with the client and not the attorney” militates against using the inherent authority to dismiss. (Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789 , 799; cf. United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 158 [trial court could properly sanction both client and attorney when there was “joint misconduct”].) Harber was not at the trial setting conference at which the trial court made the order; there is no indication that: Hufnagel (2007) ; cf. United Grand Corp. v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363 , 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), §§ 1233–1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity 29 Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 610.)” (Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 at pp. 18–19.) “The terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ fraud or mistake are generally accepted as appropriate to describe the two different categories: Taylor, –479; Tracy v. Muir,
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:upon 20 by the Chamberlain court. Moreover, section 2061 was frequently described as enumerated matters affecting the weight of evidence (People v. Moran (1904) 144 Cal. 48, 63) or weight of the evidence rules (see, e.g., People v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592 , 597, overruled on another ground in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482; People v. King (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 122, 128). Thus, the weight of the evidence phrase was used in common law to reference both preponderance of the evidence and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before and around: Grill (1907) , overruled on another ground in People v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386 , 1396 (Sisemore).) 12. “On appeal, we will affirm a ‘trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer [if it] was correct on any theory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘we do not review the validity of the trial court’s reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself.’ ” (Sisemore, supra, 151: Master Financial, Inc. (2007) (Sisemore).) 12. “On appeal, we will affirm a ‘trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer was correct on any theory. ’ Thus...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:amended complaint to be filed. We decline the request. It is well established that the “‘“trial court has wide discretion in allowing the amendment of any pleading . . . . ”’” (Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168 , 175 (italics added).) The trial court is in a better position than this court to consider all of the factors relevant to that exercise of discretion. (See ibid. [discussing factors].) If, after this opinion, Ring still wishes to amend her pleadings (whether in the form previously proposed, or by: Regents of University of California (2007) (italics added).) The trial court is in a better position than this court to consider all of the factors relevant to that exercise of discretion. (See ibid.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:absorption of the water companies. (Id. at p. 120.) Abatti's reliance on cases holding that one who acquires water rights must maintain water service is likewise misplaced. (See, e.g., City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena Land & Water Co. (1908) 152 Cal. 579 , 586-588 (South Pasadena) [transfer of water rights from company to city did not relieve service obligation; mandamus could "compel the continuance of the distribution, in the usual and 32 proper manner"]; Brooks v. Oakdale Irr. Dist. (1928) 90 Cal.App. 225, 240-241 [grantees of water system had obligation to continue: Pasadena Land & Water Co. (1908) -588 (South Pasadena) ; Brooks v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:absorption of the water companies. (Id. at p. 120.) Abatti's reliance on cases holding that one who acquires water rights must maintain water service is likewise misplaced. (See, e.g., City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena Land & Water Co. (1908) 152 Cal. 579 , 586-588 (South Pasadena) [transfer of water rights from company to city did not relieve service obligation; mandamus could "compel the continuance of the distribution, in the usual and 32 proper manner"]; Brooks v. Oakdale Irr. Dist. (1928) 90 Cal.App. 225, 240-241 [grantees of water system had obligation to continue: Pasadena Land & Water Co. (1908) -588 (South Pasadena) ; Brooks v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:a passage for light, air, or heat . . . ." Thus, "appurtenant" denotes that the water right or interest is attached to land, but does not denote its type or scope. (See, e.g., Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman (1908) 152 Cal. 716 , 724 [contractual right to water delivery for irrigating specific land became easement appurtenant]; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 [overlying water right "is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto"]; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 561 [appropriative right was: Bachman (1908) ; City of Pasadena v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:a passage for light, air, or heat . . . ." Thus, "appurtenant" denotes that the water right or interest is attached to land, but does not denote its type or scope. (See, e.g., Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman (1908) 152 Cal. 716 , 724 [contractual right to water delivery for irrigating specific land became easement appurtenant]; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 [overlying water right "is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto"]; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 561 [appropriative right was: Bachman (1908) ; City of Pasadena v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:ordinary, common meaning unless these are defined by the statute or the statutory context requires a different definition.” (Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Fulkerson (7th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 891, 895; Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254 , 1279 [“a court’s first step in determining legislative intent when construing a statute is to review the words used in the statute, giving the terms their plain and ordinary meaning.”].) Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term damages as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person: Kwikset Corp. (2007)
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Tubbs v. Berkowitz
Context from opinion:(ABCO, LLC v. Eversley (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1098.) Although we conduct a de novo review, we “must presume the judgment is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error.” (Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367 , 1376.) The Court Did Not Err “‘“A power of appointment is a power conferred by the owner of property (the ‘donor’) upon another person (the ‘donee’) to designate the persons (‘appointees’) who will receive the property [ (‘appointive property’) ] at some time in the future.”’” [Citations.] Such a: Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007)
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:cite no such precedent. If that precedent exists, it has eluded our research. Holt did not involve a revocable trust. (See Holt, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 752–761.) Neither did leading California cases applying Holt. (E.g., Patton v. Sherwood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 339 , 341–342; L.B. Research & Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 171, 176; Hardman v. Feinstein (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 157, 161–162; San Diego etc. Boy Scouts of America v. City of Escondido (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 189, 192–193.) World Services made just this point to the probate court: no: Sherwood (2007) –342; L.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:that effect. All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.” (Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (1910) 158 Cal. 474, 484; Couts v. Winston (1908) 153 Cal. 686 , 688-689.) Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. In In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 908, we stated that when reviewing the sufficiency of: Winston (1908) -689.) Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the su...
- Garcia v. Garcia : A judgment may be affirmed on appeal when an independent, adequate basis exists to support the decision, even if other alleged errors are present.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:that point, “[a] person with ‘actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry’ is deemed to have constructive notice of all facts that a reasonable inquiry would disclose. [Citations.]” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1319.) It is significant, however, that when a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, facts which would ordinarily require investigation may not excite suspicion and less diligence is required. (Bennett, supra, at pp. 559–560....: Services (2007) .) It is significant, however, that when a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, facts which would ordinarily require investigation may not excite suspicion and less dilig...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:as a prophylactic measure 9 against a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing effect on future proceedings. (City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 457, 462, 471-472; but see In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835 , 843 [“‘an appearance of impropriety by itself does not support a lawyer’s disqualification’”].) “‘Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) Under this standard, the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo,: App.5th 457, 462, 471-472; but see In re Jasmine S. (2007)
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:attorney fees— was filed after the time provided in rule 3.1702(b)(1) expired. Recognizing the late filing was not a jurisdictional bar to the motion’s consideration (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d); see Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Association (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863 , 880 [recognizing that time 23 “Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment relates back to the original complaint if the amendment (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same instrumentality.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio,: Casa Del Rey Homeowners Association (2007) [recognizing that time 23 “Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment relates back to the original complaint if the amendment (1) rests on the same gener...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:is not an initial party may become a party by intervening. (§ 387, subd. (b).) 5 A contention not appropriately raised in the opening brief under a separate argument heading may be deemed forfeited. (Teachers’ Retirement Bd. v. Genest (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1012 , 1038, fn. 6.) In any event, the contention that Richard may have been able to show standing in the Tukes Action is irrelevant. The trial court found that Richard lacked standing to prosecute the 270 Action because he was not a party to the Tukes Action. Even if he: Genest (2007)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:proof before the trial court does not necessitate any modifications to the conventional approach to appellate review for substantial evidence in a civil matter. (Ian J. v. Peter M. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 189, 208; In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339 , 345; In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 604; Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576.) Thus it has been said, “[t]he substantial evidence rule that applies on appeal, applies without regard to the standard of proof applicable at trial” (In re Marriage of: App.4th 189, 208; In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) ; In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:“on the independent ground that there was (and is) no substantial evidence of a prospective threat.” This argument, however, is unaccompanied by record citations or citations to authority and so is forfeited. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547 , 557 (Yield Dynamics).) Indeed, it appears contrary to the record, which reflects that Herren intends to pursue representing George and will seek a court order for payment of the retainer. Moreover, and in any event, “a protective order under the Elder Abuse Act may issue on the basis of: 24 did not “wrongfully deprive George of property.” Herren relatedly contends her presentation of the agreement to Susannah “precluded a finding of an intent to defraud...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1379.) Here, as noted, Waste Connections’s verified answer specifically denied the Authority’s allegations of “necessitates” and “needs.” We must accept as true those denials (Rice v. Center Point, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 949 , 954), liberally construing the facts in favor of Waste Connections. (Gerawan 7 A review of published opinions reveals only a handful of cases affirming a judgment on the pleadings for a plaintiff. Indeed, the trial court noted that in its 40 years of experience, 20 as a judge, 20: Center Point, Inc. (2007) ), liberally construing the facts in favor of Waste Connections. (Gerawan 7 A review of published opinions reveals only a handful of cases affirming a judgment on the pleadin...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1379.) Here, as noted, Waste Connections’s verified answer specifically denied the Authority’s allegations of “necessitates” and “needs.” We must accept as true those denials (Rice v. Center Point, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 949 , 954), liberally construing the facts in favor of Waste Connections. (Gerawan 7 A review of published opinions reveals only a handful of cases affirming a judgment on the pleadings for a plaintiff. Indeed, the trial court noted that in its 40 years of experience, 20 as a judge, 20: Center Point, Inc. (2007) ), liberally construing the facts in favor of Waste Connections. (Gerawan 7 A review of published opinions reveals only a handful of cases affirming a judgment on the pleadin...
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:or disturbing the peace of,” the elder. (§ 15657.03, subds. (b)(5)(A), (h).) “[P]rotective orders under the Elder Abuse Act require proof by a preponderance of the evidence of a past act or acts of elder abuse.” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1134.) Elder abuse protective orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings necessary to support such orders are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 1137.) Under the substantial evidence test, “ ‘[w]e resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent, the prevailing party,: Nielsen (2007)
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:. [is] some misuse of process in a prior action[,] . . . it is hard to imagine an abuse of process claim that . 10 would not fall under the protection of the [anti-SLAPP] statute.” (Booker v. Rountree (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1366 , 1370.) A motion to strike under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) is analyzed and resolved by “the court . . . engag[ing] in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.: Rountree (2007) .) A motion to strike under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) is analyzed and resolved by “the court . . . engag in a two-step process.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:242 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128, subd. (a)(4), 581, subd. (m).) But “dismissal is always a drastic remedy to be employed only in the rarest of circumstances.” (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736 , 764.) “[T]here are two important inquiries to be made by trial courts when determining whether a plaintiff’s actions warrant a dismissal with prejudice. First, the court must discern whether the plaintiff’s pattern of conduct was so ‘severe [and] deliberate’ as to constitute extreme circumstances. [Citation.] Second, the court must: Proc., §§ 128, subd. (a)(4), 581, subd. (m).) But “dismissal is always a drastic remedy to be employed only in the rarest of circumstances.” (Stephen Slesinger...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the same issue in the future, when you may have children, you may have been out of the work force for some time, and you have a completely different world view and set of needs.” 5 Pereira v. Pereira (1909) 156 Cal. 1 (Pereira); Van Camp v. Van Camp (1921) 53 Cal.App. 17 (Van Camp). California courts use two alternative approaches to allocating business profits from a spouse’s separate business developed from these cases. The Pereira approach allocates a fair return to the separate property investment and allocates the balance of the increased: Pereira (1909) (Pereira); Van Camp v.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:exclude evidence as a sanction for the violation of an order to exchange witness lists — even when the exclusion amounts to a 1 Discovery is available in a guardianship proceeding. (Prob. Code, § 1000; Mota v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 351 , 355.) Here, however, the witness list exchange was due on February 3, 2021, and the case was set for trial on March 3, 2021. Thus, the 30-day discovery cutoff had already run. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a).) It follows that Williams was not deprived of the opportunity: Superior Court (2007) .) Here, however, the witness list exchange was due on February 3, 2021, and the case was set for trial on March 3, 2021.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:users. (See § 22252 [when charges are fixed, water "shall be distributed equitably as determined by the board"].) This is consistent with the District's public purpose. (Allen, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at p. 467; cf. Leavitt v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (1909) 157 Cal. 82 , 90 (Leavitt) [water suppliers acting in public capacity "must supply all alike who are like situated"].) At the same time, the District must distribute water consistent with its purposes and obligations, which could potentially warrant using different distribution methods for different user groups. (See Jenison, supra, 149 Cal. at: Lassen Irrigation Co. (1909) (Leavitt) .) At the same time, the District must distribute water consistent with its purposes and obligations...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:users. (See § 22252 [when charges are fixed, water "shall be distributed equitably as determined by the board"].) This is consistent with the District's public purpose. (Allen, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d at p. 467; cf. Leavitt v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (1909) 157 Cal. 82 , 90 (Leavitt) [water suppliers acting in public capacity "must supply all alike who are like situated"].) At the same time, the District must distribute water consistent with its purposes and obligations, which could potentially warrant using different distribution methods for different user groups. (See Jenison, supra, 149 Cal. at: Lassen Irrigation Co. (1909) (Leavitt) .) At the same time, the District must distribute water consistent with its purposes and obligations...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:fn. 4 [“dismissal [through settlement] reflects ambiguously on the merits of the action”].) A voluntary dismissal of the prior suit by the plaintiff—not resulting from a settlement—will, in general, constitute a favorable termination. (Sycamore Ridge Apartments LLC v. Naumann (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1385 , 1401.) “[A] voluntary dismissal, even one without prejudice, may be a favorable termination which will support an action for malicious prosecution. [Citation.] ‘In most cases, a voluntary unilateral dismissal is considered a termination in favor of the defendant in the underlying action . . ....: Naumann (2007) .) “ voluntary dismissal, even one without prejudice, may be a favorable termination which will support an action for malicious prosecution. ‘In most cases...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:764.) “‘A party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular finding must summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient.’” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728 , 738.) This means “all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [appellant’s] own evidence.” (Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1255, italics added; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Stacey has done none: City of Palo Alto (2007) .) This means “all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely own evidence.” (Jordan v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:546, 551 (Pena); Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.) “The paramount rule in construing [a trust] . . . instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.” (Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795 , 812.) The Probate Code governs trust revocation and modification. Section 15401, subdivision (a) sets out two alternative methods for the revocation of a trust. Under the first method, a trust may be revoked by “compliance with any method of revocation provided in the trust instrument.” (§ 15401, 4 subd.: Labow (2007) .) The Probate Code governs trust revocation and modification.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:is one of multiple settlors and it thus holds the power of revocation. The trust’s words, however, contradict this claim. Extrinsic evidence offers no support either. To interpret a trust instrument, the instrument itself is paramount. (Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795 , 812.) We construe all parts of the instrument in relation to one another to form a consistent whole. (§ 21121.) This rule manifests our respect for the intelligence and effort of the drafters, whose intent deserves our allegiance. Autonomous Region’s proposed interpretation does not comport with the trust’s definition: Labow (2007) .) We construe all parts of the instrument in relation to one another to form a consistent whole. (§ 21121.) This rule manifests our respect for the intelligence and effort of the drafter...
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:(§ 1304, subd. (a)(1).) There is an exception to this rule, however, where, as here, the order requiring a trustee to account “expressly or implicitly decides other issues that could be the subject of an appealable probate order,” such 12 157 Cal.App.4th 795 , 812 [“[t]he interpretation of a trust instrument, like any written document, is a question of law”]; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [meaning and construction of statutes reviewed de novo].) Based on our independent review of the applicable law and the trust: Labow (2007) 7 As a general rule, orders “ompelling the trustee to submit an account or report acts as trustee” are not appealable. (§ 1304, subd. (a)(1).
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:evidence warranting a clear and satisfactory conviction to that effect. All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.” (Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (1910) 158 Cal. 474 , 484; Couts v. Winston (1908) 153 Cal. 686, 688-689.) Several of our more recent decisions involving the clear and convincing standard of proof also have recognized that this standard affects a reviewing court’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. In In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 908,: All questions as to preponderance and conflict of evidence are for the trial court.” (Id., at p. 637, italics added; see also Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (1910) ; Couts v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:Tunc Order because he received the order too late. And, “because nothing in the record indicates that [Adam] notified the trial court of its failure to state reasons . . . , [he] waived this requirement.” (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120 , 1128, fn.4.) d. Adam did not allege a request for relief under section 248 Adam’s contention that he adequately pleaded a claim under section 248 also is not well-taken. He omitted his earlier allegations of standing under section 248 from his second 21 The first amended petition refers to: Carneghi (2008) , fn.4.) d.
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:“circumvent procedural protections provided by the statutory motions or by trial on the merits; they risk blindsiding the nonmoving party; and, in some cases, they could infringe a litigant’s right to a jury trial.” (Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582 , 1594 [discussing in limine motions used to dispose of causes of action].) “The purpose of the pretrial is to expedite the proceedings and to facilitate the correct determination of the issues. The pretrial proceeding should not become a trap for the unwary.” (Mays v. Disneyland, Inc. (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d: Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) .) “The purpose of the pretrial is to expedite the proceedings and to facilitate the correct determination of the issues.
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:conclusive presumption of paternity (. . . § 7540), which dictates the finding that a mother’s husband is her child’s father, provided the mother and her husband were married and cohabiting when the child was conceived.” (In re J.L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1018 (J.L.).) In addition, as we have explained, pursuant to Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, “an unmarried biological father may, under narrow circumstances, assert constitutional paternity rights, even though he does not qualify under any of the presumptions listed in section 7611.” (J.L., at p. 1018.) Here, it: L. (2008) (J.
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision . . . .’” (Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130, fn. 6; see Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884 , 892 [where the trial court’s determination “turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual 5 inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the: Osborne Development Corp. (2008) [where the trial court’s determination “turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual 5 inferences to be drawn from the evidence...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:him [or her] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 862–863, quoting Mills v. Green (1895) 159 U.S. 651 , 653.) Here, the trial court made two orders on October 20, 2020 pertinent to this appeal: (1) an order granting Chen’s disqualification motions; and (2) an order striking Jacqueline’s and Michael’s removal petitions. Based on our review of the record and the supplemental briefs submitted by Michael and Jacqueline,: Green (1895) .) Here, the trial court made two orders on October 20, 2020 pertinent to this appeal: (1) an order granting Chen’s disqualification motions...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:here, Bradshaw may be found culpable of defrauding the Trust based on conduct reflecting common dishonesty — that is, dishonest conduct that does not necessarily give rise to criminal liability or cause monetary loss. (See Trusty v. State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 550 , 554 [gross negligence accompanied by an element of deceit sufficient to prove moral turpitude warranting disbarment]; Crane v. State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 124 [attempt to deceive escrow agents by deleting excerpts from a beneficiary statement without authorization]; Farnham v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, 446 [habitual: State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 ; Crane v.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:to take immediate effect. The Pearce Parties’ argument that Ruth’s will severed the joint tenancy in the property relies upon factually distinguishable cases holding that a will may be dual in character. (See, e.g., In Re: Estate of Watkins (1940) 16 Cal.2d 793 , 797 [a single written instrument, i.e., the joint and mutual will of a couple, constituted both a will and a contract, and the contract amounted to an agreement that certain properties they held in joint tenancy would be transmuted to community property]; Van Houten v. Whitaker (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d: 11. England (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 ; Guardianship of Wood (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 260, 267 ...
- Clark v. Smith : A trustee must bring any suit involving trust property in the trustee’s own name because the trust is not a separate legal entity; the trustee is the real party in interest.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:Parker also argues that since she or GSS are “now responsible for managing the assets and liabilities that were once part of the temporary conservatorship,” they are “entitled to the documents” under the rationale of Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124 (Moeller), Fiduciary Trust Internat. of California v. Klein (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1184 (Fiduciary Trust), and Stine v. Dell’Osso (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 834 (Stine). Parker’s reliance on these cases as support for her section 850 petition is unavailing. Parker explains that these cases recognize that a successor trustee had access to: Superior Court (1997) (Moeller), Fiduciary Trust Internat. of California v.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:hold title to property. “Unlike a corporation, a trust is not a legal entity.” (Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1343.) Rather, a trust is “ ‘a fiduciary relationship with respect to property.’ ” (Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124 , 1132, fn. 3, quoting Rest.2d Trusts, § 2, p. 6.) When property is held in trust, “ ‘there is always a divided ownership of property,’ ” generally with the trustee holding legal title and the beneficiary holding equitable title. (Gonsalves v. Hodgson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 91, 98; Beyer v.: Superior Court (1997) , fn. 3, quoting Rest.2d Trusts, § 2, p. 6.) When property is held in trust, “ ‘there is always a divided ownership of property,’ ” generally with the trustee holding legal title...
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:with related statutes. [Citations.] ‘ “Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent.” ’ ” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143 , 1152.) 1 Galligan’s brief also asserted that the 2016 amendment had been expressly revoked. It stated that Bertsch told Galligan she had a dispute with Haggerty in late 2017 and Bertsch had “destroyed the [2016 a]mendment with the intent to revoke it. Neither the original nor any copy of: County of Stanislaus (1997) .) 1 Galligan’s brief also asserted that the 2016 amendment had been expressly revoked.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:husband and wife, established a family 9 Cundall’s argument recognizes this. Cundall relies on the principle of interpretation acknowledging that an author’s choice to specify one thing tends to exclude others (“expressio unius est exclusion alterius”). (Stephenson v. Drever (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1167 , 1175.) In Stephenson, our Supreme Court explained this principle in the context of contract interpretation: “The fact that the contract expressly so provides tends to negate any inference that the parties also intended another consequence to flow from the same event.” (Ibid., italics added....: Drever (1997) .) In Stephenson, our Supreme Court explained this principle in the context of contract interpretation: “The fact that the contract expressly so provides tends to negate any inference th...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:defendant has ‘actively participated in the trial’ and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe and converse with the defendant”].) The probate court had the opportunity to observe and converse with appellant. (See also People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223 , 1254 [“substantial evidence, including the trial court’s own observations of defendant, supports the court's factual determination that defendant was not intoxicated at the time he entered his guilty plea and that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”]....: Fairbank (1997)
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:trust call for Susannah to “first to carry the burden to rebut the presumption that George had capacity to engage Herren.” 13 These arguments raise questions of law and statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (In re Dezi (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112 , 1128.) Initially, we observe Herren’s counsel agreed several times that the trial court would not be deciding George’s capacity in the restraining order proceeding. Herren has thus forfeited this issue. (See In re Marriage of Broderick (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 [“an appellant waives his right to attack error: Thus, in Herren’s view, both the law and the terms of the trust call for Susannah to “first to carry the burden to rebut the presumption that George had capacity to engage Herren.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:we therefore express no opinion whether any such impediment exists. 7 Furthermore, nothing in this opinion should be read to affect the respective rights of tissue banks and those who donate gametic material for the tissue banks’ use. 14 (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 836 (Hecht), and Estate of Kievernagel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1024 (Kievernagel). A. Hecht In Hecht, William Kane (Kane) deposited 15 vials of his sperm at a sperm bank. (Hecht, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) He signed a storage agreement granting control over the sperm to the executor of his estate: Plaintiff does not raise that issue on appeal, and we therefore express no opinion whether any such impediment exists. 7 Furthermore, nothing in this opinion should be read to affect the respective ri...
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:to the defendant to demonstrate exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) 6 We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order. (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919 , 923.) When the evidence conflicts, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings when substantial evidence supports them. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons), abrogated on other grounds by Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (2017) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773,: Pankow (1993) .) When the evidence conflicts, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings when substantial evidence supports them. (Vons Companies, Inc. v.
- Clark v. Smith : A claim on a note may be pursued directly in a civil action without first obtaining probate‑court permission or filing a Heggstad petition. The probate process is not a prerequisite to suing on such a...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:” (Estate of Bissinger (1964) 60 Cal.2d 756, 765 (Bissinger), quoting Estate of Marre (1941) 18 Cal.2d 184, 187.) The wisdom of those decisions has not lessened over time. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to trust challenges under section 17200 “not only makes sense as a matter of judicial economy, but it also recognizes the probate court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration: More recently, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to trust challenges under section 17200 “not only makes sense as a matter o...
- Clark v. Smith : A court’s oral pronouncement that conflicts with its later written order is not controlling; the written order is the operative judgment.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:substantial justification.” (Italics added.) The probate court did not impose section 177.5 sanctions payable to the court. It ordered that sanctions be payable to the conservatorship estate. (See Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246 , 1264 [court upheld award of sanctions at rate of $4,000 per day for refusal to comply with discovery order where sanctioned party “abused the litigation process and has shown little respect for the superior court's authority”].) The second new claim is that the probate court’s order imposing sanctions violated: Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2017) [court upheld award of sanctions at rate of $4,000 per day for refusal to comply with discovery order where sanctioned party “abused the litig...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:a joint account with a right to survivorship, and at his or her death the funds in the account will pass directly to the survivor 31 outside of probate. (Prob. Code, § 5302, subd. (a); see Estate of O’Connor (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159 , 171; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1751.) 13 Any “interested person, as defined in Section 48 of the Probate Code” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)), has standing to bring a financial elder abuse action. The phrase “interested person,” as used in section 15657.3 of: Code, § 5302, subd. (a); see Estate of O’Connor (2017) ; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.
- Barrow v. Holmes : In a judgment‑renewal proceeding, a judgment debtor may assert exactly the same defenses that are available in an independent action on the judgment.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:691 F.3d 1008, 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion. 17 surplus to that used by riparians or earlier appropriators." (United States, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 101-102; Nicoll v. Rudnick (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 550 , 556 (Nicoll) [" 'Both riparian and appropriative rights are usufructuary only and confer no right of private ownership in the watercourse.' "].) "Although there is no private property right in the corpus of the water . . . , the right to its use is classified as real property.": Rudnick (2008) (Nicoll) .) "Although there is no private property right in the corpus of the water . . . ...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:691 F.3d 1008, 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion. 17 surplus to that used by riparians or earlier appropriators." (United States, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 101-102; Nicoll v. Rudnick (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 550 , 556 (Nicoll) [" 'Both riparian and appropriative rights are usufructuary only and confer no right of private ownership in the watercourse.' "].) "Although there is no private property right in the corpus of the water . . . , the right to its use is classified as real property.": Rudnick (2008) (Nicoll) .) "Although there is no private property right in the corpus of the water . . . ...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:with a mechanism to determine rights in property belonging to a decedent or to someone else.’ ” (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 170–171; see also Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 117–118 (Kraus); Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62 , 75 [“Section 850 et seq. provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person.”].) 12 b. Based on the Legislative History, the Documents and Communication Sought by Parker Do Not Fall Within the Parameters of Section 850. The broad: App.4th 103, 117–118 (Kraus); Estate of Young (2008) .) 12 b.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:of establishing grounds for reversal. V. Liability Under Section 859 A. Statutory Interpretation Section 850 et seq. “provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person.” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62 , 75.) Section 850 allows specified persons to file a petition to obtain such a determination. (Id., subd. (a).) Sections 851 through 855 provide most of the procedural rules. If a petitioner establishes the right to property held by another party, the petitioner may recover the property under section 856.: Statutory Interpretation Section 850 et seq. “provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person.” (Estate of Young (2008) .
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:equitable action to set aside a judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud or mistake is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), including its discovery rule. (Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane (1911) 161 Cal. 689 , 702; Lataillade v. Orena, supra, 91 Cal. at pp. 577–578; Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 659; Scott v. Dilks (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 207, 209–210; Zastrow v. Zastrow (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 710, 714–715 [the weight of California case law applies statutory limitation periods in equitable actions to vacate: Lane (1911) ; Lataillade v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:p. 347.) Trial courts have no discretion, however, to assess section 271 sanctions without evidence of the statutory factual predicate, namely conduct that frustrated the promotion of settlement and the reduction of litigation costs. (In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068 , 1083.) Applying these standards here, the trial court concluded that the parties’ conduct was based upon rational motivations....: App.5th at p. 347.) Trial courts have no discretion, however, to assess section 271 sanctions without evidence of the statutory factual predicate, namely conduct that frustrated the promotion of settl...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:that O’Brian was her father. 17 On appeal, Kimberly does not contest the trial court’s consideration of the Trust. 27 part of the complaint and may be considered on demurrer.’ ” (Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 184 , 191.) “Additionally, judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.” (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288, 293, fn. 1.) We review the trial court’s decision: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (2008) .) “Additionally, judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive in those instances where there is not...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:with a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘California decisions ... generally require a plaintiff to have a personal interest in the litigation’s outcome.’ ” (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363 , 370.) The questions presented on appeal are whether a plaintiff must suffer an injury in order to have standing to sue under the FCRA in California courts, and, if so, whether Limon has adequately alleged a sufficient injury to confer standing upon him. (Cal. Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings Before: Bilafer (2008) .) The questions presented on appeal are whether a plaintiff must suffer an injury in order to have standing to sue under the FCRA in California courts, and, if so...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:that a court has the power to modify an active trust. [Citations.]” (Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 457, 468.) One such circumstance is when a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions. (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363 , 369.) The case at bar does not present an exceptional or peculiar circumstance in which a court is empowered to modify the Residuary Trust. There is no expression in the Family Trust that Joan could decide to change whether her issue take her share under the Residuary Trust if: Bilafer (2008) .) The case at bar does not present an exceptional or peculiar circumstance in which a court is empowered to modify the Residuary Trust.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:beneficiaries are not devisees.” The trustee’s legal title to the trust property vests “as of the date of death.” (Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127, 132, superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509 , 555.) Here, because Simon is the named trustee of the Trust, he is a devisee under the will, entitled to receive and administer the trust property from the Estate, and therefore is a “person claiming to be . . . entitled to distribution of a share of the estate”: Camarlinghi (2008) .) Here, because Simon is the named trustee of the Trust, he is a devisee under the will, entitled to receive and administer the trust property from the Estate...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:bind Mark, who was not a party to the agreement. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810–811 [a settlement agreement is a contract, and an essential element of any contract is consent]; see Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509 , 542 [stipulated judgment based on settlement agreement had no preclusive effect on a stranger to the settlement agreement].) The phrase “that such individual would have taken if then living” as used in the MWR Will, therefore, cannot reasonably be read to incorporate later contracts McKie Jr. may have made: Camarlinghi (2008) .) The phrase “that such individual would have taken if then living” as used in the MWR Will, therefore...
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 177.) Although federal and California law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements, “‘“[t]here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.”’ [Citation.]” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696 , 701.) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586.) The issue on appeal—i.e....: Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) .) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Flores v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 672, 680; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1087-1088.) For example, in Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 the court held the trial court adjudicating a personal injury action had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a fee dispute between the plaintiff and a nonparty court reporting company. Even though the dispute “was not within the scope of the pleadings and pertained to a third party” (id. at p.: Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) the court held the trial court adjudicating a personal injury action had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a fee dispute between the plaintiff and a no...
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:subdivision (d), and do not compel us to interpret the statute differently, as their holdings do no more than confirm that the trial court’s jurisdiction is limited by statutory authority. (Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 , 1340 [in action under section 9820, subdivision (b), the trial court does not have power to order an executor to personally compensate any attorney who has represented the executor in a personal rather than representative capacity]; Estate of Scott (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 913, 918 [former section 851....: Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) [in action under section 9820, subdivision (b), the trial court does not have power to order an executor to personally compensate any a...
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:as the conservator or trustee, the public guardian notified the department of Joseph’s death. Probate Code section 19000 et seq. “governs claims procedures, including notice requirements and time limitations, for revocable trusts of deceased settlors.” (Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 7 162 Cal.App.4th 249 , 254; see Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 2:117.2 et seq., p. 2-96 et seq.) Formally, the trustee “‘may file with the court a proposed notice to creditors’ in order to obtain a case number and then publish and serve notice to creditors: Wagner (2008) 7 ; see Ross & Cohen, Cal.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:. . Not a bona fide resident of the State.” (Former Code of Civ. Proc., § 1369; Stats. 1877, ch. 585, § 3; see In re Estate of Beech (1883) 63 Cal. 458, 459; In re Estate of Martin (1912) 163 Cal. 440 , 442.)8 In 1931, the statute was repealed and recodified as former section 420 of the Probate Code without substantive change, barring anyone from serving as administrator “who is not a bona fide resident of this state.” (Stats. 1931, ch. 281, § 420, pp. 607– 608; see In re Estate: Proc., § 1369; Stats. 1877, ch. 585, § 3; see In re Estate of Beech (1883) ; In re Estate of Martin (1912) .), the statute was repealed and recodified as former section 420 of the Probate Code without...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220 , 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426; Shade Foods,: App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) ; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code.” Under this rule, “ ‘affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing’ ” “ ‘when challenged in a lower court.’ ” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1309.) When, however, “the parties did not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and both parties adopted that means of supporting their positions” and “participated in such presentation of the evidence as a matter of convenience . . . , they cannot question the propriety of the: Therefore, even if she had a due process right to present evidence at that hearing, she waived that right. Christine also relies on section 1022, which provides that “n affidavit...
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:and cannot raise such issues for the first time on appeal. (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 865, fn. 4 [court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal].) Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1310, is of no help to the Pacific parties. There the Court of Appeal held that estate beneficiaries who petitioned to set aside a settlement agreement were entitled to an evidentiary hearing. But Bennett did not involve a party’s failure to respond to a mediation order. The Pacific parties: City of Culver City (1996) , fn. 4 .) Estate of Bennett (2008) , is of no help to the Pacific parties.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:on affidavits and declaration against appellant’s objection.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) 8 “It has long been the rule that in probate matters ‘affidavits may not be used in evidence unless permitted by statute. . . .’” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1308-1309.) “[T]he Probate Code limits the use of affidavits to ‘uncontested proceeding[s].’” (Id. at p. 1309.) “Consequently, ‘when challenged in a lower court, affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing. . . .’” (Ibid; see also Prob. Code § 1022.) The: 8 “It has long been the rule that in probate matters ‘affidavits may not be used in evidence unless permitted by statute. . . .’” (Estate of Bennett (2008) -1309.
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:court, affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing.” (Evangelho (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 7 615, 620.) “[S]ection 1022 authorizes the use of declarations only in an ‘uncontested proceeding.’ ” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1309.) “When a petition is contested, as it was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition and each fact set forth in a supporting affidavit must be established by competent evidence. [Citations.]” (Estate of Lensch (2009) 177: App.4th 7 615, 620.) “ection 1022 authorizes the use of declarations only in an ‘uncontested proceeding.’ ” (Estate of Bennett (2008) .) “When a petition is contested, as it was here...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Code. 3 Section 1022 provides, “An affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code.” “[S]ection 1022 authorizes the use of declarations only in an ‘uncontested proceeding.’” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1309.) “When a petition is contested, as it was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition and each fact set forth in a supporting affidavit must be established by competent evidence. [Citations.]” (Estate of Lensch (2009) 177: 2Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Probate Code. provides, “An affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding under t...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:Unruh Civil Rights Act]; Sipple v. City of Hayward (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 349, 358–359 [company’s standing to seek refunds on behalf of customers for taxes collected and 27. remitted by company]; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359 , 1364 [same]; MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742, 747; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810 [standing to challenge wrongful foreclosure]; Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App....: County of Los Angeles (2008) ; MTC Financial Inc. v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:provides: “Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the habit or custom.” “[A] habit involves a consistent, semiautomatic response to a repeated situation.” (Bowen v. Ryan (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 916 , 926; Briley v. City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119, 138.) More specifically, “habit” constitutes a person’s regular or consistent response to a repeated situation, while “custom” means the routine practice or behavior on the part of a group or organization that is 18 equivalent to the habit: Ryan (2008) ; Briley v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Irr. Dist. v. Hetrick (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 948, 951.) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 117 , 120 (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid.)8 Individuals also posted notices of appropriation, and later assigned their rights to the CDC. The CDC organized mutual water companies to facilitate distribution to stockholders. (Id. at pp. 122-123; see ibid....: Co. (1912) (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid.)8 Individuals also posted notices of appropriation, and later assigned their rights to the CDC.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Irr. Dist. v. Hetrick (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 948, 951.) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 117 , 120 (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid.)8 Individuals also posted notices of appropriation, and later assigned their rights to the CDC. The CDC organized mutual water companies to facilitate distribution to stockholders. (Id. at pp. 122-123; see ibid....: Co. (1912) (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid.)8 Individuals also posted notices of appropriation, and later assigned their rights to the CDC.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:mistake in the trustor’s written expression of his own intent. This result is consistent with the rule that a no-contest clause must be strictly construed and may not extend beyond what plainly was the trustor’s intent. (Perrin v. Lee (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1239 , 1248–1249.) Newton did not manifest any intent to disqualify a named beneficiary for seeking to correct an alleged drafting error in Newton’s own expression of his intended division of property. We recognize that some cases preceding Estate of Duke stated that the word “contest” as used in a no-contest: Lee (2008)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:As the latter argument is forfeited,5 we consider only the former and find it without merit. Ordinarily, the initial parties to a lawsuit are those that have sued or been sued. (See, e.g., Tracy Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1290 , 1296 [an individual not named in an initial pleading is not a party to an action]; (Apostolos v. Estrada (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 8, 12 [primary meaning of “party” is “ ‘an interested litigant or person whose name is designated on the record as plaintiff or defendant or in some: Superior Court (2008) ; (Apostolos v.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:the petitioner’s burden of proof or suggest that that burden was less than proof by a preponderance of evidence. 13 determining a legal issue: Whether there is substantial evidence to support factual findings. (See Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478 , 1515 [the existence or nonexistence of substantial evidence is a question of law].) Thus, a determination by the trial court that the petitioner has produced substantial evidence that could support a finding under section 155 is not a factual finding at all. Because section 155 requires factual findings, we: Selma Community Hospital (2008) .) Thus, a determination by the trial court that the petitioner has produced substantial evidence that could support a finding under sectio...
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : A guardian ad litem is deemed the party’s representative of record in the litigation, standing in for the protected person as a formal participant in the action.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:that compromise.” This statute thus authorizes a guardian ad litem to make settlement agreements in judicial proceedings subject only to the approval of the court. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311; Safai v. Safai (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 233 , 245.) To allow a minor to disaffirm a contract negotiated by the guardian ad litem would 67 negate this authority. It thus falls squarely within the “otherwise provided by statute” exception to the general rule under Family Code section 6710 allowing minors to disaffirm contracts. The exception is also: Safai (2008) .) To allow a minor to disaffirm a contract negotiated by the guardian ad litem would 67 negate this authority.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:meaningless the requirement that distribution take place “as soon as is practicable” and be “outright” to the Beneficiaries. Although “extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the meaning of the trust and the intent of the trustor” (Safai v. Safai (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 233 , 244, citing Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 256, 258), the only extrinsic evidence relating to intent of either Trustor in drafting the trust document is an estate 20 planning book that shows, if anything, that a primary goal of the trust document was minimizing estate taxes through use: Safai (2008) , citing Burch, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 256, 258), the only extrinsic evidence relating to intent of either Trustor in drafting the trust document is an estate 20 planning book that shows...
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:that under section 17206, the court has the discretion to “make any orders and take any action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented by the petition . . . .” (§ 17206; see Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417 , 427.) “The probate court has general power and duty to supervise the administration of trusts.” (Schwartz, at p. 427.) This power, however, comprises only the “ ‘inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out [the court’s] express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.’ ”: Labow (2008) .) “The probate court has general power and duty to supervise the administration of trusts.” (Schwartz, at p. 427.) This power, however, comprises only the “ ‘inherent power to decide all...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:a new trial and for an order vacating the judgment, and even 11 alternative decree, however, was an appealable order. (See § 2000, subd. (c); Cotton v. Expo Power Systems, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1376; Dickson v. Rehmke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 469 , 476.) Michael and Joseph had an opportunity to challenge that order in their appeal from the alternative decree, but they dismissed the appeal, making that order final. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 913; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 100; Patchett v. Bergamot Station, Ltd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th: Rehmke (2008) .) Michael and Joseph had an opportunity to challenge that order in their appeal from the alternative decree, but they dismissed the appeal, making that order final. (See Code Civ.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:ward’s claims, a court must determine whether it is reasonable and in the minor’s best interest. (See Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338; Scruton v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1607 (Scruton); Espericueta v. Shewry (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 615 , 626; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950 [petition for approval of a minor’s compromise “must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise”].) We review the probate court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Breslin v. Breslin (2021): Shewry (2008) ; see also Cal.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:be made within five days following the hearing on the conservatorship 5 As we do not decide this appeal on forfeiture grounds, we need not address appellant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701 , 710 [proposed conservatees in LPS Act proceedings are entitled to effective assistance of counsel].) 5 petition. If the proposed conservatee demands a court or jury trial before the date of the hearing as provided for in Section 5365, the demand shall constitute a waiver of the hearing. [¶] (2): Demand for court or jury trial shall be made within five days following the hearing on the conservatorship 5 As we do not decide this appeal on forfeiture grounds...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:131, 142, fn. 2 (John L.).) The Court of Appeal concluded the issue K.P. raises is capable of repetition but likely to evade review. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 254, 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701 , 709.) We agree and elect to decide this otherwise moot appeal. 5 Conservatorship of K.P. Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. placement services by a conservatorship program” (id., subd. (e)). The Act defines persons as “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” if they are unable to provide for basic personal: App.5th 254, 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) .) We agree and elect to decide this otherwise moot appeal. 5 Conservatorship of K.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:any such discussion, the probate court’s ruling on Parker’s claim for declaratory relief, which appears to regard her declaratory relief claim as wholly derivative of her failed section 850 claim, appears entirely reasonable. (See Ball v. FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 794 , 800 [notwithstanding the existence of an actual controversy, a claim for declaratory relief that is “ ‘wholly derivative’ ” of a failed claim cannot stand].) 22 _________________________ Petrou, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Tucher, P.J. _________________________ Fujisaki, J....: FleetBoston Financial Corp. (2008) .) 22 _________________________ Petrou...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:Standard of Review “On appeal from an attachment order, . . . [w]e apply the same evidentiary standard to an attachment hearing decided on affidavits and declarations as to a case tried on oral testimony.” (Goldstein v. Barak Construction (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845 , 853, citation omitted.) Although there is no dispute about that basic point, the parties take opposite positions on the standard governing the court’s exercise of discretion in granting the RTAO, with Royals urging review of substantial evidence and Lu urging de novo review. To a degree, both parties are: Barak Construction (2008) , citation omitted.) Although there is no dispute about that basic point, the parties take opposite positions on the standard governing the court’s exercise of discretion in...
- Clark v. Smith : Property transferred to a revocable inter vivos trust does not become part of the settlor’s probate estate; therefore, it is not subject to probate administration even if the settlor retains a life in...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016–1017.) 7 However, where satisfied that a party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), we review the amount of the award for abuse of discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315 , 1322.) B. Analysis 1. The Trial Court Properly Granted Respondents’ Anti-SLAPP Motion The trial court struck Richard’s complaint against Tukes and Frieden pursuant to section 425.16 because Richard failed to show a probability of success in the 270 Action. First, the trial court concluded that the act of commencing: Alnor (2008) .) B.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:it until and unless the probate court rules in Catello’s favor. The “basic purposes” of estate administration include “distribut[ing] the residue of the property . . . to those persons who are entitled to receive it.” (Estate of Bonanno (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 7 , 17.) Accordingly, at the conclusion of the probate proceedings, the court will issue a final order of distribution that “confirms the title which has accrued under the law of descent.” (Aronson v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 710, 717–718; accord Prob. Code, §: 7 This ownership requirement was met, the siblings claim, because Decedent’s estate was an intestate estate when they filed their partition claim.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841 . The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including subpoenas, for state agencies and state department heads....: Pet Food Express (2008) .
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841 . The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including subpoenas, for state agencies and state department heads. 9 The Authority is, as noted, a county agency, it has no power to serve: Pet Food Express (2008) .
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:to mean “domicile.” “When a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and approves of it.” (Heath, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 10 Weed relied in part on the definition of residence in repealed section 52 of the Political Code, now codified in substantially the same form at section 244 of the Government Code. (See Weed, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 638.) Equating residence with domicile, this statute explains that a person’s residence: S. residents and deleted the “bona fide” modifier, it did nothing to abrogate the long line of cases construing “resident” to mean “domicile.” “When a statute has been construed by judicial decision..
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:exists. 7 Furthermore, nothing in this opinion should be read to affect the respective rights of tissue banks and those who donate gametic material for the tissue banks’ use. 14 (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 836 (Hecht), and Estate of Kievernagel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1024 (Kievernagel). A. Hecht In Hecht, William Kane (Kane) deposited 15 vials of his sperm at a sperm bank. (Hecht, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) He signed a storage agreement granting control over the sperm to the executor of his estate should he die, and authorizing release of the sperm: App.4th 836 (Hecht), and Estate of Kievernagel (2008) (Kievernagel). A.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.” (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288, 293, fn. 1.) We review the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249 , 1271.) The court did not abuse its discretion by considering the Trust, and its terms, filed by the trustee. Without the Trust, appellants would have no claim under section 21622. Kimberly’s petition quoted from the Trust and attached a version of it. Adam did not attach a copy of: App.4th 288, 293, fn. 1.) We review the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) .
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:powers to supervise the administration of the trust.’ [Citation.]” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 827–828.) Construing the words of section 24 with these precepts in mind, and with general tenets of statutory interpretation (see People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1310–1311), persons with a present or future interest in a trust include those 5 persons’ successors in interest. The Estate, as successor in interest to Josephine’s interest in the trust, can pursue an accounting for the time when Josephine was the beneficiary of the trust, i.e. during her lifetime.: Salcido (2008) –1311), persons with a present or future interest in a trust include those 5 persons’ successors in interest.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:at p. 356.) This case addresses whether the District abused its discretion in adopting an equitable distribution plan for all users, including irrigating landowners. Bryant aids our analysis, but does not resolve the inquiry. (See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497 , 1513 [when " 'previous decision 102 rests on "different factual and legal foundation" [from] the issue . . . in the case at bar, collateral estoppel effect should be denied' "].)60 The judicial estoppel doctrine applies when: " '(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions: Bryant aids our analysis, but does not resolve the inquiry. (See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:at p. 356.) This case addresses whether the District abused its discretion in adopting an equitable distribution plan for all users, including irrigating landowners. Bryant aids our analysis, but does not resolve the inquiry. (See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1497 , 1513 [when " 'previous decision 102 rests on "different factual and legal foundation" [from] the issue . . . in the case at bar, collateral estoppel effect should be denied' "].)60 The judicial estoppel doctrine applies when: " '(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions: Bryant aids our analysis, but does not resolve the inquiry. (See Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008)
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:section 8402, subdivision (a)(4) required that an administrator be a “resident of the United States,” the court turned to case law to construe that phrase. More recent cases were not helpful because nonresidency was conceded. (See Estate of Heath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 396 , 401 (Heath) [stating in passing that decedent’s German sisters were “ineligible for appointment as administrators because they [did] not reside in the United States”]; Estate of Damskog (1991) 1 Cal.App....: More recent cases were not helpful because nonresidency was conceded. (See Estate of Heath (2008) (Heath) not reside in the Un...
- Clark v. Smith : A revocable inter vivos trust functions as a probate‑avoidance mechanism, so property transferred to the trust is not subject to probate administration upon the settlor’s death, even when the settlor...
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:is recognized as simply ‘a probate avoidance device,’ ” and “when property is held in this type of trust, the settlor and lifetime beneficiary ‘ “has the equivalent of full ownership of the property.” ’ ” (Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615 , 633–634; Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) The tenants point to decisions supposedly establishing that “a trust has the capacity to own property.”7 To be sure, some cases, including the two the 7 The tenants also argue that because Probate Code section 56: McGrath (2008) –634; Steinhart v.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:7. percent tenant in common with Jack.”4 The Pearce Parties note: “The severance of a joint tenancy converts the form of co-ownership to a tenancy in common allowing Ruth to dispose of her half by will. (Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615 , 631.)” The Pearce Parties further argue: “Jack’s subsequent recording of an affidavit of death of a joint tenant and his later conveyances failed to transfer Ruth’s interest that he did not own … and Ruth’s estate remains the vested owner of an undivided 43.75 percent interest in the Gibson: McGrath (2008) .)” The Pearce Parties further argue: “Jack’s subsequent recording of an affidavit of death of a joint tenant and his later conveyances failed to transfer Ruth’s interest that he did no...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:a matter of convenience . . . , they cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal.” (Estate of Fraysher (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 135; accord, Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088; see McMillian v. Stroud (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 692 , 704 [trial court did not err in failing to hold evidentiary hearing where appellants “neither expressly requested an evidentiary hearing . . . nor made an offer of proof establishing the necessity for a hearing”].) Here, both sides submitted and relied on declarations and documentary evidence to support their: Stroud (2008)
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:of . . . amendment of a trust by including that specific method in the trust agreement.’ ” (King, at p. 1193.) 3 Section 15401, subdivision (b) imposes additional obligations with respect to community property. (See Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738 , 743.) The terms “trustor” and “settlor” are interchangeable and synonymous. (See In re Marriage of Perry (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1109 & fn. 2.) 5 Thus, when a trust specifies an amendment procedure, a purported amendment made in contravention of that procedure is invalid. (Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at: Masry (2008) .) The terms “trustor” and “settlor” are interchangeable and synonymous. (See In re Marriage of Perry (1997) 58 Cal.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:of other permissible methods. Because the method of revocation and modification described in the trust agreement is not explicitly exclusive (and no party argues otherwise), the statutory method of revocation was available under section 15401. (See Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738 , 742 [reservation of rights not explicitly exclusive].) Bertsch complied with the 11 statutory method by signing the 2018 amendment and delivering it to herself as trustee. It was therefore a valid modification of the trust agreement....: Masry (2008) .) Bertsch complied with the 11 statutory method by signing the 2018 amendment and delivering it to herself as trustee.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:call upon us to interpret section 15401 and apply it to the February Trust. In deciding this issue of law, our path is partially paved by the opinion of Division Six of this appellate district in Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738 (Masry).) In that case, the court held that a trust revocation procedure is not exclusive unless the trust document explicitly says that it is. We agree with this holding, which is consistent with both the language and the history of section 15401. The February Trust did not state that its: Masry (2008) (Masry).) In that case, the court held that a trust revocation procedure is not exclusive unless the trust document explicitly says that it is.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:abuse can be asserted not only against a person or entity who wrongfully 5 deprived an elder of any property right, but also one who assisted another in doing so. (§ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (2); see Wood v. Jamison (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 156 , 164- 165 (Wood) [defendant committed financial elder abuse both directly, by taking a fee paid through loan proceeds, and by assisting another in taking loan proceeds].) Where there is room for debate regarding the meaning of the statutory text of the Act, it should be “‘liberally construed on behalf: Jamison (2008)
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:that challenges the intent of the donor. (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422.) A pleading that initiates such litigation can violate a no contest clause even if its allegations are later withdrawn. For example, in Schwartz v. Schwartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 733 , the court held that a petition seeking a particular distribution from an inter vivos trust violated a no 15 contest clause even though the petitioner withdrew the petition several months later. The court reasoned that the petitioner “used the mechanisms of the court” to challenge the decedent’s intent, compelling: Schwartz (2008) , the court held that a petition seeking a particular distribution from an inter vivos trust violated a no 15 contest clause even though the petitioner withdrew the petition several mo...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:A litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when “[t]o hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the courts.”’” (Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 830 , 842; see Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470, 481 [“‘The doctrine of estoppel to contest jurisdiction . . . “provides that when a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action, ‘a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court’s power as defined by statute or: California Coastal Com. (2008) ; see Garibotti v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:shareholders have no direct cause of action “[b]ecause a corporation exists as a separate legal entity” (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1108 (Grosset)) and “is the ultimate beneficiary of such a derivative suit” (Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995 , 1003). (See Cotton v. Expo Power Systems, Inc., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 [“A derivative claim is a property right that belongs to the corporation.”].) “The shareholders may, however, bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and redress its injuries when the board of directors fails: Alacer Corp. (2008) ). (See Cotton v.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:Trusts B and C. The plain language of the trust document provides Trusts B and C became “irrevocable” at that point, meaning Mary “was not at liberty to change that planned distribution after [Rodney, Sr.’s] death.” (Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 35 , 40; see Heaps v. Heaps (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 286, 291–292 [attempts to transfer assets from irrevocable trust to different trusts constituted conversion]; see also § 15403, subd. (a) [requiring consent of beneficiaries to amend terms of irrevocable trust].) That Trusts B and C became irrevocable and were not subject: Aguilar (2008) ; see Heaps v.
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:Notice of the hearing stated only that it was set for a “[p]rogress report on pending discovery.” There was no notice to the Estate that dismissal of the petition would be considered, much less granted. (See Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558 , 565 [court erred in imposing sanctions that resulted in a default judgment at case management conference when party had no notice that sanctions leading to dismissal could be imposed if party failed to appear].) We note that reviewing courts are “increasingly wary” of using procedural shortcuts because they “circumvent: An (2008)
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:lost standing to assert recognized inspection rights, since they are intended to promote the appropriate exercise of a director’s fiduciary duties.” (Id. at p. 921.) 30 Wolf cited another decision of our court, Tritek Telecom, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1385 , in which we “discussed the scope of directors’ inspection rights, in terms of their intended function of promoting the directors’ proper exercise of fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders.” (Wolf, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 916 citing Tritek, at pp. 1390–1391 & § 309, subd. (a).) We held: Superior Court (2009) , in which we “discussed the scope of directors’ inspection rights, in terms of their intended function of promoting the directors’ proper exercise of fiduciary duties to the cor...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:to decide an otherwise moot case if “ ‘it raises important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.’ ” (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142, fn. 2; see also Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157 , 161, fn. 2.) We decide this standard is met here and decline to dismiss the appeal as moot. B Forfeiture The public guardian argues C.O. forfeited his jury trial claims because he failed to raise them in the trial court and fully participated in the court trial. C.O. acknowledges,: P.).) Nevertheless, a reviewing court has the discretion to decide an otherwise moot case if “ ‘it raises important issues that are capable of repetition but likely to evade review.’ ” (John L.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:arising from joint title with Evidence Code section 662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291–292 (Haines); In re Marriage of Brooks 8 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176 , 185–187; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592, 597), they are in fact distinct. In order to understand the applicability of these various rules, it is necessary to examine the history of the relevant statutes and their consequences for various property ownership arrangements. As we explain, the history reveals: App.4th 277, 291–292 (Haines); In re Marriage of Brooks 8 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. & Robinson (2008) –187; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:rule is that a cause of action accrues ' "when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done," or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent "liability arises." ' " (Arcadia Dev. Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 253 , 262 (Arcadia).) Whether an act related to a prior act is separately actionable is "best analyzed by determining whether there is a factual basis for distinguishing" between them. (Ibid; id. at pp. 261-262 [addressing whether owner could challenge city's extension of a previously-adopted growth control ordinance].) Where, as here,: City of Morgan Hill (2008)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:rule is that a cause of action accrues ' "when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done," or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent "liability arises." ' " (Arcadia Dev. Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 253 , 262 (Arcadia).) Whether an act related to a prior act is separately actionable is "best analyzed by determining whether there is a factual basis for distinguishing" between them. (Ibid; id. at pp. 261-262 [addressing whether owner could challenge city's extension of a previously-adopted growth control ordinance].) Where, as here,: City of Morgan Hill (2008)
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:the trustee to recognize him as a beneficiary of the trust and other relief. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review We review de novo questions of law submitted on stipulated facts. (Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340 , 347.) We independently review due process claims “because ‘the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236, 241.) as (1) “Yvonne had to leave property in trust for distribution to McKie Jr.” and (2) “McKie Jr. had: Co. (2008) .) We independently review due process claims “because ‘the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:court’s probate department as against other departments in that same county superior court, such as the departments that hear civil matters. “Exclusive jurisdiction” in the Probate Code does not distinguish between different county superior courts. (See Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684 , 695-696; Harnedy v. Whitty, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1344-1345.) In contrast to jurisdiction, venue concerns which county superior court having fundamental jurisdiction is the proper court geographically to try the action....: Rather, it concerns assigning exclusive responsibility over certain actions to a superior court’s probate department as against other departments in that same county superior court...
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:make decisions with respect to the preservation and disposition of the procreative fluids at issue.” (Id. at pp. 287–288.) We of course are not bound by rulings of trial courts or courts of other jurisdictions. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744 , 761 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”]; Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1306 [“California courts are not bound by decisions in other jurisdictions”].) Zhu also is not persuasive. As we have discussed, neither California’s intestacy law nor the UAGA applies to: Superior Court (2008) ; Gentis v.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:in the manner provided by the Probate Code].) The trial court admitted Ruth’s 1983 will into evidence over the objection, on grounds the will was never admitted to probate, of the Briggs Parties. (Ex. 11; see Adams v. Lansing (1861) 17 Cal. 629 , 641.) Ruth’s 1983 will, provided, in Article THIRD: “I declare that for convenience or through inadvertence title to some property owned by myself and my husband may be held of record in the form of joint tenancy, but that all such property is in fact intended to be our: Lansing (1861) .) Ruth’s 1983 will, provided, in Article THIRD: “I declare that for convenience or through inadvertence title to some property owned by myself and my husband may be held of record in t...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:of “residue” in the context of trust and probate litigation has a readily understandable meaning as the surplus of the estate remaining after the payment of debts and the distribution of specific bequests and devises. (See Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1 , 8; Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 989, 1003; Estate of Keller (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 232, 241; § 21117, subd. (f).) Here, with respect to Trust A—in which Three Lanterns and Sycamore were held and which was the subject of term 1 of the settlement agreement—the reference to the: 41 In any case, the meaning of “residue” in the context of trust and probate litigation has a readily understandable meaning as the surplus of the estate remaining after the payment of debts and the d...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 701; see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 , 288 (Abelleira) [“A court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case where the type of proceeding or the amount in controversy is beyond the jurisdiction defined for that particular court by statute or constitutional provision.”]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2020 supp.) Jurisdiction, § 44 [“A court without: District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 (Abelleira) [“A court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine a case where the type of proceeding or the amount in controversy is beyond the jurisdi...
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:entitled to draft a new will and to thereby revoke her 1983 will and the purported severance of joint tenancy in relation to unnamed properties jointly owned by her and Jack. (See Prob. Code, § 6120; Cook v. Cook (1941) 17 Cal.2d 639 , 646 [“A will does not become operative until death; prior to death it is revocable at the whim of the testator, and the objects of the testator’s bounty have no vested rights.”].) Accordingly, like the trial court, we conclude, based on the operative language in Ruth’s 1983 will and: Cook (1941) 17 Cal.2d 639
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:pages 27–30, the court must consider the substantial weakness of the party influenced, the strength of the other party, and pressures to quickly conclude the agreement. Here, the trial court compared the case to In re Marriage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342 (Dawley), a factually similar case where the court upheld a PMA even though the wife was unwed and pregnant before the execution of the PMA, noting the wife, like Kim, had her own counsel. (Id. at pp. 354–355.) Further, as in In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712,: Here, the trial court compared the case to In re Marriage of Dawley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 342 (Dawley), a factually similar case where the court upheld a PMA even though the wife was unwed and pregnant bef...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:with his parents.” None of these statements can rescue Kenton’s complaint. An essential element of libel is that the publication at issue contain a false statement of fact and not merely reflect an opinion. (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596 , 600.) “The critical determination of whether the allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law.” (Id. at p. 601.) Here, Hilja’s statements to her attorney friend that her brother was “homophobic” and “dangerous” expressed no more than her subjective judgment about Kenton and were nonactionable: Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).) 28 in “every literal category of elder abuse with his parents.” None of these statements can rescue Kenton’s complaint.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:states that it was established by popular vote. These claims are not necessarily at odds; current law requires landowner support for a petition to form a water district, but permits all residents to vote on formation. (Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660 , 662-663 (Choudhry).) In any event, the parties do not explain how the manner in which the district was originally formed impacts its status once formed. Abatti's amici contend that Imperial Valley landowners founded the CDC, but they cite nothing to support this assertion. (Cf. Thayer, supra, 164 Cal. at: Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, 662-663 (Choudhry).) In any event, the parties do not explain how the manner in which the district was originally formed impacts its status once formed.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:states that it was established by popular vote. These claims are not necessarily at odds; current law requires landowner support for a petition to form a water district, but permits all residents to vote on formation. (Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660 , 662-663 (Choudhry).) In any event, the parties do not explain how the manner in which the district was originally formed impacts its status once formed. Abatti's amici contend that Imperial Valley landowners founded the CDC, but they cite nothing to support this assertion. (Cf. Thayer, supra, 164 Cal. at: Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, 662-663 (Choudhry).) In any event, the parties do not explain how the manner in which the district was originally formed impacts its status once formed.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:that, under the Restatement, “a party ordinarily may not obtain relief based upon unilateral mistake where 13 Other decisions state the same or a similar rule without citing Casey or section 1577. (See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699 , 710 [referencing “the general rule that one who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument”]; Reynolds v. Lau (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 953, 967 [same].) 22 [the party] has failed to read the contract before signing it.”: Hosps. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 ; Reynolds v.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:[¶] 1. To do everything necessary or proper and usual, in the ordinary course of business, for effecting the purpose of his agency . . . .” Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699 (Madden), the Garrison court held “[t]he decision to enter into optional revocable arbitration agreements in connection with placement in a health care facility, as occurred here, is a ‘proper and usual’ exercise of an agent’s powers.” (Garrison, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) The 8 facts in Madden, however, are: Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699 (Madden), the Garrison court held “he decision to enter into optional revocable arbitration agreements in connection with placement in a health care fa...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:a trust protector, we might be 7 In that event, we would consider whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, not whether the trial court abused its discretion as Clyde suggests. (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738 , 746–747.) 8 called upon to consider the trial court’s factual finding that Diaz did not testify reliably on that point. But it is not necessary to consider that factual question. As discussed below, Martin’s intent in requiring Diaz’s signature is irrelevant because the February Trust does not explicitly state: If the availability of the statutory revocation method under section 15401 depended upon whether Martin intended Diaz to be such a trust protector, we might be 7 In that event...
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:circumstances it was reasonable for K.R. and her counsel to believe the March 2 proceeding was the statutorily referenced hearing on the conservatorship petition. Furthermore, and in any event, because the forfeiture doctrine is not absolute (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 , 161, fn. 6), and there appear to be no disputed facts at issue, we choose to exercise our discretion to address the merits of the claim notwithstanding K.R.’s failure to object below. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190, 194, disapproved on other grounds in Public Guardian: Williams (1998) , fn. 6), and there appear to be no disputed facts at issue, we choose to exercise our discretion to address the merits of the claim notwithstanding K.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:a general rule, “a party may forfeit [the] right to present a claim of error to the appellate court if he did not do enough to ‘prevent[]’ or ‘correct[]’ the claimed error in the trial court.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 , 161, fn. 6.) The forfeiture doctrine is not absolute, however, as we are “generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.” (Ibid.) We elect to decide the merits of C.O.’s claims. There are no disputed facts at issue and the: Williams (1998) , fn. 6.) The forfeiture doctrine is not absolute, however, as we are “generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.” (Ibid.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:clear and convincing standard of proof before the trial court as having no effect on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence. (See Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 25 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 17 Cal.4th 396 , 401; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126.)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189, In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339, In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581, and: J. ; People v.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.’ ” ’ ” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 284; see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599 , 620 [“An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the court’s opinion but only ‘for the points actually involved and actually decided’ ”].) To state the obvious, we have no occasion here to consider circumstances materially different from those presently before us. The adjudication of future SIJ: Goodin (1998) .) To state the obvious...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the opportunity to consider the propriety of the conclusions espoused in those cases. Our Supreme Court has, however, cited favorably to both cases for reasons other than the section 1094.5, subdivision (c) interpretation. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763 , 789 [citing Ettinger for its application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in professional license revocation proceedings]; Kapelus v. State Bar (1987) 44 Cal.3d 179, 184, fn. 1 [same]; Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 817 [citing Chamberlain for “quoting Drummey’s ‘strong presumption of . . .: Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) ; Kapelus v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:revoking it, by either (1) the testator or (2) another person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction.” We interpret the statute de novo, starting, “as always, with the text.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46 , 64.) “‘“If we find the statutory language ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or purpose to inform our views.”’ [Citation.] Ultimately, we must ‘“‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with: PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024)
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment lien is terminated only when the creditor records an acknowledgment that the underlying judgment has been satisfied or when the creditor formally releases the lien.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:Peringer v. Franchise Tax Board (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 514, 517 [despite taxpayer’s Washington domicile, residence was established where he worked and lived in California in a position that he conceded might last indefinitely]; Noble v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 118 17 Cal.App.4th 560 , 569 (Noble) [residence established as to persons living in California who intended to relocate to Colorado but had yet to do so]....: Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 118
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:respondent’s duty was not ministerial.6 Respondent claims “mandate will not issue to compel an action unless the duty to act is ‘plain and unmixed with discretionary power or the exercise of judgment[,]’ ” citing Hutchinson v. City of Sacramento (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 791 , 796. Respondent argues “the decision to grant or deny Gann family visits required the exercise of judgment.” We view respondent’s argument as contending that administrative mandamus, rather than traditional mandamus, is the appropriate type of proceeding to challenge CDCR’s determination in this matter....: Traditional Versus Administrative Mandamus In addition to other arguments, respondent contends that a writ of traditional mandate is inappropriate because respondent’s duty was not ministerial.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:value to community property as arising from community efforts. The Van Camp approach determines the reasonable value of the community’s services, and allocates that amount to community property and the balance to separate property. (In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842 , 852– 853.) 8 In conclusion, Weaver advised Kim not to sign the PMA. “We cannot give you any advice about whether or not you should marry Mark. That is clearly a personal choice for you alone to make.” Kim signed the letter, acknowledging she had read it and that: The Van Camp approach determines the reasonable value of the community’s services, and allocates that amount to community property and the balance to separate property.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:actions, it does not inform whether the Legislature intended the phrase to mean preponderance of the evidence in section 1094.5, a statute governing special proceedings of a civil nature and 22 not civil actions. (Binyon v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 952 , 954-955 [“ ‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1115 [“[a]n application for: State of California (1993) -955 he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provi...
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:court of appeal determined that a guardian ad litem appointed for an adult party in a divorce proceeding was entitled to quasi- judicial immunity. A guardian ad litem owes fiduciary duties to its ward. (See J.W. v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958 , 964-965.) And although the guardian ad litem owes fiduciary duties and represents the ward in the litigation, “he or she does not act as an advocate, and does not simply represent the ward’s wishes.” (McClintock, at p. 549.) The court in effect is the guardian, and the guardian ad: W. v. Superior Court (1993)
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:the Probate Code, the agreement to arbitrate was a “health care decision” to which a conservator had the authority to bind a conservatee, relying on a case from the Third District Court of Appeal, Hutcheson v. Eskaton FountainWood Lodge (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 937 (Hutcheson). We conclude that Hutcheson and other cases on which Silverado relies are distinguishable on the facts and relevant legal principles....: Eskaton FountainWood Lodge (2017) (Hutcheson). We conclude that Hutcheson and other cases on which Silverado relies are distinguishable on the facts and relevant legal principles.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:information is not “available from other sources,” and “why Waste Connections’ hauler identification records . . . are necessary in addition to all 20 interpreted the word “necessary” in different ways depending on its context. (See M’Culloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. 316 , 413-414 [interpreting “necessary” in necessary and proper clause to mean “employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable”]; San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006): Maryland (1819) -414 ...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:information is not “available from other sources,” and “why Waste Connections’ hauler identification records . . . are necessary in addition to all 20 interpreted the word “necessary” in different ways depending on its context. (See M’Culloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. 316 , 413-414 [interpreting “necessary” in necessary and proper clause to mean “employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable”]; San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006): Maryland (1819) -414 ...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:settling an account of a fiduciary is an appealable order. (§1300, subd. (b).) An order denying a motion to vacate an order on equitable grounds is generally not appealable. (Kalenian, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 577; Estate of Baker (1915) 170 Cal. 578 , 581–582 (Baker).) Otherwise, an unsuccessful party would have two appeals from the same judgment: one appeal provided by law within a limited time period and another at an indefinite time in the future at the convenience of the litigant after the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment.: App.4th at p. 577; Estate of Baker (1915) –582 (Baker).) Otherwise, an unsuccessful party would have two appeals from the same judgment: one appeal provided by law within a limited time period...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:they made that argument in their motions for a new trial and for an order vacating the judgment, and even 11 alternative decree, however, was an appealable order. (See § 2000, subd. (c); Cotton v. Expo Power Systems, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1371 , 1376; Dickson v. Rehmke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 469, 476.) Michael and Joseph had an opportunity to challenge that order in their appeal from the alternative decree, but they dismissed the appeal, making that order final. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 913; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 100;: Expo Power Systems, Inc. (2009) ; Dickson v.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:proof in the trial court (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a)) “is necessary because, among other things, the reviewing court must know the substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice”]; Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229 , 282 [“the failure to make an adequate offer of proof in the court below ordinarily precludes consideration on appeal of an allegedly erroneous exclusion of evidence”].) Appellant does not discuss the issue of prejudice. Accordingly, appellant has failed to carry his burden of showing that the alleged abuse of: County of Santa Cruz (2008) .) Appellant does not discuss the issue of prejudice.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:to reweigh the evidence.” (Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486 (Bookout).) Given the parties’ respective burdens, the standard of review is as articulated in Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229 (Shaw). “When the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party appeals, it is somewhat misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. … Thus, where the issue on: County of Santa Cruz (2008)
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:subdivision (a) states: “As to community property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse is the one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent under Section 100.” 18 Cal.App.4th 559, 577; Sixells, LLC v. Cannery Business Park (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 648 , 652, fn. 3.) After the probate court granted William’s motion, Gary filed a timely writ petition, acknowledging that “an order to expunge a lis pendens is only properly reviewable by Petition for Writ of Mandate.” He did not, however, raise the issue of the attorney fees. We denied the: Cannery Business Park (2008) , fn. 3.) After the probate court granted William’s motion, Gary filed a timely writ petition, acknowledging that “an order to expunge a lis pendens is only properly revie...
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Sachs v. Sachs
Context from opinion:record, in and of itself is highly persuasive . . . .” In fact, keeping such a record would seem to have no purpose other than to equalize distributions between David’s children. Avram cites In re Estate of Vanderhurst (1915) 171 Cal. 553 , for the proposition that unsigned ledgers alone are categorically insufficient to establish a donor’s intent to treat lifetime transfers as advancements. In Vanderhurst the testator died leaving several children. His will provided that sums paid to a son and his children as shown by testator’s books of accounts shall: As the court stated, “The existence of record, in and of itself is highly persuasive . . . .” In fact, keeping such a record would seem to have no purpose other than to equalize distributions between...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:more than, the evidence on the other side, not necessarily in number of witnesses or quantity, but in its effect on those to whom it is addressed.’ ” (Chamberlain, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 369, quoting People v. Miller (1916) 171 Cal. 649 , 652-653.) As to the second case, the Chamberlain court explained, our Supreme Court “reject[ed] a claim that fraud was required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence,” reasoning: “ ‘So in civil cases tried without a jury where fraud is an issue, it is for the trial court: Miller (1916)
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:236, 241.) We must consider the language of the clause, other terms of the trust, and extrinsic evidence of the trustor’s intent to determine whether an action is a contest that violates the no contest clause. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586 , 1601 (Giammarrusco); Dae v. Traver (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 447, 461 (Dae) [“Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of a particular no contest clause depends upon the individual circumstances of the case and the language of the particular instrument.”].) Whether a petition constitutes a trust contest must: Simon (2009) (Giammarrusco); Dae v.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:of discretion. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1256; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272.) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586 , 1603; Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Probate Court’s Findings of Hanako’s Intent and the Mistake in Drafting the Pour-Over Will The testator in Duke executed a holographic will devising his entire estate to his wife. The will stated that if the couple: App.4th 1262, 1272.) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) ; Ike, supra, 61 Cal.
- Conservatorship of Martha : The appropriate standard of appellate review for an award of statutory attorney fees is abuse of discretion.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:claim an interest adverse to that of a testator. It merely determines the succession or testamentary disposition of such title as the decedent may have had. [Citation.]” (Romagnolo v. Romagnolo (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 315, 319; accord, Kasperbauer v. Fairfield (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 229 , 236.) 12 We also note that the probate court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate adverse claims to property of the estate (Prob. Code, § 850) is concurrent, not exclusive. “Accordingly, a third party claimant may bring an independent civil action, e.g., to quiet title . . . . [Citation.]” (Ross &: App.2d 315, 319; accord, Kasperbauer v. Fairfield (2009) .) 12 We also note that the probate court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate adverse claims to property of the estate (Prob.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:cited by Abatti, is inapposite. (See id. 61 We take judicial notice of the District's repeal of the 2013 EDP, the parties' petitions to this court regarding a stay, and our order. (Evid. Code, § 452; In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239 , 245, fn. 1 [taking judicial notice of materials potentially relevant to mootness].) 105 at pp. 704-705 [appeal concerning allegedly inconsistent zoning ordinance was mooted by adoption of general plan that eliminated the inconsistency].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed as to the superior court's ruling that the District abused its: V. (2009)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:cited by Abatti, is inapposite. (See id. 61 We take judicial notice of the District's repeal of the 2013 EDP, the parties' petitions to this court regarding a stay, and our order. (Evid. Code, § 452; In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239 , 245, fn. 1 [taking judicial notice of materials potentially relevant to mootness].) 105 at pp. 704-705 [appeal concerning allegedly inconsistent zoning ordinance was mooted by adoption of general plan that eliminated the inconsistency].) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed as to the superior court's ruling that the District abused its: V. (2009)
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:demonstrating error by providing an adequate record.” (Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9.) “To the extent the record is incomplete, we construe it against [them].” (Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495 , 498.) Thus, we construe appellants’ failure to provide a complete transcript of Yang’s liability phase testimony against them, and presume it provides the overwhelming evidence referenced by the court in its ruling.8 8 We note a few pages of Yang’s July 11, 2018 testimony are found in the record: App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9.) “To the extent the record is incomplete, we construe it against .” (Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) .) Thus...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:the requested relief will be granted after an opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (§ 21311, subd. (b).) In the absence of disputed facts, we review a court’s application of a no contest clause de novo. (Bradley v. Gilbert (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1058 , 1068.) De novo review is equally applicable to the legal question of whether a statute of limitations applies. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1340; Straley v. Gamble (2013) 6 The relevant subtrust became irrevocable in 2016 when Iraj passed away. Thus, the parties agree that: Gilbert (2009) .) De novo review is equally applicable to the legal question of whether a statute of limitations applies. (Gilkyson v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:ruling can be set aside “only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably [have made] the order.” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205 , 1225–1226; Menezes v. McDaniel, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) Trial courts have no discretion, however, to assess section 271 sanctions without evidence of the statutory factual predicate, namely conduct that frustrated the promotion of settlement and the reduction of litigation costs. (In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161: The trial court’s ruling can be set aside “only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Here, Richard and Brown’s opening brief evinces a legal challenge to the probate court’s authority to order Brown to pay expenses under the circumstances presented. We review the question of authority to award fees de novo. (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443 , 1452.) B. Analysis California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 affords a trial court, including one administering probate proceedings, authority to award sanctions “for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.30(a), (b).) In addition, the court may order the person found: Hernandez (2009) .) B.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:be considered in determining ability to pay, the court concluded Hatch dealt with orders made at the pendente lite stage of the case and focused on fees needed to maintain the litigation. In contrast, Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238 (Alan S.), held that the purpose of section 2030 is “not to redistribute wealth from the greater income party to the lesser but rather to equitably apportion the burden of litigation between the parties. The court must make a nuanced consideration of the needs of each party including expenses which: Superior Court (2009)
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:or of the federal government.” (§ 1424, subds. (a)–(b); see also § 1401.) Courts have traditionally characterized an “interested person” under the Probate Code as someone who could be financially affected by the probate proceedings. (See Estate of Prindle (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 119 , 126–127 [insurance company was an interested person]; see also Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1206 [“simply being [an elder’s] child is not sufficient to confer standing” where child had no “legally cognizable interest in her mother’s revocable living trust”]; Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App....: 7 is not limited to: (a) Any interested state, local, or federal entity or agency. (b) Any interested public officer or employee of this state or of a local public entity of this state or of the feder...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:228 Cal.App.4th 45, 57 [“De novo review is appropriate where the trial court’s determination of whether statutory criteria were met presents an issue of statutory construction or a question of law.”]; Munroe v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1295 , 1301 (Munroe).) This is true under both traditional and administrative mandamus. (Hoitt v. Department of Rehabilitation (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 513, 522 [administrative mandamus]; Munroe, at p. 1301 [traditional mandamus].) V....: Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2009) (Munroe).) This is true under both traditional and administrative mandamus. (Hoitt v.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:requires an accounting. [Citation.] The right to an accounting can arise from the possession by the defendant of money or property which, because of the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff, the defendant is obliged to surrender.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156 , 179-180.) In open court appellant said that on September 21, 2014, he had control over Norma’s pension checks and her share of the rental income from the Newbury Park property. Appellant was obliged to surrender these payments to the conservatorship estate. Thus, there was a 7 special relationship between: McLoughlin (2009) -180.) In open court appellant said that on September 21, 2014, he had control over Norma’s pension checks and her share of the rental income from the Newbury Park property.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:to questions of standing—except, of course, in cases involving public standing or where the statute at issue otherwise confers standing on a plaintiff. In Iglesia Evangelica Latina, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Latin American Dist. of the Assemblies of God (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 420 (Iglesia), a case which did not involve writ proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, the court held, “To have standing, a party must be beneficially interested in the controversy, and have ‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected.’ [Citation.] This: Southern Pacific Latin American Dist. of the Assemblies of God (2009) (Iglesia), a case which did not involve writ proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, the court held, “To have stan...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:joint and several.” We agree with Tukes that Civil Code section 1659 controls here. Each count asserted in the Tukes Action is predicated on a promise implied either from the parties’ conduct or other circumstances. (Gomez v. Lincare, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 508 , 525 [“ ‘A cause of action for breach of implied contract has 28 the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct’ ”]; Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept.: Lincare, Inc. (2009) ...
- Clark v. Smith : A trustee must take reasonable steps to enforce and collect trust assets, and is liable for any loss of those assets if the failure to collect is attributable to the trustee’s fault.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:standard of review is deferential to the judgment. (See Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 987, 992–994 [applying substantial evidence test to claims involving surcharges in a probate matter].) The trial court, in reliance on Purdy v. Johnson (1917) 174 Cal. 521 (Purdy), concluded it was Stacey’s burden to substantiate her accountings. In Purdy, a trust beneficiary alleged misconduct by two trustees, including failures to account and the comingling of trust assets with their personal assets. (Id. at pp. 523–524.) In reversing a judgment entered in favor of the trustees, the California: Johnson (1917) (Purdy), concluded it was Stacey’s burden to substantiate her accountings.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:defense available outside the context of malicious prosecution and insurance bad faith litigation, the defense requires “[g]ood faith reliance on the advice of counsel, after truthful disclosure of all the relevant facts.” (Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1534 , 1544.) “However, if the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise appearing from the information supplied, that defense fails.” (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 53–54.) In Ashlock I, the: Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) .) “However, if the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise appearing f...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:(1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81 , 84-85 (Steinberger).) In Crail, we explained that the clear and convincing “standard was adopted . . . for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. ‘The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires: Young (1917)
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:Moreover, and in any event, “a protective order under the Elder Abuse Act may issue on the basis of evidence of past abuse, without any particularized showing that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.” (Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128 , 137; § 15657.03, subd. (c).) Herren additionally contends the State Bar of California’s Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct formal opinion No. 2021-207 (State Bar Opinion) suggests that her conduct “is what an attorney should do with regard to a putative client who had diminished capacity.” To 25: Gdowski (2009)
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:its discretion if “ ‘it exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence [citation], failed to follow proper procedure in reaching its decision [citation], or applied the wrong legal standard to the determination.’ ” (Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474 , 1482 (Becerra).) 2 Further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise noted. 3 Section 17202 states: “The court may dismiss a petition if it appears that the proceeding is not reasonably necessary for the protection of the interests of the trustee or beneficiary....: App.5th 561, 567.) The court must exercise its discretion within the “ ‘ “limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:older decisions in ordinary civil actions where the appellants knowingly went to trial but failed to object to the absence of a jury. (See Joseph W., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 968, citing City of Los Angeles v. Zeller (1917) 176 Cal. 194 , Ferrea v. Chabot (1898) 121 Cal. 223, Boston Tunel Co. v. McKenzie (1885) 67 Cal. 485, Glogau v. Hagan (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 313, and Pink v. Slater (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 816.) Those cases do not provide an apt analogy given the specific statutory framework governing conservatorships. 10 As to: Zeller (1917) , Ferrea v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:“the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered” ’ ”].) Civil Code section 1659 applies equally to express promises and those implied by law. (See Kirtley v. Perham (1917) 176 Cal. 333 , 341 [applying section 1659 to joint vendors’ implied promise to repay purchaser’s installment payments under executory contract for sale following destruction of subject property].) Tukes also alleges that the Trustees both received benefits from the promises she asked the probate court to imply....: Perham (1917)
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:and its administration. The information provided pursuant to section 16060 must be the information reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary’s rights under the trust or prevent or redress a breach of trust. (Salter v. Lerner (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1184 , 1187.) First, the probate court did not determine that the Pacific parties were beneficiaries of the trust. Second, assuming they were or could have been beneficiaries, the notice of mediation was all the information necessary for them to protect their interest....: Lerner (2009) .) First, the probate court did not determine that the Pacific parties were beneficiaries of the trust.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.’” (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438 , 1442 (Blazer).) There is no statute defining income for the purpose of determining spousal support, and this determination is left to the trial court’s discretion. (Id. at p. 1445.) However, in evaluating support, the trial court cannot engage in speculation, and an order for spousal support must be based: Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of livin...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Dist. (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 132, 135.) And, section 1094.5’s substantial evidence review sometimes applies to underlying administrative proceedings in which the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. (See, e.g., SASCO Electric v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 532 , 535, 546 [upholding the trial court’s conclusion “there [wa]s substantial evidence to support the [administrative] finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of oppression and malice on [employer’s] part”].) Our Supreme Court did not, however, in Conservatorship of O.B....: Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2009) , 546 s substantial evidence to support the finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of oppression...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:Act. (See Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 1 Cal.4th 155, 160-162 [task force report on property taxes was a part of the relevant legislative history]; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 871 , 878, fn. 7 [same]; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) 11 increased in recent years because of real and perceived problems they present with hazardous waste, air quality and water quality. The Task Force recommended comprehensive legislation adopting a statewide integrated waste management system requiring strong source reduction: County of Los Angeles (1991) -162 ; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) , fn. 7 ; Evid.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:Act. (See Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1991) 1 Cal.4th 155, 160-162 [task force report on property taxes was a part of the relevant legislative history]; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 871 , 878, fn. 7 [same]; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) 11 increased in recent years because of real and perceived problems they present with hazardous waste, air quality and water quality. The Task Force recommended comprehensive legislation adopting a statewide integrated waste management system requiring strong source reduction: County of Los Angeles (1991) -162 ; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. County of San Diego (2009) , fn. 7 ; Evid.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:(Burnand v. Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861, 866.) As the cases Jacqueline cites illustrate, the principle has been applied to permit minors to disaffirm a minor’s execution of a deed of trust (Lee v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1918) 177 Cal. 656 , 659), a minor’s contract for personal services (Berg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 817), a minor’s execution of a deed (Sparks v. Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 137), a minor’s execution of a promissory note (Niemann v. Deverich (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 787, 793), and a minor’s contract for the: Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1918) ), a minor’s contract for personal services (Berg, supra, 148 Cal.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:effect to general disinheritance clauses—expressly applies only to section 21620 claims. The principles of statutory construction are well- established. “ ‘We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.’ ” (Estate of Pryor (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1466 , 1471.) “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com....: They contend a general disinheritance clause may defeat only a claim brought by an unknown child born after the execution of a will or trust under section 21620 because section 21621—which they argue...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:(2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 427.) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The statutory provision is mandatory. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471 , 490.) Civil Code section 5975 deals with the enforceability of covenants and restrictions in a common interest 17 See footnote 15, ante. 18 Civil Code section 2924.12, subdivision (h) states in relevant part that “[a] court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an action: Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The statutory provision is mandatory. (Cabral v. Martins (2009)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:court’s order appointing a receiver. That order was appealable, and Michael and Joseph did not file a timely notice of appeal. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(7); Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 59 , 66.) Because Michael and Joseph do not argue the order was void, except as a consequence of the court’s lack of jurisdiction to 29 C. Leonard Lacked Standing To Assert His Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Michael and Joseph contend Leonard did not have standing to: D & M Cabinets (2009) .) Because Michael and Joseph do not argue the order was void, except as a consequence of the court’s lack of jurisdiction to 29 C.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:an Evidentiary Hearing Appellant argues that the probate court “abused its discretion and committed reversible error in denying [his] request for evidentiary hearing.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) The standard of review is abuse of discretion. (See Estate of Lensch (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 667 , 676.) Appellant has failed to show an abuse of discretion. (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.) Instead of specifying the factual issues he intended to litigate and the relevant evidence 9 (testimony and exhibits) he would produce at the hearing, appellant’s counsel made vague representations....: 8 “It has long been the rule that in probate matters ‘affidavits may not be used in evidence unless permitted by statute. . . .’” (Estate of Bennett (2008) -1309.
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition and each fact set forth in a supporting affidavit must be established by competent evidence. [Citations.]” (Estate of Lensch (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 667 , 676.) The Estate contested Maria’s declarations about the trust. There was no competent evidence establishing the allegations stated by Maria in her objection to the petition. Maria contends that under section 17206, the court has the discretion to “make any orders and take any action necessary or proper to: App.4th 1303, 1309.) “When a petition is contested, as it was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition and each fact set forth in a supporting affidavit must be established by competent evidence. [Citations.]” (Estate of Lensch (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 667 , 676.) On the other hand, a declaration or report received in evidence without objection at a contested hearing may properly be considered as competent evidence. (See Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088.) Here, no one objected to the exhibits received in evidence. 3 In August 2017 respondents: App.4th 1303, 1309.) “When a petition is contested, as it was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:from is presumed correct and “‘“all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.”’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] An appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support his contentions. . . .’” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771 , 799....: Meisenheimer & Herron (2009)
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020 , 1034 quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment. The plaintiff 16 bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (Novartis, at p. 162.): Boyle (2009) quoting Blank v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786.) "The appellate court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120 , 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1409 [review is de novo, "except where the trial court made foundational factual findings, which are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence"].)7 B. Water rights in the Imperial Valley The parties' fundamental: San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) ; see City of Arcadia v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786.) "The appellate court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120 , 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1409 [review is de novo, "except where the trial court made foundational factual findings, which are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence"].)7 B. Water rights in the Imperial Valley The parties' fundamental: San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) ; see City of Arcadia v.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:the expense of litigation is caused by the unsuccessful attempt of one of the beneficiaries to obtain a greater share of the trust property, the expense may properly be chargeable to that beneficiary’s share.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Rudnick v. Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328 , 1334.) In Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172 (Pizzaro), the appellate court confirmed that “[t]he trial court’s equitable power over trusts gives the court authority to charge attorney fees and costs against a beneficiary’s share of the trust estate if the beneficiary . . . ‘instigate[d] an unfounded: Rudnick (2009) .) In Pizarro v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 341 (Casa Herrera).) Fourth, the plaintiff must show resulting damage, which may include out-of-pocket losses of attorney fees and costs, as well as emotional distress and injury to reputation. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75 , 90-91.)5 2. Favorable Termination on the Merits a. Applicable Law To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, “termination of the underlying action must reflect on the defendant’s innocence. ‘If [the termination] is of such a nature as to indicate the innocence of the accused, it is a favorable termination: Yarbray (2009) -91.)5 2.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:the only party that benefits from any recovery; the shareholders derive no benefit ‘“except the indirect benefit resulting from a realization upon the corporation’s assets.”’” (Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1108, fn. omitted; see Bader v. 32 Anderson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 775 , 793 [“a derivative suit is one in which the shareholder seeks ‘redress of the wrong to the corporation’”].) “‘The stockholder’s individual suit, on the other hand, is a suit to enforce a right against the corporation which the stockholder possesses as an individual.’” (Jones, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p.: 32 Anderson (2009) .) “‘The stockholder’s individual suit, on the other hand...
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:of the trust’s administration. California and Indiana both recognize the common law principle that an express trust is not a person or legal entity separate from the trustees, but is instead a fiduciary relationship regarding property. (Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909 , 914; see Baugher v. Hall (1958) 238 Ind. 170, 171 [“An estate, a receivership, a trusteeship are not parties to the judgment in the lower court because they are not legal entities. A trust is represented by the fiduciary, who is the party to the judgment.”], disapproved on other: Tepper (2009) ; see Baugher v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:Venverloh from it. As Adam refers to and relies on the Trust and its terms in his previous and operative petitions, it was appropriate for the court to take judicial notice of it. (See Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949 , 956, fn. 6 [on demurrer, court able to take judicial notice of settlement agreement referred 28 to in complaint]; Estate of Cooper (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 118, 122 [finding court’s consideration of probated will and codicil did not “improperly look[ ] beyond the face of the petition” and were subject: Tran (2009) , fn. 6 ; Estate of Cooper (1983) 142 Cal.
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:as to give that court jurisdiction over practically all controversies which might arise between the trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.’ ” (Estate of Bissinger (1964) 60 Cal.2d 756, 765 (Bissinger), quoting Estate of Marre (1941) 18 Cal.2d 184 , 187.) The wisdom of those decisions has not lessened over time. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to trust challenges under section 17200 “not only makes sense as a matter of judicial: litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) ; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 .) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of t...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:whether . . . any charge has been proven against petitioner which merits his disbarment” (Narlian v. State Bar of California (1943) 21 Cal.2d 876, 880-881, italics added) by clear and convincing evidence (Hildebrand v. State Bar of California (1941) 18 Cal.2d 816 , 828). (See also Furman v. State Bar of California (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 214, 229 [the court “can and always does pass upon the weight of the evidence” in attorney discipline cases to determine if guilt is established by “ ‘convincing proof to a reasonable certainty’ ”].) That the: State Bar of California (1941) 18 Cal.2d 816, 828). (See also Furman v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:theory under “the settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to the prosecution of an appeal therefrom.” (Schubert v. Reich (1950) 36 Cal.2d 298, 299; see Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110 , 114.) We grant the request for judicial notice and the motion to augment the record as unopposed, but deny the motion to take additional evidence on appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section 909 motions may be granted only in “exceptional circumstances,” and nothing argued here meets that standard. (In: Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 114.) We grant the request for judicial notice and the motion to augment the record as unopposed, but deny the motion to take additional evidence on appeal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:moot Finally, Abatti contends that the District's appeal is moot because the District has repealed the 2013 EDP. We disagree. Waiver of the right to appeal may occur when there is "voluntary compliance" with a judgment. (Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110 , 115.) However, "where compliance arises [only] under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v. Magidow (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 298, 302 104 [appeal was not moot; respondent cited "no authority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was: Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 115.) However, "where compliance arises under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:moot Finally, Abatti contends that the District's appeal is moot because the District has repealed the 2013 EDP. We disagree. Waiver of the right to appeal may occur when there is "voluntary compliance" with a judgment. (Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110 , 115.) However, "where compliance arises [only] under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v. Magidow (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 298, 302 104 [appeal was not moot; respondent cited "no authority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was: Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 115.) However, "where compliance arises under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:bond forfeiture proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1305 et seq., it could have done so as it did relative to other types of proceedings that were expressly listed in the Advisory Committee Comment. (See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190 , 195 [“…[W]here exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed. [Citations.]”].) -7- No Emergency Rule Contemplates Any Extension on Bail Bond Forfeitures The Judicial Council had created a number of very specific Emergency Rules related to Covid-19 including Emergency: Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195 here exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed. ”].
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:with the holdings of this decision. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. IRION, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. HALLER, J. but also the factual allegations to sufficiently state a cause of action.” (Ibid.; accord, Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335 , 349.) 47: Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:constituted breach of public trust; no analysis of pleadings or damages].) Finally, the burden is on Abatti to articulate how he could amend his pleading to render it sufficient. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335 , 349 ["Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading."].) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden, he forfeited the issue by not addressing amendment in his initial brief. (Badie v. Bank of: Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 .) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:constituted breach of public trust; no analysis of pleadings or damages].) Finally, the burden is on Abatti to articulate how he could amend his pleading to render it sufficient. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335 , 349 ["Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading."].) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden, he forfeited the issue by not addressing amendment in his initial brief. (Badie v. Bank of: Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 .) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:2d (1995) Malicious Prosecution § 40, italics added.) Lanz v. Goldstone (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 441 (Lanz) supports our conclusion. There, an attorney (Lanz), sued his former client, Garcia-Bolio, for attorney fees incurred in a prior Marvin (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 ) suit. (Lanz, supra, at p. 446.) Goldstone, an attorney, represented Garcia-Bolio and filed a cross-complaint on her behalf alleging three causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, and professional negligence. (Id. at pp. 446, 450, 452....: Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:(Ibid.; accord, Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) “[W]e have no power to rewrite the statute to make it conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed.” (County of Santa Clara v. Perry (1998) 18 Cal.4th 435 , 446.) The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how section 859 operates under the plain language of the statute. Assume a petitioner’s action under section 850 et seq. alleges the misappropriation of a diamond ring valued at $10,000. The probate court finds the petitioner is entitled to the ring and, pursuant: Perry (1998) .) The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how section 859 operates under the plain language of the statute.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:a cause of action for negligence. [Citations.] Hence, until the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of [the] attorney’s negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for malpractice.’” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phlegar & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739 , 749-750, quoting Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200.) “In legal malpractice claims, the absence of causation may be decided on summary judgment ‘only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.’ [Citation.]” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583.) 27 II.: Brobeck, Phlegar & Harrison (1998) -750, quoting Budd v.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:the other one-half belongs to the decedent.” Probate Code section 6401, subdivision (a) states: “As to community property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse is the one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent under Section 100.” 18 Cal.App.4th 559 , 577; Sixells, LLC v. Cannery Business Park (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 648, 652, fn. 3.) After the probate court granted William’s motion, Gary filed a timely writ petition, acknowledging that “an order to expunge a lis pendens is only properly reviewable by Petition for Writ of Mandate.” He did not,: Nielsen (2005) 130 surviving spouse and the other one-half belongs to the decedent.” Probate Code section 6401, subdivision (a) states: “As to community property...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:While “ ‘appellate courts are loath to exercise their discretion to review rulings at the pleading stage, they will do so where the circumstances are compelling and the issue is of widespread interest.’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222 , 239.) Writ review may be appropriate where “conflicting trial court interpretations of the law require a resolution of the conflict.” (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 160, 176.) These criteria are fulfilled here. Currently,: Superior Court (2017) .) Writ review may be appropriate where “conflicting trial court interpretations of the law require a resolution of the conflict.” (Omaha Indemnity Co. v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438 , 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian: App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) ; Parisi v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:forfeitures “does not exist in a vacuum, and is to be balanced against the counterpresumption that ‘when there is a breach of . . . contract, the bond should be enforced.’ ” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 863 , 879-880.) Finally, “[t]he policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of [a] statute.” (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 308.) The plainly intended meaning of Emergency rule 9 is that statutes of limitation and repose for pleadings commencing civil causes of action—not: Co. (2017) -880.) Finally, “he policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of statute.” (People v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:of payment in the event judgment is entered. “An attachment remedy would be useless if it required the court to first decide the merits and issue a judgment.” (Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World National Assurance Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881 , 889.) Section 15657.01 allows an 23 attachment to be issued in any action for damages for financial abuse of an elder. (§ 15657.01.) In light of its purpose, a right to attach order may issue ex parte if the trial court finds, inter alia, that “the plaintiff will suffer: Allied World National Assurance Co. (2017)
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:in either the trust document or contested amendment.9 Thus, the 2010 petition “is not a contest of the [trust document] as defined by the trust’s language, and . . . section 16061.8 does not apply.” 10 (Yeh v. Tai (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 953 , 967.) 9 While some of Trustees’ arguments are directed at Beneficiaries 2017 trial brief, their arguments involve the same claims on which the 2010 petition is based, and likewise constitute requests for execution and/or interpretation. 10 Trustees briefly argue that, through the contested amendment and its no contest clause,: Tai (2017)
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:by a defaulted defendant, other than a motion to set aside the default, is “‘unauthorized and void.’” (A & B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 642, 647.) It has “no legal effect.” (Christerson v. French (1919) 180 Cal. 523 , 525.) Bewley does not actually raise this argument. And wisely so, as it has previously been rejected by Forbes v. Cameron Petroleums, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 257. Forbes held that “that a demurrer filed by defendant after his default is taken constitutes a general appearance.” (Id. at p. 264.): French (1919) .) Bewley does not actually raise this argument.
- Garcia v. Garcia : An error in applying the capacity standard is harmless when the trust amendment is already invalidated on an independent ground, such as a finding of undue influence.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:to extend standing under section 1820 to a broad swath of individuals, it could have simply given standing to “any person,” a phrase it has used frequently in the Probate Code and other statutes. (See Suleman v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1287 , 1297 & fn. 2.) Its decision not to use that term in section 1820 suggests it did not intend to allow “any person” to petition for a conservatorship. (See Suleman, at pp. 1297–1298 [Legislature’s use of “ ‘other person on behalf of the minor’ ” in § 1510 suggests: Superior Court (2010)
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:“reestablishment hearing is conducted according to the same rules that govern the initial establishment of a conservatorship. [Citations.] The state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conservatee remains gravely disabled.” (Conservatorship of Deidre B. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1306 , 1312; see § 5350, subd. (d)(3).) B....: A “reestablishment hearing is conducted according to the same rules that govern the initial establishment of a conservatorship. The state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the con...
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Estate of Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894, 904; quoting, In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1527−1528; accord, Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.)8 S.H.R. views the role of the trial court under section 155 and, consequently, our standard of reviewing the court’s ruling, differently. According to him, the “role of the superior court” in evaluating a: W. (2009) −1528; accord, Patricia A.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g.,: W. (2009) ; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:Section 367 Limon contends “California standing doctrine ‘simply requires that the action be maintained in the name of “[t]he person who has the right to sue under [the] substantive law,” ’ ” quoting Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 980 , 991, italics omitted (Jasmine Networks).) This is at best an incomplete interpretation of the statement made by the court in Jasmine Networks and an oversimplification of the standing doctrine in California....: Superior Court (2009)
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:show that undisputed facts supported each element of the affirmative defense. “[T]he court’s power to deny summary judgment on the basis of failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 is discretionary, not mandatory.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102 , 118.) The evidence in the record indicates the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment despite the procedural violations. Plaintiff did not raise this procedural issue before the trial court either in his written opposition to the motion or at oral argument. Instead, he argued: As a result, Brock did not meet his burden on summary judgment to show that undisputed facts supported each element of the affirmative defense.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:of the continuing representation that precludes summary judgment. Ginsberg also argues that Knapp “discovered or should have discovered the facts essential to her legal malpractice action at the time of execution of the Agreement.” Relying on Truong v. Glaser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102 , 110, he asserts that Knapp only needed to know that Tinker was unrepresented to start the clock running, and that it was irrelevant that she was unaware of the legal theories or remedies available to her at that time. This argument, like the first, ignores the actual injury tolling: Glaser (2009) , he asserts that Knapp only needed to know that Tinker was unrepresented to start the clock running, and that it was irrelevant that she was unaware of the legal theories or remedies av...
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:the contract is ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to resolve the ambiguity by taking into account all the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution of the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1647; [citation].)’” (Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234 , 1252 (Chacon).) The standard of review when construing a contract is de novo, “including where conflicting inferences may be drawn from undisputed extrinsic evidence, ‘unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citations....: Litke (2010) (Chacon).) The standard of review when construing a contract is de novo, “including where conflicting inferences may be drawn from undisputed extrinsic evidence...
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:parental responsibilities.” (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1132.) Section 1516.5 does not require, however, a showing of parental unfitness or that terminating parental rights is the least detrimental alternative for the child. Un re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359 , 1383.) The trial court’s findings are reviewed under the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Guardianship of Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1127, fn. 9.) The question is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly: Un re Noreen G. (2010) .) The trial court’s findings are reviewed under the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Guardianship of Ann S., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1127...
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Adoption of M.R.
Context from opinion:Family Code section 7820 or 7822 or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether the child is, or might be, an Indian child. (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359 , 1387; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) Both the Probate Code and Family Code make clear that a court must determine a minor’s Indian status before freeing the child from a parent’s custody or control pursuant to either Probate Code section 1516.5 or Family Code section 7820: C. § 1903(4).) In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent’s custody and care pursuant to Family Code section or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:[“‘[j]uvenile courts, relying on the Marsden model, have permitted the parents, who have a statutory and a due process right to competent counsel, to air their complaints about appointed counsel and request new counsel be appointed’”]; In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282 , 289 [Marsden principles apply in dependency proceedings].) 7 unable to calm down and the social worker asked her to leave, Patricia threatened the social worker, telling her “I know where you live.” The social worker smelled alcohol on Patricia’s breath. The Department also asked to include Samuel in the: N. (2009) .) 7 unable to calm down and the social worker asked her to leave, Patricia threatened the social worker...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 842; In re Marriage of Jackson (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 980, 989; Conservatorship of O’Connor, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.)11 (Armstrong, at pp. 950-951; see Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 752 , 767 [“Errors of substantive law are within the jurisdiction of a court and are not typically acts beyond the court’s fundamental authority to act.”].) 11 Michael and Joseph listed in their notices of appeal a “Void Judgment” dated September 27, 2017, which was actually the trial court’s order appointing: Appeals Bd. (2010) .) 11 Michael...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:of the statute and gives them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable interpretation, with due regard to the language used and the purpose sought to be accomplished.’ ” (Leader v. Cords (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1588 , 1596.) “Generally, a trial court’s . . . award of fees and costs[] is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332; Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017 [“the propriety or amount of an attorney fees award is reviewed using the: Cords (2010) .) “Generally, a trial court’s . . . award of fees and costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct’ ”]; Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661 , 1673 [“ ‘Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that “the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered” ’ ”].) Civil Code section 1659 applies equally to express promises and those implied by law. (See Kirtley v. Perham: App.4th 508, 525 ...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:cause . . . , a corollary to this rule . . . [is that] malice can be inferred when a party continues to prosecute an action after becoming aware that the action lacks probable cause.” (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204 , 226, original italics (Daniels).) b. Prima Facie Showing of Malice Attorneys contend that Carol did not establish the element of malice. They urge there was significant evidence that they added Maleti and Maleti Corp. as respondents in the underlying probate proceeding due to a “good faith belief that they: Robbins (2010) , original italics (Daniels).) b.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:of the CLRA. The court also cited a case concluding that to plead a cause of action under the CLRA, a plaintiff must allege a deceptive practice and that the deception caused the plaintiff harm. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350 , 1367 (Durell); see Civ. Code, § 1780, subd. (a).) Durell refers to the need to allege the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation, a term that would include a material omission where the defendant has a duty to disclose. E. Exclusive Knowledge and Reasonable Access We first consider whether Torres: Sharp Healthcare (2010) (Durell); see Civ.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re: App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) ; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:her petition. The trustee submitted a complete copy of the operative Trust instruments signed by O’Brian that contain additional language in Article Two omitted 3 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238 , 240.) We treat as true “ ‘all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” (Blank, at p. 318.) 1. The Trust The Trust allocates specific dollar amounts to about 20 or so of O’Brian’s named friends and family members, including Virginia: Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) .) We treat as true “ ‘all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” (Blank, at p. 318.) 1.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer[ ] . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559 , 566.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion: Price (2010) .) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has a...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will still affirm the demurrer[ ] . . . .' " (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559 , 566.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion: Price (2010) .) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, "we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has a...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:must be taken or the right to appellate review is forfeited”];Williams v. Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1071 [same].) In addition, the vast majority of Michael and Joseph’s argument appears in a footnote. (See Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916 , 947 [“Footnotes are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal.”]; Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App....: Sterling (2010) ; Evans v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:is true that with appropriative water rights acquired by use, "the extent of the right . . . is limited to the amount of water applied to a beneficial use" and "reasonably necessary" for that use. (Haight v. Costanich (1920) 184 Cal. 426 , 431; cf. 43 U.S.C. § 372 [beneficial use is the measure of the right to use water acquired under the Reclamation Act].) Reasonable use is also a limit on all water rights, as discussed ante. (Channelkeeper, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184.) But, again, the farmers do not hold: Costanich (1920) ; cf. 43 U.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:is true that with appropriative water rights acquired by use, "the extent of the right . . . is limited to the amount of water applied to a beneficial use" and "reasonably necessary" for that use. (Haight v. Costanich (1920) 184 Cal. 426 , 431; cf. 43 U.S.C. § 372 [beneficial use is the measure of the right to use water acquired under the Reclamation Act].) Reasonable use is also a limit on all water rights, as discussed ante. (Channelkeeper, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184.) But, again, the farmers do not hold: Costanich (1920) ; cf. 43 U.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A court’s factual findings must be supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record; if the record lacks such evidence, the findings are deemed insufficient and cannot be upheld.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:. . estates. [Citations.] It provides the probate court with a mechanism to determine rights in property belonging to a decedent or to someone else.’ ” (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 170–171; see also Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103 , 117–118 (Kraus); Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 75 [“Section 850 et seq. provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person.”].) 12 b. Based on the Legislative History, the Documents and Communication Sought by Parker Do Not: App.5th 154, 170–171; see also Estate of Kraus (2010) –118 (Kraus); Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:(b).) “‘Section 856 clearly and unambiguously grants the probate court the power not only to order a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled to the property in question, but also to grant other appropriate relief.’” (Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103 , 113–114.) A petitioner may recover property under section 856 and seek additional relief under section 859. (Estate of Young, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 89.) Section 859 states, in relevant part: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of [the: 25. discussed, we conclude the undeveloped claims fall well short of establishing grounds for reversal. V. Liability Under Section 859 A. Statutory Interpretation Section 850 et seq.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:1021, 1026.) Under “section 6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform Parentage Act and not rebutted.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 921; Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506 , 1514 [the intestacy statutes “incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood”]....: Thompson (2010)
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:. . that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When, as here, the facts relevant to standing are undisputed, ‘[s]tanding is a question of law we review de novo.’ ” (Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506 , 1510.) Section 872.210, subdivision (a)(2) provides the standing requirements to bring a claim to partition real property. Consistent with these general standing principles and with partition’s purpose of splitting title amongst current owners (see ante, at p. 4), the statute provides that a partition action “may be commenced and: Thompson (2010) .) Section 872.210, subdivision (a)(2) provides the standing requirements to bring a claim to partition real property.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:some cases, including the two the 7 The tenants also argue that because Probate Code section 56 defines 7 tenants cite, have made general references to trusts “owning” property. (Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M. Ross Law Group, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 196 , 208; Trustees of the Ken Lusby v. Piedmont Lumber (N.D. Cal. 2015) 132 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1180; see, e.g., Fisch, Spiegler, Ginsburg & Ladner v. Appel (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1810, 1812 (Appel).) But these imprecise references are hardly compelling, particularly when the issue being discussed did not involve an ownership: Ross Law Group, LLP (2010) ; Trustees of the Ken Lusby v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may . . . be based upon only some of the causes of action alleged in the underlying lawsuit. [Citations.]” (Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 313 , 333 (Franklin Mint).) Favorable termination must be distinguished from the lack of probable cause element of the tort of malicious prosecution. (See Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 686 [“ ‘[w]hether a prior action was terminated favorably tends to show the innocence of the defendant in the prior action: Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2010)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1035; see People v. Superior Court (Mitchell) (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 451 , 458.) “[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 701; see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 (Abelleira): Superior Court (Mitchell) (2010) .) “ack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568 , 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990): B. (2010) ; In re I.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:with its obligations to manage and distribute water equitably. (See Leavitt, supra, 157 Cal. at p. 90 ["[a]ll who enter the class may demand the use of the water"]; Butte County Water Users' Ass'n v. Rr. Comm'n of Cal. (1921) 185 Cal. 218 , 230 [company supplying water for irrigation "has not the power to take on new consumers without limit" and the matter is "one of judgment"].) 59 Code. (§ 1700, et seq.) A permittee holding appropriative water rights "may change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use,": Comm'n of Cal. (1921)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:with its obligations to manage and distribute water equitably. (See Leavitt, supra, 157 Cal. at p. 90 ["[a]ll who enter the class may demand the use of the water"]; Butte County Water Users' Ass'n v. Rr. Comm'n of Cal. (1921) 185 Cal. 218 , 230 [company supplying water for irrigation "has not the power to take on new consumers without limit" and the matter is "one of judgment"].) 59 Code. (§ 1700, et seq.) A permittee holding appropriative water rights "may change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use,": Comm'n of Cal. (1921)
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:influence is undue. Influence “is not undue unless the pressure has reached a point where the mind of the person subjected to it gives way” and “represents in truth but the conviction or desire of another.” (Estate of Anderson (1921) 185 Cal. 700 , 707, italics added.) In other words, Robert has not demonstrated why the evidence compelled a result contrary to what the trier of fact determined. (Center for Healthcare Education, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125.) Robert instead proposes five essential questions courts must 14 consider in deciding undue influence. 7: Influence “is not undue unless the pressure has reached a point where the mind of the person subjected to it gives way” and “represents in truth but the conviction or desire of another.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:alleged FCRA violations. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Factual Background “In reviewing a judgment of dismissal entered after the sustaining of a demurrer, we accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint” (Whittemore v. Owens Healthcare-Retail Pharmacy, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1194 , 1197) and “ ‘ “consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” ’ ”4 (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 4On January 5, 2022, Circle K moved this court to take judicial notice of various documents. The motion was unopposed. We deferred ruling on the motion pending consideration of the: Owens Healthcare-Retail Pharmacy, Inc. (2010) ) and “ ‘ “consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” ’ ”4 (Evans v.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:. Under California law, ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to arbitration agreements. . . . “‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. . . .’”’” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153 , 177.) Although federal and California law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements, “‘“[t]here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.”’ [Citation.]” (Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701....: Smyth (2010) .) Although federal and California law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements, “‘“here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:of books and records, Leonard did not allege his inability to inspect company records precluded him from discharging his fiduciary duty or attempting to enforce his inspection rights under section 1601 or 1602. (See generally Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903 , 916; Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1844, 1856.) 39 make him whole created an individual injury, the court awarded Leonard damages based on the overall diminution in value to the Sage Automotive Group, not the amount Michael and Joseph owed Leonard from funds used to: CDS Devco (2010) ; Havlicek v.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 232–233.) “A plaintiff may lose standing even where an actual controversy originally existed ‘but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist.’ ” (Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903 , 916–917 (Wolf).) B. Analysis Turner alleges she has standing to maintain her causes of action “both directly under the statutes that permit a director or officer to file an action against a director for misconduct under the California laws governing nonprofit public benefit corporations (§§ 5142, subd. (a)(2) and: CDS Devco (2010) –917 (Wolf).) B.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:that a deed that names “husband and wife” presumptively creates a tenancy in common in which the wife holds a 50 percent separate interest with the remaining interest being community. (Id. at p. 588; see also Miller v. Brode (1921) 186 Cal. 409 , 414 [a deed describing the couple as husband and wife presumptively created a tenancy in common]; In re Regnart’s Estate (1929) 102 Cal.App. 643, 645–646 [same].) A year later, this court in Siberell considered a dissolution action in which the wife, invoking Civil Code former section 164, claimed a: Brode (1921) ; In re Regnart’s Estate (1929) 102 Cal.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:the order denying the motion to set aside the order approving the final account is an appealable order. Standard of Review We review an order denying equitable relief for an abuse of discretion. (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215 , 1230.) “In doing so, we determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence [citation] and independently review its statutory interpretations and legal conclusions [citations].” (Ibid....: Gorham (2010)
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of 12. witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” (Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478 , 1486 (Bookout).) Given the parties’ respective burdens, the standard of review is as articulated in Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229 (Shaw). “When the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden: Dept. of Transportation (2010) (Bookout).) Given the parties’ respective burdens, the standard of review is as articulated in Shaw v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:of the respective parties.' " (Coronado Cays Homeowners Assn. v. City of Coronado (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 602, 607). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v. Chiang (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 444 , 458.) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 664; see Bautista v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App....: Chiang (2010) .) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:of the respective parties.' " (Coronado Cays Homeowners Assn. v. City of Coronado (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 602, 607). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v. Chiang (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 444 , 458.) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 664; see Bautista v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App....: Chiang (2010) .) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Cal.App.5th 299, 321.) Second, a respondent who has advanced multiple theories in support of a demurrer or judgment on the pleadings may be deemed to have abandoned those theories by failing to reassert them on appeal. (Platner v. Vincent (1921) 187 Cal. 443 , 447 22 (Planter) [“Respondent in her brief does not mention the point of defect of parties raised by the demurrer, hence it will be regarded as abandoned . . . .”].) Put another way, if the proponent of a theory does not consider it worthy of recitation to the: Vincent (1921) 22 (Planter) .) Put another way...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:Cal. at p. 639 [decedent’s niece lost her California residency when she and her husband “moved east, taking with them all of their property, and established a residence there which they maintained for nearly five years”]; Estate of Barnes (1921) 187 Cal. 566 , 568−569 [decedent’s father did not establish California residency through his intent alone where he came in haste from Illinois, bringing no property with him, and could not immediately relocate].)9 Equating “residence” with “domicile,” Weed explained that when a person moves to another place intending to remain there indefinitely, that: 13 property in Massachusetts, came to California intending to make it his permanent home, and “resided here continuously for some six years past” before his sister’s death. (Id. at p. 128.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:to Reck, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 690, Richard and Brown say the standard of review “in determining whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees has been satisfied” is de novo. Citing Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206 , 1217, Tukes counters that we should review 15 In responding to Richard and Brown’s cross-appeal, Tukes notes our authority to strike their opening brief for failure to include a statement of appealability as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B). Rule 8.204(e), and not Tukes’s cited Lester v.: County of Los Angeles (2010) , Tukes counters that we should review 15 In responding to Richard and Brown’s cross-appeal, Tukes notes our authority to strike their opening brief for failure to include...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1432 [Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows “a ‘mix and match’ approach to the manner of agreement as long as all parties agree to the same material terms”]; accord, Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242 , 1259.) In ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “the court may interpret the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement” and decide “ ‘what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon,’ ” but may not “ ‘create the material terms: Enos (2010) .) In ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “the court may interpret the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement”...
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:at pp. 1674–1678.) Third, appellants’ interpretation would render the portion of the statute requiring that delusions stem from a mental health disorder mere surplusage, contrary to fundamental precepts of statutory interpretation. (Bay Guardian Co. v. New Times Media LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 438 , 453–454.) Before concluding, we briefly address appellants’ other arguments. First, appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding Kay had testamentary capacity by selecting a single false belief Kay had about appellants—i.e....: New Times Media LLC (2010) –454.) Before concluding, we briefly address appellants’ other arguments. First, appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding Kay had testamentary capacity by se...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:234.) By contrast, we held that “[b]ad faith involves a subjective determination of the contesting party’s state of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper purpose.” (Ibid.)14 The Court of Appeal in Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1 , 7 (Smith) reached a similar conclusion regarding the 13 Probate Code section 17211, subdivision (a) provides: “If a beneficiary contests the trustee’s account and the court determines that the contest was without reasonable cause and in bad faith, the court may award against the contestant the compensation and costs: Selma Community Hospital (2010)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:tied to need, but is a penalty for bad conduct. With section 271, a lesser showing of culpable conduct is needed than under other sanctions statutes. (Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 399; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295 , 1318 [section 271 “does not require that the sanctioned conduct be frivolous or taken solely for the purpose of delay”].) The purpose behind section 271 is to promote settlement and encourage litigant cooperation; therefore, no showing of separate injury is required. (Id. at p. 1317.) Although there need not: App.4th 387, 399; In re Marriage of Tharp (2010)
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:1198.) Stacey denies engaging in such behavior. We interpret her arguments as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. It is Stacey’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate any insufficiency of the evidence. (Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 401 , 415.) “Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment … and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Powell v....: Services, Inc. (2010) .) “Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment … and we consider the evidence in the light mo...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605; City of Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488, 504; Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758 , 765; Ventura County Ry. Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 878, 880; Gantman v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566; Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 906; Powers v. Ashton (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 787.) Code: Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) ; Ventura County Ry.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:reasonable cause and in bad faith,” the Powell court offered the 23 following definition: “Bad faith involves a subjective determination of the contesting party’s state of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper purpose. ([Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866 ,] 926, fn. 47 . . .; see Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1263 . . . (Gemini) [‘ “ ‘bad faith’ means simply that the action or tactic is being pursued for an improper motive” ’].) ‘ “A subjective state of mind: Kadisha (2010) ,] 926, fn. 47 . . .; see Gemini Aluminum Corp. v.
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.’” (Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1399 , 1406.) When more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the undisputed evidence, “‘“‘the determination of whether the evidence supports one conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and a reviewing court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial evidence to support it: AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) .) When more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the undisputed evidence, “‘“‘the determination of whether the evidence supports one conclusion or the other is fo...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:convincing standard of proof commonly involved claims of this character, such as assertions that a written instrument should be reformed on the basis of fraud, mistake, or parol evidence. In one early case of this kind, Lestrade v. Barth (1862) 19 Cal. 660 , we observed that when the correction of a mistake in a written instrument was sought in equity, the evidence showing such a mistake “must be clear and convincing, making out the mistake to the entire satisfaction of the Court, and not loose, equivocal or contradictory, leaving the mistake open: Barth (1862) , we observed that when the correction of a mistake in a written instrument was sought in equity, the evidence showing such a mistake “must be clear and convincing, making out the mistake...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570 , 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments: Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:discussed in Drummey, Laisne, Walker, Dare, and Sipper. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 811-814 [citing and discussing in part IIA: Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831 ; Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879; Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.A”].) We: Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831; Walker v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Cal.App.3d at pp. 369-370), the court rejected the assertion that civil fraud had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and, “in doing so reaffirmed the standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence” (Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278 , 289, discussing Noll v. Baida, supra, 202 Cal. at p. 101). Two glaring issues arise from the conclusion that Miller, Murphy, Noll, and Lawyer unequivocally render the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5 synonymous with the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. First, the cases were: App.3d at pp. 369-370), the court rejected the assertion that civil fraud had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence and, “in doing so reaffirmed the standard of proof by a preponderance of the...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:the agency has been delegated the Legislature’s lawmaking power. 7. [Citations.] Because agencies granted such substantive rulemaking power are truly “making law,” their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes.” (Yamaha Corporation of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 , 10.) The California Legislature has conferred broad quasi-legislative authority on the Secretary of the CDCR to “prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons .…”7 (Pen. Code, § 5058, subd. (a); In re Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683, 688 (Cabrera)....: State Bd. of Equalization (1998) .) The California Legislature has conferred broad quasi-legislative authority on the Secretary of the CDCR to “prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the admini...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:bringing an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege . . . , such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 27 425.16.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 , 1115.) Further, “[t]here is no requirement that the writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body.” (Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 17, italics omitted.) There is no dispute that Kenton’s libel claim was based on the email Hilja sent to an attorney friend seeking: Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) .) Further, “here is no requirement that the writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body.” (Ludwig v.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:the documents. We deny the request as moot. Although committee reports and analyses or digests of the Legislative Counsel are relevant, a request for judicial notice of these published materials is unnecessary. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26 , 45, fn. 9.) “Citation to the material is sufficient.” (Ibid.) We accordingly consider the request for judicial notice as a citation to those materials that are published, including legislative committee reports. (Ibid.) The legislative history supports Knapp’s construction....: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) , fn. 9.) “Citation to the material is sufficient.” (Ibid.) We accordingly consider the request for judicial notice as a citation to those materials that are publishe...
- Garcia v. Garcia : Undue influence is a distinct, independent ground from testamentary capacity, and a finding of either undue influence or lack of capacity alone is sufficient to invalidate a trust amendment.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:support in the record. We reject the further claims that Chen and the court deprived them of other rights as beneficiaries under the Trust because they received countervailing benefits under the second GAL agreement. (See In re Christina B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1441 , 1454 [guardian ad litem can compromise minor’s rights with “some countervailing and significant benefit”].) 5....: We reject the further claims that Chen and the court deprived them of other rights as beneficiaries under the Trust because they received countervailing benefits under the second GAL agreement.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:damage it inflicted). The latter concerns the misuse of the tools the law affords litigants once they are in a lawsuit (regardless of whether there was probable cause to commence that lawsuit in the first place).” (Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27 , 40 (Bidna).) Abuse of process claims include lawsuits involving improper uses of the tools afforded litigants, such as the improper use of discovery (see Younger v. Solomon (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 289, 297-299); service of wrongful attachments (see White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 336, 348-351); obtaining a: Rosen (1993) (Bidna).) Abuse of process claims include lawsuits involving improper uses of the tools afforded litigants, such as the improper use of discovery (see Younger v.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:for the principle that “[t]he issue of leave to amend is always open on appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff.” (Id. at pp. 746–747; see Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127 , 1132 [plaintiff may meet burden of demonstrating an amendment would cure a pleading’s legal defect for the first time on appeal].) We assume for purposes of this appeal that the principle stating leave to amend is always open on appeal extends to motions for judgment on the pleadings. (See: Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) .) We assume for purposes of this appeal that the principle...
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) We “adopt[ ] a liberal construction of the pleading and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the asserted claims.” (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138 , 1143.) We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm the judgment if correct on any theory. (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192–1193.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s briefing on appeal largely focuses on the trial court’s sustaining the demurrers to the tort causes: Tinder, Inc. (2018) .) We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm the judgment if correct on any theory. (Young v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:(United States).) "The riparian doctrine confers upon the owner of land the right to divert the water flowing by his land for use upon his land. . . ." (Ibid.; see Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176 , 1183-1184 (Channelkeeper) [noting similar principles govern groundwater rights].) Appropriative rights "confer[] upon one who actually diverts and uses water the right to do so provided that the water is used for reasonable and beneficial uses and is 12 The parties use the term "Law of the River," which refers: City of San Buenaventura (2018) -1184 (Channelkeeper) .) Appropriative rights "confer upon one who actually diverts...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:(United States).) "The riparian doctrine confers upon the owner of land the right to divert the water flowing by his land for use upon his land. . . ." (Ibid.; see Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176 , 1183-1184 (Channelkeeper) [noting similar principles govern groundwater rights].) Appropriative rights "confer[] upon one who actually diverts and uses water the right to do so provided that the water is used for reasonable and beneficial uses and is 12 The parties use the term "Law of the River," which refers: City of San Buenaventura (2018) -1184 (Channelkeeper) .) Appropriative rights "confer upon one who actually diverts...
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:998, 1019.) The foregoing principles raise the question of how one properly pleads the facts necessary to state a violation of the CLRA based on a failure to disclose a material fact. In Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234 (Gutierrez), this court discussed earlier cases and concluded that a cause of action under the CLRA “must be stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez, at p. 1261.) B. Contentions Torres’s opposition to Hospital’s motion for judgment: Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) (Gutierrez), this court discussed earlier cases and concluded that a cause of action under the CLRA “must be stated with reasonable particularity...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:facts. (Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340, 347.) We independently review due process claims “because ‘the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236 , 241.) as (1) “Yvonne had to leave property in trust for distribution to McKie Jr.” and (2) “McKie Jr. had to outlive Yvonne before receiving his interest in the trust,” but “[n]either of these contingencies occurred.” 11 B. Mark Was Entitled to Notice of the Proceeding that Resulted in: App.4th 340, 347.) We independently review due process claims “because ‘the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.’ ” (In re Jonathan V. (2018) .
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Estate of Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894, 904; quoting, In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527−1528; accord, Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258 , 270.)8 S.H.R. views the role of the trial court under section 155 and, consequently, our standard of reviewing the court’s ruling, differently. According to him, the “role of the superior court” in evaluating a SIJ petition under section 155 is “to determine . . . whether there is evidence: Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) .)8 S.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:38 Cal.4th 653, 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709 , 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of Probate Code section 11704, subdivision (b), was used “in its ‘useful’ or ‘appropriate’ sense, and not as a freestanding requirement satisfied only by a showing of indispensability”]; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 913: City and County of San Francisco (2006) , 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . .
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:38 Cal.4th 653, 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709 , 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of Probate Code section 11704, subdivision (b), was used “in its ‘useful’ or ‘appropriate’ sense, and not as a freestanding requirement satisfied only by a showing of indispensability”]; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 913: City and County of San Francisco (2006) , 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . .
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:of the parties understands the terms of this Agreement and its legal consequences.” We agree with Knapp, however, that the language in the PMA does not conclusively establish that Tinker was represented. In re Marriage of Clarke & Akel (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 914 , (Clarke) is instructive. There, Matthew prepared an initial draft of a premarital agreement and sent it to his intended wife Claudia. (Clarke, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 917.) Matthew retained an attorney to represent Claudia in the negotiations but did not retain or consult with an attorney himself. (Ibid.): 29 Ginsberg correctly observes that the PMA stated that “(e) each party has been represented by and relied exclusively on independent counsel of his or her own choosing and paid for with his or her ow...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:the extreme circumstances where relief is ‘entirely appropriate’ such that a trial court would abuse its discretion in denying relief . . . or where relief would never be necessary or proper.” ’ (Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Assn. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 923 , 930–931.) Here, Parker set forth her declaratory relief claim in a total of four paragraphs: (1) the first paragraph incorporated all prior paragraphs of the pleading (all regarding her request for the property pursuant to section 850); (2) the second stated there was a dispute between the parties as: 19 property” under the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement or based on Schwarcz’s obligations as a former fiduciary. “The propriety of a trial court’s denial of declaratory relief involves a tw...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:determination “presents a question of fact, we apply the deferential substantial evidence standard of review” and will not “substitute [our] judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence.” (Chino Commercial Bank, N.A. v. Peters (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1163 , 1169.) “To the extent, however, that the trial court’s finding presents a question of law, we review it independently.” (Id. at p. 1170.) Upon finding that Hilja had a right to attach property belonging to Kenton in the amount of $1.73 million, the trial court here issued a writ: Peters (2010)
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:claim that public policy would permit Dae to raise, it would be overbroad under the court’s reasoning in Ferber. There are other persuasive reasons to follow Ferber here. First, subsequent cases have adopted Ferber’s reasoning. (See Fazzi v. Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280 , 1289 (Fazzi) [following Ferber in concluding that a no contest clause could not apply to a nonfrivolous action to remove a trustee for cause]; Tunstall v. Wells (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 [citing Ferber for the proposition that “ ‘[b]eneficiaries must be free to raise public policy issues so: Klein (2010) (Fazzi) ; Tunstall v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:the trial court’s ruling that neither the alternative decree nor the judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Mack v. All Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 940; Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132 , 146.) 1. Michael and Joseph Cannot Collaterally Attack the Alternative Decree as a Void Order Because the Trial Court Had Fundamental Jurisdiction To Adjudicate the Buyout Proceeding a. Applicable Law “A judgment or order is void when there is an absence of fundamental jurisdiction. However, an act in excess: Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) .) 1.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:therefore whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief” and there is no indication in the record that Parker is in receipt of the sought-after communications or documents. (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559 , 1574.) Accordingly, this appeal is not moot. 6 review de novo. (See California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) “In construing statutes, we aim ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that: City Council of Redwood City (2011) .) Accordingly, this appeal is not moot. 6 review de novo. (See California Building Industry Assn. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].) We review the decision to grant or deny declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion. (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357 , 364.) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.)46 3. The superior court erred in its grant of declaratory relief The District first contends that the: DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) .) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].) We review the decision to grant or deny declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion. (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357 , 364.) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.)46 3. The superior court erred in its grant of declaratory relief The District first contends that the: DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) .) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:1009, 1015.) An order modifying or terminating spousal support generally may be made retroactive only to the date of filing the OSC or notice of motion to modify or terminate. (§ 3653, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627 , 638.) The question of retroactivity lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, exercised generally regarding the supported party’s 55 need and the supporting party's ability to pay during the period for which a retroactive modification is sought. (Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 312–313.) Here, the trial court’s conclusion: App.4th 1009, 1015.) An order modifying or terminating spousal support generally may be made retroactive only to the date of filing the OSC or notice of motion to modify or terminate. (§ 3653, subd.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” (In re Miranda (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 757 , 762; see Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178–1179.) The critical factor in considering mootness is “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60), and we decide the question of mootness: 24 Kenton argues the trial court erred in issuing the attachment order ex parte because, among other reasons, there was no showing of irreparable harm or immediate danger.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:days between the date [the party] was ‘first presented’ with the agreement and advised to seek independent counsel, and the time [the party] signed the agreement. ([Fam. Code], § 1615[, subd.] (c)(2).)” (In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945 , 949 (Cadwell-Faso); see also Hill & Dittmer, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) Another required finding, relevant in the present case, is that the agreement was “not executed under duress, fraud, or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.” (Fam. Code, §: 25 These include the finding that the party against whom enforcement is sought had at least seven calendar days between the date was ‘first presented’ with the agreement and advised to seek independen...
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:voluntarily.” (§ 1615, subd. (a)(1).) When we construe statutory language such as this, our fundamental task is to determine the intent of the lawmakers and effectuate the intended purpose of the statute. (In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945 , 957.) We begin with the language of the statute, giving every word its usual and ordinary meaning and garnering intent from the statute as a whole. (Ibid.) If the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends. If not, we may then look to extrinsic sources,: 33 America (2004) .) The record here does not evince any unfairness to Ginsberg and therefore does not support a finding of waiver. Moreover, even if it did...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:[noting that on demurrer, the plaintiff’s allegations were bolstered by general factual allegations incorporated by reference].) Recognizing that a “plaintiff [opposing an anti-SLAPP motion] need[] show only a ‘minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability’ [citation]” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 , 989), we conclude that Carol demonstrated that the complaint was legally sufficient in alleging favorable termination....: Jammu (2011) ), we conclude that Carol demonstrated that the complaint was legally sufficient in alleging favorable termination.8 We turn next to whether Carol made an evidentiary showing that she pre...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:balanced these interests by enforcing no contest clauses so long as they were “ ‘not prohibited by some law or opposed to public policy.’ ” (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422, quoting In re Estate of 10 Kitchen (1923) 192 Cal. 384 , 388.) No contest clauses were also strictly construed. (Kitchen, at pp. 389–390.) The Legislature began codifying the law concerning no contest clauses in 1989. (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 422.) The general rule was that, unless a statute provided otherwise, “a no contest clause is enforceable against a: 10 Kitchen (1923) .) No contest clauses were also strictly construed. (Kitchen, at pp. 389–390.) The Legislature began codifying the law concerning no contest clauses in 1989. (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:creates a trust, the trustee “is a devisee under the will” because they are the person designated to receive the trust property from the estate and administer it according to the terms of the bequest. (In re Wellings’ Estate (1923) 192 Cal. 506 , 510 (Wellings).) Section 34, subdivision (b) provides that “[i]n the case of a devise . . . to a trustee on trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees.” The trustee’s legal title to the trust property vests “as of: II. Analysis Section 11700, as case law explains, provides a means for the court to adjudicate the “rights of heir, devisee, or legatee to a share of the estate.” (Estate of Flores, supra...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:that 30 would have enabled the beneficiaries to attack the accounts. (Lataillade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565, 576; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 541; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal. 220, 223; Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651 , 655, 657; Morgan v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182; see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93.)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “[W]here one is justified in relying, and does in fact rely, upon false representations, his right of action is not destroyed merely because opportunities for examination or means: Bank, , 657; Morgan v.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” (People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 120–121, italics added.) The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that double jeopardy applies. (People v. Newell (1923) 192 Cal. 659 , 667; People v. Mason (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 282, 285....: Newell (1923) ; People v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:has held similarly. (Boorstein, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 472– 473 [noting a lack of California case law recognizing “informational injury” and holding “informational injury” is not cognizable under Civil Code, section 1798.83 et seq.];15 Price v. Starbucks Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 , 1142–1143 [deprivation of information, by itself, is not a cognizable injury under former Labor Code section 226].)16 Limon has failed to allege any concrete injury in connection with his claim of informational injury....: Starbucks Corp. (2011) –1143 .)16 Limon has failed to allege any concrete injury in connection with his claim of informational injury.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:Cal.App.5th 284, 290 (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 891.) We also review de novo the probate court’s decision to apply California and not Indiana law in determining parentage between Charles and Judy. (See Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265 , 274 [noting a trial court’s choice-of-law ruling is reviewed de novo].) B. Guiding Principles “ ‘Intestate succession is governed entirely by statute.’ [Citations.] ‘The heirs of a person are those whom the law appoints to succeed at the decedent’s death to his or her estate in case of intestacy,: Grimes (2011) .) B.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:financial condition at a later time than the date of the wrongful conduct. As we have explained: “In the end, ‘[w]hat is required is evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.’ ” (Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441 , 453.) IV. Appellants Have Forfeited Their Claims Based on Civil Code section 3294. Appellants contends plaintiffs did not prove either the wrongful conduct required by Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) or the authorization or ratification required by Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). A plaintiff may recover punitive: Laibco, LLC (2011) .) IV.
- Clark v. Smith : A general assignment of a party’s real and personal property, even when the specific assets (such as shares of stock) are not itemized, is legally sufficient to effect a valid transfer of those assets...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:seeking $70,000 in spousal support, and $25,000 per month in child support. B. Trial Court Ruling The trial court issued a statement of intended decision on March 17, 2017.27 1. Prevailing Party Relying on De La Cuesta v. Benham (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1287 , the court found there was no prevailing party, concluding Mark prevailed on the overall validity of the PMA, while Kim succeeded in invalidating the spousal 27 As amended and corrected May 10, 2017, May 30, 2017, and August 8, 2017. 57 support limitation. The court noted that the PMA: Benham (2011) , the court found there was no prevailing party, concluding Mark prevailed on the overall validity of the PMA, while Kim succeeded in invalidating the spousal 27 As amended and corrected...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.) “[O]ur review is conducted in the same manner as the trial court in considering an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s decision, not its rationale. (See City of Alhambra v. D’Ausilio (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1301 , 1307.) B. Malicious Prosecution: Protected Activity It is clear that the conduct alleged in the complaint arises out of protected activity. (See Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 734-735 [malicious prosecution suits arise out of protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute]....: D’Ausilio (2011) .) B.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:applied. (Platner, supra, 187 Cal. at p. 447.) 12 In addition to Torrey Pines, the probate court relied on Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1527, and Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1526 , 1533, each of which relies on Torrey Pines. 13 Indeed, the majority’s failure to impose the actual litigation requirement was a centerpiece of the Torrey Pines dissenting opinion. (Torrey Pines, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 825.) 25 first action; (2) the first action must have proceeded to a final: App.4th 1520, 1527, and Estate of Redfield (2011) , each of which relies on Torrey Pines. 13 Indeed, the majority’s failure to impose the actual litigation requirement was a centerpiece of the Torrey...
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:determining whether [a petition] constitutes an action to contest [a] trust within the purview of section 16061.8, we look to the substance of that petition and its ‘practical effect.’ We are not bound by its label.” (Estate of Stoker (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 236 , 241.) We must consider the language of the clause, other terms of the trust, and extrinsic evidence of the trustor’s intent to determine whether an action is a contest that violates the no contest clause. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1601 (Giammarrusco); Dae v. Traver (2021) 69: 2 Elsewhere in the Probate Code, a “contest” to a will is defined as “a pleading filed with the court by a beneficiary that would result in a penalty under a no contest clause, if the no contest claus...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:into consideration “all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.” And in no event may the amount of the sanction impose “an unreasonable financial burden” against the sanctioned party. (§ 271, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278 , 291; In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 64 Cal.App.5th 218, 234.) Unless sanctions are scaled, they might discourage the economically weaker party from pursuing actions. (In re Marriage of Norton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 53, 60.) The award of section 271 sanctions is committed to the trial court’s broad: App.5th 340, 350–351.) While “need” is irrelevant, the court must take into consideration “all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:vacate a judgment].) Although some courts have stated that an equitable action to set aside a judgment based on extrinsic fraud or mistake is not subject to statutory time limits (Department of Industrial Relations v. Davis Moreno Construction, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 560 , 570–571; Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178, 181), even under this view, courts employ the statute of limitations by analogy to measure laches or unreasonable delay in an action to set aside a judgment. (Vai v. Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329, 343; Protopappas v. Protopappas (1963): Davis Moreno Construction, Inc. (2011) –571; Munoz v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:2. Applicable law Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, declaratory relief "is available 'in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties.' " (Coronado Cays Homeowners Assn. v. City of Coronado (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 602 , 607). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v. Chiang (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 444, 458.) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' ": City of Coronado (2011) ). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:2. Applicable law Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, declaratory relief "is available 'in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties.' " (Coronado Cays Homeowners Assn. v. City of Coronado (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 602 , 607). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v. Chiang (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 444, 458.) However, the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' ": City of Coronado (2011) ). "If an actual controversy exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief." (Gilb v.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:(Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926) 199 Cal. 15, 18; accord Thompson v. Clark (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1332, 1338].) For this reason, a separate two- year statute of limitations applies. (Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 14 193 Cal.App.4th 874 , 879 [discussing Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1].) Enforcement of a no contest clause is far afield from tort: such a clause is a rule set forth in a particular instrument governing the distribution of bequests, and violating the rule serves to void the relevant bequests (vindicating the trustor’s wishes),: McCloskey (2011) 14 [discussing Code Civ.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:and child relationship exists. (See Estate of Britel (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 127, 135−136 (Britel).) The case therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo. (A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 290 (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885 , 891.) We also review de novo the probate court’s decision to apply California and not Indiana law in determining parentage between Charles and Judy. (See Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 274 [noting a trial court’s choice-of-law ruling is reviewed de novo].) B. Guiding Principles “ ‘Intestate succession: App.5th 284, 290 (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) .) We also review de novo the probate court’s decision to apply California and not Indiana law in determining parentage between Charles and Judy.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243 , 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 (Steinberger).) In Crail, we explained that the clear and convincing “standard was adopted . . . for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. ‘The sufficiency of evidence: Nickel (1924) - 261; Steinberger v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:trial court misunderstood the proper scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to exercise informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.’ (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1 , 15–16.)” (Barriga, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 334.) Fiduciary Duty to Account Generally It is undisputed that as conservator, Foster had a fiduciary duty to Hudson that required Foster to account for transactions. “There is a fiduciary relationship between the conservator and conservatee. (§ 2101....: J. (2011) –16.)” (Barriga, supra, 51 Cal.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (§ 271; Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1100.) Section 271 imposes a minimum level of professionalism and cooperation to effect the policy goal favoring settlement of family law litigation and a reduction of the attendant costs. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537.) Section 271 is not tied to need, but is a: App.4th 1172, 1177; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) .) Section 271 imposes a minimum level of professionalism and cooperation to effect the policy goal favoring settlement of family law litigation.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:to be believed or not believed. This is the nature of fact finding. ‘The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095 , 1099 (Greenberg).) “In that role, the judge may reject any evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted testimony. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 979.) “We do not judge credibility on appeal. An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to: This is the nature of fact finding. ‘The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence . . . .’ ” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) (Greenberg).) “In that role...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:also Rasmussen v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 804, 808 [conclusion that trial court had erroneously granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion did not result in a finding that the action was finally decided in the plaintiff’s favor]; Mendoza v. Wichmann (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1430 , 1448, fn. 5 [in reviewing order denying special motion to strike malicious prosecution claim, the trial court’s “prior rulings did not establish probable cause as a matter of law”].) There is no change in the judgment. 4 BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J. DANNER, J. WILSON, J. Maleti v. Wickers et al.: Wichmann (2011) , fn. 5 .) There is no change in the judgment. 4 BAMATTRE-MANOU...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:examination of witnesses that serve a point rather than just spending time, that right should not be taken away from them by a draconian fee order. Zeal and vigor in the representation of clients are commendable. Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507 [.] Davenport condemned ‘attack dog’ ‘scorched earth’ litigation but that was not the case here. If only [Kim] had been litigating in this full on, intensive fashion the court might be more inclined to question the basis of this style but both parties were similar in their litigation approach.” 3.: Zeal and vigor in the representation of clients are commendable. Marriage of Davenport (2011) Davenport condemned ‘attack dog’ ‘scorched earth’ litigation but that was not the case here.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:derangements. Testamentary capacity does not depend upon the testatrix’ ability to reason logically or upon her freedom from prejudice. A belief may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity.” (In re Estate of Perkins (1925) 195 Cal. 699 , 708 (Perkins).) “The presumption is always that a person is sane, and the burden is always upon the contestants of the will to show affirmatively, and by a preponderance of the evidence, that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will.” (Perkins,: A belief may be illogical or preposterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity.” (In re Estate of Perkins (1925) (Perkins).) “The presumption is always that a person is sane...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:of an amendment to the Family Code effective 2002 (the addition of subd. (c) to § 1612), and the decisions in In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman (2000) 24 Cal.4th 39 (Pendleton), In re Marriage of 19 Howell (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1062 (Howell), and In re Marriage of Facter (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 967 (Facter). Indeed, as noted by a leading treatise, the state of the law is “unclear if a trial court is required to consider whether a spousal support limitation or waiver in a premarital agreement executed between 1986 [the effective: He raises an issue on which California law is unsettled, an uncertainty created by the timing and intent of an amendment to the Family Code effective 2002 (the addition of subd. (c) to § 1612)...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:original complaint if the amendment (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same instrumentality.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265 , 276.) A motion is not a complaint, or any other type of pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10 [“The pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints.”].) Defendants provide no authority for the proposition that the relation-back doctrine applies to anything other than pleadings....: P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) .) A motion is not a complaint, or any other type of pleading. (Code Civ.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:and without reasonable basis.’ ” (Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219, 236-237 (Powell).) To the extent a trial court’s ruling is based on factual determinations, we review the record for substantial evidence. (Carpenter & Zuckerman, LLP v. Cohen (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 373 , 378.) “ ‘We look at the evidence in support of the trial court’s finding, resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding.’ ” (Ibid.) “We consider the question of whether a statute provides for a mandatory award: Cohen (2011) .) “ ‘We look at the evidence in support of the trial court’s finding, resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent and indulge in all legitimate...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:de novo. We concur. “In reviewing a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, we decide de novo whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1545 , 1552.) “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially: AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) .) “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts prop...
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:in the individual’s devising property in a way that, except for the existence of the delusions or hallucinations, the individual would not have done.”6 6 By its terms, section 6100.5 applies only to wills. Relying on Andersen v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722 , appellants contend section 6100.5 also applies to trusts or trust amendments that, in content and complexity, closely resemble a will or codicil. (Andersen, at p. 731.) We agree and see no reason why section 6100.5 should not apply where, as here, a trust amendment reallocates the trust estate by: Hunt (2011) , appellants contend section 6100.5 also applies to trusts or trust amendments that, in content and complexity, closely resemble a will or codicil. (Andersen...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:(Stats. 1887 . . . , secs. 11, 13 [Wright Act].)" (Id. at p. 334; ibid. [rejecting lender's claim to district's water system], limited on other grounds in La Mesa, Lemon Grove & Spring Val. Irr. Dist. v. Halley (1925) 197 Cal. 50 , 59-60.) The Merchants court further explained that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions. (Merchants, at p. 334.) The California Supreme Court applied these principles in subsequent cases. (See, e.g., Hall v. Sup. Ct. (1926) 198 Cal. 373,: Halley (1925) -60.) The Merchants court further explained that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:(Stats. 1887 . . . , secs. 11, 13 [Wright Act].)" (Id. at p. 334; ibid. [rejecting lender's claim to district's water system], limited on other grounds in La Mesa, Lemon Grove & Spring Val. Irr. Dist. v. Halley (1925) 197 Cal. 50 , 59-60.) The Merchants court further explained that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions. (Merchants, at p. 334.) The California Supreme Court applied these principles in subsequent cases. (See, e.g., Hall v. Sup. Ct. (1926) 198 Cal. 373,: Halley (1925) -60.) The Merchants court further explained that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:threshold showing that a cause of action is one arising from protected activity by demonstrating the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action falls within one of the four categories identified in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Cabrera v. Alam (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1077 , 1086.) One category protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) Courts take “a fairly expansive view: Alam (2011) .) One category protects “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:& Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000): App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) ; In re E.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions. (Merchants, at p. 334.) The California Supreme Court applied these principles in subsequent cases. (See, e.g., Hall v. Sup. Ct. (1926) 198 Cal. 373 , 376-378, 383 (Hall) [affirming injunction barring landowner Imperial County judges from presiding over an action for damages against a water company whose interests were purchased by the District; as "equitable owners" of District property, they had a proprietary interest in the case]....: Ct. (1926) -378, 383 (Hall) [affirming injunction barring landowner Imperial County judges from presiding over an action for damages against a water company whose interests were purchased by the Distr...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:that these rights are indistinguishable 22 "from other private rights," and are protected under the state and federal constitutions. (Merchants, at p. 334.) The California Supreme Court applied these principles in subsequent cases. (See, e.g., Hall v. Sup. Ct. (1926) 198 Cal. 373 , 376-378, 383 (Hall) [affirming injunction barring landowner Imperial County judges from presiding over an action for damages against a water company whose interests were purchased by the District; as "equitable owners" of District property, they had a proprietary interest in the case]....: Ct. (1926) -378, 383 (Hall) [affirming injunction barring landowner Imperial County judges from presiding over an action for damages against a water company whose interests were purchased by the Distr...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:tax consequences of spousal support.” B. Discussion 1. Child Support California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate child support, expressed in statutes embodying the statewide uniform child support guideline. (§§ 4050–4076; In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039 , 1048 (Cryer).) A parent’s first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life. (§ 4053, subd. (a).) Each parent should pay for the support of the children according to his or her ability. (§ 4053, subd. (d).): Child Support California has a strong public policy in favor of adequate child support, expressed in statutes embodying the statewide uniform child support guideline. (§§ 4050–4076...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:phrase in one part of a statute than it does in other sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.” ’ ” (Roy v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1337 , 1352.) “We usually ‘presume differences in language … convey differences in meaning.’ ” (Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. U.S. (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [138 S.Ct. 2067, 2071, 201 L.Ed.2d 490]; Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 872, 879 [same].) The term “damages”: Superior Court (2011) .) “We usually ‘presume differences in language … convey differences in meaning.’ ” (Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. U.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A court cannot perform a substantial‑evidence evidentiary review when the trial’s testimonial record (transcript or settled statement) is unavailable; in such cases the court must presume the evidence...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:question, what grounds for affirmance may or must we consider? Given the lack of guidance specific to motions for judgments on the pleadings, we look to decisions rendered in the demurrer context. City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191 , 205, states the general rule that an appellate court must consider the grounds advanced and actually argued in the demurrer and may consider other legal grounds not there advanced so long as the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to address them. Thus, we have discretion to consider an: City of Fillmore (2011) , states the general rule that an appellate court must consider the grounds advanced and actually argued in the demurrer and may consider other legal grounds not there advanced...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:is warranted and we affirm the trial court’s order. 9 I. Statutory Scheme Regarding Partnerships “The [California Revised Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)], adopted in 1996, applies to all partnerships as of 1999. (§ 16111, subd. (b).).” (Corrales v. Corrales (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 221 , 226.) “[T]he association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.” (§ 16202, subd. (a).) However, “[a]n association formed under a statute other than this chapter, a predecessor statute, or: Corrales (2011)
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:[Citation.] This requirement is expressed in mandatory terms. Property once held by the decedent and transferred to heirs by a trust is part of the decedent’s estate and is subject to recovery under the same statute.” (Maxwell-Jolly v. Martin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 347 , 353-354; see Belshé v. Hope (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 161, 164.) Here, the probate court failed to provide its reasons for denying payment of the department’s claim. Nonetheless, its prior order—which denied the same claim— explained that the conservator had no authority to use the funds from the annuity because: Martin (2011) -354; see Belshé v. Hope (1995) 33 Cal.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:case. As Ali points out, such fact-intensive arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1, 18 [laches]; Rogers v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480 , 490, fn. 6 [equitable estoppel].) Nor does Janine explain how she was prejudiced or relied to her detriment where any delay by Ali merely gave her more time to administer Ramsey’s estate. 10 trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence,: County of Los Angeles (2011) , fn. 6 .) Nor does Janine explain how she was prejudiced or relied to her detriment where any delay by Ali merely gave her more time to administer Ramsey’s estate.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the case did not change. . . . The case was essentially the same after the ruling on the special motion to strike as it was before.” (Id. at p. 955; see also Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611 , 633 [no error in denying fees and costs where granting of “anti-SLAPP motion with leave to amend was the functional equivalent of a denial”].) Moran is entirely distinguishable. It does not support the conclusion that the results here were so insignificant that Attorneys derived no practical benefit from filing: Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) .) Moran is entirely distinguishable.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:opinion. Respondents’ request for judicial notice is denied. 10 10 The documents respondents ask us to take judicial notice of are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. (See Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners, LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764 , 770 [declining to take judicial notice of a document that was “not relevant to our consideration of the issues raised on appeal”]; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [matters subject to judicial notice must be relevant to issues raised on appeal], overruled on another: San Jose Family Housing Partners, LLC (2011) ; Mangini v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:entitlement to a share of the estate; it simply restricts the value of the estate to which the abuser’s percentage share is applied and prevents that person from benefiting from his or her own wrongful conduct.” (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791 , 803−804, fn. omitted.) Thus, if the co-trustees established Christine’s liability under section 259, subdivision (a), and recovered property, damages, or costs from Christine as a result of such liability, Christine could not receive 26 Subdivision (a) of section 259 provides that a “person shall be deemed to have predeceased: Section 259 does not necessarily eliminate the abuser’s entitlement to a share of the estate; it simply restricts the value of the estate to which the abuser’s percentage share is applied...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:in tort and involves its own unique policy considerations. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089 [discussing tort’s “disfavored” nature].) Malicious prosecution has historically involved personal injury to another. (Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926) 199 Cal. 15 , 18; accord Thompson v. Clark (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1332, 1338].) For this reason, a separate two- year statute of limitations applies. (Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 14 193 Cal.App.4th 874, 879 [discussing Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1].) Enforcement of a no contest clause is far afield from: Anthony, Inc. (1926) ; accord Thompson v.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A probate estate itself has no capacity to initiate or defend a lawsuit; any action must be brought by, or defended against, the estate’s personal representative or executor.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:to do so.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) B. Analysis Generally, an executor or other personal representative is the person authorized to maintain or defend an action on behalf of a probate estate. (Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381 , 1391 (Smith); see Prob. Code, § 9820; Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a).) There are limited circumstances where the beneficiary of the estate has standing to sue a third party to seek redress for an injury to the estate. Probate Code section 9654 provides that a beneficiary may: Cimmet (2011) (Smith); see Prob.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:parties to assess whether to take the expert’s deposition, to fully explore the relevant subject area at any such deposition, and to select an expert who can respond with a competing opinion on that subject area. (Dozier v. Shapiro (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1509 , 1522 (Dozier).) By requiring the parties to provide a summary of each potential expert’s anticipated testimony, the expert witness designation procedures provide the parties with the ability to intelligently determine which of the opposing party’s potential expert-witness physicians need to be deposed before trial....: Shapiro (2011) (Dozier).) By requiring the parties to provide a summary of each potential expert’s anticipated testimony, the expert witness designation procedures provide the parties with the ability...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481 [“[u]pon dismissal of [a] dissolution cause of action, there is no dissolution to avoid and, thus, no right to buy out plaintiff’s interests” under section 2000]; Panakosta, Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Management, LLC (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 612 , 635 [“[w]ithout a pending judicial dissolution action, the trial court was without jurisdiction to allow the buyout petition to proceed”]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 383 [“no court has inherent authority to decide a matter for which there is no legally recognized cause of action”]; Housing Group: Hammer Lane Management, LLC (2011) ithout a pending judicial dissolution action, the trial court was without jurisdiction to allow the buyout petition to proceed”]; Dabney v.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:2021, November 30, 2021, January 25, 2022, and February 9, 2022, were “hearings” within the meaning of section 5350(d)(1), the public conservator argues that these hearings triggered K.R.’s five-day deadline to request a trial. Citing Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953 (Joseph W.), the public conservator argues that K.R. waived her jury trial right because she failed to timely demand a trial after those appearances. We are not persuaded. Although Joseph W....: Citing Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) (Joseph W.), the public conservator argues that K.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:in summary fashion at an initial court hearing, or, upon request within five days of the initial hearing, through a full court or jury trial. (§§ 5350, subd. (d), 5365, 5362, subd. (b); [citations].)’ ” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962, italics omitted.) However, unlike the procedure for determining an initial conservatorship petition, the trial court is not statutorily required to conduct a hearing to reestablish a conservatorship. The trial court may on its own motion accept or reject the reestablishment petition without first holding a hearing if the: Code, § 1828, subd. (b)(1).) A hearing to reestablish a conservatorship is largely conducted according to the same rules that govern the initial establishment of a conservatorship.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:p. 143.) We consider individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each part may be harmonized and given effect. (See Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953 , 963.) A. Overview of the LPS Act The LPS Act has many purposes, including “end[ing] the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of persons with mental health disorders” (§ 5001, subd. (a)), “provid[ing] prompt evaluation and treatment” (id., subd....: Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) .) A.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:The cases that Abatti cites illustrate that water rights can support a taking claim. However, that point is not in dispute. The cases do not establish that Abatti adequately pled such a claim. (See Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351 , 358-359, 374- 375 [in action by riparian owners, acknowledging appropriator use that "causes substantial damage" to land with paramount right is "an impairment . . . for which compensation must be made," but remanding for consideration of reasonable use and other issues]; Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irr.: City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351, 358-359, 374- 375 [in action by riparian owners, acknowledging appropriator use that "causes substantial damage" to land with paramount right is "an impairment . .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:The cases that Abatti cites illustrate that water rights can support a taking claim. However, that point is not in dispute. The cases do not establish that Abatti adequately pled such a claim. (See Peabody v. City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351 , 358-359, 374- 375 [in action by riparian owners, acknowledging appropriator use that "causes substantial damage" to land with paramount right is "an impairment . . . for which compensation must be made," but remanding for consideration of reasonable use and other issues]; Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irr.: City of Vallejo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 351, 358-359, 374- 375 [in action by riparian owners, acknowledging appropriator use that "causes substantial damage" to land with paramount right is "an impairment . .
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:length of the proceedings? “[Washington]: Yeah. “The court: All Right. You’re sure? Are you sure? “[Washington]: Positive. “The court: Okay. Very good.” The court proceeded to hear Washington’s motion to replace his appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . After hearing from Washington and his attorney at a closed hearing, the court denied the motion. The trial court then reported in open court that the attorneys had participated in a chambers conference to discuss scheduling. Washington was present telephonically for the hearing in open court. The court stated,: Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:and Patricia’s section 388 petition to set aside the jurisdiction findings and dismiss the amended petition. 3 On September 10, 2019, following a Marsden hearing, the court denied Patricia’s request to dismiss her appointed counsel 3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 addresses the circumstances under which a criminal defendant has a right to have his or her appointed counsel replaced and the procedures to be used by the trial court in determining whether those circumstances exist. Because parents have a statutory and due process right to competent counsel in dependency proceedings,: Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 addresses the circumstances under which a criminal defendant has a right to have his or her appointed counsel replaced and the procedures to be used by the trial court in d...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:with lenity. “What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander” is not a legal argument, and we reject the invitation to employ the concept here. The trial court’s orders are presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 , 564.) Lu has not borne her burden to demonstrate error. Applying the presumption of correctness, we conclude the trial court was correct to overrule her demurrer. 4. The Trial Court Properly Denied Lu’s Motion To Strike Lu moved to strike aspects of Royals’s petition on several grounds. First, she: Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Lu has not borne her burden to demonstrate error.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion . . . .’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557 , 566 (Denham).) When the probate court ordered appellant to account, the court said, “[I]t’s a standard, when there’s a fiduciary, to do a formal account.” Appellant claims that the probate court abused its discretion and acted “in excess of [its] jurisdiction” because he did not owe a fiduciary duty: Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 (Denham).) When the probate court ordered appellant to account, the court said, “t’s a standard, when there’s a fiduciary...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:at p. 1057 [actual injury to client is not an element of breaching the duty against self-dealing]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 12, 17 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts]; Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912 , 926 [same for willful misrepresentations]; Rules Proc. of State Bar, std. 1.5(j) [listing “significant harm to the client” as an aggravating factor].) The superior court found that “Bradshaw breached the Trust when he repeatedly engaged Bay Construction, Inc., a company in which he was a principal and a substantial: State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:intentionality arises from the fact that he stood to benefit from mispresenting that the company and the Trust were engaged in arms-length transactions, as well as from the fact that he repeated the misrepresentations. (See Lee v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 927 , 942 [“repeated false statements and attempts to deceive the 28 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. court” are evidence of “corrupt and dishonest purposes”].) This conclusion is additionally bolstered by the superior court’s findings that Bradshaw lied when he testified that he had no financial: State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 927
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:p. 441.) A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises it “ ‘ “in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 270–271; 2 Cal.4th 556 , 570 [“Because we find the [statute] inapplicable, we need not and do not decide the other issues raised by the parties regarding” its interpretation]; cf. §§ 1821, subd. (c), 2340.) 13 see also Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507 [“as long as there exists ‘a reasonable or: Williams (2013) –271; inapplicable, we need not and do not decide the other issues raised by the parties regarding” its interpretation]; cf. §§ 1821, subd. (c), 2340.) 13 see also Gonzales v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:local fees.’ ” Such interpretation is consistent with a 9 fundamental rule of statutory construction, in interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look at its words and give them their “usual and ordinary meaning.” (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593 , 601.) “The statute’s plain meaning controls the courts’ interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of Legislative intent.” (Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19Cal.4th 851, 861.) And,: Up-Right, Inc. (1992) .) “The statute’s plain meaning controls the courts’ interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:local fees.’ ” Such interpretation is consistent with a 9 fundamental rule of statutory construction, in interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look at its words and give them their “usual and ordinary meaning.” (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593 , 601.) “The statute’s plain meaning controls the courts’ interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure expression of Legislative intent.” (Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19Cal.4th 851, 861.) And,: Up-Right, Inc. (1992) .) “The statute’s plain meaning controls the courts’ interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) Regardless of a trial court’s stated reasons for sustaining a demurrer, we must affirm “ ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962 , 967.) “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law” that we also review de novo. (People v. Jacobo (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 42.) This 5“The settlor is the person creating the trust. The trustee holds the property in trust for the beneficiary.” (13 Witkin, Summary of: Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) .) “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law” that we also review de novo. (People v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:811, 821 (Wilson), superseded by statute as stated in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 547-548.) The plaintiff must show that its claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057 , 1061 (Park).) Thus, “[o]nly a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute— i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, original italics.) .: Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) (Park).) Thus, “nly a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute— i.e.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:to show a likelihood of success on his No Contest Petition in the second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure. In doing so, we employ a de novo standard of review. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057 , 1067.) 2. The Law Concerning No Contest Provisions No contest clauses respect the intent of a donor by “discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are frustrated by the donative scheme of the instrument.” (Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412, 422 (Donkin).) However, that interest is in tension with: Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) .) 2.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:‘[t]he judicial remedy of mandamus is not a civil action, but a special proceeding of a civil nature, which is available for specified purposes and for which the code provides a separate procedure’ ”]; Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109 , 1115 [“[a]n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as special proceedings of a civil nature well before the enactment of section 1094.5. (See, e.g., Jones v. Board: John Muir Health (2017) n application for a writ of administrative mandamus is a ‘special proceeding of a civil nature’ ”].) In fact, the Legislature referred to applications for a writ of mandate as...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:the absence of a concrete injury. (National Paint, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 761–762 [noting Code of Civil Procedure section 526a expressly authorizes citizen suits in the public interest].) Limon further relies on Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241 (Weatherford) and White, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 762, for the proposition that concrete injury is not a requirement for standing in California. Like National Paint, Weatherford 9 Health & Safety Code, sections 25249.5–25249.13. 18. and White also involved public interest standing—i.e....: City of San Rafael (2017) (Weatherford) and White, supra, 13 Cal.3d at page 762, for the proposition that concrete injury is not a requirement for standing in California.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:of a cause of action against the defendant.” ’ ” (Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743, 758.) “At its core, standing concerns a specific party’s interest in the outcome of a lawsuit.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241 , 1247 (Weatherford); Code Civ. Proc., § 367 [“every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute”].) “ ‘The prerequisites for standing to assert statutorily-based causes of action are determined from the statutory language, as well as the underlying: City of San Rafael (2017) (Weatherford); Code Civ.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:petition. We also decline to consider arguments Hankin made for the first time in his reply brief, including his assertions the trial court made other incorrect decisions and engaged in supposed wrongdoing. They are forfeited. (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181 , 197 [“Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”]; Shih v. Starbucks Corp. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1071, fn. 4 [the plaintiff “forfeited this argument . . . by failing to raise it in her opening brief”].) II. The Trial Court Did: Mickel (2016) ; Shih v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:and costs.” The purpose of the statute is to “compensate[e] the prevailing defendant for the undue burden of defending against litigation designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. [Citation.]” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318 , 327-328.) As explained by one court, “the statute reflects a clear preference for awarding fees and costs to prevailing 23 Attorneys filed a notice of appeal identifying four orders they were challenging. They also filed an amended notice of appeal adding a fifth challenged order. Besides the August 13,: State Bar of California (2017) -328.) As explained by one court, “the statute reflects a clear preference for awarding fees and costs to prevailing 23 Attorneys filed a notice of appeal identifying fo...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:not differentiate among individual entities, or at least among the entity defendants and the UCNP entities.10 10 Michael and Joseph recognize their collateral attack on the consent decree is limited to jurisdictional arguments. (See Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330 , 339; Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950-951.) In a nod to that limitation, Michael and Joseph argue the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by failing to include in the buyout value “the economic impact of Leonard’s derivative allegations and prayer in his verified complaint.” This is not: Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) ; Armstrong v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:will appear in court as required during the criminal prosecution. The surety pledges to pay the court the specified bond amount if it is unable to secure the defendant’s presence. (See, e.g., People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35 , 42.) If the defendant subsequently fails to appear as required and the failure to appear is not excused, the court must declare the bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314; People v. North River: Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) .) If the defendant subsequently fails to appear as required and the failure to appear is not excused, the court must declare the bail forfeited.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:“is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.” ’ ” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35 , 42 (Financial Casualty).) If the defendant “fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the court must declare the bail forfeited.” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559, 563 (North River–Watts); see Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (a);1 Financial Casualty, at p. 42.) This “forfeiture: Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) (Financial Casualty).) If the defendant “fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the court must declare the bail forfeited.” (People v.
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:protect their gifts from the donees’ creditors. [Citation.] Providing donors some measure of control over their gifts encourages donors to make those gifts, to the benefit of the donor, the beneficiary, and ultimately the beneficiary’s creditors.” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844 , 849.) California generally follows the common law of trusts, except as modified by statute. (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1074....: Reynolds (2017) .) California generally follows the common law of trusts, except as modified by statute. (Estate of Giraldin (2012) .) The law regarding spendthrift trusts is stated as follows: “Under...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:that there was no prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. Under Civil Code section 1717, parties to a contract may provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717; DisputeSuite.com LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968 , 973.) The “prevailing” party is the party who recovered greater relief in the action on the contract. (Civ. Code, §1717, subd. (b)(1).) A trial court determines the prevailing party upon final resolution of the contract claims and by making a comparison of the extent to which each party has: Scoreinc.com (2017) .) The “prevailing” party is the party who recovered greater relief in the action on the contract. (Civ.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:the Courts of Appeal. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170-171; Osal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1200; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326; In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038. 16 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. C. The Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof Informs Appellate Review for Substantial Evidence We now dispel this: Assn. (1991) ; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.
- Conservatorship of Martha : Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal, meaning the appellate court considers them anew without deference to the trial court’s conclusions.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:contradicted or uncontradicted, if it determines that he testified falsely as to some matters covered by his testimony (Nelson v. Black, 43 Cal.2d 612 . . .).” (Halagan v. Ohanesian (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 14, 21; accord Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440 , 455.) Lynne claimed that on the day she returned to the family home to see her dying father, she saw an alternative estate planning document which stated that her parents’ 24 estate would be divided equally among the four daughters. She asserted that because the Trust instruments before the: Schwartz (2016) .) Lynne claimed that on the day she returned to the family home to see her dying father, she saw an alternative estate planning document which stated that her parents’ 24 estate would...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:wholly irreconcilable with the evidence. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hen the evidence gives rise to conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which supports the finding of the trial court, the trial court’s finding is conclusive on appeal. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844 , 851.) “Normally, we must presume the trial court was aware of and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law. [Citations.]” (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299, 333–334 (Barriga)....: Campbell (2016) .) “Normally, we must presume the trial court was aware of and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law. ” (Barriga v.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:to obtain a ruling declaring whether a particular petition would violate an instrument’s no contest clause before that petition was actually filed. (Hearst, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202; see former section 21320; Funsten v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 959 , 974 [safe harbor procedure no longer available after statutory revisions in 2010].) 14 would violate the trust’s no contest clause, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1199–1200.) The trust instrument in Hearst provided the trustees with the authority to hold assets regardless of the income they: A. (2016) .) 14 would violate the trust’s no contest clause, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1199–1200.) The trust instrument in Hearst provided the trustee...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:it was precluded by fraud or the mistake of the other party from participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393 , 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v.: Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:wrong court could forfeit the defendant’s right to have venue changed where the evidence shows the defendant intended to waive the right or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court where the action was commenced. (Lyons v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 579 , 583-584.) Thomas demanded the action be moved to Mono County, then argued in his demurrers that the case should be moved to Riverside County, but he did not file a motion to change venue. “Waiver is ordinarily a question of fact” (id. at p. 583), and it is one: Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 579
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:20 Cal.4th at pp. 811-814 [citing and discussing in part IIA: Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831; Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879 ; Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.A”].) We briefly discuss Drummey given its importance in the analysis that: City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879; Dare v.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:evaluated the degree of harm as an aggravating factor in the discipline phase. (See Connor, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1057 [actual injury to client is not an element of breaching the duty against self-dealing]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 12 , 17 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts]; Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912, 926 [same for willful misrepresentations]; Rules Proc. of State Bar, std. 1.5(j) [listing “significant harm to the client” as an aggravating factor].) The superior court found that “Bradshaw breached the Trust: State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 12, 17 ; Barreiro v.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172 , 178 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts].) Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing judge found to support culpability under count one. The OCTC argues the Review Department improperly disregarded five factual findings when it dismissed this count for want of clear and convincing evidence.: State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 .) Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing judge found to support culpability under count one.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:be awarded as a sanction absent specific authorization or agreement of the parties.” (Sino Century, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.) Ordinarily we disregard arguments not made in an opening brief absent good cause. (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285 , 295, fn. 11.) Here, good cause is not shown. In any event, the argument that the probate court awarded fees as a sanction in contravention of Sino Century is without merit. The probate court expressly declined to order sanctions but awarded expenses in an amount ($4,000) that was less: City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11.) Here, good cause is not shown.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:and elsewhere, that were previously considered and rejected in Ashlock I. II. Forfeiture of New Claims in the Reply Brief* The prohibition against raising new issues in a reply brief is well established. (E.g., Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285 , 295, fn. 11 [“Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant”]; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125 [“an appellant’s failure to discuss an issue in its opening brief forfeits the issue on appeal”].): City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 ; Christoff v.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:2 Cal.4th 556, 570 [“Because we find the [statute] inapplicable, we need not and do not decide the other issues raised by the parties regarding” its interpretation]; cf. §§ 1821, subd. (c), 2340.) 13 see also Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500 , 507 [“as long as there exists ‘a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification . . . for the [trial court’s decision], such action will not be . . . set aside’ ”].) “[A] court may impose sanctions . . . if the court concludes the pleading was filed for: Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507 , such action will not be . . . set aside’ ”].) “ court may impose sanctions . . . if the court ...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:contract claims, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which party prevailed on the contract or whether, on balance, neither party prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.” (Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103 , 1109 (Scott Co.) [trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining plaintiff was the prevailing party even though it received less than 25 percent of the damages it sought].) In exercising that discretion, our high court has counseled, “the trial court is to compare the relief awarded on: Blount, Inc. (1999)
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:that Barling had a relationship with Frank III. B. Analysis “ ‘Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]’ ([People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135 ,] 1143 [(SpeeDee)].) As to disputed factual issues, a reviewing court’s role is simply to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact; ‘the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for . . ....: SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999)
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:a document on demurrer, it does not “accept[ ] a particular interpretation of its meaning,” when the meaning is in dispute. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 (Fremont); StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449 , 457, fn. 9.) Contrary to Adam’s contention, the trial court did not take judicial notice of the meaning or a particular interpretation of the Trust terms. The court considered the terms as stated in the Trust and independently determined whether they precluded appellants from recovering under section 21622 as: Superior Court (1999) , fn. 9.) Contrary to Adam’s contention, the trial court did not take judicial notice of the meaning or a particular interpretation of the Trust terms.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:that an appropriate degree of [judicial] scrutiny attaches to findings to which this standard applies.” (Id. at p. 1006.) Second, substantial evidence review is more deferential to the fact finder than independent judgment review. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805 , 818 & fn. 10 (Fukuda).) And, third, the purpose of independent judgment review is to protect individual liberty. (Id. at p. 816, fn....: City of Angels (1999) & fn. 10 (Fukuda).) And, third, the purpose of independent judgment review is to protect individual liberty. (Id. at p. 816, fn.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:testimony, as she does on appeal. We conclude Tammy has forfeited the claim of factual error in the statement of decision with regard to Aanestad’s testimony for purposes of appeal. (See Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372 , 1380 [a party forfeits any defects in the statement of decision by failing to file timely objections].) “Code of Civil Procedure section 634 and California Rules of Court, rule 232, taken together, clearly contemplate any defects in the trial court’s statement of decision must be brought to the court’s: Co. (1993) .) “Code of Civil Procedure section 634 and California Rules of Court, rule 232, taken together...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the parties’ demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and other sources. (Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 876; Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern California Financial Corp. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 191 , 204.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evaluation of the parties’ relative success in the proceedings....: Southern California Financial Corp. (2018) .) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evaluation of the parties’ relative success in the proceedings.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:1395 continued . 19 plaintiff show that all claims in the underlying action were unsuccessful and that each of them was resolved on the merits. Here, unlike Friedberg and similar cases citing that case (see, e.g., Lane v. Bell (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 61 ; StaffPro, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 1392), no portion of the underlying probate proceeding was resolved in favor of the claimant, McLaughlin. We hold that where the prior-suit defendant prevailed unequivocally on all claims in the lawsuit and at least one claim was disposed of substantively in the defendant’s favor, there: Bell (2018) ; StaffPro, supra, 136 Cal.
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:arbitrate exists is a threshold issue of contract formation and state contract law. [Citations.] The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.” (Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835 , 843-844.) With respect to the standard of review, “‘[t]here is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations....: Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) -844.) With respect to the standard of review, “‘here is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:under the Irrigation Act is the improvement, by irrigation, of the lands within the district." (Jenison v. Redfield (1906) 149 Cal. 500, 503 (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1927) 200 Cal. 318 , 329 (Crawford) 20 ["prime object and purpose" is to "provide water for the use of its inhabitants and land owners for irrigation and domestic purposes"]; City of Modesto v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 504, 507 (Modesto) [district's "main purpose is to develop, preserve and conserve water for: Dist. (1927) (Crawford) 20 ; City of Modesto v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:under the Irrigation Act is the improvement, by irrigation, of the lands within the district." (Jenison v. Redfield (1906) 149 Cal. 500, 503 (Jenison).) Their core purposes include supporting other beneficial uses as well. (Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (1927) 200 Cal. 318 , 329 (Crawford) 20 ["prime object and purpose" is to "provide water for the use of its inhabitants and land owners for irrigation and domestic purposes"]; City of Modesto v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 504, 507 (Modesto) [district's "main purpose is to develop, preserve and conserve water for: Dist. (1927) (Crawford) 20 ; City of Modesto v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:we do not address these points further. We note that water service has been recognized as a property interest in other contexts. (Cf., e.g., Erwin, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 194; De Boni Corp. v. Del Norte Water Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1163 , 1167-1168 ["shareholder's stake in a mutual water company is a property interest," with consumers entitled to receive water].) 20 We also reject the District's reliance on Clough, supra,12 Cal.2d at pp. 388-389 to contend that "it is futile to attempt to discover the 'beneficiaries . . . .' ": Del Norte Water Co. (2011) -1168 .) 20 We also reject the District's reliance on Clough, supra...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:we do not address these points further. We note that water service has been recognized as a property interest in other contexts. (Cf., e.g., Erwin, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 194; De Boni Corp. v. Del Norte Water Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1163 , 1167-1168 ["shareholder's stake in a mutual water company is a property interest," with consumers entitled to receive water].) 20 We also reject the District's reliance on Clough, supra,12 Cal.2d at pp. 388-389 to contend that "it is futile to attempt to discover the 'beneficiaries . . . .' ": Del Norte Water Co. (2011) -1168 .) 20 We also reject the District's reliance on Clough, supra...
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Conservatorship of A.B.
Context from opinion:“accomplished anything” is not the test for just and reasonable compensation. The public guardian is entitled to “compensation for expenses that the conservator believed were necessary to benefit the conservatee [if] that belief was objectively reasonable.” (Conservatorship of Cornelius (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1198 , 1205.) Nor is it dispositive that the final petition for reappointment was ultimately dismissed. (See ibid....: The public guardian is entitled to “compensation for expenses that the conservator believed were necessary to benefit the conservatee that belief was objectively reasonable.
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Conservatorship of Brokken
Context from opinion:an order fixing and allowing compensation and reimbursement of costs, provided that the court determines that the petition was filed in the best interests of the conservatee.” 2 Respondents maintained the equitable principles set forth in Conservatorship of Cornelius (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1198 (Cornelius), support an award of attorney fees under the unique circumstances of this case. The probate court granted the fee request, but not without reservation. It found the statutory language “clear” but determined Cornelius “does open the door” to fees....: 2 Respondents maintained the equitable principles set forth in Conservatorship of Cornelius (2011) (Cornelius), support an award of attorney fees under the unique circumstances of this case.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:to a complaint, cross-complaint or answer” “may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading”]; see also id. § 430.10 [party “may object, by demurrer” on enumerated grounds]; Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470 , 1482.) Indeed, Code of Civil Procedure part 2, title 6, chapter 3, article 1, which includes these provisions, is titled “Objections to Pleadings.” Reading these Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure statutes together, an interested party may file a demurrer to a petition under the Probate Code “at: County of El Dorado (2011) .) Indeed, Code of Civil Procedure part 2, title 6, chapter 3, article 1, which includes these provisions, is titled “Objections to Pleadings.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:this court. We take judicial notice of the articles of incorporation for Creative Genius, Inc. from the California Secretary of State’s website. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Friends of Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1470 , 1484, fn. 12 [taking judicial notice of articles of incorporation filed with California Secretary of State on appellate court’s own motion].) 6 knew Goodman and Thall “had a company called Creative Genius, Inc.” However, Jones had no recollection of being told there was a company incorporated to do business: County of El Dorado (2011) , fn. 12 .) 6 knew Goodman and Thall “had a company called Creative Genius, Inc.” However...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:Wheeler LLC (2010) 48 Cal.4th 68, 79, fn. 2, italics added.) “A cause of action is simply the obligation sought to be enforced against the defendant.” (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 657; see CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 158 , 165 [same]; Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 630 [“ ‘[A] “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.’ ”].) Consistent: App.2d 651, 657; see CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2011) ; Hayes v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:for the defenses set forth in section 1305, and these must be asserted within the limited period or the court loses jurisdiction.”]; People v. Ramirez (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 391, 401 [same]; see People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 712 , 719 (North River–Madriles).) Moreover, to the extent a forfeiture proceeding involves a cause of action, it is an action against the surety for the surety’s breach of the bond. 8 (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 657-658 [“when there is a breach of the” “ ‘contract between the: Co. (2011)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:allocation gives the Board discretion to select among multiple apportionment methods and the EDP also includes sharing within farm units and a clearinghouse. Abatti's specific arguments here are no more persuasive. He first cites Willard v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. (1927) 201 Cal. 726 to suggest that straight line apportionment is inequitable. In that case, the California Supreme Court held that irrigation districts may charge rates in lieu of assessments, and noted potential issues with assessment systems. (Id. at p. 744; id. at pp....: Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. (1927) to suggest that straight line apportionment is inequitable.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:allocation gives the Board discretion to select among multiple apportionment methods and the EDP also includes sharing within farm units and a clearinghouse. Abatti's specific arguments here are no more persuasive. He first cites Willard v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. (1927) 201 Cal. 726 to suggest that straight line apportionment is inequitable. In that case, the California Supreme Court held that irrigation districts may charge rates in lieu of assessments, and noted potential issues with assessment systems. (Id. at p. 744; id. at pp....: Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist. (1927) to suggest that straight line apportionment is inequitable.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:the matter, and the trial court decides whether an actual conflict exists]; see generally People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813–814 [failure to press for a ruling results in forfeiture of issue on appeal].) Citing Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197 (Kennedy), Herren appears to suggest Webb should have been disqualified sua sponte, 27 despite her failure to seek his disqualification. We are unpersuaded....: Eldridge (2011) (Kennedy), Herren appears to suggest Webb should have been disqualified sua sponte, 27 despite her failure to seek his disqualification.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:an attorney from acting both as an advocate and a witness in the same proceeding, has long been a tenet of ethics in the American legal system, and traces its roots back to Roman 10 Law.” (Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1208 (Kennedy).) California’s current version of the advocate-witness rule provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony: Eldridge (2011) (Kennedy).) California’s current version of the advocate-witness rule provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless:...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:discussion of those claims on pages 47–48 of her opening brief and deprived Gabriel of the opportunity to refute her belated assertions. (Reichardt v. Hoffman, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 764; accord, Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289 , 1294–1295.) In the final section of her reply, Stacey contends a “rush[] to judgment” by the trial court “led to [a] miscarriage of justice warranting a reversal.” The “rush to judgment” language also appears in her opening brief in the context of alleging judicial bias during the 2014–2016 time: App.4th at p. 764; accord, Provost v. Regents of University of California (2011) –1295.) In the final section of her reply, Stacey contends a “rush to judgment” by the trial court “led to miscarriage...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:or order”].) A judgment or order that is not void but “merely” voidable, however, is generally not subject to collateral attack. (See People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661 (American Contractors); Adoption of Myah M. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1518 , 1531.) “When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. [Citations.] That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by ‘principles of estoppel,: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) (American Contractors); Adoption of Myah M. (2011)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 664; see Bautista v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 716 , 733-734 (Bautista) ["[d]eclaratory relief . . . does not confer 75 upon the court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].) We review the decision to grant or deny declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion. (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v.: State of California (2011) -734 (Bautista) eclaratory relief . . . does not confer 75 upon the court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:the power to grant declaratory relief " 'does not purport to confer upon courts the authority to control administrative discretion.' " (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 664; see Bautista v. State of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 716 , 733-734 (Bautista) ["[d]eclaratory relief . . . does not confer 75 upon the court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].) We review the decision to grant or deny declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion. (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v.: State of California (2011) -734 (Bautista) eclaratory relief . . . does not confer 75 upon the court the authority to make pronouncements in a field reserved to other branches of government"].
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:in all other respects, and remand with directions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 The District "is the sole source of fresh water for the Imperial Valley, and all of that water comes from the Colorado River." (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758 , 784 (QSA Cases).) Approximately 97 percent of the water that the District distributes is used for agriculture....: We reverse the judgment and writ of mandate in all other respects, and remand with directions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 The District "is the sole source of fresh water for the Imperial Valle...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:in all other respects, and remand with directions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 The District "is the sole source of fresh water for the Imperial Valley, and all of that water comes from the Colorado River." (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758 , 784 (QSA Cases).) Approximately 97 percent of the water that the District distributes is used for agriculture....: We reverse the judgment and writ of mandate in all other respects, and remand with directions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 The District "is the sole source of fresh water for the Imperial Valle...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905 , 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94: A. (2011) ; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:of the estate and its beneficiaries. The Probate Code provides that the representative may be surcharged by the probate court for losses caused by such a breach of fiduciary duty. (Prob. Code, § 9601, subd. (a); Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971 , 988.) The beneficiary may also have an independent cause of action for damages against the representative. (Prob. Code, § 9603.) Where the beneficiary and the personal representative of the estate are the same person, however, neither the Probate 4 The Welfare and Institutions Code defines the sort of “representative”: Code, § 9601, subd. (a); Estate of Kampen (2011) .) The beneficiary may also have an independent cause of action for damages against the representative. (Prob.
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:a requirement Kirchner did not impose: participation in mediation at their expense. In effect, the court imposed a terminating sanction against the nonappearing beneficiaries. The majority countenances this result. I would not. Equity abhors a forfeiture. (Hand v. Cleese (1927) 202 Cal. 36 , 46.) And forfeiture is an especially harsh result here: It elevates the probate court’s power to order mediation (§ 17206) over myriad provisions of the Probate Code, including those related to notice requirements (§ 17203), hearings and objections (§ 1040 et seq....: Cleese (1927) .) And forfeiture is an especially harsh result here: It elevates the probate court’s power to order mediation (§ 17206) over myriad provisions of the Probate Code, including those relat...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:right or authority to disturb such a finding, even though the appellate court may be of a contrary opinion as to the weight of such evidence . . . .’ ” (Chamberlain, at p. 369, quoting Noll v. Baida (1927) 202 Cal. 98 , 15 101.) In the Chamberlain court’s view, “[t]he phrase ‘determine the weight of the evidence’ in Noll is virtually identical with that contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5” and thus the court concluded a trial court must “examine the evidence favoring the administrative determination . . .: Baida (1927)
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:21 meaning and content of the contract upon which one relies constitutes neglect of a legal duty such as will preclude recovery for unilateral mistake of fact.” The court of appeal in In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046 , at page 1054 (Hill & Dittmer), cited that language from Wal-Noon in rejecting a claim that a premarital agreement was entered into involuntarily.13 (See also Hogoboom & King, supra, at ¶ 9.55, pp. 9-24 [“absent some credible evidence showing consent was obtained through fraud or compulsion, a party who: App.4th at p. 1589 .) However, Stewart did not explain how the other party’s knowledge would change the result under section 1577 if failure to read a contract is neglect of a legal duty under Casey.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:with her contentions. A. Standard of Review In determining the voluntariness of a premarital agreement, the reviewing court accepts such factual determinations of the trial court as are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046 ,1051–1052 (Dittmer); Dawley, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 354–355; In re Marriage of Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 677, 682 [determination as to extrinsic fraud in connection with a marital settlement agreement is accepted on appeal if supported by substantial evidence]; “‘“In reviewing the evidence on . . ....: Standard of Review In determining the voluntariness of a premarital agreement, the reviewing court accepts such factual determinations of the trial court as are supported by substantial evidence.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:revised effective January 1, 2020. The version of the statute in force at the time the parties executed the PMA governs. (In re Marriage of Melissa (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 598, 611- 612; In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046 , 1057.). 28 party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party shall, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that he or she received the information required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that information. [¶](4) The agreement and the writings executed: App.4th 598, 611- 612; In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) .). 28 party prior to signing the agreement.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:a minor’s claim with court approval, thus provides the applicable rule. (See § 1000 [except where Probate Code provides an applicable rule, the rules of practice in civil actions applies].) 51 approve a minor’s compromise. (Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1337, fn. 2 (Pearson); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 12:579; see Burge v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 614 [“[a]lthough it would ordinarily be better practice to hold a hearing and take testimony, the: Superior Court (2012) , fn. 2 (Pearson); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 12:579; see Burge v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:on a separate theory, i.e., the incompatibility of contract and quantum meruit counts where the quantum meruit count fails to deny the existence of the contract alleged in support of the contract count (see Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342 , 1389 (Klein)). 20 On appeal, Tukes chose to address in her opening brief only the theories relied upon by the probate court as well as claim preclusion. Remarkably, Richard failed to address in his respondent’s brief either of the grounds the probate court relied on for decision. Indeed, his: A., Inc. (2012) (Klein)). 20 On appeal, Tukes chose to address in her opening brief only the theories relied upon by the probate court as well as claim preclusion.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:Court Erroneously Ordered Accounting Because Appellant Was Not a Fiduciary A probate court generally has discretion to grant or deny a petition for an accounting, and the court’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407 , 1413 [“Determining the need for an accounting is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion”]; Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 517, 520.) “‘Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. The burden is: Kimball (2012) ; Esslinger v. Cummins (2006) 144 Cal.
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:of the trustee’s actions. (Ibid.) In another case, a probate court’s sua sponte request for an accounting under section 17206 was affirmed as part of the probate court’s duty to supervise the administration of the trust. (Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407 , 1413.) Dismissal of a petition altogether is not an incidental issue; it is the complete resolution of the petition. The probate court does not have the power to dismiss an action sua sponte and without notice when, as here, 8 there are disputed issues. The Probate Code requires that: The court took these actions sua sponte, as part of its duties to supervise administration of the trust, and to inquire into the prudence of the trustee’s actions. (Ibid.) In another case...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237 , 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th: S. (2011) ; In re K.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:there is a disparity in their respective access to funds to retain legal counsel, and (3) whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. (§ 2030, subds. (a)(1), (2); In re Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626 , 662 (Sorge) [statutory 29 Section 2030, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that “[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, . . . the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation, including access early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if: 65 1. Sections Under sections , the trial court may make a need-based award of attorney fees and costs where the making of the award and its amount are just and reasonable given the relative circumsta...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:or her attorney without financial assistance because the court must consider the parties’ relative circumstances. (§ 2032, subd. (b).) Indeed, the other party’s superior ability to pay may itself make a fees and costs award “just and reasonable.” (Sorge, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 660 –661.) In Sorge, although 69 the wife had abundant financial assets of her own, the court found no abuse of discretion in awarding her $260,000 in total fees given the “huge disparity” in parties’ respective assets. In In re Marriage of O’Connor (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 877, 884, there was no: Section 2032 authorizes a need- based fee award even though the applicant spouse might be able to pay his or her attorney without financial assistance because the court must consider the parties’ rela...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:Court put it almost 100 years ago, “The denial in the answer” put the allegations “directly in issue and made it necessary for the plaintiff to introduce evidence thereof before he could become entitled to judgment.” (Cuneo v. Lawson (1928) 203 Cal. 190 , 193–194 (Cuneo).) “[W]here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034.) And an answer that denies material allegations is a: Lawson (1928) –194 (Cuneo).) “here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:Court put it almost 100 years ago, “The denial in the answer” put the allegations “directly in issue and made it necessary for the plaintiff to introduce evidence thereof before he could become entitled to judgment.” (Cuneo v. Lawson (1928) 203 Cal. 190 , 193–194 (Cuneo).) “[W]here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034.) And an answer that denies material allegations is a: Lawson (1928) –194 (Cuneo).) “here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:respondent of the opportunity to answer it or requires the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.” (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3 (Campos); SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549 , 573, fn. 18 [“[A]ppellant cannot salvage a forfeited argument by belatedly addressing the argument in its reply brief”].) Gary has not provided a “good reason” for waiting until the reply brief to discuss the probate court’s potentially dispositive ruling regarding his standing to prosecute the section 1101 claims....: Five Bridges Foundation (2012) , fn. 18 ppellant cannot salvage a forfeited argument by belatedly addressing the argument in its reply brief”].
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:standard applies here. Under this standard, we “accept[] the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard[] the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580 , 595.) A trial court’s exercise of its equitable powers is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1256; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272.) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers.: Under this standard, we “accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not *See footnote, ante, page 1. 32. the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580 , 589.) Stacey begins by insisting she did not commit financial abuse of a dependent adult. In Ashlock I, we affirmed the trial court’s opposite finding, which was made as to “the properties that were part of the 1993 Trust,” i.e., two of the 18 properties Stacey had transferred into: App.5th 219, 231.) This is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not *See footnote, ante, page 1. 32.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.’ [Citation.]” (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696 , 704.) 2. The Order Sustaining Royals’s Demurrer Was Erroneous Because the arguments advanced by Lu in her appeal of the trial court’s order sustaining with prejudice Royals’s demurrer to the cross- petition are limited to Lu’s fourth count seeking correction of Adams’s death certificate and sixth count for financial: App.4th 36, 53.) “ ‘In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context...
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:. . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1099 (Greenberg).) “In that role, the judge may reject any evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted testimony. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964 , 979.) “We do not judge credibility on appeal. An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to predicate reversible error.” (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175, citing Greenberg, supra, at p. 1097.) “[T]he trier of fact may disregard all of the testimony of: App.4th 1095, 1099 (Greenberg).) “In that role, the judge may reject any evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted testimony. ” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:the prior litigation, which is not the case here. (See, e.g., Colonies Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 689, 694 [validity of settlement agreement was litigated in prior validation action]; Eiskamp v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 97 , 100, 105-106 [challenge to 2002 ordinance increasing groundwater augmentation charges was barred by 2008 stipulated judgment that addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App....: Agency (2012) , 105-106 ; Griffith v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:the prior litigation, which is not the case here. (See, e.g., Colonies Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 689, 694 [validity of settlement agreement was litigated in prior validation action]; Eiskamp v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 97 , 100, 105-106 [challenge to 2002 ordinance increasing groundwater augmentation charges was barred by 2008 stipulated judgment that addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App....: Agency (2012) , 105-106 ; Griffith v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:added.) Under section 15402, when “the trust instrument is silent on modification, the trust may be modified in the same manner in which it could be revoked, either statutorily or as provided in the trust instrument.” (King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 , 1192 (King).) When the trust instrument “specifies how the trust is to be modified,” however, that “method must be used to amend the trust.” (Id. at pp. 1192, italics added, 1193.) Section 15402 “ ‘recognizes a trustor may bind himself or herself to a specific method of . .: Lynch (2012)
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:trust agreement allowed amendment in the manner attempted by the 2017 beneficiary list and 2018 amendment. In her brief, Haggerty continued to argue that the trust agreement required acknowledgment under the Civil Code. Relying primarily on King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (King), Haggerty reasoned that the trust agreement provided for a method of amendment, so that method must be followed in order to validly amend the agreement. Haggerty contended the 2016 amendment was valid, because it was acknowledged, but the 2017 beneficiary list and 2018 amendment were not....: (2012) (King), Haggerty reasoned that the trust agreement provided for a method of amendment, so that method must be followed in order to validly amend the agreement.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:the enactment of sections 15401 and 15402 in 1986, both revocation and modification of trusts were governed by former section 2280 of the Civil Code. (Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 961–963 & fn. 6; see King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 , 1191 (King).) At the time it was repealed, Civil Code section 2280 provided that “[u]nless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust, every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor by writing filed with the trustee.” (Huscher, at p. 963.) The first part of this sentence: Lynch (2012)
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:the power of revocation 10 includes the power of modification, thus an available method of revocation is also an available method of modification—unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011, rev. granted, citing King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 1196 (dis. opn. of Detjen, J.)....: App.5th at p. 1011, rev. granted, citing King, supra,
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:(Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 273.) But where an unsettled question of law requires that we interpret the meaning of a statute, we review the trial court’s interpretation de novo. (People v. Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264 , 1276.) Because the resolution of this appeal turns on open questions of 10 The flurry of motions filed in connection with Royals’s motion to dismiss includes a motion from Lu arguing that Royals’s effort to obtain dismissal of this appeal on mootness grounds merits an award of sanctions for: Kurtenbach (2012) .) Because the resolution of this appeal turns on open questions of 10 The flurry of motions filed in connection with Royals’s motion to dismiss includes a motion from Lu arguing tha...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:pending may go forward in the trial court, however, so long as the motion is not precluded by a stay put in place by statute or a court order. (See, e.g., Henry M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1375 , 1383 [trial court can proceed on matters not stayed by appeal].) As to such postappeal motions, the action or proceeding continues to be “pending” in the trial court even while the appeal is pending in the Court of Appeal. As set forth above, the related appeals did not 31: Superior Court (2012) .) As to such postappeal motions, the action or proceeding continues to be “pending” in the trial court even while the appeal is pending in the Court of Appeal.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252 , 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 (Steinberger).) In Crail, we explained that the clear and convincing “standard was adopted . . . for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a: Bank (1928) ; Treadwell v.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:Tribble acknowledged her notes were in conflict regarding whether Frank was oriented and able to answer questions during her assessment. DISCUSSION The tort of intentional interference with expected inheritance was first recognized in California in 2012. (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039 , 1050-1056.) To establish a defendant committed the tort, a plaintiff must prove six elements. “First, the plaintiff must p[rove] he [or she] had an expectancy of an inheritance. It is not necessary to [prove] that ‘one is in fact named as a beneficiary in the will or that one: Dahl (2012) -1056.) To establish a defendant committed the tort, a plaintiff must prove six elements. “First, the plaintiff must p he had an expectancy of an inheritance.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:provider disputed payment other than Miracle Mile, and there was no damage to Hudson because all his bills had been paid. In addition, Foster argued the motion was untimely. Foster relied on the legal authority of Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417 (Knox), to argue that a party seeking to set aside a judgment based on misrepresentations of fact must show the facts could not reasonably have been discovered prior to the entry of judgment. He also noted that Hudson had not submitted his own declaration in support of the motion. Hudson: Dean (2012) (Knox), to argue that a party seeking to set aside a judgment based on misrepresentations of fact must show the facts could not reasonably have been discovered prior to the entry of judgme...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48 , 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694; In re: App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) ; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment lien is extinguished if the certified copy of the renewal application is not recorded before the lien’s 10‑year term expires, even when the underlying judgment itself has been timely renewe...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:in the absence of the error’ ”].) Petitioner’s attempt to remedy the deficiency in his reply brief is to no avail. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. (Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Shill (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1054 , 1061, fn. 7; People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.) DISPOSITION The petition for writ of mandate is denied. The September 18, 2020, stay of the board’s decision and the proceedings in the superior court is vacated. /s/ Robie, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/ Renner, J. /s/ Krause,: Shill (2012) , fn. 7; People v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:of service of the motion was served and filed the next day. Since the proof of service was not among the documents Kenton designated to include in the clerk’s transcript, we presume it demonstrated proper service. (Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349 , 1362.) In the days leading up to the hearing on Hilja’s anti-SLAPP motion, Kenton filed a series of ex parte and noticed motions to delay it. On May 16, 2017, he filed a noticed motion to lift the stay on discovery and set it for hearing in July 2017.: Kiesler (2012) .) In the days leading up to the hearing on Hilja’s anti-SLAPP motion, Kenton filed a series of ex parte and noticed motions to delay it.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:[Humphrey’s] title, or any cloud on [Humphrey’s] title thereto.” (Capitalization altered.) That included Bewley. More generally, a quiet title action is in rem; a judgment, once obtained, is good “against the world.” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 201 , 215.) It follows that a default, once obtained, is likewise good against the world. Again, that included Bewley. Bewley also argues that Humphrey did not name him in the notice of appeal. However, “‘there is no provision of law requiring the notice of appeal to be addressed to the: McGurk (2012) .) It follows that a default, once obtained, is likewise good against the world.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:other legal grounds not there advanced so long as the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to address them. Thus, we have discretion to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal (Ortega v. Topa Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 463 , 472) but are under no obligation to do so (see, e.g., Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 322, fn. 2). 21 But this does not fully answer the question because waiver and abandonment rules also apply. First, one challenging a judgment after demurrer or on: Co. (2012) ) but are under no obligation to do so (see, e.g., Roman v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:in part in bringing a special motion to strike is entitled to fees and costs, subject to the trial court’s determination of the appropriate amount awardable based upon the defendant’s partial success. (See, e.g., City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751 , 782-783; Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 339-340 (Mann); ComputerXpress, supra, at pp. 1019-1020.) The entitlement to fees and costs where the defendant prevails in part, however, is not absolute. As explained by the court in Mann, supra, at page 340, “a party who: Singletary (2012) -783; Mann v.
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:power of appointment upon persons, the powerholders, to whom the owner gives property. Under the power of appointment, the powerholders may then designate who will receive the original owner’s property at some point in the future. (Sefton v. Sefton (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 875 , 882.) Sometimes a trustor will create a trust conferring a power of appointment on trust beneficiaries, empowering them to designate to whom they want to give their shares of the trust. Sometimes a trustor will also require trust beneficiaries to specifically exercise and refer to the power of appointment: Sefton (2012) .) Sometimes a trustor will create a trust conferring a power of appointment on trust beneficiaries, empowering them to designate to whom they want to give their shares of the trust.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:not persuasive. Abatti contends that use consistent with local custom is reasonable, citing Tulare, and that "historical use of irrigation water gives rise to a presumption of necessary and beneficial use," citing Joerger v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (1929) 207 Cal. 8 , 23. Even if prior use were always reasonable—and the cases that Abatti cites do not stand for this principle—that would not would justify requiring the District to use historical apportionment rather than another method. (See Tulare, supra, 3 Cal.2d at pp. 547, 567 [appropriator can make reasonable use of: Co. (1929) .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:not persuasive. Abatti contends that use consistent with local custom is reasonable, citing Tulare, and that "historical use of irrigation water gives rise to a presumption of necessary and beneficial use," citing Joerger v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (1929) 207 Cal. 8 , 23. Even if prior use were always reasonable—and the cases that Abatti cites do not stand for this principle—that would not would justify requiring the District to use historical apportionment rather than another method. (See Tulare, supra, 3 Cal.2d at pp. 547, 567 [appropriator can make reasonable use of: Co. (1929) .
- Garcia v. Garcia : A statement of decision must address only the principal contested issues expressly raised in the request, disclosing the court’s findings on the ultimate facts and material issues; it is not required...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:the LPS Act in assessing McKee’s equal protection claim.” 9 On remand, the trial court held a 21-day evidentiary hearing with expert testimony and documentary evidence on whether the disparate treatment of SVP’s could be justified. (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 , 1330, 1339-1346 (McKee II)....: 9 On remand, the trial court held a 21-day evidentiary hearing with expert testimony and documentary evidence on whether the disparate treatment of SVP’s could be justified. (People v. McKee (2012)
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:presents an issue of statutory construction or a question of law.”]; Munroe v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1301 (Munroe).) This is true under both traditional and administrative mandamus. (Hoitt v. Department of Rehabilitation (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 513 , 522 [administrative mandamus]; Munroe, at p. 1301 [traditional mandamus].) V....: Department of Rehabilitation (2012) ; Munroe, at p. 1301 .) V.
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O.C. v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.”’” (Eddie E., supra, at pp. 627-628, third italics added; see B.F. v. Superior Court (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 621 , 630 [“the superior court sitting as a probate court has the authority and duty to make findings within the meaning of section 1101(a)(27)(J) [of title 8 of the United States Code] and 8 Code of Federal Regulations part 204.11”].) The requisite factual findings “may be made at any point: Superior Court (2012)
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:immigrant juveniles. (Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions 87 Fed.Reg. 13066, 13076–13077, 13081, 13086 (Mar. 8, 2022).) In assigning state courts the task of making SIJ predicate findings, Congress recognized their particular competence in making child welfare determinations. (In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892 , 908; Perez–Olano v. Gonzalez (C.D.Cal. 2008) 248 F.R.D. 248, 265.) State courts, however, lack both the authority and competence to make 15 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J....: M. (2012) ; Perez–Olano v. Gonzalez (C.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:Immigration Act of 1990 and subsequent amendments, Congress established the SIJ classification of immigrants and a path “to protect abused, neglected, and abandoned unaccompanied minors through a process that allows them to become permanent legal residents.” (In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892 , 915; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J), 1153(b)(4), 1255(a) & (h); Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004, 1012−1013.) The USCIS may consent to grant 1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 SIJ status to an unmarried immigrant under 21 years of age: M. (2012) ; see 8 U.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:support of her declaratory relief claim, Parker cannot now fault the court for the quality of its response. Nor can she raise these arguments for the first time on appeal (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038 [“It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.”]), and we deem them forfeited. DISPOSITION The order denying the petition is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. 7 In the absence of any such discussion, the probate: Camacho (2012) ), and we deem them forfeited. DISPOSITION The order denying the petition is affirmed.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:a question of law.” (Id. at p. 601.) Here, Hilja’s statements to her attorney friend that her brother was “homophobic” and “dangerous” expressed no more than her subjective judgment about Kenton and were nonactionable opinions. (Cf. Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 , 1149 [derogatory statements that defendant was dishonest and scary constituted nonactionable opinion].) Moreover, Kenton had no probability of succeeding in proving libel based on Hilja’s statement that he had committed “every literal category of elder abuse with his parents....: Mateo (2012)
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:two corporations, (3) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the seller, or (4) the transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability 28 for the seller’s debts.’ ” (Cleveland v. Johnson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1315 , 1327 (Cleveland).)6 Although appellants cite BMW, State Farm, and Simon for these general propositions, they make no effort to apply these propositions to a situation involving an alter ego or successor liability. We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them, and we “may and do ‘disregard conclusory: Johnson (2012) (Cleveland).)6 Although appellants cite BMW, State Farm, and Simon for these general propositions, they make no effort to apply these propositions to a situation involving an alter ego...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:if the statutory interpretation issue is not resolved by this court, the parties have urged us to decide this appeal. And we agree that we should. (See Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348 , 1354 [where controversy was likely to recur between parties, appeal was not moot].) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion, we assume the defendant could have proven all of the factual allegations in its answer. (Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095,: Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) .) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:if the statutory interpretation issue is not resolved by this court, the parties have urged us to decide this appeal. And we agree that we should. (See Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1348 , 1354 [where controversy was likely to recur between parties, appeal was not moot].) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion, we assume the defendant could have proven all of the factual allegations in its answer. (Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095,: Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) .) 9 id., §§ 430.10, 430.20.) Where a plaintiff brings such a motion...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:addressing the reply portion of the District's combined brief, under the guise of "establishing the . . . water rights" to show that the breach and taking claims have merit. We do not consider these points. (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256 , 268 [cross-appellant " 'may not use its cross-appellant's reply brief to answer points raised in the appellant's reply brief.' "].) We also do not consider arguments newly raised in the amicus answer briefing. 26 Turning to Abatti's central argument, he contends that the farmers have vested, appurtenant property rights: Hixson (2012)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:addressing the reply portion of the District's combined brief, under the guise of "establishing the . . . water rights" to show that the breach and taking claims have merit. We do not consider these points. (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256 , 268 [cross-appellant " 'may not use its cross-appellant's reply brief to answer points raised in the appellant's reply brief.' "].) We also do not consider arguments newly raised in the amicus answer briefing. 26 Turning to Abatti's central argument, he contends that the farmers have vested, appurtenant property rights: Hixson (2012)
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:the trustor was delusional at the time the testamentary document was signed.” This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, arguments made in a reply brief for the first time are too late. (Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 62 , 80, fn. 7.) Second, even if we set aside its untimeliness, we are not persuaded by appellants’ sole authority in support of the aforequoted 17 argument, Goodman v. Zimmerman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667, which never examined whether section 6100.5(a)(2) requires a finding of a mental health disorder. (See Goodman,: Cox, Inc. (2012) , fn. 7.) Second, even if we set aside its untimeliness, we are not persuaded by appellants’ sole authority in support of the aforequoted 17 argument, Goodman v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal ….’” (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892–893.) “An appellate court’s decision on the sufficiency of evidence comes clearly within the doctrine.” (Wells v. Lloyd (1942) 21 Cal.2d 452 , 455; accord, People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.) Therefore, we will not address the litany of arguments in the opening brief at pages 34–38 and 45–47, in of decision” refers to the March 19, 2018, document as modified by the July 13, 2018, minute orders. *See footnote,: Lloyd (1942) 21 Cal.2d 452, 455; accord, People v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:mistake of the other party from participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645 ; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement,: Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:IIA: Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831; Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879; Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790 ; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.A”].) We briefly discuss Drummey given its importance in the analysis that follows. In Drummey, our Supreme Court addressed the scope of: Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:evidence. Our Supreme Court explained it reviewed the entire record “to ascertain the weight of the evidence and whether . . . any charge has been proven against petitioner which merits his disbarment” (Narlian v. State Bar of California (1943) 21 Cal.2d 876 , 880-881, italics added) by clear and convincing evidence (Hildebrand v. State Bar of California (1941) 18 Cal.2d 816, 828). (See also Furman v. State Bar of California (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 214, 229 [the court “can and always does pass upon the weight of the evidence” in attorney discipline: State Bar of California (1943) 21 Cal.2d 876, 880-881, italics added) by clear and convincing evidence (Hildebrand v.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:cases it relied upon are not directly on point, because they did not involve failures to read a contract. (Donovan, at pp. 289–290 [car dealer’s failure to spot mistake in advertisement]; Sun ‘n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 671 , 701 (Sun ‘n Sand) [bank customer’s failure “to examine bank statements and returned checks for alterations or forgeries”]; Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. of Riverside Cty. v. Kastorff (1960) 54 Cal.2d 380, 388 [“inadvertent clerical error of omitting” cost of plumbing from a bid]; M. F. Kemper Const. Co.: United California Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 671, 701 (Sun ‘n Sand) ; Elsinore Union Elementary Sch.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:Simon discussed with apparent approval two California cases which considered unrecoverable damages for emotional distress in assessing the relationship between the plaintiff’s compensatory damages award and the amount of punitive damages. The Court cited “Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange [(1978)] 21 Cal.3d 910 , in which a statute barred recovery of damages actually caused by the defendant’s tortious acts. In that insurance bad faith case, the plaintiff died before judgment, precluding her estate’s recovery of damages for emotional distress. (Id. at p. 920, fn. 3; see Code Civ. Proc., § 377....: Exchange 21 Cal.3d 910, in which a statute barred recovery of damages actually caused by the defendant’s tortious acts.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:is never required for standing to sue. 2. Beneficial Interest Requirement Limon contends that, in light of the above cases, we “should not be diverted by passing statements in Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352 , 362 [(Associated Builders)] or People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005) 36 Cal.4th 971, 987 [(People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation)], which Circle K may use to try to equate the federal and state standing rules.” In a later section of this opinion, we address: San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) or People ex rel.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:based termination supported punitive damages award]; Stephens v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. (1988) 23 199 Cal.App.3d 1394, 1403 [employer’s fabricated criticism to justify wrongful termination supported punitive damages award], disapproved on another ground in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563 , 574, fn. 4.) The court found credible Vasquez’s testimony that Russo told him Lopez had cancer (demonstrating Russo’s knowledge) and testimony by Marisela that she told Casar Lopez had cancer....: Ultramar, Inc. (1999) , fn. 4.) The court found credible Vasquez’s testimony that Russo told him Lopez had cancer (demonstrating Russo’s knowledge) and testimony by Marisela that she told Casar Lopez...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:finding of unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary treatment is required for a conservatorship to be established. This is a legal question subject to de novo review. (John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 142; see Conservatorship of P.D. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1163 , 1167.) Our goal in construing the LPS Act is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (John L., at p. 143.) We consider individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each part may be harmonized and given effect. (See Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10: D. (2018) .) Our goal in construing the LPS Act is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (John L., at p. 143.) We consider individual statutes in the context of the entire Act so that each part may...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:contains substantial evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder 1 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. to make the challenged finding with the confidence required by the clear and convincing standard. (E.g., T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229 , 1239-1240 (T.J.).) Another position maintains that the clear and convincing standard of proof has no bearing on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence. (E.g., In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 604....: Superior Court (2018) -1240 (T.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:v. Elwood (D.D.C. 2016) 168 F.Supp.3d 236, 244, fn. 5 [“[A] reasonable jury could . . . find that the alleged partnership was in the business of expanding whatever business [the initial LLC] operated.”]; but see Eng v. Brown (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 675 , 694 [“An association organized as another entity (e.g., a corporation) is not a partnership. (§ 16202, subd. (b).) Absent unusual circumstances, this principle holds even if the corporation began as a partnership.”].) 23 Jones acted with a subjective state of mind that warranted imposition of attorney fees. Based upon: Brown (2018) [“An association organized as another entity (e.g., a corporation) is not a partnership. (§ 16202, subd. (b).) Absent unusual circumstances...
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:Section 217, however, applies only “[a]t a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code” — i.e., the Family Code. (§ 217, subd. (a); see generally In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830 , 839-840 [discussing legislative history of § 217].) A guardianship proceeding is not a proceeding under the Family Code. Rather, it a proceeding under the Probate Code — specifically, Probate Code section 1500 et seq. Harber has not pointed to any similar provision that would apply in a guardianship proceeding,: Department of Transportation (2020) .) Section 217, however, applies only “t a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code” — i.e., the Family Code.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:“We usually ‘presume differences in language … convey differences in meaning.’ ” (Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. U.S. (2018) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [138 S.Ct. 2067, 2071, 201 L.Ed.2d 490]; Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 872 , 879 [same].) The term “damages” is not defined in the FCRA. “Statutory terms or words will be construed according to their ordinary, common meaning unless these are defined by the statute or the statutory context requires a different definition.” (Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Fulkerson: Superior Court (2018) .) The term “damages” is not defined in the FCRA. “Statutory terms or words will be construed according to their ordinary, common meaning unless these are defined by the statute.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of Patricia, prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). Standard of Review We resolve matters of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1423 , 1426.) “‘The general principles that guide interpretation of a statutory scheme are well[ ]settled. [Citation.] “Our function is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] To ascertain such intent, courts turn first to the words of the statute itself: Co. (2012)
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:to the court’s neglect and abandonment findings or, as S.H.R. argues, under a de novo standard, we reach the same conclusion as the trial court. Reunification involves the child’s return to the parents’ custody and care. (In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632 , 642; see In re Welfare of D.A.M. (Minn.Ct.App. Dec. 12, 2012, No. A12-0427) 2012 WL 6097225, p. *5 [“ ‘reunification’ ” under the SIJ law “appears to mean returning the child to successfully live with his or her parent”].) The meaning of “not viable” under the SIJ law is: L. (2012) ; see In re Welfare of D.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:when applied together with the community property presumption, sometimes led to claims by married women for more than a half interest in property jointly deeded to husband and wife. Our court first addressed this issue in Dunn v. Mullan (1931) 211 Cal. 583 (Dunn), a 12 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. dispute between the administrator of a deceased husband’s estate and the administrators of his deceased wife’s estate. Whether the wife’s property was separate or community at her death would determine how the property passed to the respective: Mullan (1931) (Dunn), a 12 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. dispute between the administrator of a deceased husband’s estate and the administrators of his deceased wife’s estate.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:a claim under that law, and appellants do not discuss the substantive provisions of that law or how it would apply to Lopez’s circumstances. Accordingly, we do not consider it. (See Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1 , 10 (Hodjat) [“appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case”].) Because appellants have not identified any civil penalty that could be imposed in a comparable case, the third guidepost is not relevant in determining whether the punitive: Co. (2012) (Hodjat) .) Because appellants have not identified any civil penalty that could be imposed in a comparable case...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:probate court should not have ordered Brown to pay expenses; not that it could not make such an order. Considering such an argument would require us to review the probate court’s discretion. (See Sino Century Development Limited v. Farley (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 688 , 700 [noting that rule 2.30 affords trial courts discretion] (Sino Century).) But Richard and Brown have not asked us to review the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Indeed, they insist that they have made no such request. We therefore decline to do so. 16 Richard and Brown argue extensively: Farley (2012) (Sino Century).) But Richard and Brown have not asked us to review the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
- Garcia v. Garcia : Attaching an extrinsic document to a pleading does not constitute a judicial admission that the document supersedes or alters the trust’s express terms; the plain language of the trust controls and ca...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:of the property as against the claims of judgment creditors or other third persons as was the case in Hulse v. Lawson.” (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 772.) Less than a year before Siberell, in Hulse v. Lawson (1931) 212 Cal. 614 (Hulse), this court reached a different conclusion in a dispute between a wife and her husband’s creditor over property that the spouses had acquired during marriage as joint tenants. Hulse held that because the married couple used community funds to acquire the property, the property was community property, and as: Lawson (1931) (Hulse), this court reached a different conclusion in a dispute between a wife and her husband’s creditor over property that the spouses had acquired during marriage as joint tenants.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (§ 271; Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172 , 1177; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100.) Section 271 imposes a minimum level of professionalism and cooperation to effect the policy goal favoring settlement of family law litigation and a reduction of the attendant costs. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1537.): Harbert (2012) ; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139 , 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530; In re: App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) ; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:S. father in its list of presumptions, a father asserting valid Kelsey S. rights may effectively qualify for presumed father status as the result of his constitutional right to parent, which overrides any contrary statutory direction.”]; J.R. v. D.P. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 374 , 389 (J.R.) [“for purposes of resolving conflicting presumptions . . . a Kelsey S. father is the equivalent of a statutorily presumed father”].) A biological father will qualify as a Kelsey S. father only 10 if he “promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional,: P. (2012) (J.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:contract, valid consent, a lawful object, and proper consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1550.) The version of the Family Code applicable to the validity and enforcement of premarital agreements turns on the date of execution. (In re Marriage of Melissa (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 598 , 611 (Melissa).) The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA, § 1600 et seq.) controls the enforceability of premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 1986 (§ 1601). Parts of the UPAA (§§ 1612 and 1615) were significantly amended effective January 1, 2002, and case law has since clarified that: Code, § 1550.) The version of the Family Code applicable to the validity and enforcement of premarital agreements turns on the date of execution. (In re Marriage of Melissa (2012) (Melissa).
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:shall be memorialized in writing and delivered to the 6 Section 1615 was revised effective January 1, 2020. The version of the statute in force at the time the parties executed the PMA governs. (In re Marriage of Melissa (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 598 , 611- 612; In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1057.). 28 party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party shall, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that he or she received the information required by this paragraph: The version of the statute in force at the time the parties executed the PMA governs. (In re Marriage of Melissa (2012) - 612; In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer (2011) 202 Cal.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:The Probate Court’s Judgment on the Pleadings in the 475 Appeal A. Judgment on the Pleadings Standard and Standard of Review “ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analogous to a general demurrer.’ ” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652 , 662.) Like a demurrer, “[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when the ‘complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.’ [Citation.] The grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters: Shin (2013)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:of subd. (c) to § 1612), and the decisions in In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman (2000) 24 Cal.4th 39 (Pendleton), In re Marriage of 19 Howell (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1062 (Howell), and In re Marriage of Facter (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 967 (Facter). Indeed, as noted by a leading treatise, the state of the law is “unclear if a trial court is required to consider whether a spousal support limitation or waiver in a premarital agreement executed between 1986 [the effective date of California’s adoption of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA)]: App.4th 1062 (Howell), and In re Marriage of Facter (2013) (Facter).
- Garcia v. Garcia : Lay witnesses may testify about another person’s health or mental condition when they have personally observed the relevant facts, without needing to be qualified as medical experts.
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Tubbs v. Berkowitz
Context from opinion:the surviving spouse’s trust to himself. She acknowledges that trust was revocable and amendable and included Berkowitz’s separate property and community property share. 7 845.) We review de novo the court’s grant of summary judgment. (ABCO, LLC v. Eversley (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1092 , 1098.) Although we conduct a de novo review, we “must presume the judgment is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error.” (Jones v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376.) The Court Did Not Err “‘“A power of appointment is a power conferred: She acknowledges that trust was revocable and amendable and included Berkowitz’s separate property and community property share. 7 845.) We review de novo the court’s grant of summary judgment. (ABCO.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) The choice of whether to challenge an agency action under traditional mandamus, as opposed to administrative mandamus, is not always straightforward. (Southern California Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1531 , 1541.) Arguably, Gann might have appropriately challenged the CDCR’s determination in an administrative mandamus proceeding....: California Apprenticeship Council (2013) .) Arguably, Gann might have appropriately challenged the CDCR’s determination in an administrative mandamus proceeding. Notwithstanding...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:have flatly stated that a requirement of clear and convincing proof before the trial court does not necessitate any modifications to the conventional approach to appellate review for substantial evidence in a civil matter. (Ian J. v. Peter M. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 189 , 208; In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 345; In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 604; Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1566, 1576.) Thus it has been said, “[t]he substantial evidence rule that applies on appeal, applies without regard to the: Peter M. (2013) ; In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:Separate Waiver could enforce a premarital agreement anyway, it would impermissibly read the Separate Waiver requirement out of the statute.” We aim to avoid constructions that render portions of a statute superfluous. (In re Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332 , 351.) We also aim to construe an ambiguous statute such as this one in accordance with its legislative history. Knapp has requested that we take judicial notice of the legislative history of section 1615. Ginsberg opposes the request on the grounds that Knapp failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances for: 35 portions of an agreement when any of those predicates are lacking.” (Ibid.) “‘Not valid’ does not necessarily mean ‘void.’” (Safarian v. Govgassian (2020) .) Yet, as Knapp points out...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983 , 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009): App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) -990; Ian J. v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:physical condition such as to permit a subversion of her freedom of will? [¶] [and (5)] Was the beneficiary active in procuring the execution of the will?” (Estate of Williams (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 302, 311; accord, Estate of Yale (1931) 214 Cal. 115 , 123.) 15 8 evidence that may have tended to show undue influence, he has not shown his evidence is “‘“‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th: App.2d 302, 311; accord, Estate of Yale (1931) .) 15 8 evidence that may have tended to show undue influence, he has not shown his evidence is “‘“‘of such a character...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:applies to “maintain the stability of title outside of dissolution actions.” Further, amici curiae Christopher Melcher and Professor Grace Blumberg (author of Blumberg, supra) point to a joint tenancy form of title principle first recognized in Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767 (Siberell) that may govern characterization in certain situations. Although caselaw has sometimes conflated Siberell and other presumptions arising from joint title with Evidence Code section 662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App....: Siberell (1932) (Siberell) that may govern characterization in certain situations.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:address claim preclusion Richard abandoned any contention that it applied. (Platner, supra, 187 Cal. at p. 447.) 12 In addition to Torrey Pines, the probate court relied on Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1520 , 1527, and Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1533, each of which relies on Torrey Pines. 13 Indeed, the majority’s failure to impose the actual litigation requirement was a centerpiece of the Torrey Pines dissenting opinion. (Torrey Pines, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 825.) 25 first action; (2): Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) , and Estate of Redfield (2011) 193 Cal.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:the Trust was proper Adam contends the trial court prejudicially erred in taking judicial notice of the Trust’s terms. 17 “[A] demurrer may be sustained where judicially noticeable facts render the pleading defective.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743 , 751 (Scott).) Moreover, “ ‘[w]here written documents are the foundation of an action and are attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference, they become 16 Because we affirm the judgment against Kimberly, we need not consider her contention that she should be allowed to present DNA evidence: A. (2013) (Scott).) Moreover, “ ‘here written documents are the foundation of an action and are attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference, they become 16 Because we affirm the ju...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 704, 715.) One element of a quiet title claim “is ‘[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780 , 802 (West), quoting § 761.020, subd. (c).) Thus, in an action brought under the statute, the plaintiff seeking to quiet title to real or personal property “shall name as defendants in the action the persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is: A. (2013) (West), quoting § 761.020, subd. (c).) Thus, in an action brought under the statute, the plaintiff seeking to quiet title to real or personal property “shall name as defendants in the action...
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:issues relating to that party.” (§ 2030, subd. (d).) A spouse does not have to demonstrate the likelihood of success or establish a prima facie case linking the third party to the dissolution proceeding. (In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863 , 865.) The spouse is entitled to relief so long as the matter underlying the fees was not specious. (In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 53.) California has a strong public policy of ensuring a level playing field between the parties to a dissolution proceeding. “ ‘California’s: 4 early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:104.) 3 The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. (See Jameson v. Desta (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1144 , 1164.) “The fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . .” (§ 16404, subd. (a).) 4 Jones’s causes of action for an accounting, determination of partnership buyout, and declaratory relief all represent: Desta (2013) .) “The fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . .” (§ 16404, subd. (a).
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:concerns which county superior court having fundamental jurisdiction is the proper court geographically to try the action. Statutes designate which county superior court is “the” or “a” proper court for trying the action. (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 309 , 313.) Jurisdiction and venue can become intertwined, but in most actions, venue rules are not jurisdictional. If an action is filed in a court that has fundamental jurisdiction to try the matter but is not the proper venue, and the defendant does not object, that court can render an: Superior Court (2013) .) Jurisdiction and venue can become intertwined, but in most actions, venue rules are not jurisdictional.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:joint tenancy title as signifying separate property interests between the spouses, even when the property was acquired during marriage with community funds. Like Siberell, these cases typically dealt with divorce or other interspousal disputes. (See, e.g., Delanoy v. Delanoy (1932) 216 Cal. 23 , 25 [dispute between wife and husband’s mother over husband’s conveyance of his joint tenancy interest to his mother; wife had previously obtained a 17 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. judgment against husband]; Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado) [divorce]; Gudelj v.: Like Siberell, these cases typically dealt with divorce or other interspousal disputes. (See, e.g., Delanoy v. Delanoy (1932) [dispute between wife and husband’s mother over husband’s conveyance of hi...
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:under current case law. (See Estate of Flores, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 632– 639.) We remand so the trial court may decide these and any other contested issues. (See Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591 , 605 [absent exceptional circumstances, factual determinations should be left to the trial court].) Section 11704 provides the trial court with discretion to order an evidentiary hearing for that purpose, if necessary. III. Conclusion Probate proceedings are statutory in nature, and standing is determined by the applicable statute....: Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) .) Section 11704 provides the trial court with discretion to order an evidentiary hearing for that purpose, if necessary. III.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:because the order sustaining the demurrer was filed in January, 2019, and the appeal not filed until August. This, of course, is wrong, as an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable. (Lopez v. Brown (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1114 , 1133). The only valid appeal is from the judgment. And that judgment was appealed, a judgment based in part on the court’s conclusion that “the administrative subpoena is valid”—a quotation, I note, that appears twice in the Authority’s own brief as a basis to uphold the court’s decision. While: Brown (2013) ).
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:because the order sustaining the demurrer was filed in January, 2019, and the appeal not filed until August. This, of course, is wrong, as an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable. (Lopez v. Brown (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1114 , 1133). The only valid appeal is from the judgment. And that judgment was appealed, a judgment based in part on the court’s conclusion that “the administrative subpoena is valid”—a quotation, I note, that appears twice in the Authority’s own brief as a basis to uphold the court’s decision. While: Brown (2013) ).
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:property settlement does not expressly identify itself as either “partial” or “complete” does not compel the conclusion that the settlement was intended to be only partial. (See Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. Eves (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156 , 164; see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1486 [“The court . . . cannot insert in the contract language which one of the parties now wishes were there”].) 18 Absent a clear expression of intent in the language of: Eves (2013) ; see also Levi Strauss & Co. v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:(2019) (Weil & Brown).) Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed. (Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218 , 227; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer. Unlike a demurrer, a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute: City of Victorville (2013) ; Cloud v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:(2019) (Weil & Brown).) Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed. (Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218 , 227; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer. Unlike a demurrer, a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute: City of Victorville (2013) ; Cloud v.
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:supervise the administration 5 BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. of the trust.” (Estate of Heggstad, at p. 951.) Other Courts of Appeal that have addressed the same question are in agreement. (Drake v. Pinkham (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 400 , 407- 409 [individual petitioned under § 17200 claiming two amendments to a trust that disinherited her were invalid on the ground the settlor was incompetent]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [“it is clear from viewing section 17200 as a whole that a probate court has jurisdiction: Pinkham (2013) - 409 ; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:exist. Because parents have a statutory and due process right to competent counsel in dependency proceedings, a comparable mechanism for challenging the adequacy of their representation by appointed counsel has been recognized by the courts. (See In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441 , 455 6 but granted her counsel’s request to withdraw from the case. The court appointed new counsel, Patricia’s fourth attorney in less than eight months. The court then granted Patricia’s new counsel time to review the section 388 petition and the psychometric test results supporting Dr. Dupée’s evaluation. On: P. (2013) 6 but granted her counsel’s request to withdraw from the case.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1340; Straley v. Gamble (2013) 6 The relevant subtrust became irrevocable in 2016 when Iraj passed away. Thus, the parties agree that the present statutory scheme, effective in 2010, applies here. (§ 21315.) 9 217 Cal.App.4th 533 , 536 [applying de novo review to interpretation of § 16061.8].) II. The probate court properly applied the trust’s no contest clause to Meiri Meiri’s litigation falls within the confines of the trust’s no contest clause and section 21311’s authorization of the enforcement of a no contest clause where a: Thus, the parties agree that the present statutory scheme, effective in 2010, applies here. (§ 21315.) 9 .) II.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:of the evidence, that the testatrix was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will.” (Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 703.) “[T]he standard for testamentary capacity is exceptionally low.” (In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628 , 642.) “A person challenging the validity of a trust instrument on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352.) Respondents do not contest Andersen’s applicability here. 12 to execute the document . . . carries the heavy burden of proving such allegations.” (Doolittle v. Exchange Bank: 11 In this context, a delusion “has been defined to be the conception of a disordered mind which imagines facts to exist of which there is no evidence and the belief in which is adhered to against all...
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:finding a conservatee doesn’t have the 18 capacity to enter a legal marriage, “‘[w]hether the conservatee has capacity to marry is determined by the law that would be applicable had no conservatorship been established.’” (In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628 , 641.) A conservatee may overcome a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their preference on the matter. (Id. at p. 643; see also In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476, 479.): established.’” (In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) .) A conservatee may overcome a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their...
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:the business and affairs of a corporation, including commencing, defending, and controlling actions on behalf of the corporation, is vested in the board of directors. (Id. at p. 1108 citing A. Paladini, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1933) 218 Cal. 114 , 121; see also § 300, subd. (a) [“the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the direction of the board”].) Shareholders are permitted under section 800 to bring a derivative suit to enforce the corporation’s rights and: Paladini, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1933)
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 , 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), §§ 1233–1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity 29 Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 610.)” (Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 at pp. 18–19.) “The terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ fraud or mistake are generally accepted as: Taylor,
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:defense in his answer to her complaint. We disagree. “Ratification is, generally, an affirmative defense.” (Reina v. Erassaret (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 418, 424.) As such, it must be pleaded and proved by a defendant. (Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 , 1097 fn. 16.) Knapp is correct that Ginsberg’s amended answer does not assert Tinker’s ratification of the PMA as an affirmative defense. However, Knapp’s sole claim is legal malpractice, and she has not cited any authority for the proposition that ratification is an affirmative defense to that cause of: Bank of America (2013) fn. 16.) Knapp is correct that Ginsberg’s amended answer does not assert Tinker’s ratification of the PMA as an affirmative defense.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:in the record which way that would have gone.” Third and importantly, Tammy’s argument fails because she does not explain why the evidence cited by the trial court was insufficient as a matter of law. (See Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402 , 1408 [“[t]he fact that there was substantial evidence in the record to support a contrary finding does not compel the conclusion that there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment”].) Tammy instead asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.: Somebody could be more responsive, more able to attend if their pain was managed correctly.” She continued: “So I can’t tell from what’s in the record which way that would have gone.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the record indicating that the court explicitly sustained Carol’s objection. Nonetheless, we believe Carol’s objection has merit. “The general rule of motion practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 , 1537 (Jay).) Strictly speaking, Attorneys’ reply presented new argument rather than new evidence. But the principle explained in Jay—which is based upon the unfairness to the opponent of not being able to address the new matter raised in a reply (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.: Mahaffey (2013) (Jay).) Strictly speaking, Attorneys’ reply presented new argument rather than new evidence.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:meaning of a trust, that opinion must be accepted even if it is directly contrary to the plain language of the trust. The language of the anti-SLAPP statute provides no room for the majority’s interpretation. In Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522 , 1537 (Jay), the defendants argued that when the statute states that “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2)), it means that a court must “consider all evidence: Mahaffey (2013) (Jay), the defendants argued that when the statute states that “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liabilit...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910 [citing Sara D. with approval; due process hearing required before appointment of guardian ad litem].) Such a hearing is now commonly referred to as a Sara D. hearing. (See In re A.H. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 337 , 342.) 9 behalf. Let me explain what that is. It’s where someone would be appointed by the court to interface with your attorney and address the issues that [have arisen]. And the reason it comes up is that I’ve reached a conclusion that there is some impediment that seems: H. (2013) .) 9 behalf.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:to his wishes. We therefore conclude the Watson standard applies. Under this standard, “the appellant bears the burden to make an ‘affirmative showing’ the trial court committed error that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514 , 532–533.) C.O. has not carried this burden. C.O. does not dispute the underlying evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that he is gravely disabled (see fn. 4, ante). Having independently reviewed the record, we determine the evidence—including the testimony provided by 24 C.O....: We therefore conclude the Watson standard applies. Under this standard, “the appellant bears the burden to make an ‘affirmative showing’ the trial court committed error that resulted in a miscarriage...
- Garcia v. Garcia : An appellate court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings, reviewing them only for substantial‑evidence support and never reweighing the evidence, drawing its own factual inferences, or seco...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (Id. at p. 279, quoting Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571; accord, Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828 , 838.) 1. Surcharge of $300,000 The first surcharge was based on the movement of funds generated by the Snelling Ranch in and out of Stacey’s bank account ending in 5255. She opened the account in 1999 under the name Little Hills Ltd., which was a fictitious business name used: County of Kern (2013) .) 1.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:(420 Caregivers, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325.) It expanded the classes of persons to which immunity from prosecution applied. (Ibid.) 3 The regulatory background is taken from the decisions in 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 219 Cal.App.4th 1316 (420 Caregivers) and Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1029 (Safe Life). 4 The CUA applied to prosecutions for violations of Health and Safety Code sections 11357 (possession) and 11358 (cultivation). (Health & Safety Code § 11362.5, subdivision (d).) 3 Among other persons, the MPA: City of Los Angeles (2012) (420 Caregivers) and Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:must clearly and specifically set forth ... factual allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of that cause of action. [Citations.] Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1491.) B. A Cure of Defects Has Not Been Demonstrated As explained below, we conclude Torres has not carried her burden of demonstrating the defects in the SAC could be cured if she was given another chance to amend. With respect to Torres’s claims based on a duty to: A. (2013) .) B.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232.) B. Legal Principles Section 16061.7, subdivision (a)(1) requires a trustee to serve notice on a trust’s beneficiaries when the trust has become irrevocable due to the settlor’s death. (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288 , 293.) Section 16061.8 provides that any person served with such a notification “shall not bring an action to contest the trust more than 120 days from the date the notification by the trustee is served upon the person, or 60 days from the date on which a copy of: Allen (2013)
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:161 Cal.App.4th 184, 191.) “Additionally, judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.” (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288 , 293, fn. 1.) We review the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1271.) The court did not abuse its discretion by considering the Trust, and its terms, filed by the trustee. Without the Trust,: Allen (2013) , fn. 1.) We review the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:is "voluntary compliance" with a judgment. (Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 115.) However, "where compliance arises [only] under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v. Magidow (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 298 , 302 104 [appeal was not moot; respondent cited "no authority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of contempt," and the record supports that explanation.61 The superior court's: Magidow (2013) 104 was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of co...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:is "voluntary compliance" with a judgment. (Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 115.) However, "where compliance arises [only] under compulsion of risk or forfeiture, a waiver will not be implied." (Id. at p. 116; see Cunningham v. Magidow (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 298 , 302 104 [appeal was not moot; respondent cited "no authority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of contempt," and the record supports that explanation.61 The superior court's: Magidow (2013) 104 was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of co...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337 , 350: “[B]ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported by substantial evidence”; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911: “Necessity is a question of fact”; and: Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) : “ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337 , 350: “[B]ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported by substantial evidence”; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911: “Necessity is a question of fact”; and: Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) : “ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:the general principles discussed above that, with respect to minors, the “court is, in effect, the guardian” and the guardian ad litem’s actions are subject to court supervision. (Cole, supra, 63 Cal. at p. 89; accord, McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540 , 549; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 (County of Los Angeles); Serway, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d at p. 89.) Under such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services,: West (2013) ; County of Los Angeles v.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:used by the courts, such as probation officers who prepare presentencing reports and social workers and psychiatrists involved in terminating parental rights. (Ibid.; Bergeron v. Boyd (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 877, 885- 889 [court appointed custody evaluator]; McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540 , 550-552 (McClintock) [guardian ad litem]; Fisher v. Pickens (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 708, 712-715 [court investigator].) These persons fulfill quasi-judicial functions “ ‘intimately related to the judicial process.’ ” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 857, quoting Myers v. Morris (8th Cir....: West (2013) -552 (McClintock) ; Fisher v.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:undisputed. (Winet, at p. 1171, fn. 7.) 20 impact of its terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it.’ ” (Stewart, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1588; accord Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87 , 93.) The Stewart court then cited Casey for the proposition that “a contracting party is not entitled to relief from [the party’s] alleged unilateral mistake” where the party failed to read the contract before signing it. (Stewart, at p. 1589; accord Amin, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.)12 Other: App.4th at p. 1588; accord Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) .) The Stewart court then cited Casey for the proposition that “a contracting party is not entitled to relief from alleged unilateral mist...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75; Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831; Walker v. City of San Gabriel (1942) 20 Cal.2d 879; Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138 ], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.A”].) We briefly discuss Drummey given its importance in the analysis that follows. In Drummey, our Supreme Court addressed the scope of judicial review pertaining to an administrative agency’s: Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790; Sipper v. Urban (1943) 22 Cal.2d 138], 816 [the scope of review under section 1094.5 is the same as that specified in the cases outlined “in part II.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:(1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863; Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808 , 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 (Steinberger).) In Crail, we explained that the clear and convincing “standard was adopted . . . for: Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:Mark because he could have deposed Scharf during a one- month hiatus in trial dates.8 We find no abuse of discretion. A party must disclose those treating physicians who will testify as an expert. (Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31 , 35.) Kalaba explained there are two types of physician experts, retained and nonretained. Experts must be listed in an expert designation to be permitted to provide expert opinion testimony at trial. In addition, should the physician testify, an expert witness declaration is required. (Kalaba, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p.: Estate of Kiser (1999) .) Kalaba explained there are two types of physician experts, retained and nonretained. Experts must be listed in an expert designation to be permitted to provide expert opinion...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1747 [probate case finding that joint tenancy property acquired in 1960 “rebuts the community property presumption found in Civil Code section 5110” because “the instrument specifically states otherwise”]; see also Abbett Electric Corp. v. Storek (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1460 , 1466 [creditor case relying on both the statutory language of Civil Code former section 5110 and Siberell to find that “the form of title here at issue creates a presumption that Storek and Cook hold the residence as joint tenants . . . [s]ince the instrument by which [the: Storek (1994)
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:of Miller, divorce proceedings in California involved first issuing an interlocutory judgment declaring that an innocent spouse was entitled to dissolution, but the marriage was not dissolved until entry of a final judgment. (See In re Marriage of Goldberg (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 265 , 273.) The death of a party spouse after interlocutory judgment but before final judgment abated a divorce action as to the status of the parties, but did not as to any division of property in the interlocutory degree. (Id. at p. 274; McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 62 Cal.2d: The court also 8 At the time of Miller, divorce proceedings in California involved first issuing an interlocutory judgment declaring that an innocent spouse was entitled to dissolution...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:him.” (Italics in original.) The trial court characterized this as precluding standing to bring the 270 Action, noting Richard’s failure to “[a]ddress the issue of his lack of standing to bring a malicious prosecution action.” (See Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743 , 756 [absent showing of impropriety by trustee in failing to initiate malicious prosecution action itself, trust beneficiary lacked standing to sue third party that had previously sued only trustee].) 8 In his opening brief, Richard argues the trial court erred in concluding he was not a party to the: Karmgard (1994) .) 8 In his opening brief...
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:will contest that required the application of section 48. Estate of Baird (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 957 and Estate of Getty (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 755 both involved will contest proceedings under prior sections of the Probate Code. Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743 involved a trust beneficiary who brought a civil suit for malicious prosecution. 8 establish his standing under section 11700. That section provides standing to any “person claiming to be . . . entitled to distribution of a share of the estate.” It is undisputed that Simon was named trustee of: Karmgard (1994) involved a trust beneficiary who brought a civil suit for malicious prosecution. 8 establish his standing under section 11700.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:the defect.” (Novartis, at p. 162.) “ ‘ “The question of standing to sue is one of the right to relief and goes to the existence of a cause of action against the defendant.” ’ ” (Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743 , 758.) “At its core, standing concerns a specific party’s interest in the outcome of a lawsuit.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247 (Weatherford); Code Civ. Proc., § 367 [“every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as: The plaintiff 16 bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (Novartis, at p. 162.) “ ‘ “The question of standing to sue is one of the right to relief...
- Barrow v. Holmes : A holder of a judgment lien may enforce the lien by filing an equitable foreclosure action without first filing a probate claim, but the holder has no right to recover a deficiency, and the action may...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:because the record showed that there had not been proper service. “‘[A] judgment that is void on the face of the record is subject to either direct or collateral attack at any time. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Gassner v. Stasa (2018) 30 22 Cal.App.5th 346 , 356.) Hence, “[a] motion to vacate a judgment void on its face is not subject to a claim of laches.” (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 831, fn. omitted.) “‘“A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an: Stasa (2018) 30 .) Hence, “ motion to vacate a judgment void on its face is not subject to a claim of laches.” (Falahati v.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment lien cannot be created against a decedent’s estate by filing an abstract of judgment after the debtor’s death; the creditor must instead file a timely claim in the probate proceeding to see...
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (2) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (3) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” (Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107 , 121.) As explained, Catello has not taken inconsistent positions regarding the siblings’ rights in the property. But even if she had, we have not been presented with any facts indicating she did so to deliberately try to game the system, a showing required to meet the doctrine’s third element.: County of Los Angeles (2013) .) As explained, Catello has not taken inconsistent positions regarding the siblings’ rights in the property.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:care decisions, I grant my agent full power and authority to make 5 We note Hogan v. Country Villa Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 259, 262 followed Garrison, opining Garrison was “well reasoned.” In Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122 , 1129, however, the court in dicta disagreed with the Garrison court’s conclusion that the “the term ‘health care decision’ made by an agent encompasses the execution of arbitration agreements on behalf of the patient.” 10 those decisions for me, subject to any health care instructions set forth below.” That: Horizon West, Inc. (2013)
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Holley v. Silverado Senior Living Management
Context from opinion:1102.) In that situation, “we must ‘accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision . . . .’” (Young v. Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122 , 1130, fn. 6; see Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, 892 [where the trial court’s determination “turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual 5 inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to: App.5th 1083, 1102.) In that situation, “we must ‘accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and dec...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270 , 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54; In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415; In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1229; In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536; In re: John Crane, Inc. (2013) ; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:Russo’s wrongful termination of her. Further, Yang was in a position to offer testimony as to whether Russo’s and Casar’s authority over decision-making impacted CWG policy and made them managing agents of CWG. (See Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358 , 372– 373.) As we have discussed, appellants have elected not to include a complete transcript of Yang’s testimony from the liability phase when these topics were covered. We again construe the absence of this transcript against appellants, and presume it contains the necessary evidence to support the trial court’s: Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) – 373.) As we have discussed, appellants have elected not to include a complete transcript of Yang’s testimony from the liability phase when these topics were covered.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:203 Cal.App.4th 97, 100, 105-106 [challenge to 2002 ordinance increasing groundwater augmentation charges was barred by 2008 stipulated judgment that addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 , 605, 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1209, fn....: Agency (2013) , 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:203 Cal.App.4th 97, 100, 105-106 [challenge to 2002 ordinance increasing groundwater augmentation charges was barred by 2008 stipulated judgment that addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586 , 605, 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1209, fn....: Agency (2013) , 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:the discretion to decide the merits of an appeal that raises an issue of continuing public interest that is likely to recur. (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 584, fn. 2; Bushell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 915 , 919, fn. 1.) We exercise that discretion here. 2Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. 2 authority to do so. Cundall argues that, by requiring Diaz’s signature on the revocation document, the February Trust delegated authority to her as a “trust protector” to approve any revocation. Second,: A. (2013) , fn. 1.) We exercise that discretion here. 2Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. 2 authority to do so.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:(§ 5257, subd. (b).) 7 Conservatorship of K.P. Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. from a conservator’s appointment or reappointment provide available and adequate remedies for aggrieved conservatees. (Gandolfo, at pp. 898–900; see Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409 , 433; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2020) Criminal Writs, § 25, pp. 630–631.) 2. Chapter 3: Conservatorships Chapter 3 of the Act goes on to provide for the imposition of a conservatorship under specifically described circumstances. A “series of temporary detentions may culminate in a: Superior Court (2013) ; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2020) Criminal Writs, § 25, pp. 630–631.) 2.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:form he signed which is part of the record on appeal. We may appropriately “take into account briefs and arguments, which are reliable indications of a party’s position on the facts ….” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49 , 93 (conc. & dis. opn. of Thompson, J.); People v. Cox (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 993.) 34. check on him—i.e., he checked “yes” for the question: “Would you be willing to submit to a background check prior to being hired?” By doing so, Limon undoubtedly understood he was advising: BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) (conc. & dis. opn. of Thompson, J.); People v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Group USA, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043.) We also review de novo any legal issues properly raised on appeal of a fee award. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 690 (Reck); Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1016–1017.) 7 However, where satisfied that a party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), we review the amount of the award for abuse of discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322.) B. Analysis 1. The Trial Court Properly Granted: App.5th 682, 690 (Reck); Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) –1017.) 7 However, where satisfied that a party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1)...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:the Legislature’s retention of the conjunctive phrase that was decisive to Cadwell-Faso’s reasoning is further indication the Legislature did not intend to change the decision’s holding through addition of the word “final.” (See Busse v. United PanAm Fin. Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038 [“the Legislature is ‘presumed to know about existing case law when it enacts or amends a statute’ ”].) 30 did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.” (Fam. Code, § 1615, subd. (c)(4).) Brandy argues the trial court’s findings were “tantamount to a finding of fraud.” We: Corp. (2014) .) 30 did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.” (Fam.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:195 Cal. at p. 703.) “[T]he standard for testamentary capacity is exceptionally low.” (In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628, 642.) “A person challenging the validity of a trust instrument on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity 222 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352.) Respondents do not contest Andersen’s applicability here. 12 to execute the document . . . carries the heavy burden of proving such allegations.” (Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529, 545.) B. Standard of Review As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. Respondents: App.4th 628, 642.) “A person challenging the validity of a trust instrument on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity .) Respondents do not contest Andersen’s applicability here.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:and that [Frank] had the ability to appreciate the consequences of the particular act he wished to undertake which was to finalize the trust plan that he had previously reviewed with Mr. Aanestad.” (Bolding omitted; citing Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352.) The trial court found Tammy’s incapacity argument to be inconsistent with the evidence produced at trial. The trial court addressed five pieces of evidence. One: The trial court found Tagg’s testimony credible on the issue of capacity. “Michelle Tagg a hospice social worker who cared for the decedent: Lintz (2014) .) The trial court found Tammy’s incapacity argument to be inconsistent with the evidence produced at trial.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:1364 [same]; MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742, 747; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810 [standing to challenge wrongful foreclosure]; Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456 , 465–466 (Boorstein) [standing for purposes of Civil Code, § 1789.83 et seq. and Business and Professions Code, § 17200 et seq.].) Although there are exceptions as illustrated in the discussion above, we conclude, as a general matter, to have standing to pursue a claim for damages in the courts: CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) –466 (Boorstein) .) Although there are exceptions as illustrated in the discussion above, we conclude...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:Cal.App.4th 488, 496; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a).) A default judgment is void on its face if the underlying proof of service fails to show compliance with all statutory requirements. (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434 , 1441-1442.) Here, the trial court determined — based, it seems, solely on the proof of service — that there had not been proper service. It could properly make that determination at any time. X DISPOSITION The order quashing service is reversed, solely as to Bewley; as to all other: Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) -1442.) Here, the trial court determined — based, it seems, solely on the proof of service — that there had not been proper service.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:for them solely because he was unaware of their births when he executed his Trust. “[S]imply parroting the language of [the statute] in the [petition] is insufficient to state a cause of action.” (Hawkins v. TACA Internat. Airlines, S.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 466 , 470- 471, 474-476, 478 [rejecting plaintiff’s contention she need not allege specific facts to state a cause of action against airlines for entering into underfunded contracts in violation of statute when she had not seen the contracts].) 5. Appellants were not entitled to leave to amend again After sustaining: A. (2014) - 471, 474-476, 478 .) 5.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:in the immigrant’s best interest to return to his or her home country or the home country of his or her parents. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) & (b)(1); see 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2021); Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 622 , 627−628.) In 2014, the California Legislature enacted section 155 (Stats. 2014, ch. 685, § 1, pp. 4485−4486), which confers jurisdiction on every California superior court—including its juvenile, probate, and family court divisions—to make the findings necessary to petition the USCIS for SIJ status. (§ 155, subd. (a); Bianka M.,: Superior Court (2013)
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O.C. v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:ensure O.C. obtains appellate review of the probate court’s findings, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400-401; see Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 622 , 628 (Eddie E.) [petition for writ relief is the remedy for a superior court’s denial of a minor immigrant’s request for SIJ findings].) DISCUSSION Our analysis involves the application of law to undisputed facts; accordingly, our review is de novo. (Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340,: Superior Court (2013) (Eddie E.) .) DISCUSSION Our analysis involves the application of law to undisputed facts...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:may give “express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court”’”].)7 7 We also question whether Michael and Joseph have standing to assert this argument on behalf of the UCNP entities. (See City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670 , 678 [a party may appeal “only that portion of the judgment adverse to the appealing party’s interest”]; In re Marriage of Hinman, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 719, fn. 3 [an “appellant may only complain of errors which injuriously affect her”]; Nichols v. Nichols (1933) 135 Cal.App. 488, 491: Horspool (2014) ; In re Marriage of Hinman, supra, 6 Cal.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:courts but whose work product 11 comes into the judicial process to be used by the courts, such as probation officers who prepare presentencing reports and social workers and psychiatrists involved in terminating parental rights. (Ibid.; Bergeron v. Boyd (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 877 , 885- 889 [court appointed custody evaluator]; McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540, 550-552 (McClintock) [guardian ad litem]; Fisher v. Pickens (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 708, 712-715 [court investigator].) These persons fulfill quasi-judicial functions “ ‘intimately related to the judicial process....: Boyd (2014) - 889 ; McClintock v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:that the petition challenged provisions that were contained in previous EDPs and were thus barred by the statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338), and that Abatti's claims were also barred by the Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892 (Morgan) validation action.56 Judge Altamirano overruled the demurrer, but indicated that she had questions. The District subsequently filed a motion to strike the second amended petition on similar grounds, and specifically sought to strike allegations regarding EDP provisions that had been contained in previous EDPs (i.e....: Imperial Irrigation District (2014)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:that the petition challenged provisions that were contained in previous EDPs and were thus barred by the statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338), and that Abatti's claims were also barred by the Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation District (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892 (Morgan) validation action.56 Judge Altamirano overruled the demurrer, but indicated that she had questions. The District subsequently filed a motion to strike the second amended petition on similar grounds, and specifically sought to strike allegations regarding EDP provisions that had been contained in previous EDPs (i.e....: Imperial Irrigation District (2014)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:whether, in rejecting the agreement, [the guardian ad litem] had acted contrary to the best interests of the minors”].) 63 if the parent objects.” (Williams, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 49, italics added; accord, In re Marriage of Metzger (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1441 , 1448.) Here, Christine and the Minors analogize Christine to the guardian ad litem in Scruton, whose repudiation was entitled to some deference. (Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Christine, however, is not in the same position as the guardian ad litem in Scruton. There was only one guardian: App.4th at p. 49, italics added; accord, In re Marriage of Metzger (2014) .) Here, Christine and the Minors analogize Christine to the guardian ad litem in Scruton, whose repudiation was entitled to s...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 364.) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210 , 226.)46 3. The superior court erred in its grant of declaratory relief The District first contends that the superior court usurped its authority in declaring that historical apportionment is the only reasonable method of apportionment. We agree....: Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) .)46 3.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 364.) We review underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to legal issues. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210 , 226.)46 3. The superior court erred in its grant of declaratory relief The District first contends that the superior court usurped its authority in declaring that historical apportionment is the only reasonable method of apportionment. We agree....: Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) .)46 3.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:court permitted to do these things, the effect would be to require the child to submit evidence beyond a declaration even when the declaration establishes the facts necessary to support SIJ predicate findings. (See Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340 , 352 (Leslie H.) [reversing denial of petition for SIJ predicate findings where “court based its finding on anecdotal impressions, untethered to any evidence in this case”].) Such an approach would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s determination that the 14 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban,: Were a court permitted to do these things, the effect would be to require the child to submit evidence beyond a declaration even when the declaration establishes the facts necessary to support SIJ pre...
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:re Israel O. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 279, 283.) Other courts have done so through writ proceedings. (Bianka M., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1015; O.C. v. Superior Court (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 76, 82 (O.C.); Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340 , 343 (Leslie H.).) The cases do not discuss whether an appeal or a writ petition is the proper vehicle to obtain appellate review of an order denying a petition for SIJ findings. We hold that the order is appealable. “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only: Superior Court (2014) (Leslie H.).) The cases do not discuss whether an appeal or a writ petition is the proper vehicle to obtain appellate review of an order denying a petition for SIJ findings.
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O.C. v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:relief is the remedy for a superior court’s denial of a minor immigrant’s request for SIJ findings].) DISCUSSION Our analysis involves the application of law to undisputed facts; accordingly, our review is de novo. (Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340 , 347 (Leslie H.).) Title 8 United States Code section 1101(a)(27)(J) “is a form of immigration relief that affords undocumented children a pathway to lawful permanent residency and citizenship [by employing] ‘a unique hybrid procedure that directs the collaboration of state and federal systems.’” (In re Marisol N.H. (2014) 979: Superior Court (2014) (Leslie H.).) Title 8 United States Code section 1101(a)(27)(J) “is a form of immigration relief that affords undocumented children a pathway to lawful permanent residency...
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:[Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 979.) “We do not judge credibility on appeal. An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to predicate reversible error.” (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172 , 1175, citing Greenberg, supra, at p. 1097.) “[T]he trier of fact may disregard all of the testimony of a party, whether contradicted or uncontradicted, if it determines that he testified falsely as to some matters covered by his testimony (Nelson v. Black, 43 Cal.2d 612 . . .).” (Halagan: An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to predicate reversible error.” (In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) , citing Greenberg, supra, at p. 1097.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:loss or damage resulting from the attorney’s negligence.” (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199.) A plaintiff must prove all four elements to prevail; failure to prove even one is fatal to recovery. (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574 , 1582 (Namikas).) “‘In the legal malpractice context, the elements of causation and damage are particularly closely linked.’” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582.) “The plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that but for the attorney’s negligent acts or omissions, he [or she] would have obtained: Miller (2014) (Namikas).) “‘In the legal malpractice context, the elements of causation and damage are particularly closely linked.’” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:879, 883 (Luna Crest) [challenging City’s permit requirement]; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 443–444 [standing to sue employer for violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act]; Sipple v. City of Hayward (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 349 , 358–359 [company’s standing to seek refunds on behalf of customers for taxes collected and 27. remitted by company]; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1364 [same]; MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742, 747; Mendoza: City of Hayward (2014) –359 ; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.) “‘[T]he reason for 54 the change of circumstances rule is to preclude relitigation of the same facts’ and to bring finality to determinations concerning financial support.” (In re Marriage of Rosenfeld & Gross (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 478 , 490 (Rosenfeld & Gross).) “‘Without a changed circumstances rule, “‘dissolution cases would have no finality and unhappy former spouses could bring repeated actions for modification with no burden of showing a justification to change the order....: App.4th at p. 1048.) “‘he reason for 54 the change of circumstances rule is to preclude relitigation of the same facts’ and to bring finality to determinations concerning financial support.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:inherent equitable power to set aside an order obtained through extrinsic fraud. We agree. The only appealable orders in probate proceedings are those listed in the Probate Code. (§§1300–1304; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10); Kalenian v. Insen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 569 , 575–576 (Kalenian); Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125–1126.) An order settling an account of a fiduciary is an appealable order. (§1300, subd. (b).) An order denying a motion to vacate an order on equitable grounds is generally not appealable. (Kalenian, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 577; Estate: Insen (2014) –576 (Kalenian); Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:82.) In that circumstance, “unlike when a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we determine only whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action, and not whether the plaintiff might be able to do so.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759 , 764.) B. Analysis Generally, an executor or other personal representative is the person authorized to maintain or defend an action on behalf of a probate estate. (Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391 (Smith); see Prob. Code, § 9820; Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a).) There are: Sangadeo-Patel (2014) .) B.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:interested person]; see also Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1206 [“simply being [an elder’s] child is not sufficient to confer standing” where child had no “legally cognizable interest in her mother’s revocable living trust”]; Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 , 782 [interested person has “ ‘ “a property right in or claim against a trust estate . . . which may be affected by the proceeding” ’ ”]; Estate of O’Brien (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 788, 792 [“An ‘interested person’ is one who has a pecuniary interest . . .: App.5th 1198, 1206 child is not sufficient to confer standing” where child had no “legally cognizable interest in her mother’s revocable living trust”]...
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:to properly plead the invalidity of Barbara’s disclaimer, and that there is no factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing. We need not discuss that argument because Simon need not plead facts concerning the disclaimer to 8 Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 involved a will contest that required the application of section 48. Estate of Baird (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 957 and Estate of Getty (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 755 both involved will contest proceedings under prior sections of the Probate Code. Pillsbury v. Karmgard (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 743 involved a trust beneficiary who: We need not discuss that argument because Simon need not plead facts concerning the disclaimer to 8 Estate of Sobol (2014) involved a will contest that required the application of section 48.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:“[a]n heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate . . . which may be affected by the proceeding.” (Prob. Code, § 48; Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 , 782–783 [to be an interested person under Probate Code section 48, a child, spouse or beneficiary must also have a “property right in or claim against a trust estate”].) 12 Kenton’s reliance on Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419 is misplaced. Saks has no bearing: Code, § 48.) Accordingly, we reject Kenton’s standing challenge. 3 An “interested person” is defined as “n heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary...
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:meaning of “interested person” as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. (§ 48, subd. (b); Estate of Sobol (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771 , 782.) 12 Here, at the very least, the peculiar interrelated procedural posture of the probate estate vis-a-vis the trust compels us to conclude trustee has standing to file his demurrer. As the proceedings stand now, trustee has been ordered by the Sonoma County Superior Court not to distribute decedent’s: The meaning of “interested person” as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceedin...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:mindful that “determination of a child support obligation is a highly regulated area of the law, and the only discretion a trial court possesses is the discretion provided by statute or rule.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1312.) (a) Below Guideline Order Kim argues the trial court erred in awarding support of $16,000, which was below the guideline $26,374 amount. She argues that the pendente lite order was based upon $213,668 per month of net income and awarded Kim $25,558 per month, while the trial court: App.4th at pp. 1046–1047.) In reviewing a child support order, however, “‘we are mindful that “determination of a child support obligation is a highly regulated area of the law...
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:finding it could not award fees absent a showing of bad faith by the trustee.4 The family court’s erroneous failure to determine whether appellant is entitled to relief under section 2030 is an abuse of discretion. (David v. Hernandez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 578 , 592 [legal error is abuse of discretion].) Since an award of fees and costs under section 2030 involves factual issues not yet addressed, we shall reverse the family court’s order and remand for additional proceedings. DISPOSITION The order denying appellant’s section 2030 motion is reversed and the matter remanded: Hernandez (2014) .) Since an award of fees and costs under section 2030 involves factual issues not yet addressed, we shall reverse the family court’s order...
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:a derivative action on its behalf.16 Even if the Trust’s real estate committee makes financial decisions 16 “ ‘ “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” ’ ” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594 , 618.) “To satisfy this burden, ‘ “a plaintiff ‘must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading’ ” ’ by clearly stating not only the legal basis for the amendment, 46 regarding the Trust’s real estate: A. (2014)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:have questioned the utility of the Laffey Matrix outside of the Washington, D.C., area,10 others have embraced it as applicable nationally where, as here, an appropriate local adjustment factor is applied. (See, e.g., Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691 , 702 (Syers) [finding no abuse of discretion in employing Laffey matrix in San Francisco litigation].) Syers is particularly informative....: Rankin (2014) (Syers) .) Syers is particularly informative.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:(Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 26.) At bottom, Hankin’s unsupported personal opinion that the law should give him standing is irrelevant to our determination of whether it actually does. (See Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428 , 442–444 (Peake) [party’s novel 3 That is not a concern in this case, where multiple concerned individuals sought to protect Anne. 9 interpretation of the statute was not supported by “any reasonable legal principles”].) And even if a trial court has some discretion to allow someone to proceed as: Underwood (2014) –444 (Peake) .) And even if a...
- Conservatorship of R.J. : An appellate court will disregard arguments raised on appeal that lack sufficient factual or legal support, treating such unsupported points as forfeited.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:a statutory right to disclaim the Trust, her disclaimer should be presumed valid, and Simon cannot force her to accept a gift she does not want. However, the presumption that disclaimers are valid is not conclusive. (Vance v. Bizek (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1155 , 1164.) And a demurrer is not an evidentiary motion to which such a presumption may be applied. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 827.) Barbara and Gerald also argue Simon only has standing if he represents the pecuniary interests of a beneficiary of the Estate. For this: Bizek (2014) .) And a demurrer is not an evidentiary motion to which such a presumption may be applied. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) .) Barbara and Gerald also argue Simon only has standing if he...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483 , 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909; In re Levi H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1279,: S. (2014) ; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:at the time. 5 Humphrey sought and obtained a settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) However, it did not provide any information not already in the minute order. 5 Action Committee v. County of San Luis Obispo (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 427 , 432.) Bewley seeks to draw a distinction between a motion to quash based on lack of minimum contacts with the forum and a motion to quash based on lack of proper service. An order granting the former is effectively a final judgment. By contrast, an order granting the latter: County of San Luis Obispo (2014) .) Bewley seeks to draw a distinction between a motion to quash based on lack of minimum contacts with the forum and a motion to quash based on lack of proper service.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:family member.” Where, as here, the interpretation of a statute or regulation is involved, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Menefield v. Foreman (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 211, 217; Children and Families Commission of Fresno County v. Brown (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45 , 57 [“De novo review is appropriate where the trial court’s determination of whether statutory criteria were met presents an issue of statutory construction or a question of law.”]; Munroe v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1301 (Munroe).) This is true under both traditional and: Brown (2014) ; Munroe v.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 861, 853–854, 864 [deprivation of a property right under section 15610.30 implicated where respondents allegedly restructured insurance policies held by plaintiffs’ trust with increased premiums that required payment by plaintiffs]; Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468 , 472, 479–480 (Bounds) [same conclusion where allegations showed that elderly petitioner executed escrow instructions authorizing the sale of real property owned by her trust, even though escrow was later cancelled and title and possession of the property were not transferred]....: Superior Court (2014) , 479–480 (Bounds) [same conclusion where allegations showed that elderly petitioner executed escrow instructions authorizing the sale of real property owned by her trust...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:which, in certain combinations, constitute property.’” (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 157 (Union Pacific), quoting United States v. Craft (2002) 535 U.S. 274, 278; see also Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468 , 479 (Bounds) [“Case law recognizes that property rights are a complex ‘bundle of rights’”].) Some of the sticks in the bundle for Atiyeh’s house passed to Ring in her individual capacity immediately upon Atiyeh’s death, but not all of them. Specifically, title to the house vested in her, and: S. 274, 278; see also Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) (Bounds) .) Some of the sticks in the bundle for Atiyeh’s house passed to Ring in her individual capacity immediatel...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:by reducing the amount of water used by farmers. The authority that Abatti cites in support of these contentions pertains to forfeiture of pre- 1914 rights and is inapposite (Millview County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 879 , 891), and he provides no statutory analysis. We deem the point forfeited, other than to note that Abatti is essentially ignoring the existence of the clearinghouse, as he does in other arguments that we discuss, post. Further, amicus IVC contends that the District is exempt from reversion of its: State Water Resources Control Bd. (2014)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:by reducing the amount of water used by farmers. The authority that Abatti cites in support of these contentions pertains to forfeiture of pre- 1914 rights and is inapposite (Millview County Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 879 , 891), and he provides no statutory analysis. We deem the point forfeited, other than to note that Abatti is essentially ignoring the existence of the clearinghouse, as he does in other arguments that we discuss, post. Further, amicus IVC contends that the District is exempt from reversion of its: State Water Resources Control Bd. (2014)
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:lower court’s jurisdiction.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs, supra, ¶ 3:2, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 916, italics omitted; see Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666; Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120 , 123.) As a result, a trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate, modify or otherwise change an order that is the subject of a pending appeal. (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [“Until remittitur issues, the lower court cannot act upon the reviewing court’s decision; remittitur: Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666; Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 123.) As a result, a trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate, modify or otherwise change an order that is the subject of a pend...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:prove the literal truth of an allegedly libelous accusation in every detail, so long as the imputation is substantially true so as to justify the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the remark.” (Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council (1943) 23 Cal.2d 146 , 160.) Because the court’s judgment on Hilja’s elder abuse petition effectively demonstrated that the gist of Hilja’s statement accusing Kenton of elder abuse was substantially true, the statement was not actionable. 2. Denial of Limited Discovery Request Kenton also contends the court erred when it denied him the opportunity: San Joaquin County Central Labor Council (1943) 23 Cal.2d 146, 160.) Because the court’s judgment on Hilja’s elder abuse petition effectively demonstrated that the gist of Hilja’s statement accusing K...
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:interests in an estate before the final order of distribution issues. Although the underlying premise for the argument—that an heir may convey or encumber an expected interest in an estate, subject to administration—is correct (see, e.g., Reed v. Hayward (1943) 23 Cal.2d 336 , 342), the question whether a potential heir can encumber a contingent interest vis-à-vis a third party is entirely distinct 11 from whether a contingent unconfirmed interest is sufficient to confer standing to partition a property where, as here, another interest in the property (Catello’s) is not subject to probate.: Hayward (1943) 23 Cal.2d 336, 342), the question whether a potential heir can encumber a contingent interest vis-à-vis a third party is entirely distinct 11 from whether a contingent unconfirmed inter...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:obtained a 17 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. judgment against husband]; Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado) [divorce]; Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 213–214 (Gudelj) [same]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754 , 757 [same]; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 604 [same].) The court in Schindler made a point of quoting Siberell’s limiting language: “As cautioned in Siberell, [214 Cal. at page 772], it should be noted that we are dealing here strictly with the controversy between the parties to: Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757 ; Schindler v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:interest or failures to fulfill duties owed to the ward or the court. We therefore conclude that minors for whom a guardian ad litem is appointed may petition for removal of the guardian ad litem. (See Guardianship of Gilman (1944) 23 Cal.2d 862 , 864 [“[t]he rule that a person under disability must appear by general guardian, or guardian ad litem, does not apply to a case where the very question involved is the validity of the order of guardianship itself ”].) If, as we hold, a minor capable of making informed decisions: We therefore conclude that minors for whom a guardian ad litem is appointed may petition for removal of the guardian ad litem. (See Guardianship of Gilman (1944) 23 Cal.2d 862
- Conservatorship of R.J. : A claim of error that was not timely objected to or preserved at trial is waived and may not be raised on appeal. Issues must be raised in the appropriate form at the trial level to be reviewable.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:a personal waiver on the record of his right to jury trial. 1. Due Process C.O. contends the trial court’s failure to obtain a personal waiver violated his due process rights. He relies on, inter alia, Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219 , in which the California Supreme Court held under the due process clause of the California Constitution that the state must prove a person is gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt and, when the proposed conservatee demands a jury trial, the jury’s finding must be unanimous. (Id. at p. 235.): He relies on, inter alia, Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, in which the California Supreme Court held under the due process clause of the California Constitution that the state must pro...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:to a jury trial to determine whether they are gravely disabled. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1).) The determination must be unanimous and upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 248 (Early); Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219 , 235 (Roulet).) If grave disability is found, the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes disabilities on the conservatee as needed (§ 5357), and determines the least restrictive appropriate placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The conservatee’s home, or that of a relative, is to be given first priority, as: vocational, and social condition, and information obtained from the person’s family members, close friends, social worker, or principal therapist.” (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this investigation...
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 595.) A trial court’s exercise of its equitable powers is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224 , 1256; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272.) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1603; Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Probate Court’s Findings of Hanako’s Intent: Mojave Water Agency (2000) ; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:does not necessarily lead to shortages and waste. 71 components of the EDP, and their role in getting water to those who need it, such as the water clearinghouse. Abatti's reliance on City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224 is misplaced. In that case, the superior court entered a judgment in a water dispute without regard to existing overlying and riparian rights, and found it unnecessary to adjudicate individual rights, due in part to its view that the solution that the court had arrived at was consistent with reasonable: Mojave Water Agency (2000) is misplaced.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:does not necessarily lead to shortages and waste. 71 components of the EDP, and their role in getting water to those who need it, such as the water clearinghouse. Abatti's reliance on City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224 is misplaced. In that case, the superior court entered a judgment in a water dispute without regard to existing overlying and riparian rights, and found it unnecessary to adjudicate individual rights, due in part to its view that the solution that the court had arrived at was consistent with reasonable: Mojave Water Agency (2000) is misplaced.
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : A court possesses broad discretion to decide which settlement expenses are reasonable and the amount to be reimbursed, and may allocate reimbursement in any manner it deems appropriate.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:K notes the FCRA uses both terms, citing sections 1681n and 1681s, and argues the terms should be interpreted to have separate meanings. In furtherance of that argument, Circle K cites to Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667 , 681 (Raines) for the proposition that statutory “penalties” are designed to punish a wrongdoer and do not require the existence of an injury, whereas “damages” are designed to be compensatory and require an injury to compensate. We believe Circle K has the better argument. Circle K is correct the: Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) (Raines) for the proposition that statutory “penalties” are designed to punish a wrongdoer and do not require the existence of an injury...
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:the absence of any evidence showing Hanako’s intent to include community property assets in her estate plan, it was reasonable for the probate court to interpret the evidence of her intent as it did. (See, e.g., Multani v. Knight (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 837 , 857.) Where, as here, there is “a mistake in expression [of] the testator’s actual and specific intent at the time the will was drafted,” the will should be reformed to express that actual intent. (Duke, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 896.) It is true that “[p]reference is to be: Knight (2018) .) Where, as here, there is “a mistake in expression the testator’s actual and specific intent at the time the will was drafted,” the will should be reformed to express that actual inten...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:overruling a demurrer and issues of statutory interpretation. (LGCY Power, LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 844, 859.) When construing a statute, we ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate its purpose in enacting the statute. (Jenkins v. Teegarden (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1128 , 1138–1139.) We give the statute’s words their plain and usual meaning, construing them in their statutory context. (Id. at p. 1138.) Having engaged in that review, we conclude Goebner has the better argument....: Teegarden (2014)
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:. on behalf of a trust.”8 But case law has recognized the distinctive status of a trustee who is, as both appellants are here, also settlor and beneficiary of a revocable living trust. For example, in Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516 , the Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff who appeared in propria persona on behalf of a trust of which he was the “sole settlor, trustee, and beneficiary” did not violate the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law under 8 In making this point, the tenants liken trusts: Bancroft (2014)
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:that the trustee was effectively speaking for the interests of the trust beneficiaries in the lawsuit against the mobilehome park and, as a nonlawyer, improperly representing those beneficiaries. (Ziegler, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 548–549; cf. Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516 , 1519–1520 [a self-represented trustee does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law under Ziegler when he is also the sole beneficiary, and thus is not representing the interests of another].) This reasoning is closely connected with the specific facts in Ziegler....: Bancroft (2014) –1520 [a self-represented trustee does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law under Ziegler when he is also the sole beneficiary...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:harmless because Brandy has not shown it is “reasonably probable” she would have received a more favorable result had the trial court done so. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); see also In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292 , 303 [applying Watson standard to juvenile court error in failing to make statutorily required findings].) 26 Notably, Brandy admits she “does not contend that she was precluded from presenting evidence that bore on the issues of voluntariness.” At the outset, we reject Brandy’s argument that respondents bore the burden: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); see also In re D’Anthony D. (2014) .) 26 Notably...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:of admissions or inconsistent statements by [a party] in earlier pleadings in the same lawsuit” and “may disregard conflicting factual allegations in the [challenged pleading].” (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 7:47, citing Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336 , 344 [demurrer]; Pang v. Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 989-990 [motion for judgment on pleadings].) 10 II. The Act A. Assembly Bill 939: The Integrated Waste Management Act In 1988, in recognition of an “emerging solid waste crisis in California,” the state Senate created a Task Force: UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) ; Pang v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:of admissions or inconsistent statements by [a party] in earlier pleadings in the same lawsuit” and “may disregard conflicting factual allegations in the [challenged pleading].” (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 7:47, citing Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336 , 344 [demurrer]; Pang v. Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 989-990 [motion for judgment on pleadings].) 10 II. The Act A. Assembly Bill 939: The Integrated Waste Management Act In 1988, in recognition of an “emerging solid waste crisis in California,” the state Senate created a Task Force: UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) ; Pang v.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:the temporary conservatorship,” they are “entitled to the documents” under the rationale of Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124 (Moeller), Fiduciary Trust Internat. of California v. Klein (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1184 (Fiduciary Trust), and Stine v. Dell’Osso (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 834 (Stine). Parker’s reliance on these cases as support for her section 850 petition is unavailing....: Dell’Osso (2014) (Stine).
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:(1928) 203 Cal. 190, 193–194 (Cuneo).) “[W]here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022 , 1034.) And an answer that denies material allegations is a “good defense.” Again, Cuneo is apt: “It requires no citation of authority to declare that the above-mentioned denials put in issue the assignment to the plaintiff of the promissory note and cause of action sued upon. [¶] As the: State Air Resources Bd. (2014)
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:(1928) 203 Cal. 190, 193–194 (Cuneo).) “[W]here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022 , 1034.) And an answer that denies material allegations is a “good defense.” Again, Cuneo is apt: “It requires no citation of authority to declare that the above-mentioned denials put in issue the assignment to the plaintiff of the promissory note and cause of action sued upon. [¶] As the: State Air Resources Bd. (2014)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:lives of the children.” (§ 4053, subd. (f).) The statewide uniform guideline under section 4055 determines child support according to a complex formula based on each parent’s income and custodial time with the child. (In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238 , 1245.) The term “guideline” is a misnomer because the amount generated by the guideline formula is presumptively correct. (In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175, 183; §§ 4053, subd. (k), 4057, subd. (a).) Under section 4057, the guideline figure “is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of: 47 appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.” (§ 4053, subd. (f).) The statewide uniform guideline under section 4055 determines chi...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. “‘A common idiom describes property as a “bundle of sticks”—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.’” (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134 , 157 (Union Pacific), quoting United States v. Craft (2002) 535 U.S. 274, 278; see also Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 (Bounds) [“Case law recognizes that property rights are a complex ‘bundle of rights’”].) Some of the sticks in the bundle for Atiyeh’s house passed to: Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) (Union Pacific), quoting United States v.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:required to interpret section 3000’s use of the term “step-parent” in defining an “immediate family member.” Where, as here, the interpretation of a statute or regulation is involved, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Menefield v. Foreman (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 211 , 217; Children and Families Commission of Fresno County v. Brown (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45, 57 [“De novo review is appropriate where the trial court’s determination of whether statutory criteria were met presents an issue of statutory construction or a question of law.”]; Munroe v. Los Angeles County Civil Service: Foreman (2014) ; Children and Families Commission of Fresno County v.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:not urge error on appeal]; Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 665 [as a general rule, respondents who fail to file a cross-appeal cannot claim error in connection with the opposing party’s appeal]; Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24 , 31.) Accordingly, we decline to reach the separate issues raised by the Briggs Parties.9 In any event, since we have affirmed the underlying judgment, the issues raised by the Briggs Parties are moot. 9 The probate court granted a motion brought by Everett Earle Pearce, Jr., “to substitute Richard: Cohen (2014)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 108 (Jones); accord, Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1171; see § 17704.09 [describing the fiduciary duties of members and managers of a limited liability company]; Feresi v. The Livery, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 419 , 425 [same]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 411, 424-425 [describing the fiduciary obligations in a partnership].) A minority shareholder may bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against majority shareholders as an individual claim or as a derivative claim, depending on the: The Livery, LLC (2014) ; Everest Investors 8 v.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:to quickly describe to insurers the services for which the provider is billing.” (People ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rubin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 753, 764; see California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 543 , 550, fn. 5.) According to an expert’s declaration in U.S. ex rel. Woodruff v. Hawaii Pacific Health (D.Ha. 2008) 560 F.Supp.2d 998, “ ‘CPT codes have been incorporated to HCPCS as the first level of HCPCS codes. HCPCS level II codes are established by [CMS] and are alpha numeric: Appeals Bd. (2014) , fn. 5.) According to an expert’s declaration in U.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:suit against the 3 The entity originally responsible for integrated waste management in California was the Integrated Waste Management Board (the Board). In 2010, the Board was renamed and is now commonly referred to as “CalRecycle.” (PaintCare v. Mortensen (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1292 , 1299 & fn. 2.) 5 Authority in Kings County seeking to enjoin the Authority from seeking the records. After losing a battle over venue, Waste Connections eventually dismissed the case without prejudice in January 2018. In June 2017 and February 2018, the Authority again requested that Waste Connections allow: Mortensen (2015) & fn. 2.) 5 Authority in Kings County seeking to enjoin the Authority from seeking the records.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:suit against the 3 The entity originally responsible for integrated waste management in California was the Integrated Waste Management Board (the Board). In 2010, the Board was renamed and is now commonly referred to as “CalRecycle.” (PaintCare v. Mortensen (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1292 , 1299 & fn. 2.) 5 Authority in Kings County seeking to enjoin the Authority from seeking the records. After losing a battle over venue, Waste Connections eventually dismissed the case without prejudice in January 2018. In June 2017 and February 2018, the Authority again requested that Waste Connections allow: Mortensen (2015) & fn. 2.) 5 Authority in Kings County seeking to enjoin the Authority from seeking the records.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:request by Public Counsel to file an amicus brief in support of S.H.R.5 DISCUSSION A. Appealability At least one appellate court has reviewed the denial of a petition for SIJ findings as an appealable order. (In re Israel O. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 279 , 283.) Other courts have done so through writ proceedings. (Bianka M., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1015; O.C. v. Superior Court (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 76, 82 (O.C.); Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340, 343 (Leslie H.).) The cases do not discuss whether an appeal or a: Appealability At least one appellate court has reviewed the denial of a petition for SIJ findings as an appealable order. (In re Israel O. (2015) .) Other courts have done so through writ proceedings.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:and amount of civil penalties, which the court concluded were essential elements of the City’s two claims. In March 2015, however, that ruling was vacated by the decision of People ex rel Feuer v. Superior Court (Cahuenga’s the Spot) (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1364, which held that although civil penalties were available remedies, they were not elements of the City’s causes of action. 18 In support of its request for penalties, the City submitted, among others, documents filed with the Secretary of State regarding Braum’s membership in the limited liability company, 1123: Superior Court (Cahuenga’s the Spot) (2015) , which held that although civil penalties were available remedies, they were not elements of the City’s causes of action.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:in Probate Code section 859 does not require a bad faith finding does not render the statute vague. Kenton provides no authority to meaningfully support his equal protection argument. Accordingly, we disregard it. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41 , 52 (“Allen”) [“[w]hen legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration”].) c. Penalty Amount Kenton’s final argument is that the trial court erred in determining the penalty amount. Again, we disagree. On: City of Sacramento (2015) (“Allen”) hen legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration”].) c.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:will presume that the trial court addressed Attorneys’ standing argument and rejected it either because it was not timely presented or because the court concluded that Carol had adequately pleaded standing. (See Lydig Construction, Inc. v. Martinez Steel Corp. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 937 , 945 [appellate court will presume that trial court “considered all the pertinent matters presented to it and ruled in favor of the prevailing party”]. . 47 F. Abuse of Process (Cross-Appeal) The tort of abuse of process has two elements: “ ‘[F]irst, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful: Martinez Steel Corp. (2015) . . 47 F.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:of action for judicial dissolution’”]; Ontiveros v. Constable, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [“a party’s right under section 2000 depends entirely on the existence of a cause of action for involuntary dissolution of a corporation”]; Kennedy v. Kennedy (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1474 , 1481 [“[u]pon dismissal of [a] dissolution cause of action, there is no dissolution to avoid and, thus, no right to buy out plaintiff’s interests” under section 2000]; Panakosta, Partners, LP v. Hammer Lane Management, LLC (2011) 199 Cal.App....: Kennedy (2015) pon dismissal of dissolution cause of action, there is no dissolution to avoid and, thus, no right to buy out plaintiff’s interests” under section 2000]; Panakosta, Partners, LP v.
- Clark v. Smith : A written general assignment of all of a party’s real and personal property is legally sufficient to effect a valid transfer of those assets, even when the specific items (such as shares or notes) are...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:pp. 674–675 [the “reasonably related” test is the “more concise modern formulation” of the “convenient, useful [etc.]” test].) As we ourselves have noted, “the issue of reasonableness” is a “factual question.” (Contra Costa County v. Pinole Point Props., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 914 , 925.) Here, despite the breadth of the Authority’s request—seeking all of Waste Connections’s Alameda County-related records from landfills in three counties over more than three years—the trial court did not even attempt to evaluate reasonableness, whether the Authority’s request was “convenient, useful,” etc....: Pinole Point Props., LLC (2015) .) Here, despite the breadth of the Authority’s request—seeking all of Waste Connections’s Alameda County-related records from landfills in three counties over more tha...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:pp. 674–675 [the “reasonably related” test is the “more concise modern formulation” of the “convenient, useful [etc.]” test].) As we ourselves have noted, “the issue of reasonableness” is a “factual question.” (Contra Costa County v. Pinole Point Props., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 914 , 925.) Here, despite the breadth of the Authority’s request—seeking all of Waste Connections’s Alameda County-related records from landfills in three counties over more than three years—the trial court did not even attempt to evaluate reasonableness, whether the Authority’s request was “convenient, useful,” etc....: Pinole Point Props., LLC (2015) .) Here, despite the breadth of the Authority’s request—seeking all of Waste Connections’s Alameda County-related records from landfills in three counties over more tha...
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:This case involves an heirship claim based on undisputed facts that requires application of various statutes, including those defining the meaning 7 of parent and child and whether a natural parent and child relationship exists. (See Estate of Britel (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 127 , 135−136 (Britel).) The case therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo. (A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284, 290 (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 891.) We also review de novo the probate court’s decision to apply California and not Indiana law in: Standard of Review This case involves an heirship claim based on undisputed facts that requires application of various statutes, including those defining the meaning 7 of parent and child and whether...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:settlement agreement. Therefore, although they may bear upon the effectiveness of the second GAL agreement, they cannot be relied on to challenge the court’s September 2018 ruling enforcing the settlement agreement. (See Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency v. Dhaliwal (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1315 , 1328 [we review a court’s ruling based on the record as it existed at the time of the ruling].) Under the ninth term, the provisions of the agreement affecting the Minors’ interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem. Christine notes that Chen was appointed: Dhaliwal (2015) .) Under the ninth term, the provisions of the agreement affecting the Minors’ interests...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:to “ ‘enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement if the parties stipulate orally before the court or in writing to settle all or part of a case. [Citation.]’ ” (Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367 , 1373–1374 (Leeman).) A settlement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if some parties stipulate orally in court while others agree in writing. (See Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1432 [Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows “a ‘mix and match’ approach to the manner: Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) –1374 (Leeman).) A settlement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if some parties stipulate orally in court while others agree in writing.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:charges was a matter for the Legislature; any person may file a claim under section 1339.54 with the Department of Public Health alleging a violation of the Payers’ Bill of Rights; and the court in Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401 , determined a facility fee, which was similar to Hospital’s EMS Fee, did not need to be disclosed to a patient before treatment. The trial court concluded Torres had not alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for declaratory relief or for a violation of the CLRA. The: Cedars-Sinai Center (2015) , determined a facility fee, which was similar to Hospital’s EMS Fee, did not need to be disclosed to a patient before treatment.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:of the action. (Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 301 [merely paying taxes is insufficient to prove seisin].) ‘Seised or possessed’ means that the plaintiff held legal title, including through adverse possession, during the requisite period. (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467 , 471 [“we conclude that the notices of default under void deed of trust provided notice of [a] cloud on plaintiffs’ title, but did not dispute or disturb plaintiffs’ possession of the property”].) In other words, an action to recover real property is time barred unless the plaintiff can show: Thomas (2015)
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:The elements of a cause of action for breach of a partnership agreement are: (1) the partnership agreement; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. (See Agam v. Gavra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 91 , 104.) 3 The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach. (See Jameson v. Desta (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1164.) “The fiduciary duties a partner: Gavra (2015) .) 3 The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:We in no way condone Richard and Brown’s failure in their cross-appeal (or Richard’s corresponding failures in the 270 Appeals). Nor do we adopt Richard and Brown’s characterization of Westchester Secondary Charter School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1226 , 1235, footnote 4, as categorically excusing compliance with rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) under any circumstance. Nevertheless, as we did with respect to Richard’s appeals, we exercise our discretion under rule 8.204(e)(2)(B) to disregard Richard and Brown’s non-compliance here. 34 only for abuse of discretion....: Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) , footnote 4, as categorically excusing compliance with rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) under any circumstance. Nevertheless, as we did with respect to Richard’s appeals...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:not executed voluntarily’ unless the [trial] court makes five designated findings. 15 We note that in the commercial context “ ‘rescission is intended to restore the parties as nearly as possible to their former positions.’ ” (Wong v. Stoler (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1375 , 1386.) Donovan recognized this objective, citing a legal treatise for the proposition, “negligence is no bar to relief from unilateral mistake if [the] other party can be placed in status quo.” (Donovan, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 284.) However, Bonds observed that, “[a]lthough a party seeking rescission of a: 15 We note that in the commercial context “ ‘rescission is intended to restore the parties as nearly as possible to their former positions.’ ” (Wong v. Stoler (2015)
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:Scott was aware of Brandy’s mistake, she is not entitled to relief if she bore the risk of the mistake due to neglect of a legal duty. (§ 1577; Rest.2d Contracts, § 153; see also Amin v. Superior Ct. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1392 , 1407 (Amin) [stating that Donovan stands for the proposition that “a necessary [prerequisite] for obtaining rescission of a contract based on unilateral mistake of fact is that the party seeking rescission did not bear the risk of the mistake”].) Brandy focuses on a portion of the Donovan decision in: Superior Ct. (2015)
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:said on many occasions “[a] real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605; City of Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488 , 504; Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, 765; Ventura County Ry. Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 878, 880; Gantman v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566; Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d: Campbell (2015) ; Doe v.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:consider if the result would be different in the event of fraud by Scott because the trial court found there was insufficient evidence that Scott “furthered or encouraged” Brandy’s mistake. (See, e.g., Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 546 , 563 [“[A] release is invalid when it is procured by misrepresentation, overreaching, deception, or fraud.”].) Brandy argues the court erred in that finding, but her argument depends on the trial court believing her testimony and that of her son regarding conversations with Scott about the premarital agreement. We have: 9 We need not and do not consider if the result would be different in the event of fraud by Scott because the trial court found there was insufficient evidence that Scott “furthered or encouraged” Bra...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:[“If the forfeiture has not been vacated at the end of the appearance period, the court has no choice but to enter summary judgment in accordance with the terms stated in the bond.”]; People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1041 , 1047 [“A summary judgment in a bail forfeiture is a consent judgment entered without a hearing and the proceedings are not adversarial.”].) While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. (See People v.: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) .) While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecut...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:311.) “Summary judgment following a declaration of forfeiture is a consent judgment entered without a hearing pursuant to the terms of the bail bond.” (North River–Watts, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; see People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1041 , 1047 [“ ‘summary judgment in a bail forfeiture is a consent judgment entered without a hearing and the proceedings are not adversarial’ ”].) II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 4, 2018, Surety posted a $30,000 bond on behalf of criminal defendant Shuxin Liu. The bond provides that in: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) .) II.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:provided by statute”].) “ ‘The prerequisites for standing to assert statutorily-based causes of action are determined from the statutory language, as well as the underlying legislative intent and the purpose of the statute.’ ” (Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905 , 916.) We independently review whether the statutory criteria have been met on undisputed facts. (Ibid.) “For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist at all times until judgment is entered and not just on the date the complaint is filed. ‘[C]ontentions based on a lack: Ford Motor Co. (2015) .) We independently review whether the statutory criteria have been met on undisputed facts. (Ibid.) “For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:terms or words will be construed according to their ordinary, common meaning unless these are defined by the statute or the statutory context requires a different definition.” (Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Fulkerson (7th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 891 , 895; Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1279 [“a court’s first step in determining legislative intent when construing a statute is to review the words used in the statute, giving the terms their plain and ordinary meaning.”].) Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term damages as “[m]oney claimed: Fulkerson (7th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 891, 895; Benson v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:the finding.’ ” (Ibid.) “We consider the question of whether a statute provides for a mandatory award of attorney fees under the de novo standard of review.” (James L. Harris Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. West Bay Builders, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1214 , 1218.) III. Attorney Fees Request Pursuant to section 16701, subdivision (i), “[t]he court may assess reasonable attorney’s fees and the fees and expenses of appraisers or other experts for a party to the action, in amounts the court finds equitable, against a party that the court finds acted arbitrarily,: West Bay Builders, Inc. (2015)
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Conservatorship of Brokken
Context from opinion:but disagree that Cornelius applies. As we shall explain, that case involved different probate statutes and is limited to its facts. DISCUSSION Standard of Review Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. (In re Joshua A. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 208 , 214-215.) In determining the scope of a statute, “we look first to the words of the statute, giving effect to their plain meaning. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citation.]”: As we shall explain, that case involved different probate statutes and is limited to its facts. DISCUSSION Standard of Review Issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:plaintiffs are shareholders in FCP, they did not bring this action as a shareholders’ derivative action. They thus do not represent FCP and cannot seek to disqualify Barling on FCP’s behalf. (See Coldren v. Hart, King & Coldren, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 237 , 246-247 [former shareholder in a law firm had no standing to disqualify defendant firm’s counsel where claims were direct, not derivative].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no evidence of concurrent representation. 25 Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in: Hart, King & Coldren, Inc. (2015) -247 [former shareholder in a law firm had no standing to disqualify defendant firm’s counsel where claims were direct...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:claims on the merits. (Morgan, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) Next, the authorities that the District cites involve matters encompassed by the prior litigation, which is not the case here. (See, e.g., Colonies Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 689 , 694 [validity of settlement agreement was litigated in prior validation action]; Eiskamp v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2012) 203 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2015) ; Eiskamp v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:claims on the merits. (Morgan, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) Next, the authorities that the District cites involve matters encompassed by the prior litigation, which is not the case here. (See, e.g., Colonies Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 689 , 694 [validity of settlement agreement was litigated in prior validation action]; Eiskamp v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2012) 203 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2015) ; Eiskamp v.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:the part of a member of the bar which cannot be condoned,” whether or not his action caused material damage to Gosey or the Trust. (Lady v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504; see Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141 , 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 [no harm requirement: State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re B...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (Id. at p. 279, quoting Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563 , 571; accord, Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) 1. Surcharge of $300,000 The first surcharge was based on the movement of funds generated by the Snelling Ranch in and out of Stacey’s bank account ending in 5255. She opened the account: De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571; accord, Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 85.) It explained that “[t]his procedure where 6 In Fukuda, our Supreme Court noted the reasoning of its plurality opinion in Tex- Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335 “casts doubt on the suggestion in Drummey . . . that the independent judgment standard of judicial review is compelled by the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.” (Fukuda, 20 Cal.4th at p. 822, fn. 15.) 13 the courts in reviewing, in its broadest sense, the actions: Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:determining standard of review to apply to such determinations].) 24 would be undermined by presuming the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship.’ ” (Hill & Dittmer, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053, quoting In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1 , 29 (Bonds).) Bonds recognizes that traditional contract defenses are applicable to premarital agreements, but cautions that the “factual circumstances relating to [such] defenses (see [] § 1567) that would not necessarily support the rescission of a commercial contract may suffice to render a premarital agreement unenforceable....: App.4th at p. 1053, quoting In re Marriage of Bonds (2000)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:be in a confidential relationship that would give rise to the fiduciary duties owed between spouses under section 721 or to the presumption of undue influence when a transaction benefits one of the parties. (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1 , 29 (Bonds) [“it is evident that the Uniform [Premarital Agreement] Act was intended to enhance the enforceability of premarital agreements, a goal that would be undermined by presuming the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship”].) 11 extension and Parsons School. Further, the parties’ rabbi, Rabbi May, found Kim: 6 Parties negotiating a premarital agreement are not presumed to be in a confidential relationship that would give rise to the fiduciary duties owed between spouses under section 721...
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:the higher-earning spouse and undoubtedly it was Knapp that needed the protections of section 1615.” As Ginsberg correctly observes, the Legislature added section 1615, subdivision (c) in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1 (Bonds). There, Sun, the unemployed fiancée of professional baseball player Barry Bonds signed 37 a premarital agreement Bonds’ attorney prepared shortly before the parties’ wedding without consulting legal counsel. (Bonds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 6-7....: 36 is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support provision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the time the agreement containing the provision is...
- Garcia v. Garcia : The appellant bears the burden of creating a complete and adequate record for appellate review. Without a sufficient record, the appellate court cannot properly assess the trial court’s findings.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:Standard of Review “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, ‘considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.’ (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317 , 334 [].) “A defendant moving for summary judgment must show ‘that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) ‘In performing our de: Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) .) “A defendant moving for summary judgment must show ‘that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense t...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:law is unsettled, an uncertainty created by the timing and intent of an amendment to the Family Code effective 2002 (the addition of subd. (c) to § 1612), and the decisions in In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman (2000) 24 Cal.4th 39 (Pendleton), In re Marriage of 19 Howell (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1062 (Howell), and In re Marriage of Facter (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 967 (Facter). Indeed, as noted by a leading treatise, the state of the law is “unclear if a trial court is required to consider whether a spousal support limitation: He raises an issue on which California law is unsettled, an uncertainty created by the timing and intent of an amendment to the Family Code effective 2002 (the addition of subd. (c) to § 1612)...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:the judgment was entered.’ [Citation.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) We also deny the request because the document is not relevant. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 , 422, fn. 2.) As discussed in part VI, ante, notice by publication in a quiet title action must include either: (1) a particular description (other than the legal description) plus a common designation; (2) a particular description (other than the legal description) plus the street address; or (3) the: Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) , fn. 2.) As discussed in part VI, ante, notice by publication in a quiet title action must include either: (1) a particular description (other than the legal description) pl...
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:that could be the subject of an appealable probate order,” such 12 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 812 [“[t]he interpretation of a trust instrument, like any written document, is a question of law”]; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 , 432 [meaning and construction of statutes reviewed de novo].) Based on our independent review of the applicable law and the trust document, we conclude that none of Trustees’ arguments has merit, and find no error in the trial court’s order. B. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted the Trust Document: Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) .) Based on our independent review of the applicable law and the trust document, we conclude that none of Trustees’ arguments has merit...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:Standard of Review Cundall’s arguments on appeal concern the interpretation of section 15401 and interpretation of the language of the February Trust. Both are issues of law that we review independently. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415 , 432 [interpretation of a statute is an issue of law]; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254 [interpretation of a trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turns on a conflict in the extrinsic evidence].) Clyde argues that this court must defer to the trial court’s: Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) ; Burch v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:on the pleadings for a plaintiff. Indeed, the trial court noted that in its 40 years of experience, 20 as a judge, 20 in private practice, it had never even seen such a motion. 13 Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468 , 516.) Put slightly differently, we must accept Waste Connections’s version of the facts as true, and presume the untruth of any of the Authority’s allegations that have been denied. (MacIsaac, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 812–813.) So, in reviewing an order to turn over records the Authority alleged were: Lyons (2000)
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:on the pleadings for a plaintiff. Indeed, the trial court noted that in its 40 years of experience, 20 as a judge, 20 in private practice, it had never even seen such a motion. 13 Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468 , 516.) Put slightly differently, we must accept Waste Connections’s version of the facts as true, and presume the untruth of any of the Authority’s allegations that have been denied. (MacIsaac, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 812–813.) So, in reviewing an order to turn over records the Authority alleged were: Lyons (2000)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:contract provisions as of the time of enforcement. Although the parties to an employment arbitration agreement may agree to something less than the full panoply of discovery available in California’s discovery statutes (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 , 105–106), courts have recognized that such agreements must “‘ensure minimum standards of fairness’ so employees can vindicate 14 Section 1670.5, subdivision (a) provides that: “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it: Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:mootness is “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60), and we decide the question of mootness on a case-by-case basis (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 , 1547). Here, even if we were to find reversible error, we could not provide Kenton any meaningful relief. The remedy Kenton seeks is the vacatur of the attachment order or remand for a new hearing in which the trial court considers the evidence that Kenton claims was not previously: App.4th 53, 60), and we decide the question of mootness on a case-by-case basis (In re Joshua C. (1994) ). Here, even if we were to find reversible error, we could not provide Kenton any meaningful re...
- Barrow v. Holmes : An appellate court may affirm a lower‑court order when the result is correct under any viable theory, even if the trial court’s reasoning is different.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:favor of the asserted claims.” (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1143.) We are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm the judgment if correct on any theory. (Young v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1192–1193.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s briefing on appeal largely focuses on the trial court’s sustaining the demurrers to the tort causes of action in the SAC on the basis that plaintiff obtained her husband’s sperm illegally and in contravention of public policy. Plaintiff argues that “the Legislature has chosen not to: Fish & Game Com. (2018) –1193.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s briefing on appeal largely focuses on the trial court’s sustaining the demurrers to the tort causes of action in the SAC on the basis that plaint...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:subdivision (g) provides a laundry list of ways in which a child may be deemed abandoned for the purposes of establishing dependency jurisdiction, among them when a child is “left without any provision for support.” (See In re E.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 648 , 663 [jurisdiction may be established based on any one of 23 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. the listed criteria].) Neither of these definitions requires a showing that the parent intended to abandon the child. By contrast, the California statutes that require a showing: A. (2018) .) Neither of these definitions requires a showing that the parent intended to abandon the child.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:dispute will 8 DISCUSSION I. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer in most respects, and we review de novo trial court rulings regarding both. (Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730 , 735.) Except as provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 7:275 (2019) (Weil & Brown).) Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on: State (2018) .) Except as provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Weil & Brown, Cal.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:dispute will 8 DISCUSSION I. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer in most respects, and we review de novo trial court rulings regarding both. (Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730 , 735.) Except as provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 7:275 (2019) (Weil & Brown).) Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on: State (2018) .) Except as provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply. (Weil & Brown, Cal.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:and voluntarily made. (See Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1017–1018; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 914– 915 (C.O.); Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383– 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241 , 1249–1251 (Kevin A.).) 7 Although the courts are split as to whether the LPS 7 These cases also recognize that a trial court may accept an attorney’s waiver of the client’s jury trial right where the client lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. (See C.O.,: App.4th 378, 383– 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) –1251 (Kevin A.).) 7 Although the courts are split as to whether the LPS 7 These cases also recognize that a trial court may acce...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:expresses no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.”]; see Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241 , 1244 [trial court erred in accepting waiver of jury trial by conservatee’s 3 Section 5350 of the LPS Act incorporates the procedures for the establishment, administration, and termination of a conservatorship in the Probate Code. Probate Code section 1827 provides for a right to a jury trial; section 1828,: Absent such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.”]...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:“is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”]; see Heather W., at pp. 384-385 [trial court’s failure to advise LPS conservatee of her right to a jury trial was reversible error]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241 , 1253 [reversing conservatorship order where trial court erred in accepting counsel’s waiver of LPS conservatee’s right to jury trial over conservatee’s objection]; but see Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App....: Tran (2015) ...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:LPS proceedings, notwithstanding (as discussed further below) significant differences between the statutes governing LPS proceedings and those applicable to MDO and NGI determinations. (See Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241 , 1244 (Kevin A.).) Notably, in Heather W....: App.4th 378, 381 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) (Kevin A.).) Notably, in Heather W., the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 6, held, “In conservatorship proceedings pursuant t...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:claim " 'The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.' " (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425 , 441.) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 882, 886 (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege: City of Vallejo (2015) .) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:claim " 'The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.' " (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425 , 441.) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 882, 886 (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege: City of Vallejo (2015) .) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:ruling that he failed to show Anush unduly influenced Layla’s creation of the 2006 will. (§ 8252, sub. (a).) At trial, Robert bore a “heavy burden” to prove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. (Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529 , 545.) On appeal, “‘“the question becomes whether the . . . evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education & Research, Inc.: Exchange Bank (2015) .) On appeal, “‘“the question becomes whether the . . . evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character...
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:on the grounds that the trustor lacked capacity 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352.) Respondents do not contest Andersen’s applicability here. 12 to execute the document . . . carries the heavy burden of proving such allegations.” (Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529 , 545.) B. Standard of Review As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. Respondents contend the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the trial court’s determination as to whether Kay had a mental health disorder and an associated delusion sufficient to invalidate the trust....: Exchange Bank (2015) .) B.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:Of Proof The parties quibble over who had the burden of proving Frank’s mental capacity or incapacity at trial. Louise asserts Tammy had the burden of proving Frank’s incapacity by clear and convincing evidence (citing Doolittle v. Exchange Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529 ) because a rebuttable presumption exists under section 810, subdivision (a), that all persons have the capacity to make testamentary decisions. Tammy disagrees and asserts Doolittle does not support Louise’s argument....: Exchange Bank (2015) ) because a rebuttable presumption exists under section 810, subdivision (a), that all persons have the capacity to make testamentary decisions.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:through application of the parol evidence rule, a matter of substantive law (Casa Herrera, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 342-345); (2) after a judgment of nonsuit because the plaintiff failed to designate an expert on causation (Nunez v. Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861 , 874); (3) by summary judgment that reflected on the merits of the claim (Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1149-1150 (Sierra Club)); and (4) by court dismissal because the claims were barred by the litigation privilege (Berman v. RCA Auto Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 321, 323-326.): Pennisi (2015) ); (3) by summary judgment that reflected on the merits of the claim (Sierra Club Foundation v.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:exchange a witness list but later, at trial, seeks to call a witness who was not on the list. 7 “Courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a case as a sanction. [Citation.]” (Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1265 , 1271; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128, subd. (a)(4), 581, subd. (m).) But “dismissal is always a drastic remedy to be employed only in the rarest of circumstances.” (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 764.) “[T]here are two important inquiries to be made: A. (2015) ; see also Code Civ.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:expenses and the reasonableness of the fees incurred. 60 (b) Access to Funds for Fees. Kim’s fees had been paid in part with loans from her mother and stepfather; such loans totaled $458,024. Under In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529 , such loans were to be treated as gifts, and the court considered them funds accessible to Kim. (c) Reasonableness of Fees. The court observed that the case was an exceptionally long trial of 57 days that was “intensively and exhaustively litigated by each side.” Fees on both sides were: Under In re Marriage of Smith (2015) , such loans were to be treated as gifts, and the court considered them funds accessible to Kim. (c) Reasonableness of Fees.
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Sachs v. Sachs
Context from opinion:not properly authenticated. There is no particular requirement for how a writing is authenticated. (Evid. Code, § 1410.) The trial court’s finding that sufficient foundational facts were shown is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674 , 684.) Benita’s testimony that she found the Permanent Record among her father’s papers, and that the record is in her father’s hand is sufficient. There was no abuse of discretion. Parole evidence was properly admitted to interpret the writing Avram argues the trial court erred in considering parole evidence: Westlake Services LLC (2015) .) Benita’s testimony that she found the Permanent Record among her father’s papers, and that the record is in her father’s hand is sufficient.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:567.) If the court prematurely enters summary judgment before the appearance period has expired, the judgment is voidable. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660- 661 (American Contractors); People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991 , 1001.) If the court fails to enter summary judgment “ ‘within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.’ ” (§ 1306, subd. (c); see North River–Rivadeneyra, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 311.) “Summary: Co. (2015) .) If the court fails to enter summary judgment “ ‘within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.’ ” (§ 1306, subd.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:which immunity from prosecution applied. (Ibid.) 3 The regulatory background is taken from the decisions in 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 219 Cal.App.4th 1316 (420 Caregivers) and Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1029 (Safe Life). 4 The CUA applied to prosecutions for violations of Health and Safety Code sections 11357 (possession) and 11358 (cultivation). (Health & Safety Code § 11362.5, subdivision (d)....: App.4th 1316 (420 Caregivers) and Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles (2016)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:for a lottery from which 100 collectives would be chosen for inspection and registration. (Ibid.) The City appealed from the injunction against the Permanent Ordinance and, in July 2012, the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in 420 Caregivers, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th 1036 , reversing the injunction and upholding the Permanent Ordinance. (Safe Life, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1338–1339.) Due to a grant of review, however, the decision in 420 Caregivers did not become final until November 2013. (Safe Life, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036–1037.) 6. Proposition D (2013) The City: In response to the Permanent Ordinance, certain medical- marijuana collectives filed suit seeking an injunction on the grounds that the ordinance denied equal protection to collectives that had not pr...
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:hearing, and the court had never advised her it was sending notices to the Orange address. Under these circumstances, there is good cause to consider her appeal despite the failure to appeal the setting order. (See In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220 , 1241-1243; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b).) “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citations.] The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to: A. (2016) -1243; Cal.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:(§ 140 [making waivers of the rights of a surviving spouse applicable to pre-marital agreements]; see Estate of Gibson, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1492.) 29 construction that we avoid when interpreting statutes. (State ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1398 , 1410.) We therefore hold that compliance with Family Code section 2105 is unnecessary to effectuate a waiver pursuant to section 145; disclosure requirements for statutory waiver under section 145 are governed by the provisions of the Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights chapter of the Probate Code.14 14 We also: Miller (2016)
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:malicious prosecution action, must be consistent with a finding for the defendant on substantive grounds, and must not be based solely upon technical or procedural considerations.” (52 Am.Jur. 2d (1995) Malicious Prosecution § 40, italics added.) Lanz v. Goldstone (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 441 (Lanz) supports our conclusion. There, an attorney (Lanz), sued his former client, Garcia-Bolio, for attorney fees incurred in a prior Marvin (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660) suit. (Lanz, supra, at p. 446....: Goldstone (2015) (Lanz) supports our conclusion. There, an attorney (Lanz), sued his former client, Garcia-Bolio, for attorney fees incurred in a prior Marvin (Marvin v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when “[t]o hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the courts.”’” (Mt. Holyoke Homes, LP v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 830, 842; see Garibotti v. Hinkle (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 470 , 481 [“‘The doctrine of estoppel to contest jurisdiction . . . “provides that when a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action, ‘a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court’s power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the: Hinkle (2015)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799 , 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247; In re K.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 905, 909;: S. (2016) ; In re J.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:While the existence of social security benefits might be assumed, it is of no moment as federal law “bars Social Security benefits from being characterized as community property and divided in a dissolution proceeding.” (In re Marriage of Peterson (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 923 , 931; In re Marriage of Cohen (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 836, 843 [social security benefits are “not an asset of the community” and “not subject to division”].) Our Supreme Court has emphasized that, “few contracts would be enforceable if the existence of subsequent disputes were taken as evidence that an: While the existence of social security benefits might be assumed, it is of no moment as federal law “bars Social Security benefits from being characterized as community property...
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:which to find that Child has three parents. As the trial court explained, the relevant inquiry under section 7612, subdivision (c) is whether it would be detrimental to Child to have only two parents. Citing In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Donovan), the trial court concluded that because M.M. did not have an existing relationship with Child, no detriment was shown. The trial court’s ruling concluded with the observation that “[n]othing in this decision prevents the parties from bringing [M.M.] into [Child’s] life at a later time as indicated in the: Citing In re Donovan L. (2016) (Donovan), the trial court concluded that because M.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:underlying facts are not in dispute . . . , the question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law, subject to independent review." (Pacific Shores Property Owners Assn. v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 12 , 34.)58 58 Abatti views the issue of whether the 2013 EDP is new as a disputed factual matter; even if that were so, it would not change our conclusion in his favor. 96 The superior court properly rejected the District's timeliness argument, because Abatti's challenge to the 2013 EDP: Department of Fish & Wildlife (2016) .)58 58 Abatti views the issue of whether the 2013 EDP is new as a disputed factual matter; even if that were so, it would not change our conclusion in his favor.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:underlying facts are not in dispute . . . , the question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law, subject to independent review." (Pacific Shores Property Owners Assn. v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 12 , 34.)58 58 Abatti views the issue of whether the 2013 EDP is new as a disputed factual matter; even if that were so, it would not change our conclusion in his favor. 96 The superior court properly rejected the District's timeliness argument, because Abatti's challenge to the 2013 EDP: Department of Fish & Wildlife (2016) .)58 58 Abatti views the issue of whether the 2013 EDP is new as a disputed factual matter; even if that were so, it would not change our conclusion in his favor.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 595.) A trial court’s exercise of its equitable powers is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1256; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262 , 1272.) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1603; Ike, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.) 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Probate Court’s Findings of Hanako’s Intent and the Mistake in Drafting the Pour-Over Will The testator: Mojave Water Agency (2000) ; In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) .) Reformation of a will involves the exercise of the court’s equitable powers. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:section 859 (sometimes loosely called “double damages”) and a multiple of three under Civil Code 3345, subdivision (b) (sometimes loosely called “treble damages”), but to be precise they are not the same as damages. (Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 24 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 , 1286 [Probate Code section 859 penalties are not equivalent to punitive damages]; Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1074 [same].) To the extent Royals’s attachment request was founded on statutory double or treble damages recovery under these two statutes, it did not fall within the authorizing provision in: Superior Court (2016) 24 ; Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:of elder or dependent adult financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code”—does not. Three courts of appeal have addressed this issue. Our reading comports with two of them. In Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 , the court noted that “the last alternative of section 859 allows for double damages without any requirement that petitioners show any aggravated misconduct—only financial elder abuse.” (Id. at p. 1287.) In Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1187, the court reviewed the statutory language and concluded no separate bad: Superior Court (2016) , the court noted that “the last alternative of section 859 allows for double damages without any requirement that petitioners show any aggravated misconduct—only financial elder...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:is no less clear when the wrongfully taken property is cash, but confusion may arise due to the tendency of practitioners and courts to informally refer to section 859 as a “double damages” provision. (E.g., Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 , 1283–1284.) We used the phrase ourselves in Ashlock I. However, the word “damages” does not appear anywhere in the statutory scheme. (§§ 850–859.) Changing our first hypothetical scenario, assume that instead of a diamond ring, the petitioner seeks to recover $10,000. The money was withdrawn from the decedent’s bank: Superior Court (2016) –1284.) We used the phrase ourselves in Ashlock I.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:bars enforcement of “‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’”’” (People v. Navarro (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1294 , 1300.) We review vagueness challenges de novo. (Id. at p. 1301.) “‘The starting point of our analysis is “the strong presumption that legislative enactments ‘must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what: Navarro (2016)
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:court’s application of a no contest clause de novo. (Bradley v. Gilbert (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1068.) De novo review is equally applicable to the legal question of whether a statute of limitations applies. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336 , 1340; Straley v. Gamble (2013) 6 The relevant subtrust became irrevocable in 2016 when Iraj passed away. Thus, the parties agree that the present statutory scheme, effective in 2010, applies here. (§ 21315.) 9 217 Cal.App.4th 533, 536 [applying de novo review to interpretation of § 16061.8].) II. The: Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) ; Straley v.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 29, 39–40.) We 5 review de novo the probate court’s judgment on the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings to determine whether the petition states a cause of action. (See Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175 , 184–185.) We accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; Estate of Dayan, at p. 40.) “ ‘Moreover, the allegations must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties,’ ” and “ ‘[o]ur: Ahmad (2016) –185.) We accept as true all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; Estate of Dayan, at p. 40.) “ ‘Moreover...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:to title.” (West, supra, at p. 802; see also Orcilla v. 13 Attorneys do not argue on appeal—nor did they do so below—that the complaint’s allegations regarding the absence of probable cause were deficient. . 36 Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982 , 1010 (Orcilla) [borrowers’ concession that “ ‘the Bank Defendants have no Adverse claims to title’ . . . dooms their quiet title claim against [those] Defendants”].) During the pendency of the Farkas proceeding, neither Maleti nor Maleti Corp. had any interest in any of the property at issue (Parcels: . 36 Big Sur, Inc. (2016) (Orcilla) Defendants”].) During the pendency of the Farkas proceeding...
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made. (See Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1017–1018; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 914– 915 (C.O.); Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 , 383– 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249–1251 (Kevin A.).) 7 Although the courts are split as to whether the LPS 7 These cases also recognize that a trial court may accept an attorney’s waiver of the client’s jury trial right where the client: O.); Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) – 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision.” (Tran, at p. 1163.) Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blackburn and Tran, Division Two of this District in Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 , 381 concluded, based on language in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.; LPS Act) that is similar, but not identical, to that in the MDO and NGI statutes, that in a proceeding to reestablish a conservatorship, the trial court must take a personal waiver of the conservatee’s statutory: 11 attorney”].) The court concluded, “We hold that this language has the same meaning as the parallel language in the MDO statute: The trial court must advise the NGI defendant personally of his or he...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:see § 5350, subd. (d).) B. Jury Trial Waivers Under the LPS Act “LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.” (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 , 383; see Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).)4 Generally, with respect to civil commitments, the failure of a court to obtain a valid jury trial waiver where required by statute 4 Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), which is incorporated into the LPS Act by Welfare and Institutions Code: Jury Trial Waivers Under the LPS Act “LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:appellate decisions have extended the analysis in Blackburn and Tran to LPS proceedings, notwithstanding (as discussed further below) significant differences between the statutes governing LPS proceedings and those applicable to MDO and NGI determinations. (See Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 , 381 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1244 (Kevin A.).) Notably, in Heather W....: 6 3. Case Law A number of courts, including this one, have concluded that in LPS proceedings a conservatee’s counsel may waive the conservatee’s right to jury trial.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:Cal.App.4th 757, 762; see Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178–1179.) The critical factor in considering mootness is “whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53 , 60), and we decide the question of mootness on a case-by-case basis (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547). Here, even if we were to find reversible error, we could not provide Kenton any meaningful relief. The remedy Kenton seeks is the vacatur of the attachment order: S. (2016) ), and we decide the question of mootness on a case-by-case basis (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:requirement that a party be “beneficially interested” in an action in order to have standing has been acknowledged in a number of cases not involving Code of Civil Procedure section 1086. (City of Palm Springs v. Luna Crest, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 879 , 883 (Luna Crest) [challenging City’s permit requirement]; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434, 443–444 [standing to sue employer for violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act]; Sipple v. City of Hayward (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 349, 358–359 [company’s standing to seek refunds on: Luna Crest, Inc. (2016) (Luna Crest) ; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:[the prevailing party] receive attorney fees as a matter of right (and that the trial court is therefore obligated to award attorney fees) whenever the statutory conditions have been satisfied.” ’ ” (Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761 , 773.) We find no comparable reflection of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation on trial courts considering attorney fee requests under Corporations Code section 16701. We apply the plain meaning of the statute and conclude the trial court may, but is not required to, award attorney fees when: Carson (2016) .) We find no comparable reflection of legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation on trial courts considering attorney fee requests under Corporations Code section 16701.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:protection claim by not asserting it in the trial court. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 [defendant’s failure to “raise his equal protection claim in the trial court” forfeited the argument]; People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438 , 1447 [“an equal protection claim may be forfeited if it is raised for the first time on appeal”].) In his reply brief, Washington contends forfeiture does not apply because his equal protection claim presents a pure question of law, relying on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,: Dunley (2016) .) In his reply brief, Washington contends forfeiture does not apply because his equal protection claim presents a pure question of law...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:trial is whether the proposed conservatee is unable to provide for essential needs due to a mental illness. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 232; Conservatorship of P.D., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168; see Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 453 , 460–461.) However, K.P. points to other cases to support a contrary conclusion. We now address these arguments. C. K.P.’s Argument and Reliance on Contrary Authority In support of his position that inability or unwillingness to accept voluntary treatment must be separately proven at trial, K.P. points to a single: App.5th at p. 1168; see Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) –461.) However, K.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:probable cause in other contexts, 9 This suffices to address Meiri’s further argument that “[s]trong policy reasons run against maintenance of a cause of action for malicious prosecution based on an action dismissed for limitations reasons.” (Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747 , 752.) Meiri cites this language in Lackner to argue that a statute of limitations cannot be used as a sword to defeat a determination of probable cause. However, that statement in Lackner was made in the context of its discussion of the favorable termination element of malicious prosecution, not: LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 752.) Meiri cites this language in Lackner to argue that a statute of limitations cannot be used as a sword to defeat a determination of probable cause.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused, and coupled with the other elements of lack of probable cause and malice, establishes the tort [of malicious prosecution].’ [Citations.]” (Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747 , 750 (Lackner).) The malicious prosecution plaintiff need not prove “that the prior proceeding was favorably terminated following trial on the merits. However, termination must reflect on the merits of the underlying action. [Citation.]” (Ibid., original italics....: LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 750 (Lackner).) The malicious prosecution plaintiff need not prove “that the prior proceeding was favorably terminated following trial on the merits.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:& Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Stacey has done none of those things, and it is “neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb the record on [her] behalf.” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877 , 888.) Moreover, Stacey had the burden of proof at trial to establish her entitlement to any offsets. As the appellant, she must affirmatively demonstrate how the evidence compelled findings in her favor as a matter of law. (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.) The offset issues were discussed: Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Stacey has done none of those things, and it is “neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb the record on behalf.” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:commonly possess and exercise; (2) a 26 breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the attorney’s negligence.” (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194 , 1199.) A plaintiff must prove all four elements to prevail; failure to prove even one is fatal to recovery. (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1582 (Namikas).) “‘In the legal malpractice context, the elements of causation and damage are particularly closely linked.’” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p.: McKenna & Cuneo (2001) .) A plaintiff must prove all four elements to prevail; failure to prove even one is fatal to recovery. (Namikas v.
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:of the statute.’ ” ’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) In doing so, we “begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 , 272.) We construe the statutory language in context and in light of the statute’s purpose. (Apple, at p. 135; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) If the language is not ambiguous, “we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of 10 the language: City of Fontana (2001) .) We construe the statutory language in context and in light of the statute’s purpose. (Apple, at p. 135; Lungren v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:in their context.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412 , 415.) “ ‘If the complaint fails to plead, or if the defendant negates, any essential element of a particular cause of action, this court should affirm the sustaining of a demurrer.’ ” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Arkopharma, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 824, 827.) When a demurrer is sustained without: PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) .) “ ‘If the complaint fails to plead, or if the defendant negates, any essential element of a particular cause of action, this court should affirm the sustaining of a...
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:appellant to show prejudice. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) An assessment of prejudice cannot be made here because appellant did not make an offer of proof in the probate court. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 , 580 [rule requiring offer of proof in the trial court (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a)) “is necessary because, among other things, the reviewing court must know the substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice”]; Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 282: Anderson (2001) [rule requiring offer of proof in the trial court (Evid.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:of a final, appealable judgment,” and appropriately exercised its discretion to treat Saul’s writ petition as his opening brief on appeal and the exhibits as his appellant’s appendix. (Id. at p. 574; cf. Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 , 697 [“A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties”].) As the Court of Appeal noted, writ review may be appropriate in other circumstances. (S.H.R., at p. 574.) 9 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. court found his evidence did not: Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) .) As the Court of Appeal noted, writ review may be appropriate in other circumstances. (S.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:petition for SIJ findings. We hold that the order is appealable. “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 , 696.) “A judgment is the final determination of the 5 Amicus Public Counsel filed in this case a request for judicial notice of three documents: A declaration filed by certain California legislators filed in another California appellate court proceeding; a declaration filed by a social worker in a federal: Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) .) “A judgment is the final determination of the 5 Amicus Public Counsel filed in this case a request for judicial notice of three documents: A declaration filed b...
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party [citation], liberally construing [his or] her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’ own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.’ (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763 , 768 [].) We accept as true both the facts shown by the losing party’s evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856 []....: Advanced Group 400 (2001) .) We accept as true both the facts shown by the losing party’s evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. (Aguilar v.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.’ (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 [].) We accept as true both the facts shown by the losing party’s evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 856 [].) “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue: Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) .) “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:not specify a burden of proof and, as the Court of Appeal noted, preponderance of the evidence is the default burden of proof for findings of fact in civil cases. (Id. at p. 574; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 861; see Evid. Code, § 115 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence”].) We presume the Legislature was aware of this default standard 3 Since no party or amicus curiae had opposed the issuance of SIJ predicate findings,: App.5th at pp. 569, 574.) The Legislature did not specify a burden of proof and, as the Court of Appeal noted, preponderance of the evidence is the default burden of proof for findings of fact in civi...
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:proceedings on Knapp’s malpractice claim. Knapp’s request for judicial notice is denied as moot. 3 BACKGROUND We view and recite the facts in the light most favorable to Knapp, the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 843 (Aguilar).) I. Parties Knapp, a realtor, is the widow of Tinker, a former television executive to whom she was married from April 5, 2004 until Tinker’s death on November 29, 2016. Tinker had four adult children from a previous marriage: John Tinker, Michael Tinker, Jodie Dilella (collectively “probate: Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) (Aguilar).) I.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:Order Denying the SIJ Petition 1. Burden of proof and standard of review As the party requesting SIJ findings, S.H.R. had the burden of proof in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 500; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 861 [generally, “the ‘party desiring relief ’ bears the burden of proof ”].) Because section 155 does not specify a burden of proof, the burden is “proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 115.)7 Here, the trial court concluded that S.H.R. had not met his burden: Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) .) Because section 155 does not specify a burden of proof, the burden is “proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Evid.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:a prima facie case [at the pretrial hearing] of why a permanent conservatorship is probably appropriate.” “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 851.) The court continued, “So . . . you need to make sure that if you object to that, . . . you make it clear to both sides and to the Court on that day [the day of trial] that you don’t want a conservatorship because when that: Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
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Tubbs v. Berkowitz
Context from opinion:fact exists only if “the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 2 Tubbs does not dispute Berkowitz could transfer the assets in the surviving spouse’s trust to himself. She acknowledges that trust was revocable and amendable and included Berkowitz’s separate property and community property share. 7 845.) We review de novo the court’s grant of summary judgment. (ABCO, LLC v.: Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) Tubbs does not dispute Berkowitz could transfer the assets in the surviving spouse’s trust to himself.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:parent.’ ” (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1026.) Under “section 6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform Parentage Act and not rebutted.” (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904 , 921; Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514 [the intestacy statutes “incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood”]....: App.4th 1021, 1026.) Under “section 6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform Parentage Act and not rebutted.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:179.) This is particularly true where the new theory presents a question of law, or where important issues of public policy are at stake. (In re Marriage of Hinds (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1398, 1403; In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1227.) Both of these concerns are present here. We accordingly proceed to the merits. 3. A PMA that is involuntarily executed cannot be ratified. Section 1615 states that a premarital agreement “is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves . . . That party did: App.3d 1398, 1403; In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) .) Both of these concerns are present here.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:late. (Bell v. H.F. Cox, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 62, 80, fn. 7.) Second, even if we set aside its untimeliness, we are not persuaded by appellants’ sole authority in support of the aforequoted 17 argument, Goodman v. Zimmerman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1667 , which never examined whether section 6100.5(a)(2) requires a finding of a mental health disorder. (See Goodman, at pp. 1674–1678....: Zimmerman (1994) , which never examined whether section 6100.5(a)(2) requires a finding of a mental health disorder. (See Goodman, at pp. 1674–1678.) Third...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:independent judgment under section 1094.5, we conclude no remedy is available to petitioner for failing to demonstrate, in his petition, that he would have received a different outcome had the trial court done so. (Fisher v. State Personnel Bd. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1 , 20 [“Reversible error requires demonstration of prejudice arising from the reasonable probability the party ‘would have obtained a better outcome’ in the absence of the error’ ”].) Petitioner’s attempt to remedy the deficiency in his reply brief is to no avail. We do not consider arguments raised for the: State Personnel Bd. (2018) .) Petitioner’s attempt to remedy the deficie...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:disability.” Appellants provide no legal authority requiring expert testimony to support non-economic damages. Generally, the law is to the contrary. “Numerous cases approve the award of emotional distress damages based on the testimony of nonexpert witnesses.” (Knutson v. Foster (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1075 , 1096.) “The law in this state is that the testimony of a single person, including the plaintiff, may be sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages.” (Ibid.) Appellants also understate the lay evidence presented at trial....: Foster (2018) .) “The law in this state is that the testimony of a single person, including the plaintiff, may be sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages.” (Ibid.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Brown argue extensively that authorities Frieden cited to the probate court by way of analogy were inapposite. Whether true or not, Richard and Brown bear the burden on their cross-appeal to show error. (Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 398 , 428, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 396, 411.) Where there is no indication that the probate court even relied on Tukes’s cited authority, as opposed to the plain language of rule 2.30 (which Richard and Brown ignore),: A. (2018) , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Pulliam v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:probate litigation has a readily understandable meaning as the surplus of the estate remaining after the payment of debts and the distribution of specific bequests and devises. (See Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 8; Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 989 , 1003; Estate of Keller (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 232, 241; § 21117, subd. (f).) Here, with respect to Trust A—in which Three Lanterns and Sycamore were held and which was the subject of term 1 of the settlement agreement—the reference to the “residue” unambiguously refers to the provision of the: Blech (2018) ; Estate of Keller (1955) 134 Cal.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A court may infer a testator’s testamentary capacity from lay witnesses’ observations of the testator’s cognitive abilities and behavior, without requiring formal medical or psychological testing.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:trial court. (E.g., In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863; Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261 , 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 (Steinberger).) In Crail, we explained that the clear and: Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:grandmother, claiming in part that their father “legitimated” them under former Civil Code section 230 by acknowledging them as his own children while the family lived together in Guatemala. (Wolf, at pp. 287−289, as discussed in Estate of Lund (1945) 26 Cal.2d 472 , 487 (Lund); see Estate of Garcia (1949) 34 Cal.2d 419, 422 [disapproving of limiting language in Lund in denying rehearing in Wolf].) Relying on Blythe for support, Wolf held that the nonmarital children were heirs of the decedent. (Wolf, at p. 289.) In reaching its decision, Wolf found the: There, nonmarital children sought to inherit from their paternal grandmother, claiming in part that their father “legitimated” them under former Civil Code section 230 by acknowledging them as his own...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:insofar as they have been controverted,” and “all such averments must be disregarded when there is a direct and specific denial or an indirect denial by virtue of affirmative allegations of a contrary state of facts.” (MacIsaac v. Pozzo (1945) 26 Cal.2d 809 , 812–813 (MacIsaac).) Or as MacIsaac elsewhere said, we assume as true all facts properly pleaded in the answer and disregard all controverted allegations in the complaint. (Ibid; see also Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1379.) Here, as noted, Waste Connections’s verified answer specifically denied: 12 judgment in its favor—overlooks the fundamental requirement that a claim in court must be proven. And it ignores the law of judgment on the pleadings.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:insofar as they have been controverted,” and “all such averments must be disregarded when there is a direct and specific denial or an indirect denial by virtue of affirmative allegations of a contrary state of facts.” (MacIsaac v. Pozzo (1945) 26 Cal.2d 809 , 812–813 (MacIsaac).) Or as MacIsaac elsewhere said, we assume as true all facts properly pleaded in the answer and disregard all controverted allegations in the complaint. (Ibid; see also Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1379.) Here, as noted, Waste Connections’s verified answer specifically denied: 12 judgment in its favor—overlooks the fundamental requirement that a claim in court must be proven. And it ignores the law of judgment on the pleadings.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:in Jackson prompted this court “to review and define the California standard for review” of a claim brought by a defendant on direct appeal alleging that a criminal conviction lacked sufficient support in the evidentiary record. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557 , 562.) We concluded in Johnson that the standard of review already established by our case law was consistent with the rule announced in Jackson. (Johnson, at p. 577.) “[W]henever the evidentiary support for a conviction faces a challenge on appeal,” we determined, “the court must review the whole record: Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable.” (Donovan, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 282.) In Donovan the parties “vigorously dispute[d]” whether the defendant car dealer “should bear the risk of its mistake.” (Donovan, supra, 26 Cal.4th 14 at p. 283.) The Supreme Court quoted section 154 of the Restatement, which states: “A party bears the risk of a mistake when [¶] (a) the risk is allocated to [the party] by agreement of the parties, or [¶] (b) [the party] is aware, at the time the contract is: 13 The Donovan court held rescission of the contract was warranted and concluded the court of appeal erred “to the extent it suggested that a unilateral mistake of fact affords a ground for rescission...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:452 that there is no constitutional right in an SVP proceeding to a jury trial, “[b]ecause civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections.” (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200 , 209 (Otto); accord, Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 818; see McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1188-1193 [indefinite commitment under SVPA does not violate federal due process, but the SVPA must be construed to mandate appointment of an expert for an indigent SVP who petitions the court for: App.4th at page 452 that there is no constitutional right in an SVP proceeding to a jury trial, “ecause civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:affirm. Because Brandy failed to read the Agreement and to meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. (See Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 1 26 Cal.4th 261 , 283 (Donovan); Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97 (Casey); Civ. Code, § 1577.)1 In addition, any error by the trial court in failing to make findings regarding voluntariness required by Family Code section 1615, subdivision (c), was not prejudicial. BACKGROUND2 On May 2, 2015, Brandy married Scott Eskra: RRL Corp. (2001) 1 (Donovan); Casey v.
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:trial or wait until November (nine months later) for a jury trial. Although we are troubled by the delay in the availability of a jury trial, there was no improper inducement.6 Joanne likens her case to People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297 , 312 (Collins), in which the Supreme Court concluded the trial court improperly induced the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial, rendering his jury trial waiver involuntary. There, the trial court told the defendant “‘there might well be a benefit’” to the defendant from waiving his right: Collins (2001) (Collins), in which the Supreme Court concluded the trial court improperly induced the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial, rendering his jury trial waiver involuntary.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) Once the defendant has made the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465 , 476-477.) We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence presented by the parties, except evidence properly excluded by the trial court, and the uncontradicted inferences reasonably supported by the evidence. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 476; see also Reid v. Google,: 25 I. Governing Principles A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact...
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:241 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] Nevertheless, courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 546.) We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to the standard of proof because, even if the preponderance of the evidence standard applies, Tammy did not meet her burden of proving mental incapacity, as explained post....: App.4th at p. 545.) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, courts have applied the clear...
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:recognize the significant constitutional problems Navarrete raises with the trial court’s order, including her suggestion that the trial court would have had to find visitation in her best interest by clear and convincing evidence. (See generally, Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 .) But we need not address those questions in this case because we conclude the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering forced visitation against Navarrete’s will and against the judgment of her conservator....: Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) .) But we need not address those questions in this case because we conclude the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering forced visitation against Na...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 , 546 (Wendland); see also In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 369- 373 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence.” (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546, citing Evid. Code, § 115.) This standard “ ‘simply requires: J. in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimat...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:“legal” before certain categories of immediate family members but did not include such a modifier before the term “step-parent” indicates the CDCR did not intend to limit the term to a “legal” status. (See Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63 , 73 [“When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from another part of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to convey a different meaning.”].) 10. In other regulations, CDCR has expressly adopted statutory definitions as part of its regulatory: “Immediate Family Members means legal spouse; registered domestic partner, natural parents; adoptive parents, if the adoption occurred and a family relationship existed prior to the inmate’s incarcera...
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:amend, the statute. . . . We may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used’”]; Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63 73-74 [“[a] court may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed”].) 4. Requiring Personal Service of the Notice of Hearing Did Not Violate Searles’s Due Process Rights Even if not expressly authorized by statute or: We may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used’”]...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an 19 interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” ’ ” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995 , 1003.) The Chamberlain and Ettinger courts essentially relied on two principles for the conclusion that the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5 is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence. The first was that the interpretation was consistent with Evidence Code section 115 and established common law; the: Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) .) The Chamberlain and Ettinger courts essentially relied on two principles for the conclusion that the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:donor of a power of appointment to take property in default of the appointment) hold property interests even though “their interests are subject to complete divestment” through exercise of a power of appointment. (Ammco Ornamental Iron, Inc. v. Wing (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 409 , 418-419 [“persons in existence, who are specifically designated in a trust instrument to take in default of the exercise of a power of appointment by the holder of the preceding estate, are beneficiaries of that trust and acquire vested remainder interests, although their interests are subject to complete divestment”];: Wing (1994)
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Conservatorship of Brokken
Context from opinion:presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We cannot rewrite a statute to conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed. (Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 125 , 142.) The Plain Language of Section 2640.1 Does Not Support the Attorney Fees Award First, we reject respondents’ contention that appellant or her counsel agreed respondents are legally entitled to a fee award and that the only issue before the probate court was the amount of those fees. In: Superior Court (2018) .) The Plain Language of Section 2640.1 Does Not Support the Attorney Fees Award First, we reject respondents’ contention that appellant or her counsel agreed respondents are leg...
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:¶ 36.) We conclude whether reasonable access existed is determined by applying the reasonable person standard, an objective test, to the circumstances of the case because reasonableness is generally regarded as imposing an objective standard. (E.g., Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219 , 234 [reasonable cause requirement in Probate Code is evaluated under an objective standard of what any reasonable person would have done]; Monarch v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App....: Tagami (2018) ; Monarch v.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:as the trustee based on the allegation that the trust instruments were forged. We review the trial court’s award of fees to Respondents based on a finding of bad faith under the substantial evidence standard. (See Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219 , 234 (Powell) [considering a bad faith finding under section 17211, subd. (a).].) “Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment or order and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable: Tagami (2018)
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:not disturb its judgment on this issue unless we are convinced the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion 12 only where its action is clearly wrong and without reasonable basis.’ ” (Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219 , 236-237 (Powell).) To the extent a trial court’s ruling is based on factual determinations, we review the record for substantial evidence. (Carpenter & Zuckerman, LLP v. Cohen (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 373, 378.) “ ‘We look at the evidence in support of the trial court’s finding, resolve all conflicts in: Tagami (2018) -237 (Powell).) To the extent a trial court’s ruling is based on factual determinations, we review the record for substantial evidence. (Carpenter & Zuckerman, LLP v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment … and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219 , 231.) This is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not *See footnote, ante, page 1. 32. the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) Stacey begins by: Tagami (2018) .) This is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not *See footnote, ante, page 1. 32.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:trustees qualify as a landlord for purposes of the family move-in provision, and we conclude that they do. A. Governing Law 1. Standard of review We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270 , 276.) In doing so, “we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) Regardless of: Standard of review We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) .) In doing so, “we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operati...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:Duty to Account Generally It is undisputed that as conservator, Foster had a fiduciary duty to Hudson that required Foster to account for transactions. “There is a fiduciary relationship between the conservator and conservatee. (§ 2101.)” (Conservatorship of Presha (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 487 , 498; Conservatorship of Lefkowitz (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313.) The conservator must account to the court for the property of the conservatee with information about receipts, disbursements, transactions, and the remaining assets. (Johnson v. Kotyck (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 83, 89....: App.5th at p. 334.) Fiduciary Duty to Account Generally It is undisputed that as conservator, Foster had a fiduciary duty to Hudson that required Foster to account for transactions.
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:a revocable inter vivos trust (the trust) and designated the trust as the pay-on-death 2 We refer to Joseph and Shawna Snukst by their first names to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect in doing so. (Estate of O’Connor (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 871 , 875, fn. 2.) 3 beneficiary of his annuity. 3 The trust designated Joseph’s niece, Shawna, as its sole beneficiary. When Joseph died, the trust received $804,456.13 from his annuity. On September 21, 2016, the public guardian notified the department of Joseph’s death. On November 28, the department presented a: Two days later, by a declaration of trust dated March 16, 2004, Joseph created a revocable inter vivos trust (the trust) and designated the trust as the pay-on-death 2 We refer to Joseph...
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:specific reference to the power of appointment itself. Thus, the will’s reference to the Family Trust (the creating instrument) is not the same as a specific reference to the power of appointment and does not suffice. (Estate of O’Connor (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 871 , 884 (O’Connor) [the Legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” in section 632 indicates that specific reference to the power or to the instrument are independent means by which a donor can restrict a donee’s exercise].) 11 The Salettas focus on the many similarities between the will here and the: Thus, the will’s reference to the Family Trust (the creating instrument) is not the same as a specific reference to the power of appointment and does not suffice.
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Tubbs v. Berkowitz
Context from opinion:or that person’s estate—or limited—exercisable only in favor of the person or class specified in the instrument creating the power. [Citation.] A trust can be the ‘creating instrument’ that ‘creates or reserves the power of appointment.’” (Estate of O’Connor (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 871 , 879, fn. omitted, italics added.) Here, the power of appointment provision in the Marital Trust provided that “the trustee shall distribute all or any part of the trust . . . to such one or more persons . . . including the surviving spouse . . . as the: The Court Did Not Err “‘“A power of appointment is a power conferred by the owner of property (the ‘donor’) upon another person (the ‘donee’) to designate the persons (‘appointees’) who will receive t...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:jurisdiction is waived if not timely asserted.”].) We review de novo the trial court’s ruling that neither the alternative decree nor the judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Mack v. All Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935 , 940; Talley v. Valuation Counselors Group, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 132, 146.) 1. Michael and Joseph Cannot Collaterally Attack the Alternative Decree as a Void Order Because the Trial Court Had Fundamental Jurisdiction To Adjudicate the Buyout Proceeding a. Applicable Law “A judgment or order is void when there: All Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) ; Talley v.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A judgment may not be reversed unless the appellate court reviews the entire trial record; a party must demonstrate that any alleged omission constitutes a material error within that complete record.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:subsequent criminal prosecution, although exactly the same questions are in dispute in both cases, for the reason that the parties are not the same, and different rules as to the weight of the evidence prevail’ ”]; Wilcoxson v. Burton (1865) 27 Cal. 228 , 23 232 [“We have examined the testimony contained in the voluminous record filed in this action with patient attention; and have furthermore availed ourselves of the thorough and exhaustive discussion of counsel upon the weight of the evidence and the conclusions properly to be drawn from it, and we: Burton (1865)
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:may be granted if the party seeking it was precluded by fraud or the mistake of the other party from participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319 , 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v.: Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:one who has a pecuniary interest . . . .”].) In other probate contexts, courts have explained that limitation serves the important purpose of “prevent[ing] persons with no interest from delaying the settlement of the estate.” (Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424 , 429 [will contest]; see also Barefoot v. Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 828 [rejecting an expansive view of § 17200 standing that would “allow individuals with no interest in a trust to bring a claim against the trust”].) With that in mind, we note Hankin has neither identified: App.2d 788, 792 .) In other probate contexts, courts have explained that limitation serves the important purpose of “prevent persons with no interest from delaying the sett...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:it finds standing by contrast, the court should allow the 4 BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490, 501 [standing in federal courts]; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424 , 426, 429-430 [will contest].) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud. Section 17200, subdivision (a), authorizes a beneficiary to petition the court concerning the trust’s affairs “or to determine [its] existence.”: S. 490, 501 ; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 .) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on the grounds o...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:purpose of the trustors.” (Id. at p. 361.) “It is only under peculiar circumstances, such as those exemplified in [Adams], that a court has the power to modify an active trust. [Citations.]” (Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 457 , 468.) One such circumstance is when a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions. (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 369.) The case at bar does not present an exceptional or peculiar circumstance in which a court is empowered to modify the Residuary Trust. There is no expression in: Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 457, 468.) One such circumstance is when a drafting error defeats the trustor’s intentions. (Bilafer v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him [or her] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859 , 862–863, quoting Mills v. Green (1895) 159 U.S. 651, 653.) Here, the trial court made two orders on October 20, 2020 pertinent to this appeal: (1) an order granting Chen’s disqualification motions; and (2) an order striking Jacqueline’s and Michael’s removal petitions. Based on our review of the record: Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 862–863, quoting Mills v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) The terms extrinsic fraud and extrinsic mistake have been interpreted broadly, encompassing “almost any set of extrinsic circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337 , 342.) Fraud is extrinsic when a party is prevented from fully participating in the proceeding or deprived of the opportunity to present a claim to the court by the fraudulent conduct of another party, as opposed to the moving party’s own negligence. (Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p.1068; City: The elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:separated is also separate. (Id., § 771, subd. (a).) And a spouse may rebut the Family Code section 760 presumption by tracing the source of funds used to acquire the property to separate property. (In re Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808 , 815 (Lucas).) Furthermore, for property acquired on or after January 1, 1985, married persons may change — i.e., transmute — the character of property from community to separate, or vice versa, if the transmutation is “made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to,: Code, § 770, subd. (a)(1).) All property acquired by a person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent is that person’s separate property. (Id., § 770...
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : A guardian ad litem acts only as a representative of the incapacitated party with essentially ministerial duties and does not possess the authority of a general guardian or conservator to control or m...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Because no party petitioned the Court of Appeal for a rehearing, we take this factual and procedural discussion largely from that court’s opinion. (Barefoot v. Jennings (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1 , 3-4 (Barefoot); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) The underlying petition in probate court alleges the following: Joan Lee Maynord and her now deceased husband established the Maynord Family Trust (Trust) in 1986. After her husband’s death in 1993, Maynord served as the sole trustor. Plaintiff Joan Mauri: Jennings (2018) -4 (Barefoot); see Cal.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:trial court possesses broad discretion to fairly exercise the weighing process of section 4320, with the goal of achieving substantial justice for the parties. (McLain, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 269.) As explained in In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025 , the 2004 amendments to section 2030 compel the court to order fees, and the 2010 amendments made section 4320 findings mandatory. 30 (Id. at pp. 1049– 1051.) “The textual changes made by the 2004 and 2010 legislation demonstrate that the discretionary authority granted to trial courts is not as: App.5th at p. 269.) As explained in In re Marriage of Morton (2018)
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281, the court noted that “the last alternative of section 859 allows for double damages without any requirement that petitioners show any aggravated misconduct—only financial elder abuse.” (Id. at p. 1287.) In Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1187 , the court reviewed the statutory language and concluded no separate bad faith finding was necessary for double damages when liability was premised on the third category of conduct, 18 that is, when property had been taken through elder or dependent adult financial abuse. (Id. at pp. 1197–1198.) Levin v.: Weber (2018) , the court reviewed the statutory language and concluded no separate bad faith finding was necessary for double damages when liability was premised on the third category of conduct, 18 t...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:in nature. 30. (Estate of Young, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 88.) Section 859 does not impose punitive damages, but it is designed to punish and deter specific misconduct. (Estate of Young, at p. 88; accord, Kerley v. Weber (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1187 , 1198, citing ibid. [“the purpose of section 859 [is] to punish and deter the wrongdoer”]; Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287 [concluding § 859 imposes liability for “statutory damages awarded as a penalty,” which differ from punitive damages].) There is nothing punitive about requiring a: Weber (2018) , citing ibid. to punish and deter the wrongdoer”]; Hill v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:low.’ [Citation.] The buyout procedure ‘does not determine whether the corporation should be dissolved, but instead, provides the plaintiff and defendant with a statutory remedy without [a] trial’ on the merits.” (Schrage I, supra, B288478; see Ontiveros v. Constable (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 259 , 277 [“A value of the corporation’s stock is determined and then the defendant has a period by which it is to pay the plaintiff for its stock. If the defendant does not do so, a judicial decree will dissolve the corporation.”].) B. Michael and Joseph Cannot Collaterally Attack the: On the other hand, if the purchasing parties tender the amount determined by the court, the moving party cannot reject the share price as being too low.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:should be allowed to amend does not salvage the argument. 86 b. Taking claim " 'The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.' " (Bottini v. City of San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 281 , 307 (Bottini).) Government regulation may also "be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster" and such "regulatory takings" may also be compensable. (Ibid. [" 'regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial us[e]" of her property' "].) There is also a: City of San Diego (2018) (Bottini).) Government regulation may also "be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster" and such "regulatory takings" may also be compensa...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:should be allowed to amend does not salvage the argument. 86 b. Taking claim " 'The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.' " (Bottini v. City of San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 281 , 307 (Bottini).) Government regulation may also "be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster" and such "regulatory takings" may also be compensable. (Ibid. [" 'regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial us[e]" of her property' "].) There is also a: City of San Diego (2018) (Bottini).) Government regulation may also "be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster" and such "regulatory takings" may also be compensa...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:order a trial if there is probable cause, and it must dismiss the petition if there is not. (Ibid.)” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 345-346; accord, People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36 , 43.) 7 An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, but only upon a demand by the alleged SVP or his or her attorney. Section 6603, subdivision (a), provides, “A person subject to this article is entitled to a trial by jury . . . .” Subdivision (b),: Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) .) 7 An alleged SVP is entitled to a jury trial, but only upon a demand by the alleged SVP or his or her attorney.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:unconstitutional.” (Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Board of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 137.) A statute “cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481 , 484.) As already indicated, it is reasonable and practical to construe Probate Code section 859 according to its plain meaning as allowing double damages when property is taken through commission of elder financial abuse pursuant to section 15610.30 without a finding of bad faith. That one of the three: Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484.) As already indicated, it is reasonable and practical to construe Probate Code section 859 according to its plain meaning as allowing double damages when prop...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:in the best interest of Gosey. Bradshaw exhibited “conduct on the part of a member of the bar which cannot be condoned,” whether or not his action caused material damage to Gosey or the Trust. (Lady v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497 , 504; see Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v.: State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504; see Pickering v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:individual claim or as a derivative claim, depending on the circumstances. (See Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52, 63; Jara v. Suprema Meats, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1252-1253, 1257-1258 (Jara); see also Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525 , 530 [“a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action for the same wrong”]; Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1018, fn. 3 [“A single cause of action by a shareholder can give: General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 ; Goles v.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:Earlywine (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 759, 762; see Estate of Luke, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1015 [“We conclude the community property presumption, not the form-of-the-title presumption, should apply in cases arising under former section 229.”]; In re Abdale’s Estate (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587 , 591–592; In re Taitmeyer’s Estate (1943) 35 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 60 Cal.App.2d 699, 705, 712.) In 1983, the Legislature consolidated these statutes into Probate Code section 6402.5....: App.3d at p. 1015 ; In re Abdale’s Estate (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587, 591–592...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:222 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1125.) Here, we need not decide which form of mandamus was most appropriate. “The full panoply of rules applicable to ‘ordinary’ mandamus applies to ‘administrative’ mandamus proceedings, except where modified by statute.” (Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668 , 674.) Because this case turns on the proper interpretation of section 3000, our review is functionally the same under either form of mandamus. IV. Standard of Review Here, the foundational facts are not in dispute. At issue is whether those foundational facts support the conclusion that the victim was: Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 674.) Because this case turns on the proper interpretation of section 3000, our review is functionally the same under either form of mandamus. IV.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:26 Cal.4th at p. 546, citing Evid. Code, § 115.) This standard “ ‘simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” ’ ” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908 , 918.) The more demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, meanwhile, applies to findings of guilt in criminal matters. (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364.) Reasonable doubt “ ‘is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible: Code, § 115.) This standard “ ‘simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” ’ ” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Cal.5th at page 465, we recognized that the applicability of the clear and convincing standard of proof before the trial court was relevant to appellate review of the evidentiary record. (Cf. Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059 , 1082 (conc. opn. of Brown. J.).) Moreover, a survey of the case law of other state courts of last resort reveals numerous recent decisions in which these courts have calibrated their review for sufficient evidence to reflect that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied to the finding: Co. (2002) (conc. opn. of Brown. J.).) Moreover, a survey of the case law of other state courts of last resort reveals numerous recent decisions in which these courts have calibrated their review for...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:requester should the requester prevail in litigation filed pursuant to this section.” (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).) “An award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to this provision is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails.” (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419 , 427.) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The statutory provision is mandatory. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 490.) Civil Code section 5975 deals with the enforceability of: Superior Court (2002) .) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:counsel may find it helpful to impose reasonable and well-defined limitations on communications with Patricia, as Patricia’s appointed appellate 12 counsel seems to have successfully done. For instance, to address Patricia’s sometimes hundreds of emails a day to counsel, (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486 , 523 [“Defendant cannot simply refuse to cooperate with his appointed attorney and thereby compel the court to remove that attorney....: For instance, to address Patricia’s sometimes hundreds of emails a day to counsel, (2002)
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:Judy. The paternity presumptions, including Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), at issue in this case, are rooted in the “ ‘strong social policy in favor of preserving [an] ongoing [parent] and child relationship.’ ” (In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 , 66 (Nicholas H.).) The presumptions are “ ‘driven by state interest in preserving the integrity of the family and legitimate concern for the welfare of the child. The state has an “ ‘interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child . . . relationships which give . . .: 19 But even if the natural parent and child presumption between Charles and Judy could be rebutted purely on public policy groundsa premise we rejectwe disagree with Shannon’s assertion that public...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:that “ ‘the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811 , 821, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.) Here, the parties agree that Robert’s No Contest Petition arose from Dae’s protected litigation conduct under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Thus, we need consider only whether Robert provided sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of success: Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) , quoting Matson v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:§ 15610.70, subd. (a).) By common law, “[u]ndue influence is pressure brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the testator’s free agency.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 , 96; David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 684–685 6 [balancing factors]; accord, § 86 [statute supplements common law].) Robert fails to show his evidence of undue influence was not “‘“‘uncontradicted and unimpeached.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1125....: Clark (2002) ; David v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:the grant deed, there was indeed an actionable taking of real property in violation of the Elder Abuse Act. Estate of Sarabia (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 599 (Sarabia), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89 , does not assist Kenton’s case. In Sarabia, the court held: “The presumption of undue influence arises only if all of the following elements are shown: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the person alleged to have exerted undue influence; (2) active participation by such: Clark (2002) , does not assist Kenton’s case.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:and at his or her death the funds in the account will pass directly to the survivor 31 outside of probate. (Prob. Code, § 5302, subd. (a); see Estate of O’Connor (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159, 171; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742 , 1751.) 13 Any “interested person, as defined in Section 48 of the Probate Code” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)), has standing to bring a financial elder abuse action. The phrase “interested person,” as used in section 15657.3 of the Elder Abuse Act, includes “[a]n heir, devisee,: App.5th 159, 171; Estate of Petersen (1994) .) 13 Any “interested person, as defined in Section 48 of the Probate Code” (Welf. & Inst.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:Estate of Blair (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 161, the court adjudicated a section 851.5 petition brought by decedent’s estate seeking one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of a family residence. (Id. at pp. 164–165.) In Estate of Peterson (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742 , the probate court adjudicated a petition under section 9860 disputing title and ownership of annuity contracts, the family residence, and funds held in a money market account. (Id. at pp. 1744–1746.) Parker’s section 850 petition did not seek any personal property akin to the property interests customarily litigated under: App.3d 161, the court adjudicated a section 851.5 petition brought by decedent’s estate seeking one-half of the net proceeds from the sale of a family residence. (Id. at pp. 164–165.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:case reasoning that “[s]ince the grant deed by which the Kanes acquired the property [in 1969] provides that title is in joint tenancy, a different intent is expressed and the community property presumption does not apply”]; Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742 , 1747 [probate case finding that joint tenancy property acquired in 1960 “rebuts the community property presumption found in Civil Code section 5110” because “the instrument specifically states otherwise”]; see also Abbett Electric Corp. v. Storek (1994) 22 Cal.App....: App.3d 1092, 1097, fn. 2 ince the grant deed by which the Kanes acquired the property provides that title is in joint tenancy...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:the premarital agreement. We have no basis to presume the court believed that testimony, and Brandy has not shown the other evidence compelled the court to conclude Scott’s conduct was fraudulent. (See Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613 , 622–623 (Johnson).) We also observe that the Hogoboom treatise cites Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1673-1674, for the proposition, “A unilateral mistake of fact renders an agreement voidable where the mistake was known to and encouraged or fostered by the other party.” (Hogoboom & King,: Pratt & Whitney Canada, Ltd. (1994) –623 (Johnson).) We also observe that the Hogoboom treatise cites Brookwood v.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A party may not rely on a mere “passing reference” to an issue; an appellate brief must set out each point under its own heading and support it with argument and authority, and the court will not deve...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:(See A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 687 [standing is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review]; Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159 , 1174 [same].) 2. Leonard Sought and Recovered Damages for Injuries to the Sage Automotive Group Leonard alleged Michael and Joseph committed a wide variety of misdeeds, including “misappropriat[ing] at least $1.7 million of company funds” to open, advertise, and operate a Lotus dealership without Leonard’s consent or participation; mismanaging: City of Pomona (2018) .) 2.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:support of the summary judgment motion. The allegations and evidence before the trial court were therefore insufficient to show that the criminal complaint was based on the same offenses as the civil actions. (See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299 , 301 [two narcotics sales, “although made to the same person, were distinct and separate sales made at different times”]; People v. Cuevas (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 620, 624 [no bar to successive prosecutions where “offenses committed at different times and at different places”].) B. Excessive Fines 1. Background Defendants contend: United States (1932) ; People v.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:(Roby, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 713.) On appeal, “ ‘determining the “degree of reprehensibility” ultimately involves a legal conclusion.’ ” (Simon, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1172, quoting Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3d 1146 , 1150.) “[F]indings of historical fact made in the trial court are still entitled to the ordinary measure of appellate deference.” (Simon, at p. 1172.) 1. First factor Harm to an employee’s emotional and mental health is considered physical harm within the meaning of the first factor. (Roby, supra, 47: 19 C. Appellants’ Conduct Was Reprehensible. Although we consider the second guidepost last, the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct is the most important of the three.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:inapplicable to void judgments.” (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.) A void judgment “ ‘may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, whenever it presents itself.’ ” (Andrews v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1946) 29 Cal.2d 208 , 214.) In Estate of Reed, for example, the 26 charities successfully moved to set aside a 1954 probate court order for failure of notice more than a decade later in 1967. (259 Cal.App.2d at p. 18.) Respondents next argue Mark’s petition fails because he cannot prove he would be: Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1946) 29 Cal.2d 208, 214.) In Estate of Reed, for example, the 26 charities successfully moved to set aside a 1954 probate court order for failure of notice more...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”’” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408; accord, McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 , 253.) As the Supreme Court explained in McKee, “we ask at the threshold whether two classes that are different in some respects are sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question to require the government to justify its differential treatment of these classes under those laws.” (McKee, at: Superior Court (2002)
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:proper when: (1) defendants have purposefully availed themselves of forum benefits; (2) the controversy relates to the defendants’ contacts with the forum; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262 , 269.) IV The trial court had case-linked personal jurisdiction over the mother, the daughters, and Bluth. All four have been deeply involved with this Trust, which is a stronghold of this family’s wealth. The Trust originated and was administered in California. It is governed by California law. It holds: Superior Court (2002) .) IV The trial court had case-linked personal jurisdiction over the mother, the daughters, and Bluth.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:claim. Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67.) To meet this burden under the second prong of the statute, “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations....: Under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court in making these determinations considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Thus, “[o]nly a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute— i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 , 89, original italics.) . 11 “Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo. [Citation.] We consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) However, we: Sletten (2002) , original italics.) . 11 “Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo. We consider ‘the pleadings...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:step, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being 9 stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, quoting Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 , 89.) A plaintiff prevails in the second step by demonstrating that “ ‘the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester: Sletten (2002) .) A plaintiff prevails in the second step by demonstrating that “ ‘the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favo...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:effect to its purpose, being careful to give the statute’s words their plain, commonsense meaning. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” (Kavanaugh v. West 17 Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911 , 919 (Kavanaugh).) Probate Code section 859 provides: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to a conservatee, a minor, an elder, a dependent adult, a trust, or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or: West 17 Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003)
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture.” But the Supreme Court has found this “oft-repeated rule” inapplicable when construing a general rule of procedure (like Emergency rule 9) rather than “a bail forfeiture law.” (People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 954 , 962.) Additionally, the preference for avoiding forfeitures “does not exist in a vacuum, and is to be balanced against the counterpresumption that ‘when there is a breach of . . . contract, the bond should be enforced.’ ” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 863,: Seneca Ins. Co. (2003) .) Additionally, the preference for avoiding forfeitures “does not exist in a vacuum, and is to be balanced against the counterpresumption that ‘when there is a breach of . . .
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:88 [ “Inconvenience or hardships, if any, that result from following [a] statute as written must be relieved by legislation .... Construction may not be substituted for legislation. [Citation.]”; internal quotations omitted.]; see also, (People v. Seneca Insurance Company (2003) 29 Cal.4th 954 , 962 [a rule of criminal procedure is not a bail forfeiture law entitled to be construed in favor of a surety even if the rule could have the effect of exonerating bail].) “[W]e acknowledge the unprecedented nature of the circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and the hardships it: Seneca Insurance Company (2003) .) “e acknowledge the unprecedented nature of th...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:is not constrained by the case or controversy provisions of Article III of the U.S. Constitution (e.g., Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1247–1248; Jasmine Networks, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 990; People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486 , 497), they have also equated the “beneficially interested” test for standing in California to the injury-in-fact prong of the Article III test for standing in the federal courts (e.g., People for Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App....: Superior Court (2018) ), they have also equated the “beneficially interested” test for standing in California to the injury-in-fact prong of the Article III test for standing in the federal courts (e.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:unless Leonard added the UCNP entities as defendants to a pending cause of action. But third parties may appear and be bound by a judgment without being named in a complaint. (See People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486 , 493; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145-1147; In re Marriage of Williams (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 753, 759-760.) As stated, Michael and Joseph do not argue the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the five UCNP entities, and in any event the UCNP: Superior Court (2018) ; Fireman’s Fund Ins.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540 , 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E.: Davidson (2018) ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:authority to examine the weight of evidence when the question concerns the right of personal liberty.’ ” (Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 85, quoting St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U.S. 38 , 52 [80 L.Ed. 1033, 1041-1042]; Drummey, at p. 86 [finding the analysis in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. to be sound].) Our Supreme Court concluded that, in exercising its independent judgment, “[t]he findings of the board come before the court with a strong presumption of their correctness, and the: United States (1936) [80 L.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:be "employed to determine the relative rights of all interested parties to a specified water source." (1 Slater, California Water Law and Policy (2006) Introduction, ch. 9, p. 9-2; see, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay- Strathmore Irrigation Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 , 533 (Tulare).) However, Abatti did not ask for a declaration of rights; instead, he assumed that the farmers possessed certain water rights that were superior to the rights of other water users, and based on those assumed rights, asked for relief as to the EDP. We addressed the issue: Lindsay- Strathmore Irrigation Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 533 (Tulare).) However, Abatti did not ask for a declaration of rights; instead, he assumed that the farmers possessed certain water rights th...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:be "employed to determine the relative rights of all interested parties to a specified water source." (1 Slater, California Water Law and Policy (2006) Introduction, ch. 9, p. 9-2; see, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay- Strathmore Irrigation Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489 , 533 (Tulare).) However, Abatti did not ask for a declaration of rights; instead, he assumed that the farmers possessed certain water rights that were superior to the rights of other water users, and based on those assumed rights, asked for relief as to the EDP. We addressed the issue: Lindsay- Strathmore Irrigation Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 533 (Tulare).) However, Abatti did not ask for a declaration of rights; instead, he assumed that the farmers possessed certain water rights th...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680 , 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), §§ 1233–1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity 29 Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 610.)” (Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 at pp. 18–19.) “The terms ‘intrinsic’ and: Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Kunkin, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 250.) But what Chamberlain missed is the next paragraph, in which our Supreme Court further said: “In People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421 , 425 . . . , we emphasized that reasonableness was the ultimate standard under the substantial evidence rule. ‘The appellate court must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Kunkin, at: Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 . . . , we emphasized that reasonableness was the ultimate standard under the substantial evidence rule. ‘The appellate court must determine whether a reasonable trier...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:indicia of reliability or trustworthiness”].) Moreover, as we explained in Ashlock I, a trier of fact may reject even the uncontradicted testimony of a witness so long as the rejection is not arbitrary. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875 , 890; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 368.) Stacey contends “[t]he trial court’s finding that [she] did not support the correctness of her accounting is belied by the fact that … nine boxes of supporting documentation were sitting in the courtroom.” She refers to these boxes no: Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890; Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:the parties and the judiciary. Requiring parties to continue to litigate a matter over which there is no longer a real dispute ‘is wasteful of the resources of the 30 judiciary.’ ” (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273 , 277.) We therefore reject the argument that the pending ILIT and anti-SLAPP appeals had the effect of staying the proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. Christine further argues that Chen was required to bring his petition for approval of the second GAL agreement in this court. She: Regents of University of California (1992) .) We therefore reject the argument that the pending ILIT and anti-SLAPP appeals had the effect of staying the proceedings that are the subject of this appea...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:to the temporary conservatorship of Parker’s estate. 9 property where the party asserting an interest is claiming adversely to the estate.” (Richer v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 748, 756 (Richer), disapproved on other grounds by Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888 , 897– 899.) Former section 851.5 provided “for a hearing in the probate court to determine ownership of property ‘(i)f a person dies in possession of, or holding title to, real or personal property which . . . is claimed to belong to another, or dies having a claim to: Howard (1992) – 899.) Former section 851.5 provided “for a hearing in the probate court to determine ownership of property ‘(i)f a person dies in possession of, or holding title to...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal ….’” (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888 , 892–893.) “An appellate court’s decision on the sufficiency of evidence comes clearly within the doctrine.” (Wells v. Lloyd (1942) 21 Cal.2d 452, 455; accord, People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.) Therefore, we will not address the litany of arguments in the opening brief at pages 34–38 and: The latter efforts implicate the law of the case doctrine. “The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court ‘states in its opinion a principle or rule of law n...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:‘[A] strong presumption’ exists against finding that an error falls within the structural category, and ‘it will be the rare case’ where an error—even ‘a constitutional violation’— ‘will not be subject to harmless error analysis.’ ” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099 , 1108.) “In the absence of structural error, the Watson standard for demonstrating prejudice controls.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 555.) “ ‘Plainly, not every violation of the state and federal right to a jury trial is a structural defect requiring reversal without regard to whether the defendant: Monier (2017) .) “In the absence of structural error, the Watson standard for demonstrating prejudice controls.” (People v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586, 605, 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191 , 1209, fn. 6 [same claim as in Eiskamp; although ordinance "was not technically under attack" at time of stipulated judgment, case was validation proceeding that extinguished potential claims]....: United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) , fn. 6 .) Finally...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:addressed similar ordinances and extinguished claims as to augmentation and management charges]; Griffith v. Pajaro Valley Water Mgmt. Agency (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 586, 605, 100 disapproved on other grounds by City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191 , 1209, fn. 6 [same claim as in Eiskamp; although ordinance "was not technically under attack" at time of stipulated judgment, case was validation proceeding that extinguished potential claims]....: United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) , fn. 6 .) Finally...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:and Joseph also appeal from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying their motion to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure sections 663 and 663a on the same grounds. That order is appealable. (See Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124 , 131-135.) We affirm it for the same reasons we affirm the judgment of dissolution. 30 1. Applicable Law “[M]ajority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a joint purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the corporation to use their ability to control the: That order is appealable. (See Ryan v. Rosenfeld (2017) -135.) We affirm it for the same reasons we affirm the judgment of dissolution. 30 1.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,”’” as well as voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 166.) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 818 (Moore) [“SVP proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature.”]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 (Allen) [“Proceedings to commit an individual as a sexually: Sivongxxay (2017) .) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) (Moore) ...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it,”’” as well as voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate 9 choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 166 (Sivongxxay); accord, People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 636-637.)5 “‘[W]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self- protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.) In determining whether a defendant: Sivongxxay (2017) (Sivongxxay); accord, People v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:totality of circumstances here, we are left solely with the error that the trial court did not personally advise C.O. of his jury trial right, which we conclude by itself does not warrant automatic reversal. (Cf. People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 , 183 [addressing statutory error under state law and rejecting criminal defendant’s argument that advisement error required automatic reversal, because “in appropriate circumstances courts can indeed ascertain whether or not a particular defendant would have chosen a jury trial instead of a bench trial had an error in advisement not: Sivongxxay (2017) [addressing statutory error under state law and rejecting criminal defendant’s argument that advisement error required automatic reversal...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) In In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 624, we explained that a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child need not amount to “neglect” or involve neglectful conduct to satisfy Welfare and Institutions 25 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (R.T., at p. 629.) That: T. (2017) , we explained that a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child need not amount to “neglect” or involve neglectful conduct to satisfy Welfare and Institutions 25 Guardianship of SAU...
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:neglect, our Supreme Court has interpreted the term in that context 16 as having its “commonly understood” meaning of a “ ‘failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect’ ” the parent’s child. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629; see also In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 627−628.) S.H.R. contends that his parents committed neglect because, between the ages of 10 and 15, he “spent [his] entire summers working in the fields helping [his] grandfather” for six to seven hours every day “under the hot: T. (2017) ; see also In re Ethan C. (2012) −628.) S.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:is 10 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise noted. 16 one of statutory construction, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. (See Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744 , 751.) “We begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that ‘our primary goal is to determine and give effect to the underlying purpose of the law.’ [Citations.] We start by considering the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the language of related provisions, and the: Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017)
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:and we have never insisted that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must discuss juror impartiality, the unanimity requirement, or both for an ensuing waiver to be knowing and intelligent.” (Id. at p. 168, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 , 992-993 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“We continue to eschew any rigid rubric for trial courts to follow in order to decide whether to accept a defendant’s relinquishment of this right.”]; id. at p. 1018 (conc. & dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.) [“We have consistently eschewed any rigid formula: Daniels (2017) -993 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) ...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:Cal.4th 764, 793.) “An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments in the appellate briefs.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 109; Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320 , 334 [“Rather than brief those arguments, [appellants] purport to ‘incorporate’ them from papers filed below. We do not consider such arguments on appeal.”].) Because Limon has failed to provide this court with supporting facts, argument, or related law relevant to the issue of whether adequate notice of the demurrer: Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) purport to ‘incorporate’ them from papers filed below.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:(California State Employees’ Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 372, 382, fn. 7 [as a general matter, “a respondent who has not appealed from the judgment may not urge error on appeal]; Celia S. v. Hugo H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655 , 665 [as a general rule, respondents who fail to file a cross-appeal cannot claim error in connection with the opposing party’s appeal]; Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24, 31.) Accordingly, we decline to reach the separate issues raised by the Briggs Parties.9 In any event, since we have: Hugo H. (2016) ; Drell v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:to discourage adults from contracting with an infant and they cannot complain if as a consequence of violating the 66 rule they are injured by the exercise of the right of disaffirmance vested in the infant.” (Burnand v. Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861 , 866.) As the cases Jacqueline cites illustrate, the principle has been applied to permit minors to disaffirm a minor’s execution of a deed of trust (Lee v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1918) 177 Cal. 656, 659), a minor’s contract for personal services (Berg, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p.: Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861, 866.) As the cases Jacqueline cites illustrate, the principle has been applied to permit minors to disaffirm a minor’s execution of a deed of trust (Lee v.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:— including section 1043 — governs “the hearing of all matters under [the Probate Code], except where the statute that provides for the hearing of the matter prescribes a different procedure.” (§ 1040, italics added; Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1 , 14.) Section 8251 prescribes a different procedure for will contests. There, a will contestant must file an objection to the will probate and serve the objection with a summons to certain enumerated persons. (§ 8250, subd. (a).) Those summoned must file a written pleading in response to the objection: Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14.) Section 8251 prescribes a different procedure for will contests.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:necessarily give rise to criminal liability or cause monetary loss. (See Trusty v. State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [gross negligence accompanied by an element of deceit sufficient to prove moral turpitude warranting disbarment]; Crane v. State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117 , 124 [attempt to deceive escrow agents by deleting excerpts from a beneficiary statement without authorization]; Farnham v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, 446 [habitual disregard of client’s interests such as misrepresenting case statuses].) The fact that lack of honesty can give rise to culpability for a scheme to: State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 124 ; Farnham v.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:458.) Assuming, without deciding, that an appellate court has similar discretion, we conclude Gann’s personal and property rights are unaffected by this litigation. Family visitation is a privilege, not a right. (§ 3177, subd. (b); see In re Cummings (1982) 30 Cal.3d 870 , 873.) Accordingly, the motion is denied. 13.: Family visitation is a privilege, not a right. (§ 3177, subd. (b); see In re Cummings (1982) 30 Cal.3d 870
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the weight of the evidence phrase in section 1094.5. “The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.” (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059 , 1063.) “In interpreting a statute where the language is clear, courts must follow its plain meaning. [Citation....: Flores (2003)
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:a preponderance of the evidence, that but for the attorney’s negligent acts or omissions, he [or she] would have obtained a more favorable judgment or settlement in the action in which the malpractice allegedly occurred.” (Ibid.; Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232 , 1241; accord, Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1091 (Masellis).) “‘If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat: Sweet (2003) ; accord, Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F.
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:as a declaration or affidavit.”].) The son verified his petition, thus converting it into the functional equivalent of a declaration like the ones the mother and her daughters have filed for themselves. The mother also cites Strauch v. Eyring (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 181 , but that holding is consistent with ViaView, for the pleadings in Strauch were not verified. The holding in Strauch does not favor the mother. Strauch does contain a dictum the mother quotes, but as support for its dictum the Strauch court cited an outdated treatise. The relevant portion from: Eyring (1994) , but that holding is consistent with ViaView, for the pleadings in Strauch were not verified.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:219.) The attorney’s duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial process includes a more specific duty, in judicial proceedings, to honor obligations of confidentiality arising from nonlawyer confidential or fiduciary relationships. (See O’Gara Coach Co., LLC v. Ra (2019) 30 Cal.App....: Ra (2019) (O’Gara Coach) [affirming disqualification of company’s former president and COO as counsel for former employees suing company, where counsel’s potential advantageous use of confidential inf...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:v. Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 129 (Jarvis).) Disqualification may be ordered as a prophylactic measure 9 against a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing effect on future proceedings. (City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 457 , 462, 471-472; but see In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843 [“‘an appearance of impropriety by itself does not support a lawyer’s disqualification’”].) “‘Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal....: Superior Court (2018) , 471-472; but see In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:254.) Thus, the Davis decision went too far to the extent it called for proof of an additional element not found in the statutory definition. Courts may not expand statutory language under the guise of interpretation. (In re Miller (1947) 31 Cal.2d 191 , 199; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) The Walker court strayed even further afield from the statutory framework. It endorsed a two- step procedure under which a jury would not even consider the issue of grave disability if it concluded the proposed conservatee was willing and able to accept: Courts may not expand statutory language under the guise of interpretation. (In re Miller (1947) 31 Cal.2d 191, 199; see Code Civ.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:or based on mistake, but such relief may be granted if the party seeking it was precluded by fraud or the mistake of the other party from participating in the proceeding or from fully presenting his case. (Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362 , 365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America,: Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 365; Howard v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:at one hearing or another, and she does not explain how she has been prejudiced by the court’s ruling. Prejudice is not presumed, and the appellant has the duty to show that an error is prejudicial. (Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586 , 601; see Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice”].) Christine has failed to make that showing 29 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court did not: Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601; see Paterno v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:indebtedness claimed by the plaintiff.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 483.015, subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘The term “indebtedness” has no rigid or fixed meaning, but rather must be construed in every case in accord with its context.’ ” (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318 , 326.) “It can include all financial obligations arising from contract,” “ ‘obligations which are yet to become due as [well as] those which are already matured’ ” (id. at pp. 326–327), and “may be created by statute rather than contract” (Patton v. City of Alameda (1985) 40 Cal.3d 41,: Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 326.) “It can include all financial obligations arising from contract,” “ ‘obligations which are yet to become due as those which are already matured’ ” (id. at pp.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:settlor. The court was also right to rule that, because this trust is revocable, Autonomous Region lacked special standing. Autonomous Region had the burden to prove it could cure defects in its petition. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074 , 1081.) It did not carry this burden. DISPOSITION We affirm the judgment and award costs to the respondent. WILEY, J. We concur: GRIMES, Acting P. J. STRATTON, J. 24: City of Los Angeles (2003) .) It did not carry this burden. DISPOSITION We affirm the judgment and award costs to the respondent. WILEY, J. We concur: GRIMES, Acting P.
- Conservatorship of R.J. : A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be dismissed solely on the ground that the defendant has not shown prejudice, without the court having to evaluate whether counsel’s performance was de...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:the record as unopposed, but deny the motion to take additional evidence on appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section 909 motions may be granted only in “exceptional circumstances,” and nothing argued here meets that standard. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396 , 405, italics omitted.) Turning to the merits of Royals’s mootness argument, we deny the motion to dismiss. The trial court’s December 27, 2021 vacatur of the RTAO is a nullity. In general, “[t]imely filing of the notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court 11 and, subject to: Code of Civil Procedure section 909 motions may be granted only in “exceptional circumstances,” and nothing argued here meets that standard. (In re Zeth S. (2003) , italics omitted.
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:and may make any further or other order as the case may require. This section shall be liberally construed to the end among others that, where feasible, causes may be finally disposed of by a single In re Zeth (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396 , 405, cautions that such authority should be exercised sparingly. But Code of Civil Procedure section 909 also mandates it shall be liberally construed where a cause may be disposed of in a single appeal. That is the case here where the interests of justice do not require a new: This section shall be liberally construed to the end among others that, where feasible, causes may be finally disposed of by a single In re Zeth (2003) , cautions that such authority should be exercis...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:her first name for clarity. We mean no disrespect in doing so. (See Rubinstein v. Rubinstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn.1.) 2 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 , 732, fn. 1 (Jarrow Formulas).) Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. . 2 Attorneys challenge the Order denying the special motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim and the denial of attorney fees. Carol filed a cross-appeal, challenging the Order striking the: LaMarche (2003) , fn. 1 (Jarrow Formulas).) Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. . 2 Attorneys challenge the Order denying the special motion to str...
- Conservatorship of R.J. : Counsel is not obligated to file futile motions or engage in idle actions merely to appear diligent; a lawyer’s performance is judged by whether it was reasonable, not by a requirement to undertake po...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:affirm.” (Blank, supra, 8 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Neither the trial court nor this court will rewrite the complaint. (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137 , 1153.) 2. Applicable law California’s Probate Code provides a statutory right of recovery to children omitted from a decedent’s will or trust. (§ 21600 et seq.) Section 21622 states: “If, at the time of the execution of all of decedent’s testamentary instruments effective at the time of decedent’s death,: 8 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Neither the trial court nor this court will rewrite the complaint. (Gould v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:when the promise occurred. We note that work she did out of pity for her mother cannot be considered for estoppel purposes here; only work performed in reliance on the Bennett Trustee’s alleged promise can.14 (Cf. Smyth v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 183 , 199 (Smyth) [changes in position undertaken prior to alleged promise irrelevant to estoppel analysis].) However, we ascertain from the petition’s allegations that the promise was made not later than June 5, 2017, when the Bennett Trustee’s assistant furnished a copy of the Property’s title report to Tukes, because Tukes: Berman (2019)
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:the objections in the appellate court.” (Ibid.) Ginsberg’s assertions that various pieces of evidence were inadmissible, supported only by references to his objections below, are not sufficient to carry this burden. (Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 232 , 251 fn. 17.) Moreover, Ginsberg cites this statement about Knapp’s understanding of Tinker’s financial status in the argument section of his response brief. 4 retained Ginsberg to represent her in connection with the PMA on March 9, 2004. Over the next few weeks, Ginsberg negotiated the PMA with Tessler: Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC (2019) fn. 17.) Moreover, Ginsberg cites this statement about Knapp’s understanding of Tinker’s financial status in the argument section of his response brief.
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:above-referenced Trust and of the estate of Don F. Kirchner, Deceased, however those assets may be held. Settlement of the matter may also result in an award of attorneys' fees to one or more parties under Smith v. Szeyller (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 450 . Interested persons or parties who do not have counsel may attend the mediation and participate. “Non-participating persons or parties who receive notice of the date, time and place of the mediation may be bound by the terms of any agreement reached at mediation without further action by the Court: Szeyller (2019) .
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:would owe. [¶] … Here, what the trial court did, was 28. essentially enter a judgment for $15, because it gave the estate the property and also twice the value of the property.” Stacey relies on Conservatorship of Ribal (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 519 (Ribal), which does support her argument. In that case, Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted section 859 as setting a limit on a wrongdoer’s monetary responsibility under section 850 et seq. However, Ribal’s analysis does not follow the plain meaning rule and conflicts with the holding: This is most she would owe. … Here, what the trial court did, was 28. essentially enter a judgment for $15, because it gave the estate the property...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:made a general appearance. In any event, a party that has made only a special appearance is a proper party to an appeal arising out of that special appearance. (See, e.g., Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543 , 549-552.) 8 IV EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT Bewley contends that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the property. Under this general heading, he also argues that (1) Humphrey’s claim is barred because he failed to file a timely creditor’s claim (see Prob. Code, § 9002), and: Ltd. (2019) -552.) 8 IV EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT Bewley contends that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the property. Under this general heading...
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543 , 553.) 6 We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order. (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 923.) When the evidence conflicts, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings when substantial evidence supports them. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc....: Ltd. (2019) .) 6 We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order. (Betz v.
- Garcia v. Garcia : When the language of a trust instrument is clear and unambiguous, it governs the settlor’s intent and extrinsic evidence may not be considered to interpret the trust.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:every Saturday morning 27 between 2008 and 2015. The trial court could infer from this evidence that Lynne hoped to influence Mildred to alter the Trust before she died. Citing Orange County Water District v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96 (Orange County), Lynne also argues that the trial court could not have found bad faith because she relied on her experts’ conclusions. In Orange County, the appellate court considered whether a party should be required to pay the costs of litigation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 after failing: The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) (Orange County), Lynne also argues that the trial court could not have found bad faith because she relied on her experts’ conclusions.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:inherent equitable authority to set aside an order or decree when extrinsic factors have deprived a party of a fair adversary hearing. (Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d 607, 614; Estate of Charters (1956) 46 Cal.2d 227, 234–235; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13 , 18 (Jorgensen).) Courts require a showing of extrinsic fraud or mistake in order to balance the public policy in favor of the finality of judgments with the policy in favor of providing litigants a fair opportunity to present a case. (Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614.) The requirements: App.3d 581, 591 (Lazzarone).) However, the probate court has inherent equitable authority to set aside an order or decree when extrinsic factors have deprived a party of a fair adversary hearing.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:review rather than the independent judgment standard of review in evaluating the merits of his 5 petition.5 The independent judgment standard of review applies to agency decisions revoking or suspending a medical license. (Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301 , 302, 308; Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 139, 146.) Our Supreme Court did not, in Conservatorship of O.B., discuss or change the standard of review applicable to this proceeding. II The Application Of Conservatorship Of O.B. To The Standards Of Review In Section 1094.5 In Conservatorship: Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301, 302, 308; Bixby v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:faith. “ ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ” (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1 , 5.) “ ‘While the interpretation of similar words in other statutes is not controlling, such interpretation is helpful in arriving at the legislative intent. [Citations.] . . . ’ [Citations.] Under general rules of statutory construction, we may consider the judicial interpretation of similar words used in another statute: Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5.) “ ‘While the interpretation of similar words in other statutes is not controlling, such interpretation is helpful in arriving at the legislative intent. . . .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully or procedurally unfair.' " (Id. at p. 1265, quoting Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779 , 786.) "The appellate court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120, 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1409 [review is: We deny the remaining requests. 9 authority of the court is limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully or procedurally unfair.' " (Id. at p. 1265, quoting Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779 , 786.) "The appellate court reviews the trial court's decision de novo under the same standard." (California Bldg. Industry Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 120, 130; see City of Arcadia v. State Water Resources Control Board (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1409 [review is: We deny the remaining requests. 9 authority of the court is limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:differently from other civil committees with respect to jury waiver protections. Thus, we do not have an appellate record on which to evaluate Washington’s equal protection claim. However, “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293; accord, Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199, 215 [“‘neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic’”].) Although Washington’s attorney failed to argue that Washington was entitled to a jury trial absent a personal waiver by Washington after a jury trial advisement, it is hard to: B. (2004) ; accord, Unzueta v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:seven weeks prior to the filing of Stacey’s opening brief. Because the statutory interpretation claim presents an important legal issue substantially affecting the parties’ rights, we exercise our discretion to address it despite the forfeiture. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an *See footnote, ante, page 1. 7. important legal issue”].) Accordingly, we have allowed Gabriel to respond to the claim in a supplemental brief. We do not excuse Stacey’s forfeiture of the: B. (2004) .) Accordingly...
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:under California law, which we turn to next. II. A Natural Parent and Child Relationship Exists Between Charles and Judy A. Guiding Principles Sections 6450 through 6455 define “the parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession.” (Estate of Ford (2004) 32 Cal.4th 160 , 165.) As relevant here, a parent and child relationship “exists between a person and the person’s natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents.” (§ 6450, subd. (a) 7; see Britel, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) Section 6453 “contains the rules for determining who is: Guiding Principles Sections define “the parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession.” (Estate of Ford (2004) .) As relevant here, a parent and child relationship “exists between a p...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:and upon subsequent appeal ….’” (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892–893.) “An appellate court’s decision on the sufficiency of evidence comes clearly within the doctrine.” (Wells v. Lloyd (1942) 21 Cal.2d 452, 455; accord, People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 246.) Therefore, we will not address the litany of arguments in the opening brief at pages 34–38 and 45–47, in of decision” refers to the March 19, 2018, document as modified by the July 13, 2018, minute orders. *See footnote, ante, page 1. 6. the reply brief at pages: Barragan (2004) .) Therefore, we will not address the litany of arguments in the opening brief at pages 34––47, in of decision” refers to the March 19, 2018, document as modified by the July 13, 2018,...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:to this as the favorable termination element.) Second, the defendant must have brought the prior action without probable cause. (Ibid.) Third, the defendant must have initiated the prior action with malice. (Ibid.; see also Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336 , 341 (Casa Herrera).) Fourth, the plaintiff must show resulting damage, which may include out-of-pocket losses of attorney fees and costs, as well as emotional distress and injury to reputation. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 90-91.)5 2. Favorable Termination on the Merits a. Applicable Law To establish a: App.5th 905, 922.) . .) (We will refer to this as the favorable termination element.) Second, the defendant must have brought the prior action without probable cause. (Ibid.) Third...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:refer to the same property taken. Kenton’s reading disregards the word “or” that separates the clauses and offers no legal or logical basis for departing from that term’s ordinary, well settled, and disjunctive meaning. (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 622.) Kenton’s remaining statutory interpretation arguments rely on tools of statutory construction that need not be considered because the plain meaning is clear. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1045; Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 919.) Because the court found Kenton took property by committing elder financial: Kenton’s reading disregards the word “or” that separates the clauses and offers no legal or logical basis for departing from that term’s ordinary, well settled...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:handling of the case”]; Mandell v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 [court has discretion to deny attorney’s request to withdraw when withdrawal would result in an injustice or cause undue delay]; see generally In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 637 [the Legislature has declared that dependency actions be resolved expeditiously]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 [time is of the essence in dependency proceedings]; In re 11 Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 [same].) 11 In denying Patricia’s Marsden motions to replace her: App.3d 1, 4 ; see generally In re Jesusa V. (2004) [the Legislature has declared that dependency actions be resolved exp...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:the word ‘or’ is well settled. [Citation.] It has a disjunctive meaning: ‘In its ordinary sense, the function of the word “or” is to mark an alternative such as “either this or that.” ’ ” (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 622.) We see no basis to depart from this rule of statutory construction, and thus conclude attorney fees may be awarded when any of the three statutory criteria is established. The parties premise their claims on different aspects of the statutory criteria. Defendants primarily focus on the “arbitrarily” language,: rather lies within the broad discretion of the trial court. 11 “The ‘ “ordinary and popular” ’ meaning of the word ‘or’ is well settled. It has a disjunctive meaning: ‘In its ordinary sense...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:particularly when one of them—O’Brian’s intent—is negated by the Trust’s disinheritance provisions. Moreover, as the trustee notes, as a “general rule . . . statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771 , 790.) Adam contends his allegations repeating the requirements for relief under section 21622 are sufficient because they inform the trustee of the basis for his claims. He argues the trustee has will never be known” because O’Brian believed that he had no children at the time. The petition continues,: Superior Court (2004) .) Adam contends his allegations repeating the requirements for relief under section 21622 are sufficient because they inform the trustee of the basis for his claims.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:initiate the suit under a particular theory, his or her decision to continue to prosecute the case on that theory after learning it was not supported by probable cause may result in liability for malicious prosecution. (Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958 , 971.) b. Prima Facie Showing of Absence of Probable Cause Attorneys contend that they had probable cause to join the Maleti Respondents in the probate proceeding when they filed the Fourth Amended Petition. Citing a lengthy joint declaration of Rodney Wickers and Christina Wickers in support of the anti-SLAPP: Even if the malicious prosecution defendant had probable cause to initiate the suit under a particular theory, his or her decision to continue to prosecute the case on that theory after learning it wa...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.' " (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974 , 986-987.) Abatti contends that the District is judicially estopped from arguing that the farmers "do not have a constitutionally protected interest" in the District's water rights....: Lerner (2004)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.' " (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974 , 986-987.) Abatti contends that the District is judicially estopped from arguing that the farmers "do not have a constitutionally protected interest" in the District's water rights....: Lerner (2004)
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:the court over the parties and the subject matter of an action continues throughout subsequent proceedings in the action.” (Italics added.) The service of summons in 2018 would not support a default entered in 2014. (See Moffett v. Barclay (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 980 , 983.) The trial court did err, however, by quashing service as to Bewley. Even though the service by publication was invalid, he had made a general appearance and was subject to its personal jurisdiction. Instead, it should have given him 15 days after service of a written notice of: Barclay (1995) .) The trial court did err, however, by quashing service as to Bewley.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:general, those cases stand for the proposition that the court’s power to conduct a special proceeding under the buyout statutes depends on the existence of a cause of action for involuntary dissolution. (See Boschetti v. Pacific Bay Investments, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1059 , 1066 [“‘the right of buyout under section 15908.02 is dependent upon a cause of action for judicial dissolution’”]; Ontiveros v. Constable, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [“a party’s right under section 2000 depends entirely on the existence of a cause of action for involuntary dissolution of a corporation”];: Pacific Bay Investments, Inc. (2019) ; Ontiveros v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:which in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.’” [Citations.] “‘[I]f an appearance is for any purpose other than to question the jurisdiction of the court[,] it is general.’” [Citations.]” (Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 114 , 125 [243 Cal.Rptr.3d 623, 631.) Humphrey asserts that Bewley made a general appearance by (1) filing and litigating the motion to intervene, (2) filing a case management statement, and (3) opposing Humphrey’s request for a default prove-up. We consider only the motion to intervene, because we agree that it: Superior Court (2019) [243 Cal.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:that the reasonableness of an 18 administrative subpoena in a question of law,” in claimed support of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 ; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons....: Cohanshohet (2019) ; and State ex rel.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:that the reasonableness of an 18 administrative subpoena in a question of law,” in claimed support of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428 ; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons....: Cohanshohet (2019) ; and State ex rel.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. Because the Court of Appeal below took the position that the clear and convincing standard of proof “ ‘ “disappears” ’ ” on appeal (Conservatorship of O.B. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 626 , 633) 2 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. when it rejected O.B.’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we reverse. I. BACKGROUND In August 2017, respondents T.B. and C.B. filed a petition in Santa Barbara County Superior Court requesting that they be appointed: B. (2019) ) 2 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320. (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83 , 108 (Ciprari).) These statutory factors include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay, the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living, the obligations and assets of each spouse, including separate property, and any other factors pertaining to a just and equitable award. (Ibid.) In making a: In particular, section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable...
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:basis for the decision, any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be 10 resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83 , 93-94.) II Substantial Evidence Supports The Finding Louise Expected An Inheritance The trial court found Louise expected an inheritance, relying in substantial part on the testimony of Aanestad, a witness the court found credible and unbiased. The court explained: “Mr. Aanestad testified that the decedent wanted to change his: 10 resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) -94.) II Substantial Evidence Supports The Finding Louise Expected An Inheritance The tr...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:(2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1062, fn. omitted.) The primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to 3 BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. the settlor’s intentions. (Brock v. Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885 (Brock).) Our review concerns whether plaintiff has standing to assert the invalidity of the Trust amendments that left her without an interest in her mother’s trust estate. In concluding that plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the amendments to the Trust, the Court of Appeal suggested that plaintiff relied: Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885 (Brock).) Our review concerns whether plaintiff has standing to assert the invalidity of the Trust amendments that left her without an interest in her mother’s trust estate.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:but does not denote its type or scope. (See, e.g., Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman (1908) 152 Cal. 716, 724 [contractual right to water delivery for irrigating specific land became easement appurtenant]; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908 , 925 [overlying water right "is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto"]; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 561 [appropriative right was appurtenant to entire property, and subsequent owner was entitled to portion thereof].) 18 Thus, an appurtenant, appropriative water right is one associated with land.: City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 ; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:but does not denote its type or scope. (See, e.g., Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman (1908) 152 Cal. 716, 724 [contractual right to water delivery for irrigating specific land became easement appurtenant]; City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908 , 925 [overlying water right "is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto"]; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 561 [appropriative right was appurtenant to entire property, and subsequent owner was entitled to portion thereof].) 18 Thus, an appurtenant, appropriative water right is one associated with land.: City of Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal.2d 908, 925 ; Nicoll, supra, 160 Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:means 5 Although Attorneys argued below that the claim failed because Carol had not adequately shown damage, they do not raise this question on appeal. It is therefore abandoned. (See Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211 , 216, fn. 4.) In any event, Carol presented evidence that Maleti had paid over $283,000 in attorney fees and costs in defending the claims in the underlying proceeding. . 14 more than showing simply that the plaintiff “ ‘prevailed in an underlying action. . . . If the termination: State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4.) In any event, Carol presented evidence that Maleti had paid over $283,000 in attorney fees...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:“in excess of jurisdiction” by a court that has jurisdiction in the “fundamental sense” . . . is not void, but only voidable.’” (Adoption of Myah M., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531; see In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49 , 56 [“A court can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the judgment voidable.”]; see also American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 660-661; People v. North: App.4th at p. 1531; see In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) [“A court can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely act...
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:the entirety of the record to determine if the circumstances reasonably justify the trial court’s conclusions, even if we believe the circumstances might also “be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding . . . .” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620 , 631.) At the time it appointed a GAL for mother, the trial court made no explicit finding of incompetence on the record. This was error. (See In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188 [“The court’s decision on this issue should be stated on the record”].) What record: 8 Any “error in the procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect req...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:it may move to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond if it can prove that one of the limited excuses set forth in the statute is applicable. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1); see People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653 , 658.) If the appearance period expires and the bail forfeiture has not been set aside, the court must enter a summary judgment against the surety in accordance with the terms of the bail bond. 5 (§ 1306, subd. (a); People v. North River Ins. Co., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) .) If the appearance period expires and the bail forfeiture has not been set aside, the court must enter a summary judgment against the surety in accordance w...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order”].) A judgment or order that is not void but “merely” voidable, however, is generally not subject to collateral attack. (See People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653 , 661 (American Contractors); Adoption of Myah M. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1531.) “When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. [Citations.] That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) (American Contractors); Adoption of Myah M. (2011) 201 Cal.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:bond, plus costs. (See § 1306, subd. (a); North River–Watts, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.) If the court prematurely enters summary judgment before the appearance period has expired, the judgment is voidable. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653 , 660- 661 (American Contractors); People v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 991, 1001.) If the court fails to enter summary judgment “ ‘within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.’: American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) - 661 (American Contractors); People v.
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:Code of Civil 16 Procedure.”10 The Legislature’s decision not to include a comparable provision for alternate forms of service in section 527.6 precludes our rewriting the statute to allow service other than by personal delivery. (See People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999 , 1008 [“‘It is our task to construe, not to amend, the statute. . . . We may not, under the guise of construction, rewrite the law or give the words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used’”]; Cornette v. Department of Transportation (2001): Leal (2004) [“‘It is our task to construe, not to amend, the statute. . . .
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:once held by the decedent and transferred to heirs by a trust is part of the decedent’s estate and is subject to recovery under the same statute.” (Maxwell-Jolly v. Martin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 347, 353-354; see Belshé v. Hope (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 161 , 164.) Here, the probate court failed to provide its reasons for denying payment of the department’s claim. Nonetheless, its prior order—which denied the same claim— explained that the conservator had no authority to use the funds from the annuity because it was a noncash asset, which ceased to be: App.4th 347, 353-354; see Belshé v. Hope (1995) .) Here, the probate court failed to provide its reasons for denying payment of the department’s claim.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:Siberell v. Siberell (1932) 214 Cal. 767 (Siberell) that may govern characterization in certain situations. Although caselaw has sometimes conflated Siberell and other presumptions arising from joint title with Evidence Code section 662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 , 291–292 (Haines); In re Marriage of Brooks 8 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 185–187; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592, 597), they are in fact distinct. In order to understand the applicability of these various rules, it: Although caselaw has sometimes conflated Siberell and other presumptions arising from joint title with Evidence Code section 662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) –292 (Haines)...
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:show that the character of the property was held differently, including by establishing that the property’s character was changed by an agreement or mutual understanding between the spouses. (Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-347; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592 , 596.) ‘However, there must be an agreement of some sort; the presumption may not be overcome by testimony about the hidden intention of one spouse, undisclosed to the other spouse at the time of the conveyance.’ (Levine, supra, at p. 705, emphasis in original; see also Edwards v. Deitrich: King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-347; Estate of Gallio (1995) .) ‘However, there must be an agreement of some sort; the presumption may not be overcome by testimony about the hidden intention of one spo...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:662 (see In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291–292 (Haines); In re Marriage of Brooks 8 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 185–187; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592 , 597), they are in fact distinct. In order to understand the applicability of these various rules, it is necessary to examine the history of the relevant statutes and their consequences for various property ownership arrangements. As we explain, the history reveals the gradual evolution of common-law separate property concepts: App.4th 176, 185–187; Estate of Gallio (1995) ), they are in fact distinct. In order to understand the applicability of these various rules, it is necessary to examine the history of the relevant stat...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:derives from its inherent power, codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(5), to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons connected with its proceedings in furtherance of justice. (Jarvis v. Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113 , 129 (Jarvis).) Disqualification may be ordered as a prophylactic measure 9 against a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing effect on future proceedings. (City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 457, 462, 471-472; but see In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835,: Jarvis (2019) (Jarvis).) Disqualification may be ordered as a prophylactic measure 9 against a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing effect on future proceedings.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:of the evidence he would present at the hearing.” (Id., slip opn. at pp. 8-9.) Appellant Has Not Shown Prejudice “[A]n abuse of discretion results in reversible error only if it is prejudicial.” (York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1190; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) The burden is on the appellant to show prejudice. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) An assessment of prejudice cannot be made here because appellant did not make an offer of proof: City of Los Angeles (2019) ; see Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:taking claim of some sort. This does not establish that a physical taking has occurred, or that any regulatory taking that might exist is ripe. (Bottini, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 307; see York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1195 [owner bears " ' "heavy burden of showing that a regulation as applied to a particular parcel is ripe for a taking claim" ' "].) Abatti also offers no analysis or authority as to how a purported diminution in value would support a taking claim here. Courts have: City of Los Angeles (2019) .) Abatti also offers no analysis...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:taking claim of some sort. This does not establish that a physical taking has occurred, or that any regulatory taking that might exist is ripe. (Bottini, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 307; see York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1195 [owner bears " ' "heavy burden of showing that a regulation as applied to a particular parcel is ripe for a taking claim" ' "].) Abatti also offers no analysis or authority as to how a purported diminution in value would support a taking claim here. Courts have: City of Los Angeles (2019) .) Abatti also offers no analysis...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:of the Article III test for standing in the federal courts (e.g., People for Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391, 407–408; Synergy Project Management, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 21 , 30–31; SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1053; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 706–707). Thus, while it is true that standing in California is not explicitly governed by Article III: City and County of San Francisco (2019) –31; SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:evidence.” 11 appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Estate of Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894 , 904; quoting, In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527−1528; accord, Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 258, 270.)8 S.H.R. views the role of the trial court under section 155 and, consequently, our standard of reviewing the court’s ruling, differently. According to him,: 11 appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:mailed notice was not required. We agree with Mark. 1. Due Process Requires Reasonable Notice of Any Proceeding Adversely Affecting a Property Interest In 1950, the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306 , 314 (Mullane) “recognized that prior to an action which will affect an interest in life, liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and: Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:inapposite. (See Los Angeles v. Aitken (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 460, 466-472, 475 [affirming damages for riparian and littoral owners after city condemned and diverted recreational waters in manner that would reduce water levels]; U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 725 , 729- 730, 752-753 [upholding compensation to riparian owners who depended on river overflow, after construction of Friant Dam ended overflow]; Dugan v. Rank (1963) 372 U.S....: Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) - 730, 752-753 ; Dugan v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:inapposite. (See Los Angeles v. Aitken (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 460, 466-472, 475 [affirming damages for riparian and littoral owners after city condemned and diverted recreational waters in manner that would reduce water levels]; U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 725 , 729- 730, 752-753 [upholding compensation to riparian owners who depended on river overflow, after construction of Friant Dam ended overflow]; Dugan v. Rank (1963) 372 U.S....: Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) - 730, 752-753 ; Dugan v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court. (E.g., In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863; Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20 , 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 260- 261; Steinberger v. Young (1917) 175 Cal. 81, 84-85 (Steinberger).): Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:held for many, many years. The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) 73 U.S. 18, 27: shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31 , 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 350: “[B]ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported by substantial: City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:held for many, many years. The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) 73 U.S. 18, 27: shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31 , 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 350: “[B]ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court’s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported by substantial: City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:former Civil Code section 230 by acknowledging them as his own children while the family lived together in Guatemala. (Wolf, at pp. 287−289, as discussed in Estate of Lund (1945) 26 Cal.2d 472, 487 (Lund); see Estate of Garcia (1949) 34 Cal.2d 419 , 422 [disapproving of limiting language in Lund in denying rehearing in Wolf].) Relying on Blythe for support, Wolf held that the nonmarital children were heirs of the decedent. (Wolf, at p. 289.) In reaching its decision, Wolf found the fact the decedent was “an alien and domiciled outside of: There, nonmarital children sought to inherit from their paternal grandmother, claiming in part that their father “legitimated” them under former Civil Code section 230 by acknowledging them as his own...
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling (Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 395 . . . ; cf. People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 455–456, 477–478 . . . [cruel or unusual punishment]).” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) Contrary to defendants’ assertion, when applied to the facts in this case, the four-part Bajakajian test shows that the imposition of the civil fines did not violate the excessive fines clause. a. Braum’s: Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455–456, 477–478 . . . ).” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:we presume the court followed the law in making its determination [citation], including a consideration of [less restrictive alternatives].” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554 , 563 [“it is presumed that the 14 court followed the law. . . . The mere fact that the court did not explicitly refer to [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 203.5(e), when the statute contains no such requirement does not support the conclusion that it was ignored”].) The Probate: Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563 [“it is presumed that the 14 court followed the law. . . .
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:as is alleged here, should be decided by the probate court, if the invalidity of those provisions or amendments would render the challenger a beneficiary of the trust. (See Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733 , 737 [courts should not examine statutory language in isolation].) So when a plaintiff claims to be a rightful beneficiary of a trust if challenged amendments are deemed invalid, she has standing to petition the probate court under section 17200. Defendants argue that interpreting section 17200 to permit purported beneficiaries: City of Los Angeles (2004)
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:1253, fn. 8 [meaningful appellate review can only occur if a party raises a potential conflict of interest, the trial court hears the matter, and the trial court decides whether an actual conflict exists]; see generally People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798 , 813–814 [failure to press for a ruling results in forfeiture of issue on appeal].) Citing Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197 (Kennedy), Herren appears to suggest Webb should have been disqualified sua sponte, 27 despite her failure to seek his disqualification. We are unpersuaded. Kennedy involved support and: Braxton (2004) –814 .) Citing Kennedy v.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:decedent’s [or settlor’s] intent, and to prevent looting of . . . estates. [Citations.] It provides the probate court with a mechanism to determine rights in property belonging to a decedent or to someone else.’ ” (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154 , 170–171; see also Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 117–118 (Kraus); Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 75 [“Section 850 et seq. provides a mechanism for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent or another person.”].) 12 b. Based on the Legislative: Dudek (2019) –171; see also Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:176.) These criteria are fulfilled here. Currently, there appears to be no appellate authority addressing whether section 1043 or Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40 governs the timing for filing a demurrer in a probate proceeding. (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154 , 162 [without discussion, sustaining demurrer filed three months after probate petition was filed].) And trial courts have employed different methods of resolving this conflict. (Christo & Vrem, Tips of the Trade: Propriety of Filing a Demurrer in Probate Court; Helpful Tips on Timing (2020) 26 Cal. Tr. & Est.: Dudek (2019) .) And trial courts have employed different methods of resolving this conflict. (Christo & Vrem...
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:28, 2018 hearing. For our purposes, the lack of the reporter’s transcript creates no issue, as we review de novo. 6 A. Standard of Review We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer. (Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154 , 163 (Dudek).) When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint or petition, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact and law. (Ibid.; Estate of Holdaway (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1052.) B. Powers of Appointment As stated above, trustors: Dudek (2019) (Dudek).) When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint or petition, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact...
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:of parent and child and whether a natural parent and child relationship exists. (See Estate of Britel (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 127, 135−136 (Britel).) The case therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo. (A.S. v. Miller (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 284 , 290 (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 891.) We also review de novo the probate court’s decision to apply California and not Indiana law in determining parentage between Charles and Judy. (See Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 265, 274 [noting a trial court’s choice-of-law ruling is: S. v. Miller (2019) (Miller); Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:persuaded. The plain language of these statutes “is inconclusive” when considered alone and does not help us determine whether an individual who was qualified to commence an action must continue to have standing throughout the litigation. (Summers v. Colette (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 361 , 368.) Therefore, we look to the legislative history. 2. Legislative History These statutes were enacted in 1978 as part of a comprehensive revision of the law governing nonprofit corporations to modernize and set forth in one division of the Corporations Code the law applicable to nonprofit corporations....: Colette (2019) .) Therefore, we look to the legislative history. 2.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:is no concern here that the Attorney General “ ‘may not be in the position to become aware of wrongful conduct or to be sufficiently familiar with the situation to appreciate its impact . . . .’ ” (Summers, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 371 quoting Holt, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 755.) Turner informed the Attorney General of her concerns even before she commenced the probate action. As required by statute, the Attorney General had notice of both the probate and civil actions, has been involved in these cases since the beginning, and is: 39 may seem fit and proper; or may, at his option, assume the management of said proceeding at any stage thereof.”) “In principle, the use of a relator allows the attorney general to bring suit in abs...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:for objection to a complaint or cross-complaint does not appear on the face of the pleading, the objection may be taken by answer”].) The Probate Code, however, does not have any rules regarding summary judgment procedures. (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505 , 521 [“Probate Code does not itself provide rules for . . . any other procedure for a preliminary determination of the strength of a petitioner’s case prior to deciding disputed facts”].) Yet “summary judgment proceedings in probate court are commonplace.” (Ibid.) In those circumstances, the relevant provisions in the: Tyler (2019) .) Yet “summary judgment proceedings in probate court ...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:to be determined as if she had predeceased the trustors without surviving issue. “Under current law, a no contest clause is enforceable against a ‘direct contest that is brought without probable cause.’ (§ 21311, subd. (a)(1).)” (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505 , 517.) 6 A “ ‘contest’ ” is a “pleading filed with the court by a beneficiary that would result in a penalty under a no contest clause, if the no contest clause is enforced.” (§ 21310, subd. (a).) A “ ‘[d]irect contest’ . . . alleges the invalidity of: Tyler (2019)
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:enforceable.” (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 423.) In 2008 the Legislature simplified the statutory scheme (effective in 2010) “by more narrowly defining the types of challenges that could be subject to a no contest clause.” (Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505 , 516 (Key).) “Under current law, a no contest clause is enforceable against a ‘direct contest that is brought 5 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. Because this case involves the application of prior law, we hereafter identify statutory provisions that have since been repealed or amended: Tyler (2019) (Key).) “Under current law, a no contest clause is enforceable against a ‘direct contest that is brought 5 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:establish that the communication was not confidential.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 420 [opponent has burden to rebut presumption that spousal communication is confidential by preponderance of evidence]; Blau v. U.S. (1951) 340 U.S. 332 , 333-334 [reversing husband’s criminal contempt conviction for refusing to disclose wife’s whereabouts to grand jury and court, where husband’s knowledge of wife’s whereabouts was undisputedly based on marital communication and government made no effort to overcome presumption of confidentiality]....: S. (1951)
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:. . that it was executed with testamentary intent. The testator must 9 have intended, by the particular instrument offered for probate, to make a revocable disposition of his property to take effect upon his death.” (Estate of Sargavak (1950) 35 Cal.2d 93 , 95.) The 2018 document meets neither the Probate Code’s definition of “instrument” nor the Supreme Court’s conception of “testamentary intent.” It names no beneficiary. It does not transfer or dispose of any property upon Layla’s death. 4 Second, the 2018 document was not witnessed by two persons. The Probate: The testator must 9 have intended, by the particular instrument offered for probate, to make a revocable disposition of his property to take effect upon his death.” (Estate of Sargavak (1950) 35 Cal.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:health disorder. (§ 5350.) Proposed conservatees have the right to a jury trial to determine whether they are gravely disabled. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1).) The determination must be unanimous and upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244 , 248 (Early); Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet).) If grave disability is found, the court appoints a conservator (§ 5350), imposes disabilities on the conservatee as needed (§ 5357), and determines the least restrictive appropriate placement (§ 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A))....: vocational, and social condition, and information obtained from the person’s family members, close friends, social worker, or principal therapist.” (§ 5354, subd. (a).) After this investigation...
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O.C. v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:a notice of appeal from the probate court’s SIJ findings. To ensure O.C. obtains appellate review of the probate court’s findings, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 , 400-401; see Eddie E. v. Superior Court (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 622, 628 (Eddie E.) [petition for writ relief is the remedy for a superior court’s denial of a minor immigrant’s request for SIJ findings].) DISCUSSION Our analysis involves the application of law to undisputed facts; accordingly, our review is: Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400-401; see Eddie E. v.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:“special proceedings” set forth in the Advisory Committee Comment. “It is well established that statutes must be given reasonable construction that conforms to the apparent purpose and intention of the law makers [citations]…. [Citations.]” (Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616 , 624.) The Advisory Committee Comment specifically limits the meaning of special proceedings of a civil nature to “include all proceedings in title 3 of the code, including mandamus actions under §§ 1085, 1088.5, and 1094....: State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 624.) The Advisory Committee Comment specifically limits the meaning of special proceedings of a civil nature to “include all proceedings in title 3 of the co...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:It did not order that only the APN be published. Second, a trial court has the inherent “ability, on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 , 1107; see also id. at pp. 1100-1101, 1103, 1105.) Third, the trial court issued the order for publication ex parte. Indeed, Humphrey’s ex parte application did not expressly request an order that only the APN be published. Rather, Humphrey’s counsel slipped this provision into the proposed order, and the: Goel (2005) ; see also id. at pp. 1100-1101, 1103, 1105.) Third, the trial court issued the order for publication ex parte.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:great a risk of arbitrary deprivation if trial courts were charged with projecting the likelihood of punitive damages recovery. There are too many nuances to the multi-pronged test governing punitive damages (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159 , 1171–1172) to expect that a provisional evaluation of that issue can be done in an accurate and reliable way in an attachment proceeding. While it is true that the Elder Abuse Act must be broadly construed in favor of elders, the paramount importance of ensuring that the Attachment Law: Holding Co., Inc. (2005) –1172) to expect that a provisional evaluation of that issue can be done in an accurate and reliable way in an attachment proceeding.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:tortfeasor to “ ‘fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.’ ” [Citation.]’ (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159 , 1171 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 113 P.3d 63] (Simon).)” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 712 (Roby).) “In State Farm, the high court articulated ‘three guideposts’ for courts reviewing punitive damages: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential: Holding Co., Inc. (2005) [29 Cal.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:(Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).) The automatic stay specifically suspends the trial court’s power to “ ‘enforce, vacate or modify’ ” the appealed judgment or order while the appeal is pending. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 , 189.) The purpose of this limit on the trial court’s power—which is fundamental to appellate procedure—“ ‘is to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed: Delfino (2005) .) The purpose of this limit on the trial court’s power—which is fundamental to appellate procedure—“ ‘is to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo unti...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 , 189 (Varian) [discussing Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a)].) In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby” (Code Civ.: Delfino (2005) (Varian) .) In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon the judgment...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:special motion to strike under section 425.16, which is “a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary- judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 , 192.) The statute provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion: Delfino (2005)
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:admissible evidence. (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.) Thus, the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis is a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 , 192.) In this step, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being 9 stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, quoting Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) A plaintiff: Delfino (2005) .) In this step, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ to avoid being 9 stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:conferred by constitutional or statutory law.” (Guardianship of Ariana K., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 701.) In general, article VI, section 10 of 14 the California Constitution confers broad authority on the superior courts. (Donaldson v. National Marine, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 503 , 512; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [except as otherwise provided, “[s]uperior courts have original jurisdiction in all other causes”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10 [a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of: National Marine, Inc. (2005) ; see Cal.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:brought her petition in bad faith. We do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them before. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747 , 761, fn. 4.) We therefore solely consider whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Lynne acted in bad faith when she sought to remove Mildred as the trustee based on the allegation that the trust instruments were forged. We review the trial court’s award of fees: Co. (2005) , fn. 4.) We therefore solely consider whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Lynne acted in bad faith when she sought to remove Mildred as the trustee based on th...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:of the opportunity to present a claim to the court by the fraudulent conduct of another party, as opposed to the moving party’s own negligence. (Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p.1068; City and County of San Francisco v. Cartagena (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1061 , 1067 (Cartagena).) “The clearest examples of extrinsic fraud are cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in ignorance of the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear. [Citation.]” (Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 614–615.) Other examples include “concealment of the existence of a: Cartagena (1995)
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.’ ” (Veiseh v. Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099 , 1104, quoting Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) “The trial court’s finding on the accrual of a cause of action for statute of: Stapp (2019) , quoting Thompson v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:McLaughlin leave to amend “to allege, that the Maleti Respondents are claiming an interest to, have title to or are in possession of the property.” 11 In their opening brief, Attorneys rely on Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1109 (Cuevas-Martinez). There, the court held that a plaintiff could properly assert a malicious prosecution claim that would survive an anti-SLAPP motion if he or she could show that a multiple-theory claim in the underlying action was not supported by probable cause as to at least one of those theories. (Id.: Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) (Cuevas-Martinez).
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.]’ ” (Estate of Pryor, at p. 1471.) “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116 , 128.) “ ‘If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ” (Estate of Pryor, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471.) We also need not “follow the plain meaning of a statute when: Wood (2019) .) “ ‘If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:to whether Braum engaged in, permitted, allowed, or aided the sale or distribution of marijuana at the properties and such conduct constituted an unlawful use in violation of the narcotics abatement law. The with certain conditions.’” (People v. Craine (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 744 , 751.) 15 City maintained that any purported lack of knowledge of the statutory nuisance was irrelevant to the imposition of liability under Health and Safety Code section 11570....: Craine (2019)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:Act (UPAA)] and 2002 is unconscionable at the time of enforcement, the time of execution, or both.” (Hogoboom, et. al. Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (Rutter Group 2021), p. 9-78, § 9:177.4; see also In re Marriage of Miotke (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 849 , 860–861 (Miotke) [noting uncertainty in the law].) Attempting to provide some clarity, we hold, for reasons explained below, that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement: Practice Guide: Family Law (Rutter Group 2021), p. 9-78, § 9:177.4; see also In re Marriage of Miotke (2019) –861 (Miotke) .) Attempting to provide some clarity, we hold, for reasons explained below..
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:references are to the Public Resources 1 Code unless otherwise specified. 1 Opn., at p. 3.) I cannot believe the Legislature meant to reduce that judicial proceeding to “an arid ritual of meaningless form” (Staub v. City of Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313 , 320), making a superior court judge little better than a potted plant. The Statutory Scheme The Act, better known as “AB 939” its enabling legislation (and as it will usually be referred to here), is found at Public Resources Code section 40000 et seq. (Assem. Bill No. 939 (1989–1990: City of Baxley (1958) ), making a superior court judge little better than a potted plant. The Statutory Scheme The Act, better known as “AB 939” its enabling legislation (and as it will usually be ref...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:references are to the Public Resources 1 Code unless otherwise specified. 1 Opn., at p. 3.) I cannot believe the Legislature meant to reduce that judicial proceeding to “an arid ritual of meaningless form” (Staub v. City of Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313 , 320), making a superior court judge little better than a potted plant. The Statutory Scheme The Act, better known as “AB 939” its enabling legislation (and as it will usually be referred to here), is found at Public Resources Code section 40000 et seq. (Assem. Bill No. 939 (1989–1990: City of Baxley (1958) ), making a superior court judge little better than a potted plant. The Statutory Scheme The Act, better known as “AB 939” its enabling legislation (and as it will usually be ref...
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:benefits. Bluth wanted his say in family affairs, including the Trust. These family affairs have been, and continue to be, linked to California. This case differs from a trust dispute decided in the landmark case of Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235 . There, a Pennsylvania resident created a trust in Delaware and named 11 Wilmington Trust Co., of Wilmington, Delaware as the trustee. (Id. at p. 238.) The settlor moved to Florida, where she exercised her power of appointment and eventually died. (Id. at p. 239.) Individuals who stood to benefit: Denckla (1958) .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:affirmed the rejection of a federal contract that incorporated the Reclamation Act's 160-acre limit. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597, 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken (1958) 357 U.S. 275 (Ivanhoe II).) The Court reasoned that the state functioned as a trustee of its domestic waters for the benefit of users, and that under state law, the right to use water could not be limited based on acreage; the Reclamation Act prohibited interference with state law; and the interest of: McCracken (1958)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:affirmed the rejection of a federal contract that incorporated the Reclamation Act's 160-acre limit. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597, 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken (1958) 357 U.S. 275 (Ivanhoe II).) The Court reasoned that the state functioned as a trustee of its domestic waters for the benefit of users, and that under state law, the right to use water could not be limited based on acreage; the Reclamation Act prohibited interference with state law; and the interest of: McCracken (1958)
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:909 request she also pursues an election of remedies theory under “the settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to the prosecution of an appeal therefrom.” (Schubert v. Reich (1950) 36 Cal.2d 298 , 299; see Lee v. Brown (1976) 18 Cal.3d 110, 114.) We grant the request for judicial notice and the motion to augment the record as unopposed, but deny the motion to take additional evidence on appeal. Code of Civil Procedure section 909 motions may be granted only in “exceptional: Reich (1950) 36 Cal.2d 298, 299; see Lee v.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:To rebut the presumption, the opposing party must show that the character of the property was held differently, including by establishing that the property’s character was changed by an agreement or mutual understanding between the spouses. (Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342 , 345-347; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 592, 596.) ‘However, there must be an agreement of some sort; the presumption may not be overcome by testimony about the hidden intention of one spouse, undisclosed to the other spouse at the time of the conveyance.’ (Levine, supra, at p. 705,: King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-347; Estate of Gallio (1995) 33 Cal.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:funds and had no intent to take separate property interests]; Hansford v. Lassar (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 364, 373 (Hansford) [same].) Courts also applied Siberell’s rule at death to give effect to the right of survivorship. (See Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342 , 346 (Socol) [probate case where “a true joint tenancy is created by a conveyance to husband and wife in that form, although the property is purchased with community funds”].) At the same time, courts struggled to reconcile community property presumptions with the incidents of separate property in joint tenancy: King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:and staffed to provide intensive treatment. (§ 5276, 2d par.) These statutes apply only to chapter 2 detentions, however, and not chapter 3’s more lengthy conservatorships. Although habeas corpus relief may be appropriate “in extraordinary circumstances” (In re Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889 , 899), ordinarily the statutory rehearing provisions (§ 5364; see also § 5358.3) and the right to appeal 5 Release is also required at the end of an involuntary detention period, unless the gravely disabled person is certified for an additional 14 or 30 days of intensive treatment, is the: Although habeas corpus relief may be appropriate “in extraordinary circumstances” (In re Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:most favorable to the plaintiff, liberally construing the plaintiff’s submissions while strictly scrutinizing the defendant’s showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in the plaintiff's favor. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843; Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028 , 1037.) B. Legal Malpractice The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are “(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a 26 breach of that duty; (3) a proximate: L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) .) B.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:[or her] complaint and elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be presumed that the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he [or she] can.’ [Citations.]” (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075 , 1091 (Reynolds), overruled on other grounds in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 66.) As the high court stated more emphatically many years ago, an election not to amend after a demurrer to a complaint is sustained with leave to amend results in the plaintiff “ ‘practically confess[ing]: App.4th 379, 384.) 10 The sixth cause of action (easement by estoppel) is discussed separately, post. . 28 “ ‘hen a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint and elects not to do so...
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:had no Indian ancestry, and the trial court found that ICWA did not apply. Mother argues that ICWA is a substantial right, and her counsel may not waive a substantial right without her consent. (Citing In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664 , 678 [attorney not authorized to impair the child’s 9 substantial rights].) Mother states the law correctly, but here the child’s substantial rights are protected. It is not disputed that Mother submitted an ICWA-020 form to the Tohono O’odham Nation. Aida R. requests that we take additional evidence pursuant to: At trial, Mother’s counsel represented that Mother had no Indian ancestry, and the trial court found that ICWA did not apply. Mother argues that ICWA is a substantial right...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:and mitigating factors proven by clear and convincing evidence. Although “we generally accord great weight to the Review Department’s recommendation,” “ ‘we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than recommended by the department.’ ” (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81 , 89–90; see In re Nevill (1985) 39 Cal.3d 729, 735 [rejecting recommendation of suspension and ordering disbarment].) Here, the Review Department’s disciplinary recommendation was based on its finding of three instances of grossly negligent misrepresentation....: Although “we generally accord great weight to the Review Department’s recommendation,” “ ‘we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than recommended by the department.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:above cases, we “should not be diverted by passing statements in Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 362 [(Associated Builders)] or People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005) 36 Cal.4th 971 , 987 [(People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation)], which Circle K may use to try to equate the federal and state standing rules.” In a later section of this opinion, we address Limon’s characterization of the 11 statutory damages provision in the FCRA as “statutory penalties.” 22. Both Associated Builders: El Dorado County (2005) [(People ex rel.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:issue [was] whether the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by adjudicating the liens in the [underlying] action,” not whether the court had fundamental jurisdiction. (Ibid.; see Law Offices of Stanley J. Bell v. Shine, Browne & Diamond (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1011 , 1021-1023 [trial court in an underlying personal injury action had subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order denying a claim under an attorney’s lien, even though contractual liens generally are enforced in an independent action by the attorney against the client].) Nor did the fact the trial court arguably: Shine, Browne & Diamond (1995) -1023 [trial court in an underlying personal injury action had subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order denying a claim under an attorney’s lien...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:is to the client corporation, not to the shareholders individually, even though the legal advice rendered to the corporation may affect the shareholders.’ (Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 692, 704.)” (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1832 , 1842.) Plaintiffs cite to Woods v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 931 (Woods) to support their claim that Barling necessarily represented them when he represented FCP. Woods is distinguishable....: Tracinda Corp. (1995) .) Plaintiffs cite to Woods v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:.’ [Citations.]” (Fuentes v. Berry (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1800, 1808.) In many instances the dismissal “may be an implicit concession that the dismissing party cannot maintain the action and may constitute a decision on the merits.” (Eells v. Rosenblum (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1848 , 1855 (Eells).) But “ ‘[i]t is not enough . . . merely to show that the proceeding was dismissed.’ [Citation.] The reasons for the dismissal of the action must be examined to determine whether the termination reflected on the merits. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) b. Carol Showed Favorable Termination Carol contends: Rosenblum (1995) (Eells).) But “ ‘t is not enough . . . merely to show that the proceeding was dismissed.’ The reasons for the dismissal of the action must be examined to determine whether the termina...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:fail to argue how the circumstances could result in the termination of the probate court’s authority. We are entitled to, and do here, disregard assertions that are unsupported by argument or authority. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142 , 153.) Without any support for their claim that the probate court’s authority was limited by the circumstances, Richard and Brown’s cross-appeal collapses into a complaint that the probate court should not have ordered Brown to pay expenses; not that it could not make such an order. Considering such an: Second, they cite no cases that a probate court loses its sanction and expense award authority under rule 2.30 under any 35 circumstances.16 Third, they fail to argue how the circumstances could resul...
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:fault. The fact that “the fault lies with the client and not the attorney” militates against using the inherent authority to dismiss. (Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 799; cf. United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142 , 158 [trial court could properly sanction both client and attorney when there was “joint misconduct”].) Harber was not at the trial setting conference at which the trial court made the order; there is no indication that it was ever personally served on her. Even if she were 8 aware: Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) .) Harber was not at the trial setting conference at which the trial court made the order...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:the employee suffered emotional distress exceeding that suffered by “any” employee who was lawfully terminated. Appellants do not support this suggestion with cogent argument or legal authority. They have forfeited this claim. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142 , 146 (United Grand) [“ ‘appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record’ ”]....: Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) (United Grand) .) Certainly...
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:The appellant, Sarah Johnson, challenges the trial court's order appointing a successor administrator. DISCUSSION I. Standing to Challenge Appointment The Probate Code provides specific requirements for challenging the appointment of an estate administrator. As stated in Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86 , 93, "a person must have a direct pecuniary interest in the estate to have standing to object to the appointment of an administrator." Similarly, in Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App....: As stated in Estate of Sapp , 93, "a person must have a direct pecuniary interest in the estate to have standing to object to the appointment of an administrator
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:post bond. A more detailed ruling followed in the court’s written order. It began by acknowledging that as the party seeking her removal, Ali bore the burden of proving grounds for removing Janine as administrator. (See Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86 , 103 (Sapp).) Noting that section 8402, subdivision (a)(4) required that an administrator be a “resident of the United States,” the court turned to case law to construe that phrase. More recent cases were not helpful because nonresidency was conceded. (See Estate of Heath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 396, 401 (Heath): It began by acknowledging that as the party seeking her removal, Ali bore the burden of proving grounds for removing Janine as administrator. (See Estate of Sapp (2019) (Sapp).
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:56 Cal.App.4th 713, 720) and, under the substantial evidence standard, our role is circumscribed. We cannot reweigh the evidence; we determine only if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86 , 104.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).) 20 _________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P.J. WE CONCUR: _________________________ Petrou, J. _________________________ Jackson, J. A157962 21 EYFORD et al. v....: We cannot reweigh the evidence; we determine only if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. (Estate of Sapp (2019) .
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:164 Cal.App.4th 469, 476.) Michael and Joseph had an opportunity to challenge that order in their appeal from the alternative decree, but they dismissed the appeal, making that order final. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 913; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86 , 100; Patchett v. Bergamot Station, Ltd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396; Schrage I, supra, B288478.) Nevertheless, Michael and Joseph can challenge it in this appeal if it is a void order, because a party may collaterally attack a void judgment or order at any time. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005): Proc., § 913; Estate of Sapp (2019) ; Patchett v.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:probate court’s historic lack of power to determine claims adverse to the properties of an estate when asserted by a stranger to the estate, that is, a person not in privity with the probate proceeding. In Estate of Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 672 , the Supreme Court noted: “It is established law ‘That the probate court has no jurisdiction to determine adverse claims to the properties of an estate in course of administration before it when asserted by a stranger to said estate . . . [citation],’ or ‘to try the question of: In Estate of Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 672
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:alterations or forgeries”]; Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. of Riverside Cty. v. Kastorff (1960) 54 Cal.2d 380, 388 [“inadvertent clerical error of omitting” cost of plumbing from a bid]; M. F. Kemper Const. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1951) 37 Cal.2d 696 , 702 [construction company’s negligence in calculating total in preparing bid].) More fundamentally, Donovan did not purport to overrule Casey and other cases concluding that the failure to read a contract generally constitutes neglect of a legal duty under section 1577. And Donovan expressly stated section 157 of the Restatement: City of Los Angeles (1951) 37 Cal.2d 696, 702 .) More fundamentally, Donovan did not purport to overrule Casey...
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:investigating an alleged violation of a building ordinance, a deputy fire marshal charged with investigating fires, and an assistant city engineer whose duties include the investigation of particular crimes. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 854-855; White v. Towers (1951) 37 Cal.2d 727 , 730-732.) When determining whether a person is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, courts look at the nature of the duty performed to determine whether the act is a 10 judicial act, not the name or classification of the person who performed it. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at: Towers (1951) 37 Cal.2d 727, 730-732.) When determining whether a person is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, courts look at the nature of the duty performed to determine whether the ac...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Motions to Strike A SLAPP suit is one in which a plaintiff “seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. [Citation.]” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 , 1055.) SLAPP suits may be disposed of summarily by a special motion to strike under section 425.16, which is “a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary- judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino: Cohen (2006) .) SLAPP suits may be disposed of summarily by a special motion to strike under section 425.16, which is “a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a sum...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from protected activity, which is defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 , 1056.) Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the “burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396....: Cohen (2006)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:the contract is immaterial”].) We review the court’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence and review legal conclusions 34 de novo. (Weddington Productions, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169 , 1175.) Christine contends that the “purported settlement” the court enforced “ ‘was different from the terms of the parties’ stipulated settlement agreement.’ ” She discusses 10 terms of the settlement agreement, which she argues were changed, and describes 15 terms that appear only in the second GAL agreement....: State Personnel Bd. (2006) .) Christine contends that the “purported settlement” the court enforced “ ‘was different from the terms of the parties’ stipulated settlement agreement.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:rejected Michael and Joseph’s argument the alternative decree was void for lack of jurisdiction because 26 trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by including the UCNP entities in the alternative decree. (See Kristine H. v. Lisa R. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 156 , 166 [“Given that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the parentage of the unborn child, and that [the plaintiff] invoked that jurisdiction, stipulated to the issuance of a judgment, and enjoyed the benefits of that judgment for nearly two years, it would be unfair both to [the: 26 trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by including the UCNP entities in the alternative decree. (See Kristine H. v. Lisa R. (2005) [“Given that the court had subject matter jurisdiction t...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:reference or depend on prior versions. (See Arcadia, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 [extension of growth control ordinance not intended to be permanent was "new burden" and could be challenged]; Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005) 37 Cal.4th 685 , 703 [reenactment that extended duration of fee schedule supported cause of action; change was significant when considered with local agency's duties, and contrary result would render later reenactments immune to challenge].) To establish that the 2013 EDP and those that preceded it are the same for purposes of its: City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:reference or depend on prior versions. (See Arcadia, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 [extension of growth control ordinance not intended to be permanent was "new burden" and could be challenged]; Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005) 37 Cal.4th 685 , 703 [reenactment that extended duration of fee schedule supported cause of action; change was significant when considered with local agency's duties, and contrary result would render later reenactments immune to challenge].) To establish that the 2013 EDP and those that preceded it are the same for purposes of its: City of Rancho Cucamonga (2005)
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:Assem. Select Com. on Revision of the Nonprofit Corp. Code, 5 Assem. J. (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 27, 1979, p. 9004; 4 Sen.J. (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) p. 7007; see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707 , 716 [“When the Legislature has expressly declared its intent, we must accept the declaration.”].) We begin, however, with Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750 (Holt) in which the Supreme Court concluded that minority directors or trustees of a charitable corporation could maintain 25: Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) .) We begin, however, with Holt v.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:Constitution contains similar protections. Article I, section 17, prohibits ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ and ‘excessive fines;’ article I, section 7, prohibits the taking of property ‘without due process of law.’” (People ex rel Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707 , 727–728 (R.J. Reynolds).) “The leading United States Supreme Court case on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines is [Bajakajian, supra,] 524 U.S. 321 . . . , which involved a federal statute (31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)) requiring any person transporting more than $10,000 out of the United States: Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) –728 (R.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:can receive prompt, appropriate treatment tailored to their individual condition and circumstances. Conservatorship of Davis, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 313, Conservatorship of Walker, supra, 196 to show the offender’s mental state, which is a required element. (See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733 , 740–742.) 23 Conservatorship of K.P. Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. Cal.App.3d 1082, and Conservatorship of Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 542 are therefore disapproved to the extent they are inconsistent with the decision here. D....: Smith (2005) –742.) 23 Conservatorship of K.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:he returned to El Salvador. To be sure, a child’s age may be relevant to the best interest determination. (See In re 31 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 947 , 961 [listing “the child’s age” as relevant factor in custody-related best interest analysis]; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(2)(ii) (2022) [clarifying that “[n]othing in this part should be construed as altering the standards for best interest determinations that juvenile court judges routinely apply under relevant State law”].) However, the probate court’s: To be sure, a child’s age may be relevant to the best interest determination. (See In re 31 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:result in invalidation of certain of the will’s provisions.”].) Rather than thwarting the donor’s intent, a petition for construction or reformation “ ‘serves to ascertain and enforce that intent.’ ” (Donkin, at p. 434; see also Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248 , 258–259 [declaratory relief claims for construction of trust did not violate no contest clause because they sought “to ascertain the true meaning of the trustors’ intent rather than to thwart their wishes in creating the Trust”].) To that end, section 15409, subdivision (a) provides that, “[o]n petition by a: Lenzi (1995)
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:(See Brock, supra, 33 Cal.2d a p. 885.) in trusts cannot be used to avoid this section because that would undermine the Legislature’s intent to deter persons from procuring trust benefits through fraud or undue influence. (Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248 , 256.) Similarly, where a person fraudulently induces a settlor to amend a trust so that it transfers all of the settlor’s estate to that person and disinherits all prior beneficiaries, it would undermine the public interest if a court were to rule that those valid beneficiaries had no standing: Lenzi (1995) .) Similarly, where a person fraudulently induces a settlor to amend a trust so that it transfers all of the settlor’s estate to that person and disinherits all prior beneficiaries...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:benefits of section 27 425.16.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115.) Further, “[t]here is no requirement that the writing or speech be promulgated directly to the official body.” (Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8 , 17, italics omitted.) There is no dispute that Kenton’s libel claim was based on the email Hilja sent to an attorney friend seeking a referral for a probate attorney to represent her in proceedings against her brother. Indeed, a few months after sending the email, Hilja had in fact: Superior Court (1995) , italics omitted.) There is no dispute that Kenton’s libel claim was based on the email Hilja sent to an attorney friend seeking a referral for a probate attorney to represent h...
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:the proposition that she cannot recover emotional distress damages absent a legal entitlement to use the sperm for posthumous conception. Plaintiff misconstrues the burden on appeal, which requires her, not defendants, to show error. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270 , 277 [appealed judgment presumed correct, and appellant has burden to overcome that presumption].) Plaintiff argues that the question of her entitlement to use the sperm is not at issue in this case: “At issue here is not an attempt to use the sperm but, rather, to recover damages for: First Student, Inc. (2019)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292 , 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alexis S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 48, 54;: App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) ; T.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law” that we also review de novo. (People v. Jacobo (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32 , 42.) This 5“The settlor is the person creating the trust. The trustee holds the property in trust for the beneficiary.” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Trusts, § 31, p. 643; see Rest.3d Trusts, § 3.) 4 rule applies equally to review of local ordinances. (Van: Jacobo (2019) .) This 5“The settlor is the person creating the trust.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 535-536 [in light of reversal of court’s order denying parent’s section 388 petition, the court’s subsequent order terminating parental rights must also be vacated]; see generally California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 800 , 813). We recognize that this will further delay already delayed proceedings. While unfortunate, that is the inevitable consequence of proceeding in a manner that violated Patricia’s fundamental rights. DISPOSITION The court’s March 12, 2020 order appointing a guardian ad litem for Patricia is reversed....: App.4th 519, 535-536 ...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:manner that would reduce water levels]; U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 725, 729- 730, 752-753 [upholding compensation to riparian owners who depended on river overflow, after construction of Friant Dam ended overflow]; Dugan v. Rank (1963) 372 U.S. 609 , 613, 625-626 [downstream water rights holders challenged upstream impounding from Friant Dam construction; if available, remedy would be damages based on market value before and after taking]; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. U.S. (2001) 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314-315, 318-320 [projects with government contracts for water 91: Rank (1963) , 625-626 ; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:manner that would reduce water levels]; U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 725, 729- 730, 752-753 [upholding compensation to riparian owners who depended on river overflow, after construction of Friant Dam ended overflow]; Dugan v. Rank (1963) 372 U.S. 609 , 613, 625-626 [downstream water rights holders challenged upstream impounding from Friant Dam construction; if available, remedy would be damages based on market value before and after taking]; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. U.S. (2001) 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314-315, 318-320 [projects with government contracts for water 91: Rank (1963) , 625-626 ; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:parties' arguments regarding the farmers' rights, and explain how the superior court erred in determining them. 1. Additional background Efforts to divert Colorado River water, and disputes regarding its use, began well over a century ago. (Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546 , 552-562 (Arizona I).) This history was marked by "the inability of local groups or individual States to deal with these enormous problems; the continued failure of the States to agree on how to conserve and divide the waters; and the ultimate action by Congress at the request of the: California (1963)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:parties' arguments regarding the farmers' rights, and explain how the superior court erred in determining them. 1. Additional background Efforts to divert Colorado River water, and disputes regarding its use, began well over a century ago. (Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546 , 552-562 (Arizona I).) This history was marked by "the inability of local groups or individual States to deal with these enormous problems; the continued failure of the States to agree on how to conserve and divide the waters; and the ultimate action by Congress at the request of the: California (1963)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:law, which right has been exercised by the actual diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a defined area of land or to definite municipal or industrial works. . . ." (Arizona v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 340 , 341 (Arizona II).) The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979, the Court entered a decree setting forth the present perfected rights. (Arizona v. California (1979) 15 439 U.S. 419 (Arizona III).) The: California (1964) (Arizona II).) The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:law, which right has been exercised by the actual diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a defined area of land or to definite municipal or industrial works. . . ." (Arizona v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 340 , 341 (Arizona II).) The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979, the Court entered a decree setting forth the present perfected rights. (Arizona v. California (1979) 15 439 U.S. 419 (Arizona III).) The: California (1964) (Arizona II).) The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:that “Mark’s future interest as a contingent remainder beneficiary also came into existence when McKie Sr. died” and that “Mark’s interest could not be defeated by McKie Jr.’s forfeiture of his intermediate or precedent interest,” citing Estate of Lefranc (1952) 38 Cal.2d 289 , 297. 9 But, the court found, “McKie Jr. received his interest in the trust” “[b]y way of the Settlement Agreement,” and “because McKie Jr. received his interest under the trust while he was alive (before he predeceased Yvonne), Mark’s contingent remainder interest did not vest.” The court next observed,: The court further recognized that “Mark’s future interest as a contingent remainder beneficiary also came into existence when McKie Sr. died” and that “Mark’s interest could not be defeated by McKie J...
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Breslin v. Breslin
Context from opinion:dramatically after mediation, when Breslin found a document—Exhibit A—that confirmed the Pacific parties’ unqualified right to inherit funds from Kirchner. 2. A charitable gift must be carried into effect if it “can possibly be made good.” (Estate of Tarrant (1951) 38 Cal.2d 42 , 46.) The majority’s newfound requirement that a party participate in mediation before it can inherit ignores this command. It will reduce the number of gifts that “can possibly be made good” by encouraging parties to send out mediation notices whenever they desire to eliminate gifts to beneficiaries that don’t: And unlike the situation in Smith, the facts here changed dramatically after mediation, when Breslin found a document—Exhibit A—that confirmed the Pacific parties’ unqualified right to inherit funds f...
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:quoting Rest.2d Trusts, § 2, p. 6.) When property is held in trust, “ ‘there is always a divided ownership of property,’ ” generally with the trustee holding legal title and the beneficiary holding equitable title. (Gonsalves v. Hodgson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 91 , 98; Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1475; Galdjie, at p. 1343; Herrick v. State of California (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 156, 161; see Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1319.) Furthermore, when settlors transfer property to a revocable living trust, there is: Hodgson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 91, 98; Beyer v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:c. Excerpts from the transcript of Limon’s deposition in the federal action. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a); Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 375 [judicial notice of facts stated in deposition testimony 3. 38 Cal.4th 1 , 6.) The facts recited below are alleged in Limon’s complaint, or are judicially noticeable. We also set forth some of Limon’s related contentions for context. However, we do not assume the truth of those contentions. (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300–301.) Circle K: App.3d 369, 375 [judicial notice of facts stated in deposition testimony 3. .) The facts recited below are alleged in Limon’s complaint, or are judicially noticeable.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:noticed matters. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1 , 6.) We determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Committee for Green Foothills, supra, at p. 42.) We read the court interpreted its order differently, expressing consternation that Ring already had leave to file the complaint she: City of Berkeley (2006)
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:which was added in 2008 (Stats. 2008, ch. 53, § 1), presumably in response to the Supreme Court’s recognition that California had not yet “adopted a ‘harmless error’ provision similar to Uniform Probate Code section 2-503.” (Estate of Saueressig (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1045 , 1053.) To be sure, the 2008 amendment gives effect to an unwitnessed will “if the proponent of the will establishes by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the testator signed the will, the testator intended the will to 4 We are unpersuaded by Robert’s citation to “thelawdictionary.org”: 9 have intended, by the particular instrument offered for probate, to make a revocable disposition of his property to take effect upon his death.” (Estate of Sargavak (1950) 35 Cal.2d 93...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:mean “employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable”]; San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653 , 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of: City and County of San Francisco (2006) , 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . .
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:mean “employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable”]; San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653 , 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of: City and County of San Francisco (2006) , 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . .
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:representing the second client. (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283; see Hazard and Hodes, The Art of Lawyering (3d ed. 2000 & 2005-2 supp.) § 13.5, pp. 13-12—13-13.)” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839 , 846-847 (Cobra Solutions)....: Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006)
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:176 A.3d at p. 141, fn. 9.)4 Third, section 155 provides that the superior court “shall issue” the findings if “there is evidence to support” them. (§ 155, subd. (b)(1).) This language imposes a mandatory duty. (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858 , 869 [“ ‘shall’ ” is presumptively “mandatory and not permissive”].) When the facts a petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence support SIJ predicate findings, the superior court must issue these findings; it has no discretion to deny the petition. (See In re Scarlett V. (2021) 72: Standish (2006) .) When the facts a petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence support SIJ predicate findings, the superior court must issue these findings...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:favorable termination which will support an action for malicious prosecution. [Citation.] ‘In most cases, a voluntary unilateral dismissal is considered a termination in favor of the defendant in the underlying action . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Fuentes v. Berry (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1800 , 1808.) In many instances the dismissal “may be an implicit concession that the dismissing party cannot maintain the action and may constitute a decision on the merits.” (Eells v. Rosenblum (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855 (Eells).) But “ ‘[i]t is not enough . . . merely to show that: Berry (1995) .) In many instances the dismissal “may be an implicit concession that the dismissing party cannot maintain the action and may constitute a decision on the merits.” (Eells v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219–1220 (Stevenson Real Estate).) 19 “Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer, the standard of review is the same.” (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182 , 187.) Thus, “[w]e independently review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. [Citation.] In doing so, we accept as true the plaintiff’s factual allegations and construe them liberally. [Citation.] If the trial court’s ruling: State of California (1995)
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Sachs v. Sachs
Context from opinion:55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [failure to raise the point in the trial court waived right to challenge on appeal].) Moreover, we will not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief. (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307 , 322.) 9 DISPOSITION The judgment (order granting petition for instructions) is affirmed. Benita shall recover her costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. TANGEMAN, J. We concur: GILBERT, P. J. PERREN, J. 10 Colleen K. Sterne, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara ______________________________ The Stone Law Group, Kenneth H.: CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) .) 9 DISPOSITION The judgment (order granting petition for instructions) is affirmed.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:substantive law.” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605; City of Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488, 504; Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, 765; Ventura County Ry. Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 878 , 880; Gantman v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1566; Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 906; Powers v. Ashton (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 787.) Code of Civil Procedure, section 367 undoubtedly relates to standing in that it largely: Hadley Auto Transport (1995) ; Gantman v.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:A trial court has discretion to appoint counsel in a civil matter where an indigent prisoner is litigating to protect his or her personal or property rights. (Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197, 203–204; Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453 , 458.) Assuming, without deciding, that an appellate court has similar discretion, we conclude Gann’s personal and property rights are unaffected by this litigation. Family visitation is a privilege, not a right. (§ 3177, subd. (b); see In re Cummings (1982) 30 Cal.3d 870, 873.) Accordingly, the motion is denied.: Ogbuehi (2019) .) Assuming, without deciding, that an appellate court has similar discretion, we conclude Gann’s personal and property rights are unaffected by this litigation.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:de novo the trial court’s ruling Leonard 33 had standing to maintain his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty as an individual claim, rather than a derivative claim. (See A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677 , 687 [standing is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review]; Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1174 [same].) 2. Leonard Sought and Recovered Damages for Injuries to the Sage Automotive Group Leonard alleged Michael and: GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) ; Citizens for Amending Proposition L v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276 , 285-286.) Other findings requiring clear and convincing proof include whether a civil defendant is guilty of the “oppression, fraud, or malice” that allows for the imposition of punitive damages (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a)), whether a conservator can withdraw life-sustaining care from a conservatee (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th: S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) -286.) Other findings requiring clear and convincing proof include whether a civil defendant is guilty of the “oppression, fraud...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice. (See James F., at p. 911, fn. 1 [“[b]ecause we did not grant review on the appropriate harmless error standard and the parties have not briefed it, we do not address that issue here”].) While we are: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v.
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 234, 241. The scope of these duties was thoroughly examined in Newman v. Casey (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 456, 462. The United States Supreme Court addressed similar issues in a federal context in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 , 461 (1967), though California law governs here. III. Standard of Review We review the trial court's appointment decision for abuse of discretion. Bailey v. Bailey (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 789, 795. This standard is well-established. See also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2019) Appeal, § 364, p. 412. DISPOSITION: Estate of Bosch, , 461 , though California law governs here
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:however, the order granting the motion to quash and the order setting aside the default are inextricably interwoven. Under these circumstances, we have jurisdiction to review and, if necessary, to reverse both. (See American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210 , 216-218; see, e.g., Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1283 [reversal of judgment necessarily reversed award of attorney fees, even though award of fees was separately appealable and appellant did not appeal from it].) III BEWLEY AS A PARTY TO THIS APPEAL Bewley argues that he is not: Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 216-218; see, e.g., Allen v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Adequately Pled Estoppel An agreement for a finder’s fee ordinarily must be in writing to be enforceable. This is because such agreements are subject to the statute of frauds, Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(4). (Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18 , 27 (Tenzer).) The statute of frauds applies to all forms of promises and agreements falling within its ambit, whether express or implied. (Beard v. Melvin (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 421, 426 [“ ‘Whatever the form of the action may be, if the proof of a promise or contract within the: Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 27 (Tenzer).) The statute of frauds applies to all forms of promises and agreements falling within its ambit, whether express or implied. (Beard v.
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:Appointment of Counsel in connection with this appeal. A trial court has discretion to appoint counsel in a civil matter where an indigent prisoner is litigating to protect his or her personal or property rights. (Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197 , 203–204; Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 458.) Assuming, without deciding, that an appellate court has similar discretion, we conclude Gann’s personal and property rights are unaffected by this litigation. Family visitation is a privilege, not a right. (§ 3177, subd. (b); see In re Cummings (1982) 30: Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197, 203–204; Smith v.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:role in the Fellowship, and had never been part of the World Service Conference. World Services charged Autonomous Region was merely the project of “certain dissident individuals.” These factual assertions are improper in a demurrer. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318 (Blank).) Autonomous Region opposed the demurrer. For the first time, Autonomous Region invoked section 15800, which grants standing to any entity that possesses the power of revocation. Autonomous Region argued the trust has not one but many settlors, Autonomous Region is one of them, and thus it has: World Services charged Autonomous Region was merely the project of “certain dissident individuals.” These factual assertions are improper in a demurrer. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:for judgment on the pleadings. (See Foster v. Sexton, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025.) Accordingly, leave to amend should be granted if “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318.) The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility of curing the defect. (Ibid.) “ ‘To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.” [Citation.] ...: Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility of curing the defect. (Ibid.) “ ‘To satisfy that burden on appeal...
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034 quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318.) “Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment. The plaintiff 16 bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (Novartis, at p. 162.) “ ‘ “The question of standing to sue is: Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:provisions of the Trust, and she attached the referenced Third Amendment/Restatement and Fourth Amendment to her petition. The trustee submitted a complete copy of the operative Trust instruments signed by O’Brian that contain additional language in Article Two omitted 3 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318 (Blank); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238, 240.) We treat as true “ ‘all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” (Blank, at p. 318.) 1. The Trust The Trust allocates specific dollar: The trustee submitted a complete copy of the operative Trust instruments signed by O’Brian that contain additional language in Article Two omitted 3 39 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318 (Blank).) 83 3. Analysis a. Breach of fiduciary duty claim " 'The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.' " (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo: Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) 83 3.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff." (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 , 318 (Blank).) 83 3. Analysis a. Breach of fiduciary duty claim " 'The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach.' " (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo: Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) 83 3.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:Although “we generally accord great weight to the Review Department’s recommendation,” “ ‘we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than recommended by the department.’ ” (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 89–90; see In re Nevill (1985) 39 Cal.3d 729 , 735 [rejecting recommendation of suspension and ordering disbarment].) Here, the Review Department’s disciplinary recommendation was based on its finding of three instances of grossly negligent misrepresentation. We have found Bradshaw 30 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J....: Although “we generally accord great weight to the Review Department’s recommendation,” “ ‘we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than recommended by the department.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:that spouses do not understand what effect, if any, joint tenancy title has on the characterization of property purchased with community funds. (See In re Marriage of Buol 41 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751 , 762–763; Schindler, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at p. 601; ante, at pp. 10–11.) If anything, we have observed that the 1965 enactment of the special community property presumption applicable at divorce had the effect of “more closely matching the intent and assumptions of most spouses who acquire and hold their: (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 762–763; Schindler, supra, 126 Cal.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:personal jury waiver under the SVPA. “‘[W]hen, as here, the Legislature undertakes to amend a statute which has been the subject of judicial construction’ ‘it is presumed that the Legislature was fully cognizant of such construction.’” (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070 , 1087-1088; accord, People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1424 [“It is a settled principle of statutory construction that the Legislature ‘“is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation....: Garcia (2006) -1088; accord, People v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:is to discern the Legislature’s intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164 , 1190.) If the words are clear and unambiguous, their plain meaning governs. (Ibid.; accord, Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.) “[W]e have no power to rewrite the statute to make it conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed.” (County of Santa Clara: One2One Learning Foundation (2006) .) If the words are clear and unambiguous, their plain meaning governs. (Ibid.; accord, Murphy v.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:entered and not just on the date the complaint is filed. ‘[C]ontentions based on a lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges and may be raised at any time in the proceeding.’ ” (Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223 , 232–233.) “A plaintiff may lose standing even where an actual controversy originally existed ‘but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist.’ ” (Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903, 916–917 (Wolf).) B. Analysis Turner alleges she has standing to maintain her causes: Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) –233.) “A plaintiff may lose standing even where an actual controversy originally existed ‘but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist.’ ” (Wolf v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260 , 269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) In performing our de novo review, we “ ‘conduct[] an independent review of the entire record. [Citations.]’ ” (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 672.) “[O]ur review is conducted in the same manner as the trial court in considering an anti-SLAPP: Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) , fn. 3 (Soukup).) In performing our de novo review, we “ ‘conduct an independent review of the entire record. ’ ” (Paulus v.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) In this step, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being 9 stricken as a SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260 , 291, quoting Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) A plaintiff prevails in the second step by demonstrating that “ ‘the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff: Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) , quoting Navellier v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:also concluded “Layla was not vulnerable . . . to the point where Anush . . . unduly influenced her in connection with the 2006 will.” The court 6 Robert does not argue any presumption applied. (Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794 , 800 [common law presumption]; Rice v. Clark, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 96–97 [statutory presumption section 21380 predecessor].) 13 also noted “very credible evidence indicating that around the time Layla wrote the 2006 will, she was able to appropriately participate in court, including multiple hours of depositions and meetings.”: The trial court found it “true that in 2006 Layla was emotionally distressed,” but also concluded “Layla was not vulnerable . . . to the point where Anush . . .
- Clark v. Smith : A revocable inter vivos trust is designed to keep its assets out of probate; property transferred to the trust is not subject to probate administration after the settlor’s death.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1812– 1813.) As we previously discussed, however, a trust itself cannot hold any interest in property. 11 unified management of the property of a surviving spouse and a decedent.” (Ibid.; see Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578 , 1582–1583.) The unique status of a trustee who is also settlor and beneficiary of a revocable living trust puts to rest the tenants’ concerns about the ramifications of interpreting the term “landlord” to include such a trustee. The tenants argue that allowing trustees to qualify as landlords “would create: Langholz (1995)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:ad litem’s petition to approve a settlement of the ward’s claims, a court must determine whether it is reasonable and in the minor’s best interest. (See Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338; Scruton v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596 , 1607 (Scruton); Espericueta v. Shewry (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 615, 626; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950 [petition for approval of a minor’s compromise “must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise”].) We review the probate court’s ruling: Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) (Scruton); Espericueta v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:inspect company records precluded him from discharging his fiduciary duty or attempting to enforce his inspection rights under section 1601 or 1602. (See generally Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903, 916; Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1844 , 1856.) 39 make him whole created an individual injury, the court awarded Leonard damages based on the overall diminution in value to the Sage Automotive Group, not the amount Michael and Joseph owed Leonard from funds used to start a separately owned venture. Second, Leonard argues we should follow: Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc. (1995)
- Conservatorship of R.J. : An issue that lacks a cognizable legal argument or sufficient factual/legal analysis is deemed abandoned/forfeited, and the appellate court need not consider it.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:alternatives to a conservatorship that it considered. “Because such express findings are not required, we presume the court followed the law in making its determination [citation], including a consideration of [less restrictive alternatives].” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691 , 698-699; see also Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563 [“it is presumed that the 14 court followed the law. . . . The mere fact that the court did not explicitly refer to [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 203.5(e), when the statute contains: Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) -699; see also Wilson v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:error here either. 15 We note there is split in the appellate precedent as to whether, in a financial elder abuse action, statutory penalties under Probate Code section 859 require a predicate showing of bad faith (Levin v. Winston-Levin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1025 , 1035–1036) or merely undue influence without any additional showing of heightened culpability (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1130)....: Winston-Levin (2019) –1036) or merely undue influence without any additional showing of heightened culpability (Keading v.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:faith finding was necessary for double damages when liability was premised on the third category of conduct, 18 that is, when property had been taken through elder or dependent adult financial abuse. (Id. at pp. 1197–1198.) Levin v. Winston-Levin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1025 (Levin) concluded otherwise, stating, “We do not believe the Legislature intended to provide double damages for undue influence without bad faith.” (Id. at p. 1036.) We respectfully disagree with Levin’s reasoning. First, Levin based its conclusion on the language “by the use of undue influence in bad faith.” (Ibid.) But: Winston-Levin (2019) (Levin) concluded otherwise, stating, “We do not believe the Legislature intended to provide double damages for undue influence without bad faith.” (Id. at p. 1036.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:use Aaron’s stored sperm for conception. Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend the SAC to add further allegations establishing Aaron’s intent, nor has she identified any additional allegations she might add. (Churchman v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 246 , 252 [it is plaintiff’s burden to show how amendment can cure defects in complaint].) Plaintiff cites Matter of Zhu (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2019) 64 Misc.3d 280 (Zhu), a ruling by a New York trial court allowing the parents of a West Point cadet to extract his sperm after he was declared: Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2019) .) Plaintiff cites Matter of Zhu (N.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:the appellate process. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142, fn. 2 (John L.).) The Court of Appeal concluded the issue K.P. raises is capable of repetition but likely to evade review. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 254 , 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 709.) We agree and elect to decide this otherwise moot appeal. 5 Conservatorship of K.P. Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. placement services by a conservatorship program” (id., subd. (e)). The Act defines persons as “: P. (2019) , fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.
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Logan v. Country Oaks Partners
Context from opinion:Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center, 4 The arbitration agreement states: “The parties to this Arbitration Agreement acknowledge and agree that the Admission Agreement and this Arbitration Agreement evidence a transaction in interstate commerce governed by the [FAA].” 5 LLC (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 311 , 317 [legal conclusions underlying a trial court’s denial of a petition to compel arbitration are reviewed de novo].) B....: Bartlett Care Center, 4 The arbitration agreement states: “The parties to this Arbitration Agreement acknowledge and agree that the Admission Agreement...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:statute provides that the court “may assess” fees, but is not required to do so. (Corp. Code, § 16701, subd. (i).) Courts construing comparable statutory language have reached the same conclusion. (See, e.g., Bustos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 369 , 381 [“[Civil Code s]ection 2924.12, subdivision (h) merely authorizes a trial court to award attorney fees and costs to a prevailing borrower. Such an award is discretionary, not mandatory.”].)18 The Legislature knows how to adopt mandatory fee shifting statutes when it desires. For example, the California Public Records Act: A. (2019) ection 2924.12, subdivision (h) merely authorizes a trial court to award attorney fees and costs to a prevailing borrower.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:“applies to questions of statutory construction [citation] and to the interpretation of written instruments, including a trust instrument, unless the interpretation depends on the competence or credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict in that evidence.” (Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 , 551 (Pena); Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.) “The paramount rule in construing [a trust] . . . instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.” (Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 812.) The Probate Code governs trust revocation: Dey (2019) (Pena); Burch v. George (1994) .) “The paramount rule in construing . . . instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.” (Brown v.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:situation in King, where the trust instrument did distinguish between methods for revocation and modification and imposed an arguably more stringent requirement on modification. The circumstances here are materially different. This appeal is also distinguishable from Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 , 552, where the court cited King and found that the method of amendment described in the trust instrument governed. The method of amendment described in the trust instrument was the same as the statutory method under the circumstances, so the issue was not clearly presented. (Compare id....: Dey (2019) , where the court cited King and found that the method of amendment described in the trust instrument governed.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.) “The determination of special appearance versus general appearance is based on the ‘character of the relief sought,’ not by statements of intention of the party. [Citation.]” (In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583 , 593.) “‘“What is determinative is whether [the] defendant takes a part in the particular action which in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.’” [Citations.] “‘[I]f an appearance is for any purpose other than to question the jurisdiction of the court[,] it is general.’” [Citations....: R. (2019) .) “‘“What is determinative is whether defendant takes a part in the particular action which in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:the family move-in provision must do so “in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent.” (Rent Ord., § 37.9, subd. (a)(8).) “Requirements of good faith and proper motive are ‘substantive limitations on eviction.’ ” (DeLisi v. Lam (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 663 , 676.) The designation of a trustee solely so that trustee could take advantage of the family move-in provision would likely fail this test. D. The Judgment Cannot Be Affirmed on the Tenants’ Other Basis for Demurring to the Complaint. As mentioned above, the tenants also demurred to the complaint: Lam (2019) .) The designation of a trustee solely so that trustee could take advantage of the family move-in provision would likely fail this test. D.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710 [referencing “the general rule that one who assents to a contract is bound by its provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity with the language of the instrument”]; Reynolds v. Lau (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 953 , 967 [same].) 22 [the party] has failed to read the contract before signing it.” (Stewart, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589.) Brandy argues her failure to read the Agreement and meet with Ms. Rain is excused by Donovan’s statement, “[t]he mere fact that a mistaken party could have avoided: Lau (2019) .) 22 has failed to read the contract before signing it.” (Stewart, supra, 134 Cal.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:see Danekas v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 638, 645.) 2. The Rent Ordinance and rule 12.14 “The San Francisco rent ordinance restricts tenant evictions except upon certain specified grounds.” (Reynolds v. Lau (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 953 , 964.) One such ground is set forth in Rent Ordinance section 37.9, subdivision (a)(8), which allows a landlord to evict a tenant when the “landlord seeks to recover possession [of the rented property] in good faith, without ulterior reasons and with honest intent,” for either the landlord’s own “use: Lau (2019)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546 (Wendland); see also In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 , 369- 373 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.).) “The default standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence.” (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546, citing Evid. Code, § 115.) This standard “ ‘simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a: J. in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimat...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:cited by the Commission did not involve the characterization of property acquired by spouses in actions between themselves or in actions with third-party 6 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. creditors. (See Olson v. Olson (1935) 4 Cal.2d 434 , 438 [common law form of deed presumption characterized property conveyed by parties who were not married at the time]; Rench v. McMullen (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 872, 874–875 [common law form of title presumption not rebutted by oral evidence of resulting trust between two business associates].) Evidence Code section 662: Olson (1935) 4 Cal.2d 434, 438 ; Rench v. McMullen (1947) 82 Cal.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:consider the merits. DISCUSSION Section 1094.5 “provides the basic framework by which an aggrieved party to an administrative proceeding may seek judicial review of any final order or decision rendered by a state or local agency.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 , 137, fn. omitted.) Subdivision (c) of the statute “provides for both an independent judgment and a substantial evidence review of administrative decisions.” (Bixby, at p. 137, italics omitted....: Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:power to enforce a trust or the power to control or advise the trustee and such powers may give the person holding those powers special interest standing to enforce the trust. Finally, Turner cites Crocker-Citizens National Bank v. Younger (1971) 4 Cal.3d 202 , which involved a trust advisory committee to designate charitable institutions to receive distributions at intervals stated by the trust. (Id. at pp. 206–207.) In that case, the court commented that “rules pertaining to the rights and duties of trustees generally would be broadly applicable to trust advisors or other: Younger (1971) 4 Cal.3d 202
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:same revised procedure for revocation if the trust is revocable by the settlor.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 31, 1986, Summary Dig., p. 3, italics added; People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164 , 1178 [Legislative Counsel’s Digest is indicative of legislative intent].) The Law Revision Commission’s 1986 report similarly summarized the proposed legislation: “Under general principles the settlor, or other person holding the power to revoke, may modify as well as terminate a revocable trust....: Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) .) The Law Revision Commission’s 1986 report similarly summarized the proposed legislation: “Under general principles the settlor...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:as well as related declarations, oppositions, and objections. Most of the requested documents are not relevant or necessary to our determination of the issues raised in the present appeals (among other potential barriers to notice). (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238 , 268, fn. 6 (Rowland) [declining notice of irrelevant court records].) We grant judicial notice as to certain documents, as identified post. To the extent that our analysis calls for a discussion of why particular documents are not suitable for notice, we address those matters post, as well. We deny: Rowland (1992) , fn. 6 (Rowland) .) We grant judicial notice as to certain documents, as identified post.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:as well as related declarations, oppositions, and objections. Most of the requested documents are not relevant or necessary to our determination of the issues raised in the present appeals (among other potential barriers to notice). (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238 , 268, fn. 6 (Rowland) [declining notice of irrelevant court records].) We grant judicial notice as to certain documents, as identified post. To the extent that our analysis calls for a discussion of why particular documents are not suitable for notice, we address those matters post, as well. We deny: Rowland (1992) , fn. 6 (Rowland) .) We grant judicial notice as to certain documents, as identified post.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:sought-after communications or documents. (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.) Accordingly, this appeal is not moot. 6 review de novo. (See California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1041.) “In construing statutes, we aim ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.’ ” [Citations.] We look first to the words of the statute, ‘because the statutory language is generally the most: State Water Resources Control Board (2018)
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:absurd results. [Citation.] If the statutory text is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, we may consider extrinsic aids such as legislative history to facilitate our interpretative analysis.” (California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032 , 1041; accord, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123 (Blackburn).) C. Right to a Jury Trial in an SVP Proceeding Washington contends the trial court erred by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and by not taking an express personal waiver of that: B. Standard of Review “We review questions of statutory construction de novo. Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent...
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:Standing Principles In reviewing orders sustaining demurrers without leave to amend, we independently examine the operative complaint “to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145 , 162 (Novartis).) We “ ‘treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation....: Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) (Novartis).) We “ ‘treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact...
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:STANDARD OF REVIEW “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145 , 162.) “ ‘ “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” ’ ” (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) We “adopt[ ] a liberal: Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) .) “ ‘ “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:competency or inherent authority to hear a case and render a valid judgment. (Harnedy v. Whitty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1344-1345.) “Fundamental jurisdiction is, at its core, authority over both the subject matter and the parties.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771 , 780.) Any ruling issued by a court that lacks fundamental jurisdiction is void. (Ibid.) Fundamental 8 jurisdiction is statewide and not specific to any one county. “The process of superior courts shall extend throughout the state.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 71.) Another layer of jurisdiction exists....: Chavez (2018) .) Any ruling issued by a court that lacks fundamental jurisdiction is void. (Ibid.) Fundamental 8 jurisdiction is statewide and not specific to any one county.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:in favor of the defendant, concluding whether the plaintiff intended to discharge claims for unknown injuries was a question of fact under section 1542. (Casey, supra, 59 Cal.2d at pp. 113–114.) 11The court of appeal in Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159 , questioned the validity of Casey on a different issue, noting that Casey predated Supreme Court cases holding that the construction of a written instrument is a question of law for the court where there is no competent parol evidence or such evidence is undisputed. (Winet, at p. 1171, fn.: Price (1992) , questioned the validity of Casey on a different issue, noting that Casey predated Supreme Court cases holding that the construction of a written instrument is a question of law for the...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:upon the jurisdictional defect of lack of standing. (Hudis v. Crawford (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1590-1592.) And “a dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable termination of the proceedings. [Citations.]” (Villa v. Cole (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1327 , 1335-1336; see also Minasian, supra, 80 . 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 827, fn. 4 [“dismissal [through settlement] reflects ambiguously on the merits of the action”]....: Cole (1992) -1336; see also Minasian, supra, Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Standard of review A writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (i.e., an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373 , 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App....: Maxxam Corp. (1992) ; see People ex rel.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Standard of review A writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (i.e., an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373 , 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App....: Maxxam Corp. (1992) ; see People ex rel.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:of practice” in proceedings under the Probate Code. (§ 1000, subd. (a).) This is a rule of default — that is, the Probate Code “adopts the civil practice rules only where special rules are not prescribed.” (Merrill v. Finberg (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1443 , 1447.) But resort to the Code of Civil Procedure provisions governing the time for 4 filing a demurrer is not appropriate here. Under the plain language of the Probate Code, it “does provide specially applicable rules” that address the timing for filing a response or objection to a petition.: Finberg (1992) .) But resort to the Code of Civil Procedure provisions governing the time for 4 filing a demurrer is not appropriate here.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:contributed to what is now a significant split of authority among the Courts of Appeal. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155 , 170-171; Osal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1200; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326; In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038. 16 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. C. The Clear and Convincing Standard of: App.4th 1635, 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) -171; Osal v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:based on its assessment of her credibility. (See Doe v. Regents of the University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1074 [“Credibility is an issue of fact for the finder of fact to resolve”]; Knight v. City of Capitola (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 918 , 932 [“Good faith, or its absence, involves a factual inquiry into the [person’s] subjective state of mind”].) “Appellate courts ‘do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.’” (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.) Section 859 does not define “bad faith.” In other contexts,: City of Capitola (1992) subjective state of mind”].) “Appellate courts ‘do not reweigh evidence...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:a settlement that, as the [t]rial [c]ourt found here, had been procured by fraud.” The undeveloped assertion is made without citation to the record. We therefore decline to consider it. (See Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574 , 590, fn. 8 [“courts will decline to consider any 39 factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point where it is asserted”].) For the foregoing reasons, we reject Christine’s and Michael’s arguments that the court enforced an agreement with terms different from the agreement Christine made in May: DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) , fn. 8 .) For the foregoing reasons...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:child support must to some degree reflect the more opulent lifestyle even though this may, as a practical matter, produce a benefit for the custodial parent.’” (Johnson v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 68, 71.) In S.P. v. F.G. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 921 , 924–925, the court found no error in deviating downward from guideline formula where the support order reflected the child’s best interest and provided standard of living commensurate with a “financially privileged child.” Where the trial court departs from the guideline amount, it is required to state for the record: G. (2016)
- Conservatorship of Martha : A reviewing court will not find abuse of discretion in a lower court’s factual findings when those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:obligations arising from contract,” “ ‘obligations which are yet to become due as [well as] those which are already matured’ ” (id. at pp. 326–327), and “may be created by statute rather than contract” (Patton v. City of Alameda (1985) 40 Cal.3d 41 , 46). We construe it in the context of the Elder Abuse Act to mean claimed liability for compensatory damages, consistent with the evident purpose expressed by the Legislature in authorizing attachment as a means to facilitate make-whole relief via return of money or property. To the extent Royals’s attachment: City of Alameda (1985) 40 Cal.3d 41, 46).
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:intentional misrepresentations in violation of sections 6106 and 6068, we now turn to the appropriate discipline for his misconduct. State Bar disciplinary proceedings are meant to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession. (Chasteen v. State Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d 586 , 591 (Chasteen).) “[T]he discipline in each case must be determined on the particular facts of the case.” (Ibid.) Exercising our independent judgment, we consider the totality of the circumstances with “ ‘no fixed formula.’ ” (Connor, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1055.) We consider the State Bar Standards for: affiliation” with NJ Construction (and by extension Gonzalez) was clearly false. We find that Bradshaw willfully misrepresented his relationship with Bay Construction...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:act or advise with the other’s interests in mind; it may exist although there is no fiduciary relationship; it is particularly likely to exist when there is a family relationship 25 or one of friendship.’ [Citations.]” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607 , 615 (Sanders).) “Fiduciary” and “confidential” have been used interchangeably to describe a relationship in which one party has a duty to act in the highest good faith for the benefit of the other party. (Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 257, 270.) When a person places: 25 or one of friendship.’ ” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 615 (Sanders).) “Fiduciary” and “confidential” have been used interchangeably to describe a relationship in which one party has a d...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:and convincing evidence. We often have emphasized the appellate court’s general responsibility to review the record for substantial evidence, even when the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court. (E.g., In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848 , 863; Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank: We often have emphasized the appellate court’s general responsibility to review the record for substantial evidence, even when the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.) If the words are clear and unambiguous, their plain meaning governs. (Ibid.; accord, Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094 , 1103.) “[W]e have no power to rewrite the statute to make it conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed.” (County of Santa Clara v. Perry (1998) 18 Cal.4th 435, 446.) The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how section 859 operates under the plain language of the statute. Assume: Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) .) “e have no power to rewrite the statute to make it conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed.” (County of Santa Clara v.
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:one year, and the conservator may seek reappointment by filing a petition. (§ 5361.) A proposed conservatee has a right to a jury trial upon demand at the establishment and annual renewal of a conservatorship. (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 , 541-542; Jose B., at p. 970; see § 5350, subd. (d).) B. Jury Trial Waivers Under the LPS Act “LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.” (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378,: 7 disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.) The Act authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of the person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:person is so disabled that he or she should be involuntarily confined for up to one year. (§§ 5350, 5361.) Because of the important liberty interests at stake, correspondingly powerful safeguards protect against erroneous findings.” (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 , 541 (Ben C.).) Conservatorships can involve confinement and other “disabilities” that may be imposed by the court, such as the loss of driving privileges, the right to enter contracts or vote, and the right to refuse medical and other treatments. (§ 5357.) Section 5352 sets out the requirements for: from a conservator’s appointment or reappointment provide available and adequate remedies for aggrieved conservatees. (Gandolfo, at pp. 898–900; see Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) ...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:be forfeited if it is raised for the first time on appeal”].) In his reply brief, Washington contends forfeiture does not apply because his equal protection claim presents a pure question of law, relying on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 888. In Sheena, the Supreme Court held the defendant did not forfeit her challenge to a probation condition as facially vague and overbroad because it presented “an asserted error that is a pure question of law, easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition.” In contrast to Sheena,: App.4th 1438, 1447 .) In his reply brief, Washington contends forfeiture does not apply because his equal protection claim presents a pure question of law...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33, 38–39 (Financial Casualty); In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1020.) The well-settled rules of statutory construction apply to the California Rules of Court. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894 , 902; People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961, 966.) “ ‘Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We: American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) ; People v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:substantive equivalent) to amend the trust”]; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1209 [where trust “expressly deprived [the decedent] of the power to revoke, modify or amend,” documents purporting to amend the trust were “invalid”]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 , 1343–1345 [amendment that did not comply with specified amendment procedure was “invalid”].) Mary acknowledges section 15402 applies here. And, as she must, Mary concedes the Trust requires that an amendment “shall” be notarized and that the amendment here is not....: App.4th 1194, 1209 of the power to revoke, modify or amend,” documents purporting to amend the trust were “invalid”]...
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:subd. (a)(1) [revocation made “[b]y a writing, other than a will, signed by the settlor or any other person holding the power of revocation and delivered to the trustee”].) Haggerty’s reliance on this court’s opinion in Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 is likewise unpersuasive for the reasons discussed in Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pages 966 through 967 and footnote 13. 12 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. GUERRERO, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. DATO, J. 13: 2 Again, we need not and do not consider the situation in King, where the trust instrument did distinguish between methods for revocation and modification...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:“compromise position” embodied in section 15401 clearly changed the prior law. Cundall’s reliance on Hibernia, which was decided under the prior law, is therefore misplaced. (See Hibernia, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at pp. 402–405.) Cundall also cites Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 , which was decided under current law and contains language suggesting that section 15401 incorporated existing prior case law. (Id. at p. 1344, fn. 3.) We disagree with 20 this conclusion for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, the issue in Irvine was not the validity of a trust revocation, but: App.3d at pp. 402–405.) Cundall also cites Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) , which was decided under current law and contains language suggesting that section 15401 incorporated existing prior case l...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:question are in agreement. (Drake v. Pinkham (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 400, 407- 409 [individual petitioned under § 17200 claiming two amendments to a trust that disinherited her were invalid on the ground the settlor was incompetent]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 , 1341 [“it is clear from viewing section 17200 as a whole that a probate court has jurisdiction over both inter vivos and testamentary trusts to entertain petitions for instructions regarding the validity (and thus, invalidity) of trust agreements or amendments”]....: App.4th 400, 407- 409 ; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995)
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:4, 1983, p. 2.) And some cases, mostly in the probate context, appeared to treat Siberell’s form of title presumption as a rule of common law existing separate and apart from the community property framework. (See Estate of Castiglioni (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 367 , 386 [applying form of title presumption to property transferred to joint tenancy in 1989]; Estate of Gallio, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 597 [applying form of title presumption to joint tenancy property acquired between 1949 and 1989]; Estate of Levine (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [joint tenancy home purchased: Sess.) as amended Apr. 4, 1983, p. 2.) And some cases, mostly in the probate context, appeared to treat Siberell’s form of title presumption as a rule of common law existing separate...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821, quoting Matson v. Dvorak (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 539 , 548.) Here, the parties agree that Robert’s No Contest Petition arose from Dae’s protected litigation conduct under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Thus, we need consider only whether Robert provided sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of success on his No Contest Petition in the second step: Dvorak (1995) .) Here, the parties agree that Robert’s No Contest Petition arose from Dae’s protected litigation conduct under the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:127 Cal.App.4th 305, 313; Denevi, at p. 1222; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 124 (Nelson).) The principles governing derivative actions in the context of corporations apply to limited liability companies and limited partnerships. (See Sprengel v. Zbylut (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1028 , 1040-1041 [limited liability company]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 425-426 [limited partnership]....: Zbylut (2019) -1041 ; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, supra, 114 Cal.
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:34 Cal.App.5th 154, 163 (Dudek).) When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint or petition, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact and law. (Ibid.; Estate of Holdaway (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1049 , 1052.) B. Powers of Appointment As stated above, trustors often include powers of appointment in trust documents. These powers allow a trustor to control to whom and how the trust property can be further devised after the trustor’s death. This appeal involves the interplay of three sections of the: App.5th 154, 163 (Dudek).) When reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we accept as true the material facts alleged in the complaint or petition, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:may lift the statutory stay for “good cause,” which requires a showing that the specific discovery sought is both necessary “to establish a prima facie case” and “tailored to that end.” (Ibid.; Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882 , 891.) We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to lift a discovery stay for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) There is no way to determine whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying Kenton’s discovery request, because Kenton failed to provide an adequate record on: Lahiji (2019) .) We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to lift a discovery stay for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) There is no way to determine whether the trial court erred or abused its discret...
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:only if the exclusion is not arbitrary. (Maricela C. v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1147.) “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.]” (Litinsky v. Kaplan (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 970 , 988.) Significantly, in this case, Harber was her own only witness. Thus, excluding her evidence was a terminating sanction; it was the basis for the dismissal of her petition and the granting of Williams’ petition. This is not a case in which a party does exchange a witness list: Kaplan (2019) .) Significantly, in this case, Harber was her own only witness.
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:costs of service by publication could instead serve their spouses by mailing to their last known addresses and posting at those locations, a method of service of process described by the United States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371 [91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 119].11 The Cohen court explained, “[T]here really is no other provision made by law for service, because although publication is theoretically possible, practically there is no way of efficient publication save by the doubtful expedient of ordering public officials to make expenditures which no statute: Connecticut (1971) [91 S.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:his joint tenancy interest to his mother; wife had previously obtained a 17 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. judgment against husband]; Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado) [divorce]; Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202 , 213–214 (Gudelj) [same]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [same]; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 604 [same].) The court in Schindler made a point of quoting Siberell’s limiting language: “As cautioned in Siberell, [214 Cal. at page 772], it should be noted that we are: Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 213–214 (Gudelj) ; Tomaier v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:minor’s compromise. (Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337, fn. 2 (Pearson); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 12:579; see Burge v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608 , 614 [“[a]lthough it would ordinarily be better practice to hold a hearing and take testimony, the [predecessor to section 3500] does not require it”].) Thus, the Pearson court stated, albeit in dictum, “it would appear that a petition to approve or disapprove a minor’s compromise may be decided by: City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 614 lthough it would ordinarily be better practice to hold a hearing and take testimony, the does not require it”].
- Clark v. Smith : An oral court pronouncement that is inconsistent with a later written order is not controlling; the subsequent written order governs the parties’ rights and obligations.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:request, because Kenton failed to provide an adequate record on the point. “It is well settled . . . that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564 , 574.) Here, Kenton’s election to proceed without a reporter’s transcript leaves us unable to assess whether an abuse of discretion occurred. (See Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447–448 [“absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial precludes a determination that: Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Here, Kenton’s election to proceed without a reporter’s transcript leaves us unable to assess whether an abuse of discretion occurred. (See Vo v.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:385.) Accordingly, an appellate court should accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912–913; see People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038 , 1052.) And if a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer. (See Haworth, at p. 385; but see Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 344, 352 [not deferring to superior court’s adverse credibility determination where evidence in: Barnwell (2007) .) And if a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer. (See Haworth, at p. 385; but see Leslie H.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:the issues raised on appeal”]; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [matters subject to judicial notice must be relevant to issues raised on appeal], overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257 , 1276.) 28 _________________________ Miller, J. We concur: _________________________ Kline, P.J. _________________________ Stewart, J. A155742, Roth v. Jelley 29 Trial Court: Superior Court of Contra Costa County Trial Judge: Hon. John H. Sugiyama Law Offices of James A. Bush, P.C., James A....: Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) , overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) .) 28 _________________________ Miller...
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:the right to testify in their own behalf [citation], and a party’s opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to proffer admissible evidence is 5 central to having his or her day in court. [Citations.]” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 , 1357.) At the same time, however, “‘[i]t is . . . well established that courts have . . . inherent power to control litigation before them. [Citation.] . . . “ . . . That inherent power entitles trial courts to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with: Superior Court (2007) .) At the same time, however, “‘t is . . . well established that courts have . . . inherent power to control litigation before them. . . . “ . . .
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:is never required in order for a plaintiff to have standing to sue in California. Limon cites several additional cases in support of his claim that concrete injury is not required for standing in California—Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 (Angelucci), Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353 (Goehring), and McConnell v. Cowan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 805 (McConnell). In Angelucci, the all-male plaintiffs sued defendant supper club under the Unruh Civil Rights Act contending they were discriminated on the basis of sex due to the defendant charging them higher: Century Supper Club (2007) (Angelucci), Goehring v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.” ’ [Citation.] The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis is whether persons are ‘similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ ” (In re Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33 , 47.) “Where two or more groups are properly distinguishable for purposes of the challenged law, it is immaterial if they are indistinguishable in other respects. [Citation.] Nor, absent this threshold requirement, is an equal protection inquiry into the justification for any legislative distinction necessary.” (People v....: 7 The Court of Appeal in Mary K. also examined whether counsel may waive a conservatee’s right to advisement of the right to jury trial—an issue not raised in this appeal. (See Mary K., supra...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:term with a legal meaning. [¶] The type of ‘mistake’ that will support rescission is defined in [] section 1577 (‘mistake of fact’) and [] section 10 1578 (‘mistake of law’).” (Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First All. Mortg. Co. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410 , 1421 (Hedging Concepts); see also Donovan, at p. 278.) Section 1577 provides, “Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the mistake, and consisting in: 1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past: Co. (1996) (Hedging Concepts); see also Donovan, at p. 278.) Section 1577 provides, “Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the mistak...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, 556.) “[A]n abuse [of discretion] occurs when a court modifies a support order without substantial evidence of a material change of circumstances.” (In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978 , 983 (McCann).) There are no rigid guidelines for evaluating whether circumstances have sufficiently changed to warrant a support modification....: App.4th 546, 556.) “n abuse occurs when a court modifies a support order without substantial evidence of a material change of circumstances.” (In re Marriage of McCann (1996) (McCann).
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:this appeal. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8 [“if an order is appealable, [an] appeal must be taken or the right to appellate review is forfeited”];Williams v. Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060 , 1071 [same].) In addition, the vast majority of Michael and Joseph’s argument appears in a footnote. (See Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947 [“Footnotes are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal.”]; Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 [raising an issue: Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) .) In addition, the vast majority of Michael and Joseph’s argument appears in a footnote. (See Sabi v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:seek refunds on behalf of customers for taxes collected and 27. remitted by company]; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1364 [same]; MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742 , 747; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810 [standing to challenge wrongful foreclosure]; Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 465–466 (Boorstein) [standing for purposes of Civil Code, § 1789.83 et seq. and Business and Professions Code, § 17200 et seq.].) Although there: California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) ; Mendoza v.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:be judicially extended beyond its intended purpose. (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301, 308 [“The policy -9- disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of [a] statute”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77 , 88 [ “Inconvenience or hardships, if any, that result from following [a] statute as written must be relieved by legislation .... Construction may not be substituted for legislation. [Citation.]”; internal quotations omitted.]; see also, (People v. Seneca Insurance Company (2003) 29 Cal....: Co. (2010) statute”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) [ “Inconvenience or hardships, if any...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:statutory scheme urged upon us, they presumably could not be the subject of an LPS Act conservatorship at all.” (Id. at p. 1467.) The issue did not resurface for 30 years, until K.P.’s appeal here and Conservatorship of D.P. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 794 , review granted and held February 11, 2020. In both cases, the juries were given a version of CACI No. 4000 that did not include unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary treatment as a required element for conservatorship. (D.P., at p. 799; Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p.: P. (2019) , review granted and held February 11, 2020.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the court without leave to amend. These allegations were incorporated by reference into the malicious prosecution cause of action and supplemented paragraph 41 alleging favorable and final termination on the merits of the underlying proceeding. (See Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879 , 893-894 [noting that on demurrer, the plaintiff’s allegations were bolstered by general factual allegations incorporated by reference].) Recognizing that a “plaintiff [opposing an anti-SLAPP motion] need[] show only a ‘minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability’ [citation]” (Grewal v....: Thurmond (2019) -894 .) Recognizing that a “plaintiff need show only a ‘minimum level o...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:have been satisfied (Pen. Code, § 2602, subd. (c)(8)), and whether a publisher acted with the intent (“actual malice”) that must be shown for a plaintiff to prevail in certain kinds of defamation cases (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 , 342). Going further back in time, “[t]he requirement in civil actions of more than a preponderance of the evidence was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibility of conscience.” (Note, Appellate Review in the: Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) ). Going further back in time, “he requirement in civil actions of more than a preponderance of the evidence was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown...
- Garcia v. Garcia : The appellant must affirmatively show that any alleged error was prejudicial—that is, that the error affected the outcome of the case.
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:is prejudicial.” (York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1190; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) The burden is on the appellant to show prejudice. (Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051 , 1069.) An assessment of prejudice cannot be made here because appellant did not make an offer of proof in the probate court. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 580 [rule requiring offer of proof in the trial court (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a)) “is necessary because,: City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069.) An assessment of prejudice cannot be made here because appellant did not make an offer of proof in the probate court. (See People v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:of action for malicious prosecution, the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit— even for an improper purpose—is not a proper basis for an abuse of process action.” (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157 , 1169 (Oren Royal Oaks Venture).) Attorneys argued below in their anti-SLAPP motion that Carol could not plead or prove her second cause of action for abuse of process. They contended the claim asserted was based upon the mere filing and prosecution of a lawsuit for an improper purpose which: Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1169 (Oren Royal Oaks Venture).) Attorneys argued below in their anti-SLAPP motion that Carol could not plead or prove her second cause...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:evaluated under a subjective standard. (See Powell, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 234 [“reasonable cause” is evaluated under an objective standard but “bad faith” is evaluated under a subjective standard]; Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast Regional Com. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 52 , 79 [“ ‘The award of attorney’s fees under Government Code section 800 is allowed only if the actions of a public entity or official were wholly arbitrary or capricious. The phrase “arbitrary or capricious” encompasses conduct not supported by a fair or substantial reason [citation], a stubborn insistence on: South Central Coast Regional Com. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 52, 79 [“ ‘The award of attorney’s fees under Government Code section 800 is allowed only if the actions of a public entity or official were wholly a...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:rule, we recognize that different forms of appellate review may apply in certain circumstances when a determination has been made by the trier of fact under the clear and convincing standard of proof. (See, e.g., McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835 , 845-846 [discussing appellate review of findings of actual malice in defamation suits].) 17 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. whether they themselves believe the evidence was so probative. And the fundamental question before an appellate court reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence is the: Hearst Corp. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 835, 845-846 .) 17 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:must look to see whether alternatives less severe than dismissal are available. The ‘sound exercise of discretion requires the judge to consider and use lesser sanctions’ unless the court’s authority cannot possibly be otherwise vindicated. [Citation.]” (Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911 , 917.) Five factors, taken in combination, render the order here an abuse of discretion. First, it was Harber’s attorney, not Harber, who was at fault. The fact that “the fault lies with the client and not the attorney” militates against using the inherent authority to dismiss. (Del Junco v.: Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 917.) Five factors, taken in combination, render the order here an abuse of discretion. First, it was Harber’s attorney, not Harber, who was at fault.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:596), neither party suggests that, in this case, the California double jeopardy clause should be interpreted differently than the federal clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” (People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110 , 120–121, italics added.) The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that double jeopardy applies. (People v. Newell (1923) 192 Cal. 659, 667; People v. Mason (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 282, 285....: “The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 [same].) But where a cause of action seeks to recover for harms to the corporation, the shareholders have no direct cause of action “[b]ecause a corporation exists as a separate legal entity” (Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100 , 1108 (Grosset)) and “is the ultimate beneficiary of such a derivative suit” (Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1003). (See Cotton v. Expo Power Systems, Inc., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380 [“A derivative claim is a property right that belongs to the corporation.”].) “The shareholders may,: Wenaas (2008) (Grosset)) and “is the ultimate beneficiary of such a derivative suit” (Patrick v.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:action to enforce or protect the assets of the trust.” (Hardman v. Feinstein (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 157, 161–162 (Hardman) citing § 5142.) Turning to the question of whether a continuous relationship is necessary, we look to Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100 where the Supreme Court held that California law “generally requires a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit to maintain continuous stock ownership throughout the pendency of the litigation.” (Id. at p. 1119.) The plaintiff in that case lost standing to continue a derivative action when he was required to sell: Wenaas (2008)
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:court abused its * See footnote, ante, page 1. 16. discretion in making such an order is open on appeal even though no request to amend such pleading was made.” Torres also cites City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730 , which involved a demurrer, for the principle that “[t]he issue of leave to amend is always open on appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff.” (Id. at pp. 746–747; see Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1132 [plaintiff: Superior Court (2007) , which involved a demurrer, for the principle that “he issue of leave to amend is always open on appeal, even if not raised by the plaintiff.” (Id. at pp.
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:resolution of these cases so that the children may receive loving and secure home environments as soon as 3 Aida R.’s request to take additional evidence dated April 11, 2022, is granted. 10 reasonably possible.” (in re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 918.) The automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct’—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (Un re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) To this we add, ICWA’s laudable goal is to preserve Indian culture. But ICWA should: 3 Aida R.’s request to take additional evidence dated April 11, 2022, is granted. 10 reasonably possible.” (in re James F. (2008) .) The automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legisl...
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:sufficient to satisfy itself that the parent is, or is not, competent. [Citation.] If the court appoints a guardian ad litem without the parent’s consent, the record must contain substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 910-911.) 8 Any “error in the procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s orders without regard to prejudice.” (Id. at: 7 residential address in Orange, California. But this address was clearly no longer valid because mother was incarcerated at the time, and everyone, including the court, was aware of this. Indeed...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing and provide a parent with an oppourtunity to be heard. (Id. at p. 665, 672; see In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 910 [citing Sara D. with approval; due process hearing required before appointment of guardian ad litem].) Such a hearing is now commonly referred to as a Sara D. hearing. (See In re A.H. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 337, 342.) 9 behalf. Let me explain what that is. It’s where someone: App.4th 661, the court of appeal held that, before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing and provide a parent with an...
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:212.) That said, “ ‘[w]here the ruling that is the subject of appeal turns on the trial court’s determination of disputed facts, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is “sufficiency of the evidence.” ’ ” (Cochran v. Rubens (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 481 , 486.) Here, the ruling upholding the trust’s validity turned on the trial court’s determination of whether, at the time she executed her trust, Kay had a mental health disorder with symptoms including delusions or hallucinations that caused her to disinherit appellants. There appears no doubt that the relevant facts: Rubens (1996) .) Here, the ruling upholding the trust’s validity turned on the trial court’s determination of whether, at the time she executed her trust...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:court held that the malicious prosecution claim was not maintainable; there had been no favorable termination because the prior-suit plaintiff had obtained injunctive relief on the third claim. (Id. at pp. 1400-1402.) In Dalany v. American Pacific Holding Corporation (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 822 , (Dalany), the defendant in the underlying action filed a cross-complaint asserting various claims; some of those claims were disposed of against defendant/cross- complainant by summary adjudication, and the remainder of the action was later settled. (Id. at pp. 825, 826....: American Pacific Holding Corporation (1996)
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6), and there appear to be no disputed facts at issue, we choose to exercise our discretion to address the merits of the claim notwithstanding K.R.’s failure to object below. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190 , 194, disapproved on other grounds in Public Guardian of Contra Costa County v. Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1107.) As for the issue of waiver, several appellate courts postdating Joseph W. have reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in: R.’s failure to object below. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) , disapproved on other grounds in Public Guardian of Contra Costa County v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:review of his claims are de novo (see part II.C.1., post). Under these circumstances, we exercise our discretion to address the 4 merits, notwithstanding C.O.’s failure to raise the claims in the trial court. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190 , 194 (Bryan S.).)5 C. The LPS Act 1. Standard of Review The statutory and constitutional claims presented here are legal issues subject to de novo review. “To determine whether the superior court violated the LPS Act . . . we must first find what the Act requires. In construing: O.’s failure to raise the claims in the trial court. (See Conservatorship of Bryan S. (2019) (Bryan S.).)5 C.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:waiver protections. Thus, we do not have an appellate record on which to evaluate Washington’s equal protection claim. However, “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; accord, Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199 , 215 [“‘neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic’”].) Although Washington’s attorney failed to argue that Washington was entitled to a jury trial absent a personal waiver by Washington after a jury trial advisement, it is hard to envision how counsel could have asserted this claim....: Akopyan (2019) .) Although Washington’s attorney failed to argue that Washington was entitled to a jury trial absent a personal waiver by Washington after a jury trial adv...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Defendants filed their initial section 16701 fee motion (seeking attorney fees only) on December 21, 2018, in compliance with rule 3.1702(b)(1). (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 416 , 429 [“Under rule 3.1702(b)(1), . . . fee motions were required to be served and filed within 60 days after notice of entry of the . . . judgment was served . . . .”].) However, Defendants filed their amended motion (seeking both attorney and expert fees) on January: City of Banning (2019)
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:denying reformation would defeat the testator’s intent and result in unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries.” (Id. at p. 890 [“[T]he paramount consideration in construing a will is to determine the subjective intent of the testator”]; see Placencia v. Strazicich (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 730 , 741 [“[T]he modern trend [is] toward favoring the decedent’s intent over formalities”].) Gary argues Duke does not apply here because the devise in the pour-over will is general and not specific. A specific devise is a “transfer of specifically identifiable property” (Prob. Code, § 21117, subd....: Strazicich (2019) he modern trend toward favoring the decedent’s intent over formalities”].) Gary argues Duke does not apply here because the devise in the pour-over will is general and not specific.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:of confidentiality for certain communications, “[t]he presumption arises when the alleged holder shows both that there was a communication and that the parties to the communication stood in a protected relationship such as spouses”]; cf. Fish v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 811 , 818 [“‘Once the claimant establishes the preliminary facts of a psychotherapist-patient relationship, the burden of proof shifts to the opponent of the privilege’”]; Roman Catholic Archbishop of (Fn. is continued on the next page.) 22 2....: Superior Court (2019) ...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:protection inquiry into the justification for any legislative distinction necessary.” (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1107.) “If there is such a disparity, then we must proceed to decide which level of scrutiny to apply.” (People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91 , 95.) In Bryan S., which examined whether proposed LPS conservatees have the right to refuse to testify in a conservatorship trial, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 1, rejected a similar equal protection challenge to the LPS statute. (Bryan S., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196–198.) In that: Yanez (2019) .) In Bryan S., which examined whether proposed LPS conservatees have the right to refuse to testify in a conservatorship trial, the First District Court of Appeal, Division 1...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:no standing, it should sustain the demurrer or dismiss the petition. If it finds standing by contrast, the court should allow the 4 BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490 , 501 [standing in federal courts]; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 [will contest].) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud. Section 17200, subdivision (a), authorizes a beneficiary to: Seldin (1975) ; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 .) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of the Trust amendments on the grounds...
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.’ ” (Id. at pp. 251–252, quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563 , 576.) 12 The Davis decision was essentially followed in Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, which involved similar instructions....: Donaldson (1975) .) 12 The Davis decision was essentially followed in Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:competence to make 15 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. immigration status determinations, which are the exclusive province of the federal government. (Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 394–395; DeCanas v. Bica (1976) 424 U.S. 351 , 354.) For these reasons, Congress assigned to federal authorities, not state courts, the determination whether a child’s request for SIJ status is bona fide. (J.U., supra, 176 A.3d at p. 141, fn. 9.)4 Third, section 155 provides that the superior court “shall issue” the findings if “there is evidence: Bica (1976) .) For these reasons, Congress assigned to federal authorities, not state courts, the determination whether a child’s request for SIJ status is bona fide. (J.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:Greenberg, supra, at p. 1097.) “[T]he trier of fact may disregard all of the testimony of a party, whether contradicted or uncontradicted, if it determines that he testified falsely as to some matters covered by his testimony (Nelson v. Black, 43 Cal.2d 612 . . .).” (Halagan v. Ohanesian (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 14, 21; accord Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 455.) Lynne claimed that on the day she returned to the family home to see her dying father, she saw an alternative estate planning document which stated that her parents’ 24: App.4th 1172, 1175, citing Greenberg, supra, at p. 1097.) “he trier of fact may disregard all of the testimony of a party, whether contradicted or uncontradicted...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:from the order mentioned above, we have found none. Thus, Limon’s contention is unavailing for several reasons: (1) Limon is responsible for providing this court with an adequate record to support his contentions on appeal. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281 , 1295.) He has not done so; and (2) We are unable to rely on the federal court’s order because (a) the portion relied upon was vacated by the federal court’s order on reconsideration; and (b) the statement is hearsay and we are unable to take judicial notice of the: Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) He has not done so; and (2) We are unable to rely on the federal court’s order because (a) the portion relied upon was vacated by the federal court’s order on recon...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379 , 1386-1387.) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.]’ ” (Estate of Pryor, at p. 1471.) “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.” (Switzer v. Wood (2019): Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387.) “ ‘If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:Legislature had intended to merge the restorative obligation with the punitive penalty, inclusion of the word “recovered” would serve no purpose. “A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379 , 1387.) Applying the Ribal holding to our first hypothetical scenario illustrates its deviation from the plain language of section 859. Upon establishing ownership of the diamond ring, the petitioner is entitled to recover the property under section 856....: Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387.) Applying the Ribal holding to our first hypothetical scenario illustrates its deviation from the plain language of section 859.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:six-month suspension and other remedial measures, and otherwise affirmed its 2019 dismissal of other charges. In our consideration of this matter, “[t]he findings of the [H]earing [Department] . . . are entitled to great weight.” (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543 , 549.) In 15 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. particular, “the hearing [court] is best suited to resolving credibility questions, because it alone is able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and evaluate their veracity firsthand.” (McKnight v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025, 1032; see: State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 549.) In 15 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. particular, “the hearing is best suited to resolving credibility questions...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:obtaining competitive bids. In addition, the Trust instrument did not exempt Bradshaw from the duty to disclose his financial ties with Bay Construction under rules 1.7 and 1.8.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (See Schneider v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 784 , 796.) In sum, the ends do not justify the means when it comes to a trustee’s faithful discharge of fiduciary duties. Clear and 26 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. convincing evidence shows Bradshaw breached the Trust by prioritizing his interests over Gosey’s and by: State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 784, 796.) In sum, the ends do not justify the means when it comes to a trustee’s faithful discharge of fiduciary duties.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:112, 117.) Nevertheless, we must ultimately “assess [any findings] independently under the more stringent [clear and convincing] 16 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. standard of proof applicable to disciplinary proceedings.” (Maltaman v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924 , 947.) A. We first consider whether the evidence establishes under count one that Bradshaw engaged in a scheme to defraud in violation of section 6106, which states that “[t]he commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the act is committed in the course of his: State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924, 947.) A. We first consider whether the evidence establishes under count one that Bradshaw engaged in a scheme to defraud in violation of section 6106...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:that Christine has a conflict of interest in purporting to represent the Minors in repudiating the agreements. We review that determination for an abuse of discretion and any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. (See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706 , 713 [abuse of discretion standard applies where trial court is in better position to “evaluate the consequences of a potential conflict [of interest] in light of the entirety of a case”].) Christine’s interest in defending the co-trustees’ claims against her is in conflict with the Minors’ interests because what: Superior Court (2008) in light of the entirety of a case”].) Christine’s interest in defending the co...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706 , 711−712.) Thus, we independently construe the meaning of “resident” in section 8402, subdivision (a)(4). We then determine whether substantial evidence supports the court’s factual finding that Janine was not a resident of the U.S. under that definition. Reversal is compelled only if under all the evidence, viewed in the: Superior Court (2008) −712.) Thus, we independently construe the meaning of “resident” in section 8402, subdivision (a)(4).
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:[that are] supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]’ (Ibid.) As to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706 , 711-712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) 43 Cal.4th 737, 742.) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra, at p. 712.)” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s: Superior Court (2008) -712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) .) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) 43 Cal.4th 737 , 742.) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra, at p. 712.)” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify counsel, “an appellate court: Superior Court (2008) -712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) .) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:and Joseph do not challenge that aspect of Judge Meisinger’s decision or the alternative decree, nor did they include the transcript of the hearing before Judge Meisinger in the record on appeal. 25 S268480; Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289 , 295 [same].) Moreover, a “party may be precluded from setting aside a voidable act or judgment made in excess of jurisdiction by ‘“principles of estoppel.”’ [Citation.] ‘When . . . the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court’s power: Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996)
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:lived in Idaho the whole time and have had no contacts with California. 14 These arguments fail. A defendant need not physically enter California at all to be subject to personal jurisdiction here. (Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062 , 1075.) Nor can the mother undo her lifelong California contacts by moving to a new state. No matter where they now live, Respondents’ activities have involved a trust that was created and managed in California, that is governed by California law, and that owned—and still owns— California real property.: Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) .) Nor can the mother undo her lifelong California contacts by moving to a new state.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:134 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 [raising an issue in a two-page footnote “is a violation of court rules that require arguments to be contained in discrete sections with headings summarizing the point”]; see also Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404 , 419-420 [an “appellant cannot bury a substantive legal argument in a footnote and hope to avoid waiver of that argument”].) 16 example, in American Contractors the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction when it declared a bond forfeited without complying with two “jurisdictional prerequisites” in: City of San Diego (2019) -420 .) 16 example...
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:distribution of estate assets and the priority of those claims. (Ibid.) It does not declare any party’s personal rights or obligations concerning any other party; it only declares their respective relationships to the estate. (Ibid.; compare Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57 , 71–73 [describing interpleader actions].) II. Analysis Section 11700, as case law explains, provides a means for the court to adjudicate the “rights of [an] heir, devisee, or legatee to a share of the estate.” (Estate of Flores, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.) An “heir” is a person “entitled: Gonzales (2019) –73 .) II.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:the allegations concerning the other patients. We thus consider forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s ruling striking the allegations concerning other patients, and express no opinion on the merits of that ruling. (Safeway Wage & Hour Cases (2019) 30 43 Cal.App.5th 665 , 687, fn. 9 [argument forfeited if not raised in opening brief].) Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal instead focus on her entitlement to tort damages based on the loss of the opportunity to conceive a child with Aaron’s sperm. This theory underlies all her tort causes of action. The SAC so: We thus consider forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s ruling striking the allegations concerning other patients, and express no opinion on the merits of that ruling.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:layer of jurisdiction exists. For jurisdictional purposes, civil actions and proceedings are classified as “ ‘in personam,’ ” “ ‘in rem,’ ” or “ ‘quasi in rem,’ ” depending on the nature of the judgment sought. (Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 U.S. 186 , 199 [53 L.Ed.2d 683].) An action that seeks to impose a personal liability or obligation on the defendant in the plaintiff’s favor is an in personam action, and the court must have jurisdiction over the defendant. (Kulko v. Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84, 91 [56 L.Ed.2d 132].) If: Heitner (1977) [53 L.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:[53 L.Ed.2d 683].) An action that seeks to impose a personal liability or obligation on the defendant in the plaintiff’s favor is an in personam action, and the court must have jurisdiction over the defendant. (Kulko v. Superior Court (1978) 436 U.S. 84 , 91 [56 L.Ed.2d 132].) If the court’s jurisdiction is based on its authority over property within its territory, the action is “ ‘in rem’ ” or “ ‘quasi in rem.’ ” In rem jurisdiction is traditionally based on the location of the property that is the subject of dispute: Superior Court (1978) [56 L.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:compensable. (Ibid. [" 'regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial us[e]" of her property' "].) There is also a "third 'essentially ad hoc' category of regulatory takings" under Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104 , 124 (Penn Central). (Bottini, at pp. 307-308 [primary factors are economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and character of the government action]....: New York City (1978)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:compensable. (Ibid. [" 'regulations that completely deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial us[e]" of her property' "].) There is also a "third 'essentially ad hoc' category of regulatory takings" under Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104 , 124 (Penn Central). (Bottini, at pp. 307-308 [primary factors are economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and character of the government action]....: New York City (1978)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:Southern Pacific Company took a controlling interest in CDC, and later foreclosed. In 1902, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act, to facilitate water reclamation in the West through the construction and operation of dams, reservoirs, and canals. (California v. U.S. (1978) 438 U.S. 645 , 648-650.) The Reclamation Act and supplemental legislation "generally limited to 160 acres the amount of private land in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project." (Bryant v. Yellen 8 A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use....: S. (1978) -650.) The Reclamation Act and supplemental legislation "generally limited to 160 acres the amount of private land in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:Southern Pacific Company took a controlling interest in CDC, and later foreclosed. In 1902, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act, to facilitate water reclamation in the West through the construction and operation of dams, reservoirs, and canals. (California v. U.S. (1978) 438 U.S. 645 , 648-650.) The Reclamation Act and supplemental legislation "generally limited to 160 acres the amount of private land in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project." (Bryant v. Yellen 8 A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use....: S. (1978) -650.) The Reclamation Act and supplemental legislation "generally limited to 160 acres the amount of private land in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979, the Court entered a decree setting forth the present perfected rights. (Arizona v. California (1979) 15 439 U.S. 419 (Arizona III).) The decree stated that the District had present perfected rights in "annual quantities not to exceed (i) 2,600,000 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145 acres and for the satisfaction of: California (1979) 15
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:The Court defined "present perfected rights" as rights perfected as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Project Act. (Ibid.) In 1979, the Court entered a decree setting forth the present perfected rights. (Arizona v. California (1979) 15 439 U.S. 419 (Arizona III).) The decree stated that the District had present perfected rights in "annual quantities not to exceed (i) 2,600,000 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145 acres and for the satisfaction of: California (1979) 15
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:form of title into a unified community property framework. III. “In community property [s]tates, ownership turns on the method and timing of acquisition, while the traditional view in common-law [s]tates is that ownership depends on title.” (Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo (1979) 439 U.S. 572 , 578.) Although California has always been a community property state, “for most of the state’s history California’s marital property law has contained strong elements of a separate property system....: Hisquierdo (1979) .) Although California has always been a community property state, “for most of the state’s history California’s marital property law has contained strong elements of a separate prop...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:to act on a request for intervention only upon the filing of a “timely application.” (§ 387, subd. (d)(1).) Thus, intervention is ordinarily allowed only where the nonparty has filed a petition to intervene. (Cf. Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 , 589 [intervention should be permitted only where the petitioner has satisfied the requirements of § 387].) Here, it is undisputed that Richard failed to comply with the requirements of section 387. Nevertheless, he claims party status by virtue of his uninvited answer to Tukes’s complaint.6 Although courts have occasionally: Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 589 .) Here, it is undisputed that Richard failed to comply with the requirements of section 387.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:additional cases in support of his claim that concrete injury is not required for standing in California—Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 (Angelucci), Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353 (Goehring), and McConnell v. Cowan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 805 (McConnell). In Angelucci, the all-male plaintiffs sued defendant supper club under the Unruh Civil Rights Act contending they were discriminated on the basis of sex due to the defendant charging them higher admission prices than its female patrons. (Angelucci, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 164–165....: Cowan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 805
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:of fact.’ ” (Veiseh v. Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1104, quoting Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103 , 1112.) “The trial court’s finding on the accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations is upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (Institoris v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 10, 17.) We affirm the trial court’s rulings and the judgment rendered in the: Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) “The trial court’s finding on the accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations is upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the section 1094.5, subdivision (c) interpretation. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 789 [citing Ettinger for its application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in professional license revocation proceedings]; Kapelus v. State Bar (1987) 44 Cal.3d 179 , 184, fn. 1 [same]; Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 817 [citing Chamberlain for “quoting Drummey’s ‘strong presumption of . . . correctness’ and burden of proof qualifications on independent judgment review”]....: State Bar (1987) 44 Cal.3d 179
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:in the court’s tentative ruling regarding her credibility, which the court addressed at the hearing and removed from its final order. 19 credibility determinations “whether the trial court’s ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474 , 479; accord People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528, fn. 7.) Nor was the trial court’s credibility finding “a clear abuse of discretion” where the court logically credited the declaration filed by Janine at a time when her residency was not at issue. Even otherwise, although the court: Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479; accord People v.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:at pp. 968–969.) 6 The distinction is a critical one, as “forfeiture results from the failure to invoke a right, while waiver denotes an express relinquishment of a known right; the two are not the same.” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386 , 411.) 6 Joseph W. also relied on certain older decisions in ordinary civil actions where the appellants knowingly went to trial but failed to object to the absence of a jury. (See Joseph W., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 968, citing City of Los Angeles v. Zeller (1917) 176: App.4th at pp. 968–969.) 6 The distinction is a critical one, as “forfeiture results from the failure to invoke a right, while waiver denotes an express relinquishment of a known right...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:to government agency interpretations of their own regulations, particularly when the interpretation involves matters within the agency’s expertise and does not plainly conflict with a statutory mandate.” (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459 , 490.) In reviewing such matters, the question for this court is “whether the construction offered by the CDCR, the agency that had promulgated the regulation and was charged with enforcing it, was clearly unreasonable.” (Cabrera, at p. 691....: California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) .) In reviewing such matters, the question for this court is “whether the construction offered by the CDCR, the agency that had promulgated the re...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 818 (Moore) [“SVP proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature.”]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843 , 860 (Allen) [“Proceedings to commit an individual as a sexually violent predator in order to protect the public are civil in nature.”]; Rowell, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [“An SVP commitment proceeding is not a criminal cause; it is civil in nature.”].) Therefore, certain protections afforded to defendants: Sivongxxay (2017) .) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) (Moore) ...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:under the supposed aegis of partnership authority, believed in the existence and legitimacy of the partnerships. The trial court necessarily found she did not, and its finding was not arbitrary. (See Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160 , 1204 [“so long as the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily and has a rational ground for doing so, it may reject the testimony of a witness even though the witness is uncontradicted”].) As set forth in Ashlock I and incorporated herein by reference, there was substantial evidence: Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996)
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:firm ordinarily is (a) an ‘executor’ named as such in the decedent’s will, (b) a successor to that executor, called an ‘administrator-with-the-will-annexed,’ or (c) an ‘administrator’ where the decedent died without a will naming an executor.” (Estate of Hilton (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 890 , 894, fn. 1; see Heath, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 400; § 8460, subd. (a).) An executor or administrator must preserve the estate, discharge debts, and distribute the residue to beneficiaries under the will or pursuant to the statutory rules governing intestate succession. (Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p.: In probate proceedings, the court appoints a personal representative to administer the decedent’s estate. “That person or firm ordinarily is (a) an ‘executor’ named as such in the decedent’s will, (b)...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:“‘sanctions available under the statute are limited to “attorney fees and costs,”’” and do not, for example, include travel expenses necessarily incurred to attend court hearings or vacation time used for relief from work obligations. (See Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340 , 350–351.) While “need” is irrelevant, the court must take into consideration “all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.” And in no event may the amount of the sanction impose “an unreasonable financial burden” against the sanctioned party. (§ 271, subd....: McDaniel (2019) –351.) While “need” is irrelevant, the court must take into consideration “all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:(B.R.L.F.); Matter of Guardianship of B.A.A.R. (Ct.App. 2020) 136 Nev. 494, 499 [474 P.3d 838].) Accordingly, we hold petitioners must prove the facts supporting SIJ predicate findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Citing to O.C. v. Superior Court (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 76 , Saul describes what he is advocating for as a “substantial evidence” standard. (See id. at p. 83 [paraphrasing § 155, subd. (b)(1) as providing that “if substantial evidence supports the requested SIJ findings, the issuance of the findings is mandatory”].) Nevertheless, Saul seems to acknowledge that a petitioner must: Superior Court (2019) , Saul describes what he is advocating for as a “substantial evidence” standard. (See id. at p. 83 [paraphrasing § 155, subd.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:of a petition for SIJ findings as an appealable order. (In re Israel O. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 279, 283.) Other courts have done so through writ proceedings. (Bianka M., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1015; O.C. v. Superior Court (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 76 , 82 (O.C.); Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 340, 343 (Leslie H.).) The cases do not discuss whether an appeal or a writ petition is the proper vehicle to obtain appellate review of an order denying a petition for SIJ findings. We hold that the order is: Superior Court (2019) (O.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:bankruptcy case is filed. (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2).) The Bankruptcy Code specifies that community property is part of the estate; bankruptcy courts look to state law to determine what property counts as community property. (See Butner v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 48 , 54.) The bankruptcy trustee in this case sought a declaration that the Redlands and San Bernardino properties are community property under Family Code section 760. The distinction between community and separate property matters because Ahn Brace has not joined in her husband’s bankruptcy petition....: United States (1979) .) The bankruptcy trustee in this case sought a declaration that the Redlands and San Bernardino properties are community property under Family Code section 760.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418 , 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276, 285-286.) Other findings requiring clear and convincing proof include whether a civil defendant is guilty of the “oppression, fraud, or malice” that allows for the imposition of punitive damages (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a)), whether a conservator can withdraw: Texas (1979) -424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:approach also harmonizes with the firmly established rule in criminal cases that the prosecution’s burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt affects how an appellate court reviews the record for substantial evidence. In Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 (Jackson), the United States Supreme Court considered “what standard is to be applied in a federal habeas corpus proceeding when the claim is made that a person has been convicted in a state court upon insufficient evidence.” (Id., at p. 309.) The Jackson court decided that “the critical inquiry on: Virginia (1979)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use. (Civ. Code, § 1415; De Necochea v. Curtis (1889) 80 Cal. 397, 407-408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.S. 352 , 360, 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 [parties included class representatives for Imperial Valley landowners with more than 160 acres].) However, the Reclamation Act provided that it would not " 'affect any right of any State . . . or of any . . . user: Curtis (1889) -408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) , 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 .) However...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use. (Civ. Code, § 1415; De Necochea v. Curtis (1889) 80 Cal. 397, 407-408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.S. 352 , 360, 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 [parties included class representatives for Imperial Valley landowners with more than 160 acres].) However, the Reclamation Act provided that it would not " 'affect any right of any State . . . or of any . . . user: Curtis (1889) -408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) , 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 .) However...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:did the trial court suggest Joanne would be rewarded if she elected to waive a jury trial—to the contrary, the court encouraged her to talk to her lawyer before making a decision. (See United States v. Leja (1st Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 86 , 95 [district court did not coerce defendant to waive his right to a jury trial even though the court indicated “a jury might have difficulty with the complexity of the case,” where the court also stated “‘I’m not pushing anybody’”].)7 7 Joanne also argues the record does not contain: Leja (1st Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 86, 95 [district court did not coerce defendant to waive his right to a jury trial even though the court indicated “a jury might have difficulty with the complexity of th...
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:themselves and therefore could not nominate an administrator].) Accordingly, the court turned to much older cases that construed a prior version of the statute requiring California residency. Although residence is not necessarily synonymous with domicile (see Smith v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 235 , 239 (Smith)), these cases seemed to equate the two in the probate administration context.5 5 To avoid repetition, we explore cases cited by the probate court in our discussion. 8 The court reasoned that “resident of the United States” under section 8402 was either synonymous with domicile or permitted: App.4th 78, 81 (Damskog) .) Accordingly...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) We construe the statutory language in context and in light of the statute’s purpose. (Apple, at p. 135; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727 , 735.) If the language is not ambiguous, “we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of 10 the language governs.” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) However, if there is ambiguity, we may “resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved: Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:of the child,’ .. . includ[ing] the circumstances leading to guardianship, the parent's efforts to maintain contact with the child, any exigencies that might hamper those efforts, and other evidence of commitment to parental responsibilities.” (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110 , 1132.) Section 1516.5 does not require, however, a showing of parental unfitness or that terminating parental rights is the least detrimental alternative for the child. Un re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1383....: .5 “requires the court to consider ‘all factors relating to the best interest of the child,’ .. . includ the circumstances leading to guardianship, the parent's efforts to maintain contact with the ch...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:illness.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) For dependency purposes, California law treats a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child similarly to neglect: as a basis for invoking jurisdiction to protect a child. (See In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217 , 1233 [“In the dependency context, the juvenile court intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent”].) The purpose of dependency law is “to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure: Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (R.T., at p. 629.) That provision “authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to s...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:Cal.4th 706, 711-712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) 43 Cal.4th 737, 742.) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra, at p. 712.)” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145 , 159.) When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify counsel, “an appellate court must uphold that decision.” (Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 778, 782.) “Credibility, even when based upon conflicting declarations, is determined by the trial court.” (Id.: Superior Court (2008) -712; People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) .) The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ (Haraguchi, supra...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843 [“‘an appearance of impropriety by itself does not support a lawyer’s disqualification’”].) “‘Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145 , 159.) Under this standard, the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, but its factual findings are reviewed only for the existence of substantial evidence supporting them, and its “‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’” (Ibid.) B....: App.4th 835, 843 .) “‘Generally, a trial court’s decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) .) Un...
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:asset of the community” and “not subject to division”].) Our Supreme Court has emphasized that, “few contracts would be enforceable if the existence of subsequent disputes were taken as evidence that an agreement was never reached.” (Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344 , 351–352.) As a practical matter, many property settlements that parties intend to be complete overlook or disregard some items of property. If we were to judge the “completeness” of a property settlement based solely on whether it provided for the precise allocation of every 22 item of community or: Liebermensch (2008) –352.) As a practical matter, many property settlements that parties intend to be complete overlook or disregard some items of property.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:the other evidence compelled the court to conclude Scott’s conduct was fraudulent. (See Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622–623 (Johnson).) We also observe that the Hogoboom treatise cites Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667 , 1673-1674, for the proposition, “A unilateral mistake of fact renders an agreement voidable where the mistake was known to and encouraged or fostered by the other party.” (Hogoboom & King, supra, at ¶ 9.75.7, p. 9-36 [italics omitted].) We disagree with that assertion because, under section 1577 as interpreted: Bank of America (1996)
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:loosely called “treble damages”), but to be precise they are not the same as damages. (Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 24 244 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1286 [Probate Code section 859 penalties are not equivalent to punitive damages]; Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066 , 1074 [same].) To the extent Royals’s attachment request was founded on statutory double or treble damages recovery under these two statutes, it did not fall within the authorizing provision in section 15657.01 of the Elder Abuse Act permitting issuance of an attachment in a financial elder abuse “action for: App.4th 1281, 1286 ; Estate of Ashlock (2020)
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:question of fact, the courts are unanimous that the reasonableness of an 18 administrative subpoena in a question of law,” in claimed support of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40 ; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including: Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) ; Grafilo v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:question of fact, the courts are unanimous that the reasonableness of an 18 administrative subpoena in a question of law,” in claimed support of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40 ; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including: Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) ; Grafilo v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors. [Citation.] It ‘empower[s]’ appellate courts ‘to examine “the entire cause, including the evidence,” ’ and ‘require[s]’ them ‘to affirm the judgment, 8 For this reason, we also reject the applicability of Conservatorship of E.B. (2020) 45 Cal.App....: B. (2020)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:or by resort to an administrative process. The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.” (Village of Hoffman Est. v. Flipside, Hoffman Est. (1982) 455 U.S. 489 , 498–499.) 3. Analysis We thus begin our analysis under the strong presumption that the City’s medical-marijuana regulations must be upheld unless defendants affirmatively demonstrate that those regulations are clearly unconstitutional. The zoning ordinances here were neither vague nor uncertain....: Flipside, Hoffman Est. (1982) –499.) 3.
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 753-754.) In those rare instances where the state does not provide such procedures, the record must demonstrate that the lack of observance of proper procedures was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, C.O. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.O....: Kramer (1982) -754.) In those rare instances where the state does not provide such procedures, the record must demonstrate that the lack of observance of proper procedures was harmless beyond a reason...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 769; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276, 285-286.) Other findings requiring clear and convincing proof include whether a civil defendant is guilty of the “oppression, fraud, or malice” that allows for the imposition of punitive damages (Civ. Code, §: Kramer (1982) ; Addington v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375 , 389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276, 285-286....: Huddleston (1983) ; see also Santosky v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:581, 591 (Lazzarone).) However, the probate court has inherent equitable authority to set aside an order or decree when extrinsic factors have deprived a party of a fair adversary hearing. (Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d 607, 614; Estate of Charters (1956) 46 Cal.2d 227 , 234–235; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 18 (Jorgensen).) Courts require a showing of extrinsic fraud or mistake in order to balance the public policy in favor of the finality of judgments with the policy in favor of providing litigants a fair opportunity to present a case. (Sanders,: App.3d 581, 591 (Lazzarone).) However, the probate court has inherent equitable authority to set aside an order or decree when extrinsic factors have deprived a party of a fair adversary hearing.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:fact within the province of the jury. The requisite showing of malice “is not limited to actual hostility or ill will toward plaintiff but exists when the proceedings are instituted primarily for an improper purpose. [Citations.]” (Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375 , 383.) “Malice ‘may range anywhere from open hostility to indifference. [Citations.]’ ” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) Malice may be found “where the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has no relation to the merits of the claim.” (HMS Capital, Inc. v.: Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 383.) “Malice ‘may range anywhere from open hostility to indifference. ’ ” (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.) Malice may be found “where the proceedings are initiated...
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:court erred in failing to make findings on voluntariness, any error was harmless because Brandy has not shown it is “reasonably probable” she would have received a more favorable result had the trial court done so. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836 (Watson); see also In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 303 [applying Watson standard to juvenile court error in failing to make statutorily required findings].) 26 Notably, Brandy admits she “does not contend that she was precluded from presenting evidence that bore on the issues of voluntariness.”: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson); see also In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (Ibid.) A miscarriage of justice results only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836.) Kim asserts that there was no evidence Weaver had a “consistent, semiautomatic response” to a repeated situation, namely, the execution of PMAs. Kim’s argument is based upon the relatively few instances Weaver had assisted a client with the signing of a PMA and her contention that there was: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Kim asserts that there was no evidence Weaver had a “consistent, semiautomatic response” to a repeated situation, namely, the execution of PMAs.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:case, based on our review of the record, it is not reasonably probable that, in the absence of the alleged error, Christine would have obtained a more favorable result. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836.) We therefore conclude that, if the court erred by ruling that Christine lacked standing to oppose the petition, the error was harmless. 3. The Court’s Approval of the Second GAL Agreement In determining whether to grant a guardian ad litem’s petition to approve a settlement of the ward’s: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We therefore conclude that, if the court erred by ruling that Christine lacked standing to oppose the petition, the error was harmless. 3.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:violation of due process was subject to harmless error review (that is, it was not structural error) without specifying whether the question of prejudice should be analyzed under the standard for state law error stated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), or some intermediate standard of prejudice. (See James F., at p. 911, fn. 1 [“[b]ecause we did not: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome), the more exacting standard for federal constitutional error of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:advise C.O. of his right to a jury trial, we consider the question of prejudice. The parties disagree on the relevant standard. The public guardian argues for application of the prejudicial error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836. Under that rubric, we must determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to C.O. would have been reached in the absence of the error. C.O. asserts the failure to advise and elicit a waiver was structural error requiring automatic reversal. We have decided that: Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Under that rubric, we must determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to C.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:settled, and disjunctive meaning. (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 622.) Kenton’s remaining statutory interpretation arguments rely on tools of statutory construction that need not be considered because the plain meaning is clear. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035 , 1045; Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 919.) Because the court found Kenton took property by committing elder financial abuse within the meaning of section 15610.30, double damages were proper without a separate finding of bad faith. b....: Pair (2009) ; Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 919.) Because the court found Kenton took property by committing elder financial abuse within the meaning of section 15610.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:had the authority to order him to file and diligently pursue an unlawful detainer action. His failure to raise the issue in the first instance with the trial court therefore forfeited the issue on appeal. (Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247 , 264–265.) Even assuming Braum had preserved the issue for appeal, defendants’ argument is based upon a faulty premise. The trial court’s liability findings against Braum were made on summary judgment and, contrary to Braum’s assertion, the allegations and evidence upon which the court’s liability determinations were made did not: Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) –265.) Even assuming Braum had preserved the issue for appeal, defendants’ argument is based upon a faulty premise.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:and section 15401). (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.) In 11 either statute is ambiguous, and it is well settled that in the absence of ambiguity, the plain meaning of the statutory language governs. (Fairbanks v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 56 , 61.) Moreover, having reviewed the legislative history surrounding the enactment of sections 15401 and 15402, including the Law Revision Commission’s 1986 report regarding the legislative changes, we find nothing inconsistent with our construction of section 15402....: Superior Court (2009) .) Moreover, having reviewed the legislative history surrounding the enactment of sections , including the Law Revision Commission’s 1986 report regarding the legislative changes...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:why it is insufficient.’” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.) This means “all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [appellant’s] own evidence.” (Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1245 , 1255, italics added; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Stacey has done none of those things, and it is “neither practical nor appropriate for us to comb the record on [her] behalf.” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 888.): City of Santa Barbara (1996) , italics added; accord, Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:claim in her opening brief. Therefore, good cause has not been shown for augmenting the record with the June 26, 2018, transcript. (Ct. App., Fifth Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 1(b); cf. Foothill Properties v. Lyon/Copley Corona Associates (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1542 , 1558, fn. 17 [denying a request to augment the record with irrelevant material]; Carleton v. Tortosa (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 745, 759, fn. 5 [same].) For the above reasons, the motion to augment is denied. 9. B. Respondent’s Motion to Strike Gabriel moved to strike (1) the transcripts in the: Lyon/Copley Corona Associates (1996) , fn. 17 ; Carleton v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:our case law also contains contrary suggestions that have contributed to what is now a significant split of authority among the Courts of Appeal. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635 , 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170-171; Osal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1200; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326; In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038. 16 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye,: App.4th 847, 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) ; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:712.)” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify counsel, “an appellate court must uphold that decision.” (Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 778 , 782.) “Credibility, even when based upon conflicting declarations, is determined by the trial court.” (Id. at p. 783.) 21 The California Supreme Court has explained motions to disqualify counsel as follows: “The authority of a trial court ‘to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every court: Superior Court (1996)
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:“special circumstances” where it is appropriate to allow the beneficiary to pursue an action because the personal representative cannot or will not act. (Bohn v. Smith (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 678, 680- 681 (Bohn).) For example, in Olson v. Toy (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818 (Olson), one of the defendants was both personal representative of a probate estate and the trustee of a trust that the beneficiaries of the probate estate contended should be declared invalid. (Id. 6 at pp. 821, 824.) The Court of Appeal found the beneficiaries had standing, reasoning that the defendant: Toy (1996)
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending proceeding and was therefore inadequate to inform those who could be notified by more effective means such as personal service or mailed notice.” (Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams (1983) 462 U.S. 791 , 795 (Mennonite).) In Mennonite, the United States Supreme Court succinctly stated the rule, “Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a 12 minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party . . .: Adams (1983) (Mennonite).) In Mennonite, the United States Supreme Court succinctly stated the rule, “Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a 12 minimum constitutional pr...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:training, discipline and employment of persons confined therein ….” (Pen. Code, § 5054.) Visitor safety is likewise an appropriate concern of CDCR. (See, e.g., §§ 3170, subds. (a), (b), (d)(1); 3176; 3177, subd. (b)(1)(D); 3262; 3263; Hudson v. Palmer (1984) 468 U.S. 517 , 526.) Thus, we are left to decide whether the interpretation given to the term “step- parent” by CDCR is “clearly unreasonable.” (Cabrera, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 691.) If it is not clearly unreasonable, we will defer to CDCR’s interpretation. Gann makes several arguments as to why the term: Code, § 5054.) Visitor safety is likewise an appropriate concern of CDCR. (See, e.g., §§ 3170, subds. (a), (b), (d)(1); 3176; 3177, subd. (b)(1)(D); 3262; 3263...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:both parties adopted that means of supporting their positions” and “participated in such presentation of the evidence as a matter of convenience . . . , they cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal.” (Estate of Fraysher (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131 , 135; accord, Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088; see McMillian v. Stroud (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 692, 704 [trial court did not err in failing to hold evidentiary hearing where appellants “neither expressly requested an evidentiary hearing . . . nor made an offer of proof establishing the: App.4th 1303, 1309.) When, however, “the parties did not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and both parties adopted that means of supporting their positions”...
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Conservatorship of Farrant
Context from opinion:probate proceeding here was contested. But appellant did not object to the probate court’s consideration of affidavits and declarations. By failing to object, appellant forfeited the issue. The probate court properly considered the affidavits and declarations. (Estate of Fraysher (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131 , 135 [“evidence which is admitted in the trial court without objection, although incompetent, should be considered in support of that court’s action [citations], and objection may not be first raised at the appellate level”]....: The probate court properly considered the affidavits and declarations. (Estate of Fraysher (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:claim that was unquestionably disposed of on the merits would support a favorable termination finding, even if other claims were disposed of on procedural grounds (i.e., not on the merits), appears to be dictum. (Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469 , 474 [obiter dictum need not be followed by appellate courts].) We nonetheless agree with the conclusion by the Lanz court. In doing so, however, we note a slight difference in our view of the significance of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 than that expressed in Lanz. The Supreme Court: Palermo (1956) 47 Cal.2d 469, 474 .) We nonetheless agree with the conclusion by the Lanz court.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:“between cases where a plaintiff is under a duty to inquire and those in which he has no such duty until he has notice of facts sufficient to arouse the suspicions of a reasonable man.” (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540 , 563 (Bennett).) A plaintiff who has no duty to inquire because of a fiduciary relationship does not need to show that he or she could not have discovered the facts earlier with a diligent inquiry. (Ibid.) Once a party actually becomes aware of facts which would make a reasonably: Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:property, they had a proprietary interest in the case].) In the Ivanhoe Irrigation District litigation, the California Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a federal contract that incorporated the Reclamation Act's 160-acre limit. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597 , 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken (1958) 357 U.S. 275 (Ivanhoe II).) The Court reasoned that the state functioned as a trustee of its domestic waters for the benefit of users, and that under state law, the right to use: All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597, 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:property, they had a proprietary interest in the case].) In the Ivanhoe Irrigation District litigation, the California Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a federal contract that incorporated the Reclamation Act's 160-acre limit. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597 , 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken (1958) 357 U.S. 275 (Ivanhoe II).) The Court reasoned that the state functioned as a trustee of its domestic waters for the benefit of users, and that under state law, the right to use: All Parties (1957) 47 Cal.2d 597, 606-607, 625 (Ivanhoe I), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:estate can be created in property devoted to a public use"]; Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) 139 Cal. 22, 24, 29 [beneficiaries had no rights to private ownership of water]; Madera Irrigation District v. All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681 , 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different from remedies available for deprivation of other rights, but this does not change the nature of the entitlement itself. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Wutchumna: All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681, 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different f...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:estate can be created in property devoted to a public use"]; Hildreth v. Montecito Creek Water Co. (1903) 139 Cal. 22, 24, 29 [beneficiaries had no rights to private ownership of water]; Madera Irrigation District v. All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681 , 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different from remedies available for deprivation of other rights, but this does not change the nature of the entitlement itself. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Wutchumna: All Persons, Etc. (1957) 47 Cal.2d 681, 691-693, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. in 18 We recognize that deprivation of a beneficial ownership right could potentially give rise to remedies different f...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:statute’s purpose of regulating professional misconduct, for acts of dishonesty “manifest an ‘abiding disregard of “ ‘the fundamental rule of ethics . . . without which the [legal] profession is worse than valueless.’ ” ’ ” (Levin v. State (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1140 , 1147; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 792–793.) 17 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Bradshaw culpable of engaging in a scheme to defraud the Gosey Trust by clear and convincing evidence. Bradshaw fraudulently held: State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, 446 .) The fact that lack of honesty can give rise to culpability for a scheme to defraud under section 6106 is consistent with the sta...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:by an element of deceit sufficient to prove moral turpitude warranting disbarment]; Crane v. State Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 124 [attempt to deceive escrow agents by deleting excerpts from a beneficiary statement without authorization]; Farnham v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429 , 446 [habitual disregard of client’s interests such as misrepresenting case statuses]....: State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, 446 .) The fact that lack of honesty can give rise to culpability for a scheme to defraud under section 6106 is consistent with the sta...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:at p. 592), we order Bradshaw disbarred. (See Lebbos v. State Bar, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 43– 44 [disbarment in first disciplinary action for attorney who lacked remorse despite committing multiple acts of dishonesty]; Weber v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 492 [attorney disbarred for misconduct involving moral turpitude and dishonesty in handling client and trust funds].) CONCLUSION We order that respondent Drexel Andrew Bradshaw, State Bar Number 209584, be disbarred from the practice of law in California and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. LIU, J. We Concur:: State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 492 .) CONCLUSION We order that respondent Drexel Andrew Bradshaw, State Bar Number 209584...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:objective determination of the ‘reasonableness’ of the defendant’s conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to the defendant, the institution of the prior action was legally tenable.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863 , 878 (Sheldon Appel).) The court determines if a claim is tenable by inquiring “whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.” (Id. at p. 886.) Thus, as the high court later explained, “probable cause to bring an action does not depend upon it being meritorious, as such,: Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:in criminal proceedings do not apply in SVPA civil commitment proceedings, including the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment rights to self- representation and confrontation. (Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 860-861; see People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 , 1193- 1195 (McKee) [because SVPA is not punitive, it does not violate ex post facto clause]; People v. Superior Court (Vasquez), supra, 14 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 57 [because SVPA is not a criminal prosecution, Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial does not attach].) However, as the Supreme Court: McKee (2010) - 1195 (McKee) ; People v.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:(Gonsalves v. Hodgson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 91, 98; Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1475; Galdjie, at p. 1343; Herrick v. State of California (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 156, 161; see Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298 , 1319.) Furthermore, when settlors transfer property to a revocable living trust, there is even more reason to conclude that the property’s title is held by the trustees, not the trust. Such property “is considered the property of the settlor for the settlor’s lifetime.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th: County of Los Angeles (2010) .) Furthermore, when settlors transfer property to a revocable living trust, there is even more reason to conclude that the property’s title is held by the trustees, not t...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:language used and the purpose sought to be accomplished.’ ” (Leader v. Cords (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1588, 1596.) “Generally, a trial court’s . . . award of fees and costs[] is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327 , 1332; Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017 [“the propriety or amount of an attorney fees award is reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard”].) However, the standard may change depending on the particular issue under review. “ ‘We independently review any legal issue regarding the appropriate: Lozano (2010) ; Castro v.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:court’s findings. We disagree. 1. Standard of Review The interpretation of a will presents a question of law for our independent review when there is no conflict or question of credibility in the relevant extrinsic evidence. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598 , 604; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331-1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however, those findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Crail: Standard of Review The interpretation of a will presents a question of law for our independent review when there is no conflict or question of credibility in the relevant extrinsic evidence.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.’ ” [Citation.]’ (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1171 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 113 P.3d 63] (Simon).)” (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686 , 712 (Roby).) “In State Farm, the high court articulated ‘three guideposts’ for courts reviewing punitive damages: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the: McKesson Corp. (2009) (Roby).) “In State Farm, the high court articulated ‘three guideposts’ for courts reviewing punitive damages: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:a cause of action." 2. Applicable law We review a ruling sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising independent judgment as to whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. (Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110 , 1115.) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will: Exchange (1996) .) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:a cause of action." 2. Applicable law We review a ruling sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising independent judgment as to whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. (Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110 , 1115.) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) Further, " '[i]f another proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists, this court will: Exchange (1996) .) "We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:the enactment. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 891, 905.) “Marital property settlement agreements are favored under California law [citation], and governed by general contract principles [citation].” (Safarian v. Govgassian (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1053 , 1063, fn. omitted.) A settlement “‘“must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” (Civ. Code, § 1636; [citation]....: Govgassian (2020) , fn. omitted.) A settlement “‘“must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascert...
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:(c).) Given the plain language of the statute, we are not at liberty to selectively enforce 35 portions of an agreement when any of those predicates are lacking.” (Ibid.) “‘Not valid’ does not necessarily mean ‘void.’” (Safarian v. Govgassian (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1053 , 1067.) Yet, as Knapp points out, construing “not enforceable” to mean “voidable” would essentially render the separate waiver portion of the statute superfluous: “If § 1615 were interpreted so that a party who was required (and failed) to sign a Separate Waiver could enforce a premarital agreement anyway, it: Code, § 1615, subds. (a), (c).) Given the plain language of the statute, we are not at liberty to selectively enforce 35 portions of an agreement when any of those predicates are lacking.” (Ibid.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:the validity of Barbara’s disclaimer. The trial court’s determination on standing presents a question of law which we review de novo. (San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73; Tarin v. Lind (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 395 , 403–404.) We hold that the undisputed facts confer standing on Simon under section 11700. Having reached that conclusion, we need not discuss his other arguments. I. Governing Law Probate proceedings are statutory; the language of the applicable statute defines the court’s powers and responsibilities. (See Bruno v. Hopkins (2022): Lind (2020) –404.) We hold that the undisputed facts confer standing on Simon under section 11700.
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:the complaint a reasonable interpretation. “‘[W]hen a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, but the plaintiff elects not to amend, it is presumed on appeal that the complaint states the strongest case possible.’” (Zolly v. City of Oakland (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 73 , 82.) In that circumstance, “unlike when a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we determine only whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action, and not whether the plaintiff might be able to do so.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) B. Analysis Generally, an executor: City of Oakland (2020) .) In that circumstance, “unlike when a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we determine only whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action, and not whether the plain...
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:themselves of a forum’s benefits if they intentionally direct their activities at a forum such that, by virtue of the benefit the defendants receive, they should reasonably expect to be subject to jurisdiction there. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462 , 475–476 (Burger King).) By focusing on the defendants’ reasonable expectations, this requirement ensures defendants will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely because of fortuitous or attenuated contacts or because of the unilateral activity of another party. (Id. at p. 475....: Rudzewicz (1985) –476 (Burger King).) By focusing on the defendants’ reasonable expectations, this requirement ensures defendants will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely because of fortuitous or...
- Conservatorship of R.J. : A court presumes that an attorney’s performance is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the claimant must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s conduct was deficient and...
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:827 [§ 17200 standing].) In the specific context of section 1820, “the proposed conservatee, spouse, domestic partner, relative, or other ‘interested’ agency, person, or friend has standing to file a petition for a probate conservatorship.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131 , 144, quoting § 1820, subd. (a).) When interpreting those terms, “ ‘ “ ‘ “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not: Jennings (2020) .) In the specific context of section 1820, “the proposed conservatee, spouse, domestic partner, relative, or other ‘interested’ agency, person...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:court to appoint a conservator of the person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et seq.), so that he or she may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and placement (§ 5350.1).” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131 , 142; accord, Conservatorship of Jose B., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 969-970.) “As defined by the Act, a person is ‘gravely disabled’ if, as a result of a mental disorder, the person ‘is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.’ (§: 7 disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.) The Act authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of the person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 et...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:mootness and forfeiture. 4 C.O. does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding of grave disability. 3 A. Mootness Pursuant to section 5361, the conservatorship order at issue automatically expired in May 2020. (See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131 , 152 (John L.).) C.O. acknowledges that the LPS conservatorship at issue here expired by operation of law but argues this court should not dismiss his appeal as moot. When a challenged conservatorship has ended, the appeal of that conservatorship is “technically moot.” (See Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th: Mootness Pursuant to section 5361, the conservatorship order at issue automatically expired in May 2020. (See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) (John L.).) C.
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Conservatorship of K.P.
Context from opinion:(b)), and “provid[ing] individualized treatment, supervision, and 3 The conservatorship challenged here ended, rendering the appeal technically moot. This problem frequently arises because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the appellate process. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131 , 142, fn. 2 (John L.).) The Court of Appeal concluded the issue K.P. raises is capable of repetition but likely to evade review. (Conservatorship of K.P. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 254, 257, fn. 2; see Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 709....: This problem frequently arises because a conservatorship’s duration is short, compared to the appellate process. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) , fn. 2 (John L.).
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Conservatorship of A.E.
Context from opinion:of a temporary appointment. This is a permanent appointment.” Discussion Section 1825, subdivision (a) requires that the proposed conservatee “be produced” at the hearing on the guardianship petition unless certain exceptions are met.3 (See, e.g., Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131 , 146 3 Section 1825, subdivision (a) states: “The proposed conservatee shall be produced at the hearing except in the following cases: [¶] (1) Where the proposed conservatee is out of the state when served and is not the petitioner. [¶] (2) Where the proposed conservatee is unable to attend: This is a permanent appointment.” Discussion Section 1825, subdivision (a) requires that the proposed conservatee “be produced” at the hearing on the guardianship petition unless certain exceptions ar...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:demurrer, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 528.) In addition, we consider judicially noticed matters. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32 , 42.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) We determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Committee: Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) .) We accept all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:is not a statute of limitations subject to tolling under the rule. “ ‘[A] statute of limitations normally sets the time within which proceedings must be commenced once a cause of action accrues.’ ” (McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2010) 48 Cal.4th 68 , 79, fn. 2, italics added.) “A cause of action is simply the obligation sought to be enforced against the defendant.” (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 657; see CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 158, 165 [same]; Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622,: 6 bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.”].
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:misapplied the doctrine of issue preclusion. Specifically, the probate court erred in concluding that dismissal with prejudice satisfies the “actual litigation” requirement for claim preclusion articulated in DKN. In his dissenting opinion in Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal....: Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) (Boeken), Justice Moreno observed as follows: “Although there is some controversy in the matter, the dominant rule in this state is that an issue that has been settled b...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:matter before it.” (Law Offices of Ian Herzog v. Law Offices of Joseph M. Fredrics (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 672, 680; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076 , 1087-1088.) For example, in Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 the court held the trial court adjudicating a personal injury action had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a fee dispute between the plaintiff and a nonparty court reporting company. Even though the dispute “was: App.4th 672, 680; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) -1088.) For example, in Serrano v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:his law of the case argument), at least for purposes of this appeal, by failing to raise them below. “‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014 , 1074.) He did argue that the property had already been sold “with the authority of the [probate c]ourt . . . .” He also argued that the probate court was “the proper place to determine the disposition of property from any decedent’s . . . estate.” He concluded that: And they are not germane to the trial court’s ruling. 10 Separately and alternatively, Bewley forfeited all of these arguments (other than his law of the case argument), at least for purposes of this...
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:for any reason, regardless of the correctness of its grounds as ‘ “ ‘[i]t is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review . . . .’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104 , 1128, fn. 12.) 9 Lynne asks this court to take judicial notice of the petition for probate of Mildred’s estate, filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court case number 18PR182639, based on her claim that it is relevant to establish her actual interest in the Trust based on the: City of Carlsbad (2020) , fn. 12.) 9 Lynne asks this court to take judicial notice of the petition for probate of Mildred’s estate, filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court case number 18PR182639...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:denying a demurrer because it may be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment — a remedy that is presumed to be adequate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration v. Superior Court (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 922 , 929; Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 393.) While “ ‘appellate courts are loath to exercise their discretion to review rulings at the pleading stage, they will do so where the circumstances are compelling and the issue is of widespread interest.’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court: Superior Court (2020) ; Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) .) While “ ‘appellate courts are loath to exercise their discretion to review rulings at the pleading stage...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:is necessary to meet constitutional standards.” (Estate of Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172, 187.) 4 4 The United States Supreme Court itself applied Mullane/Mennonite due process principles in the probate context in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope (1988) 485 U.S. 478 . In that case, the court recognized that an unsecured creditor’s claim against an estate was an intangible property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that statutory notice of the debtor’s probate by publication alone did not necessarily comply with due process....: Pope (1988) .
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’ ” (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210 , 232.) Abuse of process is distinct from the tort of malicious prosecution. “[W]hile a defendant’s act of improperly instituting or maintaining an action may, in an appropriate case, give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the mere filing or maintenance of a lawsuit— even for an: Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210, 232.) Abuse of process is distinct from the tort of malicious prosecution. “hile a defendant’s act of improperly instituting or maintaining an action may, in an appropri...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:guardian ad litem, it follows that the minor has the right to have counsel assist with such a petition and to appear on the minor’s behalf in court to advocate for the petition. (See Mendoza v. Small Claims Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 668 , 673 [“[t]he right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel”].) We therefore conclude that a minor capable of making informed decisions has the right to 11 As Jacqueline points out, precluding a minor from petitioning to remove a guardian ad litem would create an irrational anomaly: Small Claims Court (1958) 49 Cal.2d 668, 673 he right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel”].) We therefore conclude that a minor capable of making informed decisions has the right to...
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:is not defined by Catello. Rather, they must demonstrate standing when called upon to do so (Mendoza, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 810), which may properly occur for the first time on appeal (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432 , 438). Moreover, the siblings misunderstand the pleading requirements for, and purpose of, a quiet title action. Catello was required to name the siblings as defendants in her quiet title action because they were persons she knew might have claims to the property adverse to hers. (§ 761.020, subd. (c).): App.5th at p. 810), which may properly occur for the first time on appeal (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438).
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:has rendered services to an estate’s representative may obtain compensation by petitioning the superior court sitting in probate for an order requiring the representative to make payment to the attorney out of the estate. (§ 911.)” (Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868 , 873.) Former section 910 set forth the method by which the court calculated the attorney’s compensation. (Ibid.) 21 Lynne to pay an amount in excess of her potential interest in the Trust, assuming the other requirements of the statute were met. We now turn to Lynne’s contentions in that: 11 Former section 911 provided that “n attorney who has rendered services to an estate’s representative may obtain compensation by petitioning the superior court sitting in probate for an order requir...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:912.) Similarly, our review is de novo when “the question is predominantly legal” and “requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values.” (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881 , 888; Haworth, at p. 385.) That is precisely the type of review called for here. In ruling on Saul’s petition, the probate court did not weigh the evidence. It did not hold an evidentiary hearing or make credibility determinations based on what it heard and observed. Instead, it accepted: City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888; Haworth, at p. 385.) That is precisely the type of review called for here.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:the bond should be enforced.’ ” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 863, 879-880.) Finally, “[t]he policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of [a] statute.” (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301 , 308.) The plainly intended meaning of Emergency rule 9 is that statutes of limitation and repose for pleadings commencing civil causes of action—not deadlines for filing motions asserting defenses—are temporarily tolled....: Co. (2010)
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:Rule 9’s express purpose of extending statutes of limitations to permit the assertion of civil causes of action in response to an unprecedented pandemic cannot be judicially extended beyond its intended purpose. (People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 301 , 308 [“The policy -9- disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of [a] statute”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 88 [ “Inconvenience or hardships, if any, that result from following [a] statute as written must be relieved by legislation .... Construction may not: Co. (2010) statute”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:is required and it must be presumed that the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he [or she] can.’ [Citations.]” (Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1091 (Reynolds), overruled on other grounds in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 , 66.) As the high court stated more emphatically many years ago, an election not to amend after a demurrer to a complaint is sustained with leave to amend results in the plaintiff “ ‘practically confess[ing] that he [or she] has alleged in [the] pleading every fact [the plaintiff] is: . 28 “ ‘hen a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint and elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:trial, and a default jury trial unless he personally waived his jury trial right. The People assert in response that Washington has forfeited his equal protection claim by not asserting it in the trial court. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846 , 880, fn. 14 [defendant’s failure to “raise his equal protection claim in the trial court” forfeited the argument]; People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1447 [“an equal protection claim may be forfeited if it is raised for the first time on appeal”].) In his reply brief, Washington contends: Alexander (2010) , fn. 14 ; People v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Cal.App.4th at p. 260.) To show entitlement to leave to amend, “the appellant must show there is a reasonable possibility that the defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment.” (SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284 , 317.) In particular, it “ ‘must show in what manner [it] can amend [its] complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of [its] pleading.’ [Citation.]” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) 33 Tukes has done so here (and Richard does not argue: San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2020) .) In particular, it “ ‘must show in what manner can amend complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of pleading.’ ” (Rakestraw v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:793, 810 (Weddington Productions).) A new or altered term is material if “it changes the rights or duties of the parties, or [any] of them.” (Consolidated Loan Co. v. Harman (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 488, 491; see Humphreys v. Crane (1855) 5 Cal. 173 , 175 [a change that “does not vary the meaning, the nature, or subject matter, of the contract is immaterial”].) We review the court’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence and review legal conclusions 34 de novo. (Weddington Productions, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 815;: Crane (1855) .) We review the court’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:court.” (Ibid.) Thus, Tyrrell treated as parties those defendants that acted as though they had been sued and the plaintiff and the court had both treated them as having been sued. In Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Peterson (1936) 5 Cal.2d 601 , the plaintiff sued multiple assignees of an insolvent corporation’s assets, referred to in the opinion as “trustees.” A trustee that had not been named in the suit nevertheless answered the complaint and the matter proceeded to trial. Following trial, the trial court entered a judgment against the unnamed trustee.: Peterson (1936) 5 Cal.2d 601
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480 , 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264-1265 (Carrancho)....: County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 .) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480 , 491 [describing ordinary mandamus actions].) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264-1265 (Carrancho)....: County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 .) An ordinary mandamus suit "permits judicial review of . . . quasi-legislative acts of public agencies." (Carrancho v.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:a set of detailed procedural and substantive requirements. In 1972, our Supreme Court invalidated a predecessor statute that allowed summary pretrial deprivation of a defendant’s assets without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536 .) The Legislature “ ‘clearly had Randone in mind’ when drafting the current attachment statutes” (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 15 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 79), and the “safeguards” embodied in the Attachment Law are designed to rectify due process defects identified in Randone. (Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v....: Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536.) The Legislature “ ‘clearly had Randone in mind’ when drafting the current attachment statutes” (Hobbs v.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:proceedings from the category of judicial forfeitures and place them within the classification of legislative or statutory forfeitures.” (People v. Burton (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d Supp. 878, 883 (Burton), disapproved on other grounds in People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898 , 905.) “Prior to 1927 the method provided for enforcing a forfeiture of bail under Penal Code Sections 1305 and 1306 was by civil action upon the bond, brought by the District Attorney, which action could only be commenced after a declaration of forfeiture by the court in which the: Co. (1971)5 Cal.3d 898
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:alleging a claim under the CLRA based on a failure to disclose a material fact. A cause of action under the CLRA must be stated with reasonable particularity. (Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1261.) In Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082 , our Supreme Court recognized that it is possible to prove reliance on an omission by proving “that, had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of it and behaved differently.” (Id. at p. 1093.) The use of “one” in this statement refers to the plaintiff. Accordingly,: Wasserman (1993) , our Supreme Court recognized that it is possible to prove reliance on an omission by proving “that, had the omitted information been disclosed...
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:reasonably possible.” (in re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 918.) The automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct’—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (Un re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 310.) To this we add, ICWA’s laudable goal is to preserve Indian culture. But ICWA should not be abused to thwart legitimate adoptions. DISPOSITION The orders terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father are affirmed. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. GILBERT, P. J. We concur: YEGAN, J. PERREN, J.* *Retired: 3 Aida R.’s request to take additional evidence dated April 11, 2022, is granted. 10 reasonably possible.” (in re James F. (2008) .) The automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legisl...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:request to withdraw when withdrawal would result in an injustice or cause undue delay]; see generally In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 637 [the Legislature has declared that dependency actions be resolved expeditiously]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 310 [time is of the essence in dependency proceedings]; In re 11 Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 [same].) 11 In denying Patricia’s Marsden motions to replace her appointed counsel, the court implicitly recognized that bad behavior directed to one’s own counsel is not grounds for replacement: App.3d 1, 4 ; see generally In re Jesusa V. (2004) [the Legislature has declared that dependency actions be resolved exp...
- Conservatorship of R.J. : A claim of error that was not timely objected to or preserved at trial is forfeited and cannot be raised on appeal. appellate review is limited to issues that were properly raised and recorded in the...
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.] Similarly, article I, section 15, of the California Constitution provides: ‘Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . .’” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580 , 592–593.) “Although in some contexts article I, section 15, of the California Constitution may provide a level of protection higher than that afforded by its federal counterpart” (id. at p. 596), neither party suggests that, in this case, the California double jeopardy clause should be interpreted differently than the: Saunders (1993)
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:States when it would not be in their best interests to be returned to their home countries. (Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 153 (Nov. 29, 1990) 104 Stat. 4978, § 153; Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004 , 1012 (Bianka M.).) As amended, the law permits an immigrant “ ‘child’ ” — a term defined as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)) — to apply for special immigrant juvenile status if: (1) the child is a dependent of a juvenile court,: Superior Court (2018) (Bianka M.).) As amended, the law permits an immigrant “ ‘child’ ” — a term defined as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age” (8 U.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:abused, neglected, and abandoned unaccompanied minors through a process that allows them to become permanent legal residents.” (In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 915; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J), 1153(b)(4), 1255(a) & (h); Bianka M. v. Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004 , 1012−1013.) The USCIS may consent to grant 1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 SIJ status to an unmarried immigrant under 21 years of age if the immigrant is in the custody of an individual appointed by a state court with jurisdiction to determine: Superior Court (2018)
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:If the defendant subsequently fails to appear as required and the failure to appear is not excused, the court must declare the bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309 , 314; People v. North River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559, 563.) After the court declares the bail forfeited and the clerk of the court mails notice to the surety, the surety has a period of 185 days (known as the appearance period) to secure the defendant’s appearance in: Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) .) If the defendant subsequently fails to appear as required and the failure to appear is not excused, the court must declare the bail forfeited.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:issue preclusion requires “final adjudication” and “actual litigation.” (Id. at p. 825.) And, since DKN, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the two doctrines’ elements are distinct: “[c]laim and issue preclusion have different requirements and effects.” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322 , 326....: Matar (2018)
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:Law Revision Com. com., 19 West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2007 ed.) foll. § 1250.130, pp. 490-491.) 17 civil litigant’s equal access to the judicial system by recognizing exceptions to, or variations in, general procedural requirements. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 605.) Thus, in Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 236, 239, at a time when fee waivers in this state did not include costs for service of process, the court of appeal, relying on section 413.30, held indigent parties in family law cases whose spouses could not: Desta (2018) .) Thus, in Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.
- Conservatorship of R.J. : Ineffective assistance of counsel is established only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficient performance...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:courts. (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385.) Accordingly, an appellate court should accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898 , 912–913; see People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) And if a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer. (See Haworth, at p. 385; but see Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 344, 352 [not deferring: Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) –913; see People v.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:851.5 [a petitioner] must be attempting to recover assets in which there is an interest belonging to the decedent, hence, to the estate.” (Id. at p. 918.) The successor statute to section 851.5 was section 9860. (Parker v. Walker (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1173 , 1184; Estate of Phelps (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 332, 338.) That statute provided in pertinent part: “(a) The personal representative or any interested person may file a petition requesting that the court make an order under this chapter in any of the following cases: (1) Where the decedent while living: App.3d 913 (Scott), further noted that “to proceed under section 851.5 must be attempting to recover assets in which there is an interest belonging to the decedent, hence...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:identified any civil penalty that could be imposed in a comparable case, the third guidepost is not relevant in determining whether the punitive damages award in this case exceeds the constitutional limit. (See Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1 , 23.) 19 C. Appellants’ Conduct Was Reprehensible. Although we consider the second guidepost last, the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct is the most important of the three. The trial court found appellants’ conduct to be “despicable and reprehensible....: Co. (2016) .) 19 C.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:General Petroleum Corp. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 525, 530 [“a stockholder may sue as an individual where he is directly and individually injured although the corporation may also have a cause of action for the same wrong”]; Goles v. Sawhney (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1014 , 1018, fn. 3 [“A single cause of action by a shareholder can give rise to derivative claims, individual claims, or both.”]; Denevi v. LGCC, 31 LLC (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1222 [same].) But where a cause of action seeks to recover for harms to the corporation, the shareholders have: Sawhney (2016) , fn. 3 ; Denevi v.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:the subject properties.” Her subjective beliefs were, of course, an issue of fact for the trial 34. court to determine and one ultimately based on its assessment of her credibility. (See Doe v. Regents of the University of California (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055 , 1074 [“Credibility is an issue of fact for the finder of fact to resolve”]; Knight v. City of Capitola (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 918, 932 [“Good faith, or its absence, involves a factual inquiry into the [person’s] subjective state of mind”].) “Appellate courts ‘do not reweigh evidence or reassess the: Regents of the University of California (2016) ; Knight v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219 , 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705, 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at: Mazzaferro (2016) , footnote 11; In re Z.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:be done without violating its provisions, but it cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.’” [Citation.]’ (Williams v. Garcetti [(1993)] 5 Cal.4th [561,] 568.)” (People v. Mary H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 246 , 260.) “The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates— as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and: Mary H. (2016) .) “The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates— as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:amend. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer, and the standard of review on appeal is the same. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f)(2); Estate of Dayan (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 29 , 39–40.) We 5 review de novo the probate court’s judgment on the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings to determine whether the petition states a cause of action. (See Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 184–185.) We accept as true all material facts properly pleaded,: Standard of Review A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a general demurrer, and the standard of review on appeal is the same. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f)(2)...
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M.M. v. D.V.
Context from opinion:third parent show that it would be detrimental to the child to have only two parents, the putative third parent must meet the preliminary hurdle of establishing that he or she qualifies as a presumed parent. (In re M.Z. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 53 , 66 (M.Z.) [“a court considering a request for status as a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c) should initially determine whether or not a person seeking status as a third parent can establish a claim to parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act. Such an existing parent-child relationship is: Z. (2016) (M.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, footnote 11; In re Z.G. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705 , 720; In re F.S. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 812; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; In re Marriage of E. & Stephen P. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 983, 989-990; Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at page 208; In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247;: G. (2016) ; In re F.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:38–39 (Financial Casualty); In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1020.) The well-settled rules of statutory construction apply to the California Rules of Court. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902; People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961 , 966.) “ ‘Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We construe the statute’s words in context, and harmonize: Guerra (2016)
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:“the hearing [court] is best suited to resolving credibility questions, because it alone is able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and evaluate their veracity firsthand.” (McKnight v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025, 1032; see Connor v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047 , 1055 (Connor) [“On matters of credibility, we are reluctant to reverse the decision of the hearing panel, which had the opportunity to evaluate conflicting statements after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.”].) At the same time, “while we give great weight to both: State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:quash service of summons is appealable. “‘[W]hen statutory language is . . . clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.’ [Citation.]” (Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402 , 413.) Bewley also argues that the order setting aside the default is not appealable. As he points out, “no appeal lies from an order granting a motion to vacate a default entry 6 where no default judgment has been entered [citation]. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil: City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 413.) Bewley also argues that the order setting aside the default is not appealable.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Torrey Pines for that proposition. We acknowledge that collateral estoppel may apply where the parties have resolved issues in a manner that falls short of a full-blown trial. (See, e.g., California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658 , 664 (CSAA) [“a stipulated judgment may properly be given collateral estoppel effect, at least when the parties manifest an intent to be collaterally bound by its terms”]; but see Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725, 736, 736–737, fn. 1 [“A settlement which avoids trial generally does not constitute: Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 (CSAA) ; but see Rice v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:861.) And, of course, courts “should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22, citing Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785 , 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple....: Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:861.) And, of course, courts “should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 22, citing Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785 , 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple....: Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798–799.) As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in section 41821.5 applying to landfill data reporting are actually quite simple.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:a legal duty within the meaning of section 1577 is a mixed question of law and fact involving “the application of the rule to the facts and the consequent determination whether the rule is satisfied.” (Haworth v. Superior Ct. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372 , 384.) We need not decide whether the trial court’s determination is reviewed independently or for substantial evidence, because the result is the same either way. (See ibid. [explaining criteria for determining standard of review to apply to such determinations].) 24 would be undermined by presuming the existence of a: Superior Ct. (2010) .) We need not decide whether the trial court’s determination is reviewed independently or for substantial evidence, because the result is the same either way. (See ibid.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:the burden of proof in the [trial] court contends the court erred in making findings against [him]’ ”].) Trial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and weigh the evidence” than appellate courts. (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372 , 385.) Accordingly, an appellate court should accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912–913; see People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) And if a court holds: Superior Court (2010) .) Accordingly, an appellate court should accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Boling v.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:statement and many others below. The trial court did not address the bulk of Ginsberg’s evidentiary objections in its summary judgment ruling. We accordingly presume the objected-to evidence was admitted and considered by the court. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 , 534.) There is a “burden on the objector to renew the objections in the appellate court.” (Ibid.) Ginsberg’s assertions that various pieces of evidence were inadmissible, supported only by references to his objections below, are not sufficient to carry this burden. (Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC: Google, Inc. (2010) .) There is a “burden on the objector to renew the objections in the appellate court.” (Ibid.) Ginsberg’s assertions that various pieces of evidence were inadmissible, supported on...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:enactment. [Citation.] Finally, the court may consider the likely effects of a proposed interpretation because ‘ “[w]here uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.” ’ ” (Klein v. United States (2010) 50 Cal.4th 68 , 77 (Klein).) We assume without deciding that Parker was a “claimant” within the meaning of section 850, subdivision (a)(1) and thus had standing to bring her petition. 3 So assumed, this case presents an issue of first impression concerning the nature of “personal property” interests that may be asserted: United States (2010)
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802 , 818 (Moore) [“SVP proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature.”]; People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860 (Allen) [“Proceedings to commit an individual as a sexually violent predator in order to protect the public are civil in nature.”]; Rowell, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 451 [“An SVP commitment: Sivongxxay (2017) .) However, an SVP proceeding is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal prosecution. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) (Moore) ...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:as conservator, Foster had a fiduciary duty to Hudson that required Foster to account for transactions. “There is a fiduciary relationship between the conservator and conservatee. (§ 2101.)” (Conservatorship of Presha (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 487, 498; Conservatorship of Lefkowitz (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1310 , 1313.) The conservator must account to the court for the property of the conservatee with information about receipts, disbursements, transactions, and the remaining assets. (Johnson v. Kotyck (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 83, 89....: App.5th 487, 498; Conservatorship of Lefkowitz (1996) .) The conservator must account to the court for the property of the conservatee with information about receipts, disbursements, transactions, and...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:of proof. (See, e.g., Ettinger, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 856 [clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applied to a medical license revocation proceeding; independent judgment standard of review applied in trial court]; San Benito Foods v. Veneman (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1889 , 1895, 1897 [preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to revocation of food processor’s license; independent judgment standard of review applied in trial court].) As our Supreme Court said, “ ‘[a]s a matter of logic, a finding that must be based on clear and convincing evidence cannot be: Veneman (1996) , 1897 .) As our Supreme Court said, “ ‘s a matter of logic...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:DISCUSSION I. We Affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment and Orders Challenged in the 270 Appeals A. Applicable Standards of Review We review the trial court’s disposition of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1037 , 1043.) We also review de novo any legal issues properly raised on appeal of a fee award. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 690 (Reck); Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016–1017.) 7 However, where satisfied that a party is entitled to fees and: Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020) .) We also review de novo any legal issues properly raised on appeal of a fee award. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:he [or she] would have obtained a more favorable judgment or settlement in the action in which the malpractice allegedly occurred.” (Ibid.; Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1241; accord, Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1077 , 1091 (Masellis).) “‘If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not suffice to create a cause of action for: Jensen (2020) (Masellis).) “‘If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:front, that it would not exercise any discretion. The inherent power to dismiss, however, is a discretionary power. “A trial court’s failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (Fadeeff v. State Farm General Insurance Co. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 94 , 104.) In sum, we conclude that a trial court can exclude evidence as a sanction for the violation of an order to exchange witness lists — even when the exclusion amounts to a 1 Discovery is available in a guardianship proceeding. (Prob. Code, § 1000; Mota v. Superior Court: State Farm General Insurance Co. (2020) .) In sum, we conclude that a trial court can exclude evidence as a sanction for the violation of an order to exchange witness lists ...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:(d)(2), that a “[c]ourt or jury trial shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand,” unless the attorney for the proposed conservatee requests up to a 15-day continuance. As we stated in Conservatorship of Jose B. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 963 , 967, “We are deeply troubled by the 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 significant delay of over four months in holding a trial on [the] petition, especially given the lack of any justification by the court for most of the delay. [The: This delay strays far from the statutory requirement in section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), that a “ourt or jury trial shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:maximum amount of the property so affected.” (16A Cal.Jur.3d (rev. May 2020) Creditors’ Rights and Remedies, § 77.) It also ensures that the attachment request may be fairly and accurately determined in summary proceedings before trial. (Connecticut v. Doehr (1991) 501 U.S. 1 , 20 [“At best, a court’s initial assessment of each party’s case cannot produce more than an educated prediction as to who will win. This is especially true when,” as in a tort case where the plaintiff seeks damages for assault, “the nature of the claim makes any accurate prediction: May 2020) Creditors’ Rights and Remedies, § 77.) It also ensures that the attachment request may be fairly and accurately determined in summary proceedings before trial. (Connecticut v.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functionally comparable’ to those of judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their function.” (Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 429 , 435-436 [113 S.Ct. 2167, 2171; 124 L.Ed.2d 391, 399-400], fn. omitted [function performed by court reporters not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity].) 12 In the unique situation before us, the court’s listing orders did more than merely appoint Brock to sell the property. They vested an element of discretionary authority: Byers & Anderson, Inc. (1993) -436 [113 S.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:to determine ” ’ (State Farm, supra, at p. 425, quoting BMW, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 582.) [¶] State Farm’s reference to potential harm echoed the high court’s earlier decision in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. [(1993)] 509 U.S. 443 (TXO).” (Simon, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1173.) As the Simon Court recognized, “[i]n the wake of TXO, BMW and State Farm, a large number of federal and state courts have, in a variety of factual contexts, considered uncompensated or potential harm as part of the predicate for a punitive: Alliance Resources Corp.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:. It is clearly unproductive to deprive a trial court of the opportunity to correct such a purported defect by allowing a litigant to raise the claimed error for the first time on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 , 1138.) We need not address Tammy’s argument that Meyers’ testimony, by itself, failed to prove Tammy knew of Louise’s expectation. We resolve any conflict in the evidence in support of the trial court’s determination and give the evidence most favorable to Louise the benefit of every reasonable inference. (In: It is clearly unproductive to deprive a trial court of the opportunity to correct such a purported defect by allowing a litigant to raise the claimed error for the first time on appeal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:if fundamental rights are involved. This principle applies to administrative, not ordinary, mandamus. (Dominey v. Department of Personnel Administration (1998) 205 Cal.App.3d 729, 738, fn. 5.) Finally, we disagree with Abatti's assertion that under In Re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 , we are bound by factual findings to which the District did not object. One must object to avoid implied findings (id. at pp. 1133-1134), but this does not mean that such findings are not subject to review for substantial evidence. 10 the District. We thus begin with a threshold: App.3d 729, 738, fn. 5.) Finally, we disagree with Abatti's assertion that under In Re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, we are bound by factual findings to which the District did not objec...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:if fundamental rights are involved. This principle applies to administrative, not ordinary, mandamus. (Dominey v. Department of Personnel Administration (1998) 205 Cal.App.3d 729, 738, fn. 5.) Finally, we disagree with Abatti's assertion that under In Re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130 , we are bound by factual findings to which the District did not object. One must object to avoid implied findings (id. at pp. 1133-1134), but this does not mean that such findings are not subject to review for substantial evidence. 10 the District. We thus begin with a threshold: App.3d 729, 738, fn. 5.) Finally, we disagree with Abatti's assertion that under In Re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, we are bound by factual findings to which the District did not objec...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:agreements between spouses that purported to change the character of property, the Legislature enacted our present-day transmutation statutes. (Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) pp. 224–225; see Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262 , 269 (MacDonald)....: Rep. (1984) pp. 224–225; see Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 269 (MacDonald).) The legislation provides that for property acquired on or after January 1, 1985...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:appeal is moot. We disagree. 1. The District's contentions regarding the nature of farmers' rights is not barred by collateral or judicial estoppel "Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 , 341, citation omitted.) The doctrine's requirements are as follows: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding....: Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, citation omitted.) The doctrine's requirements are as follows: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:appeal is moot. We disagree. 1. The District's contentions regarding the nature of farmers' rights is not barred by collateral or judicial estoppel "Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings." (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 , 341, citation omitted.) The doctrine's requirements are as follows: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding....: Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, citation omitted.) The doctrine's requirements are as follows: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:a 22 Additionally, although pre-1914 rights holders do not need a State Board permit, they are subject to its oversight and must file a statement of diversion and use. (Cal. Farm Bureau Fed. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 421 , 428-429; § 5101.) Abatti has not established that he or other District farmers have filed such statements with the State Board, and the State Board has recognized the District, not individual farmers, as the pre-1914 rights holder. (See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (1986) 186: Control Bd. (2011) -429; § 5101.) Abatti has not established that he or other District farmers have filed such statements with the State Board, and the State Board has recognized the District, not ind...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:a 22 Additionally, although pre-1914 rights holders do not need a State Board permit, they are subject to its oversight and must file a statement of diversion and use. (Cal. Farm Bureau Fed. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 421 , 428-429; § 5101.) Abatti has not established that he or other District farmers have filed such statements with the State Board, and the State Board has recognized the District, not individual farmers, as the pre-1914 rights holder. (See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (1986) 186: Control Bd. (2011) -429; § 5101.) Abatti has not established that he or other District farmers have filed such statements with the State Board, and the State Board has recognized the District, not ind...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:and Abetting” was “properly dismissed.” II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review On appeal from a judgment based on an order sustaining a demurrer, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524 , 528.) In addition, we consider judicially noticed matters. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1,: Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) .) In addition, we consider judicially noticed matters. (Committee for Green Foothills v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:and which is not included in the record of this appeal. Even assuming the August 16, 2019 order was appealable, we do not have jurisdiction to review it in this appeal. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751 , 761, fn. 8 [“if an order is appealable, [an] appeal must be taken or the right to appellate review is forfeited”];Williams v. Impax Laboratories, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1071 [same].) In addition, the vast majority of Michael and Joseph’s argument appears in a footnote. (See Sabi v. Sterling: Even assuming the August 16, 2019 order was appealable, we do not have jurisdiction to review it in this appeal. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) , fn. 8 [“if an order is appealable...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case”]; see also Rasmussen v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 804 , 808 [conclusion that trial court had erroneously granted defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion did not result in a finding that the action was finally decided in the plaintiff’s favor]; Mendoza v. Wichmann (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1448, fn. 5 [in reviewing order denying special motion to strike malicious prosecution claim, the: Superior Court (2011) ; Mendoza v.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:disqualification of her mother from representing her in litigation against her former stepfather and her mother’s ex-husband over events occurring in the course of the marriage will “open the floodgate of abusive disqualification motions.” (Cf. People v. 25 Peoples (1997) 51 Cal.App....: People v. 25 Peoples (1997)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:the same offenses as the civil actions. (See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 301 [two narcotics sales, “although made to the same person, were distinct and separate sales made at different times”]; People v. Cuevas (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 620 , 624 [no bar to successive prosecutions where “offenses committed at different times and at different places”].) B. Excessive Fines 1....: Cuevas (1996) .) B.
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : An applicant seeking ex parte relief must affirmatively allege, with personal‑knowledge facts, that the moving party will suffer irreparable harm or faces an immediate danger (or otherwise satisfy the...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:“the rule that legal arguments made in the trial court but not addressed in an opening brief are forfeited is a discretionary one, and we may consider the merits of the arguments.” (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299 , 321.) Second, a respondent who has advanced multiple theories in support of a demurrer or judgment on the pleadings may be deemed to have abandoned those theories by failing to reassert them on appeal. (Platner v. Vincent (1921) 187 Cal. 443, 447 22 (Planter) [“Respondent in her brief does: App. 126, 134 very point relied upon for reversal should be stated and argued in the opening brief of counsel for the appellant; and therefore points not so stated and argued may be deemed to be waive...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:(Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844, 851.) “Normally, we must presume the trial court was aware of and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law. [Citations.]” (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299 , 333–334 (Barriga).) “If the record demonstrates the trial court was unaware of its discretion or that it misunderstood the scope of its discretion under the applicable law, the presumption has been rebutted, and the order must be reversed. [Citation.] ‘“[A]ll exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned: App.5th 844, 851.) “Normally, we must presume the trial court was aware of and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law. ” (Barriga v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:the exclusive method of revocation,” that method must be used. (Ibid.; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551, 552.) To do so, the trust must contain “an explicit statement that the trust’s revocation method is exclusive.” (Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 571 , 581, 584.) Thus, “section 15401, subdivision (a)(2) ‘provides a default method of revocation where the trust is silent on revocation or does not explicitly provide the exclusive method.’ ” (Id. at p. 587, italics omitted.) Section 15402, by contrast, governs modification of a trust. It states: “[u]nless the trust: Mitchell-Clyde (2020) , 584.) Thus, “section 15401, subdivision (a)(2) ‘provides a default method of revocation where the trust is silent on revocation or does not explicitly provide the exclusive met...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A); City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703 , 712; compare Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A) with recur between them if the statutory interpretation issue is not resolved by this court, the parties have urged us to decide this appeal. And we agree that we should. (See Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles: All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020) ; compare Code Civ.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A); City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 703 , 712; compare Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A) with recur between them if the statutory interpretation issue is not resolved by this court, the parties have urged us to decide this appeal. And we agree that we should. (See Los Angeles Internat. Charter High School v. Los Angeles: All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020) ; compare Code Civ.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:the first time at oral argument that any mistake of law on the part of Ms. Rain should be attributed to Brandy for purposes of rescission under section 1578. That contention has been forfeited. (Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 726 , 738, fn. 4.) In any event, Brandy cannot show her execution of the revised Agreement was due to any mistake of law by Ms. Rain because Brandy and Ms. Rain never discussed the revised Agreement. Further, we cannot presume Ms. Rain would have failed to recognize her mistake in: LLC (2020) , fn. 4.) In any event, Brandy cannot show her execution of the revised Agreement was due to any mistake of law by Ms.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:available, stating that the court was familiar with the region and that most gates served a single field, or fields owned by a single farm. The court's personal experience is not evidence. (Cf. United States v. Berber-Tinoco (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 1083 , 1091 [judge may not rely on personal experience to take judicial notice].)41 Thus, while the record reflects that the District had 41 For similar reasons, we reject the superior court's reliance on certain Board members' purported recognition that historical use would be a better method of apportionment than straight: -Tinoco (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 1083, 1091 .)41 Thus, while the record reflects that the District had 41 For similar reasons...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:available, stating that the court was familiar with the region and that most gates served a single field, or fields owned by a single farm. The court's personal experience is not evidence. (Cf. United States v. Berber-Tinoco (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 1083 , 1091 [judge may not rely on personal experience to take judicial notice].)41 Thus, while the record reflects that the District had 41 For similar reasons, we reject the superior court's reliance on certain Board members' purported recognition that historical use would be a better method of apportionment than straight: -Tinoco (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3d 1083, 1091 .)41 Thus, while the record reflects that the District had 41 For similar reasons...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:accorded the protections afforded criminal defendants, punitive damages always “ ‘pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.’ ” (State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 417, quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg (1994) 512 U.S. 415 , 432.) On the less than fully developed record presented in summary attachment proceedings, it would pose too great a risk of arbitrary deprivation if trial courts were charged with projecting the likelihood of punitive damages recovery. There are too many nuances to the multi-pronged test governing punitive damages (Simon: Oberg (1994) .) On the less than fully developed record presented in summary attachment proceedings, it would pose too great a risk of arbitrary deprivation if trial courts were charged with projectin...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:Constitution places constraints on state court awards of punitive damages. (See State Farm Mut. Automobile 9 Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416–418 [155 L.Ed.2d 585, 123 S.Ct. 1513] (State Farm); BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 , 568 [134 L.Ed.2d 809, 116 S.Ct. 1589] (BMW).) We recently explained the basis of these constraints: ‘The imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process entitles a tortfeasor to “ ‘fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but: Gore (1996) [134 L.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:custody cases finding a due process violation”]; see also In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 245 [order terminating parental rights is “widely recognized as ranking ‘among the most severe forms of state action’”]; see generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1996) 519 U.S. 102 , 128.) Patricia’s right to actively participate in this dependency proceeding may not be disregarded for the sake of 9 expediency. (See In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, representing her. (We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s May 7, 2021 order terminating Patricia’s parental rights pursuant to: J. (1996) .) Patricia’s right to actively participate in this dependency proceeding may not be disregarded for the sake of 9 expediency. (See In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:being informed of his birth suggests O’Brian would have treated Adam similarly. It certainly does not support a conclusion that, had O’Brian been aware of Adam’s birth, he would have reacted differently and provided for Adam. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1 , 12 [“The general rule . . . is that material factual allegations in a verified pleading that are omitted in a subsequent amended pleading without adequate explanation will be considered by the court in ruling on a demurrer to the later pleading.”].) 15 15 Indeed, Adam’s earlier petition alleges: Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:on a pro bono basis in support of the Court of Appeal’s holdings. We thank them for their service. 10 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. when it enacted section 155. (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894 , 907.) Federal statutes and regulations do not specify a burden of proof to be used by state courts making SIJ predicate findings. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2022).) However, application of a preponderance of the evidence standard is consistent with the practice of federal authorities: Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 907.) Federal statutes and regulations do not specify a burden of proof to be used by state courts making SIJ predicate findings. (See 8 U.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:costly legal battles.” As a court, it is not our role “to ‘ “sit in judgment of the Legislature’s wisdom in balancing such competing public policies.” ’ ” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100 , 1113.) Instead, we must “ ‘follow the public policy choices actually discernible from the Legislature’s statutory enactments.’ ” (Id. at p. 1114.) The statutory language, purpose, and context here clearly support the trial court’s conclusion Hankin had no standing as an “interested person” pursuant to section 1820. For that: Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) .) Instead, we must “ ‘follow the public policy choices actually discernible from the Legislature’s statutory enactments.’ ” (Id. at p. 1114.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:“California Supreme Court has rejected adopting Article III standards for purposes of California standing doctrine in cases decided after Associated Builders and People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation,” citing Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155 , 166 (Save the Plastic Bag). In our view, Limon inaccurately characterizes Save the Plastic Bag. Moreover, he conflates “rejecting adopt[ion] of Article III standing” with rejecting any commonality 24. among standing requirements in the federal and California judicial systems....: City of Manhattan Beach (2011) (Save the Plastic Bag). In our view, Limon inaccurately characterizes Save the Plastic Bag.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:[but elected not to] do not demonstrate incompetence” under Penal 5 Code section 1367 ]; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1034 [“an uncooperative attitude is not, in and of itself, substantial evidence of incompetence”]; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856 , 893 [“‘the test, in a section 1368 proceeding, is competency to cooperate, not cooperation’”]; People v. Medine (1995) 11 Cal.4th 5 Penal Code section 1367 provides a defendant is incompetent for purposes of a criminal trial “if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the: Clark (2011) ; People v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:of continuing her education, to find a buyer for the Property in purported reliance on the Bennett Trustee’s alleged promise. These allegations are sufficient to create a question of fact on the issue of estoppel. In Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054 , 1069, allegations that the plaintiff retired from her job, moved in with a man, and performed spousal duties for him for five years based on his oral promises to devise property to her created questions of fact regarding estoppel. Similarly, in Carlson v. Richardson (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 204, 208,: Laura (1997) , allegations that the plaintiff retired from her job, moved in with a man, and performed spousal duties for him for five years based on his oral promises to devise property to her create...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:‘[o]bvious reasons of fairness,’ ” issues “ ‘raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.’ ” (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754 , 764.) We decline to address Surety’s belatedly asserted argument. 10 In sum, we conclude Emergency rule 9 did not toll the appearance period. Accordingly, the trial court did not prematurely enter summary judgment on the bond, and the judgment is not voidable on that basis. IV. DISPOSITION The judgment: Hoffman (1997) .) We decline to address Surety’s belatedly asserted argument. 10 In sum, we conclude Emergency rule 9 did not toll the appearance period.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:brief forfeits the issue on appeal”].) “‘“To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.”’” (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754 , 764.) Thus, “[w]hen new arguments are raised in the reply brief, to which respondent has no opportunity to respond, we are not required to consider them.” (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 171.) Stacey’s reply brief raises several new issues. The most notable example is a claim regarding: Hoffman (1997) .) Thus, “hen new arguments are raised in the reply brief, to which respondent has no opportunity to respond, we are not required to consider them.” (Baptist v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the Maleti Respondents had no potential liability under the remaining claims asserted by McLaughlin. This decision appears “technical or procedural,” not “substantive,” and thus does not reflect the merits. (Lackner, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 751.) Robbins v. Blecher (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 886 supports this conclusion. There, the malicious prosecution defendants had prevailed against a corporation, and while that case was on appeal, they filed a separate action against Robbins alleging that he was the corporation’s alter ego. (Id. at p. 890....: Blecher (1997) supports this conclusion.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:of a bail bond. We disagree. 1. Scope and Standard of Review We independently review and interpret Judicial Council emergency rules. (See People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33, 38–39 (Financial Casualty); In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013 , 1020.) The well-settled rules of statutory construction apply to the California Rules of Court. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902; People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961, 966.) “ ‘Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving: P. (2020) .) The well-settled rules of statutory construction apply to the California Rules of Court. (Alan v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:Family Code and Probate Code.” The Judicial Council explained the background of Emergency rule 9, and the reasons for amending it, in a Circulating Order. (See fn. 3, ante.) We independently review Judicial Council emergency rules. (In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013 , 1020.) B. Analysis We will assume without deciding that a bail forfeiture proceeding is a civil cause of action or special proceeding within the meaning of Emergency rule 9. (See American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657 [“While bail 5 The August 3, 2020 summary judgment would be: P. (2020) .) B.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A renewed judgment may be vacated if the moving party could assert any defense that would defeat a direct action on the underlying judgment, such as lack of enforceability or a statute‑of‑limitations...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), an unpublished appellate court or superior court appellate department opinions must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action. (See Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 , 399 [refusing to consider unpublished, tentative decision from the superior court in Los Angeles County in an unrelated case].) Nonetheless, despite this rule, Kim discusses the case in her brief. 50 to ensure some form of parity with the wealthier parents’ standard of living so that the children do: Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020)
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:200 Cal.App.4th at p. 720 [finding the Stuyvesant court’s “statute of limitations analogy . . . not helpful”].) “ ‘It is 9 axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360 , 386-387.) In arguing that Emergency rule 9 applies to the appearance period, Surety invokes the general proposition that “issues dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture.” But the Supreme Court has found this “oft-repeated: Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) -387.) In arguing that Emergency rule 9 applies to the appearance period, Surety invokes the general proposition that “issues dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must b...
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:one label or the other’” and (2) “‘whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,’ [citation], as to ‘transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” (Hudson v. United States (1997) 522 U.S. 93 , 99.) 3. Analysis Defendant contends in his opening brief that he “pled nolo contendere and was convicted on all charges.” But, as we discuss above, the record on appeal does not indicate whether defendant was sentenced on January 15, 2015, or whether, at the conclusion of a 12-month period: United States (1997) .) 3.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:contend the penalties imposed, which totaled $5,967,500, were unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment because: the penalties were grossly disproportionate to the offenses; the trial court failed to properly consider the four factors mandated by United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321 (Bajakajian); and the imposition of daily penalties is suspect and disfavored. 26 2. Legal Principles “The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted....: Bajakajian (1998) (Bajakajian); and the imposition of daily penalties is suspect and disfavored. 26 2.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:to the rule and the Judicial Council’s circulating order memorandum support the conclusion that Emergency Rule 9 does not extend the timelines set forth in the Penal Code sections governing bail bond forfeiture procedures.”].) Relying on People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651 , Surety asserts that “a motion to vacate forfeiture commences an action for relief from forfeiture that is a final determination in a matter collateral to the criminal prosecution.” But the threshold question in that case, to which Surety directs our attention, concerned the finality and appealability of an order: Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, Surety asserts that “a motion to vacate forfeiture commences an action for relief from forfeiture that is a final determination in a matter collateral to the criminal pros...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:II, at p. 278.) On remand, the California Supreme Court repudiated the trust theory as to the state, but did not revisit the relationship between the irrigation district as trustee and its users. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 692 , 715-716 (Ivanhoe III).) 24 water." (Id. at p. 371, citing Ivanhoe I, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 624- 625.) (See Bryant, at p. 371, fn. 23 [landowners have "legally enforceable right, appurtenant to their lands, to continued service by the District," citing, inter alia, Erwin, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at: All Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 692, 715-716 (Ivanhoe III).) 24 water." (Id. at p. 371, citing Ivanhoe I, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 624- 625.) (See Bryant, at p. 371, fn.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:II, at p. 278.) On remand, the California Supreme Court repudiated the trust theory as to the state, but did not revisit the relationship between the irrigation district as trustee and its users. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 692 , 715-716 (Ivanhoe III).) 24 water." (Id. at p. 371, citing Ivanhoe I, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 624- 625.) (See Bryant, at p. 371, fn. 23 [landowners have "legally enforceable right, appurtenant to their lands, to continued service by the District," citing, inter alia, Erwin, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at: All Parties (1960) 53 Cal.2d 692, 715-716 (Ivanhoe III).) 24 water." (Id. at p. 371, citing Ivanhoe I, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 624- 625.) (See Bryant, at p. 371, fn.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. particular, “the hearing [court] is best suited to resolving credibility questions, because it alone is able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and evaluate their veracity firsthand.” (McKnight v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025 , 1032; see Connor v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047, 1055 (Connor) [“On matters of credibility, we are reluctant to reverse the decision of the hearing panel, which had the opportunity to evaluate conflicting statements after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.”].) At: State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025, 1032; see Connor v.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:deflected responsibility toward his lawyer Robello and has yet to acknowledge his wrongdoing. Because Bradshaw “has no appreciation that [his] method of practicing law is totally at odds with the professional standards of this state” (Lebbos v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37 , 45), we accord substantial weight to this factor. B. As for mitigation, “[a] lawyer must establish mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.” (Standards, supra, std. 1.6....: State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:the Circumstances Joanne contends the trial court’s jury waiver advisement was inadequate because the court did not inform her that she could participate in jury selection through her attorney. But as the Supreme Court held in People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056 , 1072-1074, the lack of an advisement that a defendant has the right to participate in jury selection does not automatically render a jury trial advisement invalid. Joanne argues Weaver is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s later decision in Sivongxxay. To the contrary, the Sivongxxay: Weaver (2012) -1074, the lack of an advisement that a defendant has the right to participate in jury selection does not automatically render a jury trial advisement invalid.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:that unforeseen ambiguities can and do come to light despite the drafters' considered efforts to avoid them. In such cases, courts may consult appropriate extrinsic sources to clarify the drafters' intent. [Citation.]’ ” (Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387 , 391–392, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 266 P.3d 1022 (Rossa).) Emergency Rule 9 was adopted by the Judicial Council on April 6, 2020 following Governor Newsom’s March 27, 2020 order giving the Judicial Council the authority to take the -2- necessary action to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency Rule 9: L. Falk Construction, Inc. (2012) –392, 135 Cal.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:other incorrect decisions and engaged in supposed wrongdoing. They are forfeited. (See People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 197 [“Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”]; Shih v. Starbucks Corp. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1063 , 1071, fn. 4 [the plaintiff “forfeited this argument . . . by failing to raise it in her opening brief”].) II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Sanctions The trial court imposed sanctions of $5,577 on Hankin for maintaining the Hankin Petition after Sobel’s withdrawal.: Starbucks Corp. (2020) , fn. 4 .) II.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:they have also equated the “beneficially interested” test for standing in California to the injury-in-fact prong of the Article III test for standing in the federal courts (e.g., People for Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement v. Spitzer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391 , 407–408; Synergy Project Management, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 21, 30–31; SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1053; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 706–707).: Spitzer (2020) –408; Synergy Project Management, Inc. v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:failure to appear is not excused, the court must declare the bail forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 314; People v. North River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559 , 563.) After the court declares the bail forfeited and the clerk of the court mails notice to the surety, the surety has a period of 185 days (known as the appearance period) to secure the defendant’s appearance in court. The surety may seek an extension of the appearance period: Co. (2020) .) After the court declares the bail forfeited and the clerk of the court mails notice to the surety, the surety has a period of 185 days (known as the appearance period) to secure the defe...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:(People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 35, 42 (Financial Casualty).) If the defendant “fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the court must declare the bail forfeited.” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559 , 563 (North River–Watts); see Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (a);1 Financial Casualty, at p. 42.) This “forfeiture . . . constitutes a ‘breach of th[e] contract’ between the surety and the government.” (People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 709 (Safety National Casualty).) For forfeiture of: Co. (2020) (North River–Watts); see Pen.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:they were inconsistent with the court’s rule (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010, fn. 7) and the rule has subsequently been applied to issues outside the probate context (see, e.g., King v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 675 , 711 [applied to review of punitive damages award]; Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1089-1090 [same]; In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 123 [applied to dispositional order removing a child]). As explained ante, “the superior court, in an administrative mandamus proceeding, must apply: Bank National Assn. (2020) ; Morgan v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the amount of default discovery permitted under the arbitration agreement, the standard for obtaining additional discovery, and whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the discovery limitations will prevent them from adequately arbitrating their statutory claims. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Kozak (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 897 , 910–911, italics added.) As illustrated by the cases involving employment arbitration agreements, when important statutory rights are at stake, courts are not always constrained to examine unconscionability at the time of execution of an agreement....: Kozak (2020) –911, italics added.) As illustrated by the cases involving employment arbitration agreements, when important statutory rights are at stake...
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:describes property as a “bundle of sticks”—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.’” (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, 157 (Union Pacific), quoting United States v. Craft (2002) 535 U.S. 274 , 278; see also Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 (Bounds) [“Case law recognizes that property rights are a complex ‘bundle of rights’”].) Some of the sticks in the bundle for Atiyeh’s house passed to Ring in her individual capacity immediately upon Atiyeh’s death, but not all: Craft (2002) ; see also Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:but also presents due process problems. Because civil defendants are not accorded the protections afforded criminal defendants, punitive damages always “ ‘pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.’ ” (State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408 , 417, quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg (1994) 512 U.S. 415, 432.) On the less than fully developed record presented in summary attachment proceedings, it would pose too great a risk of arbitrary deprivation if trial courts were charged with projecting the likelihood of punitive damages recovery. There are: Campbell (2003) , quoting Honda Motor Co. v.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:Punitive Damages Award Is Not Constitutionally Excessive. “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution places constraints on state court awards of punitive damages. (See State Farm Mut. Automobile 9 Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408 , 416–418 [155 L.Ed.2d 585, 123 S.Ct. 1513] (State Farm); BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 [134 L.Ed.2d 809, 116 S.Ct. 1589] (BMW).) We recently explained the basis of these constraints: ‘The imposition of “grossly excessive or arbitrary” awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process: Campbell (2003) –418 [155 L.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:‘n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 671, 701 (Sun ‘n Sand) [bank customer’s failure “to examine bank statements and returned checks for alterations or forgeries”]; Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. of Riverside Cty. v. Kastorff (1960) 54 Cal.2d 380 , 388 [“inadvertent clerical error of omitting” cost of plumbing from a bid]; M. F. Kemper Const. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1951) 37 Cal.2d 696, 702 [construction company’s negligence in calculating total in preparing bid].) More fundamentally, Donovan did not purport to overrule Casey and other cases concluding: Kastorff (1960) 54 Cal.2d 380, 388 ; M.
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:dissolution actions is best accomplished by providing at the outset of litigation, consistent with the financial circumstances of the parties, a parity between spouses in their ability to obtain effective legal representation.’ ” (Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26 , 41, fn. 12.) Accordingly, “[t]he purpose of section 2030 is to ensure that the overall cost of litigating a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation (§ 2030, subd. (a)) is apportioned equitably depending on what is ‘just and reasonable under the relative circumstances: 4 early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:recognizing equality of the spouses. Accordingly, the 1975 reform legislation marked a significant dividing line between the husband-dominated community property law of the past and the equal managerial rights of the present day.” (Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26 , 35.) By securing to both spouses equal management rights over community property, the Legislature eroded the original impetus for facilitating the wife’s ownership of separate property....: Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 35.) By securing to both spouses equal management rights over community property, the Legislature eroded the original impetus for facilitating the wife’s ow...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476 , 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424; Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) 385 U.S. 276, 285-286....: Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487, quoting Herman & MacLean v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:distinguishable for purposes of the challenged law, it is immaterial if they are indistinguishable in other respects. [Citation.] Nor, absent this threshold requirement, is an equal protection inquiry into the justification for any legislative distinction necessary.” (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081 , 1107.) “If there is such a disparity, then we must proceed to decide which level of scrutiny to apply.” (People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91, 95.) In Bryan S., which examined whether proposed LPS conservatees have the right to refuse to testify in a conservatorship trial, the First: Barrett (2012) .) “If there is such a disparity, then we must proceed to decide which level of scrutiny to apply.” (People v.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:public benefit corporations. Although courts may infer the Legislature intended a different meaning if materially different language is used in statutory provisions addressing the same or related subjects (see American Coatings Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 446 , 463), we cannot draw such an inference here....: South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) ), we cannot draw such an inference here.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:16 as having its “commonly understood” meaning of a “ ‘failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or protect’ ” the parent’s child. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629; see also In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610 , 627−628.) S.H.R. contends that his parents committed neglect because, between the ages of 10 and 15, he “spent [his] entire summers working in the fields helping [his] grandfather” for six to seven hours every day “under the hot weather.”10 As S.H.R. asserts, such work may be prohibited under California: T. (2017) ; see also In re Ethan C. (2012) −628.) S.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:(Sierra Club, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149.) Thus, Carol made a prima facie showing that the order constituted a termination on the merits as to the sixth cause of action. (Cf. Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373 , 384 [holding that, in the context of applying the res judicata doctrine, “a judgment following the sustaining of a general demurrer may be on the merits”].) (d) Conclusion (Favorable Termination) We conclude that Carol satisfied her burden in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, as to the element of favorable termination: California Coastal Com. (1997)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 946 . . .), but with deference to underlying factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling (Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373 , 395 . . . ; cf. People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455–456, 477–478 . . . [cruel or unusual punishment]).” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) Contrary to defendants’ assertion, when applied to the facts in this case, the four-part Bajakajian test shows that the imposition: App.4th 940, 946 . . .), but with deference to underlying factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling (Ojavan Investors, In...
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:property; in accordance with the order, however, they did include the APN. This did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 763.020. Service by publication requires strict compliance with the applicable statutes. (County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 443 , 450.) The publication must “particularly” describe the property, and must also give its street address. We may assume, for purposes of argument, that an APN is a sufficiently particular description. Even if so, the published notices here did not also include the street address. The statute provides that, if: Superior Court (1997) .) The publication must “particularly” describe the property, and must also give its street address.
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:estoppel prevented Ali from challenging her residency several years into the probate case. As Ali points out, such fact-intensive arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1 , 18 [laches]; Rogers v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 490, fn. 6 [equitable estoppel].) Nor does Janine explain how she was prejudiced or relied to her detriment where any delay by Ali merely gave her more time to administer Ramsey’s estate. 10 trial court’s ruling under: No. 2 (2020) ; Rogers v.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:hardships it may have caused. Those with filing deadlines during court closure periods had to be especially vigilant of court reopening dates, particularly in view of the harsh consequences attending untimely filings such as those here.” (Rowan v. Kirkpatrick (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 289 , 297.) Nothing prevented Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation from being especially vigilant of the court’s reopening date and timely filing its motion. Moreover, it was free to discharge itself from liability at any time. (Bean v. Los Angeles County, supra, 252 Cal.App.2d at p....: Kirkpatrick (2020) .) Nothing prevented Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation from being especially vigilant of the court’s reopening date and timely filing its motion.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:full legal force and effect (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 929-930), or to adopt as one’s own an act purportedly performed by an agent on one’s behalf. (City v. Brentwood v. Department of Finance (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 418 , 437.) Neither of those situations are at issue in a legal malpractice cause of action, the elements of which are duty, breach, causation, and damages. (See Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) Indeed, a leading treatise does not include ratification among the “particular defenses”: Department of Finance (2020) .) Neither of those situations are at issue in a legal malpractice cause of action, the elements of which are duty, breach, causation, and damages. (See Coscia v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:shareholder may not bring an action for indirect personal losses (i.e., decrease in stock value) sustained as a result of the overall harm to the entity.” (Bader v. Anderson, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 788; see Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984 , 994, fn. 10 [“‘“a shareholder cannot bring a direct action for damages against management on the theory their alleged wrongdoing decreased the value of his or her stock (e.g., by reducing corporate assets and net worth)”’”; instead, the “‘“corporation itself must bring such an action, or a derivative suit: App.4th at p. 788; see Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) , fn. 10 [“‘“a shareholder cannot bring a direct action for damages against management on the theory their alleged wrongdoing decreased the value of h...
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:Section 15800 governs revocable trusts. While a trust is revocable and the person holding the power to revoke it remains competent, the trustee owes duties to the person holding the power to revoke the trust. (Ibid.; Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058 , 1062, 1071 (Giraldin).) Autonomous Region incorrectly claims it has standing under section 15800 because it is one of multiple settlors and it thus holds the power of revocation. The trust’s words, however, contradict this claim. Extrinsic evidence offers no support either. To interpret a trust instrument, the instrument itself: While a trust is revocable and the person holding the power to revoke it remains competent, the trustee owes duties to the person holding the power to revoke the trust. (Ibid....
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:a revocable living trust, there is even more reason to conclude that the property’s title is held by the trustees, not the trust. Such property “is considered the property of the settlor for the settlor’s lifetime.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058 , 1065–1066.) “[A] revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply ‘a probate avoidance device,’ ” and “when property is held in this type of trust, the settlor and lifetime beneficiary ‘ “has the equivalent of full ownership of the property.” ’ ” (Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615,: Such property “is considered the property of the settlor for the settlor’s lifetime.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) –1066.) “ revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply ‘a probate avoidance devi...
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:those gifts, to the benefit of the donor, the beneficiary, and ultimately the beneficiary’s creditors.” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849.) California generally follows the common law of trusts, except as modified by statute. (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058 , 1074.) The law regarding spendthrift trusts is stated as follows: “Under the Probate Code, spendthrift provisions are generally valid as to both trust income and trust principal. [Citations.] Yet creditors need not always wait for distributions to reach the debtor’s hands....: Reynolds (2017) .) California generally follows the common law of trusts, except as modified by statute. (Estate of Giraldin (2012) .) The law regarding spendthrift trusts is stated as follows: “Under...
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:action is the revocable trust that Maynord and her deceased husband created in 1986. “A revocable trust is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058 , 1062, fn. omitted.) The primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to 3 BAREFOOT v. JENNINGS Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. the settlor’s intentions. (Brock v. Hall (1949) 33 Cal.2d 885 (Brock).) Our review concerns whether plaintiff has standing to assert: DISCUSSION Underlying this action is the revocable trust that Maynord and her deceased husband created in 1986. “A revocable trust is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the settl...
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393 , 407, internal quotations and citations omitted.) The legislative forfeiture procedure is set forth in Penal Code section 1305 et seq., and Rule 9, the Advisory Committee Comment, and the Circulating Order make no mention of the Penal Code or bail bonds. A surety’s failure to timely respond to the: The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as i...
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Gann v. Acosta
Context from opinion:1, 10.) The California Legislature has conferred broad quasi-legislative authority on the Secretary of the CDCR to “prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons .…”7 (Pen. Code, § 5058, subd. (a); In re Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683 , 688 (Cabrera).) The regulations at issue, sections 3000 and 3177, were promulgated pursuant to that authority. (See “Note” following § 3000; “Note” following § 3177.) Likewise, the Secretary of the CDCR has the authority to supervise, manage and control the state prisons and has “responsibility for the care, custody,: Code, § 5058, subd. (a); In re Cabrera (2012) (Cabrera).) The regulations at issue, sections , were promulgated pursuant to that authority. (See “Note” following § 3000...
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Conservatorship of Navarrete
Context from opinion:powers. An abuse of discretion occurs only where the decision is outside of what is allowed by the governing law or where there is no reasonable basis for the court’s action. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 , 773.) The Probate Code sets out when it’s appropriate for a trial court to appoint a conservator of the person (conservator) as well as the general powers of such a conservator. The trial court may appoint a conservator for someone “who is unable to provide properly for his or: University of Southern California (2012) .) The Probate Code sets out when it’s appropriate for a trial court to appoint a conservator of the person (conservator) as well as the general powers of such...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:using this method of calculating child support, when income fluctuates, is to provide a reasonable predictor of what each parent will earn in the immediate future. (Riddle, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081; see County of Placer v. Andrade (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1393 , 1396 [“The assumption underlying these calculations is that past income is a good measure of the future income from which the parent must pay support”].) “The theory is that the court is trying to predict 17 Section 4060 provides: “The monthly net disposable income shall be computed by dividing: Andrade (1997) .) “The theory is that the court is trying to predict provides: “The monthly net dispo...
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Sachs v. Sachs
Context from opinion:until his reply brief to challenge specific distributions on appeal. This presents a double bar to considering the issue. We will not consider points on appeal that were not presented to the trial court. (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988 , 1002 [failure to raise the point in the trial court waived right to challenge on appeal].) Moreover, we will not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief. (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 307, 322.) 9 DISPOSITION The judgment (order granting petition for: We will not consider points on appeal that were not presented to the trial court. (In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) .) Moreover...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:petition. On September 18, 2020 we reversed the court’s order summarily denying Patricia’s section 388 petition, explaining the juvenile court had erred in construing the section 388 petition as an untimely new trial motion. (In re 8 Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1 , 8-9.) We ordered the juvenile court on remand to consider whether Patricia had made a prima facie showing sufficient to justify a hearing on her section 388 petition. (Id. at p. 9.) 3. Summary of Proceedings Leading to the Appointment of a Guardian ad Litem for Patricia The juvenile: On September 18, 2020 we reversed the court’s order summarily denying Patricia’s section 388 petition, explaining the juvenile court had erred in construing the section 388 petition as an untimely new...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:remainder of the deceased trustor’s community property interest was to fund the Residuary Trust. The Residuary Trust was irrevocable. 3We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to Robert, the party opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. (Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10 , 16.) 3 The Family Trust designated the surviving trustor and Robert as the trustees of the Residuary Trust. Those trustees were given the “same powers and duties” as the original Trustors of the Family Trust, which included the authority to “grant, sell, assign, convey, exchange, convert, manage, . .: The Residuary Trust was irrevocable. 3We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to Robert, the party opposing the anti-SLAPP motion. (Murray v. Tran (2020) .
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 245.) Accordingly, courts have held that a trial court may not terminate parental rights unless the state has first made efforts to assist a parent suffering from poverty. (See, e.g., In re Serenity S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355 , 374 [“where family bonds are strained by the incidents of poverty, the [social services] department must take steps to assist the family, not simply remove the child and leave the parent on their own to resolve their condition and recover their children”].) 21 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of: R. (2021) .) Accordingly, courts have held that a trial court may not terminate parental rights unless the state has first made efforts to assist a parent suffering from poverty. (See, e.g.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:his "family established itself in Imperial County over one hundred years ago and has farmed land in the valley since that time," but does not state that they 21 Abatti also cites Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (S.D. Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature: Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:his "family established itself in Imperial County over one hundred years ago and has farmed land in the valley since that time," but does not state that they 21 Abatti also cites Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (S.D. Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321 , aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature: Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:p. 1397.) IV. Congress’s Purpose In Enacting The FCRA “Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” (Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr (2007) 551 U.S. 47 , 52 (Safeco).) In enacting the FCRA, Congress found the “banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting” and that “[i]naccurate credit reports … impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods undermine the public confidence ….” (§ 1681, subd. (a)(1).) Congress further found: Burr (2007)
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:such incidental powers as pertain to it and enabling the court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it, and can only determine those questions or matters arising in the estate which it is authorized to do.” (Estate of Schloss (1961) 56 Cal.2d 248 , 253; accord Estate of Ryder (1903) 141 Cal. 366, 368.) However, the court has broad equitable powers to protect the trust estate. “ ‘ “Courts having jurisdiction over trust administration have the power to allocate the burden of certain trust expenses to the income or principal account . .: As a general matter, probate proceedings are statutory in nature, such that the trial court “has no other powers than those given by statute and such incidental powers as pertain to it...
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Sachs v. Sachs
Context from opinion:is admissible, to the extent otherwise authorized by law, to determine the intention of the transferor. The subdivision applies to a will, trust, deed, or any other instrument. (§ 21101.) Such extrinsic evidence includes parole evidence. (Estate of Karkeet (1961) 56 Cal.2d 277 , 283 [trial court erred in excluding testimony to aid in interpreting will].) Nothing in the language of section 21135, subdivision (a)(2) indicates that the writing required by that subdivision is an exception to the rule allowing parole evidence to aid in interpreting a writing. Avram refers us to what: The subdivision applies to a will, trust, deed, or any other instrument. (§ 21101.) Such extrinsic evidence includes parole evidence. (Estate of Karkeet (1961) 56 Cal.2d 277
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178, 181), even under this view, courts employ the statute of limitations by analogy to measure laches or unreasonable delay in an action to set aside a judgment. (Vai v. Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329 , 343; Protopappas v. Protopappas (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 659, 665; Barritt v. Barritt (1933) 132 Cal.App. 538, 544.) An equitable action to set aside a judgment is also subject to a defense of laches. (Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1071.) 35 extrinsic fraud based on misrepresentations of fact must: App.2d 178, 181), even under this view, courts employ the statute of limitations by analogy to measure laches or unreasonable delay in an action to set aside a judgment. (Vai v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose [citation].’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128 , 135.) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a proposed construction.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.) For the reasons we: Superior Court (2013) .) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose [citation].’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128 , 135.) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a proposed construction.’ ” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.) For the reasons we: Superior Court (2013) .) In determining legislative intent, “ ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:us to interpret section 15401. In interpreting a statute, our task is to “ ‘ “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128 , 135.) In doing so, we “begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) We construe the statutory language in context and in light of the statute’s purpose. (Apple, at p. 135; Lungren v.: Superior Court (2013) .) In doing so, we “begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Day v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:where an error—even ‘a constitutional violation’— ‘will not be subject to harmless error analysis.’ ” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) “In the absence of structural error, the Watson standard for demonstrating prejudice controls.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545 , 555.) “ ‘Plainly, not every violation of the state and federal right to a jury trial is a structural defect requiring reversal without regard to whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice.’ ” (Id. at p. 560.) In support of his claim that a structural error analysis applies here, C.O.: Anzalone (2013) .) “ ‘Plainly, not every violation of the state and federal right to a jury trial is a structural defect requiring reversal without regard to whether the defendant suffered actual prej...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:Patricia’s behavior from counsel to the guardian ad litem tasked with speaking with her counsel on her behalf. 26 during proceedings in which Patricia was denied the benefit of communicating directly with her counsel (see In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 , 535-536 [in light of reversal of court’s order denying parent’s section 388 petition, the court’s subsequent order terminating parental rights must also be vacated]; see generally California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 800, 813). We recognize that this will further delay already delayed: Such an order merely transfers the intended target of Patricia’s behavior from counsel to the guardian ad litem tasked with speaking with her counsel on her behalf.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:support a “reasonable hypothesis” to preclude a false belief from being a delusion. In closing, we recognize the result here is likely a very disappointing one for appellants. Nevertheless, we are bound to apply the law (People v. Mowatt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 713 , 720) and, under the substantial evidence standard, our role is circumscribed. We cannot reweigh the evidence; we determine only if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 104.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed....: Nevertheless, we are bound to apply the law (People v. Mowatt (1997) ) and, under the substantial evidence standard, our role is circumscribed.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:assessing whether any substantial evidence exists, we view the record in the light most favorable to respondents, giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all 23 conflicts in their favor.’ [Citation.]” (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13 , 28.) “‘A finding . . . based upon a reasonable inference . . . will not be set aside by an appellate court unless it appears that the inference was wholly irreconcilable with the evidence. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hen the evidence gives rise to conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which: Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) .) “‘A finding . . . based upon a reasonable inference . . . will not be set aside by an appellate court unless it appears that the inference was wholly irreconcilable...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:elicit waiver decision from the defendant, but “if the trial court finds substantial evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, then control of the waiver decision belongs to counsel”]; People v. Ford (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 385 , 392-393 [defendant in NGI proceeding to extend commitment has right to be present at pretrial hearing to determine whether he has capacity to personally waive right to jury trial].) It is true that requiring an additional hearing to determine whether the defendant has the capacity to waive his or: Ford (2020)
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:administer the trust in whole or in part.” 4 Because the court dismissed the petition based solely on the pleadings, without an evidentiary hearing, we must accept the allegations of the petition as true. (Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad (2018) 56 Cal.App.5th 565 , 572.) II THE ESTATE HAD STANDING TO REQUEST AN ACCOUNTING Maria contends that the Estate had no standing to petition for an accounting pursuant to section 17200 because the Estate was not a present beneficiary of the trust. She relies on section 24, subdivision (c), which states that a: Union Pacific Railroad (2018) .) II THE ESTATE HAD STANDING TO REQUEST AN ACCOUNTING Maria contends that the Estate had no standing to petition for an accounting pursuant to section 17200 because the...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:State courts, however, lack both the authority and competence to make 15 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. immigration status determinations, which are the exclusive province of the federal government. (Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 387 , 394–395; DeCanas v. Bica (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 354.) For these reasons, Congress assigned to federal authorities, not state courts, the determination whether a child’s request for SIJ status is bona fide. (J.U., supra, 176 A.3d at p. 141, fn. 9.)4 Third, section 155 provides that the superior court: United States (2012) –395; DeCanas v.
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:our conclusion that a donor’s intent to allow the use of his or her gametic material for posthumous conception may not be presumed from the donor’s silence, but must be affirmatively shown. Plaintiff cites Vernoff v. Astrue (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 1102 (Vernoff), for the proposition that she was entitled to extract Aaron’s sperm to conceive a child. Vernoff relied in part on California law to hold that a child conceived and born after the death of her biological father was not entitled to Social Security child survivor benefits. (Id. at p.: Astrue (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 1102 (Vernoff), for the proposition that she was entitled to extract Aaron’s sperm to conceive a child.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:does not compel a conclusion of undue influence. Robert does not cite to any case where a trial court found against undue influence and an appellate court reversed that factual determination. Robert attempts to analogize to Estate of Garibaldi (1961) 57 Cal.2d 108 , where a trial court finding of undue influence was affirmed. (Id. at pp. 109–110, 114.) There, three children had unduly influenced their mother (the decedent testator) while partnering with her in ranch operations during a period when “[s]he was under the constant care of a physician.” (Id. at pp.: Robert does not cite to any case where a trial court found against undue influence and an appellate court reversed that factual determination.
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:to a trustee on trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees.” The trustee’s legal title to the trust property vests “as of the date of death.” (Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127 , 132, superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 555.) Here, because Simon is the named trustee of the Trust, he is a devisee under the will, entitled to receive and administer the trust property from the Estate, and therefore is: Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127, 132, superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in Ferraro v.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:that the FYR Trust came into existence at the death of McKie Sr. pursuant to the MWR Will and that Mark’s “future interest as contingent remainder beneficiary also came into existence when McKie Sr. died.” (See Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127 , 131–132 [if a will “creates an express trust, the legal title of the trustee and the equitable title of the beneficiary vest as of the date of death” of the testator]; (Estate of Baird (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 333, 341 [regardless of whether their remainder interests were vested or contingent,: Guerin (1961) 57 Cal.2d 127, 131–132 ; (Estate of Baird (1955) 135 Cal.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:title — and not Family Code section 760, a statute that specifically addresses the characterization of property acquired during marriage — governs the characterization of property acquired during marriage for all purposes other than divorce. (See Rader v. Thrasher (1962) 57 Cal.2d 244 , 252 [“a special provision relating to a particular subject will govern against a general provision”]; Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [“where two presumptions are in conflict, the more specific presumption will control over the more general one”]; cf. Estate of Bibb (2001) 28 In re BRACE Opinion: transact with each other, the Legislature subjects these agreements to the laws governing fraudulent transfers. (Fam. Code, §§ 851, 852.) “These provisions presuppose that, as a general rule...
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:Haggerty may be cited for “persuasive value,” and “for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 456, to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (Haggerty v. Thornton, S271483, Supreme Ct. Mins., Dec. 22, 2021; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.115(e) & Advisory Com. com.) 9 reasoned that because “the trust does not distinguish between revocation and modification, it does not ‘provide otherwise’: Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (Haggerty v.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:Their legal effect within this state will be admeasured by the laws of this state.” (Lund, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 496.) C. Analysis Applying Lund and Blythe, as we must (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455 [trial and appellate courts must follow binding Supreme Court authority]), and relying on Bassi and Wolf for guidance, we conclude: (1) a California probate court will apply this state’s laws in determining whether a legally cognizable parent and child relationship exists as a condition to an heirship claim;: Analysis Applying Lund and Blythe, as we must (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:Ukiah should be given no weight because it predates the enactment of Probate Code 7000. Aside from the fact that we cannot simply disregard a Supreme Court decision (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 455), we must assume that the Legislature was aware of this case when it enacted Probate Code section 9823 to vest in the personal representative— but not the possible heirs or devisees—the right to partition a property where an interest is not subject to probate. (Arthur Andersen v. Superior: Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), we must assume that the Legislature was aware of this case when it enacted Probate Code section 9823 to vest in the personal representa...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:§ 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) While not all provisions of “the Code of Civil Procedure apply to probate proceedings,” the proceedings “are to conform only ‘as nearly as is consistently possible, to those for civil actions.’ ” (Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 733 , 747–748.) Incorporating the meet-and-confer requirements to probate proceedings — consistent with the above mandate — parties should meet and confer at least five days before the probate hearing date.2 (§§ 1000, 1043; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Finally, we reject McDonald’s assertion that Goebner is estopped from: Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) While not all provisions of “the Code of Civil Procedure apply to probate proceedings,” the proceedings “are to conform only ‘as nearly as is consistently possible...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:contend that the above-quoted statements from Simon are dicta. Perhaps.3 They also contend that Lopez has not 3 “ ‘Dicta consists of observations and statements unnecessary to the appellate court's resolution of the case.’” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 , 1158.) The Court in Simon first considered whether it was permissible to consider the potential or uncompensated harm suffered by a plaintiff as the predicate for a punitive damages award and then, after finding support for that proposition in Supreme Court decisions, determined that “the potential harm that is: Moreno (2013)
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:definition of “friend.” Nor has Hankin identified “ ‘more than one reasonable interpretation’ ” of section 1820 that would allow us to consider the public policy arguments he makes in favor of his test. (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157 , 166.) 3. Hankin Is Not Otherwise Entitled to Standing Hankin does not argue he qualifies under any of the remaining categories of possible petitioners listed in section 1820, subdivision (a). (See § 1820, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) Nevertheless, to the 4 Although we can imagine factual scenarios in which the term: Superior Court (2013) .) 3.
- Clark v. Smith : A trustee may bring a lawsuit concerning trust property in the trustee’s own name without having to identify or describe the trust in the pleadings; the claim may be pursued as if the trustee were the...
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] . . . A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353 , 360 (Davis).) Citing Davis, Lynne contends it is not reasonable to infer from these facts that she commenced this litigation for an improper purpose, asserting that such an inference amounts to “impermissible suspicion, imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guesswork.” Her reliance on Davis is misplaced....: Davis (2013) (Davis).) Citing Davis, Lynne contends it is not reasonable to infer from these facts that she commenced this litigation for an improper purpose, asserting that such an inference amounts...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:cause of action is simply the obligation sought to be enforced against the defendant.” (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 657; see CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 158, 165 [same]; Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622 , 630 [“ ‘[A] “cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.’ ”].) Consistent with these general principles, the Judicial Council clearly and repeatedly expressed its: County of San Diego (2013)
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:62 Cal.4th 856, 879 [“[v]oluntary barriers to communication with counsel on the part of a defendant who was able to cooperate [but elected not to] do not demonstrate incompetence” under Penal 5 Code section 1367 ]; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986 , 1034 [“an uncooperative attitude is not, in and of itself, substantial evidence of incompetence”]; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 [“‘the test, in a section 1368 proceeding, is competency to cooperate, not cooperation’”]; People v. Medine (1995) 11 Cal.4th 5 Penal Code section 1367 provides a defendant: Mai (2013) ; People v.
- Garcia v. Garcia : When the language of a trust instrument is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret the trust solely by its plain terms and may not resort to extrinsic evidence to alter or supplement that mean...
- Garcia v. Garcia : An appeal is considered abandoned—and may be dismissed—when the appellant’s brief does not raise or challenge the specific order, thereby limiting appellate review to the issues actually presented.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:and costs, Attorneys identified three discovery orders from which an appeal was taken. Attorneys present no argument in their appellate briefs concerning the three discovery orders. They have thus abandoned any appeal of those orders. (See Tanner v. Tanner (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 419 , 422, fn. 2 [appellate court treats as partial abandonment of appeal an appellant’s failure to challenge in opening brief an order specified in notice of appeal].) . 51 defendants. Section 425.16, subdivision (c) provides that a prevailing defendant on a SLAPP motion to strike ‘shall be entitled to recover: Tanner (1997) , fn. 2 .) . 51 defendants.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:shown for failure to present them before. To withhold a point until the closing brief deprives the respondent of the opportunity to answer it or requires the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.” (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784 , 794, fn. 3 (Campos); SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 573, fn. 18 [“[A]ppellant cannot salvage a forfeited argument by belatedly addressing the argument in its reply brief”].) Gary has not provided a “good reason” for waiting until the reply brief to: Anderson (1997) , fn. 3 (Campos); SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’” (Center for Healthcare Education & Research, Inc. v. International Congress for Joint Reconstruction, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1108 , 1125 (Center for Healthcare Education.) 12 By statute, “‘[u]ndue influence’ means excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a); § 86 [adopting Welf. & Inst. Code definition].): International Congress for Joint Reconstruction, Inc. (2020) (Center for Healthcare Education.) 12 By statute, “‘ndue influence’ means excessive persuasion that causes another person to act...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:conclusion. Before we delve into that analysis, however, we take a quick detour to address Yazdi, a case recently decided by the Second District Court of Appeal and relied upon by the board. (Yazdi v. Dental Bd. of California (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 25 .) In that case, the Second District Court of Appeal considered the application of Conservatorship of O.B. to the independent judgment standard of review under section 1094.5. The court concluded Conservatorship of O.B. did not “overturn[] the standard to be applied by the trial court in reviewing an administrative proceeding: Dental Bd. of California (2020) .) In that case, the Second District Court of Appeal considered the application of Conservatorship of O.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:quiet title . . . . [Citation.]” (Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate, supra, ¶ 15:562, p. 15-159.)7 “We are not required to develop [respondents’] arguments for them. [Citation.]” (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480 , 498.) Because Bewley has not provided any reasoned analysis of his statutory arguments — and in particular, because he has not shown that Humphrey was not claiming the property adversely to the estate — he has forfeited them for purposes of appeal. (Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017): Torres Construction Corp. (2020) .) Because Bewley has not provided any reasoned analysis of his statutory arguments — and in particular, because he has not shown that Humphrey was not claiming the pr...
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:the forum state when assessing personal jurisdiction. (Ibid.) Jurisdiction is proper if a defendant has minimum contacts with the state such that the lawsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117 , 126.) Personal jurisdiction can be all-purpose (also called “general”) or case-linked (also called “specific”). (Bristol-Myers, supra, 137 S.Ct. at pp. 1779–1780.) The parties limit their focus to case-linked jurisdiction. We do too....: Bauman (2014) .) Personal jurisdiction can be all-purpose (also called “general”) or case-linked (also called “specific”). (Bristol-Myers, supra, 137 S.
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Buskirk v. Buskirk
Context from opinion:California lawsuit. A The first prong of the three-part test is “purposeful availment”: have defendants purposefully availed themselves of forum benefits? We consider whether the defendants’ conduct connects them to the forum in a meaningful way. (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277 , 290.) Defendants purposefully avail themselves of a forum’s benefits if they intentionally direct their activities at a forum such that, by virtue of the benefit the defendants receive, they should reasonably expect to be subject to jurisdiction there. (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S....: 8 California, but the propriety and effectiveness of that effort is the focus of this California lawsuit. A The first prong of the three-part test is “purposeful availment”: have defendants purposeful...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:on incorrect information. (Syed, supra, 853 F.3d at pp. 496–497.) V. General Differences Between Requirements For Standing In Federal And California Courts “The [U.S.] Constitution confers limited authority on each branch of the Federal government.” (Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016) 578 U.S. 330 , 337 (Spokeo II).) The judicial powers of federal courts are circumscribed by section 2 of article III of the United States Constitution which limits its powers to identified “Cases” and “Controversies.”8 (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; Spokeo, II, supra, 578 U.S. at p. 337.) For purposes of federal: Robins (2016) (Spokeo II).) The judicial powers of federal courts are circumscribed by section 2 of article III of the United States Constitution which limits its powers to identified “Cases” and “Con...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:[dispute between wife and husband’s mother over husband’s conveyance of his joint tenancy interest to his mother; wife had previously obtained a 17 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. judgment against husband]; Machado v. Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501 , 506 (Machado) [divorce]; Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 213–214 (Gudelj) [same]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [same]; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 604 [same].) The court in Schindler made a point of quoting Siberell’s limiting language: “As cautioned in Siberell, [214 Cal.: Machado (1962) 58 Cal.2d 501, 506 (Machado) ; Gudelj v.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:(In re Brace (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2017) 566 B.R. 13, 4 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 17.) The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. (Id. at p. 16.) Citing In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396 (Valli), which held that property acquired during marriage from a third party with community funds is community property upon divorce unless the statutory transmutation requirements have been met, the panel reasoned that public policy and statutory construction support the extension of Valli’s holding to the bankruptcy context. (In re Brace,: R. 13, 4 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 17.) The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. (Id. at p. 16.) Citing In re Marriage of Valli (2014) (Valli)...
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:the Legislature undertakes to amend a statute which has been the subject of judicial construction’ ‘it is presumed that the Legislature was fully cognizant of such construction.’” (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1087-1088; accord, People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415 , 1424 [“It is a settled principle of statutory construction that the Legislature ‘“is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation....: Scott (2014) [“It is a settled principle of statutory construction that the Legislature ‘“is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence...
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.) A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises it “ ‘ “in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197 , 270–271; 2 Cal.4th 556, 570 [“Because we find the [statute] inapplicable, we need not and do not decide the other issues raised by the parties regarding” its interpretation]; cf. §§ 1821, subd. (c), 2340.) 13 see also Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507 [“as long as there: Williams (2013) –271; inapplicable, we need not and do not decide the other issues raised by the parties regarding” its interpretation]; cf. §§ 1821, subd. (c), 2340.) 13 see also Gonzales v.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:its provisions, the beneficiary will be disinherited and thus may not take the gift or devise provided under the instrument.’ [Citation.] No contest clauses, whether in wills or trusts, have long been held valid in California.” (Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412 , 422.) The court’s interpretation of a no contest clause and application of the clause to a proposed action is necessarily informed by competing policy interests. On the one hand, “[s]uch 7 clauses promote the public policies of honoring the intent of the donor and discouraging litigation by persons whose: Donkin (2013) .) The court’s interpretation of a no contest clause and application of the clause to a proposed action is necessarily informed by competing policy interests.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:(Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 434; see also Estate of Black (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 582, 588 [“Numerous cases hold that . . . a petition seeking construction or amounting to a forced election. (§ 21311; Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412 , 426 (Donkin).) 3 Unlike a trust contest, a claim for reformation of a trust based on mistake is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Getty v. Getty (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1168; Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) 7 interpretation of a will is [not] a ‘contest,’: Donkin (2013) (Donkin).) 3 Unlike a trust contest, a claim for reformation of a trust based on mistake is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (Getty v.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) 2. The Law Concerning No Contest Provisions No contest clauses respect the intent of a donor by “discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are frustrated by the donative scheme of the instrument.” (Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412 , 422 (Donkin).) However, that interest is in tension with the policy of “avoiding forfeitures and promoting full access of the courts to all relevant information concerning the validity and effect of a will, trust, or other instrument.” (Ibid.) The common law of California traditionally balanced these interests by enforcing: The Law Concerning No Contest Provisions No contest clauses respect the intent of a donor by “discouraging litigation by persons whose expectations are frustrated by the donative scheme of the instrum...
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:trustee is to include in Trust B only assets in an amount up to the maximum marital deduction from federal estate tax,5 and to allocate the remainder of the marital share to Trust C. 5 In Donkin v. Donkin (2013) 58 Cal.4th 412 , 416 (Donkin I), the California Supreme Court explained the marital deduction and its role in estate planning as follows: “Federal law allows the property of a deceased spouse to be passed to the surviving spouse without payment of federal estate tax through the allowance of a ‘marital deduction.’ (Int.Rev.Code,: Donkin (2013) (Donkin I), the California Supreme Court explained the marital deduction and its role in estate planning as follows: “Federal law allows the property of a deceased spouse to be passed to...
- Garcia v. Garcia : A lay witness may testify about a person’s mental condition, competency, or health based on observations the witness personally made, even though the witness is not a medical expert.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:718, 726 [“‘“Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.”’”]; People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950 , 960 [lack of requirement that a defendant obtain a probable cause certificate before appealing denial of postjudgment motion to vacate a conviction as compared to requirement for certificate to appeal prejudgment order evidenced a different legislative intent]....: Arriaga (2014)
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:p. 1193.) 3 Section 15401, subdivision (b) imposes additional obligations with respect to community property. (See Masry v. Masry (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 738, 743.) The terms “trustor” and “settlor” are interchangeable and synonymous. (See In re Marriage of Perry (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1104 , 1109 & fn. 2.) 5 Thus, when a trust specifies an amendment procedure, a purported amendment made in contravention of that procedure is invalid. (Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 [unsigned handwritten interlineation was invalid where trust provided “any amendment to the trust ‘shall be made by written: App.4th 738, 743.) The terms “trustor” and “settlor” are interchangeable and synonymous. (See In re Marriage of Perry (1997) & fn. 2.) 5 Thus, when a trust specifies an amendment procedure...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:lack of article III-type restrictions on a California court’s exercise of jurisdiction, Limon contends California does not require a “concrete injury” to exercise jurisdiction over his claims. Limon cites to National Paint & Coatings Assn. v. State of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 753 , 761 (National Paint) for the proposition that “concrete injury and redressability are [not] essential prerequisites to justiciability in California....: State of California (1997) (National Paint) for the proposition that “concrete injury and redressability are essential prerequisites to justiciability in California.” In National Paint...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:or party, making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power, rendering the judgment voidable.”]; see also American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 660-661; People v. North River Ins. Co. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 300 , 311-313; Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 117 (Torjesen).) “Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1035; see People v. Superior: Co. (2020) -313; Torjesen v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:has a 185-day “appearance period in which to either produce the criminal defendant in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture.” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 300 , 310 (North River–Rivadeneyra); see § 1305, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1); Financial Casualty, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 42.) “On the surety’s motion and a showing of good cause, the court may extend the 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 appearance period for up to an: The North River Ins. Co. (2020)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:not provide reviewing courts with a liberal license to substitute their views for the conclusions drawn by the trier of fact on matters such as witness credibility and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence. In Jarnatt v. Cooper (1881) 59 Cal. 703 , for example, this court had explained, “It is doubtless a well-settled rule that the party 9 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B. Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. alleging fraud or mistake is bound to prove his allegation by clear and convincing evidence. That is, that the evidence which tends: Cooper (1881) , for example, this court had explained, “It is doubtless a well-settled rule that the party 9 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:to meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. (See Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 1 26 Cal.4th 261, 283 (Donovan); Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97 (Casey); Civ. Code, § 1577.)1 In addition, any error by the trial court in failing to make findings regarding voluntariness required by Family Code section 1615, subdivision (c), was not prejudicial. BACKGROUND2 On May 2, 2015, Brandy married Scott Eskra (Scott).3 Previously, Scott had been married to Stephanie Simera. Scott: Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97 (Casey); Civ.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:between Charles and Judy can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence and not for reasons of public policy, as Shannon argues. (Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (a); see Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029 , 1038 [“It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any word or provision surplusage.”]; Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1143–1144 [courts should give the words of a statute: Superior Court (2014) ; Maricela C. v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:on the part of a group or organization that is 18 equivalent to the habit of an individual. (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 518.) We review the court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258 , 266.) “Specifically, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (Ibid.) A miscarriage of justice results only if “it is reasonably probable that: Goldsmith (2014) .) “Specifically, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:property presumption set forth in Family Code section 760. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5) [this court may restate a question posed to it by a court of another jurisdiction]; see also Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 662 , 665, fn. 1 (Peabody) [example and explanation of rule 8.548(f)(5) in context].) The answer determines how much property a bankruptcy trustee can reach to satisfy a spouse’s debts. If the property is separate, then the trustee can only reach the debtor spouse’s 50 percent share. If the property 1: Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) , fn. 1 (Peabody) .) The answer determines how much property a bankruptcy trustee can reach to satisfy a spouse’s debts.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of 2 All further undesignated references are to the Probate Code. 5 review.’ ” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772 , 777.) B. A Section 1820 Petition Must Be Brought by a Proper Party In general, “every action [must] be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) “Generally, ‘the person: Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) .) B.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:time claimed that they could bring their partition claim because heirs may convey or encumber their expected interests in an estate before the final order of distribution issues. This argument is forfeited due to its timing. (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924 , 990.) In any case, their argument lacks merit even though the underlying premise—that an heir may convey or encumber an expected interest in an estate, subject to administration—is correct. (See, e.g., Reed v. Hayward (1943) 23 Cal.2d 336, 342.) The question whether a potential heir can encumber a contingent: Carrasco (2014)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:although 69 the wife had abundant financial assets of her own, the court found no abuse of discretion in awarding her $260,000 in total fees given the “huge disparity” in parties’ respective assets. In In re Marriage of O’Connor (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 877 , 884, there was no abuse of discretion in awarding husband a total of $700,000 fees even where husband had $2 million in assets and wife had $40 million in assets. Here, Mark erroneously equates the court’s ability to consider the parties’ relative incomes pursuant to section 2032 with a: In In re Marriage of O’Connor (1997) , there was no abuse of discretion in awarding husband a total of $700,000 fees even where husband had $2 million in assets and wife had $40 million in assets.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:in Imperial County over one hundred years ago and has farmed land in the valley since that time," but does not state that they 21 Abatti also cites Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (S.D. Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321, aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the: Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321, aff'd, 59 F.2d 529
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:in Imperial County over one hundred years ago and has farmed land in the valley since that time," but does not state that they 21 Abatti also cites Greeson v. Imperial Irr. Dist. (S.D. Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321, aff'd, 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1932) to support his contention that the "Ninth Circuit recognized that . . . [the District], as successor-in-interest . . . was obligated to honor the landowners' 'vested . . . right to have the supply continued [which right] becomes in the nature of an appurtenance to the: Cal. 1931) 55 F.2d 321, aff'd, 59 F.2d 529
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of [the] attorney’s negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for malpractice.’” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phlegar & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 749-750, quoting Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195 , 200.) “In legal malpractice claims, the absence of causation may be decided on summary judgment ‘only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.’ [Citation.]” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583.) 27 II. Analysis A....: Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200.) “In legal malpractice claims, the absence of causation may be decided on summary judgment ‘only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable differenc...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:no authority – or any text in section 850 – to support her view that “personal property” in section 850 means all “tangible personal property,” as she contends. Further, as explained by our Supreme Court in Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311 , the phrase “personal property” is “one whose inherent ambiguity has been noted in many court decisions. The Civil Code gives that term a broad definition, encompassing all property not classed as real property (Civ. Code, § 663), including ‘money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt’ (Civ.: Further, as explained by our Supreme Court in Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, the phrase “personal property” is “one whose inherent ambiguity has been noted in many court decisions.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Torjesen v. Mansdorf (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 111, 117 (Torjesen).) “Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028 , 1035; see People v. Superior Court (Mitchell) (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 451, 458.) “[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 701; see Abelleira: Appeals Bd. (1993) ; see People v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:[appellant] - who was sitting right in front of him - over a ten month period [citation], proves nothing.” The court’s personal observations of appellant contribute to the substantial evidence in support of its findings. (See People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal....: Rodas (2018)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:resolution of conflicting evidence; and it may not insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment. (See, e.g., People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16, 35-36; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243 , 278, 307.) To paraphrase the high court in Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at page 318, the question before a court reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is not whether the appellate court itself regards the evidence as clear and convincing; it: Veamatahau (2020) -36; People v. Gomez (2018) , 307.) To paraphrase the high court in Jackson, supra, 443 U.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:” because “ ‘the remedy of unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding to determine the right to possession of real property . . . [and] is purely statutory in nature.’ ” (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474 , 480 (Dr. Leevil).) Thus, it is “ ‘essential that a party seeking the remedy bring [itself] clearly within the statute.’ ” (Ibid.) 9 The Rent Ordinance “ ‘was enacted to respond to two principal factors: (a) a critically low vacancy rate within the city and county [of San Francisco],: Westlake Health Care Center (2018) (Dr.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:p. 913 [same].) 11 In denying Patricia’s Marsden motions to replace her appointed counsel, the court implicitly recognized that bad behavior directed to one’s own counsel is not grounds for replacement of appointed counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541 , 576 [“[A] defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by manufacturing a conflict or a breakdown in the relationship through his own conduct. [Citations.] Here it was defendant who repeatedly spit on and unilaterally refused to cooperate or even speak with counsel— and who ultimately assaulted counsel in: Johnson (2018) defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by manufacturing a conflict or a breakdown in the relationship through his own conduct. Here it was defendant who repeatedly spit on.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:as a matter of law. [Citation.] “[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” ’ ” [Citation.] ‘We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building. Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931 , 940.) a. Protected Activity Kenton contends that Hilja did not meet her movant’s burden of showing the alleged libel arose from protected activity. “A defendant can meet the burden of making a threshold showing that a cause of action is one arising from protected activity by demonstrating the act: Co. (2019) .) a.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:court’s order because (a) the portion relied upon was vacated by the federal court’s order on reconsideration; and (b) the statement is hearsay and we are unable to take judicial notice of the factual contentions therein (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548 , 1564). 35. Builders, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 361–362; Luna Crest, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 883.) We also reject Limon’s claims he suffered “informational injury” sufficient to confer upon him standing to maintain his action. “Informational injury that causes no adverse effects”—e.g., where required information is provided but: Grant (1992) ). 35. Builders, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 361–362; Luna Crest, supra, 245 Cal.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:were filed in federal courts (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), we deny the request for judicial notice by separate order. (See Bennett v. Regents of University of California (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 347, 358, fn. 7; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548 , 1564−1565, 1568.) 9 rights of the parties.” (Id. at p. 697.) An order by the superior court may constitute an appealable judgment if it disposes of all causes of action pending in the case. (See ibid.) “As a general test,” an order is final and appealable when “no issue: Grant (1992) −1565, 1568.) 9 rights of the parties.” (Id. at p. 697.) An order by the superior court may constitute an appealable judgment if it disposes of all causes of action pending in the case.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Fredrics, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 680 [order compelling arbitration in the absence of an arbitration agreement, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281, was only an act in excess of jurisdiction]; In re Marriage of Hinman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 711 , 718 [“while the court’s award [granting joint custody to a nonbiological parent] may have been beyond its statutory authority, the court did not lack jurisdiction in the fundamental sense”].) Thus, even if the trial court erred by including the five UCNP entities in the appraisal and buyout proceeding, the: App.4th at p. 680 ...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:for proposed conservatees, is incorporated by reference into section 5350. Probate Code section 1828 similarly does not reference waiver. Indeed, “[t]he Probate Code does not require a jury trial or an express waiver of a jury.” (Conservatorship of B.C. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1028 , 1035 (B.C.).) We recognize that Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (b)(1), provides that “[a]fter the court so informs the proposed conservatee and before the establishment of the conservatorship, the court shall consult the proposed conservatee to determine the proposed conservatee’s opinion concerning . . . ....: C. (2016) (B.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:food, clothing, or shelter, or to manage . . . her own financial resources . . . .” (§ 1828.5, subd. (c), italics added.) “The testimony of one witness may be sufficient to support the findings.” (Conservatorship of B.C. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1028 , 1034.) We recognize that appellant’s experts, Dr. Khoie and Donati, opined that a limited conservatorship is inappropriate. But “[a]n appellate court . . . will sustain the trial court’s factual findings if there is [the requisite] substantial evidence to support those findings [under the clear and convincing standard of: C. (2016) .) We recognize that appellant’s experts, Dr.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:and drafted by Nemecek & Cole in Mr. Frieden’s defense.”8 A trial court has discretion to award less than the fee amount requested where work performed was duplicative. (569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426 , 441 (569 ECB).) The trial court here did just that. It imposed reductions for work on the fee motion that was virtually identical to that filed by Nemecek & Cole. But it also noted material differences in the substantive motions reflecting independent work by Tukes’s counsel in advocating her: Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) (569 ECB).) The trial court here did just that.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:to litigate their partition claim on the estate’s behalf. “Standing is a threshold issue necessary to maintain a cause of action, and the burden to allege and establish standing lies with the [siblings].” (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802 , 810 (Mendoza).) “To demonstrate the requisite standing, [the siblings were] required to allege facts showing [they] had a ‘ “beneficial interest . . . that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When, as here, the facts relevant to standing are undisputed, ‘[s]tanding is: A. (2016) (Mendoza).) “To demonstrate the requisite standing, required to allege facts showing had a ‘ “beneficial interest . . . that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:remitted by company]; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1364 [same]; MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742, 747; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802 , 810 [standing to challenge wrongful foreclosure]; Boorstein v. CBS Interactive, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 456, 465–466 (Boorstein) [standing for purposes of Civil Code, § 1789.83 et seq. and Business and Professions Code, § 17200 et seq.]....: A. (2016) ; Boorstein v.
- Garcia v. Garcia : Findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed on a substantial‑evidence basis, with the appellate court giving those findings deference and construing them liberally in the light most favorable to...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970 , 981.) Pursuant to section 15610.30 of the Elder Abuse Act, financial abuse of an elder occurs when a person “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains . . . real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70.” (§ 15610.30, subd.: We disagree. “In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, . . . e apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact.’ ” (Veiseh v. Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1104, quoting Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970 , 981.) Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) “The trial court’s finding on the accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations is upheld on appeal if supported by substantial: Asimos (2016) .) Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact. (Jolly v.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:property. But a property right is not simply the percentage share a person holds in a particular asset. It encompasses a “bundle of rights and privileges as well as of obligations” (Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 441 , 447, fn. omitted), such as the right to possess, lease, encumber, or alienate the property. Shared management and control is a defining feature of our community property system and has driven the evolution of our community property laws. (Fam. Code, §§ 1100, 1102.) With few exceptions, “either spouse has: State Bd. of Equal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 441, 447, fn. omitted), such as the right to possess, lease, encumber, or alienate the property. Shared management and control is a defining feature of our communi...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:enumerated matters affecting the weight of evidence (People v. Moran (1904) 144 Cal. 48, 63) or weight of the evidence rules (see, e.g., People v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592, 597, overruled on another ground in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 ; People v. King (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 122, 128). Thus, the weight of the evidence phrase was used in common law to reference both preponderance of the evidence and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before and around the time section 1094.5 was enacted. Second, the cases relied upon by the: Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482; People v.
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Barefoot v. Jennings
Context from opinion:intended to broaden the jurisdiction of the probate court so as to give that court jurisdiction over practically all controversies which might arise between the trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.’ ” (Estate of Bissinger (1964) 60 Cal.2d 756 , 765 (Bissinger), quoting Estate of Marre (1941) 18 Cal.2d 184, 187.) The wisdom of those decisions has not lessened over time. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 explained that an expansive reading of the standing afforded to trust challenges under section: litigation to continue. (Warth v. Seldin (1975) ; Estate of Plaut (1945) 27 Cal.2d 424, 426, 429-430 .) The applicable Probate Code provisions support plaintiff’s standing to challenge the merits of t...
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence”].) “[T]he opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335 , 420 [opponent has burden to rebut presumption that spousal communication is confidential by preponderance of evidence]; Blau v. U.S. (1951) 340 U.S....: Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) ; Blau v.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:different framework for a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to a jury trial in an SVP proceeding, creating a presumption that the trial would be by the court unless demanded by the defendant. (See Rashidi v. Moser (2014) 60 Cal.4th 718 , 726 [“‘“Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed.”’”]; People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950, 960 [lack of requirement that a defendant: 16 similar language in the SVPA supports our conclusion the Legislature intentionally established a different framework for a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to a jury trial in an SVP proceed...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:determined were the reasonable expenses of the children. The court observed that “[c]hild support is not limited by historical spending averages but should meet the standard of living of the higher income parent,” citing In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 124 . Further, “the court’s goal is to provide funds sufficient that the children will not draw odious comparisons between the two households. The children need only share the lifestyle of the wealthy parent ‘to some degree,’” citing In re Marriage of Hubner (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 660 (Hubner). The court found: The court observed that “hild support is not limited by historical spending averages but should meet the standard of living of the higher income parent,” citing In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) .
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:the record concerning the probable cause element, their petition included at least 15 new citations to the appellate record that could have, and should have, been included in their briefs on appeal. (See Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294 , 1308 [“arguments, including 3 insufficiency of the evidence, cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing”].) Third, our conclusion that Carol made a prima facie showing of the element of absence of probable cause is, of course, not the final word in the litigation. Our: Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) .) Third...
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Robertson v. Saadat
Context from opinion:of course are not bound by rulings of trial courts or courts of other jurisdictions. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761 [“a written trial court ruling has no precedential value”]; Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294 , 1306 [“California courts are not bound by decisions in other jurisdictions”].) Zhu also is not persuasive. As we have discussed, neither California’s intestacy law nor the UAGA applies to a spouse’s use of gametic material for posthumous conception, so to the extent the analogous laws in New York provided: Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) .) Zhu also is not persuasive.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:from raising the standing claim. “Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171 , 181.) We have discretion to bar a party from taking a contrary position on appeal when “(1) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (2) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (3) the first position: County of Los Angeles (1997) .) We have discretion to bar a party from taking a contrary position on appeal when “(1) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:effects of the strong interest parties have in representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already familiar with the case.” (Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573 , 580-581 (Smith).) “[T]rial judges must indicate on the record they have considered the appropriate factors and make specific findings of fact when weighing the conflicting interests involved in recusal motions.” (Id. at 582....: Superior Court (1997) -581 (Smith).) “rial judges must indicate on the record they have considered the appropriate factors and make specific findings of fact when weighing the conflicting interests in...
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:damages. There is, for example, no requirement that she be unemployed for longer than a lawfully terminated employee. The law does not appear to set such a rigid standard for noneconomic damages either. (See, e.g., Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 757 , 768 (Loth) [there is no set “standard for determining pain and suffering damages [citation], [and] no expert may supply a formula for computing . . . the value of the loss of enjoyment of life”]; CACI No. 3905A [“No fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these noneconomic: Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) (Loth) no expert may supply a formula for computing . . . the value of the loss of enjoyment of life”]...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:agreement” and decide “ ‘what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon,’ ” but may not “ ‘create the material terms of a settlement.’ ” (Leeman, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374, quoting Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793 , 810 (Weddington Productions).) A new or altered term is material if “it changes the rights or duties of the parties, or [any] of them.” (Consolidated Loan Co. v. Harman (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 488, 491; see Humphreys v. Crane (1855) 5 Cal. 173, 175 [a change that “does not vary: App.4th at p. 1374, quoting Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) (Weddington Productions).) A new or altered term is material if “it changes the rights or duties of the parties, or of them.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:by the court, does not modify the will; the rights of parties under the agreement are contractual not testamentary].) Nor could the Settlement Agreement bind Mark, who was not a party to the agreement. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793 , 810–811 [a settlement agreement is a contract, and an essential element of any contract is consent]; see Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 542 [stipulated judgment based on settlement agreement had no preclusive effect on a stranger to the settlement agreement].) The phrase “that such individual would have: Flick (1998) –811 ; see Ferraro v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:and the rule has subsequently been applied to issues outside the probate context (see, e.g., King v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 675, 711 [applied to review of punitive damages award]; Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078 , 1089-1090 [same]; In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 123 [applied to dispositional order removing a child]). As explained ante, “the superior court, in an administrative mandamus proceeding, must apply the ‘substantial evidence’ rule in the same manner that that rule is applied by appellate courts in California: J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) -1090 ; In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:elder abuse action, statutory penalties under Probate Code section 859 require a predicate showing of bad faith (Levin v. Winston-Levin (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1035–1036) or merely undue influence without any additional showing of heightened culpability (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115 , 1130)....: Keading (2021) ).
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Ring v. Harmon
Context from opinion:includes a mandatory award of attorney fees to a plaintiff who proves financial elder abuse. Also, Probate Code section 859 provides for an award of double damages in at least some financial elder abuse cases. (See Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115 , 1129-1130 [discussing split of authority regarding whether award of double damages under Probate Code section 859 requires a separate finding of bad faith].) 16 recovery.” (Ibid.) But this is an issue that involves the “scope of the relief available,” a matter to be addressed on another day, not “whether: Keading (2021)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:or not, Richard and Brown bear the burden on their cross-appeal to show error. (Lafferty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 398, 428, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Pulliam v. HNL Automotive Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 396 , 411.) Where there is no indication that the probate court even relied on Tukes’s cited authority, as opposed to the plain language of rule 2.30 (which Richard and Brown ignore), we fail to see the relevance of this argument to Richard and Brown’s cross-appeal. 36 On reply, Richard and: HNL Automotive Inc. (2021)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:adjusted to establish comparable billing rates in other areas using data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.” (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057 fn. 5.) 10 (See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 446 , 454 [finding no abuse of discretion in declining to employ Laffey Matrix outside of Washington, D.C., area].) 18 required, to follow the Laffey Matrix nor to adopt the rate defense counsel opined was the ‘market rate’ for services of [the relevant] type.” (Ibid.) While other approaches may have been: Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 446, 454 [finding no abuse of discretion in declining to employ Laffey Matrix outside of Washington, D.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:70 Cal.App.5th 225 or Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 1401 because neither of those decisions addressed whether the hospital had a duty to disclose based on its exclusive knowledge of material facts. (See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520 , 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered”].) As a result, neither decision explicitly addressed the patient’s lack of reasonable access of a material fact. Therefore, they did not establish that a disclosure of the price charged for a service also discloses the: Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 .) As a result, neither decision explicitly addressed the patient’s lack of reasonable access of a material fact.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:party claims a conflict. Both sides apply the Probate Code. California law about who can sue a charitable trust flowed from the pen of Justice Roger Traynor. His landmark opinion in Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750 , 753–754, 757 (Holt) adopted a common law approach and made the Restatement Second of Trusts a part of California trust law. The Holt opinion was in 1964. California enacted a new Probate Code in 1990. (Revised and Supplemental Comments to the New Probate Code (Sept. 1990) 20 Cal. Law: College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750, 753–754, 757 (Holt) adopted a common law approach and made the Restatement Second of Trusts a part of California trust law.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 716 [“When the Legislature has expressly declared its intent, we must accept the declaration.”].) We begin, however, with Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750 (Holt) in which the Supreme Court concluded that minority directors or trustees of a charitable corporation could maintain 25 an action against majority trustees to enjoin a threatened breach of trust. (Id. at p. 755.) The Supreme Court stated that although the Attorney General had “primary responsibility for the enforcement: College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:to more than one reasonable construction, we may consider extrinsic aids such as legislative history to facilitate our interpretative analysis.” (California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041; accord, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 , 1123 (Blackburn).) C. Right to a Jury Trial in an SVP Proceeding Washington contends the trial court erred by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and by not taking an express personal waiver of that right, analogizing to the requirements in the statutory schemes: Blackburn (2015) (Blackburn).) C.
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:a jury trial,” and is a “‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of article VI, section 13 [of the California Constitution] [that] requires reversal without inquiry into the strength of the evidence in a particular case.” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 , 1132-1133 [failure to obtain valid jury trial waiver from mentally disordered offender in civil commitment proceeding was reversible error]; accord, People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal....: Blackburn (2015) -1133 ; accord, People v.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:his attorney to report such information to the court, with binding effect.” (Id. at p. 147.) In 2015, the California Supreme Court decided the companion cases of People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 (Tran) and People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn). These decisions addressed the procedure for jury trial advisements and jury trial waivers in civil commitment proceedings under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act [MDO] (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and for extending the involuntary commitment of a person originally committed after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity: Blackburn (2015) (Blackburn).
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:the Legislature had intended to allow counsel to waive a jury trial notwithstanding the defendant’s wishes, it would not have needed to require the trial court to expressly advise the defendant.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court in People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 , 1163 (Tran) considered almost identical language (requiring a jury trial advisement and express jury waiver by the defendant) in the statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of a person committed after pleading NGI to a criminal offense. (See Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(3) [“the court shall advise: Tran (2015) (Tran) considered almost identical language (requiring a jury trial advisement and express jury waiver by the defendant) in the statutory scheme for extending the involuntary commitment of...
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:the strength of the evidence in a particular case.” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132-1133 [failure to obtain valid jury trial waiver from mentally disordered offender in civil commitment proceeding was reversible error]; accord, People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 , 1169 [trial court’s acceptance of invalid jury trial waiver in commitment proceeding for defendant who pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity “is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”]; see Heather W., at pp....: Tran (2015) ...
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:to contest a proposed LPS conservatorship may reasonably expect his attorney to report such information to the court, with binding effect.” (Id. at p. 147.) In 2015, the California Supreme Court decided the companion cases of People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 (Tran) and People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Blackburn). These decisions addressed the procedure for jury trial advisements and jury trial waivers in civil commitment proceedings under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act [MDO] (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and for extending the involuntary commitment of a person originally: L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 148.) It reasoned that “a client who tells his appointed attorney he is unwilling to attend the hearing and does not wish to contest a proposed LPS conservatorship may reas...
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:the legislative history.’ . . . Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225 , 1233.) 1. Pertinent Statutes Section 5142, subdivision (a) provides a means by which a nonprofit public benefit corporation may obtain relief for a breach of a charitable trust stating, “any of the following may bring an action to enjoin, correct, obtain damages for or to otherwise remedy a breach: Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.” (Lee v.
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:term. Washington timely appealed. DISCUSSION A. The SVPA “The SVPA authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person who has completed a prison term but is found to be a[n] [SVP].” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339 , 344.) An SVP is defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health or safety of others in that it is likely that he: Superior Court (2015)
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:“On demurrer review, we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339 , 346.) In 1948, Frank R. Capra (Frank Sr.) and his wife Lucille (Lucille Sr.) acquired a house built on federal land in June Lake, Mono County. (We refer to the Capra parties and relatives by their first names to avoid confusion.) The parties refer to the house as “the: Superior Court (2015) .) In 1948, Frank R.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:dismissal on demurrer, “we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339 , 346.) 4 net income or assets of this corporation shall ever inure to the benefit of any director, officer or member thereof or to the benefit of any private person.” The operative bylaws of the Foundation state the Foundation’s “assets and income shall be held in charitable trust, to: Superior Court (2015)
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:it,”’” as well as voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate 9 choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay); accord, People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 636-637.)5 “‘[W]hether or not there is an intelligent, competent, self- protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.) In determining whether a defendant has provided a knowing and intelligent waiver, we “examine the: Cunningham (2015)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 825 (DKN).) These elements are conjunctive, meaning that if just one is unsatisfied, issue preclusion cannot apply. Moreover, even where each element is satisfied, “a court must consider whether application of the issue preclusion doctrine would comport with the doctrine’s core policies, namely the preservation of the integrity of: Faerber (2015) (DKN).) These elements are conjunctive, meaning that if just one is unsatisfied, issue preclusion cannot apply.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:demonstrate that he or she has a meritorious case, that [they have] a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action and that [they] exercised diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 823–824.) “Claim preclusion, the ‘“‘primary aspect’”’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citation.] Issue preclusion, the ‘“‘secondary aspect’”’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the bar on relitigating issues that were argued and decided: Campbell (1994) .) In order to set aside a final order based on extrinsic fraud, “the moving party must demonstrate that he or she has a meritorious case...
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:51, 80, italics omitted.) “The purpose of reformation is to carry out the wishes of the testator, and the remedy reflects no judgment other than a preference for disposition pursuant to the wishes of the testator.” (Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871 , 892; see also Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 713–714 [“Reformation is not the court creating a new agreement but rather enforcing the actual agreement already made by the parties.”].) Thus, a beneficiary may petition the probate court to reform a trust that, due to: App.4th 51, 80, italics omitted.) “The purpose of reformation is to carry out the wishes of the testator, and the remedy reflects no judgment other than a preference for disposition pursuant to the wi...
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:readily acknowledge probate law trends towards flexibility. For example, “formalities should not be allowed to defeat the testator’s intent when clear and convincing evidence satisfies the evidentiary concerns underlying the formalities of the statute of wills.” (Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871 , 893; id. at p. 879 [allowing extrinsic evidence to show reformation].) A respected wills and trusts professor laments that “revocation doctrine has never received sustained attention,” yet “consists of tripwires and traps for the unwary.” (Revoking Wills, supra, 97 Notre Dame L.Rev. at p....: Robert cites no California practice guide instructing practitioners to advise their clients they may revoke wills with stand-alone revocations.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:personal property be declared trust assets. William filed a petition seeking reformation of the pour- over will to confirm Hanako’s intent to transfer only the residue of her separate property estate into the trust. He cited Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871 (Duke), which held that “an unambiguous will may be reformed to conform to the testator’s intent if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the testator’s expression of intent at the time the will was drafted, and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at: He cited Estate of Duke (2015)
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Estate of Eimers
Context from opinion:establishes that the will contains a mistake in the testator’s expression of intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific 8 intent at the time the will was drafted. (Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871 , 879 (Duke).) The Salettas contend the “intent of Timothy Eimers controls the legal effect and interpretation of his will” and that we should amend his holographic will “to acknowledge that Timothy Eimers’ reference to giving his shares of the Norbert Theodore Eimers’ Family Trust . . . necessarily refers: Analysis A will may be reformed to conform to the testator’s intent if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the testator’s expression of intent at the time the...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:have been variously described as “ ‘ “overly harsh” ’ ” [citation], “ ‘unduly oppressive’ ” [citation], “ ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience” ’ ” [citation], or “unfairly one-sided” [citation].’ ” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899 , 910–911.) The doctrine “ ‘ “has both a 43 procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 910.) Both elements must “ ‘ “be present in order: Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015)
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Marriage of Wendt and Pullen
Context from opinion:for the dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or legal separation (§ 2030, subd. (a)) is apportioned equitably depending on what is ‘just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Perry (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 295 , 310-311.) Since a party does not have to prevail or even establish a prima facie claim to get attorney fees from a third party brought into the litigation, conditioning section 2030 5 relief on the third party’s bad faith, as the family court did here, is inconsistent with that: 4 early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party, except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or...
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:the trust.” Similarly, it is well established that California courts have the equitable power to modify the terms of a trust where the modification is necessary to “ ‘serve the original intentions of the trustor.’ ” (Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 , 80, italics omitted.) “The purpose of reformation is to carry out the wishes of the testator, and the remedy reflects no judgment other than a preference for disposition pursuant to the wishes of the testator.” (Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871, 892; see also Panterra GP, Inc. v.: Doolittle (1998) , italics omitted.) “The purpose of reformation is to carry out the wishes of the testator, and the remedy reflects no judgment other than a preference for disposition pursuant to the...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:in the Residuary Trust requires interpretation of its terms. Interpretation of a trust presents a question of law unless it turns on the competence or credibility of extrinsic evidence, or on a conflict in that evidence. (Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 , 73 (Ike).) The intent of the trustor controls. (Ibid.) “[I]t is proper for the trial court in the first instance and the appellate court on de novo review to consider the circumstances under which the document was made so that the court may be placed in the position of: Doolittle (1998)
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331-1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however, those findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51 , 87 (Ike).) The clear and convincing standard, however, “applies only at the trial level. On appeal, it is assumed that the trial court applied the proper 9 standard and the judgment will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to support it.” (Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d: Doolittle (1998) (Ike).) The clear and convincing standard, however, “applies only at the trial level.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:the addition of the UCNP entities to the existing buyout proceeding did not undermine the court’s “inherent authority to deal with the case or matter before it.” (Law Offices of Ian Herzog v. Law Offices of Joseph M. Fredrics (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 672 , 680; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1087-1088.) For example, in Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 the court held the trial court adjudicating a personal injury: Fredrics (1998) ; see American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288; Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:the probate context (see, e.g., King v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 675, 711 [applied to review of punitive damages award]; Morgan v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1089-1090 [same]; In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114 , 123 [applied to dispositional order removing a child]). As explained ante, “the superior court, in an administrative mandamus proceeding, must apply the ‘substantial evidence’ rule in the same manner that that rule is applied by appellate courts in California in reviewing decisions of trial courts.” (Beverly Hills Fed. S.: App.5th 1078, 1089-1090 ; In re Nathan E. (2021) ).
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Parcel 18 and any easements were true. “The tort of malicious prosecution does not have to be directed to an entire lawsuit or even to an entire cause of action. [Citations.]” (Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 136 , 153.) As we have concluded, Carol made a prima facie showing that some, but not all, of the claims asserted against the Maleti Respondents terminated in their favor on the merits. Since the eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action were terminated for procedural or technical reasons, our focus: Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP (2021) .) As we have concluded, Carol made a prima facie showing that some, but not all, of the claims asserted against the Maleti Respondents terminated in their favor on th...
- Clark v. Smith : A settlor who is also a lifetime beneficiary of a revocable inter‑vivos trust is deemed to have the same rights and powers as a full owner of the trust property.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:a pleading, appellate courts (1) treat the properly pleaded allegations as true, (2) consider those matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) liberally construe the allegations with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. (Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998 , 1019.) The foregoing principles raise the question of how one properly pleads the facts necessary to state a violation of the CLRA based on a failure to disclose a material fact. In Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234 (Gutierrez), this court discussed earlier cases and: Sexton (2021) .) The foregoing principles raise the question of how one properly pleads the facts necessary to state a violation of the CLRA based on a failure to disclose a material fact.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:after interlocutory judgment but before final judgment abated a divorce action as to the status of the parties, but did not as to any division of property in the interlocutory degree. (Id. at p. 274; McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 62 Cal.2d 140 , 144 [“The death destroys the cause of action for the dissolution of the marriage; it does not liquidate the property rights which crystallized in the interlocutory decree”]; Klebora v. Klebora (1931) 118 Cal.App. 613, 618.) As a result, in Miller, the property agreement entered into between the spouses survived: Superior Court (1964) 62 Cal.2d 140, 144 ; Klebora v. Klebora (1931) 118 Cal.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:to that code. The parties dispute the meaning of its provisions. We consider the issue de novo. “The meaning and construction of a statute is a question of law, which we decide independently.” (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168 , 189.) “The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] Ordinarily, the words of the statute provide the most reliable indication of legislative intent. [Citation.] When the statutory language is ambiguous, the court may examine the context in which the language appears,: County of San Bernardino (2015)
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:obliterated, or destroyed . . . .” As a statutory word “literally ‘is known by its associates,’” the word “canceled” is still best construed to require a physical act akin to burning, tearing, obliterating, or destroying. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59 , 73.) Requiring a physical alteration to the will to find a revocation is an ancient concept, perhaps in need of revisiting. (See Revoking Wills, supra, 97 Notre Dame L. Rev. at p. 570 [criticizing requirement].) But Robert presents no recent California authority expanding the concept of cancellation 8 beyond: Prunty (2015) .) Requiring a physical alteration to the will to find a revocation is an ancient concept, perhaps in need of revisiting. (See Revoking Wills, supra, 97 Notre Dame L.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Contractors the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction when it declared a bond forfeited without complying with two “jurisdictional prerequisites” in Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306. (See generally People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703 , 710 [describing the jurisdictional prerequisites of Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306].) The Supreme Court observed that neither statute declared the surety released or the bond exonerated if the court failed to comply with those prerequisites under the circumstances in that case....: Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016)
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:559, 563 (North River–Watts); see Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (a);1 Financial Casualty, at p. 42.) This “forfeiture . . . constitutes a ‘breach of th[e] contract’ between the surety and the government.” (People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703 , 709 (Safety National Casualty).) For forfeiture of a bond exceeding $400, the surety has a 185-day “appearance period in which to either produce the criminal defendant in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture.” (People v. The North: Safety National Casualty Corp. (2016) (Safety National Casualty).) For forfeiture of a bond exceeding $400, the surety has a 185-day “appearance period in which to either produce the criminal defendan...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:length of time, the Department argues, was prima facie evidence of her inability to rationally assist counsel. Contrary to the Department’s contention, Patricia’s deliberate failure to cooperate with counsel, without more, does not demonstrate incompetency. (See People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856 , 879 [“[v]oluntary barriers to communication with counsel on the part of a defendant who was able to cooperate [but elected not to] do not demonstrate incompetence” under Penal 5 Code section 1367 ]; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1034 [“an uncooperative attitude is not, in and of: Mendoza (2016) oluntary barriers to communication with counsel on the part of a defendant who was able to cooperate do not demonstrate incompetence” under Penal 5 Code section 1367 ]; People v.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:906; Powers v. Ashton (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 787.) Code of Civil Procedure, section 367 undoubtedly relates to standing in that it largely prohibits persons from pursuing claims they themselves do not own. (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 , 936 (Yvanova) [“In general, California law does not give a party personal standing to assert rights or interests belonging solely to others,” citing Code of Civil Procedure, section 367]; Jasmine Networks, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [same].) However, the Legislature has the power “to grant [such persons] a: App.3d 783, 787.) Code of Civil Procedure, section 367 undoubtedly relates to standing in that it largely prohibits persons from pursuing claims they themselves do not own. (Yvanova v.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:so, “we accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 , 924.) Regardless of a trial court’s stated reasons for sustaining a demurrer, we must affirm “ ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of: New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) .) Regardless of a trial court’s stated reasons for sustaining a demurrer, we must affirm “ ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’ ” (Aubry v.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:not cited any authority for the proposition that ratification is an affirmative defense to that cause of action. Ratification can be used to imbue a voidable transaction with full legal force and effect (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 , 929-930), or to adopt as one’s own an act purportedly performed by an agent on one’s behalf. (City v. Brentwood v. Department of Finance (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 418, 437.) Neither of those situations are at issue in a legal malpractice cause of action, the elements of which are duty,: Ratification can be used to imbue a voidable transaction with full legal force and effect (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) -930), or to adopt as one’s own an act purportedly performed by...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:the District's water." The superior court did not address this argument when Abatti made it below, and we reject it. First, Abatti does not demonstrate that the District has taken entirely inconsistent positions. (See Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1382 , 1387-1388 ["The party must have taken positions that are so irreconcilable that . . . 'one necessarily excludes the other' "].) It is not unreasonable, much less irreconcilable, that the District emphasized landowners' rights in Bryant, but underscores its own discretion and authority here; in both instances, the District: Wells Fargo Bank (1998) -1388 .) It is not unreasonable, much less irreconcilable...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:the District's water." The superior court did not address this argument when Abatti made it below, and we reject it. First, Abatti does not demonstrate that the District has taken entirely inconsistent positions. (See Bell v. Wells Fargo Bank (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1382 , 1387-1388 ["The party must have taken positions that are so irreconcilable that . . . 'one necessarily excludes the other' "].) It is not unreasonable, much less irreconcilable, that the District emphasized landowners' rights in Bryant, but underscores its own discretion and authority here; in both instances, the District: Wells Fargo Bank (1998) -1388 .) It is not unreasonable, much less irreconcilable...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:time of enforcement. 32 In Pendleton 1, the Court of Appeal noted that under section 1615, a premarital agreement was unenforceable if it “was unconscionable when executed” and the trial court made the findings listed in that section. (See former 62 Cal.App.4th 751 , 759, fn. 9, depublished by grant of review.) The opinion suggested a need for changes in the conditions of enforcement under section 1615, and further stated that until then “the courts will have to decide enforcement issues in conformance with the rules that are expressed in Family Code section: More importantly, the opinion in Pendleton 1 endorsed the power of the court to declare premarital spousal support agreements unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:the District argues that "[t]he validating statutes should be construed so as to uphold their purpose, i.e., the acting agency's need to settle promptly all questions about the validity of its action," citing Friedland v. City of Long Beach (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 835 , 842. The purpose of validation is not in dispute; validation judgments nevertheless are binding only on "matters . . . adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 870.) Morgan does not satisfy those requirements with respect to Abatti's: City of Long Beach (1998) .
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:the District argues that "[t]he validating statutes should be construed so as to uphold their purpose, i.e., the acting agency's need to settle promptly all questions about the validity of its action," citing Friedland v. City of Long Beach (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 835 , 842. The purpose of validation is not in dispute; validation judgments nevertheless are binding only on "matters . . . adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 870.) Morgan does not satisfy those requirements with respect to Abatti's: City of Long Beach (1998) .
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:have appealed, and did appeal, from the alternative decree, but they dismissed their appeal. And the UCNP entities never objected to their inclusion in the buyout proceeding or appealed from the alternative decree or judgment. (See Travis v. Brand (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 240 , 254 [nonparties have standing to appeal where “the judgment has a ‘res judicata effect’” or is otherwise binding on the nonparty], review granted June 23, 2021, 8 The January 5, 2017 stipulated order gave Michael and Joseph the right to raise any dispute concerning the proceedings with Judge Meisinger.: Brand (2021) , review granted June 23, 2021, 8 The January 5...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:other interested person, appoint a guardian ad litem” for a minor “if the court determines that representation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate.” (§ 1003, subd. (a).) 27 The word “may” implies discretionary decision-making authority (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440 , 448), and, as the statutory text indicates, such discretion is to be guided by the court’s determination regarding the adequacy of the representation of the minor’s interest in the absence of a guardian ad litem. In the absence of an appointment of a guardian ad litem, the Minors were: Moine (2021) ), and, as the statutory text indicates, such discretion is to be guided by the court’s determination regarding the adequacy of the representation of the minor’s interest in the absence o...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:a special procedural mechanism for seeking and obtaining in rem judgments resolving adverse claims to property that would be binding even to nonparties and hence be ‘good against all the world.’ [Citations.]” (Tsasu LLC v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 704 , 715.) One element of a quiet title claim “is ‘[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.’ [Citation.]” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802 (West), quoting § 761.020, subd. (c).) Thus, in an action brought under the: A. (2021) .) One element of a quiet title claim “is ‘he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.’ ” (West v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:[petition for approval of a minor’s compromise “must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise”].) We review the probate court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. (Breslin v. Breslin (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 801 , 806; Estate of Green (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 25, 28.) Here, in approving the second GAL agreement, the court relied in part on its comparison of what the Minors would receive under the Trust document in the absence of a settlement and the second GAL agreement with what the Minors: Breslin (2021) ; Estate of Green (1956) 145 Cal.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:doctrine’s core policies, namely the preservation of the integrity of the judicial 23 system, the promotion of judicial economy, and the protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation.” (Contreras- Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 88 , 100.) The probate court found that Richard properly asserted issue preclusion to each of Tukes’s claims against the Bennett Trustee because Tukes had dismissed with prejudice similar claims, raising similar issues, against the Pitts Trustee in the Tukes Action....: Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (2021) .) The probate court found that Richard properly asserted issue preclusion to each of Tukes’s claims against the Bennett Trustee because Tukes had dismi...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:we will consider here whether Carol’s complaint was legally sufficient and whether she made a sufficient prima facie showing with admissible evidence to support a favorable judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. (See Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 905 , 922.) . 13 p. 50.) (We will refer to this as the favorable termination element.) Second, the defendant must have brought the prior action without probable cause. (Ibid.) Third, the defendant must have initiated the prior action with malice. (Ibid.; see also Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32: Superior Court (2021)
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Estate of El Wardani
Context from opinion:entitled to serve as administrator or administratrix who is . . . Not a bona fide resident of the State.” (Former Code of Civ. Proc., § 1369; Stats. 1877, ch. 585, § 3; see In re Estate of Beech (1883) 63 Cal. 458 , 459; In re Estate of Martin (1912) 163 Cal. 440, 442.)8 In 1931, the statute was repealed and recodified as former section 420 of the Probate Code without substantive change, barring anyone from serving as administrator “who is not a bona fide resident of this state.” (Stats. 1931, ch.: Proc., § 1369; Stats. 1877, ch. 585, § 3; see In re Estate of Beech (1883) ; In re Estate of Martin (1912) .), the statute was repealed and recodified as former section 420 of the Probate Code without...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:“do not apply in probate proceedings. Instead, the matter is governed by [section] 1003.” (Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 3:558.) 49 Cole v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco (1883) 63 Cal. 86 , 89 (Cole) [“[t]he court is, in effect, the guardian—the person named as guardian ad litem being but the agent to whom the court, in appointing him (thus exercising the power of the sovereign [s]tate as parens patriœ) has delegated the execution of the trust”]). Therefore, the fact that a: Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco (1883)
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People v. Washington
Context from opinion:two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”’” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399 , 408; accord, McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) As the Supreme Court explained in McKee, “we ask at the threshold whether two classes that are different in some respects are sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question: Morales (2016) ; accord, McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202; Cooley v.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:interpretation, we may look to extrinsic aids, including legislative history or purpose to inform our views. [Citation.] We also strive to avoid construing ambiguous statutes in a manner that creates doubts as to their validity.” (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91 , 95–96.) 4 2. Legal Principles 2.1. Bail Forfeiture Procedure A bail bond is a contract between the government and a surety in which the surety guarantees that a specific criminal defendant will appear in court as required during the criminal prosecution. The surety pledges to pay the court the: Surety contends the trial court prematurely entered summary judgment because Emergency rule 9, which expressly tolled “the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action” from April 6,...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:argues a petitioner cannot recover misappropriated property under section 856 and also be awarded twice the value of the recovered property under section 859. We apply de novo review to this issue of statutory interpretation. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91 , 95.) “Our task is to discern the Legislature’s intent. The statutory language itself is the most reliable indicator, so we start with the statute’s words, assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.) If the: Superior Court (2016) .) “Our task is to discern the Legislature’s intent.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:right created by California discovery statutes and the court’s authority to control the conduct of its ministerial officers, and the dispute was “typical of those commonly adjudicated in California courts” (id. at pp. 1029-1030). Similarly, in Lovett v. Carrasco (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 48 the court held the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate third parties’ medical lien 19 claims in an underlying personal injury action. (Id. at p. 54....: Carrasco (1998)
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:[Citation.] ‘. . . [I]f the underlying plaintiff succeeds on any of his or her claims, the favorable termination requirement is unsatisfied and the malicious prosecution action cannot be maintained.’ [Citation.]” (Citizens of . 18 Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 117 , 128, italics added.) Accordingly, numerous cases have held that a malicious prosecution claim may not be maintained where the prior-suit defendant prevailed on one or more (but not all) claims. One such case— relied upon by Attorneys here—is Friedberg v. Cox (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 381 (Friedberg)....: Ramirez (2021) , italics added.) Accordingly, numerous cases have held that a malicious prosecution claim may not be maintained where the prior-suit defendant prevailed on one or more (but not all) cl...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:property "for flooding purposes" to obtain building permit; because "potentially all of a . . . property might have to be dedicated," the ordinance acted as a "subterfuge for a taking"]; Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2011) 635 F.3d 505 , 509, 511, 517-18 [addressing federal cessation of water deliveries in 2001 to protect endangered species; remanding for determination of whether plaintiffs had property interests under applicable Oregon law and whether those rights were impaired]; Baley v. United States (2017) 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 668 [taking claim by landowner class: Cir. 2011) 635 F.3d 505, 509, 511, 517-18 [addressing federal cessation of water deliveries in 2001 to protect endangered species; remanding for determination of whether plaintiffs had property intere...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:property "for flooding purposes" to obtain building permit; because "potentially all of a . . . property might have to be dedicated," the ordinance acted as a "subterfuge for a taking"]; Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2011) 635 F.3d 505 , 509, 511, 517-18 [addressing federal cessation of water deliveries in 2001 to protect endangered species; remanding for determination of whether plaintiffs had property interests under applicable Oregon law and whether those rights were impaired]; Baley v. United States (2017) 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 668 [taking claim by landowner class: Cir. 2011) 635 F.3d 505, 509, 511, 517-18 [addressing federal cessation of water deliveries in 2001 to protect endangered species; remanding for determination of whether plaintiffs had property intere...
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:dishonesty “manifest an ‘abiding disregard of “ ‘the fundamental rule of ethics . . . without which the [legal] profession is worse than valueless.’ ” ’ ” (Levin v. State (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1140, 1147; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787 , 792–793.) 17 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Bradshaw culpable of engaging in a scheme to defraud the Gosey Trust by clear and convincing evidence. Bradshaw fraudulently held himself out to be a prudent trustee who acted: State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 792–793.) 17 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Bradshaw culpable of engaging in a scheme to defraud...
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:of Los Angeles); Serway, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d at p. 89.) Under such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496 , 1502; accord, Zapanta v. Universal Care, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1175.) Thus, as Scruton indicated, the court could reject a guardian ad litem’s repudiation of an agreement if the court determines the repudiation is “adverse to the best interests of the minors.” (Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p.: App.2d at p. 89.) Under such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services, Inc. v.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:no contest clause, or whether the old version of the Probate Code section 21 C. Unauthorized Practice of Law Trustees represent themselves. Beneficiaries argue that such self-representation constitutes an unauthorized practice of law.13 We disagree. In Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545 (Ziegler), Division Three of this court concluded that “[a] non-attorney trustee who represents [a] trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 549....: Nickel (1998) (Ziegler), Division Three of this court concluded that “ non-attorney trustee who represents trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the beneficiary...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Leonard’s causes of action were derivative. enter the alternative decree, we do not have jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the September 27, 2017 order and must dismiss the appeal from that order. (See City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180 , 189.) And even if we had jurisdiction, Michael and Joseph forfeited the argument by failing to support it in their briefs with any argument or citation to authority. (See Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 881; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must support each point by: enter the alternative decree, we do not have jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the September 27, 2017 order and must dismiss the appeal from that order. (See City of Calexico v.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:And in no event may the amount of the sanction impose “an unreasonable financial burden” against the sanctioned party. (§ 271, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 291; In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 64 Cal.App.5th 218 , 234.) Unless sanctions are scaled, they might discourage the economically weaker party from pursuing actions. (In re Marriage of Norton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 53, 60.) The award of section 271 sanctions is committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. An “unreasonable financial burden” cap is the only limit on: App.4th 278, 291; In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 .) Unless sanctions are scaled, they might discourage the economically weaker party from pursuing actions.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:trial court’s arithmetic was in error because $5,250,000 minus $4,820,000 is $430,000, not $480,000. Mark is correct. The fee award is corrected to subtract $50,000 from $920,000 for a balance due of $870,000. (Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 346 , 361 [courts have inherent power to correct clerical errors].) 3. Mark’s Contentions: Error in Awarding Kim 80 Percent of Her Fees To the extent Mark argues that the trial court erred in awarding Kim 80 percent of her fees, we find no error. Mark asserts that “leveling the playing: A. (2021) .) 3.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:Carol’s standing, and before the filing of the formal order that is the subject of this appeal, Carol filed a declaration as executor of Maleti’s estate pursuant to section 377.32, clarifying her status as plaintiff. (See Aghaian v. Minassian (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 603 , 614 [filing of affidavit under § 377.32 is not “ ‘a condition precedent to commencing or continuing the action’ ”].) In that declaration, Carol stated that: (1) there was no pending proceeding concerning the administration of Maleti’s estate; (2) his estate was not administered; (3) she became Maleti’s successor: Minassian (2021)
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Simmons v. Bauer Media Group USA, LLC (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043.) We also review de novo any legal issues properly raised on appeal of a fee award. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682 , 690 (Reck); Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016–1017.) 7 However, where satisfied that a party is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), we review the amount of the award for abuse of discretion. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th: App.5th 1037, 1043.) We also review de novo any legal issues properly raised on appeal of a fee award. (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) (Reck); Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:denying the surety’s motion to set aside the summary judgment. Emergency Rule 9 is Unambiguous As recently explained by Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in All of US or None – Riverside Chapter v. Hemrick (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 751 : “ ‘The rules applicable to interpretation of the rules of court are similar to those governing statutory construction. [Citation.] Under those rules of construction, our primary objective is to determine the drafters' intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘If the rule's language is clear and unambiguous, it governs. [Citation....: Hemrick (2021)
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:extent appellants contend there is insufficient evidence to support the amount of the noneconomic damages, the amount of such damages is left to the sound discretion of the trier of fact, here the court. (See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166 , 172 [“ ‘[t]ranslating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement’ ”; the trier of fact must “ ‘allow such amount as in [its] discretion [it considers] reasonable’ ” for that purpose]; Loth, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p.: Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 172 ranslating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement’ ”...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. However, Limon does not challenge that aspect of the court’s decision and did not brief the issue. “Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.” (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451 , 466, fn. 6.) Because it was not briefed, any issue related to whether the trial court properly denied Limon leave to amend has been abandoned. As a result, we do not address the issue. B. Adequacy of Notice of Demurrer In his opening brief, Limon states “Circle K admittedly: Kosha (1998) , fn. 6.) Because it was not briefed, any issue related to whether the trial court properly denied Limon leave to amend has been abandoned.
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:Reynolds, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728.) 3. Analysis “[O]ur review of the ruling on the constitutional question [under the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause] is independent judgment, or de novo (Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940 , 946 . . .), but with deference to underlying factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ruling (Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 395 . . . ; cf. People v. Dillon (1983): San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) . . .), but with deference to underlying factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorabl...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) In affirming, the Syers court noted “that the trial court was neither be adjusted to establish comparable billing rates in other areas using data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.” (Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050 , 1057 fn. 5.) 10 (See, e.g., Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3d 446, 454 [finding no abuse of discretion in declining to employ Laffey Matrix outside of Washington, D.C., area].) 18 required, to follow the Laffey Matrix nor to adopt the rate defense counsel opined: McCullough (2021) fn. 5.) 10 (See, e.g., Prison Legal News v.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:from undisputed extrinsic evidence, ‘unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citations.] Put simply, ‘“when the competent extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court independently construes the contract.’ [Citation.]” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506 , 531.) 12 Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights Under the Probate Code Sections 140 through 147 comprise the Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights, and are codified as Chapter 1 of Division 2, Part 3 of the Probate Code....: Oracle Corp. (2021) .) 12 Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights Under the Probate Code Sections comprise the Surviving Spouse’s Waiver of Rights, and are codified as Chapter 1 of Division 2, Part 3 of t...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 189.) And even if we had jurisdiction, Michael and Joseph forfeited the argument by failing to support it in their briefs with any argument or citation to authority. (See Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871 , 881; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority].) And, even if we considered the argument on the merits, it would fail for the same reasons the argument concerning the alternative decree fails. Michael and Joseph also: Singh (2021) ; Cal.
- Clark v. Smith : A trustee may sue in his own name as if he were the owner of the claim, and it is not required to identify himself as trustee or reference the trust in the pleadings.
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:59 Cal.4th 1029, 1038 [“It is a maxim of statutory interpretation that courts should give meaning to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any word or provision surplusage.”]; Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138 , 1143–1144 [courts should give the words of a statute “their ordinary, everyday meaning” and neither interpretation nor construction is required where the language “is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty”].) 19 But even if the natural parent and child presumption between Charles and Judy could be rebutted purely on public: Superior Court (1998)
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:justice. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Elkins v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1351.) “The state’s strong interest in prompt and efficient trials permits the non-arbitrary exclusion of evidence [citation] . . . . [Citations.]” (Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138 , 1146-1147.) The trial court’s inherent power “‘ . . . should never be directed in such manner as to prevent a full and fair opportunity to the parties to present all competent, relevant, and material evidence bearing upon any issue properly presented for determination. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Elkins: Superior Court (1998) -1147.) The trial court’s inherent power “‘ . . . should never be directed in such manner as to prevent a full and fair opportunity to the parties to present all competent, relev...
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:the merits of Robert’s no contest claim at a hearing on a fully developed record following discovery. 19 C. The evidence is sufficient for Robert to proceed on a claim that Dae’s Petition was frivolous Citing Estate of Ferber (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 244 (Ferber), Dae argues that to establish that the breach of fiduciary duty claims in Dae’s Petition triggered the No Contest Clause, Robert will need to prove that those claims were frivolous. 10 Dae further argues that this burden must be taken into consideration in determining whether Robert has demonstrated the: The evidence is sufficient for Robert to proceed on a claim that Dae’s Petition was frivolous Citing Estate of Ferber (1998)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:lifestyle that far exceeds that of the custodial parent, child support must to some degree reflect the more opulent lifestyle even though this may, as a practical matter, produce a benefit for the custodial parent.’” (Johnson v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 68 , 71.) In S.P. v. F.G. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 921, 924–925, the court found no error in deviating downward from guideline formula where the support order reflected the child’s best interest and provided standard of living commensurate with a “financially privileged child.” Where the trial court departs from the guideline: App.4th 269, 293 (Cheriton).) Thus, a child’s need is for more than “bare necessities” and varies with the parents’ situation. “‘Accordingly, where the supporting parent enjoys a lifestyle that far ex...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the habit or custom.” “[A] habit involves a consistent, semiautomatic response to a repeated situation.” (Bowen v. Ryan (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 916, 926; Briley v. City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119 , 138.) More specifically, “habit” constitutes a person’s regular or consistent response to a repeated situation, while “custom” means the routine practice or behavior on the part of a group or organization that is 18 equivalent to the habit of an individual. (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 518.): City of West Covina (2021) .) More specifically, “habit” constitutes a person’s regular or consistent response to a repeated situation, while “custom” means the routine practice or behavior on the par...
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment lien automatically expires when the underlying judgment is not renewed before the statutory 10‑year enforcement period lapses.
- Conservatorship of R.J. : A trial court must correctly address and rectify any errors that arise during a conservatorship accounting proceeding, rather than relying on a generic fee schedule without individualized findings.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:from section 15402. It did neither. “We cannot ‘ “rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.” ’ ” (Cahill Construction Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 777 , 787.) We acknowledge that Haggerty v. Thornton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, review granted December 22, 2021, S271483 (Haggerty) — which was decided while this appeal was pending — reached a different result.4 There, a reservation of rights provision provided that the settlor “ ‘may’ ” amend or revoke the: Superior Court (2021) .) We acknowledge that Haggerty v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:thus treated as parties those defendants that the plaintiff had intended to sue and who had waived objection to being treated as having been sued, notwithstanding a technical failure on the part of the plaintiff. In Tyrrell v. Baldwin (1885) 67 Cal. 1 , individuals who were never named nor sued in an action filed an answer to the complaint and were treated by the plaintiff as named defendants. (Id. at p. 3.) The individuals sought a judgment against the plaintiff and only after judgment was rendered against them did their successor in: Baldwin (1885)
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:object to the absence of a jury. (See Joseph W., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 968, citing City of Los Angeles v. Zeller (1917) 176 Cal. 194, Ferrea v. Chabot (1898) 121 Cal. 223, Boston Tunel Co. v. McKenzie (1885) 67 Cal. 485 , Glogau v. Hagan (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 313, and Pink v. Slater (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 816.) Those cases do not provide an apt analogy given the specific statutory framework governing conservatorships. 10 As to the question of forfeiture, we cannot conclude that K.R. forfeited her claim of error by participating: McKenzie (1885) , Glogau v.
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:a decree that contains no error.’’ ” Estate of Callnon, however, did not involve a claim of voidness based on lack of notice. “The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to void judgments.” (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228 , 1239.) A void judgment “ ‘may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, whenever it presents itself.’ ” (Andrews v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1946) 29 Cal.2d 208, 214.) In Estate of Reed, for example, the 26 charities successfully moved to set aside a 1954 probate court order: Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) .) A void judgment “ ‘may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, whenever it presents itself.’ ” (Andrews v.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:case when it enacted Probate Code section 9823 to vest in the personal representative— but not the possible heirs or devisees—the right to partition a property where an interest is not subject to probate. (Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481 , 1500–1501 [Legislature is presumed to be aware of relevant common law].) In any case, the cited portion of Bank of Ukiah is fully consistent with these later-enacted Probate Code sections. 10 they had no rights in the property, which is the exact opposite of a concession that they had: Superior Court (1998)
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:on Maria’s objections, even though verified, as a basis for its ruling because the facts were contested. “[W]hen challenged in a lower court, affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered as evidence at a contested probate hearing.” (Evangelho (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 7 615, 620.) “[S]ection 1022 authorizes the use of declarations only in an ‘uncontested proceeding.’ ” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309.) “When a petition is contested, as it was here, . . . absent a stipulation among the parties to the contrary, each allegation in a verified petition: The Estate contested these statements and produced documents showing that in 1996 money was transferred to the two entities that were the assets of the Marital Trust.
- Garcia v. Garcia : A party forfeits any argument that is not supported by legal authority; unsupported points are deemed waived.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:and executes an agreement for attorney fees—trial courts need not determine the elder’s capacity but must ascertain whether a valid attorney-client relationship was formed. Setting aside Herren’s apparent forfeiture of this belatedly-raised contention (see Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784– 785), we note this new proposal does not seem materially different or any more meritorious than her argument that courts must make a threshold determination of the elder’s capacity, at least in the circumstances of this case....: Bank of America (1998) – 785), we note this new proposal does not seem materially different or any more meritorious than her argument that courts must make a threshold determination of the elder’s cap...
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:issue. Second, appellants argue the trial court committed reversible error by not specifically addressing whether each alleged false belief was a delusion as they claimed. This argument, however, is unaccompanied by citation to authority. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784–785.) Respondents cite to Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, which provides that “[a] statement of decision need not address all the legal and factual issues raised by the parties. . . . [A] trial court rendering a statement of decision is required only to set: Bank of America (1998) –785.) Respondents cite to Muzquiz v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading."].) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden, he forfeited the issue by not addressing amendment in his initial brief. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784-785 ["When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."]; Stroh, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453.) Abatti's conclusory assertion on reply that he should be allowed to amend: Bank of America (1998) -785 ; Stroh, supra, 10 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading."].) Not only did Abatti fail to meet this burden, he forfeited the issue by not addressing amendment in his initial brief. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784-785 ["When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived."]; Stroh, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453.) Abatti's conclusory assertion on reply that he should be allowed to amend: Bank of America (1998) -785 ; Stroh, supra, 10 Cal.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) B. A Section 1820 Petition Must Be Brought by a Proper Party In general, “every action [must] be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995 , 1004; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) “Generally, ‘the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law is the real party in interest.’ ” (Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 906.) A party “lack[s] standing” if: Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) ; see also Code Civ.
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Amundson v. Catello
Context from opinion:try to game the system, a showing required to meet the doctrine’s third element. (Jackson, at p. 181 [judicial estoppel is meant “to project against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts”]; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995 , 1000 [“judicial estoppel raises factual issues”].) The siblings also maintain that they could bring their partition claim because heirs may convey or encumber their expected interests in an estate before the final order of distribution issues. Although the underlying premise for the argument—that an heir may convey or encumber: But even if she had, we have not been presented with any facts indicating she did so to deliberately try to game the system, a showing required to meet the doctrine’s third element. (Jackson...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:Code of Civil Procedure, section 367. It was not attempting to delineate the entire scope of California’s standing doctrine. Generally speaking, a party lacks standing to assert a claim that belongs to another person. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995 , 1004.) Thus, it has been said on many occasions “[a] real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” (Killian v. Millard (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1605; City of Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488, 504;: Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) .) Thus, it has been said on many occasions “ real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed. (Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218, 227; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995 , 999.) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer. Unlike a demurrer, a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and: Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) .) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed. (Southern California Edison Co. v. City of Victorville (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 218, 227; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995 , 999.) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer. Unlike a demurrer, a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and: Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) .) There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement.” (Ibid.) 19 Generally speaking, “[t]he version of the statute in force at the time the parties executed [a premarital agreement] governs.” (Knapp v. Ginsberg (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 504 , 526, fn. 6.) However, it would not affect the result were we to conclude the present version of Family Code section 1615, subdivision (c)(2)(A) controls due to its express reference to agreements “executed between January 1, 2002, and January 1, 2020.” In addition to the Legislature’s express declaration of: Ginsberg (2021)
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:under a separate heading or subheading].) Generally, an appellant’s failure to provide proper headings forfeits an issue that may be discussed in the brief but is not clearly stated in a heading. (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 538 , 547; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) 19. POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J., concurring. The resolution of plaintiff’s claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.)1 (CLRA) is unnecessarily complicated by the extra-statutory expansion of omission-based liability under the CLRA by cases like: Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2021) ; Pizarro v.
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Welch v. Welch
Context from opinion:mind the policies and purposes of the statute [citation], and where possible the language should be read so as to conform to the spirit of the enactment. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Jaime Zepeda Labor Contracting, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 891 , 905.) “Marital property settlement agreements are favored under California law [citation], and governed by general contract principles [citation].” (Safarian v. Govgassian (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1063, fn. omitted....: Department of Industrial Relations (2021) .) “Marital property settlement agreements are favored under California law , and governed by general contract principles .” (Safarian v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:of process claims include lawsuits involving improper uses of the tools afforded litigants, such as the improper use of discovery (see Younger v. Solomon (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 289, 297-299); service of wrongful attachments (see White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 336 , 348-351); obtaining a temporary restraining order to perpetuate a false representation concerning a party (see Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1579-1580); knowingly filing debt collection actions in improper venues for the purpose of impairing the debtors’ ability to defend themselves (see Barquis v....: Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 336, 348-351); obtaining a temporary restraining order to perpetuate a false representation concerning a party (see Siam v.
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:protect individual liberty. (Id. at p. 816, fn. 8 [independent judgment review addresses concerns regarding the danger individuals face “ ‘from the dominance of government and other institutions wielding governmental power’ ”]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners 8 (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 , 75 [the purpose of independent judgment review is to surround individual liberty rights “with a panoply of legal protection”].) With the foregoing in mind, we took a closer look at the Chamberlain and Ettinger courts’ statutory construction and interpretation of the weight of the evidence phrase with respect to: Board of Medical Examiners 8 (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 75 .) With the foregoing in mind...
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:(Jan. 2008) 37 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (2007) p. 403.) Thus, any legally sufficient bar to relief—whether procedural (e.g., a statute of limitations defect) or substantive— appears to satisfy section 21311, subdivision (b)’s test. (Cf. Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864 , 904 [“ ‘[m]ere lapse of time, other than that prescribed by [statutes of limitations], does not bar relief’ ”].) Any contrary holding would unravel the Legislature’s reasoned amendment. Meiri’s analogy to the probable cause standard applicable to malicious prosecution actions is unconvincing....: Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 904 ere lapse of time, other than that prescribed by , does not bar relief’ ”].) Any contrary holding would unravel the Legislature’s reasoned amendment.
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:one of three categories of conduct punishable under section 859. 33. The judgment is presumed correct, all reasonable inferences are indulged to support it, and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of its affirmance. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624 , 631.) Consistent with the finding of bad faith in the current judgment, the Ashlock I judgment includes a finding Stacey committed “fraud in the setting up of the ‘partnerships.’” As discussed herein and in Ashlock I, virtually every instance of misappropriation traces back to the fraudulent partnership scheme....: 33. The judgment is presumed correct, all reasonable inferences are indulged to support it, and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of its affirmance. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) .
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.” ’ ” (Cahill Construction Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 777, 787.) We acknowledge that Haggerty v. Thornton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1003 , review granted December 22, 2021, S271483 (Haggerty) — which was decided while this appeal was pending — reached a different result.4 There, a reservation of rights provision provided that the settlor “ ‘may’ ” amend or revoke the trust “ ‘by an acknowledged instrument in writing.’ ” (Id. at: Thornton (2021)
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:if forced to return because, now 18, he was “no longer a minor” and observed that some Salvadoran youth avoid gang violence and grow up to be professionals. Saul appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Guardianship of S.H.R. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 563 , 573–574, 583 (S.H.R.).) We granted review to provide guidance on the statutory requirements governing California courts’ issuance of special immigrant juvenile predicate findings. We conclude the probate court applied an incorrect legal framework in ruling on Saul’s petition. Applying the correct framework, we hold that it is not viable: R. (2021) –574, 583 (S.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:the demurrer—does not object to these submissions. 12 World Services instead argues the probate court did consider this evidence, and did so properly. What are we to make of this? At oral argument, World Services cited Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200 , but that case does not authorize evidence at the demurrer stage. (See Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 112–118.) In this peculiar situation, we treat the evidentiary material Autonomous Region attached to its supplemental briefing as offers of proof to convince the probate court: What are we to make of this? At oral argument, World Services cited Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, but that case does not authorize evidence at the demurrer stage. (See Fremont Indemnity Co.
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Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs
Context from opinion:briefs, which included Autonomous Region’s extrinsic evidence. Courts provisionally consider all relevant and credible evidence before determining whether a contract is susceptible to a pleaded interpretation. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33 , 39–40.) Extrinsic evidence in this case is cause for wonder. We are reviewing a demurrer ruling, and demurrers must focus on the pleading, not on evidence. Usually it is the proponent of the pleading that is quick to object to evidence at this procedural stage, yet here that very: W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 39–40.) Extrinsic evidence in this case is cause for wonder.
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:findings a strong presumption of validity if they are supported by substantial evidence and especially if the issues in civil court bear a strong similarity, if not identity, to the charged disciplinary conduct. (Berstein v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1968) 69 Cal.2d 90 , 101–102; see In the Matter of Kinney (Review Dept. 2014) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 112, 117.) Nevertheless, we must ultimately “assess [any findings] independently under the more stringent [clear and convincing] 16 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. standard of proof applicable to: Committee of Bar Examiners (1968) 69 Cal.2d 90, 101–102; see In the Matter of Kinney (Review Dept. 2014) 5 Cal.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:at p. 866 [the reunification finding under section 155 “is inherently factual”].) “ The substantial evidence test,” however, “does not ask what proposed facts are more likely than not to be the true facts” (Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1012 , 1017); rather, it is aimed at 9 S.H.R. also relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in Bianka M. that, under section 155, subdivision (b)(1), “a superior court ‘shall’ issue an order containing SIJ findings if there is evidence to support them.” (Bianka M., supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1025.): Church of Scientology (1999) ); rather, it is aimed at 9 S.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:themselves (see Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 98 (Barquis)); and knowingly filing collection actions in the wrong states to obtain default judgments upon which improper garnishment orders may be obtained (see Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1377 , 1389-1391).22 The allegations in the second cause of action of the complaint do not support a claim for abuse of process. Rather, the allegations support the malicious prosecution claim asserted in the first cause of action—the filing and prosecution of the meritless probate proceeding....: Signet Bank/Virginia (1999) -1391).22 The allegations in the second cause of action of the complaint do not support a claim for abuse of process.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:of cases not involving Code of Civil Procedure section 1086. (City of Palm Springs v. Luna Crest, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 879, 883 (Luna Crest) [challenging City’s permit requirement]; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. M&N Financing Corp. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 434 , 443–444 [standing to sue employer for violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act]; Sipple v. City of Hayward (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 349, 358–359 [company’s standing to seek refunds on behalf of customers for taxes collected and 27. remitted by company]; TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163: M&N Financing Corp. (2021) –444 ; Sipple v.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:clause, other terms of the trust, and extrinsic evidence of the trustor’s intent to determine whether an action is a contest that violates the no contest clause. (Giammarrusco v. Simon (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1601 (Giammarrusco); Dae v. Traver (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 447 , 461 (Dae) [“Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of a particular no contest clause depends upon the individual circumstances of the case and the language of the particular instrument.”].) Whether a petition constitutes a trust contest must be determined from a consideration of the purposes the: Traver (2021) (Dae) [“Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of a particular no contest clause depends upon the individual circumstances of the case...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:12 The parties use the term "Law of the River," which refers to the federal obligations "that govern the allocation and use of the water of the Colorado River." (Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3d 1008 , 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion. 17 surplus to that used by riparians or earlier appropriators." (United States, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 101-102; Nicoll v. Rudnick (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 (Nicoll) [" 'Both riparian and appropriative rights are: Bureau of Reclamation (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3d 1008, 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:12 The parties use the term "Law of the River," which refers to the federal obligations "that govern the allocation and use of the water of the Colorado River." (Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3d 1008 , 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion. 17 surplus to that used by riparians or earlier appropriators." (United States, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 101-102; Nicoll v. Rudnick (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 (Nicoll) [" 'Both riparian and appropriative rights are: Bureau of Reclamation (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3d 1008, 1019, fn. 13.) We refer instead to the specific authorities, as necessary to our discussion.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:false representation concerning a party (see Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1579-1580); knowingly filing debt collection actions in improper venues for the purpose of impairing the debtors’ ability to defend themselves (see Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 , 98 (Barquis)); and knowingly filing collection actions in the wrong states to obtain default judgments upon which improper garnishment orders may be obtained (see Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1389-1391)....: Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 98 (Barquis)); and knowingly filing collection actions in the wrong states to obtain default judgments upon which improper garnishment orders may be obta...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:proceed under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, but the court held “that error was an act in excess of jurisdiction” rendering the order voidable, not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Ibid.; see Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 , 97-98, 99 [default judgments erroneously entered in favor of a collection agency that knowingly filed “statutorily inadequate complaints” in the wrong counties were not void for lack of “‘jurisdiction’ in the fundamental sense”]; Law Offices of Ian Herzog v. Law Offices of Joseph M. Fredrics, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at: Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 97-98, 99 [default judgments erroneously entered in favor of a collection agency that knowingly filed “statutorily inadequate complaints” in the wrong co...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:that has fundamental jurisdiction to try the matter but is not the proper venue, and the defendant does not object, that court can render an enforceable judgment that is not subject to collateral attack. (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94 , 121-122.) With these doctrines in mind, we can determine that the trial court erred by dismissing the action based on the exclusive jurisdiction assigned to superior courts sitting in probate. Initially, we note that fundamental jurisdiction is not at issue. The second amended complaint alleges causes of action for: If an action is filed in a court that has fundamental jurisdiction to try the matter but is not the proper venue, and the defendant does not object, that court can render an enforceable judgment that...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:v. San Jose Family Housing Partners, LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 770 [declining to take judicial notice of a document that was “not relevant to our consideration of the issues raised on appeal”]; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057 , 1063 [matters subject to judicial notice must be relevant to issues raised on appeal], overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) 28 _________________________ Miller, J. We concur: _________________________ Kline, P.J. _________________________ Stewart, J. A155742, Roth v....: Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) , overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) .) 28 _________________________ Miller...
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:the interpretation of written instruments, including a trust instrument, unless the interpretation depends on the competence or credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict in that evidence.” (Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546, 551 (Pena); Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254.) “The paramount rule in construing [a trust] . . . instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.” (Brown v. Labow (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 795, 812.) The Probate Code governs trust revocation and modification. Section 15401, subdivision (a) sets out two: App.5th 546, 551 (Pena); Burch v. George (1994) .) “The paramount rule in construing . . . instrument is to determine intent from the instrument itself and in accordance with applicable law.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:control, and a court ‘must not rewrite the [testator’s] will in such a way as to immunize legal proceedings plainly intended to frustrate [the testator’s] unequivocally expressed intent from the reach of the no-contest clause.’ ” (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254–255.) The instant appeal challenges the trial court’s determination, pursuant to sections 16061....: George (1994)
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:purposes of the No Contest Clause. Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of a particular no contest clause depends upon the individual circumstances of the case and the language of the particular instrument. (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254–255.) “ ‘[T]he answer cannot be sought in a vacuum, but must be gleaned from a consideration of the purposes that the [testator] sought to attain’ ” by the instrument in question. (Id. at p. 255, quoting Estate of Kazian (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 797, 802.) Extrinsic evidence may exist: George (1994) –255.) “ ‘he answer cannot be sought in a vacuum, but must be gleaned from a consideration of the purposes that the sought to attain’ ” by the instrument in question. (Id. at p.
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Donkin v. Donkin
Context from opinion:set aside its distributive plan”] (italics omitted).) Moreover, “ ‘[w]hether there has been a “contest” within the meaning of a particular no-contest clause depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and the language used.’ ” (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254–255 (Burch); see § 21310, subd. (a) [defining “contest” as “a pleading filed with the court by a beneficiary that would result in a penalty under a no contest clause, if the no contest clause is enforced”].) The California Supreme Court held in Donkin I that Beneficiaries’ 2010 petition: George (1994)
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:language of the February Trust. Both are issues of law that we review independently. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [interpretation of a statute is an issue of law]; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254 [interpretation of a trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turns on a conflict in the extrinsic evidence].) Clyde argues that this court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings concerning Martin’s intent in establishing the revocation procedure in the February Trust. That would be: George (1994) .) Clyde argues that this court must defer to the trial court’s factual findings concerning Martin’s...
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:The interpretation of a will presents a question of law for our independent review when there is no conflict or question of credibility in the relevant extrinsic evidence. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 604; Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246 , 254, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331-1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however, those findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; Ike: George (1994) , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety
Context from opinion:To begin with, a motion is not a pleading. Rather, “a motion . . . is ancillary to an on-going action and ‘ “ ‘implies the pendency of a suit between the parties.’ ” ’ ” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 , 451; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1004 [“motions must be made in the court in which the action is pending,” italics added]; id. § 422.10 [“The pleadings allowed in civil actions are complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints.”].) Even if a motion to vacate a forfeiture were a pleading, it: Rather, “a motion . . . is ancillary to an on-going action and ‘ “ ‘implies the pendency of a suit between the parties.’ ” ’ ” (In re Cook (2019) ; see Code Civ.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:that more specific challenge amounts to a “contest” for purposes of the trust’s no contest clause depends upon the 1 “ ‘ “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” ’ ” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781 , 785, fn. 1.) Other than Dae, we use first names because some family 2 members have the same surname. No disrespect is intended. 2 trustors’ intent. Robert provided sufficient evidence of the trustors’ intent to allow a change of beneficiary to make a prima facie showing of probability of: Schechter (2019) , fn. 1.) Other than Dae, we use first names because some family 2 members have the same surname.
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:interests. Apart from cursorily suggesting Webb had a conflict, Herren never formally moved to have Webb disqualified nor pursued or obtained a ruling as to whether Webb had a conflict. The issue was thus forfeited. (In re Candida S. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1240 , 1253, fn. 8 [meaningful appellate review can only occur if a party raises a potential conflict of interest, the trial court hears the matter, and the trial court decides whether an actual conflict exists]; see generally People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813–814 [failure to press for a: The issue was thus forfeited. (In re Candida S. (1992) , fn. 8 [meaningful appellate review can only occur if a party raises a potential conflict of interest, the trial court hears the matter...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1328.) In contrast, permanent spousal support is intended to provide financial assistance as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property. (In re Marriage of Winter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1926 , 1932.) Permanent spousal support is governed by the statutory scheme set forth in sections 4300 through 4360. In particular, section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and: App.4th 1317, 1328.) In contrast, permanent spousal support is intended to provide financial assistance as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:782–783 [to be an interested person under Probate Code section 48, a child, spouse or beneficiary must also have a “property right in or claim against a trust estate”].) 12 Kenton’s reliance on Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419 is misplaced. Saks has no bearing here, as it did not involve or address a beneficiary’s standing to sue for elder abuse under section 15657.3, subdivision (d). (See Saks, at pp. 426–430.) b. Substantial Evidence Kenton argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of elder financial abuse.: Damon Raike & Co. (1992) is misplaced.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the court must exercise its discretion within legal principles, 53 taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties as set forth in section 4320, especially their reasonable needs and their financial abilities. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of McLain (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 262 , 269 (McLain) [in awarding spousal support, the court must consider the mandatory guidelines of § 4320].) The court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. The court must recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support....: But the court must exercise its discretion within legal principles, 53 taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties as set forth in section 4320, especially their reasonable n...
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:like a civil discovery request for production of documents, not a claim for the recovery of assets improperly excluded from the conservatorship estate. Just because Parker says they are assets does not make them so. (See Bloniarz v. Roloson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 143 , 149 [“The nature of an action and the issues involved are to be determined, not from the appellation given the pleading, but from the facts alleged and the relief that they support.”].) Even at the hearing on the petition, Parker’s counsel acknowledged that it “may be the case” that: Roloson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 143, 149 [“The nature of an action and the issues involved are to be determined, not from the appellation given the pleading, but from the facts alleged...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:to the elimination of his property interest in the FYR Trust. Therefore, the 1991 Decree is void. Respondents’ attempts to salvage the 1991 Decree are unavailing. They argue the 1991 Decree cannot be collaterally attacked, citing Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150 , 157, in which the court stated, “If the decree erroneously interprets the intention of the testator it must be attacked by appeal and not collaterally. [Citations.] If not corrected by appeal an ‘erroneous decree . . . is as conclusive as a decree that contains no error.’’ ” Estate: Therefore, the 1991 Decree is void. Respondents’ attempts to salvage the 1991 Decree are unavailing. They argue the 1991 Decree cannot be collaterally attacked, citing Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:imposing an objective standard. (E.g., Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 219, 234 [reasonable cause requirement in Probate Code is evaluated under an objective standard of what any reasonable person would have done]; Monarch v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1203 [the delayed discovery rule for the start of a statute of limitations is an objective test asking whether the plaintiff knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the essential facts of injury and causation].) In addition, we conclude the issue of reasonable access is: Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1999) [the delayed discovery rule for the start of a statute of limitations is an objective test asking whether the plaintiff knew or should have known, in the exe...
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:the circumstances in which the EMS Fee is charged or how the amount of the EMS Fee is determined. 13. We note that this interpretation of the SAC does not contradict the conclusions reached in Gray v. Dignity Health (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 225 or Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 1401 because neither of those decisions addressed whether the hospital had a duty to disclose based on its exclusive knowledge of material facts. (See Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [“an opinion is not authority for a: Dignity Health (2021) or Nolte v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:to how a purported diminution in value would support a taking claim here. Courts have rejected taking claims based on water use when they were premature or otherwise unfounded. (See Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 1340 , 1359 (Casitas) [physical taking claim based on right to beneficial use of water accrued not when agency issued opinion, but whenever diversion might occur]; Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267, 1271-1272 [county did not effect a physical taking by approving conditional use permit that limited aquifer 52 Abatti: United States (Fed. Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Casitas) ; Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:to how a purported diminution in value would support a taking claim here. Courts have rejected taking claims based on water use when they were premature or otherwise unfounded. (See Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States (Fed. Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 1340 , 1359 (Casitas) [physical taking claim based on right to beneficial use of water accrued not when agency issued opinion, but whenever diversion might occur]; Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1267, 1271-1272 [county did not effect a physical taking by approving conditional use permit that limited aquifer 52 Abatti: United States (Fed. Cir. 2013) 708 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Casitas) ; Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 913 [eminent domain statute requiring taking of property be necessary to public use did not require “factual showing of absolute necessity” but only “a reasonable or practical necessity”]; see also People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954 , 960 [law banning abortion except where “necessary to preserve” life of mother was unconstitutionally vague, noting “[d]ictionary definitions and judicial interpretations fail to provide a clear meaning for the words, ‘necessary’ or ‘preserve’ ”]....: Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 913 [eminent domain statute requiring taking of property be necessary to public use did not require “factual showing of absolute necessity” but only “a reasonable or practical necessity”]; see also People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954 , 960 [law banning abortion except where “necessary to preserve” life of mother was unconstitutionally vague, noting “[d]ictionary definitions and judicial interpretations fail to provide a clear meaning for the words, ‘necessary’ or ‘preserve’ ”]....: Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:and the District. 11 California enacted the Wright Act in 1887, which "gave irrigation districts the power to construct and maintain irrigation and drainage systems," and passed amended versions in the decades to follow. (Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Hetrick (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 948 , 951.) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 117, 120 (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid....: Hetrick (1999) .) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:and the District. 11 California enacted the Wright Act in 1887, which "gave irrigation districts the power to construct and maintain irrigation and drainage systems," and passed amended versions in the decades to follow. (Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Hetrick (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 948 , 951.) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 117, 120 (Thayer).) The CDC posted a notice of appropriation. (Ibid....: Hetrick (1999) .) The District's predecessor, the California Development Company (CDC), was formed in the late 1890's to irrigate the Imperial Valley with diverted Colorado River water. (See Thayer v.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:requirement as a mere “procedural formality” that she and the decedent had the power “to waive when they drafted and executed” the amendment. “The argument is forfeited because [Mary] failed to raise it below.” (Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832 , 854; Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 865, fn. 4 [argument not raised below is “not cognizable”].) In the lower court, Mary argued the notary requirement served no purpose, but she did not assert — as she does here —that she and the decedent were: Schaefers (2021) ; Ehrlich v.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made. (See Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1017–1018; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 , 914– 915 (C.O.); Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383– 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249–1251 (Kevin A.).) 7 Although the courts are split as to whether the LPS 7 These cases also recognize that a trial court may accept an: O. (2021) – 915 (C.
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Conservatorship of Joanne R.
Context from opinion:trial was reversible error]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253 [reversing conservatorship order where trial court erred in accepting counsel’s waiver of LPS conservatee’s right to jury trial over conservatee’s objection]; but see Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 , 917-919 [trial court’s failure to personally advise proposed conservatee of right to a jury trial was statutory error, but error was harmless; and court’s acceptance of counsel’s waiver of jury trial right did not violate proposed conservatee’s rights]....: O. (2021) -919 [trial court’s failure to personally advise proposed conservatee of right to a jury trial was statutory error, but error was harmless; and court’s acceptance of counsel’s waiver of jury...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:direct (as opposed to a derivative) action is maintainable ‘only if the damages [are] not incidental to an injury to the corporation.’”]; see also Schuster v. Gardner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 305, 313; Denevi, at p. 1222; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111 , 124 (Nelson).) The principles governing derivative actions in the context of corporations apply to limited liability companies and limited partnerships. (See Sprengel v. Zbylut (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1040-1041 [limited liability company]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp....: Anderson (1999) (Nelson).) The principles governing derivative actions in the context of corporations apply to limited liability companies and limited partnerships. (See Sprengel v.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:a judgment of nonsuit because the plaintiff failed to designate an expert on causation (Nunez v. Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 874); (3) by summary judgment that reflected on the merits of the claim (Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135 , 1149-1150 (Sierra Club)); and (4) by court dismissal because the claims were barred by the litigation privilege (Berman v. RCA Auto Corp. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 321, 323-326.) On the other hand, termination based upon the action being barred by the statute of limitations is “deemed a technical or procedural: Graham (1999) -1150 (Sierra Club)); and (4) by court dismissal because the claims were barred by the litigation privilege (Berman v.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:that the judgment was premised on false facts. The party must show that such facts could not reasonably have been discovered prior to the entry of judgment.” [(Cartagena, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1067– 1068)]’ (In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288 , 1295.) Thus, the fraud, if any, was intrinsic rather than extrinsic (see Lazzarone, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 588–589) and does not provide an exception under Probate Code section 2103, subdivision (b) to the preclusive effect of the order approving the first accounting.” (Knox, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p.: App.4th at pp. 1067– 1068)]’ (In re Margarita D. (1999) .) Thus, the fraud, if any, was intrinsic rather than extrinsic (see Lazzarone, supra, 181 Cal.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:of a statute superfluous’ ”].) Second, McDonald insists — citing no legal authority — that allowing an interested party to file a demurrer at any time at or before the hearing is absurd. (County of Santa Barbara v. Connell (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 175 , 180, fn. 4 [statutory language should not be given literal meaning if it results in absurd consequences unintended by the Legislature].) He contends that, under Goebner’s reading of the statute, the phrase “response or objection” must include motions for summary judgment. Consequently, a party filing such a motion could: Connell (1999) , fn. 4 .) He contends that, under Goebner’s reading of the statute...
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:able to appropriately participate in court, including multiple hours of depositions and meetings.” “It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621 , 630.) Robert’s evidence also left room for the trial court to find it insufficient. For example, even accepting his view about Anush’s assertiveness, the court explicitly reasoned that even though “Layla’s children influenced her and most likely persuaded her to act in certain ways . . . [¶] .: Owens Corning (1999) .) Robert’s evidence also left room for the trial court to find it insufficient.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:waiver, several appellate courts postdating Joseph W. have reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made. (See Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009 , 1017–1018; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 914– 915 (C.O.); Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383– 385 (Heather W.); Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249–1251 (Kevin A.).) 7 Although the courts are split as to whether the LPS 7 These cases also: Eric B. (2022) .) As for the issue of waiver, several appellate courts postdating Joseph W. have reaffirmed the principle that a person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil com...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:not permissive”].) When the facts a petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence support SIJ predicate findings, the superior court must issue these findings; it has no discretion to deny the petition. (See In re Scarlett V. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 495 , 502 [superior court erred in concluding decision whether to issue SIJ predicate 4 To this point, new federal regulations acknowledge all children seeking SIJ predicate findings are doing so in the hope of being able to apply for SIJ status. Accordingly, the desire to “obtain relief from parental abuse,: Standish (2006) .) When the facts a petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence support SIJ predicate findings, the superior court must issue these findings...
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:five-digit numeric codes established by the American Medical Association. They are used by healthcare providers to quickly describe to insurers the services for which the provider is billing.” (People ex rel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rubin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 753 , 764; see California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 543, 550, fn. 5.) According to an expert’s declaration in U.S. ex rel. Woodruff v. Hawaii Pacific Health (D.Ha. 2008) 560 F.Supp.2d 998, “ ‘CPT codes have been incorporated to HCPCS as the first level: Rubin (2021) ; see California Ins. Guarantee Assn. v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:“ ‘The right to dispose of property in contemplation of death is as old as the right to acquire and possess property, and the laws of all civilized countries recognize and protect this right.’ ” (Estate of Della Sala (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 463 , 467 (Della Sala).) This appeal stems from judgments entered after the trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend to two probate petitions filed by Kimberly Rallo and Adam Ross —adult children of the decedent Hugh O’Brian. At issue is O’Brian’s right to choose to disinherit anyone claiming to: Wu for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ INTRODUCTION “ ‘The right to dispose of property in contemplation of death is as old as the right to acquire and possess property...
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:of a defendant’s assets without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536.) The Legislature “ ‘clearly had Randone in mind’ when drafting the current attachment statutes” (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 15 73 Cal.App.4th 76 , 79), and the “safeguards” embodied in the Attachment Law are designed to rectify due process defects identified in Randone. (Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1115.) Procedurally, the plaintiff must meet the burden of showing her claim has “ ‘probable validity,’ ”: Weiss (1999) 15 ), and the “safeguards” embodied in the Attachment Law are designed to rectify due process defects identified in Randone. (Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v.
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:way of advancement, unless it appears from the will that such omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate.’ ” (Della Sala, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 8 The child also will not recover if the decedent provided “substantially all the estate to the other parent of the omitted child,” or the decedent provided for the omitted child “by transfer outside of the estate” and intended the transfer to be in lieu of providing for the child in: 9 demonstrated through the specific circumstances identified in section 21621. Relevant here, the child will not receive a share of the estate if the objecting party establishes...
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People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc.
Context from opinion:in which a surety may move to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond. We disagree. 1. Scope and Standard of Review We independently review and interpret Judicial Council emergency rules. (See People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33 , 38–39 (Financial Casualty); In re M.P. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1020.) The well-settled rules of statutory construction apply to the California Rules of Court. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902; People v. Guerra (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 961, 966.) “ ‘Our primary task in: Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2021) –39 (Financial Casualty); In re M.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:the Disposal Reporting System or any issues or records related to it. 11 enforce its local fee ordinance are questions of fact, as cases at all levels have held for many, many years. The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) 73 U.S. 18 , 27: shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 350:: The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) : shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:the Disposal Reporting System or any issues or records related to it. 11 enforce its local fee ordinance are questions of fact, as cases at all levels have held for many, many years. The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) 73 U.S. 18 , 27: shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact”; Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 350:: The following are illustrative: The Amelie (1867) : shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact”; Ayres v.
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership.”]; Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442 , 457 (Holmes) [once partnership is established, “other provisions of the UPA and the conduct of the parties supply the details of the agreement”]....: Lerner (1999)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:she has been prejudiced by the court’s ruling. Prejudice is not presumed, and the appellant has the duty to show that an error is prejudicial. (Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601; see Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68 , 106 [“the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice”].) Christine has failed to make that showing 29 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court did not hear oral argument on the motion for new trial, which was: State of California (1999) .) Christine has failed to make that showing 29 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) “An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments in the appellate briefs.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68 , 109; Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 334 [“Rather than brief those arguments, [appellants] purport to ‘incorporate’ them from papers filed below. We do not consider such arguments on appeal.”]....: State of California (1999) ; Garrick Development Co. v.
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Turner v. Victoria
Context from opinion:is permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the People or the attorney general when the right to sue resides solely in that official. . . .” ’ ” (Arman v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697 , 705, fn. 12; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §§ 1–2 (Lexis Advance through Register 2021, No.28, July 9, 2021).) If the Attorney General deems it appropriate to grant relator status to an individual, such as a former director, to litigate the matter on behalf of the public benefit: A. (1999) , fn. 12; see Cal.
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Estate of Eskra
Context from opinion:the other party knew of the mistake, that the other party caused the mistake, or that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable. (Rest.2d Contracts, § 153; Donovan, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 281; see also Greif v. Sanin (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412 , 439.) Of course, where a party trying to avoid a contract is able to show the other party “fostered or encouraged” the mistake, the party may be able to prevail on the ground of fraud. 18 The critical question in the present case is whether Brandy’s failure to read: Sanin (2022) .) Of course, where a party trying to avoid a contract is able to show the other party “fostered or encouraged” the mistake, the party may be able to prevail on the ground of fraud.
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Packard v. Packard
Context from opinion:wishes of the testator, and the remedy reflects no judgment other than a preference for disposition pursuant to the wishes of the testator.” (Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871, 892; see also Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697 , 713–714 [“Reformation is not the court creating a new agreement but rather enforcing the actual agreement already made by the parties.”].) Thus, a beneficiary may petition the probate court to reform a trust that, due to a mistake, does not accurately reflect the trustor’s intent. (Estate of Duke, at: Superior Court (2022)
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:On appeal, Christine and the Minors rely on the same interim rulings the trial court ultimately rejected. As the trial court recognized, however, it had the inherent authority to change its interim rulings (Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1156) and explicitly exercised its discretion in doing so. We do not, therefore, consider them. This modification does not constitute a change in the judgment. Appellants Christine Chui’s and Michael Chui’s petitions for rehearing filed on March 17, 2022 are denied....: Kritt (1999) ) and explicitly exercised its discretion in doing so.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:discretion with regard to fees, and it is no longer accurate to refer to a trial court’s “broad discretion” when describing a trial court’s responsibilities under section 2030 as currently in effect. (Id. at pp. 1048– 1049.) 68 Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860 , 870–871.) Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to award fees “without making any inquiry into the reasonableness of those fees.” (Id. at p. 870; Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112.) We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees (§§ 2030, 2032) and sanctions (§ 271) for: App.5th 1025, the court observed that the 2010 amendments to section 2030 had placed limitations on trial court discretion with regard to fees, and it is no longer accurate to refer to a trial court’s...
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Estate of Ashlock
Context from opinion:issue is one she does not raise, i.e., which party had the burden of proof below. Stacey’s arguments ultimately concern the trial court’s factual findings, so the standard of review is deferential to the judgment. (See Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973 , 987, 992–994 [applying substantial evidence test to claims involving surcharges in a probate matter].) The trial court, in reliance on Purdy v. Johnson (1917) 174 Cal. 521 (Purdy), concluded it was Stacey’s burden to substantiate her accountings. In Purdy, a trust beneficiary alleged misconduct by two trustees, including failures: Her opening brief discusses the de novo standard, which applies to questions of law, but the primary legal issue is one she does not raise, i.e., which party had the burden of proof below.
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:filing of demurrers — “within 30 days after service of the complaint” — governs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a).) We independently review orders overruling a demurrer and issues of statutory interpretation. (LGCY Power, LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 844 , 859.) When construing a statute, we ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate its purpose in enacting the statute. (Jenkins v. Teegarden (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1138–1139.) We give the statute’s words their plain and usual meaning, construing them in their statutory context. (Id. at p. 1138....: Superior Court (2022) .) When construing a statute, we ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate its purpose in enacting the statute. (Jenkins v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:the opinion’s readability, we will refer to the individuals by their first names. We mean no disrespect. 2 The probate and trust litigation is described in a partially published opinion this court filed in March 2022. (Chui v. Chui (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 873 (Chui), petns. for cert. pending, petns. filed Sept. 12, 2022, 22-251, 22-253 & Sept. 13, 2022, 22-247.) 2 the removal petitions and, because the statutory authorization for Chen’s appointment terminated when Jacqueline and Michael became adults, we direct the court to terminate the appointment forthwith. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY A.: Chui (2022) (Chui), petns. for cert. pending, petns. filed Sept. 12, 2022, 22-251, 22-253 & Sept. 13, 2022, 22-247.) 2 the removal petitions and, because the statutory authorization for Chen’s appoint...
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:Lucas and Brenda G. Lucas, Husband and Wife as Joint Tenants’ ”]; Bibb, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 463 [grant deed signed by husband conveying separate property home to himself “and his wife as joint tenants”]; Estate of Mitchell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1378 , 1382 [title taken as “ ‘Robert S. Mitchell and Shirley C. Mitchell, husband and wife as joint tenants’ ”]; In re Marriage of Scherr (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 314, 316 [wife chose to title deed as “ ‘husband and wife as joint tenants’ ”].) If the joint tenants are married,: App.4th at p. 463 ; Estate of Mitchell (1999) [title taken as “ ‘Robert S.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:a permanent right to any specific proportion of the water"].) Second, even if the elements of judicial estoppel were satisfied, "[j]udicial estoppel is an extraordinary remedy that should be applied with caution." (Kelsey v. Waste Management of Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 590 , 598.) We see no basis for its application here. 2. The District's appeal is not moot Finally, Abatti contends that the District's appeal is moot because the District has repealed the 2013 EDP. We disagree. Waiver of the right to appeal may occur when there is "voluntary compliance" with: Waste Management of Alameda County (1999) .) We see no basis for its application here. 2.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:a permanent right to any specific proportion of the water"].) Second, even if the elements of judicial estoppel were satisfied, "[j]udicial estoppel is an extraordinary remedy that should be applied with caution." (Kelsey v. Waste Management of Alameda County (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 590 , 598.) We see no basis for its application here. 2. The District's appeal is not moot Finally, Abatti contends that the District's appeal is moot because the District has repealed the 2013 EDP. We disagree. Waiver of the right to appeal may occur when there is "voluntary compliance" with: Waste Management of Alameda County (1999) .) We see no basis for its application here. 2.
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 487, 498; Conservatorship of Lefkowitz (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313.) The conservator must account to the court for the property of the conservatee with information about receipts, disbursements, transactions, and the remaining assets. (Johnson v. Kotyck (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 83 , 89.) The conservator must also prevent misappropriation of the conservatee’s assets. (Ibid.) A fiduciary has a duty to provide full disclosure of all material facts that affect the beneficiary’s interest. (Ball v. Posey (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1209, 1214....: Kotyck (1999) .) The conservator must also prevent misappropriation of the conservatee’s assets. (Ibid.) A fiduciary has a duty to provide full disclosure of all material facts that affect the benefic...
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Rallo v. O'Brian
Context from opinion:the trial court noted, demurrers routinely are considered in probate proceedings. (See, e.g., Estate of Pryor, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1468, 1470 [considering order sustaining demurrer to petition that claimed a donative transfer was improper]; Johnson v. Kotyck (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 83 , 86, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752 [judicial notice proper on demurrer despite lack of formal request because “the court may take judicial notice on its own volition,” and plaintiff had opportunity to object]; Evid. Code, § 455, subd. (a).) We reject Adam’s contention he had no opportunity to: Kotyck (1999) , supra, 214 Cal.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:Yang lied about their knowledge of Lopez’s cancer to cover up the wrongful termination. Evidence that an employer offered a pretextual explanation to justify its wrongful termination may support a finding of malice or oppression. (See Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895 , 912 [employer’s use of a false explanation to hide gender- based termination supported punitive damages award]; Stephens v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. (1988) 23 199 Cal.App....: Casey (1999) ; Stephens v.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:procedural defect impaired his ability to oppose the defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment despite violations of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. (See Brown v. El Dorado Union High School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003 , 1020 [no abuse of discretion where plaintiff did not explain how the alleged deficiency in the defendant’s separate statement impaired his ability to demonstrate that material facts were in dispute]; Truong v. Glasser, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [no abuse of discretion in not denying summary judgment motion: The partitioning court’s orders, however, were not ambiguous. Because plaintiff argued against the affirmative defense of quasi-judicial immunity on its merits and did not show how the procedural defe...
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Goebner v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:Code and Code of Civil Procedure statutes together, an interested party may file a demurrer to a petition under the Probate Code “at or before 5 the hearing.” (§ 1043, subd. (a); Tan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130 , 137 [requiring courts where reasonably possible to harmonize statutes, reading them together to give effect to all provisions].) The Probate Code further addresses concerns that a party may present a demurrer at a hearing — thus placing the petitioner at a disadvantage — by allowing a court to “continue: Appellate Division of Superior Court (2022)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the 27 penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay. (Id. at pp. 337–338; see City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302 , 1320–1322 . . . (Sainez).) After reviewing those considerations, the high court held that the forfeiture of Bajakajian’s currency constituted an ‘excessive fine’ barred by the Eighth Amendment.” (R.J. Reynolds, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728.) 3. Analysis “[O]ur review of the ruling on the constitutional question [under the: Sainez (2000) –1322 . . . (Sainez).) After reviewing those considerations, the high court held that the forfeiture of Bajakajian’s currency constituted an ‘excessive fine’ barred by the Eighth Amendme...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:court affects appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence, our case law also contains contrary suggestions that have contributed to what is now a significant split of authority among the Courts of Appeal. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847 , 891; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170-171; Osal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1200; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1326; In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038. 16: Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) ; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:addressing whether each alleged false belief was a delusion as they claimed. This argument, however, is unaccompanied by citation to authority. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785.) Respondents cite to Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106 , which provides that “[a] statement of decision need not address all the legal and factual issues raised by the parties. . . . [A] trial court rendering a statement of decision is required only to set out ultimate findings rather than evidentiary ones.” (Id. at p. 1125, citations omitted.): City of Emeryville (2000)
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) Here, Kenton’s election to proceed without a reporter’s transcript leaves us unable to assess whether an abuse of discretion occurred. (See Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440 , 447–448 [“absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion”].) In the absence of a complete record or one indicating otherwise, we presume the trial court performed its job correctly. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Duran: Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) –448 .) In the absence of a complete record...
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:in the same lawsuit” and “may disregard conflicting factual allegations in the [challenged pleading].” (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 7:47, citing Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 344 [demurrer]; Pang v. Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986 , 989-990 [motion for judgment on pleadings].) 10 II. The Act A. Assembly Bill 939: The Integrated Waste Management Act In 1988, in recognition of an “emerging solid waste crisis in California,” the state Senate created a Task Force on Waste Management (Task Force) and charged it with developing “: Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) -990 .) 10 II. The Act A.
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:in the same lawsuit” and “may disregard conflicting factual allegations in the [challenged pleading].” (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 7:47, citing Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 344 [demurrer]; Pang v. Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986 , 989-990 [motion for judgment on pleadings].) 10 II. The Act A. Assembly Bill 939: The Integrated Waste Management Act In 1988, in recognition of an “emerging solid waste crisis in California,” the state Senate created a Task Force on Waste Management (Task Force) and charged it with developing “: Beverly Hospital Inc. (2000) -990 .) 10 II. The Act A.
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:909 as appendices A-1, A-2, and A-3, post, to this opinion. We achieve now what the trial court would do on remand — find that ICWA does not apply. As our colleagues pointed out in Jn re Allison B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 214 , 219: “When, however, postjudgment evidence is offered to an appellate court in support of a motion to dismiss a juvenile dependency appeal, it is ‘routinely consider[ed]’ because, if the motion is granted, it will have ‘the beneficial consequence’ of ‘ “expedit[ing] the proceedings and promot[ing] the finality of the: We admit into evidence Mother’s ICWA- 020 form and the tribe’s response pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 909 as appendices A-1, A-2, and A-3, post...
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:the motion is granted, it will have ‘the beneficial consequence’ of ‘ “expedit[ing] the proceedings and promot[ing] the finality of the juvenile court's orders and judgment.” ’” Although the facts are different, the analysis in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 , 779, is instructive here. “[T]he price that would be paid for’ the “added incentive” of “treating [an] error as... structural’ (and hence automatically reversible), “in the form of needless reversals of dependency judgments, is unacceptably high in light of the strong public interest in prompt resolution of these cases: App.5th 214, 219: “When, however, postjudgment evidence is offered to an appellate court in support of a motion to dismiss a juvenile dependency appeal, it is ‘routinely consider’ because, if the moti...
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Adoption of M.R.
Context from opinion:including on appeal, and indeed all the evidence is to the contrary. (See G.A., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 360.) In some instances, father argues, recent appellate cases with similar holdings were wrongly decided. (See In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 , review granted, Sep. 21, 2022, S275578.) He adds that the inapplicability of Probate Code section 1516.5, on which the trial court relied in part in making its ruling, to Indian children further distinguishes his case from the authority against his position, noting that this statute “is merely a best: App.5th at p. 360.) In some instances, father argues, recent appellate cases with similar holdings were wrongly decided. (See In re Dezi C. (2022)
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:on Simon under section 11700. Having reached that conclusion, we need not discuss his other arguments. I. Governing Law Probate proceedings are statutory; the language of the applicable statute defines the court’s powers and responsibilities. (See Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801 , 816–817 (Bruno)....: Governing Law Probate proceedings are statutory; the language of the applicable statute defines the court’s powers and responsibilities. (See Bruno v. Hopkins (2022)
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:365; Howard v. Howard, 27 Cal.2d 319, 321; Westphal v. Westphal, 20 Cal.2d 393, 397; Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645; Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal.2d 570, 575; Carr v. Bank of America, 11 Cal.2d 366, 371–373; Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322 , 325–326; Ringwalt v. Bank of America, 3 Cal.2d 680, 684– 685; Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476–479; Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 371; see, Restatement, Judgments, p. 588; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), §§ 1233–1235; 3 Pomeroy, Equity 29 Jurisprudence (5th ed.), p. 610.)” (Jorgensen, supra, 32: Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322, 325–326; Ringwalt v.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:on other grounds as stated in Estate of Rossi (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331-1332, 1339.) To the extent the probate court’s decision rests on its findings of fact, however, those findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744 , 750; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 87 (Ike).) The clear and convincing standard, however, “applies only at the trial level. On appeal, it is assumed that the trial court applied the proper 9 standard and the judgment will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to: Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; Ike v.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:appellate court’s general responsibility to review the record for substantial evidence, even when the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court. (E.g., In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 863; Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744 , 750 (Crail); Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25; Viner v. Untrecht (1945) 26 Cal.2d 261, 267; Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815 (Stromerson); Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928) 205 Cal. 252, 259; Treadwell v. Nickel: Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 (Crail); Nat.
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Conservatorship of C.O.
Context from opinion:that each part may be harmonized and given effect.” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 706.) 2. Statutory Provisions The LPS Act, enacted in 1967, “governs the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California.” (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005 , 1008.) The act “provides one-year conservatorships for those ‘gravely disabled as a result of a mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.’ (§ 5350.)” (K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 703.) Section 5350 addresses the procedure for establishing an LPS conservatorship. It states in relevant part: “The procedure: Statutory Provisions The LPS Act, enacted in 1967, “governs the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill in California.” (Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) .
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on clear and convincing evidence].’ ” (In re Angelia P., at p. 924; see also In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398 , 423 [taking a similar view of the appellate court’s responsibility in reviewing a finding under Civ. Code, former § 232].) In Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 519, where we reviewed a finding by the trial court that the clear and convincing standard had not been satisfied, we described our task: sufficiency of the evidence in the light of that rule, it will not disturb the finding of the trial court to the effect that the deed is a mortgage, where there is substantial evidence warranting a cl...
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:sequence of events led to some confusion, there is no reversible error here. Under our state Constitution, “a judgment [may] not be reversed unless error caused actual prejudice in light of the whole record.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 , 573; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The record here does not demonstrate that Kenton suffered actual prejudice. Indeed, the court granted his ex parte motion to shorten the time for his motion to lift the discovery stay and decided the motion on the merits. The court also accepted: General Motors Corp. (1994) ; Cal.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:complainants to pursue shotgun tactics by proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should know to be groundless.” (Id. at p. 57, fn. omitted.) The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its holding in Bertero. (See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666 , 686 (Crowley) [“ ‘a malicious prosecution suit may be maintained where only one of several claims in the prior action lacked probable cause”].) Under the Bertero rule, therefore, “[a] claim for malicious prosecution need not be addressed to an entire lawsuit; it may . . . be based upon: Katleman (1994) (Crowley) .) Under the Bertero rule, therefore...
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:Standard Of Review The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review on appeal pertaining to Tammy’s various arguments. Where the facts are undisputed, the effect or legal significance of those facts is a question of law. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791 , 799.) We review any questions of law de novo. (Id. at p. 801.) We review findings of fact for substantial evidence. “ ‘In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, “any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn: Antonioli (1994)
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:case. (Sanders, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 614.) The requirements for equitable relief have been articulated by some courts as a three-part test. (In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1069 (Stevenot) [extrinsic fraud]; Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975 , 982 [extrinsic mistake].) In order to set aside a final order based on extrinsic fraud, “the moving party must demonstrate that he or she has a meritorious case, that [they have] a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action and that [they] exercised diligence in: Campbell (1994)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:a person’s regular or consistent response to a repeated situation, while “custom” means the routine practice or behavior on the part of a group or organization that is 18 equivalent to the habit of an individual. (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475 , 518.) We review the court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) “Specifically, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in: Johnson (2019) .) We review the court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v.
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Conservatorship of Anne S.
Context from opinion:906.) A party “lack[s] standing” if he is “not the real party in interest.” (Cloud, at p. 1004.) If a court “finds [a party has] no standing, it should sustain the demurrer or dismiss the petition.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 , 827 [§ 17200 standing].) In the specific context of section 1820, “the proposed conservatee, spouse, domestic partner, relative, or other ‘interested’ agency, person, or friend has standing to file a petition for a probate conservatorship.” (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 144, quoting § 1820, subd. (a).): Jennings (2020) .) In the specific context of section 1820, “the proposed conservatee, spouse, domestic partner, relative, or other ‘interested’ agency, person...
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:want. However, the presumption that disclaimers are valid is not conclusive. (Vance v. Bizek (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1164.) And a demurrer is not an evidentiary motion to which such a presumption may be applied. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 , 827.) Barbara and Gerald also argue Simon only has standing if he represents the pecuniary interests of a beneficiary of the Estate. For this proposition, they rely on section 48 and case law. However, section 48 is a definitional provision that gives the meaning of the term “interested person.”: App.4th 1155, 1164.) And a demurrer is not an evidentiary motion to which such a presumption may be applied. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) .) Barbara...
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Dunlap v. Mayer
Context from opinion:sense as a matter of judicial economy, but it also recognizes the probate court’s inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.’ [Citation.]” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 , 827–828.) Construing the words of section 24 with these precepts in mind, and with general tenets of statutory interpretation (see People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1310–1311), persons with a present or future interest in a trust include those 5 persons’ successors in interest. The Estate, as successor: Jennings (2020) –828.) Construing the words of section 24 with these precepts in mind, and with general tenets of statutory interpretation (see People v.
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Haggerty v. Thornton
Context from opinion:15402.) With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the trust agreement at issue here. “The primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to the settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 , 826.) Where, as here, interpretation of the instrument does not depend on disputed extrinsic evidence, we consider the issue de novo. (Gardenhire v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 882, 888.) The language of Bertsch’s trust agreement does not distinguish between revocation and modification. It reserves the following right to: Jennings (2020) .) Where, as here, interpretation of the instrument does not depend on disputed extrinsic evidence, we consider the issue de novo. (Gardenhire v.
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Torres v. Adventist Health System/West
Context from opinion:generally a question of fact that can be decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or facts accepted as true for pleading purposes) can support only one reasonable conclusion. (See Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181 , 193 [allegations failed as a matter of law to trigger the delayed discovery rule because allegations showed plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence; demurrer upheld].) In this case, Hospital responds to Torres’s allegation about the lack of reasonable access by referring to the Payers’ Bill of Rights and its: Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:of those fees.” (Id. at p. 870; Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 111–112.) We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees (§§ 2030, 2032) and sanctions (§ 271) for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267 , 276.) “In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47.) “‘To the extent that a trial court’s exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it: App.5th at pp. 111–112.) We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees (§§ 2030, 2032) and sanctions (§ 271) for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) .
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:or the degree to which the fact finder finds the evidence probative. (See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233, 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160 , 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case . . . [¶] . . . [and] [a]ny other rule as to the weight of the: Bushton (1889) he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project." (Bryant v. Yellen 8 A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use. (Civ. Code, § 1415; De Necochea v. Curtis (1889) 80 Cal. 397 , 407-408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.S. 352, 360, 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 [parties included class representatives for Imperial Valley landowners with more than 160 acres].) However, the Reclamation Act provided that it would not " 'affect: Curtis (1889) -408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:in single ownership eligible to receive water from a reclamation project." (Bryant v. Yellen 8 A notice of appropriation was an early method of asserting appropriative rights, as was actual use. (Civ. Code, § 1415; De Necochea v. Curtis (1889) 80 Cal. 397 , 407-408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.S. 352, 360, 368, fn. 19 (Bryant); see id. at p. 365 [parties included class representatives for Imperial Valley landowners with more than 160 acres].) However, the Reclamation Act provided that it would not " 'affect: Curtis (1889) -408 (Curtis).) We discuss appropriative rights in more detail, post. 12 (1980) 447 U.
- Conservatorship of Martha : Due process requires that parties be given notice before a court modifies its own interim order, particularly when the change concerns a matter of significance.
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Knapp v. Ginsberg
Context from opinion:pp. 3- 4, emphasis added.) “We must construe identical words in different parts of the same act or in different statutes relating to the same subject matter as having the same meaning.” (Balasubramanian v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 977 , 988.) Ginsberg contends that we should not, because “Section 1612 has stricter requirements than section 1615,” and the legislative history does not include a similar comment pertaining to section 1615. Regardless of its breadth, however, section 1612 uses the same language as section 1615; we decline Ginsberg’s invitation to: Sess.), May 1, 2001, pp. 3- 4, emphasis added.) “We must construe identical words in different parts of the same act or in different statutes relating to the same subject matter as having the same mea...
- Barrow v. Holmes : Standing to appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, and a non‑party who is aggrieved by a judgment may acquire appellate standing by moving to vacate that judgment.
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:probability of succeeding on that claim. The court also denied Attorneys’ request for statutory attorney fees. 1 We refer to Carol Maleti by her first name for clarity. We mean no disrespect in doing so. (See Rubinstein v. Rubinstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131 , 1136, fn.1.) 2 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1 (Jarrow Formulas).) Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated. . 2 Attorneys challenge the Order denying the: Rubinstein (2000) , fn.1.) 2 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Port Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284, 317.) In particular, it “ ‘must show in what manner [it] can amend [its] complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of [its] pleading.’ [Citation.]” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39 , 43.) 33 Tukes has done so here (and Richard does not argue otherwise). She proposes to address the issue identified by the probate court by “pleading unequivocally that no enforceable contract governed the transaction” for purposes of her quantum meruit count. Such alternative pleading is expressly permitted under Klein,: California Physicians’ Service (2000) .) 33 Tukes has done so here (and Richard does not argue otherwise).
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 (CSAA) [“a stipulated judgment may properly be given collateral estoppel effect, at least when the parties manifest an intent to be collaterally bound by its terms”]; but see Rice v. Crow (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 725 , 736, 736–737, fn. 1 [“A settlement which avoids trial generally does not constitute actually litigating any issues and thus prevents application of collateral estoppel”; distinguishing CSAA].) But we agree with our Second District colleagues in Rice v. Crow, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pages 736– 737 and Le Parc Community: Crow (2000) , 736–737, fn. 1 [“A settlement which avoids trial generally does not constitute actually litigating any issues and thus prevents application of collateral estoppel”...
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Adoption of M.R.
Context from opinion:motion, it is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 27, 2022, and ordered published on October 21, 2022, be modified as follows: 1 1. On page 4, in the first paragraph, modify the citation “(In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355 , 360 (G.A.)” and replace it with “(In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355, 360 (review granted, Oct. 12, 2022, S276056) (G.A.)” 2. In the subsequent references to the G.A. case on pages 6 and 7, the words “review granted” should be inserted after the last page number in the: A. (2022) (G.
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Holt v. Brock
Context from opinion:[guardian ad litem]; Fisher v. Pickens (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 708, 712-715 [court investigator].) These persons fulfill quasi-judicial functions “ ‘intimately related to the judicial process.’ ” (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 857, quoting Myers v. Morris (8th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1437 , 1466-1467.) Without immunity, these persons “will be reluctant to accept court appointments or provide work product for the court’s use. Additionally, the threat of civil liability may affect the manner in which they perform their jobs.” (Howard, at p. 857....: Morris (8th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-1467.) Without immunity, these persons “will be reluctant to accept court appointments or provide work product for the court’s use.
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:cases contained contracts that, as such, reflected an unequivocal intent, on the part of the joint tenants, to sever their joint tenancy in certain property and transmute it to community property upon execution of the contract. Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434 , 1441-1443, another case cited by the Pearce Parties, is similarly distinguishable as it involved a trust agreement signed by both joint tenants, which agreement reflected a clear intent to sever joint tenancy in a property when the property was conveyed to the trust and made subject to the trust’s: In other words, the wills at issue in these cases contained contracts that, as such, reflected an unequivocal intent, on the part of the joint tenants, to sever their joint tenancy in certain property...
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Cundall v. Mitchell-Clyde
Context from opinion:the right of a surviving spouse to revoke a joint trust after the death of the first settlor, even when the trust instrument gave the surviving spouse the right to revoke. (Id. at p. 2; see Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434 .) Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the language was intended to 13 limit a settlor’s statutory right to revoke a trust absent an explicit statement to the contrary. Rather, the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary explained that the bill “provides that a revocable trust may be revoked by: Analysis).) The bill was intended to clarify uncertainty in the law stemming from court decisions that limited the right of a surviving spouse to revoke a joint trust after the death of the first sett...
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:discovery. A statute of repose limits the time within which a proceeding may be brought regardless of injury or damages, and it is generally calculated from a specific event (e.g., construction or manufacture). (See Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 300 , 305.) 2 Penal Code section 1305 states in part: (a)(1) A court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear …. … (b)(1) If the amount of the bond or: Sequoia Ventures, Inc. (2000)
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:on the property owner, because the owner is not before the court. (Ibid.) An in rem action or proceeding seeks to affect the interests of all persons in a particular property or thing. (People ex rel. Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759 , 765.) A quasi in rem action is brought against someone personally, but the real objective is to deal with particular property. (People v. Pollard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 483, 489-490.) Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. The probate department of a superior court has jurisdiction to determine the interests of: Kothari (2000) .) A quasi in rem action is brought against someone personally, but the real objective is to deal with particular property. (People v.
- Clark v. Smith : A trustee may bring a lawsuit over trust property in the trustee’s own name and is not required to identify or describe the trust in the pleading.
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Eyford v. Nord
Context from opinion:CPA Joan [Sturges] or attorney Lori Hunt,” and the court’s resolution of that disputed fact is neither relevant nor contested on appeal. Generally, “the application of a statutory standard to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo.” (Harustak v. Wilkins (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208 , 212.) That said, “ ‘[w]here the ruling that is the subject of appeal turns on the trial court’s determination of disputed facts, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is “sufficiency of the evidence.” ’ ” (Cochran v. Rubens (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 481, 486.) Here, the ruling upholding the: Wilkins (2000) .) That said, “ ‘here the ruling that is the subject of appeal turns on the trial court’s determination of disputed facts, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is “sufficiency o...
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:(a); see id., § 3011, subd. (a)(1); Prob. Code, § 1514, subd. (b).) In making such determinations, California courts give special weight to a child’s wishes, assuming the child can form an intelligent preference. (See In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424 , 432 [“the child’s testimony that she wants to live with her mother constitutes powerful demonstrative evidence that it would be in her best interest to allow her to do so”]; Fam. Code, § 3042, subd. (a) [a child’s preferences should be considered if the child “is of sufficient age: Code, § 1514, subd. (b).) In making such determinations, California courts give special weight to a child’s wishes, assuming the child can form an intelligent preference. (See In re Aljamie D.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:the beneficiary.” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Trusts, § 31, p. 643; see Rest.3d Trusts, § 3.) 4 rule applies equally to review of local ordinances. (Van Wagner Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 499 , 509, fn. 9; see Danekas v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 638, 645.) 2. The Rent Ordinance and rule 12.14 “The San Francisco rent ordinance restricts tenant evictions except upon certain specified grounds.” (Reynolds v. Lau (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 953, 964.) One such: City of Los Angeles (2000) , fn. 9; see Danekas v.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:Richard and Brown’s cross-appeal, Tukes notes our authority to strike their opening brief for failure to include a statement of appealability as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B). Rule 8.204(e), and not Tukes’s cited Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536 , governs our authority in this regard. We in no way condone Richard and Brown’s failure in their cross-appeal (or Richard’s corresponding failures in the 270 Appeals). Nor do we adopt Richard and Brown’s characterization of Westchester Secondary Charter School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 237 Cal....: Lennane (2000) , governs our authority in this regard.
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Wilkin v. Nelson
Context from opinion:assumed that the trial court applied the proper 9 standard and the judgment will not be upset if there is substantial evidence to support it.” (Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693, 700; see Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872 , 880-881.) The parties agree the substantial evidence standard applies here. Under this standard, we “accept[] the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard[] the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th: Superior Court (2000) -881.) The parties agree the substantial evidence standard applies here.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872 , 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1125; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.: Superior Court (2000) ; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 441.) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 882 , 886 (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege facts establishing damages that would support his claims. We construe this as a finding that Abatti did not sufficiently plead damages for purposes of his breach of fiduciary duty claim. Even assuming that the District had: Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege facts establishing damages that would support his claims.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 441.) Where "damages are an element of a cause of action, the cause of action does not accrue until the damages have been sustained." (City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 882 , 886 (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege facts establishing damages that would support his claims. We construe this as a finding that Abatti did not sufficiently plead damages for purposes of his breach of fiduciary duty claim. Even assuming that the District had: Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) (City of Vista).) The superior court determined that Abatti failed to allege facts establishing damages that would support his claims.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:included Bewley. “As a general rule, ‘the entry of a default terminates a defendant’s rights to take any further affirmative steps in the litigation until . . . the default is set aside.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032 , 1037.) Any motion by a defaulted defendant, other than a motion to set aside the default, is “‘unauthorized and void.’” (A & B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 642, 647.) It has “no legal effect.” (Christerson v. French (1919) 180 Cal. 523, 525.) Bewley does: A default had been entered, and for the reasons just discussed, it included Bewley. “As a general rule, ‘the entry of a default terminates a defendant’s rights to take any further affirmative steps in...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:remedy the deficiency in his reply brief is to no avail. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. (Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Shill (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1061, fn. 7; People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13 , 29.) DISPOSITION The petition for writ of mandate is denied. The September 18, 2020, stay of the board’s decision and the proceedings in the superior court is vacated. /s/ Robie, Acting P.J. We concur: /s/ Renner, J. /s/ Krause, J. 31: Baniqued (2000) .) DISPOSITION The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:have discretion to consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal (Ortega v. Topa Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 463, 472) but are under no obligation to do so (see, e.g., Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316 , 322, fn. 2). 21 But this does not fully answer the question because waiver and abandonment rules also apply. First, one challenging a judgment after demurrer or on a motion for judgment on the pleadings bears the burden to demonstrate reversible error. (Berman v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (2017): County of Los Angeles (2000) , fn. 2). 21 But this does not fully answer the question because waiver and abandonment rules also apply.
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:to ordering a continuance, it could have imposed monetary sanctions up to $1,500. (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5.) If it found that the violation was willful, it could even have sanctioned it as contempt. (See generally In re Ivey (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 793 , 798.) Which ties into the fifth factor: The trial court’s form order did not allow for any lesser sanctions. No matter what the circumstances, it was one size fits all: “YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CALL ANY WITNESSES NOT INCLUDED IN THE [WITNESS] STATEMENT[] . . . .”: Proc., § 177.5.) If it found that the violation was willful, it could even have sanctioned it as contempt. (See generally In re Ivey (2000) .) Which ties into the fifth factor: The trial court’s form...
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:On reconsideration, the federal district court, relying on Ruiz v. Shamrock Foods Co. (9th Cir. 2020) 804 Fed.Appx. 657, noted “demonstrating a concrete injury for Article III standing purposes as defined in … Syed [v. M-I, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492 (Syed)] … requires not just evidence of confusion about an FCRA authorization form, but also evidence that a plaintiff ‘would not have signed [the form] had it contained 7. a sufficiently clear disclosure.’ ” Because the court found “there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that [Limon] would not: M-I, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 492
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:disqualification in simultaneous representation cases is a per se or ‘automatic’ one.” (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284, original italics.) 23 have been imparted to counsel. (Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 283; Adams v. Aerojet- General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324 , 1332; H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1453-1454.) When the attorney’s contact with the prior client was not direct, then the court examines both the attorney’s relationship to the prior client and the relationship between the prior and the present representation. If the: Aerojet- General Corp. (2001) ; H.
- Conservatorship of You Wei Dong : The Probate Code authorizes the appointment of a guardian ad litem but contains no substantive or procedural provisions that govern the removal of a guardian ad litem.
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [“where two presumptions are in conflict, the more specific presumption will control over the more general one”]; cf. Estate of Bibb (2001) 28 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 87 Cal.App.4th 461 , 469–470 (Bibb) [“[T]he more general form of title presumption created by Vehicle Code sections 4150.5 and 5600.5 should not be used to negate the requirements of section 852, subdivision (a), which assure that a spouse’s separate property entitlements are not undermined.”].) In the absence of a statute that expressly: Estate of Bibb (2001) 28 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. –470 (Bibb) he more general form of title presumption created by Vehicle Code sections 4150..
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt. Authority v. Waste Connections etc.
Context from opinion:motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ibid.) In evaluating the sufficiency of the challenged pleading, we accept all material facts pleaded and those that arise by reasonable implication, but not conclusions of fact or law. (See Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513 , 517 [demurrer].) A party may not avoid a motion for judgment on the pleadings by omitting facts previously alleged in the same case or by suppressing such facts when they prove the pleaded facts false. (Ibid.) “In addition to the facts actually pleaded, the court considers facts of which: Spiegel (2001)
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Alameda County Waste Mgmt Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc.
Context from opinion:motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ibid.) In evaluating the sufficiency of the challenged pleading, we accept all material facts pleaded and those that arise by reasonable implication, but not conclusions of fact or law. (See Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513 , 517 [demurrer].) A party may not avoid a motion for judgment on the pleadings by omitting facts previously alleged in the same case or by suppressing such facts when they prove the pleaded facts false. (Ibid.) “In addition to the facts actually pleaded, the court considers facts of which: Spiegel (2001)
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:at p. 915.) The substantial evidence standard requires that the juvenile court find by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is incompetent under either Probate Code section 1801 or Penal Code section 1367. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661 , 667 (Sara D.).) Penal Code section 1367 states: “A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct: 8 Any “error in the procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect req...
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:Patricia’s fourth counsel in these proceedings to be relieved, necessitating a further continuance of the contested six-month review hearing. On its own motion the court scheduled a hearing for November 6, 2019 pursuant to In re 4 Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661 (a Sara D. hearing) to determine whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for Patricia. At the Sara D. hearing, which began on November 6th and continued to the following day, the court began by asking Christine Milo, Patricia’s newly appointed counsel, whether she was having any difficulty communicating with: On its own motion the court scheduled a hearing for November 6, 2019 pursuant to In re 4 Sara D. (2001) (a Sara D. hearing) to determine whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for Patricia.
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:principles established in Estate of Berger (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 532, 540 further support this requirement. II. Fiduciary Duties An administrator owes fiduciary duties to the estate and its beneficiaries. See Prob. Code § 8461; see also Estate of Franco (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 234 , 241. The scope of these duties was thoroughly examined in Newman v. Casey (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 456, 462. The United States Supreme Court addressed similar issues in a federal context in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 461 (1967), though California law governs here. III. Standard of: Code § 8461; see also Estate of Franco , 241
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:our Supreme Court and appellate courts sometimes used the phrase to generally refer to the standard of proof in the underlying proceeding or the degree to which the fact finder finds the evidence probative. (See, e.g., People v. Travers (1891) 88 Cal. 233 , 237 [addressing “the difference in the weight of evidence required in civil and criminal cases”]; People v. Bushton (1889) 80 Cal. 160, 164 [“[t]he well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every: Travers (1891) ; People v.
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:appointment of an administrator." Similarly, in Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015, the court held that mere allegations of misconduct are insufficient without proof of actual harm to the estate. The principles established in Estate of Berger (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 532 , 540 further support this requirement. II. Fiduciary Duties An administrator owes fiduciary duties to the estate and its beneficiaries. See Prob. Code § 8461; see also Estate of Franco (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 234, 241. The scope of these duties was thoroughly examined in Newman v. Casey (2024) 98 Cal.App....: The principles established in Estate of Berger , 540 further support this requirement
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:given away.”].) Despite the above authorities, Shawna contends the department was not “entitled to proceeds from the Beneficiary’s share of her uncle’s inter vivos Trust.” In support of this contention, she cites Citizens Action League v. Kizer (9th Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 1003 , 1006-1008 (noting that the term “estate,” before Oct. 1, 1993, was limited to the common law definition such that property passing to a joint tenant by right of survivorship was not part of a decedent’s estate under the Medicaid program) and Bucholtz v. Belshe (9th Cir. 1997) 114 F.3d: Kizer (9th Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 1003, 1006-1008 (noting that the term “estate,” before Oct. 1, 1993, was limited to the common law definition such that property passing to a joint tenant by right of su...
- Barrow v. Holmes : A judgment may be vacated when the judgment is not enforceable or when the action to enforce it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
- Barrow v. Holmes : A claim against a decedent’s estate must be filed within the statutory deadline; timely filing is a condition precedent to any suit against the estate.
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Royals v. Lu
Context from opinion:implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” ’ ” (Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 847, citations omitted.) Typically, the denial of a motion to strike is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603 , 612.) When the motion seeks to strike allegations of punitive damages, however, the standard of review is de novo, because the “motion to strike, like a demurrer, challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations, which are assumed to be true.” (Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36,: Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) .) When the motion seeks to strike allegations of punitive damages, however, the standard of review is de novo, because the “motion to strike, like a demurrer...
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:court’s “substantial evidence” standard at the trial court level. Furthermore, a substantial evidence standard would not satisfy the federal requirement that the state court actually find the required facts. (See Osorio-Martinez v. Att, Gen. U.S. of America (3d Cir. 2018) 893 F.3d 153 , 169 [SIJ eligibility “requires the state court to find” that reunification “ ‘is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law’ ”].) The SIJ petitioner must thus present “evidence of a judicial determination that the juvenile was subjected to” parental maltreatment, not: S. of America (3d Cir. 2018) 893 F.3d 153
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:. . . The test on appeal becomes whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Chamberlain, at pp. 370-371, quoting People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245 , 250.) The Chamberlain court concluded “the standard of proof on review of factual determinations of a tribunal is not a function of the standard of proof in the original proceedings before such tribunal. The standard of proof on review is, instead, governed by the degree to which it is: Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250.) The Chamberlain court concluded “the standard of proof on review of factual determinations of a tribunal is not a function of the standard of proof in the original pr...
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People v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation
Context from opinion:be entered, from which there is no appeal, the 90-day period being a period of limitation for any permissible relief. [Citation.] (Bean v. Los Angeles County (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 754, 759-760, disapproved on other grounds in In re Underwood (1973) 9 Cal.3d 345 , 348.) Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation is not Entitled to a Favorable Interpretation of Rule 9 Although “Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306 dealing with forfeiture of bail bonds must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture” (County of Los Angeles v.: App.2d 754, 759-760, disapproved on other grounds in In re Underwood (1973) 9 Cal.3d 345, 348.) Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation is not Entitled to a Favorable Interpretation of Rule 9 Although “P...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:is statutorily obligated (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)) to maintain the client’s confidences. (SpeeDee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1146.) The second is the attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client. (Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275 , 282 (Flatt).) These ethical duties are mandated by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(C) & (E) [now rules 1.7 and 1.9, respectively, effective November 1, 2018].) “The interplay of the duties of confidentiality and loyalty affects the conflict of interest rules that govern attorneys.: Superior Court (1994) (Flatt).) These ethical duties are mandated by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(C) & (E) [now rules 1..
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:§1717, subd. (b)(1).) A trial court determines the prevailing party upon final resolution of the contract claims and by making a comparison of the extent to which each party has succeeded or failed in its contentions. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863 , 876 (Hsu).) “If neither party achieves a complete victory on all the contract claims, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which party prevailed on the contract or whether, on balance, neither party prevailed sufficiently to justify an award of attorney fees.” (Scott Co. v.: Abbara (1995) (Hsu).) “If neither party achieves a complete victory on all the contract claims, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine which party prevailed on the contract or whe...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:existence of a partnership. We assume without deciding that the court could award attorney fees under the statute—if it had concluded Jones acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith—even if a partnership was not formed. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863 , 870 [“It is now settled that a party is entitled to attorney fees under [Civil Code] section 1717 ‘even when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, if the other party would have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed.’ ”]; but: Abbara (1995) section 1717 ‘even when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent...
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:in any event the UCNP entities’ participation in the appraisal and buyout proceeding without objection (to this day) acknowledged the authority of the court in that proceeding. (See Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125 , 139 [“‘a party may voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, or may, by failing to seasonably object thereto, waive his right to question jurisdiction over him’”]; Becerra, at p. 493 [“a person can become a party to an action, even if not named in the complaint,: Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) ...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:from the evidence; it must accept the factfinder’s resolution of conflicting evidence; and it may not insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment. (See, e.g., People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9 Cal.5th 16 , 35-36; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278, 307.) To paraphrase the high court in Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. at page 318, the question before a court reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence is not whether the appellate court itself: Veamatahau (2020) -36; People v. Gomez (2018) , 307.) To paraphrase the high court in Jackson, supra, 443 U.
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K.R. v. Superior Court
Context from opinion:construe the words of a statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 83.) Chapter 3 of the LPS Act (§§ 5350–5372) provides for the imposition of a conservatorship over a gravely disabled individual under specifically described circumstances....: Reins International California, Inc. (2020) .) Chapter 3 of the LPS Act (§§ 5350–5372) provides for the imposition of a conservatorship over a gravely disabled individual under specifically described...
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:issue that has been ‘actually litigated’ for collateral estoppel purposes.” (Id. at p. 810.) In the 12 years since Boeken, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve this controversy.11 The probate 11 In Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73 , 91, the Supreme Court affirmed that “[a] dismissal with prejudice is considered a judgment on the merits preventing subsequent litigation between the parties on the dismissed claim.” (Italics added.) Kim carefully cabined its discussion to the doctrine of claim preclusion and made no mention of issue preclusion. Thus, it: Reins International California, Inc. (2020) , the Supreme Court affirmed that “ dismissal with prejudice is considered a judgment on the merits preventing subsequent litigation between the parties on...
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Guardianship of A.H.
Context from opinion:suitable to the specific cases before them. [Citation.] Courts, however, do not have the authority to adopt procedures or policies that conflict with statutory law or the Rules of Court. [Citation.]” (Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840 , 857.) Section 217, however, applies only “[a]t a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code” — i.e., the Family Code. (§ 217, subd. (a); see generally In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 839-840 [discussing legislative history of: Department of Transportation (2020) .) Section 217, however, applies only “t a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code” — i.e., the Family Code.
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Guardianship of Saul H.
Context from opinion:the child’s eligibility, so long as the procedures it employs adhere to the baselines in state and federal law. (Weiss 13 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840 , 857.) A court may, for example, ask the child to provide additional evidence supporting the findings, such as a supplementary or amended declaration, or may hold an evidentiary hearing. A court may also make a referral to the local child welfare agency to assist in gathering evidence of eligibility: Dept. of Transportation (2020) .) A court may, for example, ask the child to provide additional evidence supporting the findings, such as a supplementary or amended declaration, or may hold an evident...
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Pearce v. Briggs
Context from opinion:Cal.2d 342, 345-347 [“property acquired under a joint tenancy deed may be shown to be actually community property or the separate property of one spouse according to the intention, understanding or agreement of the parties”]; see In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903 , 938 [presumption flowing from “titling of [a] deed” as joint tenancy is applicable to properties acquired before 1985].) Nor did Ruth’s will serve to rebut the presumption of joint tenancy established by the joint tenancy deed. (See Edwards v. Deitrich (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 254, 260-262 [fact that one party: King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-347 ...
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In re E.L.
Context from opinion:45 Cal.4th at p. 1127, fn. 9.) The question is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1011.) In conducting our review, we must view the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Id.: B. (2020)
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In re Bradshaw
Context from opinion:degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This intermediate standard ‘requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 998.) In this matter, the Hearing Department found culpability on three counts while dismissing two others and recommended disbarment. Before the Review Department, Bradshaw argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish culpability by clear and convincing evidence....: B. (2020) .) In this matter, the Hearing Department found culpability on three counts while dismissing two others and recommended disbarment.
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Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group
Context from opinion:degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This intermediate standard ‘requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 998.) “In general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding: B. (2020) .) “In general, when presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the rec...
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Li v. Super. Ct.
Context from opinion:interpretation. In this writ proceeding, petitioner Quinn Li challenges the continued vitality of the Chamberlain rule, asserting our Supreme Court’s recent Conservatorship of O.B. decision impliedly abrogated Chamberlain’s long-standing interpretation of section 1094.5, subdivision (c). (Citing Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 .) In Conservatorship of O.B....: B. (2020) .) In Conservatorship of O.
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:SIX Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civil No. B290805 of O.B. (Super. Ct. No. 17PR00325) (Santa Barbara County) T.B. et al., as Coconservators, etc., OPINION ON REMAND Petitioners and Respondents, v. O.B., Objector and Appellant. In Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1012, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment rendered in our prior opinion filed on February 26, 2019. The court remanded the cause to us with directions “to reevaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in light of [its] clarification” of how an appellate court should review a “finding made: B. (2020) , the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment rendered in our prior opinion filed on February 26, 2019.
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Gomez v. Smith
Context from opinion:compel the conclusion that there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment”].) Tammy instead asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. We decline to do so. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 1008 [“In assessing how the evidence reasonably could have been evaluated by the trier of fact, an appellate court reviewing such a finding is to view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below; it must indulge reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might have: B. (2020)
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation’s business.” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 108 (Jones); accord, Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147 , 1171; see § 17704.09 [describing the fiduciary duties of members and managers of a limited liability company]; Feresi v. The Livery, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 419, 425 [same]; Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 411, 424-425 [describing the fiduciary obligations in a partnership]....: F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 108 (Jones); accord, Sheley v. Harrop (2017) ; see § 17704.09 ; Feresi v.
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Parker v. Schwarcz
Context from opinion:managing the assets and liabilities that were once part of the temporary conservatorship,” they are “entitled to the documents” under the rationale of Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124 (Moeller), Fiduciary Trust Internat. of California v. Klein (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1184 (Fiduciary Trust), and Stine v. Dell’Osso (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 834 (Stine). Parker’s reliance on these cases as support for her section 850 petition is unavailing....: Klein (2017) (Fiduciary Trust), and Stine v.
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Estate of Boyajian
Context from opinion:that this theory was not presented to the trial court, we exercise our discretion to consider it because it parallels the litigated issue and raises a pure question of law based on undisputed facts. (Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257 , 1275–1276, fn. 3.) Robert relies on the Probate Code’s definition of “will,” which at first blush might be parsed to include a stand-alone revocation. Section 88 provides: “‘Will’ includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints an executor or revokes or revises another will.” There is no dispute: Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) –1276, fn. 3.) Robert relies on the Probate Code’s definition of “will,” which at first blush might be parsed to include a stand-alone revocation.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:damages … [and] requires the named plaintiff to ‘demonstrate that he or she has some such beneficial interest that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical,’ ” citing, among other cases, Schoshinski v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 780 , 791 (Schoshinski). Circle K contends “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the beneficial-interest requirement applicable to petitions for writs of mandate and the beneficial-interest requirements for an ordinary cause of action....: City of Los Angeles (2017) (Schoshinski).
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:the buyout petition to proceed”]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 383 [“no court has inherent authority to decide a matter for which there is no legally recognized cause of action”]; Housing Group v. United Nat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1106 , 1107-1108 [pending litigation is required 22 before parties may stipulate to the appointment of a judicial referee or temporary judge to secure a settlement enforceable by the court].) Unlike those cases, here there were causes of action for involuntary dissolution pending at the time Michael and Joseph moved to: Co. (2001)
- Garcia v. Garcia : When interpreting a trust, the court must exercise its own independent judgment to determine the meaning of the instrument’s language.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:court’s rationale.” (Stevenson Real Estate, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220.) This is because we review the validity of the ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and not the reasons given. (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255 , 259 (Dudley).) Our authority to consider alternative reasons for affirmance is particularly significant in this case because Richard’s motion to the probate court contained nine separately headed theories he claimed independently supported dismissal of Tukes’s claims....: Department of Transportation (2001) (Dudley).) Our authority to consider alternative reasons for affirmance is particularly significant in this case because Richard’s motion to the probate court conta...
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Capra v. Capra
Context from opinion:a particular property or thing. (People ex rel. Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 765.) A quasi in rem action is brought against someone personally, but the real objective is to deal with particular property. (People v. Pollard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 483 , 489-490.) Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. The probate department of a superior court has jurisdiction to determine the interests of all parties connected with the property of a decedent based on the property’s location within the state. (Estate of Nash (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 233, 237; Prob. Code, §: Pollard (2001) -490.) Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:record of the rental unit after February 21, 1991,” being “an owner of record of at least 25 percent interest in the property.” (Rent Ord. § 37.9, subd. (a)(8)(iii); see generally Cwynar v. City and County of San Francisco (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 637 , 644–645.) The Rent Ordinance defines “landlord” as “[a]n owner, lessor, [or] sublessor, who receives or is entitled to receive rent for the use and occupancy of any residential rental unit or portion thereof in the City and County of San 5 Francisco, and the agent, representative[,] or successor of: City and County of San Francisco (2001)
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People v. Braum
Context from opinion:by a sufficient showing that the trustee’s conduct was intentional or negligent. (§§ 18001, 18002; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A West’s Ann. Prob. Code, supra, foll. §§ 18001 & 18002, p. 237.)” (Haskett v. Villas at Desert Falls (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 864 , 877–878 (Haskett).) 40 3. Analysis The evidence in support of the City’s assertions of personal liability against Braum for the zoning and Health and Safety Code violations during the summary judgment proceedings was limited. We will therefore assume that it was insufficient to demonstrate that Braum was personally liable: Villas at Desert Falls (2001) –878 (Haskett).) 40 3.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:be brought on the corporation’s behalf”’”]; Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 651 [plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for corporate mismanagement and diverting corporate assets was derivative]; PacLink Communications Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 958 , 964 [minority 37 members’ fraudulent transfer claim was derivative where the “injury was essentially a diminution in the value of their membership interest in the [limited liability company] occasioned by the loss of the company’s assets”]; Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App....: App.4th 621, 651 ; PacLink Communications Internat....
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:be inappropriate. 66 (See Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268 [traditional mandamus may not be used to "force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner or to reach a particular result"]; Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 987 , 995 [" 'In determining whether an agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency' "].) Even if one could conceive of a situation in which only one particular action on the part of an agency could be reasonable, the court's: Castaic Lake Water Agency (2001)
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:be inappropriate. 66 (See Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268 [traditional mandamus may not be used to "force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner or to reach a particular result"]; Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 987 , 995 [" 'In determining whether an agency has abused its discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency' "].) Even if one could conceive of a situation in which only one particular action on the part of an agency could be reasonable, the court's: Castaic Lake Water Agency (2001)
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:the Court by Liu, J. a rental property in San Bernardino. The Braces acquired both properties with community funds and took title to each property as “ ‘husband and wife as joint tenants.’ ” (In re Brace (9th Cir. 2018) 908 F.3d 531 , 534.) A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates an estate to satisfy creditors’ claims. The estate generally includes “[a]ll interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community property” at the time the bankruptcy case is filed. (11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2).) The Bankruptcy Code specifies that community property is: The Braces acquired both properties with community funds and took title to each property as “ ‘husband and wife as joint tenants.’ ” (In re Brace (9th Cir. 2018) 908 F.3d 531...
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Hudson v. Foster
Context from opinion:extrinsic fraud rule.’ [Citations.] In this state equitable relief has been granted from final judgments settling the accounts of guardians, administrators, or executors who withheld information that 30 would have enabled the beneficiaries to attack the accounts. (Lataillade v. Orena, 91 Cal. 565 , 576; Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 541; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal. 220, 223; Simonton v. Los Angeles Trust & Sav. Bank, 192 Cal. 651, 655, 657; Morgan v. Asher, 49 Cal.App. 172, 182; see Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89, 93.)” (Jorgensen, at pp. 20–21.) “[W]here one: Orena, ; Silva v.
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Chui v. Chui
Context from opinion:is, in effect, the guardian” and the guardian ad litem’s actions are subject to court supervision. (Cole, supra, 63 Cal. at p. 89; accord, McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303 , 1311 (County of Los Angeles); Serway, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d at p. 89.) Under such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502; accord, Zapanta v.: Superior Court (2001) (County of Los Angeles); Serway, supra, 75 Cal.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:v. City of Buena Park (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 302, 308 [plaintiffs could not challenge older hotel stay ordinance, or portions of related provision not altered by later ordinance]; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v. Napa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342 , 387, 390 [petitioners contended that traffic measures in specific plan invalidated circulation element of general plan; holding that attack on general plan was untimely].)59 Finally, the District contends that permitting challenges to long-standing policies will "hamstr[ing]" its Board from making needed changes....: Bd. of Supervisors (2001) , 390 .)59 Finally...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:v. City of Buena Park (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 302, 308 [plaintiffs could not challenge older hotel stay ordinance, or portions of related provision not altered by later ordinance]; Napa Citizens for Honest Govt. v. Napa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 342 , 387, 390 [petitioners contended that traffic measures in specific plan invalidated circulation element of general plan; holding that attack on general plan was untimely].)59 Finally, the District contends that permitting challenges to long-standing policies will "hamstr[ing]" its Board from making needed changes....: Bd. of Supervisors (2001) , 390 .)59 Finally...
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:administrator. As stated in Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 93, "a person must have a direct pecuniary interest in the estate to have standing to object to the appointment of an administrator." Similarly, in Conservatorship of Tedesco (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1007 , 1015, the court held that mere allegations of misconduct are insufficient without proof of actual harm to the estate. The principles established in Estate of Berger (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 532, 540 further support this requirement. II. Fiduciary Duties An administrator owes fiduciary duties to the estate and its beneficiaries.: " Similarly, in Conservatorship of Tedesco , 1015, the court held that mere allegations of misconduct are insufficient without proof of actual harm to the estate
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Searles v. Archangel
Context from opinion:publication could instead serve their spouses by mailing to their last known addresses and posting at those locations, a method of service of process described by the United States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371 [ 91 S.Ct. 780 , 28 L.Ed.2d 119].11 The Cohen court explained, “[T]here really is no other provision made by law for service, because although publication is theoretically possible, practically there is no way of efficient publication save by the doubtful expedient of ordering public officials to make expenditures which no statute authorizes them: S. 371 [ L.
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:the supported [party’s] needs.” (McCann, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 982.) “Each case stands or falls on its own facts, but the overriding issue is whether a change has affected either party’s financial status.” (In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1009 , 1015.) An order modifying or terminating spousal support generally may be made retroactive only to the date of filing the OSC or notice of motion to modify or terminate. (§ 3653, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 638.) The question of retroactivity lies within: App.4th at p. 982.) “Each case stands or falls on its own facts, but the overriding issue is whether a change has affected either party’s financial status.” (In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) .
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “[I]n the case of wealthy parents . . . the well-established principle [is] that the ‘child’s need is measured by the parents’ current station in life.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269 , 293 (Cheriton).) Thus, a child’s need is for more than “bare necessities” and varies with the parents’ situation. “‘Accordingly, where the supporting parent enjoys a lifestyle that far exceeds that of the custodial parent, child support must to some degree reflect the more opulent lifestyle even though this may,: App.4th at p. 129.) “n the case of wealthy parents . . . the well-established principle that the ‘child’s need is measured by the parents’ current station in life.
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Dae v. Traver
Context from opinion:by the trustors in a specialized way. For example, there is no evidence that the word “shall” was intended to mean may, or that the word “issue” was intended to mean any person of Joan’s choosing. (Estate of Dye (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 966 , 977 [evidence did not create an ambiguity in a will because it failed “to raise a semantically plausible alternative candidate of meaning”].) I therefore decline to interpret the language “shall be distributed to [Joan’s] issue” as meaning “shall be distributed as Joan specifies.” The majority suggests that we can: For example, there is no evidence that the word “shall” was intended to mean may, or that the word “issue” was intended to mean any person of Joan’s choosing.
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In re Z.O.
Context from opinion:.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 631.) At the time it appointed a GAL for mother, the trial court made no explicit finding of incompetence on the record. This was error. (See In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180 , 1188 [“The court’s decision on this issue should be stated on the record”].) What record we do have is difficult to parse. We have reviewed the sealed portions of the record, which contains relevant information. But even having done so, we cannot find any clearly articulated basis for the: This was error. (See In re Jessica G. (2001) .) What record we do have is difficult to parse.
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In re Samuel A.
Context from opinion:competent. [Citation.] If the court appoints a guardian ad litem without the parent’s consent, the record must contain substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence.” (In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911; accord, In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180 , 1186; In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 667-668.) 15 The appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency case “is no small matter. The effect of the appointment is to remove control over the litigation from the parent, whose vital rights are: . Governing Law “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The test is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the...
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money 19 value.” ’ ” (Estate of Sigourney (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 593 , 603; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 845 [a contractual right is “a chose in action, a form of property”]; Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 861, 853–854, 864 [deprivation of a property right under section 15610.30 implicated: It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money 19 value.” ’ ” (Estate of Sigourney (2001) ...
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Roth v. Jelley
Context from opinion:interests that were future. Respondent’s claim fails for another reason. They argue Mullane does not require mailed notice given the remoteness of Mark’s interest. But “even remote interests are entitled to a measure of due process.” (Estate of Sigourney (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 593 , 604, citing Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at pp. 317–318.) In Mullane, the court held that published notice of the trustee’s petition for settlement of account was sufficient as to “[t]hose beneficiaries represented by appellant whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained....: But “even remote interests are entitled to a measure of due process.” (Estate of Sigourney (2001) , citing Mullane, supra, 339 U.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:Prof. Conduct, rule 3.7, com. 2.)3 California courts have agreed that one purpose of the advocate-witness rule is to prevent factfinder confusion regarding whether an advocate-witness’s statement is to be considered proof or argument. (See, e.g., People v. Donaldson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 916 , 928-929 (Donaldson) [quoting from foregoing comment]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 180, 196 (Younger) [“the jury may have difficulty keeping properly segregated the arguments of the attorney acting as advocate and his testimony as a witness”]....: Conduct, rule 3.7, com. 2.)3 California courts have agreed that one purpose of the advocate-witness rule is to prevent factfinder confusion regarding whether an advocate-witness’s statement is to be c...
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Maleti v. Wickers
Context from opinion:A prevailing plaintiff, however, can only recover fees and costs ‘[i]f the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay . . . .’ ” (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993 , 1018 (ComputerXpress).) The term “ ‘prevailing defendant,’ ” as used in section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is not defined, and it is unstated whether a defendant who prevails on some, but not all, of the claims challenged in his or her anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to fees and costs. (ComputerXpress,: Jackson (2001) (ComputerXpress).) The term “ ‘prevailing defendant,’ ” as used in section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), is not defined, and it is unstated whether a defendant who prevails on some, but n...
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Context from opinion:persons must bring what is called a "reverse validation action" to challenge the agency's action. (Kaatz, at p. 30 and fn. 16.) "The validation 59 (See also De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1084 , 1086 [physical taking claim based on elimination of sunset clause in rent control provision was untimely, because duration impacted only damages]; cf. Arcadia, supra, 169 Cal. App.4th at p. 266 and fn. 8 [distinguishing De Anza, as a taking is complete upon occupation, and noting doubt that it was: Cnty. of Santa Cruz (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1084, 1086 ; cf.
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Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation District
Context from opinion:persons must bring what is called a "reverse validation action" to challenge the agency's action. (Kaatz, at p. 30 and fn. 16.) "The validation 59 (See also De Anza Properties X, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1084 , 1086 [physical taking claim based on elimination of sunset clause in rent control provision was untimely, because duration impacted only damages]; cf. Arcadia, supra, 169 Cal. App.4th at p. 266 and fn. 8 [distinguishing De Anza, as a taking is complete upon occupation, and noting doubt that it was: Cnty. of Santa Cruz (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1084, 1086 ; cf.
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Tukes v. Richard
Context from opinion:a probability of success in the 270 Action. First, the trial court concluded that the act of commencing the Tukes Action— the conduct complained of in the 270 Action—was an activity protected by section 425.16. (See Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083 , 1087.) As a result, the trial court imposed on Richard the burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. (See Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Next, the trial court concluded that Richard failed to satisfy that burden. It explained: “[Richard] did not: Mendoza (2001) .) As a result, the trial court imposed on Richard the burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. (See Baral v.
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Meiri v. Shamtoubi
Context from opinion:unravel the Legislature’s reasoned amendment. Meiri’s analogy to the probable cause standard applicable to malicious prosecution actions is unconvincing. A malicious prosecution action is grounded in tort and involves its own unique policy considerations. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Mendoza (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1083 , 1089 [discussing tort’s “disfavored” nature].) Malicious prosecution has historically involved personal injury to another. (Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (1926) 199 Cal. 15, 18; accord Thompson v. Clark (2022) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 1332, 1338]....: Mendoza (2001) .) Malicious prosecution has historically involved personal injury to another. (Ray Wong v.
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Humphrey v. Bewley
Context from opinion:order setting aside the default are inextricably interwoven. Under these circumstances, we have jurisdiction to review and, if necessary, to reverse both. (See American Enterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle (1952) 39 Cal.2d 210, 216-218; see, e.g., Allen v. Smith (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1270 , 1283 [reversal of judgment necessarily reversed award of attorney fees, even though award of fees was separately appealable and appellant did not appeal from it].) III BEWLEY AS A PARTY TO THIS APPEAL Bewley argues that he is not a proper party to this appeal. Although he has filed: Smith (2002) .) III BEWLEY AS A PARTY TO THIS APPEAL Bewley argues that he is not a proper ...
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:income and custodial time with the child. (In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245.) The term “guideline” is a misnomer because the amount generated by the guideline formula is presumptively correct. (In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175 , 183; §§ 4053, subd. (k), 4057, subd. (a).) Under section 4057, the guideline figure “is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted by admissible evidence showing that application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case, consistent with the [policy]: App.4th 1238, 1245.) The term “guideline” is a misnomer because the amount generated by the guideline formula is presumptively correct. (In re Marriage of Hubner (2001)
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:1279, 1291; In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1526; In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 519; In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573 , 580-581; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, footnote 2. 5 E.g., Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Cases (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 292, 333; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pages 1239-1240; Pulte Home Corp. v. American Safety Indemnity Co.: App.4th 903, 911; In re Mark L. (2001) -581; Sheila S. v.
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:issues in a federal context in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 461 (1967), though California law governs here. III. Standard of Review We review the trial court's appointment decision for abuse of discretion. Bailey v. Bailey (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 789 , 795. This standard is well-established. See also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2019) Appeal, § 364, p. 412. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.: Bailey , 795
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In re Brace
Context from opinion:then the entirety of the Braces’ interests in the properties becomes part of Clifford Brace’s bankruptcy estate. If the properties are separate, then only Clifford Brace’s one-half property interest becomes part of the estate. (In re Reed (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 1317 , 1332; see Code Civ. Proc., § 704.820.) The bankruptcy court found that “ ‘the properties were acquired by [Clifford and Ahn] Brace during the marriage with community assets and they presumptively constitute community property under applicable law. Defendants failed to establish that the . . . [p]ropert[ies] were not: If the properties are separate, then only Clifford Brace’s one-half property interest becomes part of the estate. (In re Reed (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 1317, 1332; see Code Civ.
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Limon v. Circle K Stores
Context from opinion:rights might be difficult or impossible to quantify or prove.”].) On the other hand, “civil penalties are designed to punish culpable individuals, deter future violations, and prevent the conduct’s recurrence.” (New York v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2nd Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 554 , 599.) Limon’s citation to Midwest Airlines does not aid him. The Midwest Airlines court expressly noted that “[t]he actual or statutory damages in subsection (a)(1) [of section 1681n] … are in the nature of compensatory damages.” (Midwest Airlines, supra, 537 F.Supp.2d at p. 1168.) By its very nature, the: United Parcel Service, Inc. (2nd Cir. 2019) 942 F.3d 554, 599.) Limon’s citation to Midwest Airlines does not aid him.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:entire history of the relationship between the minor and the parent in the foreign country.” (J.U., supra, 176 A.3d at p. 140.) The finding of nonviability must be made as of the present time. (Perez v. Cuccinelli (4th Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 865 , 874.) The phrases, “due to” in the federal statute (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)) and “because of” in section 155 (§ 155, subd. (b)(1)(B)) indicate a causal connection between the parents’ maltreatment and the nonviability—or practical unworkability— of reunification. (See Leslie H., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 349 [“ ‘a: Cuccinelli (4th Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 865, 874.) The phrases, “due to” in the federal statute (8 U.
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Balistreri v. Balistreri
Context from opinion:according to specified method]; Heaps v. Heaps (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 286, 290–291, 294 [“under the literal terms of the trust,” trustors “had to write a memo to themselves (or its substantive equivalent) to amend the trust”]; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194 , 1209 [where trust “expressly deprived [the decedent] of the power to revoke, modify or amend,” documents purporting to amend the trust were “invalid”]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1343–1345 [amendment that did not comply with specified amendment procedure was “invalid”]....: Contreras (2002) of the power to revoke, modify or amend,” documents purporting to amend the trust were “invalid”]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.
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Bruno v. Hopkins
Context from opinion:determination of the contesting party’s state of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper purpose. ([Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866,] 926, fn. 47 . . .; see Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1249 , 1263 . . . (Gemini) [‘ “ ‘bad faith’ means simply that the action or tactic is being pursued for an improper motive” ’].) ‘ “A subjective state of mind will rarely be susceptible of direct proof; usually the trial court will be required to infer it from circumstantial: California Custom Shapes, Inc. (2002) . . . (Gemini) .) ‘ “A subjective state of mind will rarely be susceptible of direct proof...
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Jones v. Goodman
Context from opinion:Cal.App.3d 707, 712.) Because the terms “arbitrarily,” “vexatiously,” and “not in good faith” are not defined in section 16701, we look to other attorney fees statutes containing comparable language for guidance. In Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1249 (Gemini), this court construed the fee shifting provisions in Civil Code section 3426.4 for trade secret misappropriation claims brought in “bad faith.”12 We “conclude[d] that ‘bad faith’ for purposes of [Civil Code] section 3426....: California Custom Shapes (2002)
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Marriage of Zucker
Context from opinion:help them make decisions. Mark objected to the admission of this evidence. The court permitted Scharf to testify subject to a motion to strike. After receiving the testimony, the court granted Mark’s motion to strike, citing Kalaba v. Gray (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1416 (Kalaba). The court excluded Scharf’s testimony regarding Kim’s alleged personality disorder but admitted Scharf’s testimony to the extent it constituted percipient witness observations....: Gray (2002) (Kalaba).
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:Trusts, § 3.) 4 rule applies equally to review of local ordinances. (Van Wagner Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 499, 509, fn. 9; see Danekas v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 638 , 645.) 2. The Rent Ordinance and rule 12.14 “The San Francisco rent ordinance restricts tenant evictions except upon certain specified grounds.” (Reynolds v. Lau (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 953, 964.) One such ground is set forth in Rent Ordinance section 37.9, subdivision (a)(8), which allows a landlord to evict a: San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2001) .) 2.
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Doe v. Yim
Context from opinion:as counsel for former employees suing company, where counsel’s potential advantageous use of confidential information obtained in his former nonlawyer capacity would violate his duty as attorney to maintain integrity of judicial process]; DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002) 95 Cal.App....: App.5th 1115, 1129 (O’Gara Coach) [affirming disqualification of company’s former president and COO as counsel for former employees suing company, where counsel’s potential advantageous use of confide...
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Conservatorship of O.B.
Context from opinion:evidence introduced before the trial court had not adequately established that a written deed instrument, absolute on its face, was in fact a mortgage or trust. Our opinion in Sheehan observed that through such matters (e.g., Mahoney v. Bostwick (1892) 96 Cal. 53 ) the authorities “clearly declare that the rule, as above stated [requiring clear and convincing evidence that the intent was contrary to the deed’s terms], should govern trial courts, and that, where an absolute deed has been found to be something else, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the: Bostwick (1892)
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Wehsener v. Jernigan
Context from opinion:In support of its holding, Bassi relied on a triad of cases that had given “extraterritorial effect” to California law in resolving questions of inheritance. (Bassi, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 542.) The first case was Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532 (Blythe). In Blythe, the Supreme Court held under former Civil Code section 230 that a nonmarital child of the decedent was his heir despite the fact the child was born in England and remained in England until after the decedent’s death in California. (Blythe, at pp. 575−576.) In support of: Ayres (1892) (Blythe).
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:the trial precludes a determination that the trial court abused its discretion”].) In the absence of a complete record or one indicating otherwise, we presume the trial court performed its job correctly. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448 , 1461, fn. 5; Olivia v. Suglio (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 7, 9 [“If the invalidity does not appear on the face of the record, it will be presumed that what ought to have been done was not only done but rightly done”].) Kenton suggests our earlier order denying Hilja’s motion: Duran (2002) , fn. 5; Olivia v.
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Schrage v. Schrage
Context from opinion:Automotive Group and the “whole body of its stock and property” and that Leonard sought to, and ultimately did, recover damages for injuries to the entities. (Grosset, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1108; see Avikian v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108 , 1115 (Avikian) [plaintiffs’ “core claim” of mismanagement that caused the corporation’s demise “amount[ed] to a claim of injury to [the corporation] itself”]; Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p....: WTC Financial Corp. (2002) (Avikian) to a claim of injury to itself”]; Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.
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Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst
Context from opinion:of death (to the extent of such interest), including assets conveyed to a dependent, survivor, heir or assignee of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.’” (Bonta v. Burke (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 788 , 790-791 (Bonta), italics added, quoting former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 50960, subd. (b)(1).) “The inclusion of the catchall ‘or other arrangement’ 5 Welfare & Institutions Code section 14009.5 was amended in 2016 to limit estate recovery for individuals who die on or after January 1, 2017. (Stats.: Burke (2002) -791 (Bonta), italics added, quoting former Cal.
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Keading v. Keading
Context from opinion:or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) Courts take “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes litigation- related activities within the scope of section 425.16.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892 , 908.) As our Supreme Court has recognized, “ ‘[j]ust as communications preparatory or in anticipation of bringing an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation privilege . . . , such statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 27 425.16.” (Briggs v.: Harriman (2002) .) As our Supreme Court has recognized, “ ‘ust as communications preparatory or in anticipation of bringing an action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the liti...
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Johnson v. Estate of Williams
Context from opinion:Duties An administrator owes fiduciary duties to the estate and its beneficiaries. See Prob. Code § 8461; see also Estate of Franco (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 234, 241. The scope of these duties was thoroughly examined in Newman v. Casey (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 456 , 462. The United States Supreme Court addressed similar issues in a federal context in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 461 (1967), though California law governs here. III. Standard of Review We review the trial court's appointment decision for abuse of discretion. Bailey v. Bailey (2023) 94: Casey , 462
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Estate of Tarlow
Context from opinion:distribution. (Estate of Stehr (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1135.) A proceeding under this section is “permissive”; if no such petition is filed, “the court may determine who is entitled to distribution in a final distribution order.” (Estate of Flores (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 619 , 631.) A proceeding under section 11700 is “a specialized proceeding in rem.” (Estate of Flores, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.) It clarifies the status of 6 the estate, determining who has valid claims to distribution of estate assets and the priority of those claims. (Ibid.) It does not: App.3d 1131, 1135.) A proceeding under this section is “permissive”; if no such petition is filed, “the court may determine who is entitled to distribution in a final distribution order.
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Guardianship of S.H.R.
Context from opinion:child indirectly as well as through the parent’s employment income. Indeed, even an incarcerated parent may avoid a finding of neglect if the parent can arrange for the child’s care while the parent is in prison. (In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 , 1077.) Although S.H.R. states that his family depended in part on his siblings and himself, he does not state that his parents failed to provide him with food, shelter, clothing, or medical care.12 12 Although SIJ status may be based on a finding that reunification is not viable because: D. (2002) .) Although S.
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Boshernitsan v. Bach
Context from opinion:through human representatives.” Unlike trusts, however, corporations can hold title to property, and a corporate owner or corporate trustee clearly would not qualify as a “landlord” under rule 12.14(a). (See Caressa Camille, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1094 , 1102 [“ ‘A corporation is not a natural person’ ”].) 10 Business and Professions Code section 6125. (Aulisio, at pp. 1523–1525....: Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002)
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Herren v. George S.
Context from opinion:of respondent, the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s findings.’ [Citations.] . . . [T]he testimony of even one witness may support a finding based thereon.” (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 359 , 375.) Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Herren committed elder financial abuse by exerting undue influence to obtain a property right from George. (§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(3).) First of all, it is undisputed that George is an elder and that: Casey (2024) .) Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Herren committed elder financial abuse by exerting undue influence to obtain...
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