A170942_test

Filed 8/14/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Christopher Skaggs filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss his parole

revocation petition on due process grounds, which the trial court

construed as a Penal Code¹ section 1385 motion and denied on the

basis that such a motion was procedurally improper. The court then

revoked Skaggs’s parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered

his parole term to terminate upon release. On appeal, Skaggs challenges

the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and subsequent parole

revocation.

We dismiss the appeal as moot as we cannot afford Skaggs any effective

relief. However, we exercise our discretion to resolve the issue of

whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the motion to

dismiss and conclude the court improperly determined it could not

entertain the motion to dismiss.

Background

In 2013, Skaggs pled guilty to two felony violations of the Vehicle Code

(Veh. Code, §§ 2800.3, 2800.4) in Mendocino County. In accordance with

his negotiated plea, Skaggs was sentenced to nine years and eight months

in prison.

In February 2019, Skaggs was released on parole. On December 15, 2020,

the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition for revocation

of parole alleging Skaggs engaged in new criminal conduct, as well as a

criminal complaint based on the same conduct. After Skaggs failed to

appear for hearings on those matters on December 28, 2020, and January

7, 2021, bench warrants were issued.

On January 29, 2021, Skaggs was arrested in Lake County on the

outstanding bench warrants and additional criminal charges stemming from

activities in Lake County. Skaggs was convicted of the Lake County

offenses and sentenced in May 2021 to three years and eight months in

prison.

Skaggs made demands to the Mendocino County District Attorney in June

and July 2021 to be brought back to Mendocino County to address the

parole revocation proceeding and the related criminal action. In

September 2021, Skaggs moved to dismiss both the parole revocation

petition and the criminal case pursuant to section 1381, which provides

in relevant part that incarcerated defendants with state charges pending

against them may demand to be brought to trial on the pending charges

and, if the case is not brought to trial within 90 days of giving

appropriate notice, may seek dismissal of the case.

On November 2, 2021, the trial court dismissed the Mendocino County

criminal complaint pursuant to section 1381. However, the court declined

to dismiss the parole revocation petition on the basis that section 1381

is inapplicable to such proceedings.

In August 2022, Skaggs submitted a motion to dismiss with an attached

letter asking the Mendocino County Superior Court to recall the bench

warrant in the parole revocation proceeding or order him brought to

Mendocino County to “deal with it.” The court returned the documents to

Skaggs and instructed him to review the November 2, 2021 minute order

(which stated section 1381 does not apply to parole revocation

proceedings).

In May 2024, there was a further request to recall the Mendocino County

bench warrant and place the case on calendar, stating Skaggs’s release

date from his Lake County sentence was upcoming but the outstanding

warrant appeared to affect his release processing. At a hearing on May

17, the district attorney opposed the motion, stating Skaggs would be

brought to Mendocino County after the warrant had been served, and the

matter was dropped from the court’s calendar.

On June 4, 2024, Skaggs filed a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the

parole revocation petition on due process grounds, which underlies this

appeal. Skaggs argued his right to due process was violated by the

failure to have a hearing or resolve the parole revocation matter within

a reasonable time despite his repeated requests to do so. He alleged

prejudice because he was denied the opportunity to serve his revocation

sentence concurrently with his Lake County sentence and remained in

custody longer than necessary or permissible.

The motion to dismiss was heard on June 14, 2024. The court

“liken[ed]” the motion to a section 1385 motion to dismiss and

concluded it could not dismiss under that section on due process

grounds. The court reasoned that “[a] parole revocation proceeding is

not an action within the purview of . . . section 1385,” citing *People

v. Wiley* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1063.

Immediately after denying the motion to dismiss, the court held a

contested revocation hearing and found Skaggs violated his parole

conditions. The court sentenced Skaggs to 90 days in jail, with credit

for time spent in custody, and ordered his parole terminated upon

completion of the jail term. Skaggs appealed. The parties represent

that, during the pendency of the appeal, Skaggs’s parole was terminated.

Discussion

Skaggs’s appeal is moot as our resolution of the issues could offer no

relief regarding the time he spent in custody or the parole term that

has already terminated. (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645

(DeLeon).) We exercise our discretion to address the propriety of the

trial court’s failure to entertain Skaggs’s nonstatutory motion to

dismiss as it is an issue that “ ‘is likely to recur, might otherwise

evade appellate review, and is of continuing public interest.’ ” (Id.

at p. 646.)

We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by construing

Skaggs’s nonstatutory motion to dismiss on constitutional due process

grounds as a section 1385 motion, which in turn led the court to

incorrectly conclude it lacked authority to grant—or even consider—his

motion.

Skaggs did not cite section 1385 anywhere in his motion to dismiss or

seek dismissal based on that statute. Rather, Skaggs made clear

throughout his motion that it was premised on constitutional due process

grounds. Indeed, the motion expressly relied on Morrissey v. Brewer

(1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey), the seminal Supreme Court case

establishing the minimum due process protections for parolees facing

revocation while also clarifying that such protections are not

equivalent to the “full panoply of rights due a defendant” in a criminal

proceeding. (Id. at p. 480; see id. at pp. 481–489.) The motion also

cited DeLeon, in which the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that

Morrissey’s minimum due process requirements continue to apply to

state parole revocation proceedings after the 2012 amendments to the

parole revocation statutes. (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at

pp. 654–655.) Therefore, the motion was patently based on constitutional

due process grounds, not any statutory provision, and the trial court

erred by construing it as a section 1385 motion to dismiss.² (See,

e.g., People v. Sanchez (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 261, 267–268

[magistrate judge’s order granting motion for dismissal on

constitutional grounds, which “never cited section 1385 or any other

statutory basis for relief,” could not properly be construed as a

dismissal under section 1385].)

To the extent the trial court believed it did not have jurisdiction to

entertain a nonstatutory motion to dismiss on constitutional due process

grounds in the parole revocation context, that belief was misplaced.

(See, e.g., People v. Ruiz (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 372, 377, 379–380

[trial court had jurisdiction to consider motion to dismiss parole

revocation petition and related request to transfer supervision from

parole to postrelease community supervision premised in part on

constitutional due process and equal protection grounds].) Given the

clear case law holding that minimum due process protections apply to

parolees facing revocation (albeit not the same due process requirements

as in a criminal prosecution) (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at

pp. 481–489; DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 653–655), we conclude

the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Skaggs’s nonstatutory

motion to dismiss on constitutional due process grounds alone. (See

Ruiz, at pp. 379–380.)

We decline Skaggs’s invitation to consider his case-specific arguments

as to the merits of his due process motion and whether he was prejudiced

by the delay in adjudicating his revocation petition. (DeLeon,

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 660 [reviewing court is not “called upon to

evaluate whether case-specific prejudice occurred because subsequent

events have mooted [appellant’s] claim for relief”].)

In sum, the trial court erred by construing Skaggs’s constitutional

motion to dismiss as a section 1385 motion and denying it on that basis.

Rather, the trial court had the authority to consider the motion on the

constitutional due process grounds raised therein and should have done

so. Nevertheless, because Skaggs has completed his revocation sentence

and his parole supervision has terminated during the pendency of his

appeal, we dismiss his appeal as moot. (See DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th

at p. 660.)

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

Tucher, P. J.

Fujisaki, J.

A170942 / People v. Skaggs

Trial Court: Mendocino County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Victoria Shanahan

Counsel:

Caroline T. Alexander, County Public Defender, and Michele E.

Kemmerling, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Amit

Kurlekar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.