C101173_20250827

Filed 8/27/25 Bal v. Amerio CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

Summary of the Appeal

Gurman Bal (Bal) appeals from a trial court order granting Ashley R. Amerio’s (Amerio) motion to strike his complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The action arose out of (1) statements Amerio allegedly made to her law firm’s clients when Bal tried to obtain the representation of those clients after his employment with Amerio’s firm was terminated; and (2) statements Amerio allegedly made to one of her employees about a police investigation after Amerio made a report to police regarding drawings of firearms the employees found in Bal’s office while he worked at Amerio’s firm.

We affirm the judgment.

Facts and History of the Proceedings

Bal, an attorney, worked for Amerio’s law firm for a short time in late 2021 and early 2022. After the firm terminated Bal in March 2022, Bal attempted to convince some of Amerio’s firm’s clients to allow him to assume their representation in litigation matters then being handled by Amerio’s firm. According to Bal, Amerio and one of her firm’s employees then told clients and other firm contacts that Bal was being criminally investigated by the local police department.

Allegations of the Complaint

The complaint sets forth causes of action alleging defamation, intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It alleges as follows:

Bal was the “primary attorney contact for most, if not all, of the firm’s clients” when he worked for Amerio’s firm. In a dispute over clients, Amario’s representative falsely claimed Bal had not done work on any case at the firm and that Amerio was the primary counsel. But, in Bal’s experience, Amerio rarely returned calls or emails, rarely went to the office, and Bal was the only lawyer clients and employees dealt with.

On April 30, 2022, an ex-colleague, Andrew Roberts, called Bal and told him that Amerio’s then legal assistant Donna Cardoza had said to Roberts, “ ‘Ashley says Gurman is under criminal investigation by Roseville [Police Department].’ ”

In mid-May 2022, Bal called Srinivas Penumechchu, a potential client. Amerio had told Penumechchu that Bal was under criminal investigation.

Beverly Simpson-Hanog, a client of Amerio’s, was another potential client for Bal. Simpson-Hanog sought to retain Bal to represent her and her sister in a wrongful death action. Simpson-Hanog sent a detailed message to Amerio, firing her and hiring Bal. Amerio ignored this email and “sent a confusing email claiming that Ms. [Simpson-]Hanog was still her client.”

Bal met with Simpson-Hanog’s husband, who was not satisfied with Amerio’s representation. While Bal met with Simpson-Hanog’s husband, a sheriff’s cruiser arrived and said a report of harassment had been made. Bal lost Simpson-Hanog as a client, and he believed Amerio lied to Simpson-Hanog to convince Simpson-Hanog to call law enforcement.

Bal believed Amerio was still making defamatory claims about him to her followers, friends, family, current and prospective clients, and colleagues. He believed Amerio knew these statements were false.

Bal suffered emotional distress and “physical symptoms” because of Amerio’s actions. He also suffered damages, including loss of reputation, job opportunities, and wages.

The first cause of action is for defamation, and it is based on Bal’s allegations that Amario made false statements to Roberts, Penumechchu, and Simpson-Hanog that Bal was under criminal investigation.

The second cause of action is for intentional interference with contractual relations. The third cause of action is for intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Both of these causes of action are based on Amerio’s alleged actions in securing Simpson-Hanog as a continuing client of the firm after Simpson-Hanog allegedly agreed to retain Bal to represent her. We refer to them together as causes of action for business interference.

The fourth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This cause of action is based on allegations that Amerio’s conduct as described in the other three causes of action was extreme, outrageous, and beyond the bounds of decency tolerated by civilized society. The complaint states the alleged conduct was intended to cause him emotional distress.

Declarations Filed in Support of the Anti-SLAPP Motion

With declarations filed in support of her anti-SLAPP motion, Amerio provided a narrative that expanded upon and countered the description of events set forth in the complaint.

Amerio’s Declaration

According to Amerio’s declaration:

Simpson-Hanog and her sister retained Amerio in 2016 to represent them in an elder abuse and wrongful death claim. Penumechchu retained her in 2020 to represent his son in a personal injury action in which Penumechchu was appointed guardian ad litem.

Amario hired Bal in November 2021. As an associate attorney of the firm, Bal was assigned various tasks, but he was never assigned as the principal attorney on a case. Bal’s employment with the firm lasted less than four months. His employment was terminated on March 15, 2022, because, in one day, he failed to appear at two case management conferences and a deposition.

In the first half of March 2022, before Bal’s termination, a couple of Amerio’s employees found on Bal’s desk numerous drawings of handguns, machine guns, uniforms with skulls, a closed fist, and a person with their hands in the air. The drawings caused employees, including Cardoza, “a great deal of anxiety and concern.” When the employees brought the drawings to Amerio’s attention, they informed her they were concerned for their safety. Amerio reported the drawings and her employees’ concerns to the Roseville Police Department. To alleviate her employees’ concerns, Amerio informed them she had contacted the police. Cardoza independently reported her concerns to the police.

On April 19, 2022, a police officer went to the firm’s office, looked at the drawings, interviewed Cardoza, and said he would look into the matter. A firm employee tried to obtain a copy of the incident report regarding the drawings on April 25, 2022, but could not. However, Cardoza obtained a redacted copy on April 29, 2022. In an April 29, 2022, email Cardoza sent Amerio, Cardoza wrote, “I went to the Roseville [Police Department] this morning and since there was no crime committed, this is all they had in their file.”

Amerio never told Roberts that Bal was being criminally investigated, and she never told Roberts that Amerio was being investigated by Roseville police. If Cardoza disclosed the existence of an investigation to Roberts, it was without Amario’s knowledge, consent, or authority.

Bal was upset that his employment at the firm had been terminated, and he tried to arrange to represent several of Amario’s clients.

On April 18, 2022, Penumechchu informed Amerio that Bal had contacted him numerous times about representation in Penumechchu’s son’s case. Penumechchu told Amerio that when Penumechchu did not answer Bal’s call, Bal called Penumechchu’s wife’s cell phone, sometimes very late at night. This upset Penumechchu and his wife. Penumechchu told Amerio he wanted her to continue representing his son. Penumechchu told Amerio he did not want Bal to ever contact him again. Accordingly, Amerio sent an email to Bal instructing him that Penumechchu would remain a client of Amario’s firm and asking him to stop all communications to Penumechchu.

Bal also tried to gain Simpson-Hanog as a client. On April 19, 2022, an employee of Amerio’s firm contacted Simpson-Hanog to obtain verifications on discovery documents. Simpson-Hanog told the employee and Amerio that Bal had telephoned Simpson-Hanog repeatedly the day before, went to her house that day, and told her Amerio no longer wanted to represent her in the wrongful death action and did not actually work on cases. Simpson-Hanog told Amerio that Bal had told Simpson-Hanog her case should have settled long before and he would settle it right away. Simpson-Hanog told Amerio that Bal had told Simpson-Hanog that (1) Amerio had assigned Simpson-Hanog’s case to him; and (2) Simpson-Hanog needed to sign various documents. Amerio later learned the documents were a fee agreement retaining Bal and a substitution of attorney form substituting Bal for Amerio as counsel in the action.

Amerio told Simpson-Hanog what Bal had told her was untrue. Simpson-Hanog seemed relieved, and she emailed Bal and Amerio to say she wanted Amerio’s office and not Bal to represent her.

Later on April 19, 2022, Simpson-Hanog called Amerio in hysterics. Simpson-Hanog told Amerio after she told Bal to never contact her again, he showed up at her home and refused to leave. Simpson-Hanog said Bal was outside yelling at her husband. When Simpson-Hanog asked Amerio what she should do, Amerio said she should call law enforcement if Bal was upsetting her, if she was concerned, and if he refused to leave.

Amerio never told Penumechchu, Simpson-Hanog, any client, prospective client, or colleague that that Bal was being criminally investigated or investigated by Roseville police.

Simpson-Hanog’s Declaration

According to the Simpson-Hanog’s declaration:

Simpson-Hanog and her sister retained Amerio to represent them in a wrongful death action following the death of their mother in 2016.

On April 18, 2022, Bal called Simpson-Hanog numerous times regarding representation on her case. Bal said Amerio had already assigned him the case because Amerio does not actually work on cases, and he said the case should have settled long before. He said he would settle it right away. When Bal insisted on going to Simpson-Hanog’s home right away to discuss the case, she agreed, and he came over the next morning.

Bal said he had hired Roberts to find Simpson-Hanog.

Simpson-Hanog told Bal that if Amerio was not available to work on her case, she would at least like to keep the case manager assigned to her case, Christine. Simpson-Hanog said she wanted to call Christine immediately. Bal told Simpson-Hanog and her sister, who was on speaker phone, that they could get Christine on the phone once Simpson-Hanog signed documents, but they never got Christine on the phone.

Bal had Simpson-Hanog sign documents, which he did not review with her, and he did not have a copy of the documents to leave with her.

Once Simpson-Hanog signed the documents, Bal quickly left to go to her sister’s to obtain her signature on the documents.

After Bal left, Christine called Simpson-Hanog to discuss discovery verifications Simpson-Hanog needed to sign, and Simpson-Hanog told Christine Bal had just left her house. She told Christine and Amerio about Bal’s visit to her home. After speaking with Christine and Amerio, Simpson-Hanog concluded Bal had lied to her and her sister to get them to sign documents. She later learned the documents were a retainer agreement and substitution of attorney, replacing Amerio as her counsel with Bal.

Simpson-Hanog emailed Bal and told him to void everything and never contact her again. Bal ignored Simpson-Hanog’s request and called her phone dozens of times that day.

Bal then emailed Simpson-Hanog and Amerio and said Simpson-Hanog was his client, and he told Amerio not to contact Simpson-Hanog. Simpson-Hanog emailed Bal again and told him not to contact her.

Later in the day, Bal returned to Simpson-Hanog’s home. Her husband was outside and asked Bal to leave, but Bal would not leave.

From inside the house, Simpson-Hanog could hear yelling between Bal and her husband, which caused her great anxiety, and she began to cry. Sobbing, she called Amerio and told Amerio that Bal was at her house, yelling at her husband, and refusing to leave. She asked Amerio for advice. When she got off the phone with Amerio, she called 9-1-1. Police arrived and told Bal to stop yelling and to leave.

She believes Bal preyed on her because she was vulnerable following a crisis that had culminated in the death of her brother, and that Bal lied to her to get her to sign documents. She remained afraid of Bal. She wanted Bal to “stop harassing” her and never contact her again.

Simpson-Hanog wanted Amerio to continue representing her because she trusted Amerio. She sought advice from Amerio regarding her case, and what to do considering Bal’s lies and how he deceived her.

Amerio never told Simpson-Hanog that Bal was under criminal investigation. Amerio never criticized Bal when she spoke to Simpson-Hanog, other than to say Bal had lied about Amerio not wanting to work on the case and assigning it to Bal.

Penumechchu’s Declaration

According to Penumechchu’s declaration:

He retained Amerio to represent his son in a personal injury action in 2020, and he was appointed guardian ad litem for his son in the action.

On April 18, 2022, Bal contacted Penumechchu numerous times regarding representation of Penumechchu’s son. When Penumechchu did not answer Bal’s calls, Bal phoned Penumechchu’s wife’s cell phone. Bal tried to convince Penumechchu to retain him instead of Amerio to represent his son. Penumechchu told Bal he wanted Amerio to continue to represent his son.

Because of the repeated calls, Penumechchu told Amerio he did not want Bal calling him or his wife, and he asked Amerio to instruct Bal to never call him again.

Penumechchu received a letter from Amerio advising him that Bal, who had done some work on the case, was leaving the Amerio Law Firm. The letter informed him that he could decide between keeping his case with the firm or retaining Bal.

Amerio has never told him that Bal was being criminally investigated.

Opposition Evidence

Bal submitted his own declaration and the declaration of Andrew Roberts in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion.

Bal’s Declaration

According to Bal’s declaration:

While employed at the firm, he was the primary contact for most, if not all, of the firm’s clients. In his experience, Amerio rarely returned calls and emails or went to the office, and he was the only lawyer clients and employees dealt with.

Bal never spoke with Amerio about the drawings she says employees found, and he only found out about Amerio’s claims about the drawings when she filed the anti-SLAPP motion. He was never contacted by law enforcement about the drawings.

Simpson-Hanog sought to retain him to represent her and her sister in a wrongful death action. After Simpson-Hanog sent a detailed email to Amerio “firing” Amerio and “hiring” Bal, Amerio ignored the message and instead sent “a confusing email claiming that Ms. [Simpson-]Hanog was still her client.”

Bal then met with Simpson-Hanog’s husband, who was dissatisfied with Amerio’s representation. During the meeting, a sheriff’s cruiser showed up and said a report of harassment had been made. Simpson-Hanog’s husband told the officer nothing was wrong and the officer left.

In mid-May of 2022, Bal called Penumechchu, who was “told by [Amerio] that [Bal] was not at the firm and that [Bal] was under criminal investigation.”

He has suffered severe emotional distress, which has manifested itself with physical symptoms because of the allegedly defaming conduct. He has also suffered loss of job opportunities, wages, and reputation.

Roberts’s Declaration

Roberts stated the following in his declaration:

He was a paralegal at the Amerio Law Firm and left the firm in April 2022.

In late April 2022, when he was at a new firm, Cardoza called his cell to ask, “ ‘Andrew, are you and Gurman working together at his personal injury firm? Because Gurman is stealing our clients.’ ”

After Roberts responded that he was not working with Bal, Cardoza said to him, “ ‘Andrew, Ashley told me that Gurman is under criminal investigation by Roseville Police Department for terrorism.’ ”

On April 30, 2022, Roberts called Bal to say, “ ‘Gurman, Donna called me to ask if I am working with you at your personal injury firm. [Donna] then said, “Ashley told me that Gurman is under criminal investigation by Roseville Police Department.” ’ ”

Trial Court Ruling and Appeal

The trial court issued a ruling on April 10, 2024. It granted the motion and struck the complaint in its entirety. This appeal followed.

Discussion

I

Scope of Issues In this Appeal

Even in cases of de novo review, we presume an order or judgment of the trial court is correct and indulge all presumptions in favor of its correctness. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776-777.) It remains an appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (Ibid.)

“It is the responsibility of the appellant . . . to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [].) When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration. . . . We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants. [Citations.]

“Moreover, we do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier. [Citations.] This rule is based on considerations of fairness—withholding a point until the closing brief deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to file a written response unless supplemental briefing is ordered.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; see also Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982.)

Similarly, “[a]n appellant cannot bury a substantive legal argument in a footnote and hope to avoid waiver of that argument.” (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 419-420.)

Finally, we note that decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on California courts of appeal. (Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, 163.)

Thus, to the extent Bal makes arguments that lack legal authority, rely exclusively on lower federal court decisions or other non-binding authority, are raised for the first time in the reply brief, and/or are captured in a footnote, we need not consider those arguments in determining if Bal has met his burden on appeal.

Based on the issues identified in the opening brief, this decision considers whether the trial court erred when it granted the anti-SLAPP motion considering statements Bal allegedly made to Simpson-Hanog, Penumechchu, and Cardoza.

II

Ruling on Hearsay Objections

Bal argues the trial court erred in sustaining some of Amerio’s hearsay objections. “An erroneous evidentiary ruling requires reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1021.)

Even if we were to decide the trial court erred in ruling on the hearsay objections and considered the proffered evidence our findings would remain unchanged even if we considered the evidence excluded by the disputed hearsay objections. That is, there is not a reasonable possibility that we would reach a result more favorable to Bal if we found error and then considered the excluded evidence. Thus, we need not address the merits of Bal’s arguments regarding those objections.

III

Consideration of Anti-SLAPP Motions and Standard of Appellate Review

“A cause of action ‘arising from’ [Amerio’s] exercise of the constitutional right of free speech or petition for the redress of grievances, is commonly known as a SLAPP suit ([Code Civ. Proc., ]§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Callanan v. Grizzly Designs, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 517, 524 (Callanan).) “A SLAPP suit is subject to a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.; see also FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 139.)

In subdivision (a) of the anti-SLAPP statute, our Legislature declares, “that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)

Under subdivision (b)(1) of the anti-SLAPP statute, “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that [Bal] will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. ‘Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. [Citations.]’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson).)

If the defendant carries its burden on the first step, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) “If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the court will strike the claim.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)

“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Callanan, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 525.) In our review, “[i]n addition to the pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon which liability is based. ([Code Civ. Proc., ]§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Navellier v. Sletten[ (2002)] 29 Cal.4th [82], 89.) We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but accept [Bal]’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary evidence from [Amerio] establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) “[W]hen the complaint itself alleges protected activity, a moving party may rely on the plaintiff’s allegations alone in arguing that the plaintiff’s claims arise from an act ‘in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 929.)

In performing the SLAPP analysis, generic allegations will be addressed under a mixed cause of action analysis. (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 945-946.) Under this analysis, “the anti-SLAPP law will apply to a cause of action based on both activity that is protected by the SLAPP statute and activity that is not.” (Id. at p. 946.) In evaluating the claims, we treat the essence of the claims as the specific allegations about statements made to specific people (e.g., Simpson-Hanog, Penumechchu, and Cardoza), and the generic allegations (e.g., allegations regarding unidentified friends and colleagues) as “incidental.” (Ibid.)

IV

The Trial Court Properly Granted the Motion on the Causes of Action for Business Interference

1. Amerio’s Alleged Statements to Simpson-Hanog Are Protected Speech

Subdivision (e) of the anti-SLAPP statute states that an “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, . . . or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

“[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266, fn. omitted (Neville); accord McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 179.) “Statements that ‘bear[] no relationship to’ or ‘ha[ve] nothing to do with the claims under consideration’ in the litigation do not meet that standard. [Citation.]” (Neville, at p. 1264.) Though the protections of Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), are not coextensive with the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), they serve similar policy interests and courts will look to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), as an aid in construing the scope of Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (Id. at pp. 1262-1263.)

Caselaw has extended the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections to communications by an attorney (communicating attorney) that causes the client of another attorney to switch their representation to the communicating attorney, and to the communications of an individual when he encouraged his parents to stop using the services of retained counsel. (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 485-486, 489 (Taheri); Bowen v. Lin (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 155, 162 (Bowen).) We find these cases instructive.

In Taheri, a client’s former counsel, Taheri, sued the client’s new counsel, Evans, for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with business relations. (Taheri, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 485.) Taheri alleged, Evans induced the client, Sorokurs, “to terminate his relationship with Taheri, promising ‘unobtainable and ethically improper litigation objectives  . . . .’ Evans’s promise was that he (Evans) would be able to enforce a settlement agreement to which Sorokurs was a party . . . Evans allegedly procured the disruption of Taheri’s relationship with [the client] ‘by advising [Sorokurs] to discharge [Taheri] from his duties   . . . and refusing to pay for the legal services already rendered by [Taheri] . . . , by reporting as being fraudulent the credit card payments made against [Sorokurs’s] credit card to pay for the costs of [Sorokurs’s] matters . . ., by procuring [Sorokurs’s] insolvency, and by waiving all attorney’s fees earned by [Taheri] through out [sic] the course of eighteen months of litigation of [Sorokurs’s] matters.’ ” (Id. at pp. 485-486.) Sorokurs submitted a declaration in support of Evans’s anti-SLAPP motion. (See id. at pp. 486-487.) He declared he decided to replace Taheri as his counsel and was referred to Evans by a third party. (Id. at p. 487.) He said he approached Evans and decided to retain him. (Id. at p. 487.)

On an appeal from a trial court ruling granting Evans’s anti-SLAPP motion, the court considered whether the communications at issue arose, “from communications ‘made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body . . . .’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)” (Taheri, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.) Taheri argued that improper solicitation of another attorney’s client is not subject to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute, and that, as such, the lawsuit against Evans did not arise from protected activity, but from Evans’s conduct soliciting a client. (Id. at p. 489.) The court of appeal disagreed. (Ibid.) The court reasoned, “Taheri’s causes of action arise directly from communications between Sorokurs and Evans about the pending lawsuits against Sorokurs. . . . . [I]t is difficult to conjure a clearer scenario than the case before us of a lawsuit arising from protected activity.” (Ibid.)

In Bowen, an attorney, Bowen, was retained by a husband, wife, and son (the family) to help them collect from a business neighbor when the neighbor’s pipe leaked and damaged the husband and son’s office. (Bowen, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) When Bowen recommended the family sue after settlement negotiations failed, the son did not agree. (Ibid.) After three years, the husband asked Bowen to stop all work on the case while their daughter, an attorney, tried to settle the case. (Ibid.) The daughter substituted in and settled. (Ibid.) In a subsequent action brought by the family against Bowen, Bowen filed a cross-complaint. (Ibid.) As part of the cross-complaint, Bowen alleged the son breached his oral contract with him when he stopped cooperating in the case against the business neighbor and fired Bowen as his attorney. (Id. at p. 160.) Bowen also alleged causes of action against the son and daughter for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations, in which he asserted the son and daughter encouraged their parents to stop cooperating with him, to withhold payment, and to work with the daughter to obtain a settlement instead. (Ibid.) The trial court denied the son’s anti-SLAPP motion, but granted the daughter’s. (Ibid.) It reasoned the actions against the husband, wife, and son were probably not based on protected communications. (Ibid.)

The court of appeal reversed and remanded on the trial court’s ruling regarding the son, and it upheld the ruling regarding the daughter. (Bowen, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) With respect to the cause of action against the son based on his decision to fire Bowen, the court wrote, “[t]he anti-SLAPP statute also protects ‘conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Decisions about hiring and firing one’s attorney—the second basis for Bowen’s breach of contract cause of action—are within this category. (See, e.g., Gage v. Atwater (1902) 136 Cal. 170, 172 [] [noting that a ‘client has the absolute right to change [their] attorney at any stage’]; Taheri[, supra] 160 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 491 [] [‘the “important right to counsel of one’s choice” is . . .well established’].) The trial court thus erred when it concluded that Bowen’s breach of contract cause of action did not arise from protected activity.” (Bowen, at p. 162.)

The court of appeal reached the same conclusion with respect to the business interference causes of action. (Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.) It stated, “Bowen bases these causes on Calvin encouraging his parents to stop cooperating with Bowen in the [property damage] case, sever their attorney-client relationship with him, and instead have [their daughter] negotiate a settlement. These communications were not tangential to the [property damage] case, but directly pertained to its resolution. (Taheri, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.) As such, they were ‘ “made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” ’ (Ibid.; see also Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 462 [] (Pech) [advising clients to terminate attorney’s services is protected activity].) Bowen’s [economic and contract interference] causes of action thus ‘plainly . . .arose from’ protected conduct. (Taheri, at p. 489.)” (Bowen, at p. 162.)

Here, Amerio allegedly told Simpson-Hanog that Bal was under criminal investigation during discussions that occurred while Bal was attempting to solicit Simpson-Hanog away from the firm, and Amerio was trying to continue to represent Simpson-Hanog in litigation. Bal argues that Amerio’s alleged statements did not relate to the “substantive issues in the litigation,” and, therefore, were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). But the communications were discussions as to who was best qualified to represent Simpson-Hanog and her sister in their litigation. Counsel plays a crucial role on behalf of their clients in addressing the substantive issues raised in litigation. The relationship between counsel and client can greatly impact the process of litigation, which, in turn, can impact how the substantive issues are ultimately resolved. Thus, discussions regarding who represents a party in a lawsuit and factors that contribute to the decision to retain counsel are communications, “made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body,” and are protected. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) Amerio’s communications with Simpson-Hanog were not “tangential” to the resolution of Simpson-Hanog’s case, but “directly pertained” to how she would proceed to resolve those issues: stay the course with Amerio or aim for a quick settlement with Bal. (See Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)

Bal’s reliance on cases in which courts of appeal concluded statements were not protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), or the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), are unpersuasive. None of the cases relied upon address statements made to parties to litigation when the parties were deciding who should represent them in litigation. For example, in Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, an attorney moved to strike causes of action asserted by a securities broker alleging that the attorney, in litigating a prior arbitration proceeding, had conducted an intrusive investigation into the securities broker’s personal life and had disclosed to the broker’s clients and others personal details that had no bearing on the alleged securities fraud at issue in the arbitration. (Id. at pp. 857, 858, 866.)

In Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 768 (Argentieri), the court found the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), privilege did not apply to an attorney’s statement in a press release. (Id. at pp. 776, 778, 783-784.) This was so because the press did not have a substantial interest in the litigation matter the press release was about, and it did not serve as a useful step in the litigation matter to which it referred. (Id. at pp. 784-787.) Selecting counsel has a bearing on how issues are resolved, and frank conversations about possible legal representatives serves as a useful step in selecting counsel and moving forward in the litigation.

B. Bal’s Causes of Action for Business Interference Are Without Merit

Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), a “privileged publication or broadcast is one made: . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as” not relevant here. When the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), privilege applies, “[t]he privilege is absolute and precludes a claimant from establishing a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim.” (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)

“ ‘The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ([Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205,] 212.) The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057 [] (Rusheen).)” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 (Action Apartment).) “To be privileged under section 47, a statement must be ‘reasonably relevant’ to pending or contemplated litigation.” (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) For the litigation privilege to apply, the statement “must ‘function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation process and . . .serve its purposes.’ [Citation.]” (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 785-786.)

“ ‘ “The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]” [Citation.] In order to achieve this purpose of curtailing derivative lawsuits, we have given the litigation privilege a broad interpretation.’ (Action Apartment[, supra,] 41 Cal.4th [at p.] 1241 [].) The privilege also encourages attorneys to protect their clients’ interests, and is therefore ‘extended to attorneys to protect them from the fear of subsequent derivative actions for communications made in the context of judicial proceedings.’ (*Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. *(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 30 [].)” (Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 333 (Olsen).)

“The breadth of the litigation privilege cannot be understated. It immunizes defendants from virtually any tort liability (including claims for fraud), with the sole exception of causes of action for malicious prosecution.” (Olsen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)

The privilege “applies to any publication or other communication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, whether or not the publication is made in the courtroom or in court pleadings, and whether or not any function of the court or its officers is involved.” (Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140 (Rothman).) The privilege has been found to apply to prelitigation solicitations of potential clients. (See Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.)

“Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913; Greco v. Greco (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 810, 826.)

Amerio’s alleged statements to Simpson-Hanog were privileged in this context: (1) The were made in a judicial proceeding, Simpson-Hanog’s case. (2) They were made by an authorized participant to the litigation, Amerio, counsel of record. (3) They were made to achieve the object of the litigation, which would be the best possible award to Simpson-Hanog once the case settled or went to trial. (See Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1147-1148 [“A party’s legitimate objectives in the litigation are limited to the remedies which can be awarded by courts. Thus, the ‘objects of the litigation’ for a plaintiff are to obtain a monetary recovery for damages or other relief”].) And, (4) they had a connection or logical relation to the action. Simpson-Hanog would need to be able to trust her counsel to deliver the best possible result in her action. (See Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058 [“the litigation privilege: attorney prelitigation” has protected “solicitations of potential clients and subsequent filing of pleadings in the litigation”].)

Bal cannot show his causes of action for business interference have merit since they are barred by the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), litigation privilege. (See Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241.)

V

The Trial Court Properly Granted the Motion as to the Defamation Cause of Action

To the extent Bal’s cause of action for defamation is based on statements Amerio allegedly made to Simpson-Hanog, they are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and Bal cannot show the cause of action has merit for the same reasons the causes of action for business interference fail. (See Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [litigation privilege precludes defamation actions].) The same holds for Bal’s defamation cause of action to the extent it is based on statements Amerio allegedly made to Penumechchu: if Amerio said anything regarding a criminal investigation to Penumechchu, she did so while communicating with Penumechchu because Bal was trying to convince Penumechchu to substitute Bal for Amerio as counsel of record in Penumechchu’s son’s case.

For many of the same reasons, we find statements to Cardoza were also protected and Bal has not shown a cause of action based on those statements has merit.

A. Amerio’s Statements to Cardoza Are Protected by the Anti-SLAPP Statute

Amerio’s statements to Cardoza are protected under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).

“The law is that communications to the police are within SLAPP.” (Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 941-942.) A complaint made to a government agency to solicit an investigation qualifies as a statement before an official proceeding as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1). (Ibid., citing ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1009.)

A statement made to a person with an interest in a proceeding that relates to the substantive issues in the proceeding is one made “in connection with” the proceeding as contemplated under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (See Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 [“a statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation”]; Chabak v. Monroy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1512 (Chabak) [finding a minor’s statements to her parents that a physical therapist pinched her buttocks after she reported the incident to the police was directly related to her police report].)

Chabak is instructive here in determining whether Amerio’s statements to Cardoza would be protected under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). In Chabak, a minor reported to police that she had been touched inappropriately by her physical therapist. (Chabak, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1506, 1512.) The police investigated the incident, but no charges were ever filed. (Ibid.) After the minor reported the incident to the police, she told her mother about it at the urging of the officer who took her report. (Id. at p. 1507.) Evidence also established that the minor told her father. (Id. at p. 1508.) The court of appeal found that statements to the minor’s parents were protected as directly related to the police report. (Id. at p. 1512.) Among other factors the court considered, the court stated, “it seems to us almost impossible to avoid the involvement of [the minor’s] parents in the subsequent criminal investigation of Chabak.” (Ibid.)

Here, Amerio allegedly told Cardoza Bal was being criminally investigated. Cardoza was a firm employee who (1) found the drawings and was frightened by them; and (2) was interviewed by the police. Cardoza was unquestionably interested in the report to the police and the scope of the police investigation that followed. Her involvement in the police follow-up to the report and decision regarding further actions, as in Chabak, was impossible to avoid. Thus, Amerio satisfied the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis with respect to statements she made to Cardoza which is all that was required on the motion.

In his reply brief, Bal argues that making a report to law enforcement does not create an investigation or official proceedings to which Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), protections apply. He cautions that to allow Bal’s reporting of his drawings to be seen as creating an investigation would create a situation where “Karens” could “publicly declar[e] their targets are under criminal investigation . . . based solely on their own reports of purportedly suspicious behavior to the police.” He also argues that when Cardoza spoke with Roberts, it was on or around April 30, 2022, after Amerio made her report and after Cardoza noted the police said there was no crime. Thus, he implies, the statements at issue were not made when Amerio initiated her report to the police.

There are at least two problems with these arguments. First, Amerio did not issue a public statement that Bal was being criminally investigated. After she made the report, she discussed what happened because of the report with an employee who was concerned about Bal’s drawings, an employee later interviewed by the police. Second, though Roberts may have called Bal and reported what Cardoza said to him on April 30, 2022, Amerio’s declaration suggests she told concerned employees about her report close to the time she made the report.

B. Amerio’s Statements to Cardoza Were Privileged

Amerio’s statements to Cardoza were privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).

Amerio’s report to the police was privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). “Numerous . . . cases agree that the [Civil Code] section 47[, subdivision] (b) privilege applies to complaints to governmental agencies requesting that the agency investigate or remedy wrongdoing.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 363.) The absolute privilege Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides to, “a publication or broadcast made in any legislative, judicial, or other official proceeding authorized by law . . . is not limited to communications to or from governmental officials.” (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781 (Dove).)

In Dove, a law firm sent a letter to celebrities who had donated time to recordings in exchange for a promise that royalties from the recordings would be given to designated charities. (Dove, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.) The letter stated that the law firm planned to file a complaint with the Attorney General on behalf of their client because little money went to the charities, and it asked recipients to endorse those efforts. (Ibid.) The company that made the recordings brought a defamation action against the law firm. (Id. at pp. 779-780.) The court of appeal found the trial court had properly sustained a demurrer to the complaint based on the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), privilege. (Id. at pp. 781, 783.) The court said, “[t]he communication at issue in this case was in preparation for the sending of a complaint to the Attorney General. As we have explained, communications preliminary to the institution of an official proceeding come within the privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).” (Id. at p. 783.)

In his reply, Bal argues Amerio’s statements to Cardoza are not subject to this privilege because (1) Roberts was not a firm client and there was no litigation associated with him; and (2) the statements to Cardoza were not made to initiate a proceeding, and, in fact, Cardoza shared the statements with Roberts after the incident report stemming from Amerio’s report was completed.

With respect to the first point, we reiterate that to the extent Amerio made a statement, she made it to Cardoza, not Roberts. While the complaint alludes to statements made to “Roberts” by Amerio, the evidence suggests only Cardoza said something to Roberts. Indeed, in his opening brief, Bal identifies statements, “by Amerio to Donna Cardona [sic], who then repeated the [s]tatements to Andrew Roberts,” as at issue.

With respect to the second point, we look to the policy behind the litigation privilege and consider if it is furthered by limiting it to statements made before any statements are made to officials to initiate an investigation. We find Bal’s reading to be too narrow.

A key purpose of the privilege “ ‘is to assure utmost freedom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investigate and remedy wrongdoing.’ [Citations.] Such open communication is ‘a fundamental adjunct to the right of access to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.’ ” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213.) Accordingly, cases addressing the scope of the privilege when litigation is pending “has ‘expanded the scope of [the litigation privilege] to include publication to nonparties with a substantial interest in the proceeding (see Costa v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 673, 678 []) . . . .’ [Citation.] For example, in Costa, the chairman of the board of directors of a fraternal lodge organization sent a letter to lodge members in which he explained the basis of then pending litigation, and solicited the support and views of the members relating to the issues in dispute. (Costa, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 676.) Costa held the ‘lodge members to whom the letter was addressed possessed a substantial interest in the outcome of the pending litigation and as such were authorized participants therein.’ (Id. at p. 678.)” (GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 152-153.)

“The privilege is intended to ‘afford litigants and witnesses . . .the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently . . . . [¶]  . . . [¶] [with] protracted and costly lawsuits.’ [Citation.]” (Argentieri, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.)

Here, Amerio made statements to Cardoza about the police involvement because Cardoza was an employee who raised the concerns that prompted Amerio to make a report to the police. Cardoza had a substantial interest in the outcome of the report, and would likely be called upon as a witness to the extent an investigation into the drawings proceeded further. Indeed, police did interview Cardoza about the drawings. That Amerio may have spoken to Cardoza after she made a report to the police and even after the law enforcement authorities had decided not to investigate further, does not change that it was important Amerio be able to speak to Cardoza about the matter without facing the threat of legal action by Bal.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) and (2).)

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE, J.

MESIWALA, J.