E082864_20250821

Filed 8/21/25 P. v. Esparza CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John J. Ryan, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed and remanded with directions.

Matthew Aaron Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Y. Friedman and Eric A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 2023 a jury convicted Jesse Noe Mora Esparza of a domestic violence related offense. As part of the terms and conditions of his probation, the court ordered him to pay the victim $1,180 in restitution. Esparza appeals, arguing the restitution hearing violated principles of due process. We affirm, but remand to allow the trial court to correct an error in the written record.

BACKGROUND

In October 2019, Esparza hit his intimate partner multiple times, leaving her face and shoulder bruised and chipping her tooth. The victim testified that she had to go to the dentist to get her tooth fixed. In May 2023 a jury convicted Esparza of inflicting corporal injury on a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. (Pen. Code § 273.5, subd. (a).)¹

In August 2023 the Riverside County probation department prepared a report noting that the victim was requesting restitution. That report contained a claim for restitution from the victim, totaling $1,180. This was comprised of $500 to fix her chipped tooth, and $680 for the week of work she missed.

The court sentenced Esparza in December 2023. After hearing from the victim, the prosecution informed the court Esparza was requesting a hearing on restitution, presumably on another day. The prosecution explained that because of this the victim was no longer requesting restitution as she “would like to be done at this point today.” The following exchange then occurred:

THE COURT: You are not requesting it?

PROSECUTOR: She is not. She has changed her mind, Your Honor. She doesn’t want to come back again.

THE COURT: We can do it today. There was a figure that I mentioned.

PROSECUTOR: Correct. Defense is not agreeing to that and asking for a hearing.

THE COURT: I don’t care if they agree to it. Where is the victim in this case?

PROSECUTOR: She is here, Your Honor.

The court then inquired with both the prosecutor and the victim about the requested restitution, confirming it was $500 for the broken tooth and $680 for missed work. The court did not swear the witness in before asking her about these amounts. Defense counsel objected, which lead to a colloquy between defense counsel, the court, and the victim:

DEFENSE: I would object, Your Honor. There is no proof of any of this.

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

DEFENSE: I would object. There is no proof of any of this. I have asked for proof.

THE COURT: She just told us.

DEFENSE: And as I said, there is no written proof of anything.

THE COURT: I have her word. She’s not here lying. . . . This is not a big sum of money.

[¶] . . . [¶]

DEFENSE: But there is no proof of anything of what money she spent. There should be written proof. If you go to a dentist, there should be written proof.

THE COURT: The figures you gave me, are those true, so help you God?

VICTIM: Yes.

THE COURT: Would you like to question the victim in this case?

DEFENSE: Isn’t it true that your teeth were actually damaged before this incident?

VICTIM: Not true.

DEFENSE: If I were able to subpoena your dental records, that would show that, wouldn’t it?

VICTIM: Show what? No.

DEFENSE: That your teeth were damaged before.

VICTIM: No.

DEFENSE: Your Honor, again, I would like time to subpoena records and prepare for this.

THE COURT: We’re not going to do that. There was a jury trial. The jury found your client guilty. The victim is here. She knows more about what she spent and what she lost than anybody. So I am awarding the lost income and the chipped tooth, total of $1,180 restitution.

The court placed Esparza on formal probation for three years. The prosecutor requested that the restitution order be reflected in the terms and conditions of probation. The court then apparently handed the sentencing memorandum containing the terms and conditions of probation to one of the attorneys to fill in the restitution award. The sentencing memorandum shows a $0 restitution award crossed out with the number $1,180 substituted in by hand.

ANALYSIS

Esparza argues the restitution hearing he received did not satisfy due process. Specifically, Esparza argues the court erred when it surprised Esparza’s counsel by holding the hearing despite the parties’ understanding that no such hearing would take place, and when it refused to allow Esparza to investigate the victim’s claims before finding the restitution amount. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by holding the restitution hearing as it did.

“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) In determining this restitution award “[t]he defendant has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) “At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss.” (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) “ ‘ “ ‘[S]entencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider’ ” ’ in determining victim restitution.” (People v. Phu (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 280, 283.) For instance, “the trial court is entitled to consider the probation report, and, as prima facie evidence of loss, may accept a property owner’s statement made in the probation report about the value of stolen or damaged property.” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543 (Gemelli).) “Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by the victim.” (People v. Taylor (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 761.) In other words “[w]hen the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.” (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 947 (Foster), superseded by statute on another ground as recognized in People v. Sexton (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 64, 70.)

“A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.” (Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.)

“The trial court violates the defendant’s due process right at a hearing to determine the amount of restitution if the hearing procedures are fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Cain (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 81, 87 (Cain).) However “ ‘[t]he scope of a criminal defendant’s due process rights at a hearing to determine the amount of restitution is very limited: “ ‘A defendant’s due process rights are protected when [he or she has] notice of the amount of restitution claimed . . . , and . . . has an opportunity to challenge the figures . . . at the sentencing hearing.” ’ ” (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 692.) “[A] hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution,” and “the rigorous procedural safeguards required during the guilt phase . . . are not required.’ ” (Foster, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)

Given the latitude trial courts have in conducting sentencing hearings, and the fact that the probation report recommended the restitution award that the trial court adopted, we cannot say that Esparza was denied due process when the court held the hearing over his objection.² Esparza received the probation report—which itself established a prima facie case for restitution—three months before the sentencing hearing. At that point, he was on notice that he carried the burden to disprove the amount of claimed restitution. That counsel did not use those three months to investigate and acquire evidence—including by subpoenaing the victim’s dental records—does not show that the trial court violated Esparza’s due process by having the hearing.

Nor did the trial court violate Esparza’s due process rights by holding the hearing after the People told defense counsel they would not be seeking restitution. Due process requires only three things of a restitution hearing: notice of the amount claimed, an opportunity to challenge that amount, and fundamental fairness throughout the process. We cannot say any of these principles were violated here. Esparza had notice of the amount of restitution claimed in the form of the probation report, and the court provided him an opportunity to be heard on it. Indeed, the court gave Esparza’s counsel the opportunity to question the victim, which is not generally required in a restitution hearing. (See Cain, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 86 [“defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation at the sentencing stage of a criminal prosecution”].) The prosecution’s decision not to seek the restitution claimed in the probation report seems to be a last-minute change in their position based on the victim’s unwillingness to wait for a later hearing, not a repudiation of the amount claimed in the probation report. Therefore, defense counsel had notice of the amount claimed and was given an opportunity to contest it. The court heard testimony from the victim that supported the $1,180 restitution award for a broken tooth and missed work. We do not see some other unfair action that rendered the process of determining the restitution award fundamentally unfair.

We also conclude that holding a restitution hearing at the same time as a sentencing hearing without first notifying defense counsel of this fact does not violate fundamental principles of fairness. After all, “[a] restitution hearing is usually held at the time of sentencing.” (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319, emphasis added.) Indeed, the notion that restitution hearings require less process is “premised . . . on the understanding that restitution hearings are sentencing hearings.” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 662 n. 6, emphasis added.) Given that ordering restitution is part of the sentencing process, Esparza did not need to be given specific notice that restitution would be considered at the sentencing hearing.

We are sympathetic to defense counsel, who was caught off guard by the court’s decision to reject the request to hold the restitution hearing another time, as well as the prosecutor’s decision not to seek restitution, and to proceed anyway. But the circumstances are not fundamentally unfair given that counsel had notice of the amount of restitution being claimed, had time to prepare a rebuttal, had no reliance interest, and had knowledge that it could be an issue at the sentencing hearing. It may be understandable that defense counsel assumed the court would not seek evidence of restitution once the People were not pressing the issue. That this assumption turned out to be false is not a due process violation.

Finally, Esparza also argues the minute order and sentencing memorandum improperly recorded a $500 domestic violence fund fee which the court orally struck. The People concede this was error and agree it should be stricken from the minute order, sentencing memorandum, and the abstract of judgment if it appears there as well.³ We agree with the parties and order the trial court to strike the fee from the relevant documents. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.”].)

DISPOSITION

We remand with instructions to strike the domestic violence fund fee from the sentencing memorandum, the sentencing minute order, and the abstract of judgment if it appears in the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL

J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.