F087945_20250821

Filed 8/21/25 P. v. Feldmeier CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R. Brownlee, Judge.

Martin Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Defendant Ronald Mark Feldmeier was convicted by jury of kidnapping. On appeal, he contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his kidnapping conviction and (2) the trial court’s grant of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false imprisonment count barred his kidnapping conviction. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On November 30, 2023, the District Attorney of Kern County filed an amended information, charging defendant with kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a);¹ count 1), and false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237; count 2). As to both counts, the amended information alleged that defendant committed the instant offenses while on bail (§ 12022.1). As to count 1, the information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) and the offense involved several aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b)).² It was also alleged as to count 1 that defendant had 29 prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) that also qualified as prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).

On December 20, 2023, defendant’s first jury trial resulted in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. During his second trial, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1) as to both counts after the close of evidence. On March 18, 2024, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for acquittal of false imprisonment, count 2.

On March 20, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping on count 1 but found not true that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted the truth of the on-bail enhancement allegation and admitted having suffered 29 prior serious felony convictions as well as 29 prior strike convictions. Defendant further admitted the aggravating factors that the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) and that he engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)). The remaining aggravating factors were dismissed.

On April 24, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 38 years to life in prison as follows: on count 1, 25 years to life, plus a two-year on-bail enhancement, plus a five-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). The court ran the sentence in this case consecutive to a six-year sentence in People v. Feldmeier (Super. Ct. Kern County, 2023, No. BF180042A).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 25, 2024.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The People’s Case

Fast-food Restaurant Drive-thru

Defendant was in his SUV at a drive-thru of a fast-food restaurant in Bakersfield around midnight on June 26, 2023. S.M., a 24-year-old transient woman, walked up to defendant’s SUV and asked him for a cigarette. Defendant offered S.M. food but told her that she had to get into and stay in his SUV. S.M. got into his SUV but got out to order a cheesecake before getting back into the SUV.

S.M. Attempts to Exit the SUV

After they got their food, defendant drove out of the drive-thru and travelled southwest. S.M. asked to use defendant’s cell phone, but he refused, causing her to feel uncomfortable and start to “flip out.” When the SUV was stopped at a red light near a grocery store several miles southwest of the fast-food restaurant, S.M. asked to get out of the SUV. Defendant said “No,” or “[N]o, wait, hold on,” and accelerated through the intersection. S.M. rolled down the window and yelled for help. S.M. opened the door and continued yelling for help. It was dark outside, and S.M. did not see anyone around. S.M. then jumped out of the SUV while it was moving. She estimated the SUV was travelling 80 miles per hour. After falling to the curb, S.M. ran to a nearby residential cul-de-sac and began “banging on everybody’s doors.”

Investigation

At around 2:00 a.m., law enforcement responded to a call about a woman in distress and crying. Bakersfield Police Officers Martel Spearman and Chase Hammons found S.M. walking near the cul-de-sac. S.M. approached the officers crying and asking for help. After another officer arrived, S.M. reported that she had jumped out of an SUV because she thought she had been kidnapped. S.M. stated the SUV was travelling 80 miles per hour when she jumped out. S.M. had a laceration on her head, and her body was dirty and covered in abrasions. She spoke rapidly but communicated with police appropriately and did not appear to be hallucinating.

Nearby, Bakersfield Police Officer Michael Malley spotted defendant’s SUV with a broken taillight and ran a records check of the license plate. Several minutes later, Malley heard a police broadcast regarding a possible kidnapping in the area that described the suspect as an older, white male. Malley relayed defendant’s name as a possible suspect.

S.M. went to Kern Medical Hospital for treatment. She told the treating doctor that she jumped out of a moving vehicle driven by somebody trying to kidnap her. S.M. had a laceration on her head and abrasions or road rash on her head, chest, abdomen, hands, buttocks, and right foot. The treating doctor noted S.M. was clinically sober during their interaction, as he observed no evidence of intoxication. The treating doctor stated he believed, based on her injuries, the SUV was travelling somewhere between 20 and 40 miles per hour, but not 80 miles per hour. Bakersfield Police Officer Victor Huerta visited S.M. in the hospital to conduct a six-pack photographic lineup. S.M. identified defendant from the lineup.

The next day, on June 27, 2023, Bakersfield Police Detective Chad Ott interviewed S.M. S.M. stated that when defendant drove out of the drive-thru, she began to think something was not right. She asked defendant to let her out of the SUV three separate times.³ She opened the door and screamed “help” five times before jumping out of the SUV. She stated defendant told her to “[g]et back in the car” after she jumped out. S.M. admitted to being under the influence of methamphetamine during the interview.

The Defense Case

Defendant called Stewart C., who was friends with S.M.’s cousin and had known S.M. for about 10 years. Stewart testified that in May 2023, he was giving S.M. a ride when she tried to jump out of his car. He stated that S.M., sitting in the passenger seat, had her feet up on the seat because she said there were snakes on the floorboard of the car.⁴ He testified that S.M. tried getting out of the car while they were traveling about 15 miles per hour, but he was able to hold the door shut until he brought the car to a stop. Once she got out, S.M. did a dance “like she was squishing snakes on the ground.” Stewart further testified about a conversation he had with S.M. sometime after her incident with defendant. In that conversation, Stewart asked S.M. whether she felt like she was in danger in defendant’s SUV, and she responded, “[N]o.” Stewart also asked her if she felt like she was going to be raped or kidnapped, to which she also responded, “[N]o.”

Defendant also called Robert K., who called 911 about S.M. Robert lived in one of the homes on the cul-de-sac. Robert’s son had notified him of a woman outside of their home screaming for help, and he saw S.M. through his surveillance camera. The jury watched a recording with audio from Robert’s surveillance camera, during which S.M. called out for “legend,” although no one with that name lived at the residence.

The attending doctor on shift at Kern Medical Hospital during S.M.’s hospital visit also testified for defendant. He testified that although S.M.’s symptoms were consistent with a motor vehicle separation, he “put her in the category of mild overall” based on her injuries. He opined her symptoms were not consistent with a motor vehicle separation travelling 80 miles per hour.

DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. He argues the evidence presented did not prove the asportation element of the offense. The People disagree, as do we.

1. Standard of Review

In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review “the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility’ ” and “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) We may not reverse the judgment unless “it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

2. Analysis

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the second element: that the movement of S.M. did not constitute a substantial distance.

“To prove a defendant guilty of kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that (1) the defendant took, held, or detained another person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear; (2) using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person, or made the other person move a substantial distance; and (3) the other person did not consent to the movement.” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232; see People v. Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 464–465 [“The second element, that the victim be moved a substantial distance, is called the asportation element.”].)

“[I]n determining whether the movement in question was ‘ “ ‘substantial in character,’ ” ’ ‘the jury should consider the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 469.) The totality of the circumstances means that, in addition to the actual distance the victim is moved, the trier of fact may consider “whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional offenses.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237, overruled on other grounds by People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 71–72; accord Hin, at p. 469.)

Defendant argues the movement was not substantial because S.M. was moved only slightly further down the same street. To the contrary, the record here suggests the distance moved was not slight or trivial. S.M. testified that she first asked defendant to let her out of his SUV while they were stopped at the intersection near a grocery store, to which defendant replied, “[N]o,” and drove through the intersection. As the SUV kept moving, S.M. yelled several times out of the SUV for help. After she jumped out of the SUV, she ran toward the houses in a nearby cul-de-sac. Robert, who lived in the cul-de-sac, testified he saw S.M. in the cul-de-sac asking for help, and Spearman and Hammons found S.M. walking near the cul-de-sac. According to the maps of the area which were shown to the jury, the cul-de-sac was roughly one mile from where she withdrew her consent.⁵ Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that defendant moved S.M. roughly one mile before she jumped out of the SUV. (See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435 [sufficient evidence of asportation where the defendant moved the victim 15 feet from a public area into his apartment]; People v. Williams (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1171 [sufficient evidence of asportation where the defendant moved two victims one 840-foot-long block in a car].)

Defendant further argues the movement did nothing to increase S.M.’s risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decrease the likelihood of detection, or increase both the danger inherent in S.M.’s foreseeable attempts to escape and defendant’s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. We are not persuaded. By not letting S.M. out of the SUV at the intersection and instead accelerating through the intersection while she yelled for help, defendant increased the risk of harm from her foreseeable attempt to escape. (See People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, fn. 4 [risk of harm includes “not only desperate attempts by the victim to extricate himself but also unforeseen intervention by third parties”].) While there was a factual dispute about the speed at which the SUV was moving when S.M. jumped out, it is not for us to resolve. (See People v. Ramirez, supra,13 Cal.5th at p. 1118; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278 [“our task is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might ‘ “ ‘be reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s innocence’ ” ’ ”].) There was sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant’s movement increased the risk of harm from S.M.’s foreseeable attempt to escape. (See People v. Perkins, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 468 [jury may consider “the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape” in evaluating the asportation element].) Moreover, S.M. actually sustained injuries from her escape, including a laceration on her head and abrasions throughout her body. Further, the jury could have inferred that the point at which S.M. jumped out of the SUV, a dark residential area with no one in sight, was in a different environment from that of the intersection by the grocery store or gas station. (People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 169 [“Where movement changes the victim’s environment, it does not have to be great in distance to be substantial.”].) Based on the totality of the circumstances present here, the jury could reasonably have concluded the movement was substantial in character.

Defendant’s reliance on People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590 is misplaced. There, the defendant approached a 16-year-old victim and her friend as they were walking on the sidewalk to a bus stop. (Id. at p. 594.) During a five-minute attack, the defendant forcibly moved the victim from the sidewalk to the middle of the street, a distance the parties estimated to be about 10 feet. (Id. at pp. 594, 598.) The Ellis court concluded there was insufficient evidence of asportation, noting the movement did not appreciably change the victim’s surrounding environment. (Id. at p. 600.) The court first determined the movement from the sidewalk to the middle of the street did not decrease the likelihood of detection since both were in public view and observed by nearby patrons. (Id. at p. 599.) The court further determined the victim’s movement into the middle of the street did not enhance defendant’s opportunities to commit additional crimes. (Ibid.) Finally, although recognizing an inherent danger in being in the middle of the street, the court determined that danger, standing alone, did not make the movement substantial, especially considering there was no street traffic during the attack. (Ibid.)

Here, by contrast, although the measurement of S.M.’s movement was not as clear, the jury could reasonably have determined defendant moved S.M. roughly one mile based on the evidence presented at trial. Further, unlike in People v. Ellis, the jury here could reasonably have concluded the movement appreciably changed S.M.’s surrounding since S.M. was moved from an intersection with a business establishment to a dark residential area. Moreover, the jury could have concluded S.M.’s movement to the residential area decreased the likelihood of detection since, when S.M. yelled for help, no one was around. The circumstances in People v. Ellis are factually distinguishable from the instant record and sufficient for us to reach the opposite conclusion.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant moved S.M. a substantial distance sufficient to support his kidnapping conviction.

2. Lesser Included Offense

A. Additional Background

At his retrial, after the close of evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1. (See § 1118.1 [“In a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.”].)

In his motion, defendant argued insufficient evidence supported both counts. Defendant first noted that when there is uncontested evidence of asportation, a defendant is either guilty of kidnapping or guilty of no crime, and there is no duty to instruct on false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of kidnapping. Defendant observed that in People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 816, the “[e]vidence of asportation was not substantially questioned and the evidence permitted only acquittal or conviction of kidnapping.” Defendant then argued: “Just as in Camden, there is no possibility of false imprisonment in this case when the alleged victim was prevented from leaving a moving vehicle which she entered consensually. It is either a kidnapping or no crime. There was no substantial evidence offered by either party to support any claim of false imprisonment as a result of any action done by [defendant] other than by use of a moving vehicle.”

The trial court addressed the motion at a hearing on March 18, 2024. After taking arguments from the parties, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for acquittal of the false imprisonment count. In doing so, the trial court noted “the thrust of [Camden] is detention during the move is not false imprisonment ….” The matter proceeded to trial on the sole count of kidnapping on count 1 and the great bodily injury enhancement.

B. Analysis

Defendant contends double jeopardy principles barred his kidnapping conviction because he had already been acquitted of the count of false imprisonment. The People disagree, noting the different elements of the offenses and the trial court’s findings. We agree with the People’s conclusion that the trial court’s acquittal of the false imprisonment count did not bar prosecution of the kidnapping count.

False imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 420; People v. Apo (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 790, 796 [“the crime of false imprisonment is necessarily included in the crime of kidnap[p]ing”].)

“The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution provide that a person may not be twice placed ‘in jeopardy’ for the ‘same offense.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 103.) “ ‘The double jeopardy bar protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or conviction, and also protects against multiple punishment for the same offense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 103–104.) “Although some differences in application arise, both federal and California law generally treat greater and lesser included offenses as the ‘same offense’ for purposes of double jeopardy.” (Id. at p. 104.) “The court’s legal determination on the question of former jeopardy is a question of law that we review de novo.” (People v. Sanchez (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 961, 976.)

Noting false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping, defendant argues the trial court’s acquittal of the lesser included offense barred his conviction of the greater offense. We are not persuaded. Although the chronology of the proceedings shows the jury convicted defendant of kidnapping two days after the trial court acquitted defendant of false imprisonment, the conviction did not occur in a subsequent prosecution for double jeopardy purposes. (See People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 95 [“ ‘The proscription against multiple prosecution does not apply where there has been but one prosecution, i.e., a single criminal action; it prohibits only a subsequent prosecution for the same act or omission, which, of course, means the filing and pressing of a new criminal action.’ ”].) Defendant’s conviction on the kidnapping count occurred within the same prosecution as the acquittal of the false imprisonment count. (See People v. Garcia (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1056, 1067 [double jeopardy “has no application where there is one prosecution involving multiple offenses”].) As such, we agree with the People that defendant’s false imprisonment acquittal did not affect his kidnapping conviction.⁶

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HILL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

FAIN, J.*