F089025_20250827

Filed 8/27/25 In re Grimes CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Jennifer O. Trimble, Judge.

Kojo H. Moore for Petitioner.

Nicole A. Silveira, District Attorney, Thomas M. Pfeiff, Deputy District Attorney; Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Jenna M. Anderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

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In December 2024, Reginald Grimes, Jr. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court challenging two trial court orders—the first one increasing his bail from $500,000 to $1,000,000, and the other one ordering him detained without bail. A different panel of this court summarily denied the petition. Grimes then petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court. In May 2025, the Supreme Court granted Grimes’s petition for review and transferred the case to this court with directions to vacate the summary denial order and issue an order to show cause to the Merced County Sheriff’s Office why Grimes should not be granted a new bail hearing on the basis that the trial court did not comply with In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135 (Humphrey) when making its detention order. We have since complied with the Supreme Court’s directions and received further briefing from the parties.

We conclude Grimes is entitled to relief on the ground that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements laid out in Humphrey. We accordingly vacate the detention order and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to hold a new hearing consistent with Humphrey. We decline Grimes’s request to be immediately released from custody and express no opinion on his entitlement to bail or any other relief.

BACKGROUND

I. Superior court proceedings

Petitioner Reginald Grimes, Jr. was arrested on August 5, 2024,¹ for an attempted murder allegedly committed that day. At jail booking, his bail was set at $500,000. He posted the $500,000 bail the next day.

The prosecution filed a complain`t September 6 charging Grimes with willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,² §§ 664/187, subd. (a)). The complaint also alleged enhancements and sentencing factors in aggravation.

With the complaint, the prosecutor filed a declaration asking for bail to be increased to $1,000,000. The prosecutor asserted, “Because the complaint now alleges that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated, the crime now carries a prison sentence of life plus 4 years. Based upon the charges as now alleged, the People request an arrest warrant in the amount of $1,000,000.00, pursuant to the Merced County Superior Court Bail Schedule, and consistent with all other life cases.”

The county bail schedule states that “for all offenses … for which no presumptive bail is specified in this schedule, the presumptive bail” for “all life sentences” shall be $1,000,000. At the same time, the bail schedule specifies that the presumptive bail amount for “attempted murder”—which is noted as sections “664/187”—is $500,000. The bail schedule does not distinguish between attempted first and second degree murder.

On September 10, the trial court entered an order issuing a warrant which increased Grimes’s bail to $1,000,000. Grimes posted the $1,000,000 bond and was released.³

Grimes filed a bail motion, which was heard on September 18. The day before the hearing, the prosecution filed a motion of its own to have Grimes detained without bail. The prosecution’s two-page motion represented that Grimes had been released after posting the $1,000,000 bail and asserted in conclusory fashion that Grimes should be detained without bail “[d]ue to the seriousness of the charged offense and the risk [he] poses to the public,” the victim, and the victim’s family.

Defense counsel asserted the prosecution’s motion for detention without bail was untimely and improperly served, and argued detention without bail was unwarranted as there had been “no change in circumstance[s].” The prosecutor stated that his office “filed the motion once [they] discovered that Mr. Grimes was able to post the million dollar bond.” He asserted he was requesting no bail “due to the concerns for public safety.”

Defense counsel stated that Grimes had shown up three times to court already, had no criminal history, and had ties to the community. Counsel added that Grimes had been out on bond since August 5, except for two days when he was remanded on the $1,000,000 bond before bailing out. The trial court said it was concerned about public safety, not about Grimes showing up to court. Counsel said he understood the concern and asserted the court must consider whether there are “other less restrictive means” besides detention. Counsel asserted that Grimes had complied with pretrial release conditions and had been obeying the restraining order the victim had against him. Counsel said there are “numerous other things the Court can do besides the most damaging thing of in custody,” including electronic monitoring and imposing a curfew. Counsel added that there are “a thousand things” the court could impose which Grimes would willingly abide by.

The trial court allowed the victim to address the court. The victim, S., was a martial arts instructor and Grimes used to be one of his students. One day, Grimes contacted S. and said he wanted to return to class. Grimes apologized and S. allowed him to return.⁴

Grimes arrived at the dojo on August 5 near the end of the kids’ class. Grimes spoke to some parents and a few adult students. About five minutes after class ended, while some children were still present, Grimes “lunged up behind” S. and stabbed him in the back of the head. The weapon entered his spinal column and broke vertebrae. S. collapsed onto his back, and Grimes stabbed him some more in his left arm and under his chin. Grimes then began chasing a father and son, who were able to escape. Grimes returned to S. and stabbed him four more times in the chest and abdomen. S. asked Grimes why he was doing this, and Grimes said because he heard S. “was talking about him.” Grimes left the dojo.

S. was airlifted to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery. The attack left him disfigured and caused a loss of motor control in his arm. He and his family live in fear of another surprise attack from Grimes, and he said no amount of bail would make him and his family feel safe.

After S.’s address, defense counsel said “there’s no issue of public safety,” and even if there were, “there are other less restrictive means the Court has to take into effect.” Counsel stated that Grimes is over 30 years old, has no criminal history, has community ties, and is a college graduate. He added that Grimes is receiving mental health treatment and would be negatively affected by jail. He also asserted that there were no changed circumstances since bail was increased to $1,000,000 and characterized the prosecution’s no-bail request as vindictive.

The prosecutor responded that the People’s concern was not Grimes’s coming back to court, but the safety of the victim and general public. The prosecutor asserted nothing could guarantee Grimes would comply with his mental health treatment plan.

After hearing from the parties and S., the court ordered Grimes detained without bail. The court stated, “[B]ased on information that [it had] received from the victim in this matter, I’m going to find by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions or a combination of conditions that will protect the public and the victim in this case.” The court said it was “noting the extreme injuries [and] the well thought out opportunity to attack the victim,” as well as that children were present during the attack and that Grimes reportedly went after another man and his son. The court reiterated “that there are no nonfinancial conditions that can protect the safety of the public at this time.”

Defense counsel asked if the court had “even looked into any less restrictive means.” The court responded, “I’ll note that I just said I made a finding that there were no nonfinancial conditions that would protect the safety of the public and victim in this matter.” Counsel said he did not understand “how electronic monitoring, curfew, or anything like that, any terms the Court would want to impose, would not protect the public.” The court replied, “So I don’t think I need to explain to you that if someone is on GPS monitor, if they really want to kill somebody, they certainly can.” The court added that it had made its findings and would no longer discuss the issue and then confirmed the preliminary hearing date.

The minute order for the September 18 hearing stated that the court grants the prosecution’s motion to increase bail for “[r]easons stated on the record.”

Grimes moved the trial court to reconsider its detention order, and the motion was heard on October 11. The court denied the motion, finding that although Grimes was not a flight risk due to his community ties, clear and convincing evidence showed “that there’s a substantial likelihood that his release would result in great bodily injury to [S.] or to others.” In reaching this conclusion, the court stated it considered protection of the public, S.’s safety, and the seriousness of the offense. It also found there were “no lesser or combination of conditions of restraint that will reasonably assure the safety or the public or the victim.” The court acknowledged defense counsel’s representation that the attack may have been caused by psychosis but stated that it had not been apprised of a diagnosis or treatment plan. Thus, the court could not be sure that Grimes’s mental health issues were being sufficiently addressed so as to prevent another violent incident. The court concluded by saying that Grimes’s “risk to public safety does outweigh his eligibility for bail.”

The minute order for the October 11 hearing stated that the court “makes the finding that there is no lesser combination of conditions of restraint that will reasonably assure the safety of the public or the victim. Therefore, making the no bail findings on all the information.”

On November 4, the presiding judge of the Merced County Superior Court denied Grimes’s petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the “bail orders.”⁵ The presiding judge held that Grimes must petition the Fifth District Court of Appeal for habeas relief because a superior court judge cannot “nullify” a decision made by another judge of the same court.

II. Subsequent proceedings

Grimes petitioned this court for writ of habeas corpus challenging both the order increasing his bail to $1,000,000 and the detention order. One of the stated bases for relief was that “the trial court erred in raising bail [both times] without supporting the order[s] with articulable reasons stated on the record.” We summarily denied the petition on February 27, 2025.

Grimes then petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and transferred the matter back to this court. The court ordered us to vacate our summary denial and issue an order to show cause to the Merced County Sheriff’s Department, returnable before this court, why Grimes “should not be granted a new bail hearing on the basis that the superior court did not comply with In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135 when it failed to address the feasibility of nonfinancial conditions of release with sufficient specificity to facilitate review of its detention order.”

We accordingly issued an order to show cause, directing the Sheriff to file a return and inviting Grimes to file a traverse. The Sheriff’s Department, in its return, stated it “has no objection to a new bail review hearing for [Grimes],” adding that it “takes no position on whether the Superior Court’s bail determination complied with In re Humphrey, and defers to this honorable Court’s discretion and has no opposition to an order granting petitioner a new bail review hearing consistent with applicable legal standards.” Grimes, in his traverse, argues that this court should order him released from custody without ordering a new bail review hearing.

DISCUSSION

We conclude the trial court failed to comply with Humphrey by failing to address the feasibility of nonfinancial conditions of release with sufficient specificity to facilitate review of its detention order. We accordingly direct the trial court to conduct a new bail hearing.

We begin with the relevant language of article I, section 12 of the California Constitution, which provides:

“A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for: [¶] … [¶]

“(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person, or felony sexual assault offenses on another person, when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others[.]”

“A person who falls within the article I, section 12(b) exception does not have a right to bail, yet may nonetheless be granted bail—or release on the person’s own recognizance—in the trial court’s discretion.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 469 (White).) “When making any bail determination, a superior court must undertake an individualized consideration of the relevant factors. These factors include the protection of the public as well as the victim, the seriousness of the charged offense, the arrestee’s previous criminal record and history of compliance with court orders, and the likelihood that the arrestee will appear at future court proceedings.” (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 152.) “Along with those primary considerations of victim and public safety, the court must assume the truth of the criminal charges.” (Id. at p. 153.)

A trial court’s decision to deny bail is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court’s factual findings in support of the decision are reviewed for substantial evidence and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 469–470.)

The constitutionality of bail was addressed in Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135. While that case dealt mostly with the monetary aspect of bail, it also provided guidance on what a court must consider before concluding a person accused of a crime can be detained without bail. Under Humphrey, “a trial court must first determine whether an arrestee is a flight risk or a danger to public or victim safety. If the arrestee does pose one or both of these risks, then the court should consider whether ‘nonfinancial conditions of release may reasonably protect the public and the victim or reasonably assure the arrestee’s presence at trial.’ ” (In re Brown (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 296, 305 (Brown), quoting Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154.) “Although ‘no condition of release can entirely eliminate the risk that an arrestee may harm some member of the public,’ the [Humphrey] court observed, ‘[t]he experiences of those jurisdictions that have reduced or eliminated financial conditions of release suggest that releasing arrestees under appropriate nonfinancial conditions—such as electronic monitoring, supervision by pretrial services, community housing or shelter, stay-away orders, and drug and alcohol testing and treatment [citations]—may often prove sufficient to protect the community.’ ” (Brown, at p. 305, quoting Humphrey, at p. 154, original italics.)

“Having considered potential nonfinancial conditions, if the trial court nonetheless concludes money bail is ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect the public and ensure the arrestee’s presence at trial, then bail must be ‘set at a level the arrestee can reasonably afford’ unless the court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that no nonfinancial condition in conjunction with affordable money bail can reasonably protect public safety or arrestee appearance.” (Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 305–306, quoting Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154.) These requirements ensure pretrial detention “doesn’t depend on the arrestee’s financial condition. Rather, it depends on the insufficiency of less restrictive conditions to vindicate compelling government interests: the safety of the victim and the public more generally or the integrity of the criminal proceedings.” (Humphrey, supra, at p. 143.)

“A court’s procedures for entering an order resulting in pretrial detention must also comport with other traditional notions of due process to ensure that when necessary, the arrestee is detained ‘in a fair manner.’ [Citations.] Among those fair procedures is the court’s obligation to set forth the reasons for its decision on the record and to include them in the court’s minutes. [Citation.] Such findings facilitate review of the detention order, guard against careless or rote decisionmaking, and promote public confidence in the judicial process.” (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 155–156.)

These procedures were not followed here as the trial court failed to address the feasibility of nonfinancial conditions of release with sufficient specificity to facilitate review of its detention order. At the September 18 hearing where the court made its detention order, the court concluded that it found “by a clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that will protect the public and the victim in this case.” When defense counsel stated he did not understand how electronic monitoring, a curfew, or other measures would not protect the public, the court replied that a person on a GPS monitor could still kill someone if they wanted to. The court said nothing else about the feasibility of nonfinancial conditions of release.

This comment about a person on electronic monitoring still being able to kill someone alludes to the fact that no condition of release can guarantee community or victim safety. But the Humphrey court spoke directly to this. It said, “[J]ust as neither money bail (nor any other condition or release) can guarantee that an arrestee will show up in court, no condition of release can entirely eliminate the risk that an arrestee may harm some member of the public. [Citation] In choosing between pretrial release and detention, we recognize that absolute certainty—particularly at the pretrial stage, when the trial mean to adjudicate guilty or innocence is yet to occur—will prove all but impossible. A court making these determinations should focus instead on risks to public or victim safety or to the integrity of the judicial process that are reasonably likely to occur.” (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154, italics original.) The trial court here improperly focused on the impossibility of guaranteeing victim and public safety with electronic monitoring for Grimes.

The trial court also did not explain with specificity how electronic monitoring or any other nonfinancial condition of release would insufficiently protect the public or S. Indeed, besides electronic monitoring, the court did not even mention any other nonfinancial conditions. The court noted the extreme injuries and premeditated nature of the attack, but it did not articulate its analytical process connecting these observations to its determination that all potential nonfinancial conditions of release, including those suggested by Grimes, were insufficient to protect public and S. The court also did not explain its analytical process in the minute order.

The court’s determination on Grimes’s motion for reconsideration was no different. The court found a “substantial likelihood that [Grimes’s] release would result in great bodily injury to [S.] or to others,” and found that no less restrictive means “could reasonably assure the safety of the public or the victim.” The court stated it had considered protection of the public, S.’s safety, and the seriousness of the offense in making these findings. The court added that it lacked information about Grimes’s mental health diagnosis and treatment plan and thus did not know if his issues were being sufficiently addressed so as to prevent another violent incident. So, as in the first hearing, the trial court expressed its concerns for public and victim safety but did not address any nonfinancial conditions of release, including those proposed by Grimes. The minute order for the reconsideration hearing also failed to explain the court’s analytical process.

Based on this record, we conclude the trial court did not comply with Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135 when it failed to address the feasibility of nonfinancial conditions of release with sufficient specificity to facilitate review of its detention order. (See Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 155–156.) We hold that Grimes is entitled to a new bail review hearing conducted in a manner consistent with Humphrey and its progeny. We express no opinion on Grimes’s entitlement to bail or any other relief.

DISPOSITION

Relief is granted to Grimes on the ground that the trial court failed to comply with Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135 in making its detention order.  Accordingly, the detention order is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to

hold a new bail hearing consistent with Humphrey, supra, Cal.5th 135 and its progeny.  All other requests for relief are denied, including Grimes’s request for immediate release from custody.

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

FAIN, J.⁶