Statutory Citations

. . .” (§ 6110, subd. (c)(1).) Robert tries to avoid the witness requirement by relying on Section 6110, subdivision (c)(2), which was added in 2008 (Stats. 2008, ch. 53, § 1), presumably in response to the Supreme Court’s recognition that California had not yet “adopted a ‘harmless error’ provision similar to Uniform Probate Code section 2-503.” (Estate of Saueressig (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1045, 1053.) To be sure, the 2008 amendment gives effect to an unwitnessed will “if the proponent of the wil...

The statute is “the same in substance as Section 2-507 of the Uniform Probate Code (1987).” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 53 West Ann. Code Prob. Code (2022 ed.) foll. § 6120, p. 197; accord § 2, subd. (b) [where Probate Code adopts Uniform Probate Code, it “shall be so construed as to effectuate the general purpose to make uniform the law . . . .”].) The official comments to Uniform Probate Code section 2-507 note that revocation by act requires something be “done to the” will: “Revocation o...

te the Beneficiaries’ various shares, and prepare the trust assets for distribution to the Beneficiaries.12 12 Appellants’ petition raises other arguments regarding issues not decided in the order on appeal and already finally determined by the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision (for example, whether beneficiaries should be disinherited under the no contest clause, or whether the old version of the Probate Code section 21 C. Unauthorized Practice of Law Trustees represent themselves. Beneficiaries...

amily Code).”5 (See Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 921.) Thus, the intestacy provisions of the Probate Code defining natural parentage explicitly “incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood.” (Scott v. 5 The substance of this provision has been part of California probate law on intestate succession since California adopted the UPA in 1975. It was first enacted as former Probate Code section 25, subdivision (d). (Stats. 1975, ch. 1244, § 25.) In 1983, it became part of for...

Appellant was obliged to surrender these payments to the conservatorship estate. Thus, there was a 7 special relationship between appellant and Norma that warranted the order compelling appellant to account for the pension checks and rental income. Second, the court did not err because there was a fiduciary relationship between appellant and Norma. Probate Code section 39 provides: “‘Fiduciary’ means . . . attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney . . . .” In 2008 Norma appointed appellant a...

that Soloway became the representative of Lewis’s estate upon accepting her appointment as trustee, Kenton acknowledges that Soloway declined to join as a plaintiff in prosecuting the elder abuse claim. Pursuant to section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(1)(c) and (d)(2), when a representative refuses to maintain an action, the right to prosecute may pass to any “interested person” within the meaning of Probate Code section 48, such as a “beneficiary” or “any other person having a property right in ...

4 Richard fails to include a statement of appealability in either of his opening appellate briefs. We exercise our discretion under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(B) to disregard Richard’s non-compliance in this instance. 6 Richard, in his capacity as a beneficiary of the Bennett Trust (and thus an interested party pursuant to Probate Code section 48), responded to Tukes’s petition with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The probate court granted Richard’s motion but gave Tu...

o not foreclose the possibility the language of section 1820 could be ambiguous in some factual circumstances not presented here, it not ambiguous on this record. There is thus no room for us to “ ‘ “rewrite the law or give [its] words an effect different from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” ’ ” (Peake, at p. 443.) 6 Hankin argues two “Law Revision Commissioners” told him “Probate Code § 48 [defining an interested person] did not govern Probate Code § 1820.” (Italics omitted.)...

McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615, 633–634; Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1320.) The tenants point to decisions supposedly establishing that “a trust has the capacity to own property.”7 To be sure, some cases, including the two the 7 The tenants also argue that because Probate Code section 56 defines 7 tenants cite, have made general references to trusts “owning” property. (Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M. Ross Law Group, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 196, 208; T...

to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos.” (Ibid.) The Hecht court similarly concluded “that at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction. Such interest is sufficient to constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of Probate Code section 62. Accordingly, the probate court had jurisdiction with respect to the vials...

The court reached this conclusion even though the state constitution imposes on public pension system boards a “fiduciary responsibility” over the fund’s assets and declares those assets to be “trust funds” held to provide benefits to the system’s participants. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17, subd. (a).) As shown by Probate Code section 82’s exclusion of pension funds and other trust relationships from the Trust Law, “simply because something is referred to as a ‘trust’ or as a ‘trust fund,’ ev...

As a result, Hanako died intestate with respect to her community property assets. Under Probate Code sections 100 and 6401, Hanako’s interest in those assets passed to William as the surviving spouse.5 Any prior actions taken by William with respect to those assets are irrelevant because he is legally entitled to them. 5 Probate Code section 100, subdivision (a) provides: “Upon the death of a person who is married or in a registered domestic partnership, one-half of the community property bel...

ant to section 144, subdivision (a), if a court determines either: “(1) The waiver at the time of signing made a fair and reasonable disposition of the rights of the surviving spouse”; or “(2) The surviving spouse had, or reasonably should have had, an adequate knowledge of the property and financial obligations of the decedent[.]”7 The MSA Is a Complete Property Settlement Within the Meaning of Probate Code Section 145 Freeman contends that the MSA is not a “complete” property settlement bec...

ath an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of the gametic material for reproduction.” (Id. at pp. 1030–1031.) Thus, it was proper to “[use] the intent of the donor to determine the disposition of gametic material upon the donor’s death.” (Id. at p. 1031.) The court concluded its holding was consistent with statutory law. It noted that Probate Code section 249.5 permits a child conceived and born following the death of a decedent to...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents . 2 The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong ...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents. The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter’s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong sta...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents. The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong sta...

Courts of Appeal, and divisions thereof, are empowered to reconsider and in the appropriate case disapprove of or overrule prior decisions of those courts. (See, e.g., *Estate of Sapp* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9 [overruling decision by prior panel of the same court after determining the decision wrongly interpreted the term mismanagement [under former Probate Code section 521] for purposes of removing a personal representative of an estate ]; *Saucedo v. Mercury Sav*. & Loan Assn. (...

Courts of Appeal, and divisions thereof, are empowered to reconsider and in the appropriate case disapprove of or overrule prior decisions of those courts. (See, e.g., *Estate of Sapp* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9 [overruling decision by prior panel of the same court after determining the decision wrongly interpreted the term mismanagement [under former Probate Code section 521] for purposes of removing a personal representative of an estate ]; *Saucedo v. Mercury Sav*. & Loan Assn. (...

Zurich determined it had a duty to appear and defend the named 2 While named as a defendant, the Miller Estate “is a legal fiction – the defendant[s] [are] actually the insurers, Zurich and Allianz [Insurance Company]. [Citation.] Because . . . an ‘estate’ may not be sued . . . , [u]nder Probate Code § 550 . . . a plaintiff may directly sue an insurance company by naming [as defendant] . . . ‘Estate of [Insured]’ and then serving the insurer directly. Judgment against an estate under this sec...

nt lien expired because a certified copy of the renewal application was not recorded while the lien was still in effect\].) Unless a judgment has been timely renewed, on expiration of the 10-year enforcement period any judgment liens based on the judgment are automatically extinguished. (§ 683.020; see Starcevic v. Pentech Financial Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 365, 381 (Starcevic).) 2. Probate Code Section 686.020 of the Enforcement of Judgments Law states, “After the death of the ju...

or standing to seek a restraining order under the Elder Abuse Act without first rebutting the presumption that George had capacity to make decisions such as retaining Herren. Relatedly, she argues the trial court was powerless to consider the restraining order request without first adjudicating George’s competence. In so contending, Herren relies principally on Probate Code sections 810 and 811. Probate Code section 810, subdivision (a), provides: “For purposes of this part, there shall exist...

or standing to seek a restraining order under the Elder Abuse Act without first rebutting the presumption that George had capacity to make decisions such as retaining Herren. Relatedly, she argues the trial court was powerless to consider the restraining order request without first adjudicating George’s competence. In so contending, Herren relies principally on Probate Code sections 810 and 811. Probate Code section 810, subdivision (a), provides: “For purposes of this part, there shall exist...

Susan1 contends the family court erred in denying her motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Family Code section 2122, subdivisions (c) and (d),2 based on duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution proceeding. As the court acknowledged, the Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress. However, with respect to mental incapacity, we find guidance in Probate Code section 810, which governs an individual’s ability to make decisions regarding the person’s assets, medical op...

. . shall be supported by evidence of a deficit in at least one of the following mental functions [(alertness and attention, information processing, thought processes, ability to modulate mood and affect)], . . . and evidence of a correlation between the deficit or deficits and the decision or acts in question.” Probate Code section 811 further provides: “The mere diagnosis of a mental or physical disorder shall not be sufficient in and of itself to support a determination that a person is of...

. . shall be supported by evidence of a deficit in at least one of the following mental functions [(alertness and attention, information processing, thought processes, ability to modulate mood and affect)], . . . and evidence of a correlation between the deficit or deficits and the decision or acts in question.” Probate Code section 811 further provides: “The mere diagnosis of a mental or physical disorder shall not be sufficient in and of itself to support a determination that a person is of...

der subdivision (c), a determination that a person “suffers from one or more mental deficits so substantial that, under the circumstances, the person should be deemed to lack the legal capacity to perform a specific act, should be based on evidence of a deficit in one or more of the person’s mental functions rather than on a diagnosis of a person’s mental or physical disorder.” (Id., subd. (c).) Probate Code section 811, subdivision (a), enumerates 18 mental functions relevant to a determinat...

C. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining Royals’s Demurrer to Lu’s Cross-petition In December 2019, Lu filed a demurrer to Royals’s petition arguing that, as pleaded, the first claim in the petition seeking return of trust assets fails to state a cause of action under Probate Code section 850, and that the prayer for punitive damages does not plead facts sufficient to constitute oppression, fraud or malice as required by Civil Code section 3294. Along with her demurrer, Lu also filed a motion t...

e court’s termination of the temporary conservatorship of her estate, former conservatee Cynthia Parker filed a “Petition for Return of Property; for Declaratory Relief” requesting all communications and documents concerning the administration of the conservatorship estate from professional fiduciary Kim Schwarcz, the temporary conservator. The petition for return of property was made pursuant to Probate Code section 850 1, which allows for the filing of various petitions to recover property ...

Hinojosa & Forer, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for Respondent Jackson Chen. McBride Law Group and Julia C. McBride for Respondents Helena Chang Chui and Ruth Chang. ________________________________ In proceedings under the Probate Code concerning the administration of a trust, the co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 2 alleging that Christine Chui misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. On the day s...

The court relied on the same actions in support of its findings on both the elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The court awarded the value of the property misappropriated by Jon and damages pursuant to section 859 on the ground that Asaro had “succeed[ed] on his claim under Probate Code section 850 requiring Jon to return to the estate the assets he stole from 28 Antoinette.”15 Thus, any errors were harmless because they did not result in the award of any additional damages. (Se...

In addition to particularly describing the property, the publication shall describe the property by giving its street address, if any, or 7 Humphrey’s response to this contention is not particularly helpful. He merely cites Shaw v. Palmer (1924) 65 Cal.App. 441 for the proposition that the probate court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to try title. (Id. at p. 447.) The enactment of Probate Code section 850 legislatively overruled Shaw on this point. (See generally Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice G...

aint, Caroline argued that portions of the complaint should be stricken as including “irrelevant, false and improper matters.” Nationstar joined in Caroline’s motion to strike citing the same grounds. Leslie opposed Respondents’ motions to strike. She argued that she had a right to file a partition action as a tenant in common to the property and an estate beneficiary. She further contended that Probate Code section 850 authorized her to file the partition action, along with related causes of...

. 5 B. The Farkas Probate Proceeding Attorneys, on behalf of McLaughlin as administrator of the Farkas Estate, filed a petition for probate in January 2014. On May 12, 2016, Attorneys filed a “Petition to Establish Estate’s Claim of Ownership and for Order Directing its Transfer to Estate Pursuant to Probate Code Section 850.” McLaughlin alleged that at the time of his death, “[Farkas] held a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress with respect to the dirt road . . . located within [Parc...

. 5 B. The Farkas Probate Proceeding Attorneys, on behalf of McLaughlin as administrator of the Farkas Estate, filed a petition for probate in January 2014. On May 12, 2016, Attorneys filed a “Petition to Establish Estate’s Claim of Ownership and for Order Directing its Transfer to Estate Pursuant to Probate Code Section 850.” McLaughlin alleged that at the time of his death, “[Farkas] held a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress with respect to the dirt road . . . located within [Parc...

While the court recognized that sections 850 and 855 authorized certain matters to be filed in a probate proceeding that would otherwise proceed in a civil action, the court determined that Leslie’s complaint “does not clearly resemble in material part a petition under Probate Code section 850, which is the gateway for invoking Probate Code section 855 as a vehicle to include causes of action normally raised in a civil action in a probate proceeding.” Even if the court liberally construed the...

Kenton appeals the trial court’s order granting Hilja’s motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) and dismissing the action. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of elder financial abuse (part A.1.b of Discussion, post) and conclude that Probate Code section 859 authorizes an award of double damages for the commission of elder financial abuse without a separate finding of...

(b)(1)), caused the plaintiff to suffer certain losses (id., subd. (b)(2)), and how vulnerable the protected person was relative to other members of the public based on their poor physical or mental health (id., subd. (b)(3)). 4 general prayer for relief on all causes of action she included a demand under Probate Code section 859 4 for double the value of her compensatory damages. B. Application for a Writ of Attachment On the same day Royals filed her petition, she applied for a pretrial wri...

his fiduciary duties under 4 The probate court found that William “brought his Castro Valley residence into [the] marriage with Hanako, and at no time did Hanako express an intent to exert testamentary control over this real property.” The court later confirmed the residence “as community property, with Hanako’s interest passing to [William] at her death.” 7 sections 721 and 1101 and Probate Code section 859. William later withdrew his claim as to the Goleta property. Following the evidentiar...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents . 2 The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong ...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents. The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter’s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong sta...

The court found that Benjamin used undue influence to get mother to amend the trust and deed the family home to him and that mother lacked the requisite capacity to execute those documents. The court deemed Benjamin to have predeceased mother under Probate Code section 259 and found him liable for double damages under Probate Code section 859. Benjamin appeals. Without a reporter s transcript of the trial, he contends the court: (1) incorrectly interpreted the trust; (2) applied the wrong sta...

1390.) We are not persuaded that these cases’ reasoning is inapplicable in the probate estate context, at least on the points for which we cite them. 10 The damages may not, however, overlap entirely with sums that are recoverable by the estate. For example, section 15657.5 includes a mandatory award of attorney fees to a plaintiff who proves financial elder abuse. Also, Probate Code section 859 provides for an award of double damages in at least some financial elder abuse cases. (See Keading...

(Estate of Ashlock (Mar. 14, 2019, F074969) [nonpub. opn.] (Ashlock I).) We later affirmed an award of attorney fees. (Estate of Ashlock (May 3, 2019, F076941) [nonpub. opn.] (Ashlock II).) Stacey now appeals from a judgment entered in a bifurcated proceeding on issues of damages and remedies. The monetary portion of the judgment exceeds $11 million. Stacey was found liable under Probate Code section 859, which imposes a penalty of “twice the value of the property recovered” in certain action...

The first petition was filed on April 26, 2011, by the appellants in this matter, Everett Earle Pearce, Jr., and Flora Geraldene Crawford (collectively, Pearce Parties), and was entitled “Petition to Determine Title to Property and Compel its Return and Transfer to Court Appointed Personal Representative of Ruth L. Briggs; Double Damages Under Probate Code § 859.” The Pearce Parties supplemented the petition on July 25, 2011 and September 14, 2011. The probate court granted a motion for judgm...

Christopher appeals from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court sitting in probate (the “probate court”) entered on December 15, 2021, in connection with an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 (unnecessary capitalization omitted) brought by respondent Kathy Pool-O’Connor (Kathy) and joined in by respondents Rachelle Lapham (Rachelle) and Sharon Whiteside (S...

These distinctions also mean we need not pass on whether those cases were properly decided, or entirely correct in all their particulars. Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 did not involve Government Code section 818 or a treble damages provision. It instead addressed whether the double damages authorized under Probate Code section 859 for the improper taking, concealment, or disposal of a vulnerable person’s property were a kind of punitive or exemplary damages that, pursuant...

of trust provisions, compelling the trustee to provide an accounting, removing and replacing the trustee — and section 850 — identifying persons authorized to file petitions requesting court orders. The same day McDonald filed the petition, he notified Goebner of a March 14, 2024 hearing to determine his claim to the property. Two days before the hearing, Goebner filed a demurrer — “Pursuant to Probate Code section 1000, and sections 430.10, et seq., of the California Code of Civil Procedure”...

831.) Maria distinguishes Elliott because it involved the survivability of a cause of action when the beneficiary died while the action was pending. The Elliott court’s legal interpretation of former section 573 applies to both of its two successors in the Code of Civil Procedure, sections 377.20 and 377.30, regarding survivability and commencement of actions respectively. 4 Probate Code section 1000 states: “Except to the extent that [the Probate Code] provides applicable rules, the rules of...

Herren objected to the continuance of the temporary restraining orders, contending that she could speak on George’s behalf, that George would disagree with the restraining order requests, and that he would agree with Gabriella’s request allowing contact. Herren requested appointment of a guardian ad litem for George pursuant to Probate Code section 1003. The court denied that request without prejudice. Though case 2765 and case 2766 were not consolidated, at the parties’ request, the court to...

Herren objected to the continuance of the temporary restraining orders, contending that she could speak on George’s behalf, that George would disagree with the restraining order requests, and that he would agree with Gabriella’s request allowing contact. Herren requested appointment of a guardian ad litem for George pursuant to Probate Code section 1003. The court denied that request without prejudice. Though case 2765 and case 2766 were not consolidated, at the parties’ request, the court to...

(Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then the c...

(*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (*Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then t...

(*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (*Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then t...

(*Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006.) We review any pure issues of law de novo. (*Roberts v. United Health Care Services, Inc.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 149.) II\. The Court Erred by Considering Jodee’s Objections The Probate Code addresses objections such as the ones at issue here. Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then t...

bute to legislative oversight the absence of any provision authorizing the court to utilize Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30 if personal service in a restraining order case has proved unsuccessful. Probate Code section 1215 provides for service of notices and other papers in probate proceedings through delivery by mail or personal delivery (and by electronic delivery with consent). However, Probate Code section 1212 expressly directs the court to section 413.30 and authorizes alternativ...

Provisions of the Probate Code make clear that we cannot simply attribute to legislative oversight the absence of any provision authorizing the court to utilize Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30 if personal service in a restraining order case has proved unsuccessful. Probate Code section 1215 provides for service of notices and other papers in probate proceedings through delivery by mail or personal delivery (and by electronic delivery with consent). However, Probate Code section 1212 ex...

probate court often persist for long periods of time and may encompass many separate disputes between different parties, each with its own dispositive motion or trial and resulting order. As a result, there is no “final judgment” to serve as the bedrock concept of appealability in probate court. 4 Instead, the Probate Code makes certain specific categories of orders appealable. Probate Code section 1300 lists categories of appealable 3 orders in all probate court proceedings. Sections 1301 th...

v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) But first we address Arturo and Sonia s contention that this appeal was not taken from an appealable order. A. The Probate Court s Order Was Appealable An appeal may be taken from any order made appealable by the Probate Code. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(10); Boys & Girls Club of *Petaluma v. Walsh* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1057.) Probate Code section 1304, subdivision (a), provides that any final order under Probate Code section 17200...

of the lack of findings when applying the statutes at issue here and the limited information before the trial court at the time judgment was entered, we must remand for additional inquiry and entry of findings. B. Adequacy of the Inquiry Father argues the ICWA inquiry was inadequate here because there was no documented inquiry of extended family members. He points to Family Code section 177 and Probate Code section 1459.5, which require the court to apply certain inquiry and notice requiremen...

of the lack of findings when applying the statutes at issue here and the limited information before the trial court at the time judgment was entered, we must remand for additional inquiry and entry of findings. B. Adequacy of the Inquiry Father argues the ICWA inquiry was inadequate here because there was no documented inquiry of extended family members. He points to Family Code section 177 and Probate Code section 1459.5, which require the court to apply certain inquiry and notice requiremen...

4. Thomas’s right to independent counsel. Defendants contend that their assistance in asserting Thomas’s civil and testamentary rights cannot be restrained by EAROs to prevent them from seeking a judicial determination that will resolve the very issue raised by the EAROs. In support of this contention, they argue that (1) the recent amendment to Probate Code section 1471 (Stats. 2021, ch. 417, § 6, eff. Jan. 1, 2022)—which empowers them to act as Thomas’s independent counsel—overrules this co...

(§ 217, subd. (a); see generally In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 839-840 [discussing legislative history of § 217].) A guardianship proceeding is not a proceeding under the Family Code. Rather, it a proceeding under the Probate Code — specifically, Probate Code section 1500 et seq. Harber has not pointed to any similar provision that would apply in a guardianship proceeding, and we have found none. We therefore conclude that the pretrial order did not conflict with section ...

S.H.R. stated in the petition that Rivas has been caring for him “since he arrived [in] the United States” and has provided him with “shelter, food, and other vital necessities.” The guardianship, he asserted, “will promote stability for [him] as he adjusts to life in 2 The appointment of a guardian under Probate Code section 1510.1 and the judicial findings described in section 155 do not guarantee USCIS’s consent to SIJ status. (See Reyes v. Cissna (4th Cir. 2018) 737 Fed.Appx. 140, 146 [US...

S.H.R. stated in the petition that Rivas has been caring for him “since he arrived [in] the United States” and has provided him with “shelter, food, and other vital necessities.” The guardianship, he asserted, “will promote stability for [him] as he adjusts to life in 2 The appointment of a guardian under Probate Code section 1510.1 and the judicial findings described in section 155 do not guarantee USCIS’s consent to SIJ status. (See Reyes v. Cissna (4th Cir. 2018) 737 Fed.Appx. 140, 146 [US...

(a)(1).) From its enactment, section 155 has provided that, on request, a court “shall issue” an order containing SIJ predicate findings if “there is evidence to support those findings.” (§ 155, subd. (b)(1).) The Legislature has since acted to facilitate the issuance of SIJ predicate findings to California’s immigrant children in several ways. The 2015 enactment of Probate Code section 1510.1 aligned California law with federal law by authorizing courts to “appoint a guardian of the person f...

But Code of Civil Procedure section 909 also mandates it shall be liberally construed where a cause may be disposed of in a single appeal. That is the case here where the interests of justice do not require a new trial or further hearings in the trial court. This is an appeal from an order terminating parental rights of both parents pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5.2 We determine that the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is appropriate based on additional evidence whi...

But Code of Civil Procedure section 909 also mandates it shall be liberally construed where a cause may be disposed of in a single appeal. That is the case here where the interests of justice do not require a new trial or further hearings in the trial court. This is an appeal from an order terminating parental rights of both parents pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5.2 We determine that the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is appropriate based on additional evidence whi...

The trial court held a contested hearing in December 2021, during which father and other relatives testified. The court did not ask about possible Indian heritage or otherwise address the issue during the hearing. The court indicated it would consider the 1 The maternal great-grandfather passed away in 2016. 2 petition under both Family Code section 7822 (abandonment) and Probate Code section 1516.5 (best interests). The trial court issued a tentative written ruling in January 2022 granting t...

The trial court held a contested hearing in December 2021, during which father and other relatives testified. The court did not ask about possible Indian heritage or otherwise address the issue during the hearing. The court indicated it would consider the 1 The maternal great-grandfather passed away in 2016. 2 petition under both Family Code section 7822 (abandonment) and Probate Code section 1516.5 (best interests). The trial court issued a tentative written ruling in January 2022 granting t...

(See Estate of Emery (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 22, 25−26; accord, Estate of Lacy (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 172, 185.)10 Although we have not been referred to a case in which a minor ward has petitioned for removal of his or her guardian ad litem, we find support for such a rule in the provisions of the Guardianship-Conservatorship Law. (Prob. Code, § 1400 et seq.) Probate Code section 1601 provides for the removal of a guardian 10 We note that Chen successfully petitioned the trial court to remove Chr...

916). 17 694, 735 [“[d]efendant’s cursing and disruptive actions displayed an unwillingness to assist in his defense, but did not necessarily bear on his competence to do so”]; see also In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 916 [“[i]n a dependency proceeding, a juvenile court should appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent if the requirements of either Probate Code section 1801 [standards for appointment of conservator] or Penal Code section 1367 [standards for finding criminal defendant me...

(People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 805 [“[w]eight” in relation to evidence “describes the degree to which the jury [or fact finder] finds the evidence probative”].) 26 mean preponderance of the evidence by implicitly incorporating only the cases identified in Chamberlain and Ettinger. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011 [interpreting Probate Code section 1801, Legislature not “regarded as having implicitly incorporated th[e] judicially created rule [that the standard o...

(People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 805 [“[w]eight” in relation to evidence “describes the degree to which the jury [or fact finder] finds the evidence probative”].) 26 mean preponderance of the evidence by implicitly incorporating only the cases identified in Chamberlain and Ettinger. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011 [interpreting Probate Code section 1801, Legislature not “regarded as having implicitly incorporated th[e] judicially created rule [that the standard o...

t a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s orders without regard to prejudice.” (Id. at p. 915.) The substantial evidence standard requires that the juvenile court find by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is incompetent under either Probate Code section 1801 or Penal Code section 1367. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 66...

1995, ch. 842, § 7, p. 6410). Respondents argue that we should defer to this expectation in interpreting the requirement of clear and convincing evidence found in Probate Code section 1801, subdivision (e). This argument is not persuasive. Respondents fail to identify anything within the text or legislative history of Probate Code section 1801 affirmatively establishing that the Legislature believed the clear and convincing standard of proof should be ignored by an appellate court reviewing a...

. . .” Court-appointed counsel expressed concerns regarding certain expenditures listed in the accounting and requested Yen be removed as conservator. He noted the court investigator had similar concerns and had recommended the court not approve the accounting. Counsel noted Yen (1) could not serve as conservator if she were also a creditor of the conservatee under Probate Code section 1820, subdivision (c) , (2) was financially conflicted from serving as conservator, and (3) interfered with ...

. . .” Court-appointed counsel expressed concerns regarding certain expenditures listed in the accounting and requested Yen be removed as conservator. He noted the court investigator had similar concerns and had recommended the court not approve the accounting. Counsel noted Yen (1) could not serve as conservator if she were also a creditor of the conservatee under Probate Code section 1820, subdivision (c), (2) was financially conflicted from serving as conservator, and (3) interfered with c...

. . .” Court-appointed counsel expressed concerns regarding certain expenditures listed in the accounting and requested Yen be removed as conservator. He noted the court investigator had similar concerns and had recommended the court not approve the accounting. Counsel noted Yen (1) could not serve as conservator if she were also a creditor of the conservatee under Probate Code section 1820, subdivision (c), (2) was financially conflicted from serving as conservator, and (3) interfered with c...

Zetjian for Objector and Respondent. ____________________ Marc B. Hankin appeals a probate court order granting judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. 1 Hankin also appeals the court’s imposition of $5,577 in sanctions. In this appeal, we consider who is authorized by Probate Code section 1820 to petition for the appointment of conservators and whether the trial court correctly concluded Hankin was not so authorized in th...

Indeed, such a conclusion would run afoul of the notice rules incorporated into the LPS Act. (See § 5350 [procedures under chapter 3 of LPS Act “shall be the same as” under Division 4 (commencing with § 1400) of Probate Code, except as otherwise provided in § 5350].) As relevant here, Probate Code section 1822, subdivision (a), provides that notice must be given “[a]t least 15 days court may, on its own motion, accept or reject the petition to reestablish the conservatorship. (§ 5362, subd. (...

(Prob. Code, § 1828(a)(6), italics added.) Taking guidance from the California Supreme Court in Blackburn, we conclude this language reflects a legislative intent to “judicially ensure” the proposed conservatee has knowledge of his or her right to a jury trial. (See Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) Probate Code section 1823 requires that the clerk serve a citation that includes, among other information, that “the proposed conservatee has the right to a jury trial if desired.” (Prob. ...

portunity to examine the biological parents, caregivers, or investigators, and that the conservatorship order violates the American with Disabilities Act (42 USC § 12101 et seq.). We do not reach those 7 issues because section 1825 required that A.E. consent to the appointment of the proposed conservator or a showing had to be made that A.E. was unable or unwilling to attend the hearing.4 “Probate Code section 1825(a)(3)’s procedure pertaining to a proposed conservatee’s production and attend...

B. s argument is also unavailing for the reasons asserted by the Public Guardian. As the Public Guardian notes, the procedure for establishing, administering, and terminating LPS conservatorship is the same as for conservatorship under Division Four the Probate Code except as otherwise provided in the LPS Act. ( 5350.) And the Public Guardian points out, Probate Code section 1827 states: The court shall hear and determine the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship according to the...

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1244 [trial court erred in accepting waiver of jury trial by conservatee’s 3 Section 5350 of the LPS Act incorporates the procedures for the establishment, administration, and termination of a conservatorship in the Probate Code. Probate Code section 1827 provides for a right to a jury trial; section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), requires the court to “inform the proposed conservatee,” among other things, of his or her right “to have the matter of the establishment of...

. L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 147–149, 156.) In reaching its decision in John L., the California Supreme Court emphasized the civil nature of an LPS proceeding. “In providing that the procedure set forth in division 4 of the Probate Code shall apply in establishing LPS conservatorships absent a statutory 7 conflict, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 plainly requires the operation of Probate Code section 1827, which provides in full: ‘The court shall hear and determine the matter of ...

(a)(1); Prop. 83, §§ 27, 28, enacted in 1967, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 governing the appointment of conservators. (See Stats. 1967, ch. 1667, pp. 4093-4094.) Under the LPS Act, section 5350 incorporates the procedures for a conservatorship under the Probate Code, as it did in 1967. (Stats. 1967, ch. 1667, pp. 4093-4094.) Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), provides in turn that the court must inform the proposed conservatee of his or her right to a trial...

rs Under the LPS Act “LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed conservatee.” (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383; see Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).)4 Generally, with respect to civil commitments, the failure of a court to obtain a valid jury trial waiver where required by statute 4 Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), which is incorporated into the LPS Act by Welfare and Ins...

[¶] (2) Court or jury trial shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand . . . . [¶] (3) This right shall also apply in subsequent proceedings to reestablish conservatorship.” (§ 5350.) Division 4 of the Probate Code–incorporated by reference into section 5350– includes Probate Code section 1828. That statute provides in relevant part “before the establishment of a conservatorship of the person or estate, or both, the court shall inform the proposed conservatee of . . . [¶] . . . [...

On appeal, the conservatee contends the order denying the motion to vacate is appealable, because it is based on the probate court’s equitable power to set aside an order obtained through extrinsic fraud. The conservatee further contends that the order approving the account was not preclusive under Probate Code section 2103,1 because it was based on misrepresentations of material fact, and as a result, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the order. We agree that the...

e the funds from this annuity to pay the [department’s] claim.” The court added, “Even if the conservator had authority to access these funds, the conservator would have no statutory duty to use the funds to pay this debt of the conservatee’s estate. This was not a debt that became payable during the conservatee’s lifetime, but rather was a creditor’s claim that arose upon his death. Compare Probate Code section 2430 and Probate Code section 9000. Although Probate Code 2631(a) would permit th...

Probate Code section 3602, subdivision (b) states in relevant part: “Upon application of the guardian or conservator, the court making the order . . . may, with or without notice, make an order that all or part of the money paid or to be paid to the guardian or conservator under this subdivision be deposited or invested as provided in \[Probate Code\] Section 2456.” Probate Code section 2456 then provides, “Upon application of the guardian or conservator, the court may, with or without notice...

Probate Code section 3602, subdivision (b) states in relevant part: “Upon application of the guardian or conservator, the court making the order . . . may, with or without notice, make an order that all or part of the money paid or to be paid to the guardian or conservator under this subdivision be deposited or invested as provided in \[Probate Code\] Section 2456.” Probate Code section 2456 then provides, “Upon application of the guardian or conservator, the court may, with or without notice...

1191.) 18 conservatorship under section 2520 (the predecessor statute to section 850) to set aside the 1981 will and the inter vivos trust on the ground that Doris Romo was incompetent when they were executed. (Id. at pp. 281, 283.) Responding to the argument that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the 1981 will and inter vivos trust, the court noted, “Probate Code section 2520 expressly gives that court jurisdiction to make an appropriate order relating to property claimed by...

In the first and final account filed on August 10, 2017, the public guardian requested authority to pay $480,465.52 to the department. The probate court denied the request, finding that the annuity ceased to be a conservatorship asset upon Joseph’s death and became an asset of the trust. According to the probate court, the trust “is the primary beneficiary of the annuity. No order under Probate Code section 2580 was made to change the beneficiary. Therefore, the annuity ceased to be a conserv...

We agree that Gloria has standing 32 to petition for termination of the conservatorship; however, she has no standing to assert Thomas’s claims for violation of his civil rights. Gloria cites several statutes that provide standing for the spouse of a conservatee to raise challenges in and to the conservatorship. Probate Code section 2622 provides that a conservatee’s spouse “may file written objections to the account of the . . . conservator, stating the items of the account to which objectio...

Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then the court has discretion to “hear and determine the response or objection at the hearing, or grant a continuance for the purpose of allowing a response or objection to be made in writing.” Probate Code section 2622 provides similarly for accountings. When an interested party has objections to an account, the objector must “sp...

Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then the court has discretion to “hear and determine the response or objection at the hearing, or grant a continuance for the purpose of allowing a response or objection to be made in writing.” Probate Code section 2622 provides similarly for accountings. When an interested party has objections to an account, the objector must “sp...

Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then the court has discretion to “hear and determine the response or objection at the hearing, or grant a continuance for the purpose of allowing a response or objection to be made in writing.” Probate Code section 2622 provides similarly for accountings. When an interested party has objections to an account, the objector must “sp...

Probate Code section 1043, subdivisions (a), (b), state: “An interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing,” and then the court has discretion to “hear and determine the response or objection at the hearing, or grant a continuance for the purpose of allowing a response or objection to be made in writing.” Probate Code section 2622 provides similarly for accountings. When an interested party has objections to an account, the objector must “sp...

B306918.) 6 On March 4, 2021, the trial court granted Chen’s ex parte application authorizing him to file a respondent’s brief in connection with the appeal in Chui v. Chui, supra, B306918. The court rejected Jacqueline’s argument that the court “ha[d] no choice but to remove” Chen as her guardian ad litem upon her 18th birthday, which was to occur four days hence. The court, citing Probate Code section 2627, subdivision (b),5 explained that “a court appointment in such circumstances does not...

Becker also sought \$6,720.16 in costs. The court noted that all of Marty’s daughters objected to the fee petition “in writing as well as orally during closing arguments.” The court found many of these objections “meritorious.” The court first determined that Probate Code section 2640, subdivision (d)(1), which states that a conservator shall not be compensated from the estate for any fees or costs incurred in unsuccessfully defending their fee petition, or opposing a petition or any other un...

Becker also sought \$6,720.16 in costs. The court noted that all of Marty’s daughters objected to the fee petition “in writing as well as orally during closing arguments.” The court found many of these objections “meritorious.” The court first determined that Probate Code section 2640, subdivision (d)(1), which states that a conservator shall not be compensated from the estate for any fees or costs incurred in unsuccessfully defending their fee petition, or opposing a petition or any other un...

Becker also sought \$6,720.16 in costs. The court noted that all of Marty’s daughters objected to the fee petition “in writing as well as orally during closing arguments.” The court found many of these objections “meritorious.” The court first determined that Probate Code section 2640, subdivision (d)(1), which states that a conservator shall not be compensated from the estate for any fees or costs incurred in unsuccessfully defending their fee petition, or opposing a petition or any other un...

Becker also sought \$6,720.16 in costs. The court noted that all of Marty’s daughters objected to the fee petition “in writing as well as orally during closing arguments.” The court found many of these objections “meritorious.” The court first determined that Probate Code section 2640, subdivision (d)(1), which states that a conservator shall not be compensated from the estate for any fees or costs incurred in unsuccessfully defending their fee petition, or opposing a petition or any other un...

DORIS MAE BROKKEN, Appellant. Respondents Beth and Barry Brokken filed this conservatorship proceeding on their mother’s behalf. The case settled before a conservator was appointed. Respondents requested an award of attorney fees under Probate Code section 2640.1, 1 which authorizes fees in certain cases in which a conservator was appointed. The trial court erred by granting the request. Attorney fees are not available where, 1 All statutory references are to the Probate Code. as here, the ma...

3. In addition, the petition stated: [I]t would be in the best interests of the proposed Conservatee, and therefore Petitioner requests authority to make periodic payments from the conservatorship estate for compensation for services of the Public Conserva tor [p]ursuant to Probate Code section 2643, based on the current Public Conservator/Public Guardian fee schedule. Authorizing periodic payments according to the existing fee schedule will not only ensure that conservatorship fees are paid ...

d Conservatee in a facility providing intensive treatment pending the determination of this Conservatorship proceeding.” In addition, the petition stated: “\[I\]t would be in the best interests of the proposed Conservatee, and therefore Petitioner requests authority to make periodic payments from the conservatorship estate for compensation for services of the Public Conservator \[p\]ursuant to Probate Code section 2643, based on the current Public Conservator/Public Guardian fee schedule. Aut...

In addition, the petition stated: [I]t would be in the best interests of the proposed Conservatee, and therefore Petitioner requests authority to make periodic payments from the conservatorship estate for compensation for services of the Public Conservator [p]ursuant to Probate Code section 2643, based on the current Public Conservator/Public Guardian fee schedule. Authorizing periodic payments according to the existing fee schedule will not only ensure that conservatorship fees are paid only...

The court s order further noted that any periodic payments made to the public conservator from R. J. s estate would be subject to court approval at a subsequent accounting proceeding, as required by Probate Code section 2643, subdivision (c).4 4 To the extent R. J. s brief references Probate Code section 2643.1, that statute does not appear to be relevant here as it applies only to professional fiduciaries licensed 14. B. Analysis R. J. argues that the trial court s order, insofar as it autho...

be paid by the Public Guardian to the Superior Court, if the balance of cash in the conservatorship estate within possession and control of the Public Guardian exceeds \$2,000.” The instant appeal does not implicate any issue as to reimbursement, from R.J;’s estate, of any filing fees related to filings made by the public conservator in this matter. [^4]: To the extent R.J.’s brief references Probate Code section 2643.1, that statute does not appear to be relevant here as it applies only to “...

ll be paid by the Public Guardian to the Superior Court, if the balance of cash in the conservatorship estate within possession and control of the Public Guardian exceeds $2,000. The instant appeal does not implicate any issue as to reimbursement, from R. J; s estate, of any filing fees related to filings made by the public conservator in this matter. [^4]: To the extent R. J. s brief references Probate Code section 2643.1, that statute does not appear to be relevant here as it applies only t...

Gloria cites several statutes that provide standing for the spouse of a conservatee to raise challenges in and to the conservatorship. Probate Code section 2622 provides that a conservatee’s spouse “may file written objections to the account of the . . . conservator, stating the items of the account to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.” Probate Code section 2651 allows a conservatee’s spouse to petition the court to have the conservator removed if the stated facts show ...

The actual amount paid by Petitioner [i.e., the Conservator] to Kern County Counsel for attorney services will be presented in annual accounting petitions, and the Conservator will seek reimbursement from the Conservatee s estate for the amount paid for its attorney 12. According to R. J. s brief, [o]rders for compensation for services by the Public Guardian are governed by Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b). Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b), provides: [The public guardian s...

R.J. was under conservatorship from September 5, 2024 to February 18, 2025, a period of approximately five months. The fee amount in dispute would therefore appear to be around \$185.[^3] According to R.J.’s brief, “\[o\]rders for compensation for services by the Public Guardian are governed by Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b).” Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b), provides: > “\[The public guardian shall be paid from the estate of the conservatee as follows:\] Compensation f...

R. J. was under conservatorship from September 5, 2024 to February 18, 2025, a period of approximately five months. The fee amount in dispute would therefore appear to be around $185.[^3] According to R. J. s brief, [o]rders for compensation for services by the Public Guardian are governed by Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b). Probate Code section 2942, subdivision (b), provides: > [The public guardian shall be paid from the estate of the conservatee as follows:] Compensation for ser...

A.B. contends the public guardian’s petition failed to include sufficient information regarding the services rendered by the public guardian or regarding A.B.’s financial circumstances. He argues that absent this information, the court was unable to determine whether the requested compensation was “just and reasonable” as required by Probate Code section 2942.1 Finally, A.B. contends the court improperly delegated its authority under section 2942 to the public guardian by directing the agency...

The court concluded she was not entitled to expenses because “Yen was appointed as GAL pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure section] 3 72,” and “the Probate Code does not apply” because the matter was a personal injury case. Yen contends the trial court erred in reaching this holding . CSC concedes the court misinterpreted Probate Code section 3600 and should have considered Yen’s “reas onable” expenses “strictly limited” to her services as GAL. 14 While the trial court correctly noted Yen wa...

The court concluded she was not entitled to expenses because “Yen was appointed as GAL pursuant to \[Code of Civil Procedure section\] 372,” and “the Probate Code does not apply” because the matter was a personal injury case. Yen contends the trial court erred in reaching this holding. CSC concedes the court misinterpreted Probate Code section 3600 and should have considered Yen’s “reasonable” expenses “strictly limited” to her services as GAL. While the trial court correctly noted Yen was ap...

The court concluded she was not entitled to expenses because “Yen was appointed as GAL pursuant to \[Code of Civil Procedure section\] 372,” and “the Probate Code does not apply” because the matter was a personal injury case. Yen contends the trial court erred in reaching this holding. CSC concedes the court misinterpreted Probate Code section 3600 and should have considered Yen’s “reasonable” expenses “strictly limited” to her services as GAL. While the trial court correctly noted Yen was ap...

3600 and 3601 , coupled with Code of Civil Procedure section 372, thus indicate s GALs are entitled to seek reimbursement for reasonable expenses arising from their services, regardless of whether they are appointed under the Probate Code or Code of Civil Procedure section 372. In Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained Probate Code section 3601 “bestows broad power on the court to authorize payment from the 15 settlement —to ...

Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(3).) Probate Code section 3600 then contains broad language, stating it applies “whenever” a court approves a compromise of a pending action involving the payment of money for the benefit of the person with a disability. (Prob. Code, § 3600, subds. (a), (b).) And Probate Code section 3601 authorizes reimbursements from such payments, providing: “The court making the order or giving the judgment referred to in \[Probate Code\] Section 3600” shall authorize reimbursement...

Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(3).) Probate Code section 3600 then contains broad language, stating it applies “whenever” a court approves a compromise of a pending action involving the payment of money for the benefit of the person with a disability. (Prob. Code, § 3600, subds. (a), (b).) And Probate Code section 3601 authorizes reimbursements from such payments, providing: “The court making the order or giving the judgment referred to in \[Probate Code\] Section 3600” shall authorize reimbursement...

that all or part of the money paid or to be paid to the guardian or conservator under this subdivision be deposited or invested as provided in [Probate Code] Section 2456 .”].) 1. The Requested Annuities In support of her argument that the trial court erred in declining to order the purchase of two annuities , Yen contends she demonstrated good cause for such an order as required by Probate Code section 3602 . Specifically, Yen asserts her calculations regarding the income Dong would receive ...

er that all or part of the money paid or to be paid to the guardian or conservator under this subdivision be deposited or invested as provided in \[Probate Code\] Section 2456.”\].) **1. The Requested Annuities** In support of her argument that the trial court erred in declining to order the purchase of two annuities, Yen contends she demonstrated good cause for such an order as required by Probate Code section 3602. Specifically, Yen asserts her calculations regarding the income Dong would r...

er that all or part of the money paid or to be paid to the guardian or conservator under this subdivision be deposited or invested as provided in \[Probate Code\] Section 2456.”\].) **1. The Requested Annuities** In support of her argument that the trial court erred in declining to order the purchase of two annuities, Yen contends she demonstrated good cause for such an order as required by Probate Code section 3602. Specifically, Yen asserts her calculations regarding the income Dong would r...

(Garrison, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) In concluding the daughter had authority to sign the arbitration agreements because they were “executed as part of the health care decisionmaking process,” the Garrison court relied on three provisions of the Health Care Decisions Law in Probate Code section 4600 et seq. (Garrison, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265-266.) As discussed below, we are unpersuaded these provisions support that conclusion. First, the Garrison court relied on section 468...

There is no express language to that effect. Nor is there a general or catchall provision from which that authority can be reasonably inferred. In asserting Scott derives such authority from his power to decide Lisa’s placement, defendants overlook the fact that committing a conservatee to a facility for treatment is itself a health care decision. Probate Code section 4617, subdivision (a)(1) of the HCDL, defines “health care decision” as “a decision made by a patient or the patient’s agent, ...

nd Hogan after it, cite other provisions of the Health Care Decisions Law to support the result they reach, noting a combined effect with the implied agency principles of Civil Code section 2319. (Garrison, supra, 132 Cal. App.4th at pp. 265 267; Hogan, supra, 148 Cal. App.4th at pp. 265 267.) But those other provisions do not bear on whether an agreement to arbitrate is a health care decision. Probate Code section 4683, subdivision (a), merely states an agent for health care decisions may ma...

12, ante), under the Health Care Decisions Law, these post-death decisions are categorized separately from health care decisions and are exemplified by approving organ donation, autopsies, disposition of remains, and records releases not matters such as arbitration. Finally, Probate Code section 4684, in requiring an agent to make . . . health care decision[s] in accordance with a principal s individual health care instructions or known wishes, 28 HARROD v. COUNTRY OAKS PARTNERS, LLC Opinion ...

. James III was again named as the first alternate, and Marybeth was the second alternate. In 2015, Trudy executed 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Harrod was decided while this appeal was pending. We requested and received supplemental briefing from both parties regarding its impact, if any, on this case. 2 the health care POA prepared under Probate Code section 4701 that is at issue in this case. Her husband was named as her agent for health care...

62.) Arguably, therefore, upon Ralph’s death, his interest in the Franklin 5 Fund account became part of his personal estate, which would need to be probated. 5 Ralph’s interest consisted of the entire account because all of the money in the account came from him during his lifetime. Probate Code section 5301, subdivision (a) provides, “An account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each, unless there is clear and convincing ev...

62.) Arguably, therefore, upon Ralph’s death, his interest in the Franklin 5 Fund account became part of his personal estate, which would need to be probated. 5 Ralph’s interest consisted of the entire account because all of the money in the account came from him during his lifetime. Probate Code section 5301, subdivision (a) provides, “An account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each, unless there is clear and convincing ev...

JIM NORD, as Trustee, etc., et al., (Napa County Super. Ct. No. 17PR000071) Defendants and Respondents. Shannon Eyford and Erin Johnson appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court denied their petition to invalidate their grandmother’s trust, which disinherited them. Appellants contend the court should have invalidated the trust pursuant to Probate Code section 6100.5, subdivision (a)(2),1 because their grandmother had delusions that negated her testamentary capacity. We affirm. FACT...

23 A The Trial Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard Tammy argues the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard regarding mental capacity because the trial court failed to “undertake the analysis called for under Probate Code Section 812” and mistakenly relied on section 6100.5 when Lintz “specifically holds that Probate Code Section 6100.5 is an inappropriate standard for assessing mental capacity related to a trust, or trust amendment that is more complex than one analogous to a s...

23 A The Trial Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard Tammy argues the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard regarding mental capacity because the trial court failed to “undertake the analysis called for under Probate Code Section 812” and mistakenly relied on section 6100.5 when Lintz “specifically holds that Probate Code Section 6100.5 is an inappropriate standard for assessing mental capacity related to a trust, or trust amendment that is more complex than one analogous to a s...

. . under this chapter [Code Civ. Proc., § 405.30 et seq.] shall be appealable. Any party aggrieved by an order made on a motion under this chapter may petition the proper reviewing court to review the order by writ of mandate.” (See Woodridge Escondido Property Owners Assn. v. Nielsen (2005) 130 surviving spouse and the other one-half belongs to the decedent.” Probate Code section 6401, subdivision (a) states: “As to community property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse is the one-...

lude the community property presumption, not the form-of-the-title presumption, should apply in cases arising under former section 229.”]; In re Abdale’s Estate (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587, 591–592; In re Taitmeyer’s Estate (1943) 35 In re BRACE Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 60 Cal.App.2d 699, 705, 712.) In 1983, the Legislature consolidated these statutes into Probate Code section 6402.5. Although the Legislature altered the statute’s applicability to certain property, the rules for determining “...

5 The substance of this provision has been part of California probate law on intestate succession since California adopted the UPA in 1975. It was first enacted as former Probate Code section 25, subdivision (d). (Stats. 1975, ch. 1244, § 25.) In 1983, it became part of former Probate Code section 6408 (Stats. 1983, ch. 842, § 55), then in 1993, it was moved to what is now Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (a). (Stats. 1993, ch. 529, § 5.) In each of these versions, this provision incorp...

Having considered Bertuccio’s response, it discharged the order to show cause and allowed the appeal to proceed. On April 1, 2022, this case was fully briefed. On August 9, 2022, the case was transferred by California Supreme Court Order from the Sixth District Court of Appeal (where it had been designated case No. H049297) to the First District Court of Appeal. 5 Probate Code section 6450 provides that “a relationship of parent and child exists for the purpose of determining intestate succes...

on (a), which provides, in pertinent part, that “the child of spouses who cohabited at the time of conception and birth is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Based on that finding, the court then held Bertuccio, as the child of the marriage of Marilyn and Frank, Sr., was not entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent from whom he could inherit in intestate succession under Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (b)(2). 2 As a preliminary matter, we agree with the proba...

“(b) It is established by clear and convincing evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier.” 4 heirship under section 6455,3 which allows for inheritance through equitable adoption. In January 2021, Zambito filed a second amended petition, this time adding a theory of inheritance under Probate Code section 6453, subdivisions (a) and (b)(2). Those provisions state that a “natural parent and child relationship” is established for intestate...

a bench trial, the probate court determined that Decedent was Zambito’s “natural parent” under Probate Code1 sections 6540 and 6453, which define the “natural parent” and child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. In this appeal, we conclude that Zambito has standing to claim natural parentage heirship even though he is not the Decedent’s biological child. We further conclude that Probate Code section 6454, which provides a pathway for intestate succession by stepchildren and fo...

(a)(2); see also American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1013 [“ ‘The only indispensable requirement to [a partition] award is that a clear title be shown’ ”].) This ownership requirement was met, the siblings claim, because Decedent’s estate was an intestate estate when they filed their partition claim. In this regard they rely on Probate Code section 7000. It provides that “[s]ubject to section 7001,” which concerns estate administration, “title to a decede...

Code, § 761), such as a fee simple (Alamo School Dist. v. Jones (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 180, 184) or a tenancy in common (Gunn v. Gunn (1929) 102 Cal.App. 606, 607). 7 This ownership requirement was met, the siblings claim, because Decedent’s estate was an intestate estate when they filed their partition claim. In this regard they rely on Probate Code section 7000. It provides that “[s]ubject to section 7001,” which concerns estate administration, “title to a decedent’s property passes on the d...

Appellant Mitchell Bailey is the only child of the late James Bailey. Mitchell1 opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Mitchell any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Mitchell appeals. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).2 We affirm. 1 We use first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 Unlabel...

JONES ESTATE Appeal from Superior Court of Los Angeles County This is a test case for the CourtListener format processor. The appellant, John Smith, appeals from the probate court's order denying his petition to be appointed as administrator of the Jones Estate. The court found that Smith lacked standing under Probate Code section 8461. We affirm the trial court's decision. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mary Jones died intestate on January 1, 2024, leaving an estate valued at approximatel...

California Appellate Law Group, Charles M. Kagay and Claudia Ribet; Velasco Law Group, Peter Ali Sahin and Sindee M. Smolowitz for Defendant and Respondent. __________________________________ Appellants Brendon Welch (Brendon) and Jeanne Donohoe (Jeanne) appeal the probate court’s January 14, 2021 orders: (1) 1 denying Brendon’s Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 8501 and sustaining objections thereto by respondent Freeman H. Welch (Freeman); and (2) denying Brendon’...

Hinojosa & Forer, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for Respondent Jackson Chen. McBride Law Group and Julia C. McBride for Respondents Helena Chang Chui and Ruth Chang. ________________________________ In proceedings under the Probate Code concerning the administration of a trust, the co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 8502 alleging that Christine Chui misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. On the day se...

to pay the [department’s] claim.” The court added, “Even if the conservator had authority to access these funds, the conservator would have no statutory duty to use the funds to pay this debt of the conservatee’s estate. This was not a debt that became payable during the conservatee’s lifetime, but rather was a creditor’s claim that arose upon his death. Compare Probate Code section 2430 and Probate Code section 9000. Although Probate Code 2631(a) would permit this payment to be made (if the ...

They are not at issue on appeal. As relevant here, the court then discussed the “\[p\]robate issues.” (Underscoring omitted.) The court stated: “The parties have now briefed multiple probate issues concerning the interplay of an abstract of judgment on probate proceedings and whether under Probate Code § 9050, more than published notice was required because ‘the personal representative shall give notice of administration of the estate to the known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the ...

They are not at issue on appeal. As relevant here, the court then discussed the "\[p\]robate issues." (Underscoring omitted.) The court stated: "The parties have now briefed multiple probate issues concerning the interplay of an abstract of judgment on probate proceedings and whether under Probate Code § 9050, more than published notice was required because 'the personal representative shall give notice of administration of the estate to the known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the ...

They are not at issue on appeal. As relevant here, the court then discussed the “\[p\]robate issues.” (Underscoring omitted.) The court stated: “The parties have now briefed multiple probate issues concerning the interplay of an abstract of judgment on probate proceedings and whether under Probate Code § 9050, more than published notice was required because ‘the personal representative shall give notice of administration of the estate to the known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the ...

They are not at issue on appeal. As relevant here, the court then discussed the "\[p\]robate issues." (Underscoring omitted.) The court stated: "The parties have now briefed multiple probate issues concerning the interplay of an abstract of judgment on probate proceedings and whether under Probate Code § 9050, more than published notice was required because 'the personal representative shall give notice of administration of the estate to the known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the ...

complaint be included in the appellate record.6 He merely asserts, in passing, that Humphrey’s “claim [is] that he should take the property by adverse possession.” In support, he cites only his own motion to intervene. 6 They do happen to be included, fortuitously, as attachments to Bewley’s request for judicial notice in support of his motion to intervene. 11 Bewley relies on Probate Code section 9100, which requires a creditor to file a timely claim. He has not shown, however, that Humphrey...

C. Creditor’s Claim and Breach of Contract Suit On November 28, 2017, Knapp filed a creditor’s claim against Tinker’s estate. Citing the PMA, she sought $3,993,468.32 as reimbursement for the amount she paid to satisfy the mortgage on the 12 Perugia property. After the estate failed to respond within 30 days, the claim was deemed rejected under Probate Code section 9256. On June 18, 2018, Knapp filed a complaint for breach of contract against Tinker’s son Mark in his capacity as executor of T...

Barrow opposed the motion. In May 2023, during the initial hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Rhonda’s request to submit supplemental briefing regarding probate issues. In her supplemental brief, Rhonda argued the judgment was void and barred from enforcement for Barrow’s failure to follow the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure[^4] section 686.020 and Probate Code section 9300 et seq. Rhonda asserted that after Martin died, Barrow was required to enforce the judgment by fi...

Barrow opposed the motion. In May 2023, during the initial hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Rhonda's request to submit supplemental briefing regarding probate issues. In her supplemental brief, Rhonda argued the judgment was void and barred from enforcement for Barrow's failure to follow the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure[^4] section 686.020 and Probate Code section 9300 et seq. Rhonda asserted that after Martin died, Barrow was required to enforce the judgment by fi...

Barrow opposed the motion. In May 2023, during the initial hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Rhonda’s request to submit supplemental briefing regarding probate issues. In her supplemental brief, Rhonda argued the judgment was void and barred from enforcement for Barrow’s failure to follow the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure[^4] section 686.020 and Probate Code section 9300 et seq. Rhonda asserted that after Martin died, Barrow was required to enforce the judgment by fi...

Barrow opposed the motion. In May 2023, during the initial hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Rhonda's request to submit supplemental briefing regarding probate issues. In her supplemental brief, Rhonda argued the judgment was void and barred from enforcement for Barrow's failure to follow the requirements under Code of Civil Procedure[^4] section 686.020 and Probate Code section 9300 et seq. Rhonda asserted that after Martin died, Barrow was required to enforce the judgment by fi...

(Prob. Code, §§ 48, 8000.) Here, there is no dispute that Everett filed her claim within the Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 limitations period, submitting it along with her petition for probate two days shy of a year after the decedent’s death. Pursuant to Probate Code section 9352, Everett’s timely filing of her claim tolled the statute of limitations “until allowance, approval, or rejection.” (Prob. Code, § 9352, subd. (a).) Thereafter, no action was taken on Everett’s claim until Ma...

2, or perhaps until the trial court employs its supervisory powers to articulate a specific reason why that claim (as opposed to any petition seeking appointment as personal representative) is dismissed. 8 In the alternative, Holdaway argues that Everett did not timely file suit following the rejection of her claim. He acknowledges that Probate Code section 9353 allows a period of 90 days for a creditor to bring suit after the rejection of her claim.2 Citing a treatise (Borden et al., 2 Calif...

Barrow argued that when she recorded the abstract of judgment in 2015, she created a valid judgment lien against Martin’s property, including later-acquired property. She further argued that she renewed the judgment in 2020 and thereafter recorded the renewal. Regarding the Probate Code, Barrow argued that she was not required to file a creditor claim to enforce her lien. Citing Probate Code section 9391, Barrow asserted that the holder of a judgment lien on property in the decedent’s estate ...

Barrow argued that when she recorded the abstract of judgment in 2015, she created a valid judgment lien against Martin's property, including later-acquired property. She further argued that she renewed the judgment in 2020 and thereafter recorded the renewal. Regarding the Probate Code, Barrow argued that she was not required to file a creditor claim to enforce her lien. Citing Probate Code section 9391, Barrow asserted that the holder of a judgment lien on property in the decedent's estate ...

Barrow argued that when she recorded the abstract of judgment in 2015, she created a valid judgment lien against Martin’s property, including later-acquired property. She further argued that she renewed the judgment in 2020 and thereafter recorded the renewal. Regarding the Probate Code, Barrow argued that she was not required to file a creditor claim to enforce her lien. Citing Probate Code section 9391, Barrow asserted that the holder of a judgment lien on property in the decedent’s estate ...

Barrow argued that when she recorded the abstract of judgment in 2015, she created a valid judgment lien against Martin's property, including later-acquired property. She further argued that she renewed the judgment in 2020 and thereafter recorded the renewal. Regarding the Probate Code, Barrow argued that she was not required to file a creditor claim to enforce her lien. Citing Probate Code section 9391, Barrow asserted that the holder of a judgment lien on property in the decedent's estate ...

(Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391 (Smith); see Prob. Code, § 9820; Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a).) There are limited circumstances where the beneficiary of the estate has standing to sue a third party to seek redress for an injury to the estate. Probate Code section 9654 provides that a beneficiary may bring suit to recover possession of or quiet title to property. Also, appellate courts have occasionally recognized “special circumstances” where it is appropriate to allow...

the probate petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PMA in their undue influence suits against Knapp, or in a separate lawsuit on behalf of Tinker’s estate, because they were not parties to the document. He points out that neither petition alleged that the PMA was unenforceable, and that the probate petitioners did not amend the petitions to include such allegations. He further asserts that Probate Code section 9820, which defines the powers of a personal 40 representative, authorizes on...

e question whether a potential heir can encumber a contingent interest vis a vis a third party is entirely distinct from whether a contingent unconfirmed interest is sufficient to confer standing to partition a property where, as here, another interest in the property (Catello’s) is not subject to probate. There is no need to recognize the standing of an expected heir in this circumstance because Probate Code section 9823 expressly authorizes the personal representative—who is responsible for...

Aside from the fact that we cannot simply disregard a Supreme Court decision (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), we must assume that the Legislature was aware of this case when it enacted Probate Code section 9823 to vest in the personal representative— but not the possible heirs or devisees—the right to partition a property where an interest is not subject to probate. (Arthur Andersen v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1500–...

have objected at the time of the Court’s approval of the Settlement Agreement [in 1990], or before the issuance of the 1991 [Decree].” The court went on to consider whether Mark received sufficient notice of the McKie Sr. estate probate proceedings “from a due process perspective.” First, the court found Mark was not statutorily entitled to personal notice of the hearing on the 1991 Decree under Probate Code section 11000. 2 Second, it determined that due process considerations did not entitl...

iming by adverse possession, “‘“[i]t is well settled that one who claims as his own, adversely to an estate, specific property held and claimed by the estate, cannot be called a creditor of the estate within the meaning of the probate law . . . ”’ [Citation.]” (Pay Less Drug Stores v. Bechdolt (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 496, 501; see also Prob. Code § 9000, subds. (b), (c).) Bewley also relies on Probate Code section 11605. That section is part of Division 7, Part 10, Chapter 1 of the Probate Code,...

When an heir-hunter firm informed appellant Donald Carmody he was the heir of a nephew he never knew existed, he thought it was a scam. He assigned any rights he might have in the nephew s estate to his brother, John Carmody, believing any such rights were worthless.1 However, the estate had value. John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 for determination of entitlement to distribution of the nephew s estate.2 He obtained a determination that he and Donald were the nephew s hei...

and Sheila W. Pendergast for Appellant. Polsinelli, John W. Peterson and J. Alan Warfield for Petitioners and Respondents. INTRODUCTION If a will creates a trust and names a trustee, does that trustee have standing to seek a court order determining their right to take charge of the trust assets? We hold that they do. Probate Code section 11700 1 provides that “any person claiming to be a beneficiary or otherwise entitled to distribution of a share of the estate, may file a petition for a cour...

ate proceeding in Nevada, he claimed that Domenick was his “natural father.” They also assert that the probate court erred by denying their request for a statement of decision on this issue as untimely. We conclude that Objectors 8 To the extent Objectors are asserting that Zambito lacked standing under Family Code section 7630, we reject this argument as well. Zambito had standing under Probate Code section 11700, which authorizes a petition by any person claiming to be entitled to distribut...

City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of Probate Code section 11704, subdivision (b), was used “in its ‘useful’ or ‘appropriate’ sense, and not as a freesta...

City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 672, 674 (San Francisco Firefighters) [holding “necessary” in context of Charter provision was intended “in its broader sense, i.e., ‘that which is . . . convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conducive’ ”]; Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 720 [concluding phrase “as necessary,” in the context of Probate Code section 11704, subdivision (b), was used “in its ‘useful’ or ‘appropriate’ sense, and not as a freesta...

Thus, under the terms of the Trust, when Donald died, Linda became the sole trustee, with power over all the Trust assets, including the Notes. At oral argument, Respondents asserted—for the first time and without citation to authority—that the restated Trust’s general assignment was insufficient to transfer the Notes into the Trust. Pursuant to Probate Code section 15200, a trust is created by several methods, including “\[a\] declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds the pro...

Thus, under the terms of the Trust, when Donald died, Linda became the sole trustee, with power over all the Trust assets, including the Notes. At oral argument, Respondents asserted---for the first time and without citation to authority---that the restated Trust's general assignment was insufficient to transfer the Notes into the Trust. Pursuant to Probate Code section 15200, a trust is created by several methods, including "\[a\] declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds the...

Thus, under the terms of the Trust, when Donald died, Linda became the sole trustee, with power over all the Trust assets, including the Notes. At oral argument, Respondents asserted—for the first time and without citation to authority—that the restated Trust’s general assignment was insufficient to transfer the Notes into the Trust. Pursuant to Probate Code section 15200, a trust is created by several methods, including “\[a\] declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds the pro...

itor can petition to levy up to 25 percent of the payments expected to be made to the beneficiary, reduced by the amount other creditors have already obtained and subject to the support needs of the beneficiary and any dependents. (\[Id.,\] § 15306.5.)” (Carmack, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 856–857.) The predistribution claim procedure referenced in Carmack that is pertinent here—the one governed by Probate Code section 15301, subdivision (b)—is as follows: “After an amount of principal has becom...

etition to levy up to 25 percent of the payments expected to be made to the beneficiary, reduced by the amount other creditors have already obtained and subject to the support needs of the beneficiary and any dependents. (\[*Id.*,\] § 15306.5.)” (*Carmack*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 856–857.) The predistribution claim procedure referenced in *Carmack* that is pertinent here—the one governed by Probate Code section 15301, subdivision (b)—is as follows: “After an amount of principal has become ...

etition to levy up to 25 percent of the payments expected to be made to the beneficiary, reduced by the amount other creditors have already obtained and subject to the support needs of the beneficiary and any dependents. (\[*Id.*,\] § 15306.5.)” (*Carmack*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 856–857.) The predistribution claim procedure referenced in *Carmack* that is pertinent here—the one governed by Probate Code section 15301, subdivision (b)—is as follows: “After an amount of principal has become ...

at p. 152.) The Court of Appeal found the trustee could not frustrate Probate Code section 15305 in this way. Recognizing that courts generally do not interfere with a trustee’s discretion in the absence of bad faith (see Ventura, at p. 154), such restraint did not apply in light of the strong public policy advanced by Probate Code section 15303. The Ventura court noted California has a strong public policy favoring payment of child support (Ventura, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 154) and, “[b...

849.) The family court relied on a spendthrift trust case, Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Brown (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 144 (Ventura), to find section 2030 fees could be awarded only upon a finding of bad faith by the trustee. Ventura involved an application of the provision allowing spendthrift trusts to be accessed for child support payments, Probate Code section 15305, subdivision (c).3 (Ventura, at p. 149.) The issue in Ventura was “whether a court may order a trustee to...

DISPOSITION Affirmed. Costs on appeal to be awarded to Defendants. STREETER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: GOLDMAN, J. CLAY, J.[^2] [^1]: The second claim procedure described in the quoted passage from Carmack is set forth in Probate Code section 15306.5 and provides that, under certain circumstances and subject to limitations, a judgment creditor may petition the court for an order “directing the trustee to satisfy all or part of the judgment out of the payments to which the beneficiary is entitle...

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to the fourth cause of action. # DISPOSITION Affirmed. Costs on appeal to be awarded to Defendants. STREETER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: GOLDMAN, J. CLAY, J.[^2] [^1]: The second claim procedure described in the quoted passage from *Carmack* is set forth in Probate Code section 15306.5 and provides that, under certain circumstances and subject to limitations, a judgment creditor may petition the court for an order “...

Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer as to the fourth cause of action. Affirmed. Costs on appeal to be awarded to Defendants. STREETER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: GOLDMAN, J. CLAY, J.[^2] [^1]: The second claim procedure described in the quoted passage from *Carmack* is set forth in Probate Code section 15306.5 and provides that, under certain circumstances and subject to limitations, a judgment creditor may petition the court for an order “directing the ...

. . shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by notary public, by the trustor(s) making the revocation, amendment, or termination, and delivered to the trustee.” (Italics added.) Because the proffered amendment was not acknowledged by a notary, it is not valid. Nothing in Probate Code section 15401 or 15402 requires a different result. Under Probate Code section 15402, “[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise,” the settlor of a revocable trust “may modi...

1 In revoking the February Trust, Martin did not follow the revocation method specified in the trust document, which required a signature by Martin’s attorney, Frances Diaz, on the revocation document. Rather, with the assistance of a new estate planning lawyer, Martin revoked the February Trust using the statutory revocation method established by Probate Code section 15401, subdivision (a)(2). 2 That method simply requires that the settlor of a trust sign a revocation and deliver it to the t...

gly, we conclude that the UETA s electronic signature provisions do not apply to Mary s writings, and the probate court did not err in finding that neither the e-mails nor the attached questionnaire was properly signed to effectuate an amendment to the Trust.2 2 Our Supreme Court recently decided *Haggerty v. Thornton* (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729 (Haggerty), holding that a trust may be modified using Probate Code section 15401 procedures for revocation unless the trust instrument provides a method ...

. . shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by notary public, by the trustor(s) making the revocation, amendment, or termination, and delivered to the trustee.” (Italics added.) Because the proffered amendment was not acknowledged by a notary, it is not valid. Nothing in Probate Code section 15401 or 15402 requires a different result. Under Probate Code section 15402, “[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise,” the settlor of a revocable trust “may modi...

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Brenda J. Penny, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Timothy G. Mishler and Timothy G. Mishler for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Law Office of Robert Mills and Robert Mills for Defendant and Respondent. We must decide which of two provisions governs a settlor’s purported 1 amendment of a revocable trust—Probate Code section 15402 or the terms of the trust—when the trust instrument specifies how the trust may be modified but does not ...

le="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; margin: 1.5em 0;">BACKGROUND The Petition The parties to this dispute are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust (the Trust) and its three sub-trusts. David and Scott are Allison’s brothers, and Denise Sobel is Allison’s aunt. Allison filed a verified petition alleging “request[s] for relief” for: (1) removal of appellants as co-trustees under Probate Code section 15642; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) breach of the Trust.3 The petition als...

Following the entry of judgment, Respondents filed a motion for attorneys’ fees in which Mildred asked for $331,274, and Jane and Gwen asked for $497,762.50. Asserting that Lynne had filed her petition to remove Mildred as trustee in bad faith, Respondents brought the motion under the court’s “broad” equitable powers, as well as Probate Code section 15642, subdivision (d),5 and Code of Civil Procedure, section 2033.420.6 Lynne argued that the evidence presented at trial did not support an awa...

(Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1144 [“before a settlor’s death (and in the absence of a showing of incompetence), a contingent beneficiary lacks standing to petition the probate court to compel a trustee to account or provide information relating to the revocable trust”].) 5 Legislation in 2021 amended Probate Code section 15800, effective January 1, 2022, such that section 15800, subdivision (a) now reads: “Except to the extent that the trust instrument otherwise pro...

with a complete copy of the trust instrument. Dominic and Eric Jr. requested a court order requiring LaDonna to submit the original trust instrument along with any amendments. On April 17, 2020, LaDonna served Dominic and Eric Jr. with a “notification by trustee” (notification), pursuant to Probate Code section 16061.7.1 As required by statute, the notification informed Dominic and Eric Jr. in bold, capitalized letters, “you may not bring an action to contest the 1 All unspecified statutory r...

Arthur stopped communicating with Newell in May 2021. He died in November 2022. Because Lopez had died in October 2022, Rollins became the successor trustee upon Arthur’s death. Newell learned of the January 2021 second restatement and the April 2021 amendment in December 2022, when an attorney for Rollins sent Newell a notice under Probate Code section 16061.7. Newell filed a petition in probate court to determine the validity of the January 2021 second restatement and the April 2021 amendme...

Scott Packard (Scott) appeals from an order granting judgment in favor of Gregory Roy Packard (Greg), as trustee for Newton Roy Packard Trust, on Scott’s petition for construction and reformation of an amendment to the trust. Scott contends that the probate court erred in finding that his petition constituted a trust contest subject to the 120-day statute of limitations period set forth in Probate Code section 16061.7. 1 We conclude that Scott’s petition was one to reform the trust to correct...

Mildred denied having this conversation with Lynne. C. Notification of the Trust Upon James’s death in 2006, Mildred became the sole trustee of the Trust. Mildred waited until 2015 to authorize Jane to prepare the notification required when a revocable trust becomes irrevocable by the death of one or more settlors of the trust under 5 Probate Code section 16061.7, subdivisions (a)(1), (b)(2), and (f).4 Lynne received the notice in early February 2015. Mildred suffered a stroke shortly after s...

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gus T. May, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of L’Tanya M. Butler and L’Tanya M. Butler for Plaintiffs and Appellants. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Would-be beneficiaries of a trust failed to bring a challenge within Probate Code section 16061.8’s 120-day statute of limitations. Here we decide they may not later bring a civil complaint alleging forgery of a purported trust amendment. Plaintiffs filed a...

“[Christopher] states that the beneficiaries consented to his distribution of [the Subject Property] …[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher] never received any objections to the proposed distribution[,]” (italics added). “[Christopher] admitted during his testimony that he 5 Subdivision (a)(2) of Probate Code section 16501 provides: “(a) The trustee who elects to provide notice pursuant to this chapter shall deliver notice pursuant to Section 1215 of the proposed action to each of the following...

uld gain a pecuniary benefit from invalidating the trust should have standing to bring a trust contest” and that “[u]nder most circumstances, the contestants are the beneficiaries of an earlier estate plan or the heirs at law.” (Campisi & Latham, Cal. Trust and Probate Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 2024) § 20.6; see also § 20.31 [form “petition to determine the validity of purported trust” pursuant to “Probate Code § 17000”].) In other words, secondary authority recognizes the standing of heirs to ...

Plaintiffs filed an appeal from this order. 2. The Sustained Demurrer Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on September 12, 2016. Thomas filed his third demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer without prejudice. The court decided it did not have jurisdiction to try this matter, believing that the Riverside County Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction under Probate Code section 17000 to try this matter since Frank Sr.’s estate was probated in that court and the probate ...

Plaintiffs filed an appeal from this order. 2. The Sustained Demurrer Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on September 12, 2016. Thomas filed his third demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer without prejudice. The court decided it did not have jurisdiction to try this matter, believing that the Riverside County Superior Court had exclusive jurisdiction under Probate Code section 17000 to try this matter since Frank Sr.’s estate was probated in that court and the probate ...

Head’s and respondents’ deceased mother as additional assets of the Trust. On May 18, 2020, respondents initiated the instant matter by filing a verified petition to invalidate the Trust on the grounds of undue influence, lack of capacity, and/or forgery. The petition alleged it concerns the internal affairs of the Trust, giving the probate court jurisdiction under Probate Code section 17000.2 1. Hearing on Standing Early in the litigation, the trial court raised questions regarding responden...

Under Probate Code section 17002, subdivision (a), a trust’s principal place of administration “is the usual place where the day-to-day activity of the trust is carried on by the trustee or its representative who is primarily responsible for the administration of the trust.” No alleged facts show that Thomas carries on the day-to-day activity of the trust at the cabin. 13 Probate Code section 17002 continues: “If the principal place of administration of the trust cannot be determined under su...

Under Probate Code section 17002, subdivision (a), a trust’s principal place of administration “is the usual place where the day-to-day activity of the trust is carried on by the trustee or its representative who is primarily responsible for the administration of the trust.” No alleged facts show that Thomas carries on the day-to-day activity of the trust at the cabin. 13 Probate Code section 17002 continues: “If the principal place of administration of the trust cannot be determined under su...

(Id. at p. 605.) The court concluded with the observation, “We are constrained to add for the trial court’s guidance that a trust can be modified if provisions are ambiguous or if 24 ‘slavish adherence” to the terms of the trust would defeat the primary purpose of the trust; but neither former Probate Code section 17200 nor the common law of trusts permits the creation of a new agreement under the guise of a modification or reformation.” (Ibid.) In Estate of Sigourney, the court held that whe...

Head disinherited by the trust, had standing to contest the instrument in the probate court and that their petition was not * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts B., C., and D. of the Discussion. 1 barred under Probate Code section 17200. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude substantial evidence supported the court’s application of the common law presumption of undue influen...

Therefore, no contesting of my will/trust and this document. It is a gift. B. Arturo and Sonia s Petition When Silvia passed away in November 2020, Leticia became trustee under the terms of the trust instrument. A probate referee valued the Property at $1,050,000 at the time of Silvia s death and $1,300,000 as of December 2022. In September 2021, Arturo and Sonia filed a petition under Probate Code section 17200, seeking a determination whether Silvia s wishes in the 2019 amendment as to the ...

Accordingly, in their prayer for relief, the Smiths requested an order that Emma transfer the ranch to them. 3 The petition alleged it concerned the internal affairs of the trust and, consequently, that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in the matter under Probate Code section 17200. Emma filed a demurrer to the petition. As one of the stated grounds for demurrer, Emma argued that Bruce was not entitled to seek an order confirming the validity of the amendment, because he “faile...

Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, the plaintiff filed a probate petition alleging trust amendments disinheriting her were invalid on the grounds of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud. (Id. at p. 826.) The Court of Appeal had concluded the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a petition under Probate Code section 17200 challenging the validity of the amendments because she was no longer a named beneficiary. (Barefoot, at p. 825.) The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal ...

If amendments to a revocable trust made shortly before the settlor dies disinherit a beneficiary, does that individual, as one who is not named in the trust’s final iteration, have standing to challenge the validity of the disinheriting amendments in probate court on grounds such as incompetence, undue influence, or fraud? The Court of Appeal interpreted Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (a),1 which provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this cha...

If amendments to a revocable trust made shortly before the settlor dies disinherit a beneficiary, does that individual, as one who is not named in the trust’s final iteration, have standing to challenge the validity of the disinheriting amendments in probate court on grounds such as incompetence, undue influence, or fraud? The Court of Appeal interpreted Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (a),1 which provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this cha...

e an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.” (Civ. Code, § 3426.4.) 15 constitutes a sanction [citation], and the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on sanctions motions.” (Ibid.) Similarly, this court in Powell, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th 219 construed Probate Code section 17211, subdivision (a), as containing both objective and subjective criteria for ...

tor had no authority to use the funds from the annuity because it was a noncash asset, which ceased to be a conservatorship asset upon Joseph’s death and became an asset of the trust. However, the public guardian was both the conservator of Joseph’s estate and the trustee of the trust. Whether acting as the conservator or trustee, the public guardian notified the department of Joseph’s death. Probate Code section 19000 et seq. “governs claims procedures, including notice requirements and time...

We disagree and therefore reverse. Our holding rests upon the plain language of the Original Trust s no contest provision (the No Contest Clause) in light of a key issue of law that is now beyond dispute. Tyler cannot, and does not, ask us to revisit our holding in *Key v. Tyler* II that her defense of the 2007 Amendment in court was a direct contest of the Trust. Under Probate Code section 21311, such a direct contest, if brought without probable cause, provides a legally sufficient basis to...

on 21362 The trial court determined that the free room and board Gutierrez received for her services did not constitute “remuneration” as that term is used in section 21362. The court stated: “No evidence was presented at trial that [Gutierrez] received remuneration for the services [she] provided to the Decedent other than the receipt of free rent and board. This is not remuneration as used in Probate Code § 21362. Petitioners in their Post-Trial Brief have cited various court opinions arisi...

Newell learned of the January 2021 second restatement and the April 2021 amendment in December 2022, when an attorney for Rollins sent Newell a notice under Probate Code section 16061.7. Newell filed a petition in probate court to determine the validity of the January 2021 second restatement and the April 2021 amendment, naming Rollins and Lopez (and later Lopez’s estate) as respondents. Citing Probate Code section 21380, which provides that a donative transfer to a care custodian of a transf...

D083713 CARLA MONTGOMERY, Petitioner and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. TRUPS2000072) v. BENITA WILLIAMS, Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Douglas K. Mann, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Jay S. Belshaw and Jay S. Belshaw for Petitioner and Appellant. The Horspool Law Group and J. David Horspool for Respondent. Under Probate Code section 21622, Carla Montgomery petitioned to receive a share of her father Benjamin C. Williams’ trust estate as an omi...

. Nivala Balistreri filed a petition in probate court alleging that, the day before her husband, Sal C. Balistreri, (decedent) died, the two amended their revocable trust. The probate court subsequently deemed the alleged amendment “null and void” and denied Mary’s petition to construe the trust and confirm the validity of the amendment. The court concluded the claimed amendment was invalid under Probate Code section 154021 because the trust mandated that any amendment “shall be made by writt...

To be sure, Scott signed the agreements, but, as discussed, he lacked authority to bind Lisa and her heirs to arbitration. Nor did he sign the agreements in an individual capacity.7 Scott’s 7 Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim is personal to them; it lies independent of survivor claims. “Unlike some jurisdictions wherein wrongful death actions are derivative, Code of Civil Procedure section 12 wrongful death claim is thus not subject to arbitration. (Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare & Rehabilitat...

(We refer to these motions as the disqualification motions.) Chen based the disqualification motions on the following grounds: (1) Jacqueline and Michael are unemancipated minors; (2) the Overing and the Hawekotte firms were retained by Christine, who has a conflict of interest with Jacqueline and Michael; and (3) the actions taken by the Overing and Hawekotte firms are sanctionable under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. Between June 15 and October 16, 2020, the parties filed numerous d...

. . by failing to raise it in her opening brief”].) II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Sanctions The trial court imposed sanctions of $5,577 on Hankin for maintaining the Hankin Petition after Sobel’s withdrawal. We conclude the award was reasonable. A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework An award of sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.) A trial court abuses its d...

. . previous country.” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), (ii).) 2 All undesignated statutory citations refer to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 with title 8 United States Code section 1101(a)(27)(J), 8 Code of Federal Regulations part 204.11 (2019), and Code of Civil Procedure section 155. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY O.C., now 14 years old, was born in Jutiapa, Guatemala. O.C. was 12 years old when her mother died. O.C.’s father became ill and depressed, and failed to provide O.C. w...

(Tedesco I, supra, E070316.)” (White v. Davis, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 280.) In March 2017, Gloria moved to disqualify Judge Cox on the grounds he made comments at a December 2016 hearing that “cause[d her] ‘to doubt that [he] would be able to be impartial’”15 and he provided advice to the parties in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(A).16 On March 21, 2017, Judge Cox recused himself under Code of Civil 14 The law firm of Ian Herzog (Herzog) and Evan D...

he offered “unsolicited advice,” and (4) she believed he “has a terrible opinion of [her], and is biased against [her].” To avoid the appearance of bias, Judge Cox recused himself. (Code, Civ. Proc, § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii) [A judge shall be disqualified if “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”].) According to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (b)(4): “If grounds for disqualification are first lea...

ng any changes to his estate plan, including taking him to any attorney, accountant, financial planner, or banker, or by acting (or purporting to act) as his attorney or representative. On April 28, 2020, the trial court (Hon. John G. Evans) denied the applications for temporary EAROs pending a hearing on the merits. Shortly thereafter each defendant successfully challenged Judge Evans under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and the matter was assigned to the Hon. Kenneth J. Fernandez. P...

te plan, including taking him to any attorney, accountant, financial planner, or banker, or by acting (or purporting to act) as his attorney or representative. (White v. Wear, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 31; White v. Davis, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 282.) 18 Prior to the hearing on the merits of the EAROs, defendants (except for Wear)19 successfully challenged Judge Evans under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and the matter was reassigned to the Hon. Kenneth J. Fernandez. (White v. D...

Accordingly, appellant has failed to carry his burden of showing that the alleged abuse of discretion prejudiced him. New Claims in Appellant’s Reply Brief Appellant makes two new claims in his reply brief. First, appellant claims that, because the Probate Court awarded sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, the amount of sanctions was limited to $1,500. Section 177.5 provides, “A judicial officer shall have the power to impose 11 reasonable money sanctions, not to excee...

ct that [decedent] had never transferred” property to them and “further concealed that fact by falsely representing they were” the owners of the property].) Accordingly, we find Asaro’s claim timely under the delayed discovery rule. 4. Real Property Jon hastily contends that because Asaro’s request for relief included return of the Adams Avenue Property to the Trust, the claim is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 318, which provides: “No action for the recovery of real property, or ...

ed: “The presumption may only by overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the objecting party has superior title or has obtained title by adverse possession. (Tobin, supra, at p. 953; Schoenfeld v. Pritzker (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 117, 122; Code Civ. Proc., § 325.)” The trial court concluded that the Pearce Parties had not rebutted the presumptions established by Evidence Code section 662 and Code of Civil Procedure section 321. On this point too, we agree with the trial court. Evidence C...

Cal.App.3d 705, 716 [“The parties are bound by the terms of the contract even if they do not read it”]), a signatory’s constructively charged knowledge at execution does not necessarily start the running of the statute of limitations for a reformation action. (Western Title Guar. Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 815, 825 (Western Title) [applying predecessor of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d)].) More accurately stated, the rule is—it de...

Cal.App.3d 705, 716 [“The parties are bound by the terms of the contract even if they do not read it”]), a signatory’s constructively charged knowledge at execution does not necessarily start the running of the statute of limitations for a reformation action. (Western Title Guar. Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 815, 825 (Western Title) [applying predecessor of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d)].) More accurately stated, the rule is—it de...

Ruth’s will did not sever the joint tenancy held by Ruth and Jack in the Gibson property; 2. Ruth’s estate did not have an interest in the Rosedale property; 3. The claims relating to Ruth’s interest in the Briggs Oil Co. partnership were barred by the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338;3 and 3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. 4. All claims seeking to recover interests in the Gibson and Rosedale properties were barred by t...

able does not apply.” Brian filed his original petition within one year of James’ death, and as discussed ante, the creditor’s claim was an amended version of the claim in the 14 original petition, so his claim is timely if the limitations period had not expired before James died. Therese implicitly accepts this, since she argues Brian’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 339 for oral contracts. Therese is correct that a two-year period...

“We review such questions of law and constitutional interpretation de novo.” (*Valley Baptist Church v. City of San Rafael* (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 401, 410.) Because we conclude AB 218 does not violate the gift clause, we need not consider whether it serves a public purpose. 5. Relevant Statutes and Legal Principles 1. Assembly Bill 218 At the beginning of 2019, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 required a childhood sexual abuse claim be brought “within eight years of the date the plaintif...

Code, § 825, subd. (e).) This borrowing and reference are consistent with our interpretation of section 818, and do not convey a legislative intent that this section should be interpreted in a manner that would be inconsistent with its plain language and fail to fully vindicate its apparent goals. B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 Having determined that in enacting Government Code section 818 the Legislature intended to shield public entities from damages under Civil Code section 3294 ...

B. Summary Judgment Proceedings 1. Motion for Summary Judgment Ginsberg moved for summary judgment on January 21, 2020 on two grounds: “The Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations,” and “There is no causal connection to any damages alleged.” On the statute of limitations ground, Ginsberg argued that Knapp’s claim was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which requires plaintiffs to commence malpractice actions against attorneys “within one year after the plaintiff d...

As has been explained, the objective characteristics of these awards establish that they qualify as a form of punitive or exemplary damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis, and 10 In supplemental briefing filed shortly before oral argument, plaintiff asserted that a recent amendment (Stats. 2022, ch. 442, § 3) to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, which prescribes the statute of limitations for claims of sexual abuse suffered as an adult, and legislative history materials associat...

[Citation.] In order for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” ’ ” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a) states, “If a person against whom an action may be brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tor...

Robbins for Defendant and Respondent. Petitioner and appellant Patricia C. Everett (Everett) filed a creditor’s claim against the estate of Richard Edison Holdaway, seeking repayment of sums she contends the decedent had owed her. When filed, the claim was timely and tolled the statute of 1 limitations for actions against a decedent, Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2. The son of the decedent, defendant and respondent Richard Everett Holdaway (Holdaway), in his capacity as the personal rep...

Given common last names, in this decision we refer to the parties and the decedent by their first names, except we refer to Kathleen and Bruce together as the Smiths. Emma filed a motion for summary adjudication in which she argued the Smiths’ petition to have the amendment declared valid was barred by the statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3 (section 366.3). Section 366.3, subdivision (a), states, “[i]f a person has a claim that arises from a promise or a...

(Cal. Judges Benchbook: Civil Proceedings Before Trial (CJER 2022) Parties, § 10.26 [“The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in the complaint to establish standing to sue.”]; Codoni v. Codoni (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 18, 21.) VI. Standing In California A. Code of Civil Procedure Section 367 Limon contends “California standing doctrine ‘simply requires that the action be maintained in the name of “[t]he person who has the right to sue under [the] substantive law,” ’ ” quoting Jasmine Network...

All we can discern from the record is that Crystal Jewelry requested three times to call Gonzalez and Padilla as remote witnesses at trial. The issue we must decide is whether defendants met their burden on appeal of showing the trial court abused its discretion in denying these requests. A party’s request to appear remotely at trial is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 367.75 (section 367.75). The statute provides that “the court may require a party or witness to appear in person” ...

992.) The Law Revision Commission Comments to Code of Civil Procedure, section 367 provide examples of “statutes that permit prosecution of an action in the name of a person other than the real party in interest” including “Civil Code Section 1363 (association to manage common interest development), Code of Civil Procedure Section 369 (fiduciaries), and Probate Code Sections 550-550 (insured claims).” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 13D pt. 2 West’s Ann. Code of Civ. Proc. (2022 ed.) foll. § 36...

de] Section 3600 ” shall authorize reimbursement of “reasonable expenses, medical or otherwise” to a “ parent of the mino r, the guardian ad litem, or the guardian of the estate of the minor or the conservator of the estate ,” including “costs[ ] and attorney’s fees.” (Prob. Code, § 3601, subd s. (a), (b)(1) .) The express language of Probate Code sections 3600 and 3601 , coupled with Code of Civil Procedure section 372, thus indicate s GALs are entitled to seek reimbursement for reasonable e...

(*In re Marriage of Caballero* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 \[“ ‘A guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, but merely a party’s representative \[citation\], an officer of the court \[citation\]. . . . “The duties of a guardian ad litem are essentially ministerial.” ’ ”\].) This distinction is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which allows a GAL to compromise or settle claims with court approval but does not confer authority over postsettlement fund management. (Cod...

(*In re Marriage of Caballero* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 \[“ ‘A guardian ad litem is not a party to the action, but merely a party’s representative \[citation\], an officer of the court \[citation\]. . . . “The duties of a guardian ad litem are essentially ministerial.” ’ ”\].) This distinction is set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which allows a GAL to compromise or settle claims with court approval but does not confer authority over postsettlement fund management. (Cod...

. (See In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, representing her. (We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s May 7, 2021 order terminating Patricia’s parental rights pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459.) That order, as well as all other orders made by the juvenile court while a guardian ad litem was in place, must be vacated. 9 The Department’s reliance on Code of Civil Procedure section 372, subdivision (a), to argue expediency alone is a sufficient basi...

. . at the election of the minor” (id. at p. 1339)—even when the guardian ad litem continues to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dictum. Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between Code of Civil Procedure section 372 and Family Code section 6710, we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson’s holding to the facts in this case. 69 D. Christine’s Additional Arguments At pages 102 to 1...

. . at the election of the minor” (id. at p. 1339)—even when the guardian ad litem continues to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dictum. Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between Code of Civil Procedure section 372 and Family Code section 6710, we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson’s holding to the facts in this case. 69 D. Christine’s Additional Arguments At pages 102 to 1...

As the court acknowledged, the Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress. However, with respect to mental incapacity, we find guidance in Probate Code section 810, which governs an individual’s ability to make decisions regarding the person’s assets, medical options, and whether to marry, and in Code of Civil Procedure section 372, subdivision (a)(4), which concerns an individual’s ability to make decisions regarding an ongoing action or proceeding. The contexts in which these P...

However, the appealed order states that Smith “cannot represent 25 [A.F.] in this proceeding,” and nothing before us indicates that has changed.9 Further, after the appointed GAL passed away, the court declined to appoint a new GAL.10 We observe that Code of Civil Procedure section 372, subdivision (b)(1)(C) permits a 12 year old to appear without a guardian, counsel, or GAL to seek a restraining order, but it also grants the court discretion to appoint a GAL to assist the minor in obtaining ...

same manner as an adult, except that a guardian must conduct the action or proceedings” (§ 6601, italics added) and with Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which requires minors, as well as those who lack legal capacity to make decisions, to appear by a guardian or GAL appointed by the court in which the proceeding is pending or by a judge in the case. Further, even Family Code section 6229 and Code of Civil Procedure section 374, which permit minors under age 12 to appear and request restr...

A169131 Barrow v. Holmes [^1]: Because Martin and Rhonda share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. [^2]: It appears that after Martin died a personal representative was not substituted as defendant in this lawsuit. In her declaration, Rhonda stated she was specially appearing to file the motion to vacate the judgment and was Martin’s successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. We conclude that Rhonda has standing to appeal. While Barrow does not challen...

Holmes* [^1]: Because Martin and Rhonda share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. [^2]: It appears that after Martin died a personal representative was not substituted as defendant in this lawsuit. In her declaration, Rhonda stated she was specially appearing to file the motion to vacate the judgment and was Martin's successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. We conclude that Rhonda has standing to appeal. While Barrow does not challenge appellate stan...

Holmes* [^1]: Because Martin and Rhonda share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. [^2]: It appears that after Martin died a personal representative was not substituted as defendant in this lawsuit. In her declaration, Rhonda stated she was specially appearing to file the motion to vacate the judgment and was Martin’s successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. We conclude that Rhonda has standing to appeal. While Barrow does not challenge appellate stan...

Holmes* [^1]: Because Martin and Rhonda share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. [^2]: It appears that after Martin died a personal representative was not substituted as defendant in this lawsuit. In her declaration, Rhonda stated she was specially appearing to file the motion to vacate the judgment and was Martin's successor in interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. We conclude that Rhonda has standing to appeal. While Barrow does not challenge appellate stan...

Fifth and finally, he asserts the court improperly calculated damages under section 859 and wrongly awarded those damages to Asaro rather than the Trust. A. Asaro Did Not Lack Standing Jon argues Asaro lacked standing to assert elder abuse claims on Antoinette’s behalf because he was not her “successor in interest,” as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(1), specifically authorizes elder abuse claims on behalf of a ...

4 Probate Code section 1000 states: “Except to the extent that [the Probate Code] provides applicable rules, the rules of practice applicable to civil actions . . . apply to, and constitute the rules of practice in, proceedings under this code.” 5 Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30 provides as relevant: “A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest, . . . and an action may be commenced b...

d person.” He argues, however, that Asaro must also qualify as a “successor in interest.” He relies on the prefatory language in Welfare 9 and Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(1) that states persons have standing “if the requirements of Section 377.32 of the Code of Civil Procedure are met.” Jon maintains that anyone advancing a claim on behalf of a decedent must comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32, which sets out a procedural requirement for any “person who s...

to her medical condition, awarded plaintiffs $15,057 in economic damages, and added Holdings as a judgment debtor as the alter ego of and/or successor in interest to CWG, which had been dissolved. The court determined punitive damages were warranted, found Lopez’s noneconomic damages to be in the $100,000 to $150,000 range but not recoverable by plaintiffs after her death due to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34,1 and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 a...

(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049 involved a claim that a defendant was “guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [elder or dependent adult] abuse . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) Upon a sufficient showing of such misconduct, the plaintiffs could recover attorney fees and costs as well as pain and suffering damages that otherwise would have been prohibited under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657, subds. (a), (b).) The Court ...

Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11’s definition of a successor in interest includes a successor in interest to a cause of action or item of property. Sections 19400 and 19402 establish that the trustee and trust beneficiaries are the decedent’s successors in interest to trust property for the purposes of claims when there is no personal representative. Code of Civil Procedure section 377.40 is therefore consistent with sections 19400 and 19402. Second, Therese cites Arluk, which stated, “...

Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 did not involve Government Code section 818 or a treble damages provision. It instead addressed whether the double damages authorized under Probate Code section 859 for the improper taking, concealment, or disposal of a vulnerable person’s property were a kind of punitive or exemplary damages that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.42, cannot be recovered against the successor of a deceased defendant. (Hill, at pp. 1285–1286.) H...

agree and assent to enter into this Agreement.” (Italics added.) The children’s wrongful death claims are not derivative of Trudy’s causes of action, which are within the purview of the plain language in the arbitration agreement. In California, a wrongful death claim is personal and lies independent of survivor claims. “ ‘Unlike some jurisdictions wherein wrongful death actions are derivative, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 “creates a new cause of action in favor of the heirs as bene...

The trial court found that Richard lacked standing to prosecute the 270 Action because he was not a party to the Tukes Action. Even if he could now establish that he may have had standing to become a party to the Tukes Action, it would not change the fact that he did not, in fact, become a party to the Tukes Action, for the reasons herein discussed. 9 Code of Civil Procedure section 387 governs intervention. It provides that the nonparty seeking intervention “shall petition the court for leav...

McKee has a law office in Northern California, but spends most of his time in his Southern California office. Warga “was the primary contact for living trusts in the Northern California office.” Jay, who assisted his mother in obtaining the trust, told Warga that Hanako wanted “just trust for home” and was given a 3 The appealability of the order awarding attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38 was not briefed by the parties. At our request, the parties submitted supplement...

a lis pendens to “reasonable attorney[] fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney[] fees and costs unjust.” Gary appeals the probate court’s order requiring him to pay $4,500 in attorney fees incurred by William in successfully moving for expungement. Code of Civil Procedure section 405.39 provides that “[n]o order . . . under this chapter [Code Ci...

The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated the Song-Beverly Act and breached Forest River’s express limited warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability by failing to perform necessary repairs to the trailer and failing to replace the defective trailer. (Civ. Code, § 1790, et seq.) In March 2024, Forest River filed a motion to stay the proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30 based on a forum selection clause contained in the Forest River limited warranty f...

Even though Bewley did make a general appearance, the trial court did not err by vacating the default sua sponte. A general appearance does not retroactively validate a default entered earlier. (In re Marriage of Smith (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 543, 547-552.) As mentioned, Code of Civil Procedure section 410.50, subdivision (a) merely provides that a general appearance is the equivalent of service of summons. Subdivision (b) then provides, “Jurisdiction of the court over the parties and the subje...

Nor does section 527.6 state personal service is preferred, but other means of service may be employed if personal service is not feasible. Provisions of the Probate Code make clear that we cannot simply attribute to legislative oversight the absence of any provision authorizing the court to utilize Code of Civil Procedure section 413.30 if personal service in a restraining order case has proved unsuccessful. Probate Code section 1215 provides for service of notices and other papers in probat...

Kenton argues the trial court erred by granting Hilja’s motion to dismiss his complaint, denying him discovery to oppose the motion, and providing inadequate notice of the hearing on the motion. On all points, we disagree. 1. Dismissal under the Anti-SLAPP Statute Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (hereafter, section 425.16), commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, provides a motion procedure for weeding out, early in a litigation, meritless claims challenging the exercise of constitut...

Ct. No. 17CIV05074) Representative, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants. Defendants Aaron Wong and Tianqi Liu, as personal representatives of the Estate of Sylvia Tang and co-trustees of the Sylvia Tang Trust (collectively, the Tang Estate), appeal from a trial court order denying a special motion to strike under California’s anti- SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 The Tang Estate brought the motion after plaintiffs James Wong and Irene Wong, as personal representati...

In the first step, “the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from protected activity, which is defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) Second, if the defendant makes such a sh...

Bennett, M.D. Trust DTD 3/30/2001 (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2020, No. BP115475) (the 475 Action). We refer to this appeal as the 475 Appeal. The 475 Appeal also encompasses a cross-appeal by Richard and his counsel, Robert Brown. In the 270 Action, the trial court sustained special motions to strike Richard’s complaint against Tukes and her counsel, James Frieden, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)1 (i.e., anti-SLAPP motions). The trial court further awarded...

Our record contains no further order signed by the court. On November 2, 2022, Luo filed a notice of appeal from the trial court s October 25, 2022 minute order. 10 DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Granting Volokh s Anti-SLAPP Motion5 The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to combat a disturbing increase in strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs): lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom...

Plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in misconduct, including calling the police to report plaintiffs as squatters and filing an unlawful detainer action against them. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ special motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). We conclude plaintiffs have not carried their burden on appeal and affirm the order. **FACTUAL AND PROCEDU...

ASHLEY R. AMERIO, Defendant and Respondent. C101173 (Super. Ct. No. S-CV-0050336) Summary of the Appeal Gurman Bal (Bal) appeals from a trial court order granting Ashley R. Amerio’s (Amerio) motion to strike his complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The action arose out of (1) statements Amerio allegedly made to her law firm’s clients when Bal tried to obtain the representation of those clients after his employment with Amerio’s firm was termin...

(Id. at p. 294.) 19 Wear “did not file any response or paperwork, nor did she appear at the hearing. Rather, on July 29, 2020, the Herzog firm (Marshall) filed a document denominated as ‘NOTICE OF NON-SERVICE,’ which alleged that Wear had ‘not been served with process’ and, in the event she is served, she would file a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” (White v. Wear, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.) Thus, on July 30, 2020, the trial court (Judge Evans) gr...

Wickers (collectively, Attorneys). Carol alleged, inter alia, that McLaughlin and Attorneys brought the probate proceeding against the Maleti Respondents without probable cause and with malice, and that the claims alleged in that proceeding were terminated in their favor on the merits. Attorneys filed a special motion to strike the two claims alleged in the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (special motion to strike, or anti-SLAPP motion). 2 There was no dispute that the ...

Wickers (collectively, Attorneys). Carol alleged, inter alia, that McLaughlin and Attorneys brought the probate proceeding against the Maleti Respondents without probable cause and with malice, and that the claims alleged in that proceeding were terminated in their favor on the merits. Attorneys filed a special motion to strike the two claims alleged in the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (special motion to strike, or anti-SLAPP motion).2 There was no dispute that the c...

Saletta and Caryn Saletta I hereby leave my shares of the Norbert Theodore Eimers’ Family Trust under the power of appointment. I also leave all my other property and any funds I have.” On October 30, 2018, trustee filed a demurrer to the first amended petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e). He alleged sections 631, subdivision (b) and 632 prohibited addition of the requested phrase. He asked the trial court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend....

Stratos 2000 Trust, including an amendment that named William Goebner as successor trustee. (Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Two days before a noticed hearing on the petition — and more than four months after the petition had been served — Goebner filed a demurrer, seeking to dismiss McDonald’s claims. The trial court overruled the demurrer as untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, which requires a demurrer to be filed within 30 days after service of...

Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).) Finally, we reject McDonald’s assertion that Goebner is estopped from invoking the Probate Code deadline because his counsel met and conferred with opposing counsel in compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure prior to 2 We have no occasion in this case to address whether, or how, the portion of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 addressing an extension of time may be harmonized with the timeline in section 1043. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(2).)...

17, 2021, denying the First Amended Petition to Vacate Order Establishing Conservatorship etc., without prejudice to the parties’ further discussion in their briefs of whether this court’s holding in case No. E070316 pertains to Gloria.” II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review. “A motion to strike a pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 19, 23.) A trial court’s decision denyi...

teral meaning if it results in absurd consequences unintended by the Legislature].) He contends that, under Goebner’s reading of the statute, the phrase “response or objection” must include motions for summary judgment. Consequently, a party filing such a motion could simply present it orally or in writing at or before the hearing rather than adhering to the deadlines or notice requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. This argument finds no support in the statute. Section 1043...

. . . But you failed to do that because you believe that a deposition of your client is the same as a declaration. And that is a fatal error.” The Hospital tacitly concedes that excluding Berry’s deposition was error. The summary judgment statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), expressly authorizes the use of depositions in the opposition. And while the court has discretion to enforce the Rules of Court, it does not have discretion to raise its own evidentiary objec...

Authority to make a “showing” prerequisite to Waste Connections’s “production” of documents—i.e., rejection of the need for the Authority to present evidence on a contested issue of fact before entry of 12 judgment in its favor—overlooks the fundamental requirement that a claim in court must be proven. And it ignores the law of judgment on the pleadings. The Law and the Standard of Review Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides that a plaintiff can move for judgmen...

Authority to make a “showing” prerequisite to Waste Connections’s “production” of documents—i.e., rejection of the need for the Authority to present evidence on a contested issue of fact before entry of 12 judgment in its favor—overlooks the fundamental requirement that a claim in court must be proven. And it ignores the law of judgment on the pleadings. The Law and the Standard of Review Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides that a plaintiff can move for judgmen...

action to pursue her appeal from the fees order in the last two and a half years, we treat that appeal as forfeited and affirm the order denying her request for fees. (*In re A.C.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672–673 \[points not raised by an appellant are forfeited\].) 2. **Judgment on the Pleadings** “In reviewing the trial court’s grant of the motions for judgment on the pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (b)(1), we apply the same rules governing the review of ...

He asserts the court struck the complaint because he had not served his second amended complaint. He argues that because the County had refused to accept service and had not at that time filed an answer or demurrer to his second amended complaint, he was entitled under Code of Civil Procedure section 472 to file the third amended complaint as a matter of right. In other words, plaintiff contends he was entitled to file an amended pleading as a matter of right before a defendant files an answe...

As a result, Torres has not stated a cause of action under the CLRA or for declaratory relief. II. LEAVE TO AMEND* A. Standard of Review Torres contends that because the standards of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings are the same as applied to a demurrer, the issue of whether amendment should be permitted is open on appeal. Torres cites Code of Civil Procedure section 472c, subdivision (a), which states: “When any court makes an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to ame...

Although intervener Mortgage Assets Management LLC (MAM LLC) raised a legitimate question as to whether the Trust has any independent legal existence separate from Dupree—a potentially fatal jurisdictional defect—the defect was easily curable by allowing Dupree to substitute into the case by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court could have, and on this record should have, followed the traditional default rule that amendments to a complaint should b...

Although intervener Mortgage Assets Management LLC (MAM LLC) raised a legitimate question as to whether the Trust has any independent legal existence separate from Dupree—a potentially fatal jurisdictional defect—the defect was easily curable by allowing Dupree to substitute into the case by amendment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). The court could have, and on this record should have, followed the traditional default rule that amendments to a complaint should b...

This assertion does not persuade. First, Michael and Joseph’s so-called forewarning appeared in their motion to stay the involuntary dissolution causes of action filed six months before their stipulation to include the UCNP entities in the appraisal and buyout they failed to appeal directly from the order, file a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), or file a collateral action challenging the order. (Schrage I, supra, B288478.) 27 proceeding, and it made no menti...

Accordingly, under section 1306, the court entered summary judgment against Surety on July 31, 2020. The clerk mailed notice of entry of judgment in the amount of the bond, plus $435 in court costs, to Surety on August 3, 2020. On August 17, 2020, Surety filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment and to reinstate and extend the bail bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). Surety stated that the statewide shelter-in-place order issued by Governor Gavin Newsom 3 i...

Freeman’s counsel stated his client’s position that the case was dismissed by operation of law. Neither party’s counsel nor the court raised the existence of the judgment signed by the court the prior month. The court dismissed the case without objection from either party. On October 22, 2018, Freeman moved to set aside the judgment signed in July under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and Family Code section 2105. Brendon, acting as the proposed administrator of Patricia’s estate and repr...

v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian).) Appellant points to an appeal he filed in August 2023, arising from his motion to vacate the March 2019 order. We dismissed his appeal because the Probate Code does not allow appeals from the denial of a motion made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (Conservatorship of Martin, B333262 \[nonpub. dismissal order filed Aug. 12, 2025\].) This court never had jurisdiction to consider the appeal; therefore, further probate court proceedings ...

v. Delfino* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (*Varian*).) Appellant points to an appeal he filed in August 2023, arising from his motion to vacate the March 2019 order. We dismissed his appeal because the Probate Code does not allow appeals from the denial of a motion made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (*Conservatorship of Martin,* B333262 \[nonpub. dismissal order filed Aug. 12, 2025\].) This court never had jurisdiction to consider the appeal; therefore, further probate court proceed...

v. Delfino* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (*Varian*).) Appellant points to an appeal he filed in August 2023, arising from his motion to vacate the March 2019 order. We dismissed his appeal because the Probate Code does not allow appeals from the denial of a motion made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (*Conservatorship of Martin,* B333262 \[nonpub. dismissal order filed Aug. 12, 2025\].) This court never had jurisdiction to consider the appeal; therefore, further probate court proceed...

be summarized as: (1) whether the trial court properly granted nonsuit and erroneously denied her a trial by jury; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing Mazda to replace the water pump belt before inspecting the vehicle; and (3) whether costs were properly awarded in the judgment. Hegerle mentions other issues throughout her brief, such as whether she should have been granted relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 for her counsel’s failure to file the trial documents as the ...

. . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 482.040.) In her third cause of action for financial elder abuse, Royals pleads as follows: “The Court should award damages according to proof, but on information and belief at least $1,095,000, against [Lu] for her financial elder abuse.” This allegation fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 482.040. To the extent Royals’s attachment application attempted to rely upon it, the application was not based on facts within her personal knowledge. Second, a...

483.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as noted above, is the limiting statute restricting the scope of the Attachment Law to contract claims for damages, absent a statutory exception. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.01 is such an exception. The first sentence of this statute extends the remedy of attachment to financial elder abuse “action[s] for damages” under the Act by disabling Code of Civil Procedure section 483.010 (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.01), while the second sentenc...

We construe it in the context of the Elder Abuse Act to mean claimed liability for compensatory damages, consistent with the evident purpose expressed by the Legislature in authorizing attachment as a means to facilitate make-whole relief via return of money or property. To the extent Royals’s attachment request was based on her demand for punitive damages, it did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 483.015, subdivision (a)(1) of the Attachment Law because a demand for punitive da...

[¶] On the contrary, California authority supports the conclusion that a suit by a citizen in the undifferentiated public interest is ‘justiciable,’ or appropriate for decision in a California court.” (Ibid., citing White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 762 (White) [rejecting a challenge to taxpayer standing as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 526a].) As is relevant here, National Paint merely stands for the proposition that the Legislature may grant standing to sue in the public’s ...

Plaintiff ultimately agreed to entry of judgment as to all allegations except the section 1090 violation. Defendants then argued that plaintiff lacked standing as to that issue, citing San Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 679 (San Bernardino). Plaintiff argued it had standing under section 1092 and Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.3 Plaintiff also mentioned it had timely filed its action under the validation statutes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 860 et seq.) The trial co...

Affirmed. Queen Searles, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance by Defendant and Respondent. ___________________________ The superior court dismissed Queen Searles’s petition for a civil harassment restraining order when she was unable to personally serve Michael Archangel with a copy of the petition and notice of hearing as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (m).1 On appeal Searles argues the court erred in denying her motion to waive traditional...

es of Court, rule 8.25(b)(5) [if envelope shows document was mailed or inmate delivered document to custodial officials for mailing within the period for filing the document, document is deemed timely filed even if clerk receives it late].) II. Amended Pleading Brian contends the trial court erred in dismissing his case for failing to file an amended petition after Therese’s demurrer. We agree. Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2) provides that a court “may dismiss the comp...

The trial court ordered Scott to serve URM with notice of the proceeding and denied Scott’s request for leave to serve URM by delivering notice to the Secretary of State. Two years after Scott appealed, the court found that Scott had neither properly served URM nor diligently attempted to do so, and dismissed the matter for delay in prosecution pursuant to, among other authorities, Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420.[^1] Scott contends that the trial court erroneously denied his request ...

Chen’s Petition for Approval of the First GAL Agreement On November 12, 2018, Chen filed a petition for an order approving the first GAL agreement. A trial on Chen’s petition took place in April and May 2019. After Chen rested his case, Christine made a motion for nonsuit, which the court treated as a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. On July 18, 2019, the court granted Christine’s motion and denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement. Chen, ...

16 F. Chen’s Petition for Approval of the First GAL Agreement On November 12, 2018, Chen filed a petition for an order approving the first GAL agreement. A trial on Chen’s petition took place in April and May 2019. After Chen rested his case, Christine made a motion for nonsuit, which the court treated as a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. On July 18, 2019, the court granted Christine’s motion and denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement. ...

981.) “ ‘Without a statement of decision, the judgment is effectively insulated from review by the substantial evidence rule,’ as we would have no means of ascertaining the trial court’s reasoning or determining whether its findings on disputed factual issues support the judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at pp. 981–982.) “In rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632, a trial court is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts; only when it...

“The trial court is not required to make an express finding of fact on every factual matter controverted at trial, where the statement of decision sufficiently disposes of all the basic issues in the case.” (Bauer v. Bauer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1118.) “[A] trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required to state only ultimate rather than evidentiary facts because findings of ultimate facts necessarily include findings on all intermedia...

he defendant’s property caused the plaintiff's injuries, but also found that this condition did not create a reasonable, foreseeable risk of the kind of injury the plaintiff suffered\].) “Where the jury’s findings are so inconsistent that they are incapable of being reconciled and it is impossible to tell how a material issue is determined, the decision is ‘“against law”’ within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 657. \[Citation.\] ‘“The inconsistent verdict rule is based upon the...

the Department urged the court to deny the petition as procedurally improper and untimely; and Samuel’s counsel stated she had no objection to setting the petition for hearing on the same day as the upcoming six-month review hearing, as several of the issues would overlap. Accepting the Department’s argument the section 388 petition was procedurally improper and an untimely new trial motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 659, the court summarily denied the petition without deciding whe...

. . for failure to do the act within the time commanded” ’ ” (*Kabran*, *supra*, 2 Cal.5th at p. 343) and “whether the consequences of holding a time limitation mandatory or jurisdictional ‘would defeat or promote the purpose of the enactment.’ ” (*Ibid*.) In *Kabran*, the Supreme Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 659 and former section 660, governing procedures for a motion for new trial, included “clear markers of legislative intent that their respective deadlines are jurisdic...

deration) restricts the window for the Board to respond to a petition for reconsideration and requires prompt action by a litigant wishing to seek judicial review of the Board’s action or denial (§ 5950) but lacks express effect *depriving* the appeals board of its power to act after that time. (See *Law Finance*, *supra*, 14 Cal.5th at p. 951.) This silence distinguishes former section 5909 from Code of Civil Procedure section 660, examined in *Kabran*, where our high court observed the stat...

The first GAL agreement recited Chen’s approval of the oral settlement agreement and set forth additional terms. Christine sought to cancel and repudiate the agreements through a variety of procedural methods. The court granted the co-trustees’ motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, but denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement. Chen, the co-trustees, and certain trust beneficiaries—but not Christine—subsequently enter...

The first GAL agreement recited Chen’s approval of the oral settlement agreement and set forth additional terms. Christine sought to cancel and repudiate the agreements through a variety of procedural methods. The court granted the co-trustees’ motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, but denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement. Chen, the co-trustees, and certain trust beneficiaries—but not Christine—subsequently enter...

The administrators of the estate—Mulyadi’s surviving spouse and his son—rejected the creditor claim. The dispute was ultimately resolved at mediation and the parties executed a settlement agreement fully resolving Haryati’s claims against the estate. Haryati then brought a motion to enforce the agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.[^2] The trial court granted the motion, and the administrators of the estate now appeal, arguing the settlement agreement was procured by fraud an...

(Id. at pp. 1525–1526.) Similarly, Appel relied on the nature of a revocable living trust to hold that settlors and trustees of such a trust who lived in the subject property were entitled to protection under the homestead exemption to the enforcement of judgments under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.910. (Appel, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1813.) Even though “the homestead exemption applies only to the property of natural persons,” Appel concluded that the exemption should be construed ...

. . shall be published below the First Amended Summons in the newspaper publications.” The proofs of service showed that the published notices did not include the legal description or the street address of the property; in accordance with the order, however, they did include the APN. This did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 763.020. Service by publication requires strict compliance with the applicable statutes. (County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 443, ...

Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268.) 3 SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. Plaintiff appealed. In the Court of Appeal, the parties agreed that Code of Civil Procedure section 863 did not provide plaintiff an independent right of action to assert a section 1090 violation.4 As to whether plaintiff could proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, plaintiff argued that it could, while de...

She contends that she owns part of the property independent of the outcome of the probate proceedings and that the probate court has yet to determine whether she or the siblings own the other part. Thus, in her view, the siblings could not have been “owner[s] of an estate of inheritance” in the property as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 872.210 to bring a partition claim. 1 We agree that the uncertainty concerning ownership of the property means the siblings lacked standing to br...

She contends that she owns part of the property independent of the outcome of the probate proceedings and that the probate court has yet to determine whether she or the siblings own the other part. Thus, in her view, the siblings could not have been “owner[s] of an estate of inheritance” in the property as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 872.210 to bring a partition claim.1 We agree that the uncertainty concerning ownership of the property means the siblings lacked standing to bri...

The court ultimately agreed with MAM LLC, reversed course, and denied leave to amend. Explaining that it normally takes a liberal attitude toward motions for leave to amend, the court stated that “the case is void. I actually lack authority to make the amendment.” Dupree, an aggrieved party under Code of Civil Procedure section 902, appealed from the ensuing judgment.2 The notice of appeal named FFSF “et al.” as respondents, and CIT Bank and MAM LLC (collectively MAM) appeared and jointly fil...

The court ultimately agreed with MAM LLC, reversed course, and denied leave to amend. Explaining that it normally takes a liberal attitude toward motions for leave to amend, the court stated that “the case is void. I actually lack authority to make the amendment.” Dupree, an aggrieved party under Code of Civil Procedure section 902, appealed from the ensuing judgment.2 The notice of appeal named FFSF “et al.” as respondents, and CIT Bank and MAM LLC (collectively MAM) appeared and jointly fil...

we filed that opinion, she applied ex parte in the trial court for an order vacating the RTAO, and the trial court granted the requested vacatur the same day. Expressing a desire to relieve us of the need to devote resources to Lu’s appeal of the 7 The Probate Code has its own appealability regime. (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2021), ¶ 2:190 [Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(10) “defers to specific Probate Code provisions on the appea...

The existence of an appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. A reviewing court must raise the issue on its own initiative whenever a doubt exists as to whether the trial court has entered a final judgment or other order or judgment made appealable by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1. (*Jennings v. Marralle* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) The right to appeal is statutory. (*Gastelum v. Remax Internat*., Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1021 (Gastelum).) Section 904...

IV Attorney Fees QCH argues the attorney fee award should be reduced for various reasons, and Myers argues we lack jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the fee award because QCH did not appeal it. Myers is correct. “The right to appeal is conferred by statute. \[Citation.\] Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a) lists appealable judgments and orders. These include ‘an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1).’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) (s...

At the hearing on October 18, 2019, the trial court, on its own motion, quashed the service by publication, finding that it was “improper,” and set aside the default. There was no court reporter at that hearing.5 II APPEALABILITY Preliminarily, Bewley contends that the trial court’s order is not appealable. Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3), provides that “an order granting a motion to quash service of summons” is appealable. (See also Templeton 4 Bewley now describes ...

The court determined Lynne owed Mildred $27,035.89 in costs, and owed Jane and Gwen $69,218.20 in costs. The trial court issued an amended judgment which included the specific amounts Lynne owed to respondents for attorneys’ fees and costs. Lynne timely filed a notice of appeal of the amended judgment and the order on the motion to strike costs, appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). II. DISCUSSION8 A. Attorneys’ Fees Lynne argues that the trial court erre...

& Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subds. (a)–(c)), but is not itself a probate order, is appealable under Code of 9 Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(5). 7 The prior orders on Royals’s demurrer and Lu’s demurrer and motion to strike are appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 906. 8 II. DISCUSSION A. Motion To Dismiss In our opinion affirming the interpleader order, we had no occasion to assess the merits of the claims Royals alleges in her petition, but we left no doubt that, on...

In an apparent effort to buttress her motion to dismiss, Royals filed (1) a motion to augment the record on appeal, (2) a request for judicial notice of the discharge of the writ of attachment, and (3) a motion to take additional evidence on appeal under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 so that we may consider various email communications between counsel for the parties concerning Royals’s offer to “release” the writ of attachment and Lu’s acceptance of that offer. Royals’s primary argumen...

et al., Minors. 2d Juv. No. B316261 (Super. Ct. No. T000117) (Ventura County) AIDA R., Petitioner and Respondent, V. E.O. et al., Objectors and Appellants. California Code of Civil Procedure section 909 allows a reviewing court to admit evidence not adduced at trial.! ! Code of Civil Procedure section 909 reads, “In all cases where trial by jury is not a matter of right or where trial by jury has been waived, the reviewing court may make factual determinations contrary to or in addition to th...

et al., Minors. 2d Juv. No. B316261 (Super. Ct. No. T000117) (Ventura County) AIDA R., Petitioner and Respondent, V. E.O. et al., Objectors and Appellants. California Code of Civil Procedure section 909 allows a reviewing court to admit evidence not adduced at trial. ! ! Code of Civil Procedure section 909 reads, “In all cases where trial by jury is not a matter of right or where trial by jury has been waived, the reviewing court may make factual determinations contrary to or in addition to t...

(Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [“Until remittitur issues, the lower court cannot act upon the reviewing court’s decision; remittitur ensures in part that only one court has jurisdiction over the case at any one time.”].) Once an appeal is perfected, an automatic stay goes into effect under Code of Civil Procedure section 916 preventing all further trial court proceedings that may undermine the effectiveness of the appeal, including “enforcement of the judgment or or...

The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian) [discussing Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a)].) In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon t...

The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian) [discussing Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a)].) In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon t...

ority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of contempt," and the record supports that explanation.61 The superior court's writ of mandate required the District to withdraw the 2013 EDP. The District asked the superior court to recognize that the automatic stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 916 applied pending its appeal; Abatti contended that the stay di...

ority" that "to preserve her right to appeal, [appellant] was required to defy the court's order"].) The District contends that it repealed the 2013 EDP because of the "threat of contempt," and the record supports that explanation.61 The superior court's writ of mandate required the District to withdraw the 2013 EDP. The District asked the superior court to recognize that the automatic stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 916 applied pending its appeal; Abatti contended that the stay di...

8 When the evidence is not in dispute, subject matter jurisdiction is a legal issue, which we review de novo. (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42.) The court disqualified A.F.’s first retained attorney, Castro, an order which A.F. appealed. At the time of the hearing at which the court appointed a “minor’s counsel” in the DV matter, that appeal was pending. Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a) explains that the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the ...

. . the judgment or order appealed from,” on the other hand. While in general, enforcement is deemed to be embraced within matters affected by the judgment or order appealed from under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), the exception carves enforcement matters out of this category where no bond is obtained. If the Code of Civil Procedure section 917.65 reservation of jurisdiction were read to encompass not just enforcement but vacatur, the exception would swallow the genera...

At trial, Jones demanded five percent of the value of the bracelet business, which he valued at over $30 million. 3 breach of partnership agreement claim, Jones asserted he was “damaged in an amount equal to his share of the distributions taken by the Defendants.” Defendants denied all of Jones’s allegations. Prior to trial, Defendants made an offer to compromise of over $300,000 under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Jones declined the offer. Also prior to trial, Defendants moved for sum...

We consider only the motion to intervene, because we agree that it was a general appearance. A motion to intervene does not question the jurisdiction of the court. To the contrary, it affirmatively asks the court to exercise jurisdiction. Thus, it recognizes the authority of the court to proceed. Bewley cites Code of Civil Procedure section 1014, which lists certain actions, such as filing an answer, which constitute a general appearance; he then argues that he did not take any of the listed ...

Although the court ultimately found Suffolk had made a prima facie showing that it incurred fees to defend against the subcontractor actions, the court determined Suffolk could not recover those fees under a breach of contract theory against the District. The court determined there was no persuasive authority to deviate from Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 (section 1021), which provides that each party is to pay its own attorney fees unless fee shifting is authorized by statute or agreem...

We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Thompson’s due process cause of action. **C.** Thompson argues that the trial court erred in declining to issue the writ relief she requested: that the city review her second set of plans and omit the setback requirement under section 9-9.205. Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that a writ of mandate may be issued “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.” Thompson ...

We granted the applications, indicating that we would not consider newly raised issues. The parties filed answering briefs.6 DISCUSSION A. Standard of review A writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (i.e., an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d ...

We granted the applications, indicating that we would not consider newly raised issues. The parties filed answering briefs.6 DISCUSSION A. Standard of review A writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (i.e., an ordinary mandamus action) compels the "performance of a legal duty imposed on a government official." (Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. v. Maxxam Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380; see People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d ...

Dept. of Conservation)], which Circle K may use to try to equate the federal and state standing rules.” In a later section of this opinion, we address Limon’s characterization of the 11 statutory damages provision in the FCRA as “statutory penalties.” 22. Both Associated Builders and People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation involved writ petitions brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1086, which provides the writ “must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially intere...

. . , Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action. Thereafter, the Schwartzes filed a return, to which the Cohens filed a reply.2 2 Because the return does not contain a demurrer or a verified answer, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b)(1) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1089, the Cohens 5 We invited the City of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities (collectively, the City Amici) to file briefs as amici curiae to a...

. . , Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action. Thereafter, the Schwartzes filed a return, to which the Cohens filed a reply.2 2 Because the return does not contain a demurrer or a verified answer, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b)(1) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1089, the Cohens assert it should be stricken. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5 We invited the City of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities (coll...

to the independent judgment standard of review under section 1094.5. The court concluded Conservatorship of O.B. did not “overturn[] the standard to be applied by the trial court in reviewing an administrative proceeding pursuant to a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.” (Yazdi, at p. 33.) Two reasons informed the court’s decision. First, the court relied on the nature of the proceeding before our Supreme Court, explaining “[t]he [Conserva...

to the independent judgment standard of review under section 1094.5. The court concluded Conservatorship of O.B. did not “overturn[] the standard to be applied by the trial court in reviewing an administrative proceeding pursuant to a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.” (Yazdi, at p. 33.) Two reasons informed the court’s decision. First, the court relied on the nature of the proceeding before our Supreme Court, explaining “[t]he [Conserva...

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a proposed decision finding Breeze was a common law employee of the City, and his employment violated the applicable postretirement employment rules,[^5] and CalPERS adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision in its entirety. 3. *The trial court proceedings* Breeze and the City challenged the decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. They argued the evidence did not support the finding that Breeze was a...

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a proposed decision finding Dowswell was a common law employee of the City, and his employment violated the postretirement employment rules,[^4] and CalPERS adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision in its entirety.[^5] 3. *The trial court proceedings* Dowswell challenged the decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. He argued the evidence did not support the finding that he was a common law employee a...

Jones contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to plaintiff and respondent Sierra Asset Investments, LLC (Sierra). Sierra had acquired Jones’s residence at a trustee’s sale, and it sought to have Jones removed from the premises. Jones contends he introduced evidence of triable issues of material fact on the elements of an unlawful detainer action set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a. (Statutory section references that follow are to the Code of Civil Procedure....

Wolflick and Theodore S. Khachaturian for Defendant and Appellant. Moon Law Group, Kane Moon, Christopher L. Garcia and Sara Salinas for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________ After an employer failed to pay arbitration costs within 30 days of the due date, the employee filed a motion to withdraw from arbitration and litigate in state court as permitted under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97.1 The trial court found the employer breached the arbitration agreement and ...

. . the effect shall be a denial of the motion without further order of the court’ ” and “ ‘\[t\]he times specified . . . shall not be extended by order or stipulation.’ ” (*Ibid*.) By contrast, in *Law Finance*, the Supreme Court concluded that the 100-day deadline in Code of Civil Procedure section 1288.2 for a party to file a request to vacate an arbitration award after service of the final award in response to a petition to confirm an award did not affect the court’s fundamental jurisdict...

IV. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Wrongful Death Defendants also challenge the trial court’s ruling that the arbitration agreements are not enforceable against plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim. We are not persuaded. In Ruiz v. Podolsky, supra, 50 Cal.4th 838 (Ruiz), the Supreme Court held all heirs in wrongful death actions are bound by arbitration agreements under Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, when the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind the heirs. (Id. at p. 841; Holland v...

or failure to assert claim before probate court; judgment in rem and final distribution decree did not settle third party s claim; probate court had no jurisdiction to determine dispute between heirs and third persons].) The distribution decree thus did not invalidate the previously executed deed. In *In re Estate* of Burton (1892) 93 Cal. 459 (Burton), the court held that the enactment of former Code of Civil Procedure section 1664, a predecessor to section 11700, was an express authorizatio...

Citing Orange County Water District v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96 (Orange County), Lynne also argues that the trial court could not have found bad faith because she relied on her experts’ conclusions. In Orange County, the appellate court considered whether a party should be required to pay the costs of litigation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 after failing to admit certain fact-specific requests for admission (RFA) during discovery. (Orange County, a...

Experts must be listed in an expert designation to be permitted to provide expert opinion testimony at trial. In addition, should the physician testify, an expert witness declaration is required. (Kalaba, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) However, treating physicians are not “retained experts” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, subdivision (b), and no expert declaration is required when a party intends to call a treating physician for the purpose of eliciting exp...

Experts must be listed in an expert designation to be permitted to provide expert opinion testimony at trial. In addition, should the physician testify, an expert witness declaration is required. (Kalaba, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) However, treating physicians are not “retained experts” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, subdivision (b), and no expert declaration is required when a party intends to call a treating physician for the purpose of eliciting exp...

. 639.) “More complicated decisions and transactions . . . require greater mental function.” (Andersen v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, 730.) The agreement here was a relatively complex five-page document that included legal terms, referred to several statutes, and waived the constitutional right to trial. While Probate Code sections 811 and 812 provide a “baseline” for capacity to contract, “Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b), provides more specific guidelines for determining the capa...

hat she wanted to take the debtor examination to show that Gregory, Jennifer, and Scuderi were tenants under the theater lease, and therefore they were liable for the loss of Halo’s painting. However, once Scuderi filed his contractual interference action, Halo was “unable to continue with the small claims court case.” Further, Halo’s conduct in filing the small claims action was privileged under Civil Code section 47; Scuderi’s voluntary dismissal of his action against Halo was a favorable t...

defendants’ prosecution of the unlawful detainer action, defendants contacting the police and an investigative agency, and communications made in anticipation of litigation. Defendants asserted plaintiffs could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits because the conduct complained of in these causes of action was “absolutely privileged” under the litigation privilege embodied in Civil Code section 47. Plaintiffs filed a “combined opposition” to defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion ...

erary Agency, Inc.* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 179.) “Statements that ‘bear\[\] no relationship to’ or ‘ha\[ve\] nothing to do with the claims under consideration’ in the litigation do not meet that standard. \[Citation.\]” (*Neville*, at p. 1264.) Though the protections of Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), are not coextensive with the litigation privilege contained in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), they serve similar policy interests and courts will look ...

egations from that petition, including allegations relating to the Petition for Instructions, the elder abuse lawsuit, and expenditure of trust funds to pursue the Petition for Instructions and fund the elder abuse lawsuit. Ashbrook argued Jonathan was suing him for bringing and funding litigation, which are protected activities under section 425.16(e)(1) and (2) under the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). In opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, Jonathan argued t...

e the Legislature appears to have provided more evidence of nonpunitive intent than exists here.11 Similarly distinguishable is Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 261 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority), in which the court considered a challenge to the imposition of statutory penalties under Civil Code section 52 for violations of Civil Code section 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976. The Court of Appeal in Los Angeles Tr...

ation on compensatory damages — and there the Legislature appears to have provided more evidence of nonpunitive intent than exists here.11 Similarly distinguishable is Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 261 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority), in which the court considered a challenge to the imposition of statutory penalties under Civil Code section 52 for violations of Civil Code section 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 197...

While living in Italy, Giacomo publicly acknowledged Carlo and Umberto as his own, and with Maddalena and Paul they “openly lived together as a family.” (Bassi, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 534.) Giacomo passed away in Italy in 1905. The petitioners in Bassi were the descendants of brothers and sisters of Giacomo. They claimed the California probate court erred by applying former Civil Code section 230 4 in finding that Carlo and Umberto were the legal 3 Historically, the law has used the term...

(Marsh, Finkle and Bishop, Marsh’s Cal. Corp. Law, (Aspen Pub. 2021), App. B Committee Reports, B.1.A., Assem. Select Com., Rep. on Revision of the Nonprofit Corp. Code, Aug. 27, 1979, Cross-reference Tables, Intro and Chart for Part II.) However, section 5142 was derived from former Corporations Code section 9505 (as added Stats 1947 ch. 1038) and former Civil Code section 605c (as added Stats 1931, ch. 871, § 1.) (Derivation Notes, Deering’s Ann. Corp. Code (2021 ed.) foll. § 5142.) These f...

An "appurtenance" is "something attached to something else," and has long been used in reference to land and easements. (Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019); ibid. ["appurtenant rights" cross-references to "secondary easement," one "appurtenant to the primary . . . easement; the right to do things . . . necessary to fully enjoy the easement"].) Accordingly, Civil Code section 662 defines an appurtenance to land as a "thing . . . deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right...

An "appurtenance" is "something attached to something else," and has long been used in reference to land and easements. (Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019); ibid. ["appurtenant rights" cross-references to "secondary easement," one "appurtenant to the primary . . . easement; the right to do things . . . necessary to fully enjoy the easement"].) Accordingly, Civil Code section 662 defines an appurtenance to land as a "thing . . . deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right...

e, there was insufficient evidence that at the time they acquired the Gibson property, Jack and Ruth mutually agreed to hold the property as community property, or that Jack consented to transmute the Gibson property from joint tenancy to community property.” C. Analysis of Claims Regarding Gibson Property 1. Ruth’s Will Did Not Sever the Joint Tenancy in the Gibson Property Under Civil Code Section 683.2, Subdivision (a)(2) The Pearce Parties challenge the trial court’s ruling as to the Gibs...

ssed, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the probate court, in part, for an order determining the trust instrument unreasonably restrained their ability to alienate their interests in the real property. Over Leticia s objection, the court granted Arturo and Sonia s requested relief and declared the amendment void. Because Silvia s amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of Civil Code section 711, we affirm the probate court s order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A....

They asserted that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by laches. The Maleti Respondents also argued that each of the five claims failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because (1) the Maleti Respondents “own no vested interest in . 27 any of the property at issue,” citing section 762.010 and Civil Code section 804; (2) Maleti, individually, never owned any interest in the properties at issue in the proceeding; and (3) the Maleti Respo...

They asserted that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by laches. The Maleti Respondents also argued that each of the five claims failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because (1) the Maleti Respondents “own no vested interest in . 27 any of the property at issue,” citing section 762.010 and Civil Code section 804; (2) Maleti, individually, never owned any interest in the properties at issue in the proceeding; and (3) the Maleti Respo...

)3 The 120-day pathway has three main components, which involve a preapplication notice, submitting the application for review by the County, and arranging for an inspector to monitor compliance with mitigation measures and applicable law after the application has been approved. Prior to submitting an application, the applicant must provide the surface owner the 30-day notice required by Civil Code section 848 and must 3 County contends that under either pathway, there is no discretionary rev...

real party in interest. In such a case it might justly be said that it has granted him ‘standing.’ ” (Jasmine Networks, supra, at p. 992.) The Law Revision Commission Comments to Code of Civil Procedure, section 367 provide examples of “statutes that permit prosecution of an action in the name of a person other than the real party in interest” including “Civil Code Section 1363 (association to manage common interest development), Code of Civil Procedure Section 369 (fiduciaries), and Probate ...

v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.* (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 232). ### Suffolk’s Substantial Performance of the Prime Contract Does Not Eliminate Its Duty To Substantially Comply With the Contract’s Conditions Precedent Relating to Claim Procedures #### *Background law* Three statutory provisions authorize the notice and claims procedures in the prime contract. Civil Code section 1511 authorizes parties to a contract to require written notice of an intention to claim an extension of time “...

10 (8) Benjamin “disclaims any further interest or rights or standing in Robert’s trust, with the exception of the Domingo property.” “All litigation between the parties . . . will be dismissed, with each side to bear their own costs and attorney fees.” No one admits liability and all parties “agree to a waiver of Civil Code section 1542.” (9) “[A]ll provisions of this agreement affecting the Minors’ interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem.” (10) “[T]he parties s...

10 (8) Benjamin “disclaims any further interest or rights or standing in Robert’s trust, with the exception of the Domingo property.” “All litigation between the parties . . . will be dismissed, with each side to bear their own costs and attorney fees.” No one admits liability and all parties “agree to a waiver of Civil Code section 1542.” (9) “[A]ll provisions of this agreement affecting the Minors’ interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem.” (10) “[T]he parties s...

Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1156 [reviewing the “Legislature’s use of the words ‘marital status’ ” in the Family and Probate Codes to determine the meaning of that word in a Government Code provision]; see also Pesce v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1958) 51 Cal.2d 310, 312; Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1428.) Civil Code section 1559, for example, provides that a “contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third p...

Agreement.” In light of this evidence, Ginsberg asserted, “section 1615 has no applicability whatsoever, and there is no causal connection to any damages as claimed in the Complaint.” Third, Ginsberg argued that Tinker “ratified the terms of the Premarital Agreement on multiple occasions.” Ginsberg contended that section 1615 renders a PMA signed without independent counsel involuntary, and that Civil Code section 1588 provides that contracts “voidable solely for want of due consent, may be r...

Freeman first contends that the MSA never became effective because the family court did not enter a judgment of dissolution, and could not have entered a judgment because it lost jurisdiction upon Patricia’s death. He argues that the MSA was void under Civil Code 1598 because it had a single purpose— entry of the judgment—which was wholly impossible of performance. This contention lacks merit. Civil Code section 1598 provides: “Where a contract has but a single object, and such object is unla...

Statute of frauds Finally, Therese contends the trial court properly dismissed Brian’s claim because it rests on oral contracts that violate the statute of frauds. We disagree. Therese contends the oral agreements come within the statute of frauds because James promised that both debts would be due in full upon his death. Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(5) provides that “[a]n agreement that by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of the promisor” is “invalid” unless i...

820 [parties who are jointly and severally liable may be sued in separate actions].) 29 3. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar Tukes’s Claims Against the Pitts Trustee Because She Adequately Pled Estoppel An agreement for a finder’s fee ordinarily must be in writing to be enforceable. This is because such agreements are subject to the statute of frauds, Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (a)(4). (Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 27 (Tenzer).) The statute of frauds applies to a...

Nor does she dispute that the prior allegations are properly considered in assessing the Bennett Trustee’s amenability to suit in the 475 Action. We therefore do consider the allegations. Tukes’s sole response is that her allegations in the Tukes Action create a presumption of joint and several liability by the Trustees and no contrary intention is shown. In support, Tukes relies on Civil Code section 1659, which provides that “[w]here all the parties who unite in a promise receive some benef...

According to Everett, appellants were represented by counsel at the mediation who approved the form of the settlement agreement. Appellants opposed Haryati’s motion. As relevant on appeal, appellants argued there were grounds to rescind the settlement agreement under Civil Code section 1689, subdivision (b). Specifically, appellants alleged Haryati fraudulently induced them to settle the case by sending them “fraudulent documents” shortly before the mediation that allegedly supported her clai...

(Ibid.) Indeed, such an addition would not have been clearly surplusage. Even the provisions cited by the majority show that the Legislature may modify the word “party” although the statutory language already references a contract. (See id. at p. 8 & fn. 7.) For instance, Civil Code section 1689 provides that “[a] contract may be rescinded if all the parties thereto consent.” (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (a), italics added; see also id., § 1559 [“[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a...

(e).) [^6]: For this reason, we need not reach the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, i.e., whether Miran met his burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of the cross-complaint. At oral argument, counsel for the Los argued Miran’s pool equipment was being operated illegally and the Los therefore cannot be liable for invasion of privacy pursuant to Civil Code section 1708.8, subdivision (l)(2). That section carves out from the scope of actionable invasion of privacy the ...

1. Duty of care owed to third parties “Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; accord, Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 398 (Gas Leak Cases).) The general rule governing duty of care is set forth in Civil Code section 1714. (Brown, at p. 213.) Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides, “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasi...

Finally, he asserts that in the context of a PMA, the “prevailing party” question is not just about money; here, the parties would not have married without a PMA and lived pursuant to the PMA’s terms during their marriage. Kim does not dispute the trial court’s finding that there was no prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. Under Civil Code section 1717, parties to a contract may provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717; DisputeSuite.com LLC...

Finally, he asserts that in the context of a PMA, the “prevailing party” question is not just about money; here, the parties would not have married without a PMA and lived pursuant to the PMA’s terms during their marriage. Kim does not dispute the trial court’s finding that there was no prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. Under Civil Code section 1717, parties to a contract may provide that the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. (Civ. Code, § 1717; DisputeSuite.com LLC...

City of Berkeley* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 177-178 (*Bowman*) \[attorney fees awarded despite court’s acknowledgment that plaintiffs’ case was “largely unsuccessful”\]; cf. *Buck v. Barb* (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 920, 926 \[that a party recovered “less than the amount he prayed for does not make his adversary the prevailing party within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717”\].) ### The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Attorney Fees Under Civil Code Section 9564 in the Third Phase As state...

tal owed a duty to specifically disclose the existence and amounts of the EMS Fee charged to emergency room patients in advance of providing treatment that would trigger such a fee and sought a legal determination that such a duty existed. The CLRA cause of action alleged Hospital’s practices relating to the disclosure and billing of EMS Fees violated paragraphs (5) and (14) of subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 1770 and sought injunctive relief. The declaratory relief cause of action was ...

ossession of marijuana that is two or more years old (Labor Code section 432.8); \[¶\] (6) In addition to the limitations provided in subsections (b)(1)–(5), employers that obtain investigative consumer reports such as background checks are also subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) and the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (Civil Code section 1786 et seq.).”[^5] On its face, regulation 11017.1 might appear to prohibit d...

ng two separate identities to pass \[Sterling’s\] background check on 03-04-2020.” Specifically, it alleges defendant submitted Levine’s sworn affidavit, which contained plaintiff’s protected criminal history and defendant’s allegations of plaintiff’s fraud, to the EEOC on December 3, 2020. The complaint also indicates numerous statutes and regulations that defendant allegedly violated, including Civil Code section 1786.18, which is part of ICRAA; section 12269 of title 2 of the California Co...

*EpicentRx* did not involve the issue presented here and decided in both *Lathrop* and *Hardy*: whether a post-dispute offer to stipulate to the application of unwaivable California law in the foreign jurisdiction is sufficient to salvage an otherwise unenforceable forum selection clause. [^2]: Civil Code section 1790.1 provides: “Any waiver by the buyer of consumer goods of the provisions of this chapter, except as expressly provided in this chapter, shall be deemed contrary to public policy...

36, 1142–1143 [deprivation of information, by itself, is not a cognizable injury under former Labor Code section 226].)16 Limon has failed to allege any concrete injury in connection with his claim of informational injury. Thus, his alleged informational injury is insufficient under California law to confer upon him standing to pursue his claim in state court. We 15 Under subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 1798.83, a business that supplies personal information of its customer to third part...

They can use the coerced debt findings to dispute debts with creditors, collectors, and/or credit reporting agencies, which will protect their future income and facilitate their economic recovery. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1243 (2021 2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 28, 2021, p. 5; id., at p. 8 [ Used together with the relief provided to victims of identity theft in Civil Code Section 1798.93, this should help protect elder or dependent adult abuse victims from th...

at p. 971, fn. 13.) 11 Prior to the enactment of sections 15401 and 15402 in 1986, both revocation and modification of trusts were governed by former section 2280 of the Civil Code. (Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 961–963 & fn. 6; see King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1191 (King).) At the time it was repealed, Civil Code section 2280 provided that “[u]nless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust, every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor...

. . and defendant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan.” (Madden, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 702, fn. omitted.) Plaintiff, a state employee who enrolled under the Kaiser plan, contended she was not bound by the provision for arbitration. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court held that Civil Code section 2319 granted the Board (as agent for the employee) the authority to do whatever is “‘proper and usual’” to carry out its agency, and therefore the Board “enjoyed an implied authority to agree to arbitration of malpr...

148 Cal.App.4th 581, 594.) Accordingly, the execution of an optional, separate arbitration agreement with a skilled nursing facility is not a “health care decision.” (Harrod, at p. 966.) The Supreme Court next considered whether the relative’s power of attorney gave the relative implied power to execute the arbitration agreement on the resident’s behalf. Here, the Harrod court acknowledged that Civil Code section 2319 “embodies the notion of implied authority—that an agent expressly granted a...

(Former 4711, 4715.) 22 HARROD v. COUNTRY OAKS PARTNERS, LLC Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. relating to every possible aspect of a transaction with a skilled nursing facility, such as optional, separate agreements that do not affect health care or the selection of the facility.11 B. Agency Law Defendants, the facility owners and operators, contend Civil Code section 2319, part of our state s law of agency, imbued Logan s health care decisionmaking agent with authority to agree to arbitra...

To remedy the conflict, Cumis held that the insurer is obligated to provide separate counsel for the insured in representation of the liability case, independent of the counsel utilized by the insurer in its coverage case.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1225, fn. 1.) “In 1987, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 2860, which codified the right to independent or Cumis counsel but ‘clarifi[ed]’ and ‘limit[ed]’ Cumis’s stated rights and respo...

We resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in the opposing party’s favor. (*Saelzler v. Advanced Group* 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) II *Sierra’s Proof of Each Element* To prevail on an unlawful detainer action under section 1161a, Sierra must establish: (1) the property was sold in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust; (2) title under the sale has been duly perfected; (3) Sierra has served a three-day written notice to quit the ...

Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The statutory provision is mandatory. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 490.) Civil Code section 5975 deals with the enforceability of covenants and restrictions in a common interest 17 See footnote 15, ante. 18 Civil Code section 2924.12, subdivision (h) states in relevant part that “[a] court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section.” (Italics added.) 19 development’s gover...

It sets forth a scheme of heightened remedies—punitive damages ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 15657, subd. (c)), attorney’s fees and costs (id., subd. (a)), and exemption 11 See Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 (actions for damages in financial elder abuse cases); Civil Code section 8468 (claims by mechanics seeking a lien upon property they have improved); Civil Code section 3065a, (claims by loggers); Harbors and Navigation Code section 495.1 (actions against vessels); Labor Code sec...

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court appropriately looked at the litigation as a whole to determine there was no prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees.” (*Harris*, *supra,* 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1222-1223; see *Brawley v. J.C. Interiors, Inc*. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1126 \[similar as to private sector construction contracts under former Civil Code section 3260 (now section 8800)\].) Here, the District makes the same argument the Court of Appeal rejected in *Harris*. The District...

The trial court issued one order addressing these motions. The court awarded Suffolk attorney fees in the amount of \$32,726.50 pursuant to Public Contract Code, section 7107 (section 7107), awarded Suffolk costs of \$169,484.72 under that same section, and granted Suffolk’s motion for prejudgment interest in the amount of \$216,044 pursuant to Civil Code section 3278. A “final amended judgment on jury verdict” was entered January 22, 2022, awarding damages to Suffolk in the total amount of \...

ong been settled that the primary purpose of section 3287(a) ‘is to provide just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the \[underlying\] award during the prejudgment period—in other words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.’” (*Id.* at p. 643.) Prejudgment interest under section 3287(a) is thus considered a component of damages. (See *id.* at p. 635, fn. 2.) Civil Code section 3281 defines damages as follows: “Every person who suffers detriment from the ...

ttorney fees to the subcontractors and the attorney fees it incurred in defending against the subcontractor lawsuits does not transform this contract action into an action to enforce a payment bond. ### The Trial Court Erred When It Awarded \$169,828 in Prejudgment Interest Lastly, the District argues the trial court erroneously awarded Suffolk prejudgment interest of \$169,828 pursuant to Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) (section 3287(a)), on three payments it voluntarily made to Suf...

in Sustaining Royals’s Demurrer to Lu’s Cross-petition In December 2019, Lu filed a demurrer to Royals’s petition arguing that, as pleaded, the first claim in the petition seeking return of trust assets fails to state a cause of action under Probate Code section 850, and that the prayer for punitive damages does not plead facts sufficient to constitute oppression, fraud or malice as required by Civil Code section 3294. Along with her demurrer, Lu also filed a motion to strike, repeating her a...

This court has certainly permitted the consideration of a defendant’s financial condition at a later time than the date of the wrongful conduct. As we have explained: “In the end, ‘[w]hat is required is evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay the damage award.’ ” (Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453.) IV. Appellants Have Forfeited Their Claims Based on Civil Code section 3294. Appellants contends plaintiffs did not prove either the wrongful conduct required by Civil Code s...

Plaintiff argues that this provision prohibits only the imposition of damages that are “simply and solely punitive.” (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 39 (Younger).) We conclude that section 818 is not so limited, and instead immunizes public entities from damages awarded under Civil Code section 3294 and from other damages that would function, in essence, as an award of punitive or exemplary damages. 1. Statutory Language and Purpose Government Code section 818 p...

Royal’s petition alleged on information and belief that the total amount of the misappropriated funds was “at least $1,095,000.” In addition to recovery of that amount, her third cause of action for financial elder abuse sought punitive damages, trebled under Civil Code section 3345, subdivision (b) 3 plus attorney fees and costs. She made no mention of any other basis for relief in her financial elder abuse cause of action, but in her dependent adult by undue influence as defined in Section ...

7 See Dobbs, supra, 40 N.C. L.Rev. at p. 73 (“[T]he allegation of jurisdiction was necessary and without it jurisdiction did not exist. The allegation itself, in other words, was jurisdictional. [Fn. omitted.]” (Citing Moravia v. Sloper (C.P. 1737) 125 Eng.Rep. 1039.)). 8 Civil Code section 3399 (reformation); Code Civil Procedure section 1060 (declaratory relief); id., section 760.010 et seq. (quiet title). 18 We see no justification for treating the complaint as if it were never filed, effe...

7 See Dobbs, supra, 40 N.C. L.Rev. at p. 73 (“[T]he allegation of jurisdiction was necessary and without it jurisdiction did not exist. The allegation itself, in other words, was jurisdictional. [Fn. omitted.]” (Citing Moravia v. Sloper (C.P. 1737) 125 Eng.Rep. 1039.)). 8 Civil Code section 3399 (reformation); Code Civil Procedure section 1060 (declaratory relief); id., section 760.010 et seq. (quiet title). 18 We see no justification for treating the complaint as if it were never filed, effe...

ubject matter.” (Estate of Maron (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 707, 712.) Because the terms “arbitrarily,” “vexatiously,” and “not in good faith” are not defined in section 16701, we look to other attorney fees statutes containing comparable language for guidance. In Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1249 (Gemini), this court construed the fee shifting provisions in Civil Code section 3426.4 for trade secret misappropriation claims brought in “bad faith.”12 We “c...

ivil Code former section 164: An instrument that vests title as a joint tenancy expresses a “ ‘different intention’ ” by the parties than to hold the property as community property. (Siberell, supra, 214 Cal. at p. 773.) In 1969, the Legislature moved this language, together with the general community property presumption (enacted in 1872) and the married woman’s presumption (enacted in 1889), to Civil Code section 5110. (Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, p. 3339.) B. In the wake of Siberell and th...

Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 427.) A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) The statutory provision is mandatory. (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 490.) Civil Code section 5975 deals with the enforceability of covenants and restrictions in a common interest 17 See footnote 15, ante. 18 Civil Code section 2924.12, subdivision (h) states in relevant part t...

1983, ch. 842, § 55), then in 1993, it was moved to what is now Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (a). (Stats. 1993, ch. 529, § 5.) In each of these versions, this provision incorporated by reference the presumed parentage provisions of the UPA, which since 1975 has always included the substance of what is now Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), formerly Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a)(4). 8 Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514 (Scott).) And under the UPA, a man may...

It sets forth a scheme of heightened remedies—punitive damages ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 15657, subd. (c)), attorney’s fees and costs (id., subd. (a)), and exemption 11 See Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 (actions for damages in financial elder abuse cases); Civil Code section 8468 (claims by mechanics seeking a lien upon property they have improved); Civil Code section 3065a, (claims by loggers); Harbors and Navigation Code section 495.1 (actions against vessels); Labor Code sec...

e District was not one to “enforce the liability on the bond.” First, Suffolk is not a claimant “authorized under Section 9100” of the Civil Code to maintain an action to enforce the liability of a payment bond, such as an employee, architect, project manager, or “other person having charge of all or part of the public works contract.” (Civ. Code, §§ 9100, subd. (a)(1), 9554, subds. (b)(1), (c).) Civil Code section 9100, subdivision (a), does not include the owner of the project, such as the ...

First, although it acknowledges Suffolk achieved a “minor win” under Public Contract Code section 7107, the District challenges the trial court’s determination that Suffolk, rather than the District, was the prevailing party.[^21] Next, the District challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney fees under Civil Code section 9564 as the prevailing party in the third phase of trial. Third, it challenges the award of prejudgment interest to Suffolk for certain payments the Dist...

368, quoting Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d at pp. 84-85.) 14 The Chamberlain court then said: “The purpose for which a court normally weighs the evidence is to determine which way it preponderates on a given issue. Evidence Code section 115 provides in pertinent part: ‘Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.’ Thus, an unexplained statement that a reviewing court shall weigh the evidence is a stat...

368, quoting Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d at pp. 84-85.) 14 The Chamberlain court then said: “The purpose for which a court normally weighs the evidence is to determine which way it preponderates on a given issue. Evidence Code section 115 provides in pertinent part: ‘Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.’ Thus, an unexplained statement that a reviewing court shall weigh the evidence is a stat...

the admission of the gang evidence was unduly prejudicial to the defense in \[a\] manner that would likely cause the jury to convict on an improper basis.” Chaney similarly argues, “\[T\]here was no evidence that suggested any gang motivation to murder the particular victim in this case.” We disagree. A *Legal Standards* “Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. \[Citation.\] Under Evidence Code section 210, relevant evidence is evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or dispro...

1. *Standard* Relevant evidence is inadmissible if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “Evidence is prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 if it ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against a party as an individual’ ” \[citation\] or if it would cause the jury to ‘ “ ‘prejudg\[e\]’ a p...

\[Citation.\] Under Evidence Code section 210, relevant evidence is evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’ A trial court has ‘considerable discretion’ in determining the relevance of evidence. \[Citation.\] Similarly, the court has broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant evidence if it determines the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed b...

On appeal, he claims his convictions should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a similar uncharged offense he committed in 2019. We conclude (1) evidence of Garay’s prior offense was relevant and admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) and (2) its probative value substantially outweighed any undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. We therefore affirm. I. A. In October 2022, Garay and Ismael R. had been neighbors for one year ...

We disagree. “Generally when an *in limine* ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal.” (*People v. Jennings* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975, fn. 3.) Such an objection is unneeded, however, if the motion in limine “satisfies the basic requirements of Evidence Code section 353\[:\] (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced and subsequently raised on appeal; (...

The trial court said, “[Stacey’s testimony] made it clear this money was not for wages he had earned, but rather it was some type of incentive to stay on through harvest. Mr. Reyes never testified in trial, so we are left solely with the testimony of [Stacey].” For those reasons, it invoked the principle stated in Evidence Code section 412: “If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evi...

Hansen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 618 (Hansen), she argued that the complaint should be stricken because Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could the trial court when it issued the order on appeal. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) We may take judicial notice of appropriate materials under Evidence Code section 451 et seq., where relevant to a material issue on appeal. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544,...

seven days to review the premarital agreement” because a provision within the agreement stated, “‘Each of us acknowledges that he/she received this Agreement more than seven 30 days before executing it, and had ample time to review this Agreement with independent legal counsel and other professional advisors before signing it.’” (Clarke, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 920.) Claudia relied on Evidence Code section 622, which provides that “The facts recited in a written instrument are conclusivel...

(Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 471 [“we conclude that the notices of default under void deed of trust provided notice of [a] cloud on plaintiffs’ title, but did not dispute or disturb plaintiffs’ possession of the property”].) In other words, an action to recover real property is time barred unless the plaintiff can show that he or 8 Section 321 is in sync with Evidence Code section 622, under which the owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be owner of the full b...

is applicable to properties acquired before 1985].) Nor did Ruth’s will serve to rebut the presumption of joint tenancy established by the joint tenancy deed. (See Edwards v. Deitrich (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 254, 260-262 [fact that one party expresses intent in will to convert or transmute character of property does not rebut presumption raised by form of deed].) Finally, as the trial court noted, Evidence Code section 662 and Code of Civil Procedure section 321 are also applicable here. The tr...

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to determine which presumption governs the characterization of joint tenancy property in a dispute between a couple and the bankruptcy trustee of one of the spouses. More precisely, the question here is whether the form of title presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 applies to the characterization of property in disputes between a married couple and a bankruptcy trustee when it conflicts with the community prop...

C. Navarrete’s Interview with the Court Late in the trial, Navarrete proposed to testify herself, and counsel for her father and older brother asked the court to inquire about her capacity to testify before allowing her to discuss the allegations against father. The court agreed it would interview Navarrete and evaluate whether she was qualified to testify under Evidence Code section 701. “[T]he Court will ask questions of Anna Navarrete, and give the answers the weight to which they are enti...

e Department’s and Patricia’s Section 388 Petitions and Patricia’s Court-ordered Psychiatric Evaluation On April 29, 2019 Patricia filed a section 388 petition seeking return of Samuel to her custody or, alternatively, liberalized visitation, including unmonitored and overnight visits. The Department filed its own section 388 petition the same day requesting, among other things, a court-ordered Evidence Code section 730 psychiatric evaluation and an order prohibiting Patricia from contacting ...

In October 2020, the parties to the elder abuse lawsuit reached an agreement to settle the case by means of a dismissal with prejudice and mutual releases and waivers of costs. Ashbrook was “fully supportive of the decision to end that litigation.” In November 2020, the trial court ordered an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation of Arnold because “we have lots of proof on this matter that there is a capacity problem.” Dr. David Sheffner, who had been appointed to conduct the evaluation, submi...

. . . In granting this *Ex Parte* petition on June 14, 2021, the court noted regarding the disputed facts listed in the *Ex Parte* petition and response thereto: ‘All such disputed facts are immaterial to the relief requested.’” McKibben was appointed. An Evidence Code section 730 exam was performed by Dr. Sara N. Mourra. Mourra opined: “\[Marty\] lacks the capacity to manage her health care and to make and carry out health care decisions in her own rational self-interest.” Her current condit...

During cross-examination, appellant admitted that when she filed her first DVRO petition against respondent in 2022, she did not mention many of the incidents she testified about in this case. She also conceded that none of those incidents appear in the report of Dr. Keith Peterson, a psychologist who was appointed in the underlying custody dispute to evaluate the parties pursuant to Evidence Code section 730.[^3] Appellant testified she did in fact tell Dr. Peterson about those incidents. Sh...

352 is “matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner”\].) In her reply brief, Gagliano raises two new issues: 1) the trial court’s concerns about Gagliano’s failure to disclose the child’s possible autism spectrum disorder diagnosis prior to her Evidence Code section 776 examination; and 2) Gutierrez’s argument in his trial brief that Gagliano ...

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling plaintiff’s objections to Goldman’s testimony that DSS would likely have decertified Russo or revoked Beverly Place’s license had Russo refused to speak to DSS investigators as speculative or as encompassing an ultimate issue.[^3] The testimony was not speculative, as Goldman was qualified as an expert in the field. Under Evidence Code section 805, “\[i\]t is neither unusual nor impermissible for an expert to testify to an ultimate is...

We concur: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Humes, P. J. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Langhorne Wilson, J. A170297, People v. Guery [^1]: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. [^2]: Defendant was 43 years old at the time of his arrest. [^3]: Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2) provides in pertinent part: “A public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose official information, and to prevent ano...

sclosing official information, if the privilege is claimed by a person authorized by the public entity to do so and either of the following apply: \[¶\] . . . \[¶\] (2) Disclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interests of justice. . . .” Evidence Code section 1041, subdivision (a)(2) provides in pertinent part: “a public entity has a privil...

. . .” Both sections stated that, “the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding shall not be considered,” in “determining whether disclosure of the identity of the informer is against public interest.” Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: “in any preliminary hearing . . . any otherwise admissible evidence of information communicated to a peace officer by a confidential informant . . . is admissible on the issue of reasonable ...

Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245(a)(1); count 2). On appeal, he claims his convictions should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of a similar uncharged offense he committed in 2019. We conclude (1) evidence of Garay’s prior offense was relevant and admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) and (2) its probative value substantially outweighed any undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. W...

He contends the judgment should be reversed for three reasons: (1) there was no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the movement of the victim satisfied the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping under Penal Code section 209[^1]; (2) section 209 is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain prior-acts evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). We reject each contention. First, the evidence showed defendant moved the ...

According to Kim, Weaver had not previously reviewed a PMA with a client like Kim who was four months pregnant and who had two previous abortions; and there was no evidence Weaver “had developed the ability to discern whether her client actually understood the numerous and complex legal principles which were supposedly being explained.” Evidence Code section 1105 provides: “Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformit...

According to Kim, Weaver had not previously reviewed a PMA with a client like Kim who was four months pregnant and who had two previous abortions; and there was no evidence Weaver “had developed the ability to discern whether her client actually understood the numerous and complex legal principles which were supposedly being explained.” Evidence Code section 1105 provides: “Any otherwise admissible evidence of habit or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformit...

1003.) As in *Noriega*, we “decline to extend *Griffin* beyond its plain language to include a witness’s testimony.” (*Ibid*.) VI In addition, defendants contend the trial court erred in admitting Gray’s incriminating statements against Manor under Evidence Code section 1230 without redacting them to exclude reference to Manor.[^2] A The People moved in limine to admit (1) Gray’s letter to Manor demanding payment for delivering him revenge, (2) Gray’s statement to Barnard that he brought Wrig...

# Admissibility of the CFIT Defendant contends Doe’s recorded statements from the CFIT were inadmissible because the CFIT lacked the required indicia of reliability and his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to its admission. ## *Additional Background* Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed an in limine motion to play the video of the CFIT to the jury in its entirety pursuant to Evidence Code section 1360. Defendant’s attorney did not object to the CFIT’s admissibility and conceded t...

were played for the jury and admitted into evidence) and to Thrash’s identification of Wellington based on a still photograph from one video (which was also shown to the jury and admitted into evidence). We address Thrash’s narration and identification in turn. First, Wellington faults Drake for failing to object to Thrash’s narration of the videos under the secondary evidence rule codified in Evidence Code section 1523, which generally renders oral testimony inadmissible to prove the content...

(See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 7612, subds. (a), (b).) And, as pertinent here, Family Code section 7630, subdivision (c), which allows a child to file an action to determine parentage, specifically excludes cases where a child is a child of a marriage under the Family Code section 11 7540 marital presumption: “Except as to cases coming within Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7540) of Part 2 . . , an action to determine parentage may be brought by the child [or] the personal representative of the ...

spite some inquiry, because of the lack of findings when applying the statutes at issue here and the limited information before the trial court at the time judgment was entered, we must remand for additional inquiry and entry of findings. B. Adequacy of the Inquiry Father argues the ICWA inquiry was inadequate here because there was no documented inquiry of extended family members. He points to Family Code section 177 and Probate Code section 1459.5, which require the court to apply certain i...

spite some inquiry, because of the lack of findings when applying the statutes at issue here and the limited information before the trial court at the time judgment was entered, we must remand for additional inquiry and entry of findings. B. Adequacy of the Inquiry Father argues the ICWA inquiry was inadequate here because there was no documented inquiry of extended family members. He points to Family Code section 177 and Probate Code section 1459.5, which require the court to apply certain i...

It shows that Williams is still the duly appointed guardian. The father has not been given custody, and the guardianship has not been terminated. (See Prob. Code, § 1601.) While it may have become more difficult for Harber to prove that she is the appropriate guardian, it is still possible for the trial court to remove Williams and to appoint Harber. Thus, the appeal is not moot. III FAMILY CODE SECTION 217 Harber contends that the pretrial order was invalid because it was inconsistent with F...

cipation of separation or dissolution or annulment of marriage.” It is significant that the first mechanism—what we refer to as an express waiver—requires specific language; however, the second mechanism—what we refer to as a statutory waiver—is effected 7 Section 144 includes an exception to enforceability of a waiver if the decedent spouse violated his or her fiduciary duties as specified in Family Code section 721, subdivision (b), or if a probate court finds enforcement of the waiver woul...

More precisely, the question here is whether the form of title presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 applies to the characterization of property in disputes between a married couple and a bankruptcy trustee when it conflicts with the community property presumption set forth in Family Code section 760. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5) [this court may restate a question posed to it by a court of another jurisdiction]; see also Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 ...

the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 111.7, p. 1619.) The married woman’s presumption and the post-Siberell/Dunn rule allowing form of title to rebut the community property presumption, both previously codified at Civil Code section 5110, now appear at Family Code section 803 and apply only to property acquired before 1975. (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, §...

Just as the presumptions themselves have evolved over time, the cognizable ways of rebutting the presumptions have also evolved. We thus answer a further question: When a married couple uses community funds to acquire property as joint tenants, is the joint tenancy deed alone sufficient to transmute the community character of the property into the separate property of the spouses? Family Code section 852 provides that for property acquired on or after January 1, 1985, a transmutation “is not ...

We disagree. Our explanation of our decision requires an examination of the state of the law when the parties entered the PMA and subsequent developments. 1. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act Effective 1986, the Legislature adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), now Family Code section 1600 et seq. 11 In 1994, when the parties in the present case entered the PMA, section 1612, subdivision (a) provided, as it does now, that “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract wit...

We disagree. Our explanation of our decision requires an examination of the state of the law when the parties entered the PMA and subsequent developments. 1. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act Effective 1986, the Legislature adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), now Family Code section 1600 et seq. 11 In 1994, when the parties in the present case entered the PMA, section 1612, subdivision (a) provided, as it does now, that “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract wit...

In all other respects, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed. Rather, the court retains the power under Family Code section 1612, subdivision (a)(7) to shape public policy regarding premarital 1 The two separate appeals (...

In all other respects, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed. Rather, the court retains the power under Family Code section 1612, subdivision (a)(7) to shape public policy regarding premarital 1 The two separate appeals (...

v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9.) “Citation to the material is sufficient.” (Ibid.) We accordingly consider the request for judicial notice as a citation to those materials that are published, including legislative committee reports. (Ibid.) The legislative history supports Knapp’s construction. The bill that added section 1615, subdivision (c)(1) also added Family Code section 1612, subdivision (c) (“section 1612, subdivision (c)”), which provides in relevant pa...

ed to read the Agreement and to meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. (See Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 1 26 Cal.4th 261, 283 (Donovan); Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97 (Casey); Civ. Code, § 1577.)1 In addition, any error by the trial court in failing to make findings regarding voluntariness required by Family Code section 1615, subdivision (c), was not prejudicial. BACKGROUND2 On May 2, 2015, Brandy mar...

dify the temporary spousal support order, and remand for the trial court to determine the amount of pendente lite spousal support from the date of Kim’s request. In all other respects, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when execute...

dify the temporary spousal support order, and remand for the trial court to determine the amount of pendente lite spousal support from the date of Kim’s request. In all other respects, we affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when execute...

Although the PMA stated that Tinker had been represented by and consulted with independent legal counsel, no attorney signed on Tinker’s behalf. Tinker did not sign a separate writing expressly waiving representation by independent legal counsel, as is required by Family Code section 1615 (“section 1615”) for unrepresented PMA signatories. During the marriage, Tinker made several amendments to his trust and estate plan, some of which concerned the Perugia property. After Tinker’s death in 201...

Under the schedule, reply briefs were due by July 1, 2024. The court ordered that any actions to transfer/sell the assets described in the March 25, 2024 and April 8, 2024 FOAH be stayed pending a ruling on the present motion. On July 2, 2024, Misty Key filed an opposition to the motion. In the same filing, Misty asserted she was an “Interested Party” under Family Code section 2021, and asked to be joined as a party. The court held a hearing on the motion on July 8, 2024. When the matter was ...

cases often relied on Siberell or its progeny, we see no indication that the abrogation of Siberell in 1973 or any subsequent development suggests an intent by the Legislature to disturb the rule that the form of title controls the disposition of joint tenancy property at death. To the contrary, the Legislature has acted in a manner consistent with the case law. In 1994, the Legislature amended Family Code section 2040 to specify that when one party files for divorce, “the summons shall conta...

Freeman does not point to evidence in the record identifying any particular property or financial obligation that Patricia failed to disclose to him prior to entering the MSA. The only reasonable inference from the record is that Patricia made a fair and reasonable disclosure; specifically, it is undisputed that Patricia and Freeman each filed and served the information required by Family Code section 2104, also known as a preliminary declaration of disclosure, prior to holding their mediatio...

Freeman’s counsel stated his client’s position that the case was dismissed by operation of law. Neither party’s counsel nor the court raised the existence of the judgment signed by the court the prior month. The court dismissed the case without objection from either party. On October 22, 2018, Freeman moved to set aside the judgment signed in July under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and Family Code section 2105. Brendon, acting as the proposed administrator of Patricia’s estate and repr...

. per.; Blain & Associates and Tony Blain for Appellant. Stanton Law Corporation, Marian L. Stanton and Harold J. Stanton for Respondent. _________________________________ Susan Diamond appeals from an order denying her request to set aside the judgment in this marital dissolution proceeding. Susan1 contends the family court erred in denying her motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Family Code section 2122, subdivisions (c) and (d),2 based on duress and mental incapacity during the disso...

. . [s]ince the instrument by which [the couple] acquired the residence [in 1973] [expresses] ‘a different intent . . . and the community property presumption does not apply’ ”].) But, as Justice Kruger details (conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 10–11), not all observers understood the 1973 amendments to abrogate Siberell. During the 1983 amendments to the predecessor of Family Code section 2581, a committee analysis asserted that “the Siberell [form of title] presumption still holds even thoug...

We have already rejected the contention that the regulations at issue are not quasi- legislative. Although we concur with Gann that section 3000 does not define “step-parent,” we nonetheless reject Gann’s argument that CDCR must use the statutory definition of “stepparent” contained in subdivision (d)(2) of Family Code section 3101 in interpreting the regulations at issue. Said code section reads, in relevant part: “(d) As used in this section: [¶] … [¶] (2) ‘Stepparent’ means a person who is...

Reversed and remanded with directions. Dennis Temko for Defendant and Appellant. Law Office of Gerald L. Vogt, Gerald L. Vogt; Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, and Kyla Dayton, for Plaintiffs and Respondents. Felicia Balandran[^1] appeals from an order granting her late husband’s parents visitation with her minor children under Family Code section 3102.[^2] She contends the order violates her constitutional right as a fit parent to make decisions about her children’s associations. We agree. Fol...

he fact that he had been retained.” While the court appropriately considered the impact of Smith’s continued representation in the matter, we nonetheless conclude that it abused its discretion by relying on the factors detailed in Rule 5.240 and the requirements in Rule 5.242, which “governs counsel appointed to represent the best interest of the child in a custody or visitation proceeding under Family Code section 3150.” Those standards address appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” who, as we ...

llows for dependency jurisdiction when, among other things, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child” or a child is “left without any provision for support.” (Id., subds. (b)(1), (g).) It also cited to Family Code section 3402, subdivision (a), which 7 Guardianship of SAUL H. Opinion of the Court b...

ts in a civil action “in the same manner as an adult, except that a guardian must conduct the action or proceedings” (§ 6601, italics added) and with Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which requires minors, as well as those who lack legal capacity to make decisions, to appear by a guardian or GAL appointed by the court in which the proceeding is pending or by a judge in the case. Further, even Family Code section 6229 and Code of Civil Procedure section 374, which permit minors under age 1...

ined: “[U]nder [Code of Civil Procedure section] 372, minors can only appear through the guardian ad litem[,] who the court has previously appointed to represent them in this matter. The court further notes that the bench officer previously assigned to this matter ruled on March 3rd, 2020 that the guardian ad litem has exclusive authority to act for the minors in this litigation and further, that Family Code section 6602 makes it clear that a contract for attorneys[’] fees 5 made by or on beh...

at p. 561.) “We will reverse the trial court’s ruling only where there is no reasonable basis for its action.” (City National Bank, at p. 323.) B. Capacity and Competency to Contract The court considered whether A.F. had the capacity to hire Smith. It opined that its authority to make this inquiry derives from Civil Code 15 section 1550 and Family Code section 6602, and it found Akkiko M. v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 525 (Akkiko) instructive. Akkiko occurred in the dependency conte...

. . at the election of the minor” (id. at p. 1339)—even when the guardian ad litem continues to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dictum. Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between Code of Civil Procedure section 372 and Family Code section 6710, we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson’s holding to the facts in this case. 69 D. Christine’s Additional Arguments At pages 102 to 1...

. . at the election of the minor” (id. at p. 1339)—even when the guardian ad litem continues to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dictum. Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between Code of Civil Procedure section 372 and Family Code section 6710, we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson’s holding to the facts in this case. 69 D. Christine’s Additional Arguments At pages 102 to 1...

For ease of convenience, we refer to Bertuccio and his estate collectively as “Bertuccio.” Because some of the persons referred to in this opinion have the same last name, we use first names for clarity and by doing so intend no disrespect. 1 Marilyn and Frank C. Bertuccio, Senior (“Frank, Sr.”) under the marital presumption set forth in Family Code section 7540, subdivision (a), which provides, in pertinent part, that “the child of spouses who cohabited at the time of conception and birth is...

ordingly, the record does not establish that the Nevada probate court actually adopted or accepted any argument or position of Zambito’s that is inconsistent with anything he has asserted in this case. For both of these reasons, Objectors’ judicial estoppel argument would fail on the merits even if it were preserved. 9 As an exception to this general rule, “a child of a marriage under the Family Code section 7540 marital presumption is barred from proving a parent-child relationship existed w...

at p. 184.) Objectors’ judicial estoppel defense lacks merit for two reasons. First, Zambito’s assertion in this proceeding that Decedent was his “natural parent” under Probate Code section 6453 was not necessarily inconsistent with Zambito’s prior position that he could inherit as Domenick’s son under his will. As noted, Family Code section 7601 recognizes that a person can have a “natural parent” who is not one of the two biological parents. (Fam. Code, § 7601, subd. (a).) Subdivision (c) f...

y”].) 19 But even if the natural parent and child presumption between Charles and Judy could be rebutted purely on public policy groundsa premise we rejectwe disagree with Shannon’s assertion that public policy, including the ones she identifies, “requires” a California court to reject the natural parental relationship between Charles and Judy. The paternity presumptions, including Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), at issue in this case, are rooted in the “ ‘strong social policy in...

Specifically, because section 6453, subdivision (a) defines natural parentage for purposes of intestate succession to include presumed parentage that is not rebutted under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.), a stepchild may establish a right to intestate succession under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), which creates a presumption of natural parentage if “[t]he presumed parent receives the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural...

M.M. does not dispute the parental status of T.M., who is married to Child’s mother (Mother), is listed on Child’s birth certificate as the father, and signed a Voluntary Declaration of Parentage at the Child’s birth. However, M.M. contends that he should be accorded status as Child’s third parent pursuant to Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c).1 For the purpose of our analysis, we assume without deciding that M.M. is entitled to presumed parent status as a Kelsey S. father, making him ...

ioner attains the status of a “de facto” family member, that status remains “unless disavowed” or “terminated”].) It is Shannon’s contention, however, that the presumption of natural parenthood created under the UPA can be rebutted based on “both facts and policy.” (Italics added.) She argues “[b]y providing that the presumption of natural parenthood can be rebutted in an ‘appropriate action,’ ” Family Code section 7612, subdivision (a), “gives courts wide discretion to determine whether best...

t Decedent received Zambito into his home both in Zambito’s childhood and when he was an adult; and that Decedent held out Zambito as his natural child throughout Zambito’s life. The court made all of its factual findings by clear and convincing evidence. Objectors timely appealed. They do not challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support any of the probate court’s factual findings. 4 Family Code section 7612, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: “If two or more presumptions arise u...

(C.A. v. C.P., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) To implement that continuing social policy, the Legislature has specifically chosen to retain the Family Code section 7540 marital presumption and continues to treat it separately from other presumptions of parentage. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 7612, subds. (a), (b).) And, as pertinent here, Family Code section 7630, subdivision (c), which allows a child to file an action to determine parentage, specifically excludes cases where a child is a child...

Those provisions state that a “natural parent and child relationship” is established for intestate succession purposes when (1) the relationship is presumed and not rebutted pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in the Family Code, or (2) in actions brought under Family Code section 7630, subdivision (c), where clear and convincing evidence establishes that the parent has openly held out the child as that parent’s own. (Prob. Code, § 6453, subds. (a) & (b)(2); see Fam. Code, § 7600, et ...

(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355, 360 (G.A.).) An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is a child who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent’s custody and care pursuant to Family Code section 7820 or 7822 or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and conti...

(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355, 360 (G.A.).) An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is a child who “is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent’s custody and care pursuant to Family Code section 7820 or 7822 or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and conti...

The trial court held a contested hearing in December 2021, during which father and other relatives testified. The court did not ask about possible Indian heritage or otherwise address the issue during the hearing. The court indicated it would consider the 1 The maternal great-grandfather passed away in 2016. 2 petition under both Family Code section 7822 (abandonment) and Probate Code section 1516.5 (best interests). The trial court issued a tentative written ruling in January 2022 granting t...

The trial court held a contested hearing in December 2021, during which father and other relatives testified. The court did not ask about possible Indian heritage or otherwise address the issue during the hearing. The court indicated it would consider the 1 The maternal great-grandfather passed away in 2016. 2 petition under both Family Code section 7822 (abandonment) and Probate Code section 1516.5 (best interests). The trial court issued a tentative written ruling in January 2022 granting t...

Grandmother does not argue the absence of error, and we agree with father. The court made no findings as to whether the ICWA applied before freeing the minor from father’s custody and control under Probate Code section 1516.5 and Family Code section 7822. Nor did the court make any of the required findings under Family Code section 7892.5. No ICWA findings were made at any point in the proceeding. This was error. Grandmother does not separately address the trial court’s failure to make findin...

Grandmother does not argue the absence of error, and we agree with father. The court made no findings as to whether the ICWA applied before freeing the minor from father’s custody and control under Probate Code section 1516.5 and Family Code section 7822. Nor did the court make any of the required findings under Family Code section 7892.5. No ICWA findings were made at any point in the proceeding. This was error. Grandmother does not separately address the trial court’s failure to make findin...

at p. 898.) Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the probate court found that clear and convincing evidence supported equitable reformation of the will to provide for testamentary control and disposition of Hanako’s separate property only. The court denied Gary’s requests under Family Code section 11012 for a community property award against William and ordered Gary to reimburse William for the attorney fees incurred to expunge the lis pendens on one of William’s properties. Gary appeal...

§ 1912(a).) An “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) ICWA does not itself impose a duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian child. That duty is imposed by federal regulation. (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a).) In Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, California has enacted a statute that parallels the federal regulations. Welfare and Institut...

§ 1912(a).) An “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) ICWA does not itself impose a duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian child. That duty is imposed by federal regulation. (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a).) In Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, California has enacted a statute that parallels the federal regulations. Welfare and Institut...

Her blood alcohol level measured .296 mg/dL. Samuel was in daycare. While hospitalized, Patricia exhibited shaking, 2 trembling, hot and cold sweats and increased agitation, which her medical providers attributed to severe alcohol withdrawal. Patricia left the hospital prior to receiving medical clearance for discharge. On January 16, 2019 the Department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 1 subdivision (b)(1), alleging Patricia had a long and unresolved hi...

§ 1901 et seq.) as codified in various sections of the Family Code, Probate Code, and Welfare and Institutions Code, applies to most proceedings involving Indian children that may result in . . . guardianship” and expressly includes “(1) Proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq.” 3. Analysis Under the plain language of section 366.4, subdivision (a), T.R. remains “within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” as a ward of the legal guardianship, notwithstanding the ...

. . and screaming at . . . Valerie” while Valerie and Zoey were passengers, and that this conduct “places” all three children “at risk of physical harm, damage and danger” (thereby warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivisions (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300);[^1] (2) father “emotionally abused” Valerie “by denigrating \[her\] and frequently speaking to \[her\] in a harsh and abusive manner,” despite being “aware of \[her\] self-harming ideation and behav...

was showering to observe her “ass,” and had once remarked on the size of D.C.’s breasts—which made her feel uncomfortable. **II. Procedural Background** **A. *The petition*** Two days after K.F.’s 911 call, the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed three separate but identical dependency petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, one petition for each of the three minors.[^3] The petitions alleged that the minors were at substantial risk...

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appellant A.R. appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders declaring her son, R.T., and her three wards—K.G., Mark.H, and Mari.H.—dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and ordering family maintenance services for her.[^1] Appellant argues that R.T.’s father, A.T., po...

Accordingly, we accept the stipulation, conditionally affirm the court’s disposition orders, and remand with directions to ensure ICWA compliance. ** FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND **[^2] In October 2024, the agency filed a dependency petition alleging the child and her younger sibling were described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (g).[^3] The petition alleged the child was sexually abused by her mother’s partner, and that her mother, J.G. (moth...

Given the prior investigations, mental health and drug issues, and other factors, SSA determined Z.O.’s safety was at high risk and applied for a protective custody warrant on October 16, 2020. This was granted and Z.O. was placed in foster care on October 17, 2020. A dependency petition was filed on October 20, 2020, under 2 Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g) and (j). A detention report was filed the same day. Because of previous referrals and the parents’ fa...

He states his belief that he “cannot hide” from the gangs, from which his parents are unable to protect him. Together with his petition, Saul submitted proposed SIJ predicate findings. Saul proposed the probate court find that reunification with his parents is not viable due to their failure to provide him with adequate care and protection. The proposed findings cited to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, which allows for dependency jurisdiction when, among other things, “[t]he child ...

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* \* \* \* Defendant and appellant Jose A. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders of October 17, 2024, sustaining a subsequent juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 342[^1] and removing his children, Ethan N. (Ethan, born July 2019), Scarlett A. (Scarlett, born July 2020), and Avery N. (Avery, born Feb. ...

v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 525 (Akkiko) instructive. Akkiko occurred in the dependency context. (Akkiko, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 527.) The primary conflict in Akkiko is not present here. There, the court considered the interplay between Welfare and Institutions Code sections 317 and 318, which direct a court to appoint counsel, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 349, which specifies that a dependent minor has the right to select counsel of his or her choosing. The Depa...

In this case we examine the different statutory procedures and substantive rights that apply to legal guardians who are appointed by the juvenile court and legal guardians appointed by the probate court before dependency proceedings commence. Rene V. a/k/a/ Johnny V. (born 2012)1 was removed from the physical custody of Dora V., his legal guardian appointed by the juvenile court, pursuant to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Chi...

Kubelun, Judge. Affirmed. John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION This is defendant and appellant H.H.’s (Father) second appeal. Father appeals the March 19, 2025, orders denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[^1] petition and terminating parental rights (§ 366.26). Father contends the ju...

contends on appeal that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition order must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support its true findings on counts 7 through 9. The People disagree. We affirm. ** PROCEDURAL SUMMARY ** On September 13, 2023, a juvenile wardship petition was filed in Tulare County Superior Court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging minor committed vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a);[^2] count 1). On January 1...

For privacy, additional persons are referred to by their first names. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90.) No disrespect is intended. [^5]: As to both counts, it was alleged both appellant and Hoffman were 16 years of age or older when they committed the murders, and murder was an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, former subdivision (d)(1). At that time, Welfare and Institutions Code sect...

1328.) The assumption was based on the principle that “ ‘[When] a word or phrase has a well- known and definite legal meaning it will be construed to have the same meaning when used in a statute.’ ” (Ibid.) Jason V. was cited by Gann for a similar proposition. At issue in that case was whether the term “parent” as used in Welfare and Institutions Code section 903 could be construed to mean an “aunt or uncle acting as a legal guardian.” (Jason V., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1171.) In answerin...

l 15, 2024, the Kern County Public Conservator filed, in the Kern County Superior Court, a petition for appointment of temporary conservator and conservator of the person and the estate (petition) as to R. J., a 37 -year-old man. The petition stated: The appointment of the Conservator of the Person and Estate is required because the proposed Conservatee is a gravely disabled person as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5008(h)(1)(A) and is unwilling to accept or incapable of acc...

15, 2024, the Kern County Public Conservator filed, in the Kern County Superior Court, a petition for appointment of temporary conservator and conservator of the person and the estate (petition) as to R.J., a 37-year-old man. The petition stated: “The appointment of the Conservator of the Person and Estate is required because the proposed Conservatee is a gravely disabled person as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5008(h)(1)(A) and is unwilling to accept or incapable of accept...

il 15, 2024, the Kern County Public Conservator filed, in the Kern County Superior Court, a petition for appointment of temporary conservator and conservator of the person and the estate (petition) as to R. J., a 37-year-old man. The petition stated: The appointment of the Conservator of the Person and Estate is required because the proposed Conservatee is a gravely disabled person as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5008(h)(1)(A) and is unwilling to accept or incapable of acc...

and C.O. himself. C.O.’s attorney cross- examined both the expert and C.O. At the conclusion of the court trial, the trial court stated that it found “beyond a reasonable doubt, that [C.O.] has both been advised in writ[]ing of his right to a jury trial [and] that he remains a gravel[]y disabled person under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5008[, subdivision] (H)(1)(A).” The trial court granted the LPS petition for reappointment and found by “clear and convincing evidence that [C.O.] [w...

2006, ch. 337, § 55, p. 2665), and the voters approved Proposition 83, similarly providing for an indefinite commitment (see § 6604.1, subd. (b)) and modifying the definition of an SVP (see § 6600, subd. (a)(1); Prop. 83, §§ 27, 28, enacted in 1967, including Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 governing the appointment of conservators. (See Stats. 1967, ch. 1667, pp. 4093-4094.) Under the LPS Act, section 5350 incorporates the procedures for a conservatorship under the Probate Code, a...

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383; see Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).)4 Generally, with respect to civil commitments, the failure of a court to obtain a valid jury trial waiver where required by statute 4 Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), which is incorporated into the LPS Act by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, requires the trial court to inform the proposed conservatee of his or her right to a jury trial. 8 “denies the defendant his or her statutory right to a jury ...

The court concluded: Therefore, it is ordered that the Kern County Public Conservator, Public Guardian is appointed conservator of the person and estate of [R. J.] and letters of conservatorship shall be issued accordingly. The court added: The conser vatorship is established pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 et [seq] and will terminate on September 3rd, 2025. The court asked counsel, Anything further as to this matter? R. J. s counsel responded, No, Your Honor. Subsequen...

the Kern County Superior Court for public conservator, public guardian services is just and reasonable.” The court concluded: “Therefore, it is ordered that the Kern County Public Conservator, Public Guardian is appointed conservator of the person and estate of \[R.J.\] and letters of conservatorship shall be issued accordingly.” The court added: “The conservatorship is established pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 et \[seq\] and will terminate on September 3rd, 2025.” Th...

The court concluded: Therefore, it is ordered that the Kern County Public Conservator, Public Guardian is appointed conservator of the person and estate of [R. J.] and letters of conservatorship shall be issued accordingly. The court added: The conservatorship is established pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 et [seq] and will terminate on September 3rd, 2025. The court asked counsel, Anything further as to this matter? R. J. s counsel responded, No, Your Honor. Subsequent...

(John. L., supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 147–149, 156.) In reaching its decision in John L., the California Supreme Court emphasized the civil nature of an LPS proceeding. “In providing that the procedure set forth in division 4 of the Probate Code shall apply in establishing LPS conservatorships absent a statutory 7 conflict, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350 plainly requires the operation of Probate Code section 1827, which provides in full: ‘The court shall hear and determine the matte...

2. The Kern County Public Conservator or some other suitable person be appointed Conservator of the Person and Estate of the proposed Conservatee. [ ] [ ] [3]. The Conservator be given the following powers: (a) The Conservator shall have the power to detain the Conservatee in the intensive treatment facility or to place the Conservatee for treatment in one of the facilities set out in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5358. (b) The Conservator shall have the power and authority to conserv...

\[¶\] … \[¶\] > > “\[3\]. The Conservator be given the following powers: > > “(a) The Conservator shall have the power to detain the Conservatee in the intensive treatment facility or to place the Conservatee for treatment in one of the facilities set out in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5358. > > “(b) The Conservator shall have the power and authority to conserve and protect the property of the Conservatee from loss or injury. > > “(c) The Conservator shall have the right to require ...

The Kern County Public Conservator or some other suitable person be appointed Conservator of the Person and Estate of the proposed Conservatee. [ ] [ ] > > [3]. The Conservator be given the following powers: > > (a) The Conservator shall have the power to detain the Conservatee in the intensive treatment facility or to place the Conservatee for treatment in one of the facilities set out in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5358. > > (b) The Conservator shall have the power and authority t...

stee’s first and final account for the trust, requesting authority to distribute the remaining funds in the trust to Shawna and an order that the trust be terminated after the funds have been distributed. The department objected to the trustee’s accounting. It challenged the “court’s finding that there is no authority to use the annuity funds to pay the Department’s creditor claim” because “Welfare and Institutions Code section 14009.5” authorizes such recovery. According to the department, “...

Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 71.) Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03, subdivision (a), “(1) An elder or dependent adult who has suffered abuse,[16] as defined in Section 15610.07, may seek protective orders as provided in this section. [¶] (2) A 15 As to Wear, the EARO had been granted on July 30, 2020. (See fn. 14, ante.) 16 Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.07, subdivision (a)(3), includes “[f]inancial abuse,” which occurs when a person “[...

nfluence based on various factors including Benjamin s long-term plan to gain ownership of the property , mother s extreme vulnerability, evidence that mother was drugge d, and Benjamin s secret actions at an inappropriate time. Turning to section 859, the statement of decision concluded that Benjamin took the property in bad faith and through the commission of elder financial abuse as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30. As a result, the statement found award of the fol...

fluence based on various factors including Benjamin’s long-term plan to gain ownership of the property, mother’s extreme vulnerability, evidence that mother was drugged, and Benjamin’s secret actions at an inappropriate time. Turning to section 859, the statement of decision concluded that Benjamin took the property in bad faith and through the commission of elder financial abuse as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30. As a result, the statement found award of the follow...

influence based on various factors including Benjamin s long-term plan to gain ownership of the property, mother s extreme vulnerability, evidence that mother was drugged, and Benjamin s secret actions at an inappropriate time. Turning to section 859, the statement of decision concluded that Benjamin took the property in bad faith and through the commission of elder financial abuse as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30. As a result, the statement found award of the foll...

(Kerley v. Weber, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1197.) Prohibited acts include “(1) taking property in bad faith; (2) taking property by the use of undue influence in bad faith; and (3) taking property through [the commission of financial abuse of a dependent adult] as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30.” (Id. at p. 1198.) Stacey denies engaging in such behavior. We interpret her arguments as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. It is Stacey’s burden to affirmativ...

(See Code Civ. Proc., § 634.) Furthermore, as Jendayi acknowledges, the Probate Code and Welfare and Institutions Code share the same definition of undue influence, (§ 86; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a)), and the probate court expressly stated that its undue influence finding was based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70. Nothing more was required under section 632. Finally, Jendayi argues the statement of decision was defective because the probate court did not addre...

Bill No. 611 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 26, 2007, p. 4; see Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 611 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 31, 2007, p. 4 [“The attachment procedure is a useful tool to prohibit the perpetrator from disposing of the elder or dependent adult’s assets in his or her possession prior to final disposition of the case.”].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.01, the statute specifically authorizing pretrial attachment in financial...

(San Luis Rey Racing, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73.) “Standing, for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, must be analyzed in a manner that induces interested persons to report elder abuse and to file lawsuits against elder abuse and neglect.” (Lowrie, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) When the Legislature enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3,2 it “specified that the Elder Abuse Act was intended to ‘enable interested persons to engage attorneys...

32 it was in Mahan based on the alleged financial elder abuse scheme in that case, is that Royals obstructed Adams’s estate plan and “deprived” Lu “of property indirectly, using the Trust as an instrument of [her] scheme.” (Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) To funnel recovery on such a claim back into the hands of the person who allegedly carried out the scheme would defeat the purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(2). The demurrer to Lu’s sixth coun...

Fifth and finally, he asserts the court improperly calculated damages under section 859 and wrongly awarded those damages to Asaro rather than the Trust. A. Asaro Did Not Lack Standing Jon argues Asaro lacked standing to assert elder abuse claims on Antoinette’s behalf because he was not her “successor in interest,” as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3, subdivision (d)(1), specifically authorizes elder abuse claims on behalf of a ...

Defendants complain that White has no standing to request the EAROs because she is unable to establish that she is either a trustee of the living trust or fiduciary of Thomas. We disagree. White’s “standing to sue is a threshold issue which must be resolved before this matter can be reached on its merits.” (Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 71.) Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03, subdivision (a), “(1) An elder or dependent adult who has suffe...

[Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 15657 has been amended several times since then, but the core of it remains the same today. It sets forth a scheme of heightened remedies—punitive damages ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 15657, subd. (c)), attorney’s fees and costs (id., subd. (a)), and exemption 11 See Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5 (actions for damages in financial elder abuse cases); Civil Code section 8468 (claims by mechanics seeking a lien upon property they have improve...

16 reasonably found that Asaro did not have reason to know of breaches of fiduciary duty to Nicola’s trust, let alone that Asaro might have a cause of action against Jon. 3. Elder Abuse Claims Asaro’s claim for financial elder abuse of Antoinette, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, had to be “commenced within four years after the plaintiff discover[ed] or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse.”...

y* **Case Number:** A165210 --- Filed 1/30/24 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE RICHARD NEWMAN, as Executor, etc., A165210 Plaintiff and Respondent, (*San Mateo County v. Super*. Ct. No. 22PRO00138) MARINA CASEY, Defendant and Appellant. This is an appeal from elder abuse restraining orders (EAROs) issued pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.031 and a subsequent order declaring a deed transferri...

term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from another part of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to convey a different meaning.”].) 10. In other regulations, CDCR has expressly adopted statutory definitions as part of its regulatory scheme. (See, e.g., § 3008 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 311]; § 3003 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 76]; § 3016 [expressly incorporating definition of Health and Safety Code secti...

on to the partition cause of action against all defendants, Leslie stated causes of action against Caroline for: breach of fiduciary duty; fraudulent concealment; pre- and post-death conversion; neglect, abandonment, elder abuse and financial elder abuse under the Welfare and Institutions Code; ejectment and damages for wrongful detention; accounting, appointment of receiver, and allocation; and “Penal Code §115(a).”4 Caroline filed a motion to strike the complaint for partition and related c...

The complaint also indicates numerous statutes and regulations that defendant allegedly violated, including Civil Code section 1786.18, which is part of ICRAA; section 12269 of title 2 of the California Code of Regulations; sections 1001 and 1621–1623 of title 18 of the United States Code; section 1681 of title 15 of the United States Code; Labor Code sections 432.7 and 432.8; Penal Code section 118; and rules 1.0, 1.0.1, 1.2.1, 3.1, and 3.4 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. The...

. Martinez, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Marcia A. Fay, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of Parts III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and X. 1 This case of first impression involves the application of Penal Code section 134,1 preparing false evidence. At issue are declarations containing false information collected by defendant, Dolores Maria Lucero, to be us...

ty to proceed against Archangel conflicts with a crime victim’s rights to justice and due process, as set forth in article I, section 28, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution, is misplaced. It may be that Archangel’s threatening conduct toward Searles constituted a crime. If so, he is subject to arrest; and, as his victim, Searles may qualify for a pretrial protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (a), and, following a conviction, a more extended restraini...

Bloomfield, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* \* \* \* In 2010, Earl Youell (appellant) pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted a prior strike conviction, a gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22, and a prior prison term enhancement.[^1] The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years in prison. In 2024, the trial court recalled the sentence, struck the one-year prior prison term e...

\* \* \* Eduardo Gonzalez appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of, inter alia, aggravated kidnapping with intent to commit rape. He contends the judgment should be reversed for three reasons: (1) there was no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the movement of the victim satisfied the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping under Penal Code section 209[^1]; (2) section 209 is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain prior-acts...

DAVID VINCENT FERRER, Defendant and Appellant. A172526 (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR2403283) After a plea of guilty, David Vincent Ferrer was convicted of one count of assault with a deadly weapon, a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[^1] Ferrer now appeals his conviction. We affirm. 1. **BACKGROUND** On November 6, 2024, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a single count felony complaint against Ferrer alleging that on October 16, 2024, Ferrer committed an ...

Carter, Judge. Affirmed. Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Robert Anthony Marquez appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[^1] The trial court sentenced him to the low term of two years in state prison. Marquez’s appointed co...

e “much less serious than the 1990 convictions.” He was now over 60 years old, was “declining in health,” and had remained “trouble free” since being incarcerated in June 2011. He attached a copy of his habeas petition from case No. 0936 involving the 2012 convictions, which alleged (1) the trial court failed to give a required jury instruction regarding the meaning of “knowingly possessed” under Penal Code section 311.11, and (2) defendant’s appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on app...

and appellant District Attorney of Los Angeles County (plaintiff) filed a 28-count information in March 2023 charging defendants and respondents Silverado Senior Living Management, Inc.; Silverado Senior Living Holdings, Inc.; Subtenant 330 North Hayworth Ave, LLC; Loren Bernard Shook; Jason Michael Russo; and Kimberly Cheryl Butrum (collectively, defendants)[^1] with elder abuse in violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (b)(1) and violation of Labor Code section 6425. The charges w...

eges that Campbell’s April 22, 2014 email “sparked a firestorm of aggressive and unlawful statutory, regulatory and local code enforcement to interfere with Fishback’s use and enjoyment of his property.” In October 2015, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed another misdemeanor criminal complaint against Fishback. Five counts were alleged: two counts of unlawful dumping under Penal Code section 374.3, subdivision (a) and subdivision (b), both pleaded as infractions; misdemea...

Wilens, and Macy Wilens for Plaintiff and Appellant. Russo & Duckworth and J. Scott Russo for Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiff Randy R. Johnson appeals from a nominal judgment entered in his favor after the trial court granted a motion for directed verdict against him. The court found his payment of illegally increased rent did not support his claim based on Penal Code section 496,[^1] which authorizes civil remedies for its violation. (*Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour* (2022) 13...

(*Id.* at p. 725.) Reversing the denial of the appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus, the *Carrera* court held that “the \[local\] ordinance allowing the impoundment and sale of farm animals found to be ‘at large’ upon any street or public place or upon any private property against the wishes of the owner of the property, and \[former\] Penal Code section 597f, to the extent that it commands the impoundment of any farm animal ‘neglected’ by its owner, are constitutionally invalid for fail...

to receive custody of any excess dogs pending separate contempt proceedings.” Yet, as *Carrera* explains, a “ ‘temporary non-final deprivation of property is nonetheless a “deprivation” in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” (*Carrera, supra*, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 726.) As such, the “process” provided here does not pass muster. Finally, defendant’s counsel, at oral argument, insisted that Penal Code section 597.1 is the sole statutory means by which an SPCA can obtain a court order allow...

It may be that Archangel’s threatening conduct toward Searles constituted a crime. If so, he is subject to arrest; and, as his victim, Searles may qualify for a pretrial protective order pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (a), and, following a conviction, a more extended restraining order, valid for up to 10 years, under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (k). In seeking a civil harassment restraining order, however, Searles does not come within the scope of the victims’ rig...

The court also considered the fact that application of the enhancements would result in a sentence of over 20 years, and that multiple enhancements were alleged in a single case. The court went on: “I don’t find, however, that application of the enhancements in this case would result in a discriminatory racial impact, as defined in Penal Code Section 745\[, subdivision \](a)(4)(A), and, certainly, the defense has not proved with a preponderance of the evidence that this mitigating factor appl...

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Defendant and appellant Yvette Renee Garcia challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36.[^1] Garcia was charged with one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), one...

(Stats. 1986, ch. 858, §§ 4, 7, pp. 2953-2956.) Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a), provided, as it does today, “The court shall advise the person of his or her right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a jury trial,” and further, “[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and the district attorney.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 858, § 7, p. 2955.) Penal Code section 1026.5 governing NGI proceedings was enacted in 1979 and provided, as it does today in Penal Co...

(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); *People v. Hilburn* (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205 (*Hilburn*).) “When a trial court imposes a middle term sentence, the court is only required to state, on the record, the facts and reasons for imposing the middle term, pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1), (5), and (c). Section 1170, subdivisions (a)(3) and (b)(1) do not prescribe any other evidentiary or proof requirements on the imposition of a middle term sentence.” (*Sarmiento-Zuniga*, *supra*,...

VINCENT MEDRANO, Defendant and Respondent. 2d Crim. No. B340959 (Super. Ct. No. CR28216) (Ventura County) The People appeal an order granting the petition of Vincent Medrano (respondent) for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) (section 1170(d)(1)(A)).[^1] The statute provides relief to juvenile offenders who were “sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” (LWOP). (*Ibid*.) Respondent does not qualify for relief under t...

Rene Navarro, Judge. Dismissed. Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appellant Solomon Andrews filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),[^1] which the court took off calendar. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under the authority of *People v. Delgadillo* (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (*Delgadillo*), setting forth a statement of the ...

Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Whitney and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- **INTRODUCTION** Appellant Christopher Baldwin was sentenced to 44 years to life stemming from the aggravated sexual assault of his neighbor when he was 16 years old. In 2024, he petitioned for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d))[^1] and pursuant to *People v. Heard* (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (*Heard*). Se...

. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* After being found guilty of, among other offenses, two counts of attempted murder, Martin Frank Arroyo was sentenced to 20 years plus 15 years to life on one attempted murder conviction, and a concurrent term of 10 years plus 15 years to life on the other conviction. In 2023, Arroyo filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).[^1] In his petition, Arroyo argued he was entitled to relief ...

(*Ibid.*) In 2022, the trial court declined to resentence defendant. (*People v. Scott* (Jul. 11, 2023, C096477) \[nonpub. opn.\] (*Scott III*).) Defendant again appealed, and this court again remanded the matter for a new hearing. (*Ibid.*)[^1] On remand, defendant argued he did not currently pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in Penal Code section 1170.18. His criminal history was remote and had decreased in seriousness. During his 12 years of incarceration, he ...

Brazil, Judge. Affirmed. Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Appellant Anthony Jerome James appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for relief under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (current Penal Code section 1172.6).[^1] Finding no error, we affirm. Section 1172.6 provides relief for certain individuals convicted of attempted murder under an imputed-malice theory of liability. The ...

Lewis* (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970 (*Lewis*) was pending before the Supreme Court on the following issues: “(1) May superior courts consider the record of conviction in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95? (2) When does the right to appointed counsel arise under Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (c).” (*People v. Lewis* (2020) 460 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 \[460 P.3d 262\], review granted on specified issues Mar....

After using the drugs, they learned from watching the news that Sam Troia of Troia’s Market had died in the robbery. Defendant told Holt they “had to be real careful” or they were “going to get caught.” ## Resentencing Proceedings In 2022, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly Penal Code section 1170.95; unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code). The prosecution conceded that defendant had stated a prima facie case for resentencing, and ...

. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ **MEMORANDUM OPINION**[^1] Defendant Jeffery Lawrence Jernigan appeals from an order denying his request for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1.[^2] We conclude that the order Jernigan challenges is not appealable. We therefore...

Dismissed. Jennifer Peabody and Olivia Meme, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Appellant Salvador Cortez appeals from the superior court’s order denying a request for recall of his 2003 sentence and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1.[^1] Appellate counsel asks us to follow the procedures outlined in *People v. Delgadillo* (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.[^2] Because we conclude the superior court’s order is not...

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ When a superior court receives a letter from a case records manager in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informing the court that the abstract of judgment for a defendant “may be in error,” does the court have jurisdiction to correct the sentence where the judgment is long since final? Penal Code section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1),[^1] gives the court jurisdiction to recall and resentence a defendant in limi...

Ct. No. SS111071A) In 2013, defendant Pedro Perez pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted gang and firearm allegations. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 41 years in state prison. In 2024, Perez filed an “Invitation to Recall Sentence” under Penal Code section 1172.1.[^1] Based on subdivision (c) of that section, the trial court declined to take any action on the motion, and Perez appealed. At issue is whether a trial court’s decision not to act on a defendant...

. SS032624A) A jury convicted defendant Robert Tino Armendariz in 2004 of first degree murder and dissuading a witness by force or threat. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 111 years to life in prison. In 2024, Armendariz filed a “Request for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing” pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1.[^1] Based on subdivision (c) of that statute, the trial court declined to respond to the request. Armendariz appealed. We conclude that the trial court’s decision ...

Lee, Deputy Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* \* \* \* Defendant and appellant Aaron Shorter (appellant) pleaded no contest to murder and admitted a firearm enhancement. The trial court denied his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95)[^1] without an evidentiary hearing because “\[appellant\] was the actual shooter and perpetrator of the crime” and thus ineligible for relief. Now...

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jose Trinidad Ramirez (defendant) appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 after the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and determined there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted...

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ We affirm the resentencing court’s order, brought by appellant Steven Michael Romero pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, denying his petition for resentencing.[^1] As a matter of law, he is ineligible for resen...

Brazil, Judge. Affirmed. Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. Appellant Anthony Jerome James appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for relief under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (current Penal Code section 1172.6).[^1] Finding no error, we affirm. Section 1172.6 provides relief for certain individuals convicted of attempted murder under an imputed-malice theory of liability. The ...

Pulliam, Judge. Affirmed. John Anthony Perez, in pro. per.; and Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. John Anthony Perez appeals an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.[^1] A jury convicted Perez in 2012 of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death ...

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to evaluate whether his prior conviction qualified as a strike under *People v. Gallardo* (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 (*Gallardo*). Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his *Romero*[^2] motion and in summarily denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.[^3] We conclude defendant forfeited his *Gallardo* challenge because he did not raise it during the resentencing hearing. We also conclude the trial co...

Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (*Wende*) and *Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (*Anders*), and not under *People v. Delgadillo* (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (*Delgadillo*), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record. Appellate counsel argues that “\[w\]hile this appeal involves Penal Code section 1172.6 proceedings, the limitations set forth in *People v. Delgadillo* \[ \] do not apply because the superior court denied the petition after issuing an order to show cause...

Marvell Carruthers, in pro. per.; and Francine R. Tone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Appellant Marvell Carruthers appeals the denial of his request for resentencing after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.[^2] Appellant’s counsel initially filed a brief requesting this court independently review the recor...

Steiner, Judge. Affirmed. Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* A jury convicted defendant Prentis John Hill of second degree murder. He filed a resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court denied after a prima facie hearing.[^1] On appeal, his appointed counsel filed a no-issue brief, requesting that we independently review the record for error under *People ...

JUAN E. deGEORGE, Defendant and Appellant. H051611 (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. CR6768) Defendant Juan deGeorge pleaded guilty to second degree murder and robbery in 1979. In 2022, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his petition. On appeal he contends the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to establish that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to ...

H051745 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. F26219) In 2015, Damian Alex Herrera pleaded guilty to attempted murder of a member of a rival gang and was sentenced to 35 years in prison. In 2022, Herrera petitioned for resentencing under what is now Penal Code section 1172.6, hoping to take advantage of new restrictions on imputing malice for murder or attempted murder. (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The trial court denied the petition, ruling, based on the...

Furthermore, the petition that he filed was under \[section\] 1170\[, subdivision\] (d). He’s not eligible for relief under that section either. And so\[,\] for that reason, I ask just to take it off calendar at this point.” The court took the matter off calendar “for the reasons stated by counsel.” II\. DISCUSSION Penal Code section 1172.7, subdivision (a) rendered most sentencing enhancements imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 prior to January 1, 2018, invalid. Defen...

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ A jury convicted Robert Beard of assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor sexual battery in 2005. The trial court sentenced him to 39 years to life in prison, a sentence that included two now-invalid one-year enhancements for prior prison terms and two five-year enhancements for serious felony priors. In a resentencing proceeding under Penal Code section 1172.75,[^1] the superior court struck the one-year enhancements but expressly retained t...

JOE NATHAN TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. C102464 (Super. Ct. No. 10F05622) Defendant Joe Nathan Taylor appeals from a postconviction order recalling his previous sentence and resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.[^1] Appellate counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues under *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Although not required t...

Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Miguel Morales Velez appeals after the trial court resentenced him under Penal Code section 1172.75. (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Velez requested that the court (1) d...

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura G. Baggett and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. \* \* \* In 2008, Jaime Perez Alvarez was sentenced to a term of 140 years to life. In December 2023, Alvarez appeared before the trial court regarding his eligibility for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 (all undesignated statutory references are to this code). Alvarez argued he qualifie...

*People v. Moenius* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 820, 827, fn. 6 (*Moenius*) \[noting that *Turner* misstated the relevant date; “the pertinent issue is whether the prior crime was a serious or violent felony on June 30, 1993 \[the applicable lock-in date\]”\].) The next case in this line, *Moenius*, similarly held that “a prior serious felony conviction sustained before the effective date of Penal Code section 1192.7 may qualify as a strike.” (*Moenius*, *supra*, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 827.) The defe...

Given that defendant “could be paroled at any moment,” the court found defendant posed an unreasonable risk and declined to reduce defendant’s sentence. Defendant timely appealed. In September 2024, pursuant to a request from defendant’s appointed counsel under Penal Code section 1237.1, the trial court filed an amended abstract of judgment that updated defendant’s presentence custody credits to 3,395 actual days as of the October 2020 resentencing. **DISCUSSION** Appointed counsel filed an o...

Gragas, Assistant County Counsel, and Yuan Chang, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Surety) provided a $100,000 bail bond for a criminal defendant who failed to appear in court as required. The court declared a forfeiture of the bond under Penal Code section 1305 1 and Surety failed to vacate the forfeiture within the statutorily specified appearance period. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment against Surety in the ...

A statute of repose limits the time within which a proceeding may be brought regardless of injury or damages, and it is generally calculated from a specific event (e.g., construction or manufacture). (See Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 300, 305.) 2 Penal Code section 1305 states in part: (a)(1) A court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear …. … (...

… (j) A motion filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court may extend the 30-day period upon a showing of good cause. The motion may be made by the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the depositor of money or property, any of whom may appear in person or through an attorney. …. Penal Code section 1305.4 states: Notwithstanding Section 1305, the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the d...

Code Civ. Proc. Section 12a. Defendant did not make a motion at that time, nor at any time up to the entry of summary judgment on June 11, 2020. The court’s entry of summary judgment on that date was well within the 90- day period specified in Penal Code section 1306. Therefore, the summary judgment order is timely and valid. This appeal followed. The Appellate Division grants the People’s Motion for Judicial Notice of the Judicial Council’s Circulating Order Memorandum (Evid. Code, §459), an...

to a traffic stop, law enforcement recovered a black Glock 30 .45-caliber semi-automatic firearm with an extended magazine with a round in the chamber. On April 27, 2021, law enforcement involved in the instant case facilitated obtaining that firearm. It does not appear the person involved in the traffic stop was involved in the instant shooting. [^3]: Alfonso testified pursuant to order under Penal Code section 1324. He also testified he received threats over his involvement in the case. [^4...

Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1034 [“an uncooperative attitude is not, in and of itself, substantial evidence of incompetence”]; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 893 [“‘the test, in a section 1368 proceeding, is competency to cooperate, not cooperation’”]; People v. Medine (1995) 11 Cal.4th 5 Penal Code section 1367 provides a defendant is incompetent for purposes of a criminal trial “if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to unders...

arent in a dependency proceeding is trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s orders without regard to prejudice.” (Id. at p. 915.) The substantial evidence standard requires that the juvenile court find by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent is incompetent under either Probate Code section 1801 or Penal Code section 1367. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 667 (Sara D.).) Penal Code sect...

(See *People v. Kelly* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) In January 2022, appellant was charged with two counts of murder, with enhancements alleging the use of a deadly weapon and the special circumstance of committing multiple murders. Appellant initially pleaded not guilty. Shortly thereafter, the proceedings were suspended pending a mental competence evaluation under Penal Code section 1368. After multiple continuances and evaluations, appellant was found competent to stand trial. After a...

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Dumaurio Wellington appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the allegation that he personally used a metal pipe as a deadly weapon in committing the murder. The trial court found true the allegation that Wellington had two prior convictions for serious felonies and denied his motion under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), to dismiss two five-year sentence enhancements for those c...

when certain compelled documents were received or when he reviewed them, if at all.” The court found that compelled statements taken by DSS from Russo and other Silverado employees impacted Baudendistel’s overall conclusions, “which in turn was used to support the People’s theory of elder abuse and criminal negligence.” The trial court then dismissed the action against all defendants pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION #### Applicable law and standard of revi...

Fishback sued Campbell, a then deputy district attorney, for defamation based on an email sent by Campbell to another public employee in which Campbell stated that Fishback “entered a no contest (guilty) plea to charges” years earlier, when the particular misdemeanor action referenced was actually dismissed under Penal Code section 1385. Reviewing de novo, we conclude that Campbell is immune from liability based on the allegations in the TAC. We accordingly affirm the judgment. **BACKGROUND**...

(See, e.g., § 3008 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 311]; § 3003 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 76]; § 3016 [expressly incorporating definition of Health and Safety Code section 11014.5]; § 3260.1 [expressly incorporating definition of Government Code sections 6250 et seq.]; § 3317.2 [expressly incorporating definitions from Penal Code section 2602 and Probate Code section 3200, et seq.].) Had the CDCR wanted to incorporate the provisions of...

## Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Penal Code sections 2931 and 2933 allow prisoners to earn credit through work and good behavior. These credits may not be forfeited without due process. (See *Gomez v. Johnson* (N.D.Cal. Apr. 21, 1994, No. C 94-0575 DLJ) 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5598 at p. \*3 (*Gomez*).) Penal Code section 2932 allows prisoners to lose those credits for acts of misconduct and sets forth certain procedural requirements where a disciplinary action may result in such...

ply of rights applicable in criminal cases do not apply.” Since Rowell was decided, the Supreme Court has clarified the rights of civil committees under the MDO and NGI statutes to procedural protections of their right to a jury trial. In 2015 the Supreme Court in Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at page 1116, construed the jury trial provisions that apply to petitions to extend an MDO’s commitment. Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (a)(1), provides, “The court shall advise the person of the r...

Rather, he is challenging the interpretation given to the phrase “step-parent[ ]” as that term is used in section 3000. Under such circumstances, we generally “ ‘defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, particularly when the interpretation implicates areas 7 The quasi-legislative rulemaking authority embodied in Penal Code section 5058 initially resided in the Director of Corrections. (Pen. Code, § 5058, subd. (a); id. at § 6080, subd. (b) [As used in Penal Code section 505...

n the FLR, family visits are not allowed for inmates convicted of a violent offense (including first degree murder) if the victim was an “[immediate] family member” as defined in section 3000. (§ 3177, subd. (b)(1).) “Step-parents” are included in section 3000’s definition of “immediate family members.” (§ 3000.) In 2016, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 843 which was enacted as Penal Code section 6404. It provides: “Inmates shall not be prohibited from family visits based so...

Garcia* (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973, citations omitted.) Appellant argues that a finding of personal use of a firearm does not prove he was the actual killer, citing *People v. Jones* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084. In that case, the jury merely found that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5. (*Id.* at p. 1097.) The California Supreme Court recognized: “The finding of personal use, however, would not in itself prove defendant was the actual killer. ...

(c)(40).) Section 12022.53 defines several sentencing enhancements for personal use of a firearm in connection with certain felonies. Under the majority’s view, the Legislature could repeal and replace section 12022.53 with a prohibition on possessing a controlled substance or narcotic drug (see Health & Saf. Code, § 11350). Following such amendment, and notwithstanding the inclusion of Penal Code section 12022.53 on the list of serious felonies, prior convictions for violation of section 120...

(See Powell, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 234 [“reasonable cause” is evaluated under an objective standard but “bad faith” is evaluated under a subjective standard]; Halaco Engineering Co. v. South Central Coast Regional Com. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 52, 79 [“ ‘The award of attorney’s fees under Government Code section 800 is allowed only if the actions of a public entity or official were wholly arbitrary or capricious. The phrase “arbitrary or capricious” encompasses conduct not supported by a fair o...

Riley* (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) 3. LAUSD’s Liability for Sexual Assault Government Code section 905.8 provides: “Nothing in this part \[including section 911.2\] imposes liability upon a public entity unless such liability otherwise exists.” In 1963, the Legislature enacted Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), which reads: “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the ac...

on 340.1(b)(1))) by the defendant, with a “ ‘cover up’ ” being defined as “a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault” (id., subd. (b)(2)). The specific issue before us is whether enhanced damages can be awarded under section 340.1(b)(1) against a public entity named as a defendant in a lawsuit for childhood sexual assault, or whether such awards are prohibited under Government Code section 818 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as section 818), a provision withi...

omment explains that this section ‘makes clear that the claims presentation provisions do not impose substantive liability; some other statute must be found that imposes liability.’ \[Citations.\] Thus the question of the District’s ‘substantive liability’ is determined by reference to statutes *outside* the claim presentation requirement. At the time of the alleged sexual misconduct (and today), Government Code section 820, subdivision (a) provided that ‘a public employee is liable for injur...

tted a multitude of violations over the years relating to his brazen scheme of operating unlawful, environmentally destructive, and dangerous solid waste disposal sites, the particular prosecution referenced in Campbell’s email did not result in a no contest plea or guilty verdict. Nevertheless, we conclude that Campbell was immune from suit under Government Code sections 821.6 and 822.2. **I. Government Code section 821.6** Government Code section 821.6 provides: “A public employee is not li...

The email was sent in Campbell’s capacity as a deputy district attorney performing prosecutorial functions. Accordingly, because Campbell’s email was directly connected to the prosecution of official proceedings, he is entitled to absolute immunity under Government Code section 821.6. **II. Government Code section 822.2** We further conclude that, based on the allegation of the TAC, Campbell is additionally protected by governmental immunity under Government Code section 822.2, which provides...

argues that textual clues within section 818 and elsewhere in the Government Claims Act convey the Legislature’s intent to prohibit only a limited array of damages. Specifically, plaintiff assigns significance to section 818’s repetition of the “for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant” language appearing in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), and to a reference within Government Code section 825, part of the Government Claims Act that is concerned with the payment ...

Nevertheless, the teacher “retained his position with \[LAUSD\].” Based on these allegations, O.B. brought causes of action for negligence and for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. O.B. also alleged that “\[t\]his action alleges liability against \[LAUSD\] pursuant to California Government Code §§ 815.2, 815.4, and/or 815.6” and that “\[p\]ursuant to California Government Code § 905, this action, brought pursuant to CCP § 340.1, is exempt from the claims presentment requirement se...

21–22.) The Legislature cannot “create a liability against the state for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees” because to do so “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.” (*Heron v. Riley* (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.) 3. LAUSD’s Liability for Sexual Assault Government Code section 905.8 provides: “Nothing in this part \[including section 911.2\] imposes liability upon a public entity unless such liability otherwise exists.” In 1963, the Legislature enac...

filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.” In short, the changes made by AB 218 allowed O.B. to bring her claims against LAUSD even though the acts alleged occurred before 2009, and O.B. did not present a timely claim under the timelines set forth in Government Code section 911.2. 2. The Gift Clause of the California Constitution Article XVI, sectio...

SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT v. PUBLIC FACILITIES FINANCING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO S245996 Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. A citizens’ taxpayer organization sued to invalidate certain contracts allegedly made in violation of Government Code section 1090. The question is whether Government Code section 1092 gives plaintiff the statutory standing to do so. We hold that section 10921 does not provide plaintiff a private right of action because it was not a party to the contra...

v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including subpoenas, for state agencies and state department heads.9 The Authority is, as noted, a county agency, it h...

v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons. First, the cases all involve Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), which authorizes certain investigatory powers, including subpoenas, for state agencies and state department heads. 9 The Authority is, as noted, a county agency, it ...

Statutory authorization is required. (See, e.g., L. Modjeska, Admin. Law Practice & Proc. (2021) Subpoenas, Administrative Law Practice and Procedure, § 2:4.) 19 Third, in all three cases the court did in fact hear and evaluate evidence. In each case, the state entity issuing the subpoena filed a petition compelling compliance required by Government Code section 11187, subdivision (a). And in each case, the subpoena recipients filed declarations in response. In short, the respondents had an o...

Statutory authorization is required. (See, e.g., L. Modjeska, Admin. Law Practice & Proc. (2021) Subpoenas, Administrative Law Practice and Procedure, § 2:4.) 19 Third, in all three cases the court did in fact hear and evaluate evidence. In each case, the state entity issuing the subpoena filed a petition compelling compliance required by Government Code section 11187, subdivision (a). And in each case, the subpoena recipients filed declarations in response. In short, the respondents had an o...

SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (§ 818.) In LeVine v. Weis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 201 (LeVine), the court concluded that section 818 did not prohibit an award of double back pay under Government Code section 12653, part of the state False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.), against a public entity. (LeVine, at p. 209.) In so holding, the court emp...

But the reach of the regulation is not as broad as plaintiff suggests. First of all, regulations must fit “within the scope of authority conferred.” (Gov. Code, § 11342.1.) Here, the “credits” following regulation 11017.1 expressly state it was promulgated under the authority of Government Code section 12935, subdivision (a), which confers upon the Civil Rights Council of the Civil Rights Department (see Gov. Code, § 12903) the authority to adopt regulations that interpret, implement, and app...

93.) In *Trujillo,* the jury found by special verdict that the defendant employers did not discriminate against or harass the plaintiff employees. (See *Trujillo, supra,* 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 282.) The jury, however, also found the defendants failed to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent employment discrimination and harassment from occurring in violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (i). The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs under th...

(*Association of California Ins. Companies v. Jones* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 376, 390 \[regulations that “alter or amend \[a\] statute, or enlarge or impair its scope, are invalid”\].) Accordingly, the regulation provides no legal basis for interpreting or implementing ICRAA as plaintiff urges. The credits do, however, indicate regulation 11017.1 was promulgated to implement Government Code section 12952—known as the Fair Chance Act—which concerns employer inquiries into the criminal history of *job...

In 2023, while a sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, Washington applied to be appointed as the next Public Defender. The County later informed him that he would not be considered for the position because it believed he was ineligible under Government Code section 27701,[^2] which provides: “A person is not eligible to the office of public defender unless he has been a practicing attorney in all of the courts of the State for at least the year preceding the date of his electi...

Based on these allegations, the complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) nuisance; (2) violation of LAMC section 12.22, subdivision (C); (3) violation of LAMC section 62.129; and (4) declaratory relief. With respect to the second and third causes of action, the complaint alleges: Under Government Code section 36900, a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action [citing Riley]. Plaintiffs are affected private individuals who seek to redress Defendants violation with this...

Based on these allegations, the complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) nuisance; (2) violation of LAMC section 12.22, subdivision (C); (3) violation of LAMC section 62.129; and (4) declaratory relief. With respect to the second and third causes of action, the complaint alleges: Under Government Code section 36900, a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action [citing Riley]. Plaintiffs are affected private individuals who seek to redress Defendants violation with this...

The trial court denied the motion on the ground the acts that form the basis of the cross-complaint are not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP law. We affirm. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Los filed their complaint against Miran[^1] for breach of the covenants, codes and restrictions (CC&Rs) that govern the parties’ properties and violation of Government Code section 36900 arising from Miran’s alleged violation of certain city ordinances.[^2] The Los also asserted claim...

variously, that: (1) sections 37103 and 53060 have preempted, abrogated, or modified the common law test in the circumstances of this case; (2) “\[t\]he power to contract for specialized services necessarily means that the RGS contract describes the legal relationship \[between the City and Breeze\] even if one or more common law criteria of employment might exist”; and (3) “the plain language of Government Code § 37103 grants \[the City\] the right to utilize contracting rather than direct e...

Dowswell argues, variously, that: (1) sections 37103 and 53060 have preempted or abrogated the common law; (2) “\[t\]he power to contract for specialized services necessarily means that the RGS contract describes the legal relationship \[between the City and Dowswell\] even if one or more common law criteria of employment might exist”; and (3) “the plain language of Government Code § 37103 grants \[the City\] the right to utilize contracting rather than direct employment as a means to obtain ...

He hasn’t. This Court has been more than patient with the Plaintiff, but to no avail. The Court had previously stated to Plaintiff that perhaps he should attempt to serve via publication.” Based on those findings and the totality of the circumstances, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.150 and 583.420, Government Code section 68608, and the court’s inherent authority. The court issued a signed minute order dismissing the pro...

h Care Decisions Law was to set[] out uniform standards for the making of health care decisions by third parties, whether by conservators, agents, or surrogates. (*Conservatorship of Wendland* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 539 540; see 4617 [defining a health care decision as one made by a patient or the patient s agent, conservator, or surrogate ].) Before the Health Care Decision Law s enactment, Health and Safety Code section 1418.8 addressed the ability of next of kin to represent residents in s...

2005) 404 F.3d 418, 436; *United States v. Vangates* (11th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 1315, 1321.) The statutes that sanction an administrator’s failure to cooperate in a DSS investigation accordingly need not mention the Fifth Amendment nor penalize its invocation. The statutory penalties imposed for failure to cooperate expressly include termination of an administrator’s employment. Health and Safety Code section 1569.58, subdivision (a)(1), for example, authorizes DSS to “prohibit any person from...

ement stated, READ CAREFULLY Not Part of Admission Agreement, and continued, Resident shall not be required to sign this arbitration agreement as a condition of admission to this facility or to continue to receive care at the facility. 3 The arbitration agreement stated disputes concerning 2 Neither compliance with, nor the enforceability of, the requirements for arbitration agreements under Health and Safety Code section 1599.81 or 42 C. F. R. 483.70 (2019) is before us. 3 The admissions pap...

In other regulations, CDCR has expressly adopted statutory definitions as part of its regulatory scheme. (See, e.g., § 3008 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 311]; § 3003 [expressly incorporating definition of Penal Code section 76]; § 3016 [expressly incorporating definition of Health and Safety Code section 11014.5]; § 3260.1 [expressly incorporating definition of Government Code sections 6250 et seq.]; § 3317.2 [expressly incorporating definitions from Penal Code se...

(b)(1)) as to counts 1, 3, and 4; personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) as to counts 1 and 2; had one prior strike conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12); had one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and served a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) for a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350. On November 24, 1999, a jury convicted defendant of all counts and found true that defendant commit...

Code, § 11361.8, subd. (b).) An “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new super strike, including sexually violent offenses and certain sexual acts with a child younger than 14 years old. (*Id.*, § 11361.8, subd. (b)(2); Pen. Code, §§ 1170.18, subd. (c), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) In considering a Health and Safety Code section 11361.8 petition, the trial court may consider the petitioner’s criminal conviction history, incl...

2 II. REGULATORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Overview of State and Local Regulation of Medical Marijuana3 1. Compassionate Use Act (CUA) (1996) In 1996, state voters approved the CUA (Proposition 215; Health & Safety Code § 11362.5), which immunized from prosecution physicians who recommended marijuana to patients for medical purposes. (420 Caregivers, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1324.) The CUA also immunized from prosecution patients and their primary caregivers4 who cultivated and possess...

statutes relied upon by the City to show liability were ambiguous; the City failed to show that he aided and abetted the conduct of the dispensaries; the action was moot because both dispensaries had vacated the properties; the civil enforcement actions violated Braum’s double jeopardy rights because he had been criminally convicted for the same offense; and Braum was immune from liability under Health and Safety Code section 11362.775. Braum supported his opposition with his declaration that...

He’s not eligible for relief under that section either. And so\[,\] for that reason, I ask just to take it off calendar at this point.” The court took the matter off calendar “for the reasons stated by counsel.” II\. DISCUSSION Penal Code section 1172.7, subdivision (a) rendered most sentencing enhancements imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2 prior to January 1, 2018, invalid. Defendants can obtain relief if the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (C...

cture shall be erected, reconstructed, structurally altered, enlarged, moved, or maintained, nor shall any building, structure, or land be used or designed to be used for any use other than is permitted in the zone in which such building, structure, or land is located and then only after applying for and securing all permits and licenses required by all laws and ordinances.” 9 violation of Health and Safety Code section 11570 et seq. (narcotics abatement).10 Other than the respective start da...

And, for the zoning violations at the Ventura property, the City maintained that Braum was liable for the maximum civil penalty of $2,500 per day under section 11.00 (l) for the period from January 26, 2009, through at least February 4, 2013, for a total of 1,470 days. In addition, the City argued that Braum was liable for the maximum penalty of $25,000 for each property under Health and Safety Code section 11581, subdivision (b)(2) based on the nuisance violations established under section 1...

(F)). Caru then successfully moved for summary adjudication as to defendant’s violations of the municipal code. Caru also successfully moved to have matters deemed admitted based on defendant’s failure to serve timely responses to its requests for admissions. These matters deemed admitted include that defendant qualified as a “ ‘breeder’ ” under Health and Safety Code section 122045; failed to maintain sanitary conditions for her dogs (*id*., § 122065, subd. (a)); failed to provide her dogs w...

With respect to the standard of review on appeal, we found that a finding of bad faith is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard and, “[i]f there is no dispute as to what facts were known at the time the contest was initiated or maintained, the existence of reasonable cause is a question of law.” (Powell, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 234.) 16 attorney fees provision in Business and Professions Code section 809.9.15 The statutory language there referred to conduct that was...

75 [“the plaintiff must be able to allege injury” and “must actually suffer the discriminatory conduct”].) The court determined the plaintiffs suffered injury because the plaintiffs’ claims were per se injurious. (Id., at p. 174.) Limon’s citation to Goehring is also unavailing. The plaintiffs’ standing was not at issue in the case. Rather, the arguably related question was whether a claim under Business and Professions Code section 6061 required the plaintiffs prove an injury to obtain the r...

In family court, counsel for a minor has a statutorily- imposed duty to present to the court recommendations based on what the attorney believes is in the best interests of the child in addition to the child’s wishes. [Citations.] In a civil matter, attorneys representing minors—or any other party who has a GAL—are bound by Business and Professions Code section 6068 and the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct and have an obligation to zealously represent their clients’ interest within the...

corporations, which also “can only act through human representatives.” Unlike trusts, however, corporations can hold title to property, and a corporate owner or corporate trustee clearly would not qualify as a “landlord” under rule 12.14(a). (See Caressa Camille, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102 [“ ‘A corporation is not a natural person’ ”].) 10 Business and Professions Code section 6125. (Aulisio, at pp. 1523–1525.) Although generally nonattorne...

Eventually tenant cashed landlord’s second check for \$21,200. Tenant moved out on September 3, 2019. Tenant had not paid the \$1,050 monthly rent in 14 months. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Tenant filed his complaint on June 17, 2019, alleging (1) violation of statute (Civ. Code, § 1942.4), (2) restitution based on unjust enrichment, (3) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, (4) money had and received, (5) damages for breach of contract, (6) damages for fraud and deceit, (7) violati...

Scott contends that the trial court erroneously denied his request for leave to serve process on URM by delivering notice of the proceeding to the Secretary of State. He argues that this ruling “effectively foreclosed any meaningful path to serve \[URM\]” and therefore excused his delay in service, rendering the court’s dismissal based on that delay an abuse of discretion. We find no error. Corporations Code section 1702 provides that a trial court “may” authorize a plaintiff to serve process...

Leonard Sues His Brothers To Dissolve the Family Business and for Breach of Fiduciary Duty We pick up with the story in this (the parties’ third) appeal where we left off following Michael and Joseph’s appeal from an order awarding Leonard fees and expenses he incurred in a court- ordered appraisal under Corporations Code section 1800.1 (See Schrage v. Schrage (Aug. 19, 2020, B288478) [nonpub. opn.] (Schrage I); see also Schrage v. Schrage (May 14, 2021, B307539) [nonpub. opn.] (Schrage II).)...

755.) To enlarge standing to include every subset of the Fellowship’s worldwide membership would be to open the door wide. Autonomous Region’s opening papers argued that, when it comes to special standing, there is no basis for distinguishing between revocable and irrevocable trusts, and Corporations Code section 5142 proves this, for that provision makes no such distinction. This provision authorizes the following to bring an action to remedy a breach of a charitable trust: (1) the corporati...

(Marsh, Finkle and Bishop, Marsh’s Cal. Corp. Law, (Aspen Pub. 2021), App. B Committee Reports, B.1.A., Assem. Select Com., Rep. on Revision of the Nonprofit Corp. Code, Aug. 27, 1979, Cross-reference Tables, Intro and Chart for Part II.) However, section 5142 was derived from former Corporations Code section 9505 (as added Stats 1947 ch. 1038) and former Civil Code section 605c (as added Stats 1931, ch. 871, § 1.) (Derivation Notes, Deering’s Ann. Corp. Code (2021 ed.) foll. § 5142.) These f...

Caru is a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals (SPCA) registered as a nonprofit public benefit corporation with a principal office in Sonoma County. On October 5, 2017, Caru filed a complaint against defendant asserting one cause of action under Corporations Code section 10404. This law authorizes an SPCA such as Caru to bring a complaint against a person for violating “any law relating to or affecting animals . . . .” (Corp. Code, § 10404.) Caru sought injunctive and declaratory ...

r a complaint against any person, before any court or magistrate having jurisdiction, for the violation of any law relating to or affecting animals, and may aid in the prosecution of any such offender before the court or magistrate.” Thus, the Legislature, in drafting Corporations Code section 10404, chose to authorize the proffering of any “complaint,” not just a “criminal complaint.” Similarly, Corporations Code section 10405 provides, “All magistrates, sheriffs, and officers of police shal...

rtner and the partnership was wound up as of that date.” 10 The partnership’s buyout offer must be accompanied by various financial documents, including a statement of partnership assets and liabilities and a balance sheet and income statement, and “[a]n explanation of how the estimated amount of the payment was calculated.” (§ 16701, subd. (g).) 11 express or implied, of the parties”].) Corporations Code section 16701 establishes an exception to the American rule—authorizing the trial court ...

Trevor Jones contended he was entitled to a percentage of the successful Pura Vida bracelet business established with his former friends and colleagues Paul Goodman and Griffin Thall. He claimed the parties had formed a partnership regarding a bracelet business and sued Goodman and Thall (Defendants) seeking (among other things) a partnership buyout under Corporations Code section 16701.1 Defendants denied Jones’s claims and prevailed at trial. After trial, Defendants sought to recover attorn...

rnia Rules of Court, rule 8.200 authorizes the filing of “[p]arties’ briefs,” including the “appellant’s opening brief,” “respondent’s brief,” and appellant’s reply brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1)–(3).) “ ‘Appellant’ means the appealing party,” and “ ‘[r]espondent’ means the adverse party.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.10(1), (2).) A “ ‘[p]arty’ is a person appearing in an action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.6(15).) Based on these rules, we conclude I-House is permitted to sub...

rejected because I-House “has no standing or interest” in how the Boesch Trust should be interpreted, as I-House is not a trustee or beneficiary of the Boesch Trust 8 and its sole interest in this case is as a beneficiary under the wholly separate Hudson Trust. I-House responds that it was permitted to submit a respondent’s brief in this appeal because it is a “party” within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 1.6. Alternatively, I-House moves for leave to present the same argument...

(Reck, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 690–691.) Here, Richard and Brown’s opening brief evinces a legal challenge to the probate court’s authority to order Brown to pay expenses under the circumstances presented. We review the question of authority to award fees de novo. (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452.) B. Analysis California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 affords a trial court, including one administering probate proceedings, authority to award sanctions “for failure without...

We review the question of authority to award fees de novo. (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452.) B. Analysis California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 affords a trial court, including one administering probate proceedings, authority to award sanctions “for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.30(a), (b).) In addition, the court may order the person found in violation of an applicable rule to “pay to the party aggrieved by ...

The probate court expressly declined to order sanctions but awarded expenses in an amount ($4,000) that was less than half the amount ($8,085) Tukes claimed were incurred in preparing the motion for sanctions. Rule 2.30(d) authorizes fee awards in the amount “incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.30(d).) The sanctions motion was among the “additional work” Frieden undertook as a result of Brown’s repeated rule violations. For all of these reasons,...

of technological enlightenment, what is for the moment unorthodox and unusual stands a good chance of sooner or later being accepted and standard, or even outdated and passé.” (Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, supra, 48 Misc.3d at pp. 313-314.) We encourage the Legislature and the Judicial Council, which have already authorized extensive use of electronic service of notice (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251; see also Prob. Code, § 1215, subd. (c)), to consider developing p...

ng the filing of Royals’s petition on October 24, 2019, Lu’s time to demur was 30 days following proof of personal service on October 25, making the deadline November 25, 2019. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430,40, subd. (a); Prob. Code, §§ 1000, 1044.) Lu filed her demurrer on December 17, 2019. The trial court overruled it as untimely. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (a); Prob. Code, §§ 1000, 1044; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110, subd. (d).) Here on appeal, Lu fails to address the issue of unt...

Pacific Center, Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 (*Hotels Nevada*).) We therefore treat the argument as forfeited and resolve this issue against them. (*Ibid.*) Crystal Jewelry’s oral request at the final status conference to conduct part of the trial remotely was also procedurally deficient. “Notice to the court must be given by filing a *Notice of Remote Appearance* (form RA-110).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.672(h)(2)(C)(ii).) Crystal Jewelry failed to file the required form. On June...

w and will agree to give testimony remotely.” This request was untimely because it failed to give the other parties and the court at least 10 days’ notice. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.672(h)(2)(C)(i).) The request also did not—as defendants contend—demonstrate that its untimeliness should have been excused due to “good cause, unforeseen circumstances, or . . . \[to\] promote access to justice.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.672(j)(2).) Crystal Jewelry’s third and final request that Gonzalez a...

y or indirectly, in any way, including but not limited to, in person, by telephone, in writing, by 2 Section 15657.03, subdivision (y)(1) states, The Judicial Council shall develop forms, instructions, and rules relating to matters governed by this section. The petition and response forms shall be simple and concise, and shall be used by parties in actions brought pursuant to this section. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1160 [augmenting procedures set forth in statute].) 2 public or private...

ides, “Upon the filing of a petition under this section, the respondent shall be personally served with a copy of the petition, temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing of the petition. Service shall be made at least five days before the hearing. The court may for good cause, on motion of the petitioner, or on its own motion, shorten the time for service on the respondent.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1160(c) [“The request for a protective order, notice of hearing, and ...

In its order, the trial court said it could not find the deposition of Andrea Randenberg. In a related footnote, the court explained that it opted to reference the Hospital’s separate statement rather than its submitted evidence because that evidence was scattered in different places and unlabeled, in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. The trial court has discretion to overlook a violation of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. (*Holt v. Brock* (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 611,...

The partitioning court’s orders, however, were not ambiguous. Because plaintiff argued against the affirmative defense of quasi-judicial immunity on its merits and did not show how the procedural defect impaired his ability to oppose the defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment despite violations of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. (See Brown v. El Dorado Union High School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1020 [no abuse of discretion where pla...

Plaintiff argues the omissions caused a due process violation, as no material facts were identified to support adjudication of the defense. As a result, Brock did not meet his burden on summary judgment to show that undisputed facts supported each element of the affirmative defense. “[T]he court’s power to deny summary judgment on the basis of failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 is discretionary, not mandatory.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118.) Th...

party moving for summary judgment to identify in its separate statement of undisputed material facts each affirmative defense to be raised in the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1).) If the party moves for summary adjudication of issues, any affirmative defense must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated in the separate statement of undisputed material facts. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summar...

Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158.) 6 II Rules of Court Violations Rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of Court requires a party moving for summary judgment to identify in its separate statement of undisputed material facts each affirmative defense to be raised in the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1).) If the party moves for summary adjudication of issues, any affirmative defense must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and...

Lawrence Wilson.” No such document appears anywhere in the moving papers. [^3]: Counsel frequently supplied additional facts to support Berry’s arguments instead of supplying evidence to controvert the Hospital’s stated facts. Additional facts should be provided elsewhere in the opposition separate statement, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(3). [^4]: The trial court specifically referenced the Hospital’s undisputed material facts, Nos. 5 and 18. [^5]: The Hospital arg...

It also issued a writ of possession. The county sheriff executed the writ, and possession was restored to Sierra on July 24, 2024. Discussion I *Standard of Review* A motion for summary judgment in an unlawful detainer action is granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under section 437c. (§ 1170.7; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1351.) A plaintiff’s motion, such as the case here, contends there is no defense to its action. (§ 437c, subd. (a)(1).) To establish there is no defense, the mov...

The bench trial was not transcribed by a court reporter. Benjamin requested a statement of decision on the factual basis for the capacity, undue influence, elder abuse, and section 259 findings. Albert prepared a proposed statement of decision per the trial court’s request. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590.) Benjamin objected to the proposal, insisting mother had capacity, there was no evidence she was drugged or intended to sell the property, and the evidence did not establish financi...

The bench trial was not transcribed by a court reporter. Benjamin requested a statement of decision on the factual basis for the capacity, undue influence, elder abuse, and section 259 findings. Albert prepared a proposed statement of decision per the trial court s request. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590.) Benjamin objected to the proposal, insisting mother had capacity, there was no evidence she was drugged or intended to sell the property, and the evidence did not establish financi...

Proc., § 1003, italics added.) A minute order reflecting a verbal ruling is equivalent to the signing of a formal order. (*Simmons v. Superior Court* (1959) 52 Cal.2d 373, 378–379.) Kathleen also observes that the trial court could have later changed its rulings made at trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(a)–(b).) But that is true of many orders before judgment. Yet cases like *Lisi* do not treat this as the relevant factor. Instead, the question is whether th...

After trial, Defendants sought to recover attorney fees pursuant to section 16701, which authorizes an equitable award of attorney and expert fees “against a party that the court finds acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith.” (§ 16701, subd. (i).) The trial court denied Defendants’ motion on two grounds: (1) the motion was untimely under applicable rules (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702), and (2) on the merits, the court declined to find that Jones acted arbitrarily, vexatiousl...

Timeliness of Motion “A notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court—including attorney’s fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court—must be 25 served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) The parties may stipulate to extend the time for filing the motion. (Id., subd. (b...

Defendants’ arguments are not well taken. Their initial motion—which sought only attorney fees—was timely filed. However, their amended motion—which added a request for expert fees in addition to attorney fees— was filed after the time provided in rule 3.1702(b)(1) expired. Recognizing the late filing was not a jurisdictional bar to the motion’s consideration (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d); see Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Association (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880 [recognizing tha...

It wasn’t capricious.” After the hearing, the court confirmed its tentative decision to deny Defendants’ motion for attorney fees, ruling as follows: “The amended motion was untimely as it raised grounds for recovery of attorney’s fees not set forth in the original motion. . . . The amended motion was filed after the time set forth under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702. There is no stipulation on file to expand the scope of the fees. Even if the amended motion was not untimely, the cou...

minal action in which a misdemeanor or infraction is charged in conjunction with a felony”\], 954.1 \[“\[i\]n cases in which two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses have been charged together in the same accusatory pleading”\], 1192.6, subd. (a) \[“\[i\]n each felony case in which the charges contained in the original accusatory pleading are amended or dismissed”\]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.200(a)(1) \[“\[a\] brief outline of the nature of the case, including...

41 than in state prison. (People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657, 664.) Defendant points out that felony offenders sentenced to county jail are not subject to parole. However, there is a presumption that a defendant sentenced to county jail will serve a portion of the sentence under mandatory supervision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.415(a).)16 Defendant asserts that defendants sentenced under section 1170, subdivision (h) might be eligible for home detention under section 1203.016, but t...

The offense in counts 1 to 4 permits only one sentence of 25 years to life (§ 288.7, subd. (a)). The two aggravating circumstances alleged in the amended information were later dismissed at the prosecutor’s request. The court imposed the middle term of 12 years on count 5, the maximum the court could impose without any proven aggravating circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(b) \[courts may only choose an upper term where the aggravating circumstances have been...

The trial court sentenced Wright to 36 years and four months to life. This total was the sum of 25 years to life for count 1 (pursuant to the Three Strikes Law); 10 years (the upper term) for the firearm enhancement on count 1; and 1 year 4 months on counts 2 and 3 (one third of the 2-year middle term, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes Law). Under subdivision (b)(2) of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, the court imposed the upper term of 10 years on the firearm enhancement because Wr...

The People argued Sanchez’s crimes were increasing in severity and his current convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and injury of a child’s parent were the most serious crimes yet. The People also contended Sanchez had never successfully completed probation. The People additionally asserted that under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421,[^3] there were several circumstances in aggravation: the crime involved the infliction of great bodily harm (rule 4.421(a)(1)); Sanchez was armed w...

s: (1) the crime involved great violence; great bodily harm, the threat of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; (2) the victim was particularly vulnerable; (3) the defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense; and (4) defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subds. (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(11), & (b)(1).) Baby K.’s Birth and E...

(a)(1)); criminal threats (count 3, § 422, subd. (a)); burglary in the second degree (count 4, §§ 459-460, subd. (b)); and brandishing an imitation firearm, a misdemeanor, (count 5, § 417.4.) The information alleged three aggravating factors as to counts 2 through 4: (1) That the offense involved great violence, great bodily harm or threat of great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (a)(1)); (2) That the defendant was armed with and used a weapon, including fake firearm and or a poc...

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ On March 24, 2024, the district attorney filed a felony complaint, alleging Serena Hernandez committed the crime of grand theft from an elder or dependent adult by a caretaker. (Pen. Code,[^1] § 368, subd. (e).) The complaint further alleged the victim was particularly vulnerable, within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3). On October 8, 2024, Hernandez waived her rights to a preliminary hearing and trial, a...

Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) The evidence in the record amply supports the court’s decision. As the court noted, Berger’s decision to open fire onto a group of young men constituted “gratuitous violence.” Burger shot Alex multiple times, including a fatal shot to his head. These acts leading to Alex’s murder was a crime that “involved great violence, great bodily harm.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).) Three additional victims suffered serious and/or multiple gunshot wounds that requi...

Code, § 207, subd. (a);[^1] count 1), and false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237; count 2). As to both counts, the amended information alleged that defendant committed the instant offenses while on bail (§ 12022.1). As to count 1, the information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) and the offense involved several aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), (b)).[^2] It was also alleged as to count 1 that defendant had 29 prior serious felony...

conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to *every* aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.” (*Id.* at p. 775.) In imposing the upper term on the robbery count, the trial court relied on four aggravating factors. Three were found true by the jury, but one was not: that appellant’s “criminal acts are increasing.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) \[aggravating circumstances include “\[t\]he defendant’s prior ...

“Judges may not assume the jury’s factfinding function for themselves, let alone purport to perform it using a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” (*Id*. at p. 834.) The error here was that Wright was entitled to, but did not receive (or waive), trial by jury on the aggravating factor of whether he had suffered “numerous” convictions in the past. (California Rules of Court, Rule 4.421(b)(2).) Citing *Erlinger*, the prosecution concedes error. The prosecution argues this error was ha...

(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) An upper term may be imposed based on a single, properly proven aggravating factor if, in the court’s discretion, that circumstance alone justifies a sentence exceeding the middle term. (*People v. Lynch* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 764.) Here, the trial court expressly stated that the upper term was based on defendant’s prior prison term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b).)[^1] According to the record, this aggravating circumstance “was what got \[the court\] to the high...

(See *People v. Carmony, supra*, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377 \[party attacking the judgment must clearly show abuse of discretion\].) The court was authorized to consider the “circumstances specific to the crime” in deciding whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety. (*Nazir v. Superior Court* (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 497; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) The evidence in the record amply supports the court’s decision. As the court noted, Berger’s decision to open fire o...

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) This law and these rules require a sentencing court imposing a determinate sentence consecutively to another determinate sentence imposed by a different court to pronounce a single aggregate term combining the sentences. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(a)(1); § 1170.1, subd. (a).) This requirement applies across counties. (See *People v. Brantley* (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 917, 920, 923 \[Lassen County sentencing court erred in failing to include Mendocino County offen...

655.) If a determinate term is imposed consecutive to a determinate term imposed previously in a different proceeding, the second sentencing court “must designate the longest single term as the principal term, which may displace a previously designated principal term.” (*In re Rodriguez* (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 952, 961 (*Rodriguez*); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(a).) Thus, in this circumstance, “the second court is empowered to modify a sentence previously imposed by a different court a...

Baker* (2002) 144 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1329.) However, the second court cannot disturb the discretionary sentencing choices of the first sentencing court, such as “the decision to impose \[the lower, middle, or upper term\], making counts in prior cases concurrent with or consecutive to each other, or … striking the punishment for an enhancement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(c); see *Reeves, supra,* 35 Cal.4th at p. 773; *Rodriguez,* at p. 960.) “This limitation reflects, in part, the commo...

. . , Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action. Thereafter, the Schwartzes filed a return, to which the Cohens filed a reply.2 2 Because the return does not contain a demurrer or a verified answer, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b)(1) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1089, the Cohens assert it should be stricken. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5 We invited the City of Los Angeles and the League of California Cities (coll...

The court stated that Kathleen’s counsel was “logged into the family law Zoom link,” but he was “in the wrong location.” The court said it would take a break and then re-call the case. During the break, Kathleen filed a reply brief in which she opposed Misty’s joinder to the action, observing that she did not comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 5.24(d)(1). When the court re-called the matter later in the afternoon, Kathleen’s counsel appeared and explained his offi...

Department also contacted the maternal grandmother and mother’s cousin, Nicole, and was provided phone numbers for two other unnamed maternal relatives. There is no indication the Department asked these maternal relatives whether T.R. had any Indian ancestry. The jurisdiction report noted only that “[o]n November 8, 2022, the Court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.” 2 California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) requires: “The petitioner must on an ongoing basis include i...

§ 1903(4).) In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent’s custody and care pursuant to Family Code section 7820 or 7822 or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether the child is, or might be, an Indian child. (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) Both the Probate Code and Family Code make clear that a court must det...

§ 1903(4).) In the context of a petition to free a minor from a parent’s custody and care pursuant to Family Code section 7820 or 7822 or Probate Code section 1516.5, the court, petitioner, and court-appointed investigator have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether the child is, or might be, an Indian child. (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).) Both the Probate Code and Family Code make clear that a court must det...

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) Under corresponding California law, the juvenile court and the child welfare agency have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding may be an Indian child. (*In re Dezi C.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (*Dezi C*.); § 224.2, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).) Section 224.2 creates three distinct inquiry duties: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal IC...

(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) \[adopting federal definitions\].) In every dependency proceeding, the agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child .…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a);[^6] see § 224.2, subd. (a); *In re W.B.* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 53; *In re Gabriel G.* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165.) The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child “can be di...

Further inquiry may be required by the Indian Child Welfare Act. Page 1 of + Farm Adopted for Mandatory Use Welfare & Institutions Cade, § 224.3; Judicial Council of Callfomia PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF INDIAN STATUS eee Family Cade, si 77{a); ICWA-020 [New January 1, 2008) Prabate Gade, § 1459.56); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.484 www.courtinio.ca.gov APPENDIX A-1 TOHONO O’ODHAM NATION OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL fr BO April 7, 2022 Tami A, Toumayan Attorney at Law PAMILYBUILDING 155 North River...

(*In re K.L.*, *supra*, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) We are not persuaded that the juvenile court erred as Mother suggests. The court made reference to the preponderance of the evidence standard, which we construe to have been regarding what was necessary for her to ultimately prevail on her modification petition. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D) \[petitioner bears burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence\].) The court recognized the question before it was whether to “...

Mother had not previously appeared for any hearing except the GAL hearing, and the court had never advised her it was sending notices to the Orange address. Under these circumstances, there is good cause to consider her appeal despite the failure to appeal the setting order. (See In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1241-1243; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b).) “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citation...

(a); 3 “The juvenile court’s power to appoint a guardian for a child who has been detained is governed by sections 360 and 366.26.” (In re Carlos E., supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.) Section 360 applies if the child’s parent waives reunification or family maintenance services and agrees to the guardianship. 15 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.620(d); see In re Carlos E., supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 1420 [discussing differences between dependency guardianships created in juvenile court versus proba...

Rules of Court, rule 5.700.) A custody and visitation order issued under section 362.4 is commonly referred to as an “‘exit order.’” (See, e.g*.*, *In re John W*. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 970 & fn. 13; *In re Cole Y*. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455.) Such exit orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700(a).) A juvenile court has “broad discretion” in fixing the terms of an ...

Pertinent Law** When “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile court on its own motion\[\] may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” (§ 362.4, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.) A custody and visitation order issued under section 362.4 is commonly referred to as an “‘exit order.’” (See, e.g*.*, *In re John W*. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 970 & fn. 13; *In ...

(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 68, 72 [“California law recognizes two types of guardianships pertaining to minor children governed by two separate statutory schemes.”].) Where, as here, a dependency guardianship has been granted to a relative, the juvenile court generally terminates dependency jurisdiction but retains jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the guardianship. (§ 366, subd. (a)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(a)(4); see In re Jacob P., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.) Although a...

egal guardianship that has been granted pursuant to Section 360 or 366.26 shall be held either in the juvenile court that retains jurisdiction over the guardianship, as authorized by Section 366.4, or the juvenile court in the county where the guardian and child currently reside, based on the best interests of the child, unless the termination is due to the emancipation or adoption of the child.” California Rules of Court, rule 5.740(d), provides in relevant part: “A petition to terminate a g...

and Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather (Grandfather) serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found that Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court, rule 5.2422 to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” So, the court removed Smith as A.F.’s attorney, appointed a “minor’s counsel” ...

Nothing in this section shall require a public guardian to base a request for compensation upon an hourly rate of service.”3 3 Section 2641 similarly authorizes conservators in general to petition the court for “just and reasonable” compensation for services rendered. Under California Rules of Court, rule 7.756, “[t]he court may consider the following nonexclusive factors in determining just and reasonable compensation for a conservator from the estate of the conservatee . . . : [¶] (1) The s...

ORDER GRANTING REQUESTS FOR PUBLICATION The Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the Western Center on Law and Poverty, BASTA, Inc., and the Public Good Law Center have requested that our opinion filed July 22, 2025, be certified for publication. It appears that our opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.l105(c). The request is GRANTED. The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports. SCOTT, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. SANCHEZ, J. [^1]: All u...

California Rules of Court, rule 8.200 authorizes the filing of “[p]arties’ briefs,” including the “appellant’s opening brief,” “respondent’s brief,” and appellant’s reply brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1)–(3).) “ ‘Appellant’ means the appealing party,” and “ ‘[r]espondent’ means the adverse party.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.10(1), (2).) A “ ‘[p]arty’ is a person appearing in an action.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.6(15).) Based on these rules, we conclude I-House is permitted ...

. . is without jurisdiction to issue a ruling that would bind Administrator Bewley . . . .” First, he argues that a “[r]espondent must . . . generally be both (1) a party of record; and (2) legally ‘aggrieved.’” Not so. An appellant must be aggrieved, but not a respondent; a respondent need only be “an adverse party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.10(2).) Next, he argues that he was not a named party below. In his view, the parties named as “the testate and intestate su...

Golden 4 We grant Brian’s unopposed request for judicial notice of this letter and otherwise deny his request for judicial notice. (People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 35, fn. 12 [judicially noticing letter from trial court clerk].) We deny his request to augment the record. 6 Eagle Ins. Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172 [same]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(5) [if envelope shows document was mailed or inmate delivered document to custodial officials for mailing within the pe...

Before the submission of this matter in this court, Anush passed away for purpose of appearing in this appeal and waiving oral argument. The trial court appointed Robert as the special administrator of Anush’s estate. We granted a motion to substitute Robert for Anush as her personal representative. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.36(a).) 2 FACTS The decedent, Layla Boyajian, was married to her ex-husband, Mike Boyajian, for 50 years. They had four children, including ...

The Joint Petition was supported by a number of declarations from Anne’s family (including her stepson, Jonathan S.), friends, medical personnel, and other individuals. Essentially, it alleged Anne was being unduly influenced and 1 We refer to Anne and her stepson, Jonathan S., by first names and last initials. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(2), (11).) 2 possibly mistreated by her housemate, Nadine Brownen. It also claimed Brownen attempted to orchestrate a sale of Anne’s home. Anne, ...

in case No. B339596. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. BENDIX, J. We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J. [^1]: As a person seeking protection from alleged domestic violence, we refer to Nicholas A. initially by his first name and last initial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1)), and thereafter by his first name only for ease of reference. We do the same for Sandra V. No disrespect is intended. [^2]: Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family C...

In the interest of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J. We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J. M. KIM, J. [^1]: Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code. [^2]: As a person seeking protection from alleged domestic violence, we refer to Manuel Q. initially by his first name and last initial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1)), and thereafter by his first name only for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended. [^3]: The couns...

& Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq. 2) (Elder Abuse Act), Susannah filed a petition on behalf of George for a * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts C and D of the Discussion. 1 We refer to the protected person, George S., by his first name and last initial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90.) So as not to defeat the objective of anonymity, we likewise refer to persons who share his last name by their ...

& Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq. 2) (Elder Abuse Act), Susannah filed a petition on behalf of George for a * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts C and D of the Discussion. 1 We refer to the protected person, George S., by his first name and last initial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90.) So as not to defeat the objective of anonymity, we likewise refer to persons who share his last name by their ...

Jackson* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1208; see *People v. Washington* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 27.) [^3]: “Unspecified references to dates are to dates in 2008.” [^4]: For the sake of clarity, the Parrotts will be referred to by their first names. For privacy, additional persons are referred to by their first names. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90.) No disrespect is intended. [^5]: As to both counts, it was alleged both appellant and Hoffman were 16 years of age or older when they committed the ...

was based on rulings granting motions for judgment on the pleadings and the voluntary dismissal of another defendant, not the tentative summary judgment ruling that the court withdrew. But giving the notice of appeal a liberal construction, as we must, and because SLS does not claim it was misled or prejudiced by the inaccuracy of the description in this notice of appeal, we deem it sufficient. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) \[“The notice of appeal must be liberally construed.”\]; *K....

argues that, because the trial court entered judgment awarding Myers’ unpaid overtime compensation, attorney fees were mandatory and were thus “effectively an integral part of the judgment” even though the judgment did not mention them. It cites no legal authority to support its argument, and we are aware of none. QCH also cites the rule that a “notice of appeal must be liberally construed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) This is true, but no amount of liberal construction would all...

Again, that included Bewley. Bewley also argues that Humphrey did not name him in the notice of appeal. However, “‘there is no provision of law requiring the notice of appeal to be addressed to the opposite party.’” (Balkins v. Norrby (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 413, 415; see generally Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100.) Humphrey did serve the notice of appeal on Bewley. Finally, he argues that he made only a special appearance below. In part VII, post, we will hold that he actually made a general app...

. . .” (Id., subd. (d).) Under Rule 8.104, a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the service of the notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).)22 Defendants here served notice of entry of judgment on October 22, 2018, so time to appeal from this judgment expired on December 21, 2018, 60 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Defendants filed their initial section 16701 fee motion (seeking ...

Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.) 8 After we notified the Law Firm that the order granting summary judgment was not appealable, the Law Firm filed a response attaching the June 24, 2022 judgment. We consider the Law Firm’s premature notice of appeal a valid “notice of appeal filed after judgment is rendered but before it is entered” and treat the notice as filed immediately after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1); see Silva v. Langford (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 710, 715, fn. 6; Val...

22 Rule 8.108, not applicable here, extends the time to appeal under specified circumstances, for example, if any party files and serves a motion for new trial, a motion to vacate judgment, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion to reconsider. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(a)-(e).) 26 Defendants contend the trial court lacked authority to deny the amended motion as untimely because they filed their initial motion within the rule’s deadline, which is not jurisdiction...

ocation?” Haggerty may be cited for “persuasive value,” and “for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (Haggerty v. Thornton, S271483, Supreme Ct. Mins., Dec. 22, 2021; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.115(e) & Advisory Com. com.) 9 reasoned that because “the trust does ...

in the case; (2) “Circle K received the unfair benefit of taking a ‘sneak peek’ at Limon’s reply arguments in the first appeal so it could adjust its respondent’s brief in the second appeal”; and (3) “Circle K now wants to dismiss this first appeal so 7 Limon has incorporated, by reference, the entire Appellant’s Appendix filed in appellate case No. F082289 into appellate case No. F082929. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b)(2).) 9. the Court only considers its modified arguments.” Circle...

he California Rules of Court require an appellant who elects to proceed by appendix to include, among other things, any document filed in the trial court which ‘is necessary for proper consideration of the issues, including … any item that the appellant should reasonably assume the respondent will rely on.’ ” (*Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc.* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 643; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(b).) “Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of ...

City of Los Angeles* (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 364, 373-374 and *B.F. Schlesinger, supra,* 103 Cal.App. at pages 199 to 200. Again, neither case contained the type of clear and certain provisions that are in the prime contract. [^17]: The District contends Suffolk did not timely identify this issue pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.130(a)(2) and we should not consider the issue. Rule 8.130(a)(2) provides: “If the appellant designates less than all the testimony, the notice must state t...

. GOORVITCH, J.[^5] [^1]: Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code. [^2]: Our record contains no opposition to respondent’s motion. [^3]: The subject of appellant’s ex parte motion is unknown because his moving papers are not in our record. [^4]: Appellant did not seek a settled statement as evidence of the oral proceedings, if they were not transcribed by a court reporter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) [^5]: \*** Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County assigne...

[^2]: Our record contains no opposition to respondent’s motion. [^3]: The subject of appellant’s ex parte motion is unknown because his moving papers are not in our record. [^4]: Appellant did not seek a settled statement as evidence of the oral proceedings, if they were not transcribed by a court reporter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) [^5]: **\*** Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitu...

[^2]: Our record contains no opposition to respondent’s motion. [^3]: The subject of appellant’s ex parte motion is unknown because his moving papers are not in our record. [^4]: Appellant did not seek a settled statement as evidence of the oral proceedings, if they were not transcribed by a court reporter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) [^5]: **\*** Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitu...

Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3), provides that “an order granting a motion to quash service of summons” is appealable. (See also Templeton 4 Bewley now describes this as a “special[] appear[ance].” However, he did not label it a special appearance at the time. 5 Humphrey sought and obtained a settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.) However, it did not provide any information not already in the minute order. 5 Action Committee v. County of San Luis Obisp...

. . Carpenter 20 and/or Gloria . . .” The court further sustained the demurrer to the petition, without leave to amend. On August 17, 2021, nonappointed counsel, on behalf of themselves, Thomas, Carpenter, and Gloria appealed the orders of the probate court. Subsequently, this court dismissed the appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 8.140, for failure to timely deposit costs for preparing the record. Appellants’ motion to vacate the dismissal was denied as to Thomas, Carpenter, and no...

. . .” (Corp. Code, § 1702, subd. (a).) [^4]: The signed dismissal order was omitted from the clerk’s transcript, but Scott submitted it to this Court on August 22, 2024, in response to our notice that he failed to attach a signed judgment to his civil case information statement. On our own motion, we order the record augmented to include the signed dismissal order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) [^5]: As the trial court recognized, its inherent powers and Government Code section...

# DISCUSSION ## **We Augment the Record To Include Sandra’s and Nicholas’s Respective DVRO Requests, and We Deny Sandra’s Request for Judicial Notice** As a preliminary matter, we note Sandra’s and Nicholas’s DVRO requests do not appear in the clerk’s transcripts. We exercise our discretion to augment the record to include these two requests, along with their respective attachments. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) \[“At any time, on . . . its own motion, the reviewing court may ...

Ashbrook timely appealed from the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. MOTIONS Ashbrook has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of a minute order entered on June 4, 2021, from the hearing on Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion. Ashbrook’s motion to augment the record is unopposed. The motion is appropriate (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)), and we grant it. Jonathan has filed a request for judicial notice of these five documents: (1) minute order entered on May 3, 2021; (2) minute or...

The siblings omitted this stipulation from the appellate record and request that we take judicial notice of it under California Rules of Court, rule 8.252. The face of the stipulation indicates that it was either filed or lodged in the superior court. Thus, we construe the siblings’ motion as one to augment the record under California Rules of Court, rule 8.155, which we grant. This stipulation states in relevant part, “The administrator, on behalf of the estate, does not plan to participate ...

The siblings omitted this stipulation from the appellate record and request that we take judicial notice of it under California Rules of Court, rule 8.252. The face of the stipulation indicates that it was either filed or lodged in the superior court. Thus, we construe the siblings’ motion as one to augment the record under California Rules of Court, rule 8.155, which we grant. This stipulation states in relevant part, “The administrator, on behalf of the estate, does not plan to participate ...

I-House responds that it was permitted to submit a respondent’s brief in this appeal because it is a “party” within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 1.6. Alternatively, I-House moves for leave to present the same arguments in an amicus curiae brief. California Rules of Court, rule 8.200 authorizes the filing of “[p]arties’ briefs,” including the “appellant’s opening brief,” “respondent’s brief,” and appellant’s reply brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1)–(3).) “ ‘Appella...

Alternatively, I-House moves for leave to present the same arguments in an amicus curiae brief. California Rules of Court, rule 8.200 authorizes the filing of “[p]arties’ briefs,” including the “appellant’s opening brief,” “respondent’s brief,” and appellant’s reply brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1)–(3).) “ ‘Appellant’ means the appealing party,” and “ ‘[r]espondent’ means the adverse party.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.10(1), (2).) A “ ‘[p]arty’ is a person appearing in an actio...

7 Although T. B. frames the issue as a failure to exercise discretion, her arguments challenging the trial court s good cause findings are actually directed at findings that it made in the exercise of its discretion. We thus 7 To the extent T. B. s opening brief contains loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in an appropriate heading, her opening brief fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) (further undesignated rule references are to the Cali...

Thompson’s claim was based on the city’s substantial improvement determination, it was barred for failure to obtain timely administrative mandate review. The city now argues that her claim based on work stoppages and revocation is barred for the same reason, but does so in a footnote without any further explanation or authority. The argument is not properly presented and we need not address it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); *Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automo...

(*Jameson v. Desta* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) The appellant bears the burden to show error with an adequate record and to support any points made with citations to the record. (*Id.* at p. 609 \[“ ‘ “\[I\]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ ”\]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) \[“Support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the re...

That issue is beyond the scope of the grounds Rhonda raises on appeal. (See Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 \[“We will not develop the appellants’ arguments for them,” refusing to consider a “passing reference” in the briefs to issues without argument or citation to authority\]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) \[brief must state each point under a separate heading and support each point by argument and authority\].) We merely conclude that the...

That issue is beyond the scope of the grounds Rhonda raises on appeal. (See *Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd.* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 \["We will not develop the appellants' arguments for them," refusing to consider a "passing reference" in the briefs to issues without argument or citation to authority\]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) \[brief must state each point under a separate heading and support each point by argument and authority\].) We merely conclude that t...

That issue is beyond the scope of the grounds Rhonda raises on appeal. (See *Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd.* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 \[“We will not develop the appellants’ arguments for them,” refusing to consider a “passing reference” in the briefs to issues without argument or citation to authority\]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) \[brief must state each point under a separate heading and support each point by argument and authority\].) We merely conclude that t...

That issue is beyond the scope of the grounds Rhonda raises on appeal. (See *Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd.* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 \["We will not develop the appellants' arguments for them," refusing to consider a "passing reference" in the briefs to issues without argument or citation to authority\]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) \[brief must state each point under a separate heading and support each point by argument and authority\].) We merely conclude that t...

(See City of Calexico v. Bergeson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 180, 189.) And even if we had jurisdiction, Michael and Joseph forfeited the argument by failing to support it in their briefs with any argument or citation to authority. (See Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 881; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [briefs must support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority].) And, even if we considered the argument on the merits, it would fail for the same reason...

The Shamtoubi trust Tale Shamtoubi and her husband, Iraj Shamtoubi, 2 were married for nearly 60 years before Iraj passed away in 2016. In 1994, Tale and Iraj created the Shamtoubi Trust, serving as joint trustees during their lifetimes, with the trust’s property used for their benefit. 1 Preliminarily, we note that Meiri has failed to provide the required statement of facts (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)). The following summary has nonetheless been gleaned from our independent rev...

Sanction orders or judgments of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less against a party or an attorney for a party may be reviewed on an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition for an extraordinary writ. ( 904.1.) 18 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 687.) In her appellate briefing, Luo failed to follow California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B), which requires her to explain why the orders being a...

ermination that Gutierrez and the decedent had the prior personal relationship required by section 21362 for Gutierrez not to be a “care custodian” for purposes of section 21380. Also, the briefs filed by both sides do not comply with the Rules of Court. The Rules require briefs to support any reference to a matter in the record with a citation to a place in the record where the matter appears. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(c).) Each of the briefs filed in this appeal omit citations ...

(*Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles* (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776-777.) It remains an appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (*Ibid.*) “It is the responsibility of the appellant . . . to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); *Badie v. Bank of America* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 \[\].) When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a ...